1. John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 41-42.

2. Abdallah Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb (Paris: François Maspero, 1982), 248.

3. There is some dispute about the appropriate characterization of this relationship, which some have identified as feudal. In State and Revolution in Algeria (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), Rachid Tlemçani argues against this claim on several grounds, but his own presentation of the communal nature of Algerian society is also open to interpretation. At least by 1871, local social harmony had been undermined. As Peter von Sivers notes, the difficulty some notables had in rousing peasant support for resistance suggests that differences in interest were widely perceived ("Rural Uprisings as Political Movements in Colonial Algeria, 1851-1914," in Islam, Politics, and Social Movements , ed. Edmund Burke III and Ira M. Lapidus [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988], 39-59).

4. Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb , 250; see also Tlemçani, State and Revolution , 29.

5. Ruedy, Modern Algeria , 46-48.

6. Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb , 277-78.

7. Ruedy, Modern Algeria , 55-57.

8. Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb , 279-81, and Ruedy, Modern Algeria , 59.

9. Tlemçani, State and Revolution , 34-37, and Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb , 280. See also René Gallisot, Maghreb-Algérie: Classes et nation (Paris: Arcantère, 1987), 1: 107-56.

10. Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), 125-26.

11. Ibid., 139; Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 214-17.

12. Bourdieu, Algerians , 139.

13. Elbaki Hermassi, Leadership and National Development in North Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), 136.

14. Ironically, Ahmad Pasha's concerted efforts in Tunisia to raise an army and implement fiscal reforms were partially inspired by the recent installation of the French in Algeria. With more time, Ruedy argues, an Algerian state apparatus might have emerged. Drawing on Vatin and others, he directs attention to several developments in the early nineteenth century. In addition to tribal or religious leaders who, like Abd-al-Qadir, controlled local political structures with potential for expansion, either of the two Ottoman offices of dey and bey might have provided the foundation for an eventual Algerian state. From 1817 to 1930, the office of dey was gradually being converted into a monarchy, and the beys of both Oran and Constantine were consolidating links with the local elites on whom they de-

pended to legitimize their authority. French colonization, of course, truncated such developments. See Ruedy Modern Algeria , 32-37 and 42-44; Jean-Claude Vatin, L'Algérie politique: Histoire et société (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1983), 96-104.

15. Quoted by Alastair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York: Viking Press, 1977), 40.

16. William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), 25-42.

17. Hermassi, Leadership and National Development , 132.

18. Mohammed Harbi, Le F.L.N.: Mirage et réalité (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1980), 389.

19. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership , 92. The nine chefs historiques were Ahmed Ben Bella, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohammed Khider, Mohammed Boudiaf, Mustapha Ben Boulaid, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Mourad Didouche, Rabab Bitat, and Belkacem Krim. Ben Boulaid, Ben M'Hidi, Didouche, Bitat, and Krim were wilaya leaders.

20. Tlemcani, State and Revolution , 62-63. Harbi, Le F.L.N. , 143-62.

21. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership , 134-38.

22. Provoking some controversy, Ben Khedda left the conference early, before any decision on the Political Bureau had been made. Ben Bella would later claim that the Political Bureau had been supported by a majority of the CNRA at Tripoli, but regardless, it was not invested by a formal vote of two-thirds majority as required by the CNRA statutes. Further undermining the Political Bureau's legitimacy, or at least its ability to perform, two of the proposed members (Mohamed Boudiaf and Hocine Ait Ahmed) refused to be part of it (Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership , 165-67).

23. See, e.g., Mohammed Harbi, Les Archives de la révolution algérienne (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1981); id., Le F.L.N.; Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership; Gallisot, Maghreb-Algérie; .

24. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership , 164.

25. Ramdane Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie depuis 1962 (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1991), 45.

26. See Bourdieu, Algerians; LaCoste-Dujardin, Des mères contre les femmes .

27. See Moore, Politics in North Africa , 285.

28. An appendix to Harbi's Le F.L.N. lists many such noms de guerre and reveals how extensive the practice was. See also Benjamin Stora, Dictionnaire biographique de militants nationalistes algériens (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1965). According to the journalist Hamza Kaïdi, even after Chadli Bendjedid became president, few knew that his given name was Khemaïs and Chadli a nom de guerre ("Chadli: Pouvoir, famille, et farniente. . . ," Jeune Afrique , no. 1622 [6-12 February 1992]).

29. Only four of the chefs historiques played active roles in the guerrilla war, and three of them died in the conflict (Ben Boulaid, Ben M'Hidi, and Didouche). The other five—including Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, and Boudiaf—were arrested when their plane was intercepted by the French; they spent the entire war in French custody.

30. Jean Leca and Jean-Claude Vatin, Algérie politique: Institutions et régime (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1975), 393.

31. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership , 241-45.

32. Ibid., 246-51.

33. Cf. Zartman, "The Algerian Army in Politics," in Man, State, and Society in North Africa , ed. I. William Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1973), 211-24.

34. John P. Entelis, "Algeria: Technocratic Rule, Military Power," in Political Elites in Arab North Africa , ed. I. William Zartman (New York: Longman, 1982.), 94.

35. "Les Petits pas de Chadli," Jeune Afrique , no. 1099 (27 January 1982).

36. "Qui tient la barre?" Jeune Afrique , no. 1345 (15 October 1986).

37. "A la tête de l'Algérie: Deux généraux et deux civils," Jeune Afrique , no. 1619 (16-23 January 1992), 8.

38. Soldiers were called in to reestablish order in Algiers in 1988, and in 1991 a protracted general strike initiated by Islamists ended in the imposition of martial law. Previously the army had preferred a position on the sidelines, "observing the process carefully, with a discreet but always present eye" (Entelis, "Algeria: Technocratic Rule, Military Power," 97).

