1. For a contemporary discussion of the significance of these trends, see Arthur Upgren, "Geographical Directions of United States

Foreign Trade: A Study in National Interests," Council on Foreign Relations Memorandum E-B15, June 28, 1940. See also the section later in this chapter on the Council's role in postwar planning.

2. Jacob Viner, "National Monopolies of Raw Materials," Foreign Affairs 4 (July 1926), 595-600.

3. I. F. Stone, Business as Usual (New York: Modern Age, 1941), 28.

4. Quoted in Magdoff, Age of Imperialism , 49-50. For a similar assessment, see Percy Bidwell, Raw Materials: A Study of American Policy , (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1958), 1-2.

5. Quoted in Laurence Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The United States Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 24.

6. Fortune 20 (September 1939), 82.

7. After U.S. marines occupied the Philippines in 1898, President McKinley decided to retain the islands as a colony in part on the basis of investigations of their mineral wealth. See Benjamin Williams, Economic Foreign Policy of the United States (New York: McGraw Hill, 1929), 373. Also note the State Department's exertions to oppose a German monopoly on the world's available potash, a material needed for fertilizers and other chemicals. Joseph Brandes, Herbert Hoover and Economic Diplomacy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), 108-109.

8. H. Foster Bain, Ores and Industry in the Far East (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1927).

9. Congressional Record 84 (April 25, 1939), 4747-4748.

10. William C. Redfield, Dependent America (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1926), 17.

11. Bryan to Ambassador Page, November 12, 1914, in Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, hearings, Munitions Industry (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1936), 8258-8262.

12. Associates in International Relations, Department of Social Sciences, Raw Materials in War and Peace (West Point: U.S. Military Academy, 1947), 86-87.

13. U.S. Army, Strategic and Critical Raw Materials . Service Forces Manual M104. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 10; Associates in International Relations, Raw Materials , 86-87.

14. Redfield, Dependent America , 18. Cf. Address of Dr. George Smith, director of U.S. Geological Survey, at January 6, 1922, conference of Council on Foreign Relations, "Mineral Resources and Their Distribution as Affecting International Relations."

15. James Gould, Americans in Sumatra (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 97-99; Oliver Lawrence, "The International Control of Rubber," in W. L. Holland, ed., Commodity Control in the Pacific Area

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935), 402-408, 412; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Notes on Raw Materials in the Far East and Pacific Dependencies (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1933), 15-18; K. E. Knorr, World Rubber and its Regulation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1945); B. Wallace and L. Edminster, International Control of Raw Materials (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1930), Ch. VI; Brandes, Hoover , 85-86.

16. Quoted in Brandes, Hoover , 71.

17. Cited in Gould, Sumatra , 98. For more on his position, see Herbert Hoover, "America Solemnly Warns Foreign Monopolists of Raw, Materials," Current History 23 (December 1925), 307-311.

18. Lawrence, "Control of Rubber," 413.

19. According to one study of international cartels, the "great political and economic repercussions aroused [by] the Stevenson scheme . . . [were] still mentioned even in 1945 . . . as a reason why the United States public should resist all kinds of international marketing controls." Ervin Hexter, International Cartels (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1945), 284.

20. Harry Whitford, "The Crude Rubber Supply," Foreign Affairs 1 (June 15, 1924), 613-621. For more on the concern over U.S. dependence during this period, see Bain, Ores and Industry , 21-22; C. K. Leith, "The Political Control of Mineral Resources," Foreign Affairs 3 (July 1925 ), 541-555; C. K. Leith, ''Mineral Resources of the Far East," Foreign Affairs 4 (April 1926), 433-442; Josiah Spurr, "Steel-Making Minerals," Foreign Affairs 4 (July 1926), 601-612; Viner, "National Monopolies," 595-600.

21. Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1937) 38, 87.

22. Ibid., 38. Coconut shells were important because they produced the highest-quality charcoal used in gas-mask filters. For other important evaluations of U.S. dependency during the early 1930s, see C. K. Leith, World Minerals and World Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1931); Mineral Inquiry, Elements of a National Mineral Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1933). This study, conducted by various members of the Council on Foreign Relations, seems to have been an outgrowth of the famous Inquiry following World War I, many of whose leaders later founded the CFR. See also Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials (New York: Macmillan, 1934).

21. Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1937) 38, 87.

22. Ibid., 38. Coconut shells were important because they produced the highest-quality charcoal used in gas-mask filters. For other important evaluations of U.S. dependency during the early 1930s, see C. K. Leith, World Minerals and World Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1931); Mineral Inquiry, Elements of a National Mineral Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1933). This study, conducted by various members of the Council on Foreign Relations, seems to have been an outgrowth of the famous Inquiry following World War I, many of whose leaders later founded the CFR. See also Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials (New York: Macmillan, 1934).

23. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, hearings and report, The Tin Investigation (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935).

24. Staley, Raw Materials, 118 .

25. C. K. Leith, "Mineral Resources and Peace," Foreign Affairs 16 (April 1938), 522-523.

26. C. K. Leith, "Role of Minerals in the Present War," Mining Congress Journal 26 (November 1940), 34-38.

27. C. K. Leith, "Strategic Minerals in War and Peace," Science 93 (March 14, 1941), 244-246.

28. Stark to FDR, November 12, 1940, President's Secretary's File (hereafter "PSF"): Plan Dog, Roosevelt papers, Franklin Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park.

29. House Committee on Military Affairs, hearings, Strategic and Critical Raw Materials (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 109, 110, 115.

30. Ibid., 212-213. The Committee on Military Affairs, in its final report to Congress, concluded no less forcefully that the United States lacked "certain raw materials essential to the needs of the armed forces of the Nation and to the well-being of the civilian population in event of war" and would "find itself at a grave disadvantage in the event that war or other emergency should close the sea lanes or block the normal sources of supply." Congressional Record 84 (April 25, 1939), 4749.

29. House Committee on Military Affairs, hearings, Strategic and Critical Raw Materials (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 109, 110, 115.

30. Ibid., 212-213. The Committee on Military Affairs, in its final report to Congress, concluded no less forcefully that the United States lacked "certain raw materials essential to the needs of the armed forces of the Nation and to the well-being of the civilian population in event of war" and would "find itself at a grave disadvantage in the event that war or other emergency should close the sea lanes or block the normal sources of supply." Congressional Record 84 (April 25, 1939), 4749.

31. Army and Navy Munitions Board, The Strategic and Critical Materials (Washington: Army and Navy Munitions Board, 1940).

32. G. A. Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), viii-ix. He wrote further, "On the whole, the total United States imports of mineral origin in 1937 constituted about one-sixth of the total value of all imports; but of this one-sixth more than 40 percent was in the strategic group, and more than 20 percent in the one metal tin. This illustrates rather pointedly the exaggerated importance of this small group of a dozen materials, and explains to some extent their indispensable character in our present-day industrial life." Roush worked in the Commodity Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and was a major in the Staff Specialist Reserve, U.S. Army. His book won an award from the Society of American Military Engineers.

33. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 6; Office of Emergency Management, Materials for Defense (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941). See also "The Facts About Chromium," Far Eastern Review 37 (April 1941), 140, 143. Chromium was considered at one time the highest-priority material. See memorandum of conversation between Feis, Clayton, et al., 811.20 Defense (M)/865 1/2, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives. Hereafter cited by decimal file and record group.

34. Alvin Barber, "Philippine Chromite Now a Factor in World Market," Far Eastern Survey 8 (March 1, 1939), 58-59; Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States ,

1940 , 168. On the Philippines chromium potential, see U.S. Tariff Commission, United States-Philippine Trade , Report no. 118, 2nd series (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937).

35. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 8. See also "Manganese and Preparedness," Mining and Metallurgy 21 (October 1940), 453-455.

36. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce , 167.

37. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 11.

38. Ibid., 9. On the great significance of abaca, see also H. J. True-blood (EA) to Hornbeck (PA), March 4, 1941, 811.20 Defense (M)/2218, RG 59, National Archives.

37. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 11.

38. Ibid., 9. On the great significance of abaca, see also H. J. True-blood (EA) to Hornbeck (PA), March 4, 1941, 811.20 Defense (M)/2218, RG 59, National Archives.

39. Robinson Newcomb, "The United States and Southeast Asia's Strategic Products," Far Eastern Survey 8 (April 12, 1939), 88.

40. M. Kerbosh, "Some Notes on Cinchona Culture and World Consumption of Quinine," Far Eastern Review 36 (April 1940), 156-160.

41. Lt. Col. Herman Beukema and Lt. Arnold Sommer, "Dependence of U.S. Economy on Raw Materials from the Far East," Amerasia 3 (May 1939), 108.

42. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 19; Sir Lewis Fermer, "Burma's Mineral Resources and the War," Far Eastern Review 36 (April 1941), 124-127. See also Jonathan Marshall, "Opium, Tungsten and the Search for National Security, 1940-1952," in William O. Walker III ed., Drug Control Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 89-116.

43. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 18.

