1. Hull, Memoirs , II, 982.

2. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 89-91.

3. FR, 1941 , V, 1. Various export restrictions and other commercial obstacles forced Japan to turn to Thailand for rubber, tin, and even some rice.

4. Ibid., 5.

3. FR, 1941 , V, 1. Various export restrictions and other commercial obstacles forced Japan to turn to Thailand for rubber, tin, and even some rice.

4. Ibid., 5.

5. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 91-92; FR, 1941 , V, 12..

6. Ibid., 10, 15.

5. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 91-92; FR, 1941 , V, 12..

6. Ibid., 10, 15.

7. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 92.

8. FR, 1941 , V, 14.

9. Ibid., 16-17, 20.

8. FR, 1941 , V, 14.

9. Ibid., 16-17, 20.

10. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 93. See also "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Acceptance by the Governments of Thailand and France of the Proposal by the Japanese Government For Mediation in the Border Dispute Between Thailand and French Indo-China, January 24 1941"; "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning Japanese Delegation for the Armistice Conference Between Thailand and French Indo-China, January 29 1941"; and "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Armistice Agreement Between Thailand and French Indo-China, January 31, 1941" in [Japan] Board of Information, Official Announcements Concerning Foreign Relations (Tokyo, 1941), 3-5.

11. FR, 1941 V, 29.

12. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 133; Hull, Memoirs , II, 984.

13. FR, 1941 , V, 55.

14. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 303-305.

15. Grew cable, February 7, 1941, in Grew, Ten Years in Japan , 371.

16. February 1 diary entry, in Grew, Ten Years in Japan , 369.

17. This discussion of the private diplomacy of Drought and Walsh is based largely from the following sources: R.J.C. Butow, The John Doe Associates (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974); John Boyle, "The Drought-Walsh Mission to Japan," Pacific Historical Review 34, 141-161; Ladislas Farago, The Broken Seal (New York: Random House, 1967), ch. 14; Lewis Strauss, Men and Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), 123-126; FR , 1941, IV, 14; Hull, Memoirs , II, 984-985.

18. FR, 1941 , IV, 14; Farago, Broken Seal , 175.

19. Hull, Memoirs , II, 984-985.

20. FR, 1941 , IV, 21-22. The exchange on this subject between Roosevelt and the State Department may also be found in PHA Exhibits, XX, 4284ff.

21. Farago, Broken Seal , 176.

22. FR, 1941 , IV, 21-22.

23. February 5 memorandum in FR, 1941 , IV, 22-27; also found in PHA Exhibits, XX, 4289-4291.

24. FR, 1941 , V, 61-62.

25. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 95-96.

26. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 176.

27. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 95-96.

28. FR, 1941 , V, 77. The French authorities also denied U.S. requests to purchase raw materials in Indochina but gave Japan (and Germany) free access to its resources. This action aggravated the crisis facing U.S. leaders. Ibid., 66-68.

27. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 95-96.

28. FR, 1941 , V, 77. The French authorities also denied U.S. requests to purchase raw materials in Indochina but gave Japan (and Germany) free access to its resources. This action aggravated the crisis facing U.S. leaders. Ibid., 66-68.

29. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long (February 11 and 17), 177, 182. Hull, Memoirs , II, 985-986, cited these chances as his low estimate.

30. Stimson diary, February 10, 1941.

31. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 387-388.

32. Grew, Turbulent Era , II, 1307; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 139ff.

33. On his approval (and instigation) of the meeting, see Grew, Turbulent Era , II, 1307. Grew informed the department of the conversation on February 14—see FR, 1941 , IV, 37-39. No reprimand was ever sent back. Furthermore, on February 26, Grew told Matsuoka of his approval of Dooman's message and handed him a copy of the conversation record. He must have had approval from the State Department to do this. See Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War , 326.

34. Hull, Memoirs , II, 988; FR, 1941 , IV, 39-40.

35. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 96; New York Times , February 20, 1941. See also Washington Star editorial, February 13, 1941, on Japan's threat to the "incalculable wealth" of the region.

36. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 96-97. See also "Statement of the Spokesman of the Board of Information Concerning Alarming Reports With Reference to the East Asiatic Situation, February 18, 1941" in [Japan] Board of Information, Official Announcements , 8-9.

37. Department of State Bulletin , February 22, 1941, 211.

38. FR, 1941 , V, 103-105.

39. FR, 1941 , V, 102.

40. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 99-102. See also, "Joint Communique of Japan, France and Thailand Concerning the Conclusion of the Mediation, March 11, 1941" and "Statement of the Foreign Office Concerning the Conclusion of the Mediation, March 11, 1941," in Board of Information, Official Announcements , 15-19.

41. These conversations, aimed at finding a feasible settlement for the Pacific area, continued with a short break in July until late November.

42. Hull, Memoirs , II, 989.

43. FR, Japan, 1931-1949 , II, 397.

44. FR, 1941 , V, 115-118. Lauchlin Currie, Roosevelt's adviser, reported after visiting China that "all of the people I talked to who had been trained in Japan or who claimed to know the Japanese thought that, being so methodical, they would consolidate their positions in Indochina and Thailand, construct air and supply bases before moving on Singapore, and would move on Singapore before venturing to take the Dutch East Indies." See his "Report on Some Aspects of the Current Political, Economic and Military Situation in China," March 15, 1941, in FR, 1941 , IV, 91.

45. FR, 1941 , V, 121.

46. Testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, PHA Hearings, IX, 4272-4278. Ingersoll was sent to London as director of the Navy's War Plans Division. All understandings reached with the British during these conversations were superseded by ABC-1. See also Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific (Boston: Little Brown, 1948), 49.

47. PHA Exhibits, XV, 1487; Morison, Rising Sun , 49-50. The quotation (reprinted in Morison) is taken from the minutes of the conference.

48. For the whole text of the agreement, see Exhibit 49, PHA Exhibits, XV, 1485-1542. Quote is from ibid., 1491-1492. The same passage noted, "Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention" (ibid., 1491). For the relevant text from "Rainbow 5," see Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, PHA Exhibits, XXXII, 70-71.

49. Testimony of Admiral Turner, Hart Inquiry, PHA Exhibits, XXVI, 265. The admiral explained, "While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany—that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department—we were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific. . .. The United States believed that our strongest naval concentration and naval effort ought to be in the Central Pacific" (ibid., 266).

47. PHA Exhibits, XV, 1487; Morison, Rising Sun , 49-50. The quotation (reprinted in Morison) is taken from the minutes of the conference.

48. For the whole text of the agreement, see Exhibit 49, PHA Exhibits, XV, 1485-1542. Quote is from ibid., 1491-1492. The same passage noted, "Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention" (ibid., 1491). For the relevant text from "Rainbow 5," see Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, PHA Exhibits, XXXII, 70-71.

49. Testimony of Admiral Turner, Hart Inquiry, PHA Exhibits, XXVI, 265. The admiral explained, "While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany—that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department—we were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific. . .. The United States believed that our strongest naval concentration and naval effort ought to be in the Central Pacific" (ibid., 266).

47. PHA Exhibits, XV, 1487; Morison, Rising Sun , 49-50. The quotation (reprinted in Morison) is taken from the minutes of the conference.

48. For the whole text of the agreement, see Exhibit 49, PHA Exhibits, XV, 1485-1542. Quote is from ibid., 1491-1492. The same passage noted, "Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention" (ibid., 1491). For the relevant text from "Rainbow 5," see Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, PHA Exhibits, XXXII, 70-71.

49. Testimony of Admiral Turner, Hart Inquiry, PHA Exhibits, XXVI, 265. The admiral explained, "While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany—that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department—we were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific. . .. The United States believed that our strongest naval concentration and naval effort ought to be in the Central Pacific" (ibid., 266).

