1. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, The New Class War: Reagan's Attack on the Welfare State and Its Consequences (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), pp. xi, 9, 13; Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , pp. 46, 109; Jospeh G. Peschek, Policy-Planning Organizations: Elite Agendas and America's Rightward Turn (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). See also Dan Clawson and Mary Ann Clawson, "Reagan or Business? Foundations of the New Conservatism," in The Structure of Power in America: The Corporate Elite as Ruling Class , ed. Michael Schwartz (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), pp. 201-217.

2. Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , pp. 13-14.

3. Alan Wolfe, "Toward a Political Sociology of Reaganism," Contemporary Sociology 16 (1987): 31.

4. For a summary of these and related indicators, see Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , pp. 79-82; and Samuel Bowles, David M. Gordon, and Thomas E. Weisskopf, Beyond the Waste Land: A Democratic Alternative to Economic Decline (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983), pp. 19-61.

5. The argument in the following paragraphs draws especially on Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf, Beyond the Waste Land .

6. Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , p. 81.

7. Samuel Bowles, "The Post-Keynesian Capital-Labor Stalemate," Socialist Review 12 (September-October 1982): 45-72.

8. Piven and Cloward, New Class War , pp. 14-15.

9. Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , pp. 51-57.

10. Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf, Beyond the Waste Land , pp. 84-91; Piven and Cloward, New Class War , pp. 13-39.

11. Dan Clawson, Karen Johnson, and John Schall, "Fighting Union Busting in the 1980s," Radical America 16 (1982): 45-64; Dan Georgine, "From Brass Knuckles to Briefcases: The Modern Art of Union Busting," in The Big Business Reader , ed. Mark Green and Robert Massie, Jr. (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1980), pp. 91-110; Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, "The Knights of the Roundtable," The Nation 229 (1979): 620-628. For a general discussion of the strategies corporations used to cut labor costs, see Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone, The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and the Polarizing of America (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

12. Silk and Vogel, Ethics and Profits .

13. Silk and Vogel, Ethics and Profits , p. 52; Michael Useem, "Company vs. Classwide Rationality in Corporate Decision-Making," Administrative Science Quarterly 27 (1982): 199-226; idem, "Business and continue

Politics in the United States and the United Kingdom," Theory and Society 12 (1983): 281-308; idem, The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the U.S. and the U.K. (New York: Oxford, 1984); Murray Weidenbaum, "The High Cost of Government Regulation," Challenge , November-December 1981, pp. 32-39.

14. Silk and Vogel, Ethics and Profits , pp. 57-58.

15. Ibid., p. 75.

16. Ibid., pp. 104, 126.

14. Silk and Vogel, Ethics and Profits , pp. 57-58.

15. Ibid., p. 75.

16. Ibid., pp. 104, 126.

14. Silk and Vogel, Ethics and Profits , pp. 57-58.

15. Ibid., p. 75.

16. Ibid., pp. 104, 126.

17. "The Reindustrialization of America," Business Week , June 30, 1980, pp. 56-114; Silk and Vogel, Ethics and Profits , pp. 75-101.

18. Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , p. 128. Good overviews of the political mobilization of business in the 1970s and 1980s include Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , pp. 78-219; Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , pp. 107-140; Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 32-86; Saloma, Ominous Politics , pp. 7-37, 63-80; Pines, Back to Basics , pp. 31-98.

19. Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 336-368; G. William Domhoff, The Powers That Be: Processes of Ruling-Class Domination in America (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 53-60. Interestingly, corporate officials sometimes agree about the minimal role of the Chambers of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers in coordinating business political activity. These organizations may be good for exchanging information, they say, but not for organized political action. Conversations with Don Hendriksen, former vice president for government relations at Arco, and John Burton, a public-affairs officer first at Fluor Corporation and later at CooperVision, Sloan Workshop on Political Technology, Claremont, California, January 6, 1988.

20. Ferguson and Rogers, "Knights of the Roundtable," p. 621.

21. Ibid.; Peter Slavin, "The Business Roundtable: New Lobbying Arm of Big Business," Business and Society Review , Winter 1975-1976, pp. 28-32; Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , pp. 120-123; G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 135-136; Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 69-80; Kim McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power from FDR to Reagan (New York: Morrow, 1982), pp. 284-305.

20. Ferguson and Rogers, "Knights of the Roundtable," p. 621.

21. Ibid.; Peter Slavin, "The Business Roundtable: New Lobbying Arm of Big Business," Business and Society Review , Winter 1975-1976, pp. 28-32; Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , pp. 120-123; G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 135-136; Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 69-80; Kim McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power from FDR to Reagan (New York: Morrow, 1982), pp. 284-305.