44. Newcomb, "Strategic Products," 89.

45. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 18. See also December 2, 1941, memorandum from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in Leo Pasvolsky office file, box 2, RG 59, National Archives; Adolph Bregman, "Tin," Iron Age 146 (July 4, 1940), 29-31; "Tin and Preparedness," Mining & Metallurgy 21 (September 1940), 412-413.

46. Colonel Rutherford testimony, House Committee on Military Affairs, hearings, Strategic and Critical Raw Materials , 129; William Fox, Tin: The Working of a Commodity Agreement (London: Mining Journal Books Ltd., 1974), 57-61; Norman Gall, Bolivia: The Price of Tin, Part I: Patino Mines and Enterprises (New York: American University Field Staff, 1974), 12-13. Sidney Ball observed, "The optimist might hope that Latin America, in the future, will furnish us with ore for from a quarter to a third of our consumption, provided we had smelters to treat it. For the rest, we must look elsewhere. The tin situation is critical." Engineering & Mining Journal 141 (September 1940), 39-41.

47. Army and Navy Munitions Board, memorandum to Industrial Materials Department, Advisory Commission to Council of National Defense, September 13, 1940, in entry 8, package 3, Rubber Survey Committee papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

48. George B. Emeny to W. W. Knight, Jr., July 16, 1941, 345.13413 C, RG 179, Records of the War Production Board, National Archives.

49. Indeed, the United States imported as much as 60 percent of the entire world output of rubber. Munitions Board, Critical Materials , 15.

50. William Christians and Otis Starkey, "The Far East as a Source of Vital Raw Materials," Annals 215 (May 1941), 84-85.

51. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 15-16.

52. Besides those already cited, see J. C. de Wilde and George Mon-son, "Defense Economy of the United States, An Inventory of Raw Materials," Foreign Policy Reports 16 (November 15, 1940), 202-212; Adolph Bregman, "Non-Ferrous Materials and Strategic Position," Iron Age 145 (January 4, 1940), 98-100; G. A. Roush, "Strategic Mineral Supplies," Military Engineer 30 (September-October 1938), 370-374; August Maffry, "Strategic Materials in United States Import Trade," Survey of Current Business 20 (December 1940), 10-15; "Strategic Materials: 14 Items Essential to National Defense Must Be Imported in Whole or in Part,'' Barron's 20 (May 20, 1940), 6; "Essential Defense Materials," Barron's 20 (June 3, 1940), 6; Robert Burnett Hall, "American Raw Material Deficiencies, and Regional Dependence," The Geographical Review 30 (April 1940), 1977-186, "America's Material Interests in the Far East Are Vital," Baltimore Sun , November 29, 1941. This latter article was particularly noted by Secretary of State Hull; see Leo Pasvolsky office file, box 2, in RG 59, National Archives. More optimistic accounts include "U.S. Dependence on Far East Discounted," Baltimore Evening Sun , July 20, 1940, and "Experts Say This Hemisphere Can Produce Defense Materials," Baltimore Evening Sun , July 4, 1940.

53. Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, hearings, Construction of Certain Naval Vessels (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 23. Other Navy officials discussed these issues even more bluntly. Rear Admiral Woodward wrote a column for the New York Journal American on February 23, 1941, entitled, "Philippines and U.S. Trade Routes Doomed if Japs Take Singapore."

54. Senate Naval Affairs Committee, hearings, Nomination of William Franklin Knox (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 9.

55. Japanese plans for a New Order have been widely analyzed and described. For a good summary of Japan's position, see the articles of

Akira Iriye reprinted in Esmonde Robertson, ed., The Origins of the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1971), especially 254-261, 269-271.

56. Andrew Roth, Japan Strikes South (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), 47-48, 2-3.

57. Address by Raymond Geist, May 21, 1941, Department of State Bulletin , May 24, 1941.

58. Stanley Hornbeck, "Japan Versus the United States," September 16, 1941, box 145, Stanley Hornbeck papers, Hoover Institution.

59. For evidence of the administration's deep concern, see 1940 Department of State Bulletin , 29-42, 63-81, 97-109, 176-186, 206-214, 25-245, 390-397, 461-464, 473-479, 506-510.

60. League of Nations, The Network of World Trade (Geneva: League of Nations, 1942), 87-88.

61. Dietrich, Far Eastern Trade , 11.

62. League of Nations, World Trade , 126.

63. Ibid., 80.

62. League of Nations, World Trade , 126.

63. Ibid., 80.

64. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce , Table I.

65. Kate Mitchell and W. L. Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1939 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), 16.

66. Address by Grady to the National Foreign Trade Council, July 31, 1940, Department of State Bulletin , August 3, 1940, 84-85.

