1. In the historical scholarship on early Soviet foreign relations, works on relations between Russia and Germany predominate. Germany was important both to the revolutionary expectations of the Bolsheviks and to their efforts to break out of diplomatic and commercial isolation. But Germany did not have the singular importance one might assume from the large number of works devoted to Soviet-German relations listed in Robert H. Johnston, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1918-1945: A Guide to Research and Research Materials (Wilmington, Del.: 1991), 155-60. The accessibility of archival sources from Germany before similar sources became available in England, France, and Russia permitted an extensive investigation of Soviet-German relations. A significant portion of the work of E. H. Carr for this period is devoted to Soviet-German relations, for example, The Interregnum, 1923-1924 (New York: 1954), chaps. 5, 7, 9, and Socialism in One Country , 3: 46-62. Martin Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik: Stresemanns Russlandpolitik in der Locarno Ära (Bremen: 1971), 29-42, achieved a breakthrough toward a fuller understanding of both Soviet and German policy. Gunter Rosenfeld's Sowjetrussland und Deutschland, 1917-1922 and Sowjetunion und Deutschland, 1922-1933 (Cologne: 1984) are based on archival sources in the former Soviet Union and the former German Democratic Republic and on printed sources published in German, Russian, and English. Although the work utilizes "bourgeois" as well as "socialist" scholarship, it sustains a pervasive Marxist-Leninist interpretation. The Soviet work in the field is A. A. Akhtamzian, Rapallskaia politika: sovetsko-germskie diplomatichoskie otnosheniia v 1922-1932 gg (Moscow: 1974). The author's glasnost-era publications based on unpublished archival materials are significant contributions to scholarship: "Sovetsko-Germanskie ekonomicheskie otnosheniia v 1922-1932 gg,'' Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1988:4): 42-56, and "Voennoe sotrudnichestvo SSSR i Germanii v 1920-1933 gg," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1990:5): 3-24.

2. Kurt Rosenbaum, Community of Fate: German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1922-1928 (Syracuse, N.Y.: 1965) demonstrates the personal relationship between Brockdorff and Chicherin. So too does Timothy Edward O'Connor, Diplomacy and Revolution: G. V. Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930 (Ames, Iowa: 1988), 95-96 (hereafter cited as Chicherin ).

3. Brockdorff-Rantzau quoted in Valeri A. Shishkin, "The USSR and Western Countries in the Mid-1920s. An Experience of Political and Economic Relations in Connection with de jure Recognition," in Contact or Isolation? ed. John Hiden and Aleksander Loit (Stockholm: 1991), 110.

4. The torture of Krestinskii was established juridically in 1957 during "the Khrushchev thaw," but it was revealed publicly in the USSR only during glasnost : See N. V. Popov, "Byl i ostaius' kommunistom," in Otkryvaia novye stranitsy , ed. Akhmed A. Iskenderov (Moscow: 1989), 244-51.

5. Helmut Grieser, "Die Rapallo-Politik in sowjetischer Sicht: Zur Beurteilung der deutschen Aussenpolitik 1922-1932 in der zeitgenöss-ischen sowjetischen Presse," in Historisch-politische Streiflichter: Geschichtliche Beiträge zur Gegenwart , ed. Kurt Jürgensen and Reimer Hansen (Neumünster: 1971), 159-68; and Die Sowjetpresse über Deutschland in Europa 1922-1932. Revision von Versailles und Rapallo-Politik in sowjetischer Sicht (Stuttgart: 1970). Also, Klaus Hildebrand, Das Deutsche Reich und die Sowjetunion im internationalen System, 1918-1932. Legitimität oder Revolution? (Wiesbaden: 1977), 9-15.

6. On the Ruhr occupation, see the works of Denise Artaud, Jacques Bariety, Walter McDougall, Charles Maier, Hermann Rupieper, Stephen Schuker, and Marc Trachtenberg discussed in Jon Jacobson, "Strategies of French Foreign Policy after World War I," Journal of Modern History 55 (1983): 82-83, 89. Contemporary Soviet reactions are explained in Eichwede, Revolution und Internationale Politik , 154-75.