22. See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of the impact of campaign reform laws and of electoral politics in general. In fact, the business elite played a major role in framing the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. See Tom Koenig, "Business Support for Dis- soft

closure of Corporate Campaign Contributions: An Instructive Paradox," in Schwartz, Structure of Power in America , pp. 82-96.

23. Gary C. Jacobson, "The Republican Advantage in Campaign Finance," in New Direction in American Politics , ed. Chubb and Peterson, p. 147; Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , p. 131; Useem, "Business and Politics," p. 299.

24. Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadtl, and James Bearden, "The Logic of Business Unity: Corporate Contributions to the 1980 Congressional Elections," American Sociological Review 51 (1986): 810.

25. Common Cause, 1972 Federal Campaign Finances (Washington, D.C.: Common Cause, 1973); idem, 1976 Federal Campaign Finances (Washington, D.C.: Common Cause, 1977); Federal Elections Commission, computer tape of PAC contributions to candidates for federal office, 1981; Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 469-471. Dan Clawson provided me with the data on the changing patterns of corporate PAC contributions to congressional candidates. Of course, a preference for incumbents could reflect an ideological strategy rather than a pragmatic one if indeed most corporate money so targeted went to incumbents in close races and hence reflected an intent to keep politically suitable persons in office. In fact, however, such money went disproportionately to incumbents who carried 60 percent of the vote or more in the previous election. This suggests the goal was not to save embattled incumbents with ideologies favorable to business but to win access to entrenched incumbents with considerable clout. See Dan Clawson and Alan Neustadtl, "Corporate Political Strategies: Classwide Rationality and Conservatism in PAC Contributions to the 1980 Congressional Elections," unpublished paper.

26. Clawson, Neustadtl, and Bearden, "Logic of Business Unity," p. 801. See also Stuart Rothenberg and Richard R. Roldan, Business PACs and Ideology: A Study of Contributions in the 1982 Elections (Washington, D.C.: Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, 1983).

27. For a lucid summary of different arguments about the bases of political divisions among corporations, see Val Burris, "The Political Partisanship of American Business: A Study of Corporate Political Action Committees," American Sociological Review 52 (1987): 732-744.

28. Dan Clawson, Allen Kaufman, and Alan Neustadtl, "Corporate PACs for a New Pax Americana," Insurgent Sociologist 13, no. 1-2 (1985): 63-77; Clawson and Neustadtl, "Corporate Political Strategies"; Burris, "Partisanship of American Business." In the first two continue

works the measures of centrality included total sales, foreign sales, capital intensity, and director interlocks. Only the last of these was significantly related to contribution strategy, with the more interlocked corporations more likely to support incumbents. In Burris's work the measures of centrality comprised these as well as profit rate, an oligopoly index, Business Roundtable membership, and several others. Only capital intensity was significantly related to contribution strategy, and then weakly. In both sets of studies the factor that best distinguished contribution strategies was relationship to government: corporations in traditional regulated industries with longstanding ties to specific government agencies and congressional committees and those with substantial government contracts were most likely to support incumbents. The finding of Clawson and his co-authors that the more interlocked corporations were most likely to pursue a contribution strategy rooted in a narrow company rationality runs counter to the idea that inner-circle corporations are apt to take a broad class view of politics.

29. Clawson, Neustadtl, and Bearden, "Logic of Business Unity," p. 803.

30. Elizabeth Drew, Power and Money (New York: Macmillan, 1983); Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , pp. 136-138; Alan Neustadtl and Dan Clawson, "Corporate Political Groupings: PAC Contributions to the 1980 Congressional Elections," American Sociological Review 53 (1988): 172-190. There are of course less formal modes of coordination. The chief contributions officers of individual corporations do not make decisions about political contributions in a vacuum. They share data bases and sometimes meet to listen to and discuss candidates. Conversations with Don Hendriksen.

31. David Vogel, "Business's 'New Class' Struggle," The Nation 229 (1979): 609, 625-628; Ann Crittenden, "The Economic Wind's Blowing toward the Right—for Now," New York Times , July 16, 1978, section 3, pp. 1, 9; Richard Goldstein, "The War for America's Mind," The Village Voice , June 8, 1982, pp. 1, 11-20; Useem, Inner Circle , pp. 129-132.

32. I noticed the ad in question in Commentary , June 1980. The resuits of the survey itself are from "The Vital Consensus: American Attitudes on Economic Growth," provided by Union Carbide on my request.

33. See, for example, Domhoff, Powers That Be , pp. 61-127. For a more thorough analysis, see Peschek, Policy-Planning Organizations .