67. Address by Raymond Geist, May 2, 1941, Vital Speeches 7 (August 1, 1941), 632.

68. Department of State Bulletin , April 6, 1940, 364; Franklin Roosevelt, message to the National Foreign Trade Convention, July 25, 1940, in Report of the Twenty-Seventh National Foreign Trade Convention (New York: NFTC), 346-347.

69. Speech by Will Clayton, "The World Cotton Situation," reprinted in Frederick Dobney, ed., Selected Papers of Will Clayton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 53-54. Clayton prefaced these remarks by saying, "This much seems certain: If the dictators win this war, the United States must embark on a preparedness program of colossal proportions. That means, among other things, an economic, and to some extent, a political revolution in the United States."

70. Edgar Smith, "Foreign Trade and the Free Enterprise System," speech of July 31, 1940 to Second General Session of the 27th Convention of the NFTC, in box 306, Hornbeck papers.

71. Emeny, Strategy of Raw Materials , 17.

72. Miner, "United States Policy," 61-62. First on the British War Department's list of "Far Eastern interests which we must do our utmost to defend in the event of war with Japan" were "essential sea

communications" (Chiefs of Staff Committee, "The Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese Intervention Against Us," July 31, 1940, PREM3 156/2, Public Records Office, London).

73. "General Strategy Review," July 31, 1941, cited in Miner, "United States Policy," 272; cf. Memorandum from First Sea Lord, "Essential Imports from the Far East," August 8, 1941, cited in ibid., 277. For more on British view of Singapore's importance, see minutes, memoranda, and cables in "Admiral Ghormley" folders of ComNavEu file, Operational Archives, Navy Yard, Washington D.C.

72. Miner, "United States Policy," 61-62. First on the British War Department's list of "Far Eastern interests which we must do our utmost to defend in the event of war with Japan" were "essential sea

communications" (Chiefs of Staff Committee, "The Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese Intervention Against Us," July 31, 1940, PREM3 156/2, Public Records Office, London).

73. "General Strategy Review," July 31, 1941, cited in Miner, "United States Policy," 272; cf. Memorandum from First Sea Lord, "Essential Imports from the Far East," August 8, 1941, cited in ibid., 277. For more on British view of Singapore's importance, see minutes, memoranda, and cables in "Admiral Ghormley" folders of ComNavEu file, Operational Archives, Navy Yard, Washington D.C.

74. Churchill to Roosevelt, February 15, 1941, in Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings and Exhibits XIV, 3452-3453. (Hereafter PHA Hearings or PHA Exhibits.)

75. For example, Churchill authorized a buildup of troops and aircraft in Malaya after the August 8, 1940, War Cabinet meeting. See War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS(40)676, F4144/193/61, Public Records Office.

76. Kate Mitchell, "Japan's Southern Drive Faces Obstacles, Amerasia 5 (June 1941 ), 139-140. See also Michael Greenberg, "Malaya—Britain's Dollar Arsenal," Amerasia 5 (June 1941), 144-151; Ernest Hauser, "Britain's Economic Stake in Southeast Asia," Far Eastern Survey , 6 (December 22, 1937, 283-288; Denis Weaver, The Battle of Supplies (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., n.d.).

77. Alexander Kiralfy, "American Pacific Strategy," Asia 39 (November 1940), 567-569.

78. "Navy Reaches Out in Pacific With Eyes on Aid to Britain," Newsweek , January 13, 1941, 33-34.

79. Stark to FDR, November 12, 1940, PSF:Plan Dog, Roosevelt papers.

80. James Herzog, Closing the Open Door (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973), 116. British representatives explained these considerations in more detail at an unofficial, private conference on "Anglo-American Cooperation in the Pacific" held on December 7-8, 1940 and attended by representatives of the U.K., Canada, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies, and the United States. In response to a question as to why the British wanted more aid in the Pacific instead of the Atlantic, they gave two answers: "Admittedly the situation in Europe is precarious. Britain requires full American aid. But it is essential to Britain's success in Europe that the war be prevented from spreading to the Pacific. The Far East is vital to the British war effort, particularly in the Near East. Australian manpower and materials are immediately important in the Mediterranean; in a long war the contribution of the Pacific Dominions, the Far Eastern colonies, and India may be decisive. Strategically the function of Singapore is to block Japan from

the Indian Ocean. Once British communications are disrupted by the Japanese Navy, the British may be lost in the Near East for lack of supplies. If this happens, the blockade of Europe is broken. American aid in the Pacific is essential, therefore, to prevent Germany and Italy from joining hands in the Near East with Japan in the Far East to break the back of British resistance." E. C. Carter, of the Institute of Pacific Relations, sent a copy of the transcript to Hornbeck, to be distributed through the Department. See box 460, Hornbeck papers.