50. PHA Exhibits, XV, 1511-1512.

51. On the administration's approval of ABC-1, see Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 168; also, testimony of Admiral Stark, PHA Hearings, V, 2391. The Singapore agreements, known as ADB (for American-Dutch-British conversations), are reprinted in PHA Exhibits, XV, 1551-1584; see also Morison, Rising Sun , 53-56. On the importance of these later conversations, Herbert Feis writes that "this Singapore report left one lasting mark on American official thinking and planning.

The conferees defined the geographical limits on land and sea beyond which Japanese forces could not be permitted to go. ... They drew the line at which, in their judgment, military resistance against Japan was dictated. When in December next, Japanese warships and troop transports were reported on their way south to an unknown destination, Stark and Marshall advised the President to declare these limits, and to warn Japan that we would join the fight if they were passed. Had not the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, this line would have become the boundary between war and peace" (Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 170.

52. Farago, Broken Seal , 182.

53. Ibid., 183; see also FR, 1941 , IV, 123.

52. Farago, Broken Seal , 182.

53. Ibid., 183; see also FR, 1941 , IV, 123.

54. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 398-402. Many specific terms were cited, but those mentioned here were salient.

55. Hull, Memoirs , II 993.

56. FR, 1941 , IV, 136. Hornbeck wrote his analysis on April 7 based on his knowledge of the April 5 draft.

57. Ibid., 124-125.

56. FR, 1941 , IV, 136. Hornbeck wrote his analysis on April 7 based on his knowledge of the April 5 draft.

57. Ibid., 124-125.

58. FR, 1941 , IV, 150-152.

59. Ibid., 944; "Statement of the Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, April 13, 1941," in Board of Information, Official Announcements , 29-30; Hull, Memoirs , II, 993.

58. FR, 1941 , IV, 150-152.

59. Ibid., 944; "Statement of the Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, April 13, 1941," in Board of Information, Official Announcements , 29-30; Hull, Memoirs , II, 993.

60. Grew, Ten Years in Japan , 382 (April 22 diary entry).

61. Knox address, in box 268, Hornbeck papers. See also T. W. Lamont's address, "China and the Dictators," to Economic Club of Detroit, April 28, 1941, Hornbeck papers, and New York Herald Tribune , April 29, 1941.

62. Hull, Memoirs , II, 994-995; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 407-408.

63. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 407-409.

64. Nomura to Tokyo, April 17, 1941, in Department of Defense, The "MAGIC" Background of Pearl Harbor , Volume I (Washington: Department of Defense, 1978), 41.

65. Robert J.C. Butow, "The Hull-Nomura Conversations: A Fundamental Misconception," American Historical Review 65 (July 1960), 822-836.

66. Hull, Memoirs , II, 996-997; FR, 1941 , V, 132-136.

67. Hull, Memoirs , II, 997.

68. FR, 1941 , V, 138-139.

69. FR, 1941 , IV, 168.

70. FR, 1941 , IV, 191. Hornbeck believed Japan's pledges would be worthless in any case.

71. Department of State, United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 [China White Paper] (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 26-27. In early 1941,

the United States was sending about 4,000 tons of supplies to China each month. By November, this figure had risen to 15,000 tons.

72. Hull, Memoirs , II, 997. Hull was aware of increasing Japanese pressure on Indochina. See FR, 1941 , V, 144-146.

73. ''Contents of the Convention and the Agreement, May 6, 1941," Board of Information, Official Announcements ; for an analysis of the agreement, see U.S. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, "Survey of Indo-China" (R&A No. 719), second edition, September 24, 1943, 38.

74. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 419, 422; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1000. As to Japan's "peaceful nature," Hull knew from Grant that the Japanese were planning a coup d'etat in Thailand to install a friendly government there ( FR, 1941 , V, 150).

75. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1002.

76. Welles's covering letter to Roosevelt can be found in FR, 1941 , IV, 208; the actual excerpt from Grew's diary (along with the Welles letter) is in box 188, Hornbeck papers. It was first distributed throughout the State Department on May 19. The original diary entry is on pages 4904-4909, Grew papers.