34. William E. Simon, A Time for Truth (New York: Berkley, 1978), pp. 208-257; quotations at pp. 245, 248, 249. The growing power of continue

the New Class, its ideological unity, and its hostility to business were articles of faith among neoconservative intellectuals, who contributed to developing an image of America as a postindustrial society in which businessmen play a declining role. See the essays in The Third Century , ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979) and The New Class? ed. B. Bruce-Briggs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). See also Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America's Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), pp. 188-213. For the best analysis of the actual political beliefs of the New Class, see Steven Brint, "The Political Attitudes of Professionals," Annual Review of Sociology 11 (1985): 389-414; and idem, "'New Class' and Cumulative Trend Explanations of the Liberal Political Attitudes of Professionals," American Journal of Sociology 90 (1984): 30-71.

35. Crittenden, "Economic Wind's Blowing toward the Right"; Malcolm Scully, "More than GOP's 'Government in Exile,' " Chronicle of Higher Education 21 (December 15, 1980): 3; Peter Stone, "Conservative Brain Trust," New York Times Magazine , May 10, 1981, p. 18; "A Think Tank at the Brink," Newsweek , July 7, 1986, p. 87; "The Tale of Two Right-Wing 'Think Tanks,' " Group Research Reports 25 (1986): 22. Unpublished sources of expenditure figures cited here and in the following paragraphs include annual reports for the Heritage Foundation and the Brookings Institution; and conversations with public-affairs officers for AEI and the Hoover Institution. My thanks again to Dan Clawson for supplying many of these statistics. By 1988 at least one major corporation, Arco, which runs the largest corporate foundation, had decided it had given too much to right-wing think tanks and was moving back to the center. Arco, however, has a relatively liberal reputation among major corporations. Conversation with George Dunn, director of public affairs at Arco, Sloan Workshop on Political Technology, Claremont, California, January 6, 1988.

36. Crittenden, "Economic Wind's Blowing toward the Right"; Janet Hook, "Georgetown's 'Intellectual Brokerage House,' " Chronicle of Higher Education 21 (December 8, 1980): 3-4; Stewart McBride, "Leaning to the Right," Christian Science Monitor , April 2, 1980; Jack McCurdy, "A Reagan 'Brain Trust': Hoover Institution Finds It's in the Public Eye," Chronicle of Higher Education 21 (December 1, 1980): 3.

37. Morton Kondracke, "The Heritage Model," The New Republic 183 (December 20, 1980): 10; Dom Bonafede, "Issue-Oriented Heritage Foundation Hitches Its Wagon to Reagan's Star," National Journal , March 20, 1982, pp. 502-507; "Heritage Foundation Booms on the Right," Group Research Report 25 (1986): 22. break

38. The list included the Institute for Contemporary Studies, Center for Law and Economics, Center for Public Choice, Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, International Institute for Economic Research, Center for Free Enterprise, Center for Research in Government Policy and Business, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Center for the Study of American Business, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, National Strategy Information Center, the Manhattan Institute, the Lehrman Institute, and many others. Dan Morgan, "Conservatives: A Well-Financed Network," Washington Post , January 4, 1981, pp. A1, A14.

39. Karen Rothmyer, "Citizen Scaife," Columbia Journalism Review , July-August 1981, pp. 41-50; David Warner, "Scaife: Financier of the Right," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette , April 20, 1981; Bernard Weinraub, "Foundations Support Conservatism by Financing Scholars and Groups," New York Times , January 20, 1981, p. 17.

40. Peter Stone, "The Counter-Intelligentsia," Village Voice , October 27, 1979, pp. 14-19; Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 66-68.

41. Chris Welles, "The Supply-Side Cabal," This World , September 20, 1981, pp. 8-12; Geoffrey Norman, "Neo-Conservatism: An Idea Whose Time Is Now," Esquire , February 23, 1979, pp. 23-42; Walter Goodman, "Irving Kristol: Patron Saint of the New Right," New York Times Magazine , December 6, 1981, p. 90; Stone, "Counter-Intelligentsia." For detailed accounts of the development of supplyside economics, see Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 166-209; Stockman, Triumph of Politics , pp. 30-76; and Brooks, "Annals of Finance," pp. 97-150.

42. Peter Stone, "The I.E.A.—Teaching the Right Stuff," The Nation 233 (1981): 231-235; Goldstein, "War for America's Mind"; Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 66-68. After noting that as many as sixty conservative campus papers began publication in the early 1980s, one sympathetic observer candidly admitted, "Without IEA there would not be a conservative student newspaper movement to speak of." Stephen Weeks, "Notes from the Underground," National Review 38 (September 26, 1986): 36-40.

43. Bonafede, "Issue-Oriented Heritage Foundation"; Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration , ed. Charles Heatherly (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1981); Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 292-296.

44. Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 35-37, 328.