7. For the Central Executive Committee's condemnation of the Ruhr occupation, 13 January 1923, see Soviet Documents , 1: 368-70. For the Soviet warning to Poland, see Izvestiia , 21 January 1923, in Xenia Eudin and Harold H. Fischer, eds., Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford, Calif.: 1957), no. 55. For the possibility of renewed intervention, see press interview by Chicherin in Manchester Guardian , 24 December 1923, Soviet Documents , 1: 422. For the report on the Soviet diplomatic offensive, see speech by Kamenev to the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR, SRW , no. 78. See Wolfgang Ruge, Die Stellungsnahme der Sowjetunion gegen die Besetzung des Ruhrgebiets: zur Geschichte der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen von Januar bis September 1923 (Berlin: 1962), 32-59, for the fullest scholarly discussion.

8. For the "German October," see Angress, Stillborn Revolution , chaps. 11-13, especially 394-405 (decision and preparation), 319, 365-69 (hesitations of Radek and Brandler), and 417-20 (military provisions).

9. This was the objective of the "Schlageter line" strategy devised by Radek and presented to the Third ECCI Plenum on 12 June 1923: See Möller, Karl Radek in Deutschland , no. 31. Discussion in Angress, Stillborn Revolution , 327-50; Eichwede, Revolution und Internationale Politik , 38-52; and Warren Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist (Stanford, Calif.: 1970), 119-23.

10. Angress, Stillborn Revolution , 378, 398.

11. Kuusinen, Before and after Stalin , 63.

12. Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology , 159-60, and "Russia and Europe," 64-66.

13. The apology was made for a raid by the Berlin police on the Soviet Trade Delegation in May 1924—"the Bozenhardt incident": See Rosenbaum, Community of Fate , 87-112; O'Connor, Engineer of Revolution , 281-86.

14. For British recognition, see Resolution of the Second Congress of Soviets, 2 February 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 422-23; for the note from Rakovskii to MacDonald, 8 February 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 426-27; for interview by Litvinov in Pravda , 14 February 1924, Soviet Documents , 427-29; and Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Precarious Truce: Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1924-27 (Cambridge and New York: 1977), 7-13.

15. Shishkin, "The USSR and Western Countries," 109.

16. For the de jure recognitions of 1924, see Carr, Interregnum , 243-53.

17. Francis Conte, Un révolutionnaire-diplomate: Christian Rakovski. L'Union soviétique et l'Europe, 1922-1941 (Paris and New York: 1978), credits Rakovskii's "personal skill" with winning for the USSR the maximum concessions possible in the negotiations with both Britain and France. The English translation of Conte's work— Christian Rakovski (1873-1941): A Political Biography (Boulder, Colo. and New York: 1989)—"does not do justice to the competent analysis of the original French version," as Michael Carley has stated in a review published in International History Review 12 (1990): 604. Gus Fagan, ed., Christian Rakovsky: Selected Writings on Opposition in the USSR 1923-30 (London: 1980), 35-45, briefly sketches Rakovskii's career as a diplomat as well as his role in Bolshevik intraparty politics. Rakovskii was the number-two man in the Trotsky opposition, and he spoke for Trotsky at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927. For sixty years thereafter his name was expunged from the record of Soviet foreign relations. This situation began to change in May 1988 at a discussion of Soviet history of the 1920s held under the auspices of the leading Soviet historical journal, Voprosy istorii . There V. A. Shishkin, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, stated that the reinclusion of Rakovskii in the history of Soviet diplomacy would be one of the most significant steps that could be taken toward ending the prolonged depersonalization ( obezlichivanie ) of the history of Soviet foreign policy. A move in this direction was taken by Dimiter Stanischev, in "Khristian Rakovsky: His Life and Work," International Affairs (Moscow) (1989:1): 90-95. Written by the secretary of the CC of the Bulgarian Communist Party, this work is a glasnost -era tribute to "an honest and selfless man, a well-educated Marxist devoted to the cause of the revolution, an associate of Lenin in the bitter struggle to found, consolidate, and develop the Soviet state." See also N. A. Paniev, "Bolgarskii revoliutsioner i sovetskii polpred," in Otkryvaia novye stranitsy , ed. A. A. Iskenderov (Moscow: 1989), 278-80.

