1. Although the golden urn lottery had been used on a number of occasions after 1792, it was not used for the last two Dalai Lamas or the last Panchen Lama.

2. The late Panchen Lama in 1988 wrote why he couldn't return to Tibet in 1949, "The Kashag (the Tibetan local government in Lhasa) had not recognized me as Panchen, so I couldn't go to Tibet. (According to Tibetan tradition, the confirmation of either the Dalai or the Panchen must be mutually recognized.)" (Panchen Lama 1988, p. 11.)

3. Tibet Press Watch , May 1995, p. 13, and Gyalo Thondup, comments made to delegation of National Committee on U.S. China Relations, November 1995, Hong Kong.

4. Gyalo Thondup was in Beijing as part of a secret delegation sent by the Dalai Lama. They carried letters to Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin (see Dalai Lama 1993).

5. Gyalo Thondup, comments made to delegation of National Committee on U.S. China Relations, November 1995, Hong Kong.

6. Ibid.

5. Gyalo Thondup, comments made to delegation of National Committee on U.S. China Relations, November 1995, Hong Kong.

6. Ibid.

7. FBIS—CHI-95-229, 29 November 1995, from Xinhua.

8. Apropos of this, R. Barnett (personal communication, April 1997) indicated that the Dalai Lama had already worked with a BBC film crew doing a piece on the selection of the Panchen Lama, creating incontrovertible film evidence that he had done the confirming divination before the Chinese announcement so there would be evidence that he had actually confirmed the boy before the Chinese. This could have been used as a face-saving device among his followers in exile.

9. These taxes were primarily to pay for the expansion of the army.

10. The Regulations of 1792 began the custom of the Chinese-run golden urn lottery.

11. The decree stated there was no need for "confirmation formalities" (i.e., the golden urn lottery).

12. Ya 1994, pp. 309-312.

13. Ya 1994, pp. 337-338.

14. However, as mentioned earlier, Mao did not want to elevate the Panchen Lama to political equality with the Dalai Lama, so he rejected the proposal to treat the Panchen Lama as head of a "Back Tibet" centered on Tashilhunpo that was equal to the Dalai Lama's "Front Tibet" centered on Lhasa.

15. FBIS—CHI-95-229, 29 November 1995, from Xinhua; FBIS—CHI-95-223, 4 November 1995, from Lhasa Radio.

16. FBIS—CHI-95-223, Lhasa Radio Broadcast, 3 November 1995.

17. Tibet Press Watch , May 1995, p. 13.

18. Xinhua News Agency, May 7, 1997, cited in World Tibet News .

19. The source for this is a senior Tibetan exile official.

20. Copy of letter dated February 21, 1997, provided by the International Campaign for Tibet.

21. Reuters, 20 January 1997.

22. Reuters, Taipei, 27 March 1997.

23. Internal unity among the exiles has been shaken over the past few years as a result of the Dalai Lama's willingness to forsake complete independence, and as a result of his prohibition of the worship of a Yellow Hat sect protector deity called Shungden. Threats have been made against the Dalai Lama's life, and in February 1997, a key monastic official working for the Dalai Lama was assassinated in Dharamsala by Tibetan dissidents.

24. Actually, in a recent TV interview, the Dalai Lama responded to a question about Buddhism and violence with the intriguing response that "intentions" are more important than actions, and that if acts, even violent ones, are carried out with pure intentions, they would not be evil.

25. Tibet Information Network News Update, 28 December 1996, SSN 1355-3313.

26. The first "official" U.S.-Tibet contact appears to have taken place in 1908 when W. W. Rockhill, President T. Roosevelt's envoy to China, met the thirteenth Dalai Lama. (See Rowland 1967, pp. 36-37.)

27. The U.S. CIA had informed the Tibetan guerrillas by the late 1960s that they were terminating U.S. financial support.

28. Most of the support groups appear to have developed as an outgrowth of the first riots in Lhasa in 1987 / 88 (see McLaren, forthcoming). An interesting account of the place of Tibet in the Western imagination is found in Bishop 1989.

29. Tibet Press Watch . May 1994, p. 5.

30. Tibet Press Watch . October 1996, p. 5.

31. President Bush, however, is said to have frankly told the Dalai Lama that he was limited in what the U.S. could do to help Tibet.

32. Tibet Press Watch . 1991, vol. 3 (1): 17. The president has the option of commenting on these provisions to clarify the official U.S. position but chose not to, apparently to avoid irritating the pro-Tibet lobby in Congress.

33. Herald Tribune , 22 November, 1993, p. 1.

34. An article by Shimuzu (1996) cogently examines the Clinton Administration's China policy.

35. State Department 1995, p. 4.

36. Ibid., p. 1.

35. State Department 1995, p. 4.

36. Ibid., p. 1.

37. World Tibet News , 11 April 1997 (press release from the Danish Tibet Support Group).

38. The New York Times , 16 April 1997, p. 6.

39. One is reminded of the fates of three other "Tibetan areas"—Sikkim, Ladakh, and Bhutan—all of whom, with different degrees of success, had to accommodate the interests of their powerful neighbor, India.

40. He would also have to agree to the legitimacy of the Panchen Lama chosen in China. However, since a lama like the late Panchen Lama can decide to incarnate into several new bodies simultaneously, it is possible to have two incarnations of one lama and this should pose no insurmountable problem.