Hull, in a discussion with Halifax, speculated about the possibility of a vast domino effect: "I myself have visualized the problem and issue in a broader way and that issue is presented by the plan of the Japanese to invade by force the whole of the Indian Ocean and the islands and continents adjacent thereto, isolating China, sailing across probably to the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil area, to the Cape of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a military despotism the trade routes and the supply sources to the British. I added that this broad military occupation would perhaps be more damaging to British defense in Europe than any other step short of the German crossing of the Channel." See Hull's memorandum of conversation in Department of State, Peace and War (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 710-711.

Note that some administration officials also feared the consequences to Britain if Japan sent its surplus raw materials to Nazi Germany, reinforcing the Axis war effort. See Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Far East, 1940 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), Volume IV, 232-233. (Hereafter these volumes are cited as FR .)

81. Many experts both at the time and subsequently believed the public awoke too late to the magnitude of the crisis. Commenting on the persistently widespread belief that the United States was invulnerable to blockades owing to its self-sufficiency, the U.S. Military Academy's Raw Materials in War and Peace observed: "The folly of such views, revealed in the train of events down to VJ-Day, was clear at least to American experts who were concerned with the problem of our raw materials resources in World War I. Unfortunately, the fallacy of our self-sufficiency persisted in popular opinion so strongly and for so long as to hamper seriously our preparation for the emergency precipitated by World War II. The heavy and needless cost of atonement for such errors of judgment and forethought has ushered in a more realistic examination of the nation's materials resources present and future" (80). The Armed Service Forces manual Strategic and Critical Raw Materials , similarly lamented that "It is a common form of misinformation long employed by propagandists, publicists, and wishful

thinkers to assure the American public that we have no vital needs which cannot be supplied within our own borders. Such misinformation is not only potentially harmful to our highly industrialized economic system, but it is a menace to the institution of an adequate program for war" (11). See also the discussion in the section on stockpiling.

82. Cyrus Peake, editorial, Amerasia 1 (May 1937), 100.

83. Statement of Senator Walsh, Congressional Record 83 (April 1938), 5518.

84. Naval Expansion Program , Senate report 1611, 75th Congress, 3rd session, April 18, 1938, 3-4. In hearings before the Senate Naval Affairs Committee in 1938, Navy Secretary Claude Swanson enumerated the many raw materials for which the United States was dependent on foreign sources and said, "It is necessary that we be able to defend the trade routes . . . for American ships to go in order to bring back the necessary raw materials." Senate Naval Affairs Committee, hearings, Naval Expansion Program (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938), 384.

85. Vital Speeches 7 (November 15, 1940), 75-76. See also his News Reel Address in New York City, September 18, 1940, in box 449, Horn-beck papers. In a letter to Hull on July 25, 1939, Hornbeck noted, "Admiral Yarnell has made for himself during this his last detail, in the Far East, a magnificent record. Our own [Foreign Service] officers, American and foreign civilians in the Far East, the 'foreign' press, and even the Japanese Navy, have given repeated testimony to the respect in which he is held and the admiration with which those near him have viewed his upholding of the traditions and the prestige of the United States in connection with the performance of the functions which have appropriately been his." Box 449, Hornbeck papers. See also the praise given Yarnell in Evans Carlson to Miss LeHand, January 23, 1941, PHA Exhibits, XX, 4282-4283.

86. Fortune 21 (January 1940), 79.

87. Fortune 21 (April 1940), 92.

88. Ibid., emphasis in the original. One businessman at the conference was moved to argue, "I believe that our foreign-trade policy should be based almost entirely upon our need for materials that we do not produce in this country, such as rubber, coffee, tea, silk, and other items. Our desire for these products rather than the pressure to sell our products abroad should be controlling" (104).

87. Fortune 21 (April 1940), 92.

88. Ibid., emphasis in the original. One businessman at the conference was moved to argue, "I believe that our foreign-trade policy should be based almost entirely upon our need for materials that we do not produce in this country, such as rubber, coffee, tea, silk, and other items. Our desire for these products rather than the pressure to sell our products abroad should be controlling" (104).

89. "America's Raw Material Needs: The Potential Availability of Strategic Supplies," The Index 20 (Winter 1940), 86-87.

90. Watson address, July 30, 1940, in box 306, Hornbeck papers. Watson used tin as an example of a vital import. "Tin is very impor-

tant in our manufacturing," he said, "because, in our great canning industry we have to import all of the tin we use. We import 34% of the world's production of tin." See also Report of the 27th National Foreign Trade Convention , 352.