18. For Chicherin's telegram to Paris welcoming recognition by France, 28 October 1924, see Soviet Documents , 1: 473-75. The archives of the French Foreign Ministry have yet to be used extensively for the study of Franco-Soviet relations during the 1920s, but see Michael Jabara Carley, "From Revolution to Dissolution: The Quai d'Orsay, the Banque Russo-Asiatique, and the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1917-1926," International History Review 12 (1990): 721-61. Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Les relations franco-soviétiques, 1917-1924 (Paris: 1981) argues that French policy was inspired by considerations of grand diplomatic strategy—the fear of a German-Russian alliance and an unwillingness not to follow the British lead—rather then by economic interests. Similarly, Kalervo Hovi, "The French Alliance Policy 1917-1927: A Change of Mentality," in Contact or Isolation? ed. Hiden and Loit, 93-99, contends that anti-Bolshevik ideology was not an important consideration in French foreign policy after the autumn of 1920, policymakers being overcome by a concern for security against Germany.

19. Stuart R. Schram, "Christian Rakovskij et le premier rapprochement franco-soviétique," Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique 1 (1960): 214-17; hereafter cited as "Rapprochement franco-soviétique."

20. Schram, "Rapprochement franco-soviétique," 230.

21. Report by Stalin at the Central Committee Courses for Secretaries of Uezd Party Committees, 17 June 1924, in Josef Stalin, Works (Moscow: 1952), 6: 248.

22. For the Anglo-Soviet Conference, 14 April-12 August 1924, see DBFP , ser. 1, v. 25, ch. 3. For the speech by Rakovskii, 14 April 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 441-47; for press interviews by Rakovskii, 26 April and 1 June 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 449-52; for the draft text of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, 8 August 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 453-59, and DBFP , ser. 1, v. 25, no. 293. Also, Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 13-32; Conte, Rakovski , 120-32; David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London: 1977), 361-63; and Shishkin, "The USSR and Western Countries," 106-107.

23. This is the standard interpretation. Compare the counterargument in Andrew J. Williams, Labour and Russia: The Attitude of the Labour Party to the USSR, 1924-34 (Manchester and New York: 1989), 13-16, which states that MacDonald did attach great importance to the meetings; he truly was busy with other duties, and Ponsonby was the best-suited person with whom to entrust the work of the conference.

24. Speech by Chicherin to the special plenary session of the Moscow Soviet, 20 August 1924, SRW , no. 94; report by Chicherin to the Central Executive Committee, 18 October 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 466.

25. For the Dawes Plan, see Jon Jacobson, "The Reparation Settlement of 1924," in Konsequenzen der Inflation , ed. Gerald D. Feldman et al. (Berlin: 1989), 79-108.

26. Jürgen Spenz, Die diplomatische Vorgeschichte des Beitritts Deutsch-lands zum Völkerbund, 1924-1926. Ein Beitrag zur Aussenpolitik der Weimarer Republik (Göttingen, Berlin, Frankfurt, Zürich: 1966), 33-34; Christoph M. Kimmich, Germany and the League of Nations (Chicago: 1976), 54-61.

27. Report by Chicherin to the Central Executive Committee, 18 October 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 463.

28. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald , 364-78. Allegedly under pressure from the left wing of the Labour Party, MacDonald persuaded the attorney general to drop the charges lodged under the Incitement to Mutiny Act against J. R. Campbell, the temporary editor of the official organ of the British Communist Party (CPGB), the Worker's Weekly . Campbell had allowed publication of an article calling on soldiers in the British army to let it be known that they would not turn their guns on their fellow workers in case of either a foreign war or a class war at home.

29. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald , 381-89.

30. Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service , 298-313, suggests that the published letter was a composite of leaks from a genuine original authored by Zinoviev, and that its publication was an effort by Tory diehards within the intelligence community to bring down the Labour government, which it considered soft on Communism and a threat to the intelligence service itself.

31. The case for forgery is put forth most fully in Lewis Chester, Stephen Fay, and Hugo Young, The Zinoviev Letter (Philadelphia: 1968), with significant emendations by Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Other "Zinoviev Letters": New Light on the Mismanagement of the Affair , Slavic and Soviet Series, no. 3, Russian and East European Research Center of Tel-Aviv University, 1976. According to this explanation, the letter was manufactured by a group of White Russian émigrés in Berlin and fed to the Foreign Office through the efforts of some members of the Central Office of the Conservative Party and of the Special Intelligence Service. No one in the Foreign Office regarded it as having any special significance except for Eyre Crowe, who took an extraordinary interest in the document. Being critical of the Russia policy of the Labour government and knowing that the Daily Mail was about to publish the letter, Crowe released it to the press before its authenticity could be confirmed or denied by the Soviet government and without clear authorization from MacDonald, who was slow to recognize the impact it would have on the electoral campaign. A thorough criticism of the forgery thesis, and an attempted exoneration of Crowe, is to be found in Sybil Crowe, "The Zinoviev Letter: A Reappraisal," Journal of Contemporary History 10 (1975): 407-432.

