1. For the text of the petition, see GG 1013: pp. 93-94; for the text of the protest sent to the embassies and the Porte, see pp. 92-93.

2. GG 1013: p. 92, 1 Tem. 1308 (July 1892).

3. GG 1013: pp. 89, 91-92, 103-104, and 95-98, various correspondence (June-Aug. 1892). For more information on this issue, see Chapter 4.

4. GG 1013: pp. 94 and 106-109 for copy of the protocol and related correspondence among the Palace, the Porte, and the Foreign Ministry; pp. 110-111, general instructions of the sultan, 26 M 1310; and pp. 111-112, special instructions of the grand vizier, 29 M 1310 (Aug. 1892).

5. For recommendations of Mustafa Arslan, see GG 1013: pp. 111-112, 29 M 1310, from the grand vizier, and pp. 104-105, 3 and 8 Agus. 1308, from the governors of Beirut and Damascus (Aug. 1892). Naum felt that Mustafa's appointment to Shuf would complicate the affairs of that district, and contemplated other options, but in the end yielded to the pressure in favor of Mustafa. See GG 1016: 1, 13, and 16 R; 4 and 9 Ca, and 3 B 1310 (Oct. 1892-Jan. 1893).

6. William Shorrock, French Imperialism in the Middle East, 1900-1914 (Madison, 1976), 138-148; Spagnolo, France , 196-202 and 217; Jacques Thobie, "Osmanli Devleti'nde Yabanci Sermaye," in Tanzimat'tan

Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi , vol. 3 (Istanbul, 1985), 724-739, and Interêts et impérialisme Français dans l'Empire Ottoman, 1895-1919 (Paris, 1977).

7. Akarh, "Abdulhamid II's Attempt to Integrate Arabs," 74-89, and "Economic Policy and Budgets in Ottoman Turkey, 1876-1909," Middle Eastern Studies 28(1992): 443-476; Sevket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913 (Cambridge, 1987), chap. 7.

8. GG 1013: pp. 147-150, 26 M, 2 S, 14 Ra, and 20 Ra 1311 (Aug.-Sept. 1893), and CL 2/82 (1310-1311). Also see GG 1016: various correspondence in the months of M-Ra 1311.

9. See, for instance, the report of the committee sent to inspect the Beirut harbor in Nov. 1903: CL 1/37: göm. 2, no. 10. On the sentries' involvement in smuggling, see CL 1/37, göm. 2, no. 34, from Mount Lebanon to the Porte, 3 Ca 1325 (June 1907).

10. GG 1014: 16 B 1283 (Nov. 1866).

11. Compare YEE: 35/439/122/105, defter 2, p. 20, 28 Sh 1303 (June 1886), and YEE: 35/429/122/104, 18 R 1303 (Jan. 1886).

12. GG 1016: 7-27 Ka.e. and 18 Ka.s. 1308 (Dec. 1892-Jan. 1893), and 14 Tem., 17 Agus., and 21 Ka.e. 1309 (1893).

13. GG 1019: 6 Sh 1326 (Sept. 1908) and 11 S 1330 (Jan. 1912).

14. On these issues, see Akarh "Ottoman Attitudes Towards Lebanese Emigration, 1885-1910," in The Lebanese and the World: A Century of Emigration , ed. A. Hourani and N. Shehadi (London, 1992), 109-138. On Lebanese emigration in general, see other articles in the same work and those of Karpat, Labaki, Naff, Orfalea, and Safa mentioned in the Bibliography, and Hitti, 473-477.

15. See Khater's account, based on contemporary Lebanese memoris and newspapers (pp. 151-161). It should be noted, however, that Khater tends to have a bias in favor of the Maronite clerical point of view. Spagnolo's account ( France , 190-203), based on contemporary French documents, makes it clear that the French were critical of Naum's authoritarian ways but nevertheless appreciated his efficiency.

16. See Isma'il Haqqi, 603. On budgetary issues, see Chapter 5 below.

17. See CL 1/20: nos. 17 and 34-38 (May-June 1897), and CL 3/104: no. 4, 19 Ra 1315 (Aug. 1897), for petitions. For references to other complaints and petitions, see GG 1016: 23 Te.e. and 16 Te.s. 1309 (Nov. 1893) and 19 Haz. 1310 (July 1894), from the Porte to Naum; the last two letters urge Naum to use discretion. For other complaints, see CL 1/20: nos. 19 and 20 (May-June 1897). On the investigation of Tuaini, see CL 3/107: nos. 11-12, 19 N and 9 L 1315 (Feb.-March 1898).