39. David Ottaway and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Republic (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), 199.

40. I. William Zartman, "Algeria: A Post-Revolutionary Elite," in Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East , ed. Frank Tachau (New York: Schenkman), cited by Entelis, "Algeria: Technocratic Rule, Military Power," 97.

41. All of these men were "rehabilitated" into the FLN posthumously in 1984, as were Belkacem Krim and Mohamed Khider ( Le Monde , 25 October 1984). It is estimated that as many as one-half of the leaders who survived the war of liberation were subsequently murdered by instruments of the FLN in power (Khalid Duran, "The Second Battle of Algiers," Orbis 33 [Summer 1989], 413).

42. Moore, Politics in North Africa , 123-25.

43. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership , 195.

44. In an FFS memorandum written by Ali Mecili and reproduced in Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie , 194-202, allegations are made of military responsibility for the assassination of Khider. According to Redjala, Mecili was a member of the military intelligence forces before joining the FFS. He later became an attorney and close associate of Hocine Ait Ahmed; he was assassinated in Paris in 1987. See Hocine Ait Ahmed, L'Affaire Mecili (Paris: Editions de la découverte, 1989).

Harbi notes several victims of repression, listing the assassinations of Krim, Khider, and Cheikh Mesbah but also several "suicides" and "accidents" (Mohammed Harbi, "Sur les processus de relégitimation du pouvoir en Algérie," Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord 28 [1989], 134).

45. "Pas de condoléances pour la SM," Jeune Afrique , no. 1554 (10-16 October 1990). See also Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie , 170.

46. "Pas de condoléances pour la SM." See also Harbi, "Sur les processus de relégitimation."

47. Harbi, "Sur les processus de relégitimation," 134.

48. The entry on Algeria in the U.S. State Department's 1990 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990 notes: "In late 1990 the Government announced the abolition of the Algerian internal intelligence services, although this 'abolition' seems to represent a transfer of intelligence functions to other agencies rather than the end of governmental intelligence-gathering activity."

49. The wilaya of Kabylia was one of the last holdouts in the 1962 conflict, and FLN candidates from that region were among those excluded when electoral lists for the Constituent Assembly were revised.

50. See Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie , 161.

51. Ait Ahmad was condemned to death in April 1965 but was subsequently pardoned by Ben Bella. Before the Boumediene coup, he escaped from prison and went into exile, returning to Algeria only in December 1989.

52. Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie , pp 155-58.

53. These included the Organization of Popular Resistance and the Clandestine Organization of the Algerian Revolution. See Leca and Vatin, L'Algérie politique , 405-10.

54. ''Faible et divisée: L'Opposition algérienne," Jeune Afrique , no. 1350 (19 November 1986).

55. Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie , 164-67.

56. Ibid., 109.

57. Ibid., 128-32.

58. Ibid., 73, 171. From 1969 to 1975, democracy was not favored by the PRS (ibid., 109). See also Leca and Vatin, who note that Boudiaf's leadership within the PRS was commonly criticized for its authoritarian character and for the arbitrariness of decisions ( L'Algérie politique , 403).

59. Ibid., 122.

60. Kasdi Merbah, for example, head of the SM from 1962 to 1979 and prime minister from 1962 to l979, founded the Algerian Movement for Justice and Democracy. (He was assassinated in 1993.) In a separate effort Cherif Belkacem invited other figures prominent in the Boumediene era, including Abdel Aziz Bouteflika and Mohammed Salah Yahiaoui, to form a party.

61. World Bank, World Development Report, 1988 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 275, 281. By 1990, postsecondary education had reached 11 percent, and population had also grown, to 25 million ( World Development Report, 1992 ).

62. Duran, "Second Battle of Algiers."

63. "Algeria: Sectarian Clashes," Africa News , 11 April 1983.

64. "Chadli face aux intégristes," Jeune Afrique , no. 1296 (6 November 1985).

65. Several of his lieutenants survived and after a brief imprisonment would again take up armed struggle. In 1991, Abdelkader Chebouti revived the Armed Islamic Movement, which in 1992 under his direction became the backbone of the Army of Islamic Salvation (AIS, the armed branch of the Islamic Salvation Front, FIS), while Mansouri Meliani led an armed group near Blida from 1989 until his capture in 1992 (he was executed in 1993).

66. Duran, "Second Battle of Algiers," 405.

67. "Que vont faire les islamistes de leur victoire?" Jeune Afrique , no. 1538 (20-26 June 1990).

68. Ibid.

69. "La Dernière croisade des islamistes algériens," Jeune Afrique , no. 1568 (16-22 January 1991).

70. Several hundred Algerian Islamists served alongside Afghani rebels after 1980, and many of them have advocated armed struggle against the government.

Four radical groups were said to have surfaced, or resurfaced, by the end of 1991. One such group attacked military barracks in Guemmar in late November 1991 and in April 1992 were condemned to death by hanging. Although the FIS had a "hard" wing that advocated open confrontation with the government, it was not an armed movement at the time of its dissolution in February 1992.

71. See, e.g., Benjamin Storer "Huit clés pour comprendre," Jeune Afrique , no. 1539 (22 June-3 July 1990).

72. See "L'Arroseur arrosé," Jeune Afrique , no. 1588 (5-11 June 1991). In Djendel, Bir Oulad Khelifa, and Ben Allal, FIS municipal governments had actually been displaced.

73. "Kidnappers Give Foreigners '1 Month' to Leave," FBIS-NES-93-212 (4 November 1993). The statement accompanied the release of three French hostages kidnapped by a group calling itself the Armed Islamic Group, Jama'a al-islamiyya al-mussallah.