32. Note from Rakovskii to MacDonald, 25 October 1925, Soviet Documents , 1: 471-73; NKID reply to British note, 27 October 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 473; note from Rakovskii to Chamberlain, 28 November 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 477-80; interview by Chicherin, Pravda , 22 March 1928, Soviet Documents , 2: 296-99.

33. Notes from Chamberlain to Rakovskii, 21 November 1924, DBFP , ser. 1, v. 25, nos. 266, 267. For the official position of the British government on the "Zinoviev letter," see Foreign Office memorandum, 11 November 1924, DBFP , ser. 1, v. 25, no. 264.

34. For the Chamberlain-Herriot meeting, see memorandum by Chamberlain, 5 December 1924, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 26, no. 608. For other contemporaneous Anglo-French conversations, see Clemens A. Wurm, Die französische Sicherheitspolitik in der Phase der Umorientierung 1924-1926 (Frankfurt a.M., Bern, and Las Vegas: 1979), 218.

35. Kuusinen, Before and after Stalin , 51.

36. Report by Chicherin to the Central Executive Committee, 18 October 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 461, 465-67.

37. Jon Jacobson, "Is There a New International History of the 1920s?" American Historical Review 88 (1983): 643-45.

38. Indeed, because Chamberlain was careful to keep London's relations with Moscow formally correct, the NKID was unable to find direct evidence that the British government had undertaken a policy hostile to the Soviet Union or was leading the rest of Europe toward one: See report by Chicherin to the Third Soviet Congress, 14 May 1925, Soviet Documents , 2: 38-43.

39. Stephen E Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (New York: 1975), 147-48, 162, 186-88; Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary , 377-94. Tucker maintains (399) that it was Stalin who insisted that international proletarian revolution be retained as a second stage of development in the formulation of "socialism in one country." Cohen attributes this idea to Bukharin (187).

40. The role played by the debate over the doctrines of "socialism in one country," "permanent revolution," and "revolutionary internationalism" in the Lenin succession is discussed in Richard Day, Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation (Cambridge: 1973), 3-16, 98-101, and in Anthony D'Agostino, Soviet Succession Struggles: Kremlinology and the Russian Question from Lenin to Gorbachev (Boston: 1988), 75-105. Both works correct the notion that Bolshevik intraparty politics of 1925 to 1927 are to be understood as a confrontation between Stalin and ''socialism in one country," on the one hand, and Trotsky and "permanent revolution" on the other. Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-1929 (London and New York: 1959), 157-63, 201-70, discusses Trotsky's absence from the debate during the important period from January 1925 to April 1926. For Trotsky's writings and politics during these years, see Pierre Broue, Trotsky (Paris: 1988), 441-73.

41. For the implications of the doctrine of "socialism in one country" for international relations theory, see V. Kubálková and A. A. Cruickshank, Marxism and International Relations (Oxford and New York: 1985), 85-86; quotation, 82; Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of International Relations (New York: 1987), 18-19.

42. Report by Stalin to the Moscow Party Organization on the results of the Fourteenth Party Conference, 9 May 1925, in Stalin, Works , 7: 95.

43. Richard B. Day, The Crisis and the Crash: Soviet Studies of the West (1917-1939) (London: 1981), 77-81; and Leon Trotsky , 130.

44. "The International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist Parties," Pravda , 22 March 1925, Stalin, Works , 7: 51-57; Report to the Moscow Party Organization, 9 May 1925, Stalin, Works , 7: 90-134; Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Party Congress, 18 December 1925, Stalin, Works , 7: 267-403; Resolutions, Decisions, and Directives of the Fourteenth Party Congress, December 1925, in Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: The Early Soviet Period: 1917-1929 , ed. Richard Gregor (Toronto and Buffalo: 1974), 2: 258-60, hereafter cited as Resolutions and Decisions .

45. Stalin, Works, 7: 51, 92-95, 302-304. For Marx, Lenin, and Bukharin on the theory of "capitalist stabilization" and its implications for the doctrine of "socialism in one country" see Day, The Crisis and the Crash , 73-77.