18. CL 3/107: nos. 17-18, B 1317 (Nov. 1899), letters sent to the Porte by an "Ottoman loyalist" and a "loyal informant"; no. 41, Mart 1318 (March 1902), from Khalil Shihab to the Porte; and no. 40, 2 Mayis 1318

(May 1902), to the foreign minister, by a group of Lebanese notables who wanted their names concealed for fear of Naum's and Mustafa Arslan's possible vengeance.

19. CL 3/107: nos. 31 and 45, 13 Ka.s. 1317 (Jan. 1902), for the original petitions; and nos. 21-23 and 28-29 for their Ottoman-Turkish translations.

20. CL 3/107: nos. 24, 26-27, 30, 33-34, and 39, 23 Z 1319-30 R 1320 (Apr.-Aug. 1902), correspondence between the Porte and various ministries on the petitions and letters mentioned in notes 17 and 18 above. On the development of events leading to Muzaffer's election, see CL 3/113: nos. 1-22, 27 R-28 C 1320 (Aug.-Oct. 1902).

21. This is the impression one gets from reading al-Mallah's book. Muzaffer's contemporaries agree on his good intentions, especially in the first two years of his governorship; see the quotations in Khater, 166-168.

22. CL 1/37: no. 68, 11 L 1320 (Jan. 1903), from the Porte to the Interior Ministry, in reference to Muzaffer's letter dated 18 N 1320 (Dec. 1902). Muzaffer hinted at this solution in his later letters as well. See the references to these letters in the correspondence between the Porte and the Interior Ministry: CL 1/37: göm. 2, nos. 1, 2, and 8, Sh-N 1321 (Oct.-Dec. 1903). For the response of the governor of Damascus, see al-Mallah, 112.

23. CL 2/77-4: nos. 1-16, 17 C-6 Za 1320 (Sept. 1902-Feb. 1903). On the French position, see Spagnolo, France , 226-227; also see al-Mallah, 296-298.

24. There were times when Abdulhamid II would even force his legalistic ministers to stretch the related agreements to their legal limits in order to protect the interests of Ottoman subjects. See the cases discussed in Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908 (New York, 1983).

25. CL 1/37: göm. 3, no. 66, 17 Sh 1320 (Nov. 1902); no. 71, 8 Za 1320 (Feb. 1903), and göm. 2, no. 2, 1 Sh 1321 (Oct. 1903). Also see al-Mallah, 153-155, 197-206, and 293-294.

26. See the same documents mentioned in the previous note. Muzaffer's accusations were corroborated by the findings of a high-level inspection committee later in 1903; see CL 1/37: göm. 2, no. 10, 15 Sh 1321 (Nov. 1903), and its cover letter, no. 9, same date.

27. CL 1/37: göm. 3, no. 69, 27 L 1320 (Jan. 1903), and YEE: 5/2195/83/2, 3 Za 1320 (Feb. 1903). The latter letter indicates that the Porte considered initiating an investigation of Muzaffer, but refrained. Also see al-Mallah, 200-201.

28. CL 3/114-1: no. 12, 21 Ka.s. 1318 (Feb. 1903), telegram from the grand vizier to Muzaffer. For other correspondence on this incident, see the same file, nos. 6, 9, 17, 26, 28, 29, 33, 35, 38, and 42, Ka.s.-Shu. 1318 (Feb.-March 1903). Also see al-Mallah, 287-296.

29. For the problems between the companies and the local groups, see Thobie's works mentioned in note 6 above. The inspection committee report mentioned in note 26 above makes it clear that Resid was not only supportive of local interest groups but was in fact an organizer and legitimizer of them. See my ''Ottoman Attitudes" for more details on this report.

30. See al-Mallah, 289-291, and Spagnolo, France , 226-227.

31. CL 3/114-1: no. 9, 19 Ka.s. 1318; no. 28, 27 Ka.s. 1318; no. 29, 27 Ka.s. 1318; no. 26, 11 Za 1320; and no. 42, 28 Shu. 1318 (Feb.-March 1903).

32. CL 1/37: göm. 3, no. 71, p. 4, 8 Za 1320 (Feb. 1903). Muzaffer encouraged the Maronite patriarch to write a letter to the Palace with the same emphasis; see al-Mallah, 291-294. Another petition sent to the Palace by "Kisrawanis" was also written, almost certainly with Muzaffer's encouragement; see CL 3/114-1: no. 38, 30 Ka.s. 1318 (Feb. 1903).

33. CL 3/114-1: no. 33, 15 Za 1320 (Feb. 1903), and its appendices nos. 34-35, 10-11 Feb. 1903. Muzaffer was obviously afraid of the Porte's wrath, and in this letter he wrote as if the whole incident had occurred on the initiative of local people.

