1. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," World Politics 35 (October 1982): 1-24.

2. On the general connection between ritual and the construction of political relationships, see David L Kertzer, Ritual, Politics and Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

3. These dynasties were the al-Murabitin (Almoravids: 1069-1147); the al-Muwahhidun (Almohads: 1147-1269), and the Banu Marin (Merinids: 1258-1420). Their successive empires spanned the length of Morocco and large parts of the Iberian Peninsula and stretched across the breadth of the Maghrib. Berber dynasts presided over a centralized state apparatus, developed an administrative corps, and promoted a celebrated educational and judicial system. Fez, home to Ibn-Khaldun and Ibn-Rushd (Averroës) was renowned as a center of learning, and the architecturally exquisite residential colleges surrounding the Qarawiyin (Kairouine) mosque were monuments to Islamic scholarship, as well as to the rulers who commissioned them.

4. Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 208.

5. Ibid., 209.

6. Combs-Schilling, Sacred Performances , 157-74.

7. Ibid., 180.

8. See Jacques Berque, Ulemas, fondateurs, et insurges du Maghreb (Paris: Sindbad, 1982), 81, 122-23, 149.

9. Abun Nasr, History of the Maghrib , 227-30.

10. Berque, Ulemas, fondateurs, et insurges , 266-67.

11. Ibid., 235 and, more generally, 221-32.

12. Combs-Schilling, Sacred Performances , 249.

13. Ibid., 277, citing Charles-André Julien, Le Maroc face aux impérialismes (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1978), 90.

14. Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 81.

15. I. W. Zartman, "King Hassan's New Morocco," in The Political Economy of Morocco , ed. I. W. Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1987), 1-58.

16. Mark A. Tessler discusses this image of Morocco in "Image and Reality in the Moroccan Political Economy," in Political Economy of Morocco , ed. Zartman (cited in preceding note), 218-42.

17. Omar Bendourou treats the general relationship between monarch and parties in Le Pouvoir exécutif au Maroc depuis l'indépendence (Paris: Publisud, 1986).

18. These parties are often identified as the parliamentary opposition. They include the Istiqlal Party, the USFP, the OADP, the PPS, and the very small remnant of the UNFP.

19. Aherdane in turn formed a new party, the National Popular Movement, which won 14 of the 222 directly elected seats in the June 1993 parliamentary elections, as compared to the MP's 33.

20. In the first decade after independence, ministers from outside the royal coalition occasionally succceeded in depriving the king of a policy victory, but more commonly they got only enough rope to hang themselves. Unempowered, but seeming responsible to the electorate, many ultimately resigned. See I. William Zartman, Morocco: Problems of New Power (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), 208, and John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1970), 218.

For concerns underlying more contemporary ministerial appointments, see Mustapha Sehimi, "Les Elites ministérielles au Maroc: Constantes et variables," in Le Maroc actuel: Une Modernisation au miroir de la tradition? ed. Jean-Claude Santucci (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1992), 209-31.

21. Alain Claisse, 'Le Makhzen aujourd'hui," in Le Maroc Actuel , ed. Santucci (cited in preceding note), 296.

22. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful , 262-63.

23. Frank H. Braun, "Morocco: Anatomy of a Palace Revolution That Failed," International Journal of Middle East Studies 9, no. 1 (1978): 63-72, and John Damis, "The Moroccan Political Scene," Middle East Journal 26 (Winter 1972): 25-36.

24. Combs-Schilling, Sacred Performances , 306-9.

25. Constitutional changes allowed a greater proportion of parliamentary seats to be filled by direct election. Hassan II's disdain for parliament is well known; cf. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful , 157. With a certain amount of arrogance, he has frequently reiterated the basic position. In a speech to parliament in 1978 cited by Mohamed Tozy, he claimed that at that point his role as Prince of the Faithful made him equally responsible for executive and legislative functions of government (Tozy "Représentation / Intercession: Les Enjeux de pouvoir dans les 'champs politiques désamorcés' au Maroc," Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord 28 [1989]: 157). To European audiences he put it differently. It is generally recognized, he told French journalist Jean Daniel, that modernity requires the efficiency of a presidential regime ("Hassan II s'explique," Le Nouvel Observateur , 18 December 1989.) Also see Bendourou, Le Pouvoir executif .

