1. Charles Wolf, Jr., "A Theory of Non-Market Failures," The Public Interest 55 (Spring 1979):114-33.

2. James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 373.

3. For a description of the policy consensus on certain forms of economic deregulation, see Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985).

4. Robert B. Reich, "Looking Back at Regulation: Business Is Asking for Trouble Again," New York Times, November 22, 1981, sec. 3, p. F2. There recently has been considerable discussion of "reregulation," particularly in airlines and trucking. See, for example, Stuart Reginald, "To Regulate, to Deregulate, or, Now, to Reregulate," New York Times, October 29, 1984, 14; "Rumblings of Reregulation," Fortune, January 10, 1983, 17.

5. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, x.

6. An important alternative to command-and-control regulation, frequently touted by economists but outside the scope of this study, is incentives such as taxation and subsidy. See, for example, John Mendeloff, Regulating Safety: A Economic and Political Analysis of Occupational Safety and Health Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979).

7. Lester M. Salamon, "Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations," in Walter W. Powell, The Nonprofit Sector (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 100.

8. The name change was part of the massive Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, signed into law on August 23, 1988. The new Institute (NIST) retains all of the old functions of NBS, along with several new ones concerning technology transfer.

9. Engineers refer to these standards as "M&Ms" because they specify either materials or methods. Many simply set forth definitions, such as the meaning of two-by-four (a piece of lumber that, under the standard, is not actually 2" X 4"). Others facilitate the interchangeability of items such as flashlight batteries and automobile parts. Scores of these private standards are used by government for procurement purposes.

10. See, generally, Steven M. Spivak, Implementation of OMB Circular A-119: An Independent Appraisal of Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Standards, prepared for the National Bureau of Standards, NBS-GCR-85-495 (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, 1985).

11. See Timothy J. Muris, "Legalization of Standardization Under the Antitrust Laws"; John Boyer, "The Role of Due Process in Avoiding Antitrust Liability"; and Edward T. Buhl, "Antitrust Liability for Standards Developers," all in American National Standards Institute, Standards and the Law (New York: ANSI, 1984). A recent decision of the Supreme Court, in a case involving the National Fire Protection Association, concludes that the immunity granted for influencing legislation, known as Noeer immunity, does not apply equally to private standards-setting; rather, private organizations are bound to unspecified "safeguards" against "bias" and "stacking" (Allied Tube and Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 56 U.S.L.W. 4539 [June 13, 1988], 4543).

12. A 150-page report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States discusses several "horror stories" and presents "impressionistic" evidence from scattered meetings, but it contains no case studies. See Robert W. Hamilton, "The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health," Texas Law Review 56 (November 1978): 1329, 1446. Similarly, a report on representation of interest groups that was commissioned by NFPA discusses many of the same "horror stories" but contains no detailed information for any single case. See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Standards Development in the Private Sector: Thoughts on Interest Representation and Procedural Fairness (Quincy, Mass.: National Fire Protection Association, 1978). David Hemenway, author of the only book on industrywide voluntary product standards (Industrywide Voluntary Product Standards [Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1978]), confirmed in an interview in 1984 that he knew of no detailed case studies of voluntary standards-writing in this country. The only case study (subsequently located) compares two safety standards for regulating liquefied natural gas facilities: one developed by NFPA, the other promulgated by the Materials Transportation Board of the U.S. Department of Transportation. See John H. Young, "Direct Interest Participation in the Regulatory Decision Process: Lessons Learned from Two LNG Safety Standards" (Staff paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, 1983).

13. UL has three kinds of standards: published, proposed, and unpublished. Unpublished standards (also known as "desk" standards) cover hundreds of products. These standards are somewhat controversial and are discussed in more detail in chapter 3. UL also distinguishes between "published" standards and "proposed" standards. "Proposed" standards are, in fact, published; they are a kind of intermediate step between unpublished and officially "published."

14. Hemenway, Industrywide Voluntary Product Standards, 78.

15. The proposal, Federal Register 49 (June 19, 1984): 25005, was withdrawn unanimously by the FTC in 1985. However, the CPSC chair vowed: "The recognition issue is not dead. I am not deterred in my efforts to find a viable plan ... to promote voluntary standards" (CPSC, "Statement of Terrence M. Scanlon, Chairman," January 16, 1985).

16. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

17. John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, "Politics, Markets, and the Organization of Schools," American Political Science Review 82 (December 1988): 1067.

18. Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 141.

19. George Eads and Peter Reuter, Designing Safer Products (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1983), 43.

20. George S. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (Spring 1971): 3.

21. McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, 127.

22. Ibid., 120-26. See also Robert Michels, Political Parties (1915; reprint Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949).

23. Constance Smith and Anne Freedman, Voluntary Associations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 54.

24. According to the acting director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection, the "staff recommends that the Commission terminate this proceedings, and continue to pursue a program of case-by-case enforcement against deceptive or anticompetitive practices" (Memorandum to the Federal Trade Commission from Amanda B. Pedersen, August 29, 1985).

25. Henry S. Kariel, The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 73-74. These comments were specifically in reference to the National Recovery Act. For an interesting and alternative interpretation of these events, see Donald R. Brand, Corporatism and the Rule of Law: A Study of the National Recovery Administration (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

26. Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

27. McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, 6.

28. Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 2d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), 116-19. As mentioned earlier, both the CPSC and OSHA turned to private standards-setters in their early years. OSHA adopted hundreds of ANSI standards wholesale; the CPSC utilized the "offeror process," which allowed outside organizations to propose safety standards for public adoption. Both policies were later rescinded.

29. See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest," Yale Law Journal 61 (April 1952): 467-509; Marver Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955); Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation."

30. Kariel, The Decline of American Pluralism, 94.

31. See, for example, Nina W. Cornell, Roger G. Noll, and Barry Weingast, "Safety Regulation," in Setting National Priorities (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976).

32. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, 372.

33. Underwriters Laboratories v. Internal Revenue Service, 135 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1943). UL subsequently regained its tax-exempt status from Congress.

34. Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Foundation, 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 826 (1980).

35. See Petitioner's brief at pp. 43-47 and Respondent's brief at pp. 41-47 in American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982).

36. Alfred E. Kahn, "Cartels and Trade Associations," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 2:320-25 (standardization is essential if collusively fixed prices are to be truly uniform).

37. Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1962), 42-58.

38. Robert Leone, Who Profits (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

39. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 118.

40. McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, 66.

41. Brand (Corporatism and the Rule of Law, 307) also concludes that the NRA actually favored small and medium-sized businesses, not large ones as argued by Lowi and others.

42. Less than six months after it began operations OSHA incorporated into law over 250 pages of private standards, mostly from ANSI and NFPA (Federal Register 36 [May 29, 1971]: 10466). For a discussion of the problems that ensued, see Phillip Harter, "A View from the OSHA Task Force: Voluntary Standards Used in Regulation," ASTM Standardization News, May 1977.

43. Henry Weinstein, "OSHA Will Place New Limits on 402 Toxics," Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1988, 1.

44. Bruce W. Owen and Ronald Braeutigam, The Regulation Game: Strategic Use of the Administrative Process (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1978), 12.

45. Ibid., 3.

46. Lawrence S. Bacow, Bargaining for Job Safety and Health (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980), 45-46.

47. Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hansler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 113.

48. McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, 120-21.

49. As Lipset et al. argue in their landmark study of the International Typographical Union, it is necessary to combine structural and historical analyses to understand the organization (Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James C. Coleman, Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union [New York: Free Press, 1956], chap. 18).

50. Michael S. Hunt, "Trade Associations and Self-Regulation: Major Home Appliances," in Regulating the Product: Quality and Variety, ed. Richard E. Caves and Marc J. Roberts (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1975), 39-56.

51. Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Case Study of Occupational Safety and Health Regulations (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981).

52. David A. Garvin, "Can Industry Self-Regulation Work?" California Management Review 25, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 44.

53. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, xi.

54. Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982).

55. Lester B. Lave, The Strategy of Social Regulation: Decision Frameworks for Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), 8-28.