91. Business Week , August 1940, 52.

92. Fortune 22 (April 1941), 90.

93. Fortune 24 (July 1941), 75.

94. Time , September 16, 1940, 45. See also Capt. Po-shen Yen, "The Economic Factor of American Far Eastern Policy," China Monthly II (April 1941), 15-17, 19; "Man in the Street Drives U.S. Stake in N.E.I.," China Weekly Review , October 26, 1940, 259-260. For a more elaborate popular discussion of the strategic resources of Southeast Asia, see Wilbur Burton, "The Dutch East Indies: Vital Resources," The Living Age CCCLIX (November 1940), 263-267. Daily newspapers also followed up the story of U.S. dependence on Far Eastern raw materials. The Washington Evening Star , for example, published a five-part series on U.S. dependence in May 1940 based on the Munitions Board study. (Copies of these articles may be found in the Hornbeck papers, box 403.) Other editorials and articles from major newspapers are cited later in the text. The Europe-oriented Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies also turned its propaganda efforts toward the Far East question. In a pamphlet by Livingston Hartley, the committee argued that Japan could greatly damage the British war effort by cutting off supplies of raw materials and men (from Australia and New Zealand) if it seized the strategic port. As the pamphlet pointed out, Japan could also weaken the United States by cutting off its supplies of rubber and tin and ultimately become a military threat to the United States. See Livingston Hartley, "Singapore," Hornbeck papers, box 389.

95. On the views of these public opinion leaders and regional elites, see Council On Foreign Relations, Some Regional Views on our Foreign Policy, 1941 , especially 30-31, 119, 137, 162, 178. It shows that elites generally recognized Japan's threat to vital raw material sources in Southeast Asia and favored a more militant foreign policy. The regional viewpoints expressed in this CFR study are those of members of the Committees on Foreign Relations located in strategic metropolitan centers throughout the country, such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Cleveland, St. Louis, Detroit and Chicago. The membership of these organizations reflected an upper-class and professional bias; top businessmen were most heavily represented. Other examples of statements by internationalist opinion makers include Mark Ethridge, "The Economic Consequences of a Hitler Victory," address before the Retail Merchants Association of Louisville, January 21, 1941, in Inter-

national Conciliation 370 (May 1941), 558-559; Charles Woolsey Cole, "International Economic Dependence," monograph for Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, in International Conciliation 369 (April 1941), 242; John Oakie, "Today We Need Access to Eastern War Materials," and John Condliffe, "We Must Keep China and the Indies Within the World's Free Trade Area," both in San Francisco Chronicle , June 30, 1941.

96. Miriam Farley, "America's Stake in the Far East Trade," Far Eastern Survey 5 (July 29, 1936), 169-170. See also her pamphlet, America's Stake in the Far East (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council, 1936).

97. Robert Barnett, America Holds the Balance in the Far East (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council, 1940), 21.

98. Henry Douglas, "Japan's Expansion," China Today , March 1940.

99. Robert Aura Smith, Our Future in Asia (New York: Viking Press, 1940). Smith worked with the New York Times through 1941. The theme of his book might be summed up in his sentence, "The South China Sea is the battle-ground for our future in Asia." He dealt at great length with Southeast Asia's raw materials reserves and with U.S. needs and concluded that the United States must fight to protect its lifelines to Southeast Asia. Also see his "Japan Forces America's Hand," China Monthly 1 (December 1940). Trade expert Ethel Dietrich observed that the loss of trade from the Far East would burden U.S. consumers in a host of ways that went well beyond the loss of militarily strategic materials: "Other commodities vitally important to American industries, if not themselves war necessities, include bristles, coconut oil and copra, jute and kapok, shellac, perilla oil, pyrethrum, soya beans, tapioca and tung oil, over 75 percent of which come from these countries. Among the food imports, tea, pepper and spices come almost wholly from Southeastern Asia. Medical supplies include, in addition to quinine, camphor, menthol, agar-agar and nux vomica" (Dietrich, Far Eastern Trade , 170.) Other books include Claude Buss, War and Diplomacy in Eastern Asia (New York: Macmillan, 1941): "The United States would be in an industrial predicament if a war should cut off the stream of imports from the land of the setting sun" (510), and Mark Gayn, The Fight for the Pacific (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1941), ch. 18, ''Treasure Box of Asia."

100. A number of these are quoted in later chapters on diplomacy.

101. Stone, Business as Usual , 29.

102. Hanson W. Baldwin, United We Stand (New York: Whittlesey House, 1941), 87. For a sample refutation of this line of argument, see R. Veatch, "South America as a Source of United States Strategic Materials," March 21, 1940, in box 56, Feis papers.