77. Memorandum, May 14, 1941 (revised May 22), boxes 188 and 425, Hornbeck papers. Grew read the memo "with keen interest" (Grew letter to Hornbeck, June 17, 1941, Grew papers).

78. Marshall to Stimson, May 20, 1941, cited in Miner, "United States Policy," 210-211.

79. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service , 386. "In these opinions the Navy under Admiral Stark concurred . . .; the Pacific Ocean had for years been the Navy's assumed area of combat."

80. Stimson diary, April 24, May 5 and 6, 1941.

81. Miner, "United States Policy," 199, 231.

82. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service , 387; Morison, Rising Sun , 57.

83. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long (June 4, 1941), 202-203.

84. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1007; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 454-455.

85. Most of these later discussions centered around China, but the fate of Southeast Asia remained an unresolved issue (see FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 482). Hull realized well that Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere program "envisage[s] the placing of areas in the southern Pacific, including the Philippine Commonwealth, under Japanese economic and political hegemony" ( FR, 1941 , V, 177). Hull's suspicions of Japanese intentions, and particularly his anxiety over China, were not new, as indicated by his February 5 letter to Roosevelt. Nonetheless, they owed much to the constant barrage of Hornbeck's memoranda; see, for example, his May 15 memo to Welles in FR, 1941 , IV, 192-193, and another written May 26, 1941, box 52, Hornbeck papers.

Secretary Hull heard similar arguments from the Chinese ambassador, Hu Shih. The old Chinese scholar understood that Americans were aiding his country less from sympathy than self-interest. In a letter to Hull on May 26, Hu Shih argued, like Hornbeck: "So far two things—and two things only—have prevented Japan from going to the aid of her European partners: First, the war in China has bogged down her millions of troops and service men and has tied up hundreds of ships for the transport of troops and for keeping these troops supplies. And, secondly, the presence of the American fleet in the Pacific has made Japan hesitate either to carry out her 'southward advance', or to raid the commerce and cut the supply lines for the British Commonwealths as well as for China. I am reasonably sure that, as long as China fights on and a sufficiently strong portion of the American fleet is maintained in the Pacific, there will not be active and effective Japanese assistance to the Axis powers in the Pacific. But, if Japan is freed from her war in China or from the danger of being effectively flanked by the American fleet, then no amount of appeasement, nor any Japanese pledge can stop Japan from playing the role of an active partner of the Axis powers and completely cutting off Australia and New Zealand from participation in the war in Africa and Asia, as well as effectively intercepting all material supplies from the United States and Canada"( FR, 1941 , IV, 225-227).

86. FR, 1941 , V, 141-142. U.S. leaders worried that the Dutch might accede to Japanese demands ( FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 233, 250).

87. FR, 1941 , V, 174.

88. Ibid., 178.

87. FR, 1941 , V, 174.

88. Ibid., 178.

89. FR, 1941 , V, 178, 169-170.

90. Ibid., 206.

91. Ibid., 180-181, 186-188, 188-189, 192, 235.

89. FR, 1941 , V, 178, 169-170.

90. Ibid., 206.

91. Ibid., 180-181, 186-188, 188-189, 192, 235.

89. FR, 1941 , V, 178, 169-170.

90. Ibid., 206.

91. Ibid., 180-181, 186-188, 188-189, 192, 235.

92. FR, 1941 , IV, 276-277.

93. Ibid., 279.

92. FR, 1941 , IV, 276-277.

93. Ibid., 279.

94. Nobutaka Ike, ed., Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 78; see also Nagaoka Shinjiro, "The Drive into Southern Indochina and Thailand," in Morley, The Fateful Choice , 236.

95. Ike, Japan's Decision , 80.

96. Ibid., 81-82.

95. Ike, Japan's Decision , 80.

96. Ibid., 81-82.

97. Memorandum by Joseph Ballantine to George Renchard, of the Secretary's Office, July 5, 1941 in FR, 1941 , IV, 291.