26. Zartman, "King Hassan's New Morocco," in Political Economy of Morocco , ed. id., 6-18.

27. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful , 220.

28. Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 347; cited in Reinhart Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), 340.

29. In June 1991, plans to publish an exposé of Moroccan finances won Moumen Diouri expulsion from France to Gabon, under a little-used French legal procedure and despite earlier recognition of his status as a political refugee. Following public outcry, Diouri was returned to France a month later. The book was eventually published, and in it Diouri makes prominent note of Article 168 of the Moroccan Penal Code, forbidding investigation into the finances and private affairs of the king and the extended royal family (Moumen Diouri, A qui apartient le Maroc? [Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1992,], 19).

30. Will D. Swearingen, Moroccan Mirages: Agrarian Dreams and Deceptions, 1912-1986 (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1987).

31. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful , 150.

32. See Tessler, "Image and Reality," and Gilles Perrault, Notre ami le roi (Paris: Gallimard, 1990).

33. In theory the constitutional reforms of 1992 altered this by giving the prime minister powers to appoint the ministerial cabinet, although the King retained power to appoint the prime minister. In practice, after the 1993 elections, Hassan II made direct offers of ministries to Kutla parties, apparently bypassing the prime minister.

34. The patronage system in Morocco has been extensively described. See John Waterbury, "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime," World Politics 25 (July 1973): 533-55, and Kenneth Brown, "Changing Forms of Patronage in a Moroccan City," in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies , ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Duckworth, 1977), 309-27. Also see Alain Claisse, "Makhzen Traditions and Administrative Channels," in The Political Economy of Morocco ,, ed. I. W. Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1987), 51.

35. "Par-delà la fête royale," Jeune Afrique , no. 1380 (17 June 1987).

36. "Subventions pour l'opposition au Maroc," Jeune Afrique , no. 1357 (7 January 1987).

37. See Driss Basri, L'Agent d'autorité: Mémoire du diplome d'études supérieures (Rabat: Imprimerie royale, 1975), and interview with the labor leader Mohammed Noubi Amaoui, "On ne négocie pas avec le roi," Jeune Afrique , no 1566 (2-8 January 1991).

38. Claisse, "Makhzen Traditions," in Political Economy of Morocco , ed. Zartman, 54. The Ministry of the Interior has taken over an office of rural affairs from the Ministry of Housing, and since 1985 Driss Basri has also held the Ministry of Information porfolio.

39. Remy Leveau, Le Fellah marocain, défenseur du trône (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale de science politique, 1985), 54. Also see Claisse, "Le Makhzen aujourd'hui."

40. Harold Nelson, ed., Morocco: A Country Study , U.S. Government Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 357-69.

41. Many Moroccan Arabs, and in particular the urban elite, have historically viewed themselves as culturally superior to the Berbers, and in a society where

bonds of lineage are primordial, cultural identification may be strong. The importance of ethnic identity can easily be overstated in the Moroccan case, however, as numerous authors have argued. See, e.g., Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 220; Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa (London: Lexington Books, 1972); and Lawrence Rosen, "The Social and Conceptual Framework of Arab-Berber Relations in Central Morocco," in Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society , ed. Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, and Lawrence Rosen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 155-74.

42. Claisse, "Makhzen Traditions," in Political Economy of Morocco , ed. Zartman, 39.

43. "Moulay Ahmed Alaoui: Le Ministre anti-ministre," Jeune Afrique , no. 1417 (2 March 1988).

44. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Moroccans—Citizens or Subjects? A People at the Crossroads," New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 26 (Fall 1993): 63-105.