103. Justus Doenecke, ed., In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940-1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 169-170.

104. "Did you know that the Western Hemisphere by itself possesses all the materials necessary for American industry in war or peace?" in Doenecke, In Danger Undaunted , 169 (no. 17, August 8, 1941). In another document, issued as Japan was seizing southern Indochina, the committee repeated, "A threat to the rubber and tin supply line is not the emergency that the President and General Marshall are talking about. American boys need not die for old Dong Dang." ("Did you know that Congress is being asked to declare a national emergency whose nature is unknown?" no. 12, July 24, 1941, in Ibid., 365.)

105. Ibid., 172.

103. Justus Doenecke, ed., In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940-1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 169-170.

104. "Did you know that the Western Hemisphere by itself possesses all the materials necessary for American industry in war or peace?" in Doenecke, In Danger Undaunted , 169 (no. 17, August 8, 1941). In another document, issued as Japan was seizing southern Indochina, the committee repeated, "A threat to the rubber and tin supply line is not the emergency that the President and General Marshall are talking about. American boys need not die for old Dong Dang." ("Did you know that Congress is being asked to declare a national emergency whose nature is unknown?" no. 12, July 24, 1941, in Ibid., 365.)

105. Ibid., 172.

103. Justus Doenecke, ed., In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940-1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 169-170.

104. "Did you know that the Western Hemisphere by itself possesses all the materials necessary for American industry in war or peace?" in Doenecke, In Danger Undaunted , 169 (no. 17, August 8, 1941). In another document, issued as Japan was seizing southern Indochina, the committee repeated, "A threat to the rubber and tin supply line is not the emergency that the President and General Marshall are talking about. American boys need not die for old Dong Dang." ("Did you know that Congress is being asked to declare a national emergency whose nature is unknown?" no. 12, July 24, 1941, in Ibid., 365.)

105. Ibid., 172.

106. On the early history, see Whitney Shepardson, "The Early History of the Council on Foreign Relations," privately printed, in Shepardson papers, Roosevelt Library; "Report of the Committee appointed by an informal meeting of persons attached to the British and American peace delegations at the Hotel Majestic on May 30th, 1919," in box 329, Hornbeck papers.

107. Hamilton Fish Armstrong speech, quoted in CFR, "Proceedings at the Opening of the Harold Pratt House," April 6, 1945.

108. The most substantial published work on its influence is Laurence Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations & United States Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977). Its chapter 4 deals cogently with the issues raised here.

109. Lester Milbraith, "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy," in James Rosenau, ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 247.

110. Joseph Kraft, "School for Statesmen," Harper's Magazine , July 1958, 64.

111. Quoted in Kraft, "Statesmen," 67. Feis and Stimson both published books through the council. Roosevelt was not himself a member, but many of his close friends were, including council president Norman Davis, one of his most trusted advisers. Roosevelt founded the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, which helped finance the council. (See grants list in box 58, Arthur Sweetser papers, Roosevelt Library.) Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong later became president of the foundation. Roosevelt even lived next door to the council's headquarters in New York. See Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Peace and Counterpeace: From Wilson to Hitler (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 439.

112. In a single year, the journal published C. K. Leith, "The Political Control of Mineral Resources," Foreign Affairs 3 (July 1925), 541-555; C. K. Leith, "Mineral Resources of the Far East," Foreign Affairs 4 (April 1926,) 433-442; Josiah Spurt, "Steel-Making Minerals," Foreign Affairs 4 (July 1926), 601-612; Jacob Viner, "National Monopolies of Raw Materials," Foreign Affairs 4 (July 1926), 595-600. Among its books were Council on Foreign Relations, Mineral Resources and Their Distribution As Affecting International Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1922); H. Foster Bain, Ores and Industry in the Far East (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1927); Mineral Inquiry, Elements of a National Mineral Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1933); and Staley, Raw Materials . See also Eckes, Global Struggle , 38, 53.

113. Council on Foreign Relations, The War and Peace Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations, 1939-1945 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1946), 2-3; Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Of-rice, 1949), 19-22; Kraft, "Statesmen," 67. Breckinridge Long recorded in his diary for January 4, 1940, "It is all to be be secret, and if anything is known about it, it is to be given the color of economic activity in support of the Trade Agreements program" (Fred Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge Long [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966], 51). The head of the council's postwar planning group was Norman Davis, Roosevelt's close friend and foreign policy adviser. Other key figures included Johns Hopkins University president and geographer Isaiah Bowman, a former member of President Wilson's team in Pads; Allen Dulles, then an attorney with Sullivan and Cromwell; and Harvard economist Alvin Hansen.