45. Alexander Haig, Reagan's first secretary of state, was president of United Technologies, a director of several other corporations, continue

and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. George Schultz, his successor, was president of the Bechtel Corporation and a director of the Council on Foreign Relations. Caspar Weinberger, Reagan's first defense secretary; was a vice president of Bechtel and a member of the Trilateral Commission. Finally; Donald Regan, first Reagan's treasury secretary and later his chief of staff, was head of Merrill Lynch, a trustee of the Committee for Economic Development, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. The first three all had prior governmental experience. See Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? pp. 139-140.

46. As I noted in Chapter 3, conservatives never lacked business support. What changed from the 1950s to the 1970s was the breadth of support. Where once one could identify an idiosyncratic business Right of rich individuals, family-owned companies, and a few corporations distinct from a corporate mainstream, by the late 1970s that mainstream too had moved right. See Forster and Epstein, Danger on the Right , for data on business contributions to right-wing groups in the 1950s and early 1960s.

47. Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , p. 33.

48. William Spinrad, "Power in Local Communities," in Class, Status, and Power , ed. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, 2d ed. rev. (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 229.

49. Daniel Bell, End of Ideology , p. 45. See also idem, Radical Right , pp. 21-22.

50. Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," in C. Wright Mills and the Power Elite , ed. G. William Domhoff and Hoyt B. Ballard (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 25-36; Ivar Berg and Mayer Zald, "Business and Society," Annual Review of Sociology 4 (1978): 137; Bell, End of Ideology , pp. 39-45, 66; Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 101-102. For a recent revival of pluralism, see David Vogel, "The New Political Science of Corporate Power," The Public Interest 87 (Spring 1987): 63-79.

51. Edsall, New Politics of Inequality ; Piven and Cloward, New Class War ; Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment . The titles themselves imply a pluralist approach. Of the major works on the politics of big business in the 1970s and 1980s, only Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , avoids assuming that big business sat on its hands politically for years before the 1970s.

52. Useem, "Classwide Rationality," p. 221; idem, Inner Circle .

53. Useem, Inner Circle , pp. 34-48.

54. The instrumentalist/structuralist distinction was articulated in continue

the mid-1970s in two articles by Erik Olin Wright and his colleagues. See David Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Erik Olin Wright, "Some Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," Monthly Review 27 (October 1975): 29-43, and 27 (November 1975): 36-51; and Gosta Esping-Andersen, Rodger Friedland, and Erik Olin Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," Kapitalistate 4-5 (1976): 186-220. They certainly did not mean these categories to be static or final; indeed, in articulating them, these writers also sought to transcend them. In general, Marxist theories of the state and the broader discussion of which they are a part have for some time gone beyond the simple instrumentalist/structuralist dichotomy by stressing the independent impact of state structures and the range of possible capitalist states, the contradictory nature of the relationship between the state and capitalist relations of production, and the role of class struggle. For a general discussion, see Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Bob Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," Cambridge Journal of Economics 1 (1977): 353-373. See also Fred Block, "Beyond Corporate Liberalism," Social Problems 24 (1977): 352-361; idem, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State," Socialist Revolution 7 (1977): 6-28; and Theda Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal," Politics and Society 10 (1980): 155-201. The instrumentalist/structuralist dichotomy is also problematic because virtually no one has embraced the instrumentalist label. Domhoff in particular has rejected it vehemently. See G. William Domhoff, "I Am Not an 'Instrumentalist': A Reply to Kapitalistate Critics," Kapitalistate 4-5 (1976): 221-224. Although the terms thus have limited utility in describing contemporary ruling-class theories of the state, they still denote with some accuracy two ideal-typical images of the political role of the capitalist class, two poles toward which a diversity of theories of the state inevitably gravitate.

55. Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," in Ideology in Social Science , ed. Robin Blackburn (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 238-253; quotations at pp. 245-247.

56. Domhoff, Higher Circles ; idem, Powers That Be ; idem, Who Rules America Now? ; James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1967); Lawrence Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977).

57. For other works on policy-planning organizations, see Pes- soft

chek, Policy-Planning Organizations ; Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America? The Conservative Years , 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1986); Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust ; Robert Collins, The Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power .

58. Domhoff, Higher Circles , pp. 217-218.

59. Gold, Lo, and Wright, "Some Recent Developments," p. 48.

60. See, for example, Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State (New York: Schocken Books, 1979), pp. 111-179; Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984).

61. David Vogel, "Why Businessmen Distrust their State," British Journal of Political Science 8 (1978): 45-78. The combination of early democracy and late bureaucracy also helps to explain the late and uneven development of the U.S. welfare state. See Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol, Politics of Social Policy .

62. I mean this point to dovetail with major criticisms of the notion of corporate liberalism. See, for example, Block, "Beyond Corporate Liberalism," and Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis." See also Collins, Business Response to Keynes .

63. McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power , perhaps comes closest to capturing the image I have in mind.