45. The March 23 Movement derived its name from the 1965 riots in Casablanca that resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency and suspension of the constitution.

46. The PPS claims to have about 40,000 members.

47. "Les 'Gauchistes' de Sa Majesté," Jeune Afrique , no. 1306 (15 January 1986), and "Un Parti pas commes les autres," Jeune Afrique , no. 1364 (26 February 1987).

48. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful , 218-19.

49. Ibid., 295.

50. "Maroc: Les Révélations explosives du 'Fqih' Basri," Jeune Afrique , no. 1383 (8 July 1987).

51. See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Briefing on Morocco (Nottingham: Russell Press, 1977). There were eight major trials in July-August 1976 alone.

52. Perrault, Notre ami le roi , 153.

53. Ibid., 198-205, and Amnesty International, Briefing , 4.

54. Saïd Ihraï, Pouvoir et influence: Etat, partis et politique étrangère au Maroc (Rabat: Edino, 1986), 190-98.

55. USFP leaders publicly protested the king's endorsement of a proposal that emerged at the 1981 OAU summit in Nairobi, calling for a referendum on the disputed territory. They argued that the Sahara's link to Morocco was not debatable. Over the past ten years the Palace has approved a series of UN-negotiated terms, but without apparent enthusiasm. John Damis has discussed the Moroccan position in several articles, including most recently "The U. N. Settlement Plan for the Western Sahara: Problems and Prospects," Middle East Policy 1 (1992): 36-46." Also see "The Western Sahara: The Referendum Process in Danger. A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992).

56. Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights, "Morocco Briefing Memo" (photocopied, n.d. [c. 1984]), 51.

57. "On s'en sortirait créait son partie: Interview avec Mohamed Elyazghi," Jeune Afrique , no. 1728 (17-14 February 1994).

58. See "Les 'Gauchistes' de Sa Majesté."

59. "Le Procès des intégristes de Casablanca: Treize des soixante et onze accusés sont condamnés à mort," Le Monde , 2 August 1984.

60. "Le Procès des intégristes de Casablanca: Deux observateurs français protestent contre 'la disproportion du réquisitoire,'" Le Monde , 27 July 1984.

61. "Dix-neuf intégristes condamnés à perpétuité à Marrakech," Jeune Afrique , no. 1296 (6 November 1985). Enaamani led a group called "the Moudjahidin Movement" until his disappearance in September 1985. According to friends, he was "picked up" while living in France; followers of Muti claimed he was the victim of internal squabbles. Also see Henry Munson, Jr., "Morocco's Fundamentalists," Government and Opposition 26 (1991): 331-44.

62. "Le Temps de la clémence," Jeune Afrique , no. 1602 (11-17 September 1991).

63. Several arrests were made, but the security forces apparently did not intervene to stop the attacks. By contrast to the death sentences handed out to Islamists engaged in political protest in 1984, Islamists convicted of civil crimes resulting in death received penalities ranging from only six months to four years. See "23 Injured, 130 Arrested in University Clashes," FBIS-NES-91-211 (31 October 1991), and La Lettre de l'ASDHOM , no. 24 (20 November 1991).

64. Hassan II's own views on Islamism were made clear in an interview with Jean Daniel, "Je ne laisserai pas l'intégrisme déformer l'islam," Le Nouvel Observateur , 28 March-3 April 1986.

65. Amnesty International publications have covered these issues extensively. See the annual Amnesty International Report (London: AI Publications), 1978-92, as well as reports specific to Morocco: Briefing on Morocco (1977); Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Kingdom of Morocco (1982); Torture in Morocco (1986); Human Rights Violations in Garde-à-Vue Detention (1990); " Disappearances" of People of Western Saharan Origin and Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (1990); and Morocco: A Pattern of Political Imprisonment, "Disappearances" and Torture (1991).

66. Mustapha Sehimi, "Depuis un an . . . le Maroc," Grand Maghreb , no. 55 (2 February 1987): 45-46.