114. Mallory letter to Eugene Staley, September 18, 1945, CFR file, box 2, Bay Region IPR papers, Hoover Institution.

115. See minutes of May 2, 1942, meeting of the Division of Special Research in box 85, Hull papers, Library of Congress; Hull's letters to Hamilton Fish Armstrong and Isaiah Bowman, July 30, 1945, in box 54, Hull papers; and Hull memo to Gray, April 14, 1944, box 85, Hull papers.

116. Winfield Riefler, quoted in council discussion paper T-A14, June 17, 1941.

117. E-B27, "Economic Trading Blocs and Their Importance for the United States," February 15, 1941.

118. E-B34, "Methods of Economic Collaboration: Introductory. The Role of the Grand Area in American Economic Policy, July 24, 1941.

119. E-B31, "Intra-Bloc Preferential Tariff and Other Devices for Encouraging Economic Integration," March 7, 1941.

120. E-B12, "A Pan-American Trade Bloc," June 7, 1940; P-A12, discussion re effects of Russia's entry into the war, June 25, 1940; E-B17, "The Resources of Germany and the United States," June 28, 1940; E-B18, Supplement II, "The Future Position of Germany and the United States in World Trade: A Western Hemisphere-Pacific Area Economic Bloc," September 6, 1940; E-B27, "Economic Trading Blocs."

121. E-B34, "Methods of Economic Collaboration."

122. William Diebold Jr. comment, in T-A14, June 17, 1941.

123. E-B31, "Intra-Bloc Preferential Tariff."

124. T-B8, "Political Regions of Eastern Asia," May 20, 1940 [prepared by Owen Lattimore]. For Roosevelt's glowing praise, see his letter to Chiang Kai-shek, June 23, 1941, in PSF:China, FDR papers.

125. E-B26, "American Far Eastern Policy," January 15, 1941. See Pasvolsky note to Hull, January 28, 1941, in box 75, Hull papers.

126. Ibid. This strategy of confining the conflict to China was fore-shadowed by study group reports from late 1940, which envisioned the country as serving as "fly paper" for Japan's Imperial Army: "If Japan is to be deterred from a southward thrust (without a very remote and difficult naval war by the United States), it must, therefore, be forced to devote greater resources of manpower, material, and shipping to its struggle against Nationalist China. By assisting the Chinese to intensify their resistance to Japanese conquest the United States might help so burden Japan that its reserves of shipping, material, and manpower would not be adequate to embark on the conquest of the Netherlands East Indies and of Singapore" (T-B20, "Aid to China," October 11, 1940). For the "fly paper" analogy, see T-B22, ''Alternatives of American Policy Toward Russia," December 9, 1940.

125. E-B26, "American Far Eastern Policy," January 15, 1941. See Pasvolsky note to Hull, January 28, 1941, in box 75, Hull papers.

126. Ibid. This strategy of confining the conflict to China was fore-shadowed by study group reports from late 1940, which envisioned the country as serving as "fly paper" for Japan's Imperial Army: "If Japan is to be deterred from a southward thrust (without a very remote and difficult naval war by the United States), it must, therefore, be forced to devote greater resources of manpower, material, and shipping to its struggle against Nationalist China. By assisting the Chinese to intensify their resistance to Japanese conquest the United States might help so burden Japan that its reserves of shipping, material, and manpower would not be adequate to embark on the conquest of the Netherlands East Indies and of Singapore" (T-B20, "Aid to China," October 11, 1940). For the "fly paper" analogy, see T-B22, ''Alternatives of American Policy Toward Russia," December 9, 1940.

127. T-A14, June 17, 1941, discussion of Lattimore's memo, Coordination of American Policy in the Far East. Many CFR studies and discussions were quite sympathetic to Japan, seeing it as a preeminent organizing power in the postwar Asian economy, an ally in supplanting European influence and a worthy trading partner. See CFR Study Group, "Do Bases for a Real Peace Exist Between the United States and Japan?" November 3, 1941; E-B33, "The Economic Organization of Peace in the Far East," June 20, 1941. Riefler pointed out that "from a strategic point of view it would be wise to bring Japan into the Grand Area by making her dependent on our market rather than building up the Far East as an autonomous region" (E-A16, May 17, 1941). Another study assumed that "Japan will play a leading role in that peace because of her position in the Far East and in the world. . . . Basically, Japan must secure a commercial role commensurate with her importance as an economic power" (E-B33).