46. Stalin, Works , 7: 51-52.

47. Ibid., 272-73.

48. Ibid., 98.

49. Ibid., 99-100.

50. Ibid., 52.

51. Ibid., 276.

52. Ibid., 53-55, 290-94.

53. Ibid., 98-99, 273-74, 278-79. The Soviet/Comintern economist Eugen Varga also maintained that the Dawes Plan would not stabilize the international economy: See Day, The Crisis and the Crash , 70-72. His argument was the conventional one. France and Britain could not accept German exports at the level required for Germany to create the surplus necessary to make reparations payments.

54. "Concerning the International Situation," Bolshevik , 20 September 1924, Stalin, Works , 6: 289-99, 303.

55. Stalin, Works, 7 : 279-83.

56. Anna di Biagio, "Bukharin's International Alternative," in The Ideas of Nikolai Bukharin , ed. A. Kemp-Welch (Oxford: 1992), 116-20.

57. Report by Stalin to the Moscow Party Organization, 27 January 1925, Stalin, Works, 7: 25-29.

58. Resolutions of the Fourteenth Party Congress, Resolutions and Decisions , 258-60.

59. Speech by Stalin to the Central Committee Plenum, 19 January 1925, Stalin, Works, 7: 9-14; "The Prospects of the Communist Party of Germany and the Question of Bolshevization," Pravda , 3 February 1925, in Stalin, Works, 7: 34-41; Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Party Congress, 18 December 1925, Stalin, Works, 7: 279-83, 287; Robert C. Tucker, "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy," Slavic Review 36 (1977): 563-64, 565-66. Stalin's analysis and his prescription were supported by M. V. Frunze, who replaced Trotsky as commissar for military and naval affairs in January 1925. Frunze warned that ''the danger of war ... has not diminished ... as a result of our economic consolidation, it has increased." "Nothing but the development of our military power will prevent our enemies from attacking us": Speech by Frunze to the Moscow Garrison, Pravda , 16 February 1925, SRW , no. 104.

60. Stalin, Works, 7: 12-13, 34.

61. Resolutions of the Third Soviet Congress, 16 May 1925, Soviet Documents , 2: 45; Resolutions of the Fourteenth Party Congress, Resolutions and Decisions , 258.

62. Cohen, Bukharin , 179, 246-47; Day, Leon Trotsky , 101-104, 118-21.

63. Resolutions of the Fourteenth Party Congress, Resolutions and Decisions , 258; Stalin quoted in Day, Leon Trotsky , 120. Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary , 377, contends that "Stalin made no particular contribution to the industrialization debate in its earlier phases. He echoed the Bukharinist position." Cohen, Bukharin , 215, states that "while Stalin sometimes eulogized industrialism ... and the virtues of Soviet economic autarky more than did Bukharin, he did not seem to harbor a separate industrial or agrarian program."

64. Stalin, Works , 7: 279; Day, The Crisis and the Crash , 71-72; also the statement by Ia. Rudzutak quoted from the Stenographic Report of the Fourteenth Party Congress in S. Iu. Vygodskii, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, 1924-1929 gg (Moscow: 1963), 85: "The Dawes plan is aimed at converting Russia into an agrarian appendage, even Germany's, ... at squeezing pennies [out of the Russian working people] to pay German reparations to the USA. That is not our way, comrades!"

65. Stalin quoted in Day, Leon Trotsky , 121.

66. For the discussion of Trotsky's strategy of economic development and economic foreign policy, see Day, Leon Trotsky , 126-78, and "Leon Trotsky on the Dialectics of Democratic Control," in The Soviet Economy on the Brink of Reform: Essays in Honor of Alec Nove , ed. Peter Wiles (Boston: 1988), 17-24.

67. Hodgson (Moscow) to Chamberlain, 25 August 1925, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 25, no. 326.

68. Day, Leon Trotsky , 131, 169.

69. On Preobrazhenskii see M. M. Gorinov and S. V. Tsakunov, "The Life and Works of Evgenii Alekssevich Prebrazhenskii," Slavic Review 50 (1991): 286-96, and Alexander Erlich, The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924-1928 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1960), 31-60.

70. Richard Day demonstrates convincingly that although Preobrazhenskii and Trotsky both favored rapid industrialization, Trotsky wanted to fund it with foreign capital rather than by expropriating the accumulations of the peasantry. Moreover, unlike Preobrazhenskii, Trotsky favored balanced industrial growth rather than giving priority to heavy industry: Leon Trotsky , 146-47. Compare Erlich, Soviet Industrialization Debate , in which the Preobrazhenskii road and the Bukharin road are viewed as the two primary alternative industrialization paths.