34. For more information on these developments and the details of the inspection committee report, see the sources mentioned in notes 26 and 29. For Muzaffer's views on the new governor, see CL 1/37, göm. 2, no. 2, 1 Sh. 1321 (Oct. 1903). On the incidents that led to Resid's dismissal, see al-Mallah, 324-357.

35. See note 51 below.

36. See al-Mallah, 112-114 and 242-252.

37. Isma'il Haqqi, 603. The Council did not always fulfill this role very responsibly. For instance, an agreement was reached between Beirut and Mount Lebanon according to which the former would construct 33 kilometers of the Beirut-Saida road at a cost of 5,000 Ottoman liras, in return for construction of a 14-kilometer section of the Beirut-Tripoli road by the latter at an estimated cost of 4,000 Ottoman liras. When Beirut fulfilled its part of the agreement, the Administrative Council pleaded its inability to fulfill its own part. See GG 1016: 7 B 1323 (Sept. 1905), where the Porte invites the mutasarrifiyya to honor its pledge. On another occasion, distribution of the burden for the construction of roads led to a serious dispute among the councillors; see CL 5/190, esp. nos. 5-8, Za 1323 (Jan. 1906).

38. GG 1016: 6 M 1321 (Apr. 1903); CL 3/134: nos. 3-4, 20 Ra and 4 C 1321 (June and Aug. 1903); CL 3/135: 28 B 1321 (Oct. 1903); YEE: 30/2560/51/78: 26 Ra 1322 (June 1904); CL 1/37: göm. 2, no. 20, 5 B 1322 (Sept. 1904) and no. 27, 29 B 1323 (Sept. 1905); GG 1016: 5 B 1323 (Sept. 1905); GG 1013: pp. 158-159, 16 Te.s. 1322 (Nov. 1906). Also see al-Mallah, 115-134 and 155-178.

39. For examples of the kind of pressure the Arslans were putting on Muzaffer, see the petitions in CL 3/114-1: no. 24, ca. Dec. 1902-Jan. 1903, sealed or signed by more than 5,000 people; no. 27, 8 Ka.s. 1318 (Jan. 1903), 'Imadzade 'Ajjaj and his 36 friends; and no. 25, 23 Shu. 1318 (March 1903), 'Ajjaj and his 51 friends. Compare al-Mallah, 112-113.

40. See al-Mallah, 387-394, on relations between the governor and the Church. The following account of the events of 1904 is based on correspondence between Istanbul and Mount Lebanon and the petitions preserved in CL 3/118: nos. 3-45, 22 Mayis 1320-4 Agus. 1321 (June 1904-Aug. 1905). Other related sources are mentioned in notes 41-47 below.

41. Al-Mallah (pp. 393-394) believes that the whole incident was a scheme of the governor of Beirut to drive a wedge between Muzaffer and the patriarch and embarrass both. The Ottoman documents, however, make it clear that the bandit, Iskandar Nims, was in fact captured in the Mountain. There is strong evidence that he was hiding in the monasteries, although he was arrested in a private house. Apparently Muzaffer dropped the charges that would have implicated the Church in this incident. See CL 3/118: nos. 17-19, 9-21 Ca 1322 (July-Aug. 1904) on Iskandar's capture.

42. In addition, the Porte ordered Muzaffer to send his son Resid away from the Mountain, because of numerous complaints about the latter's behavior. On Resid, see Muzaffer's biography in Appendix A.

43. CL 3/118: no. 37, 22 L 1322 (Dec. 1904). Cf. no. 36, 18 N 1322 (Nov. 1904), and no. 25, 4 B 1322 (Sept. 1904).

44. CL 3/118: no. 38, 28 L 1322 (Jan. 1905).

45. Sa'adullah's position becomes evident in Muzaffer's complaints about him: CL 1/21: no. 14, 18 N 1322 (Nov. 1904). On Ilias Huwayyik's position, see Spagnolo, France , 230-233. Muzaffer was aware of the existence of different positions within the Maronite Church, but he believed them to be insignificant: CL 3/118: no. 31, 8 Sh 1322 (Oct. 1904). Also see Chapters 4 and 8 below. On the patriarch's visit to Istanbul, see CL 3/144: nos. 1-35 (Sept. 1905-Jan. 1906).

46. Shakib Arslan, Muzaffar Bâsha fi Lubnân (Alexandria, 1907), summarized and quoted in al-Mallah, passim, esp. pp. 380-386. On Habib's dismissal, see CL 1/21: nos. 15-16, 5-6 Tem. 1321 (July 1905). Muzaffer dismissed even Kan'an al-Zahir at this point, but appointed him to the important district governorship of Matn at the first opportunity, which availed itself in 1906. See the list of officials in al-Mallah, 246-247.

47. See the next chapter on the councillor elections of 1907 and subsequent developments. Muzaffer's conduct was in accord with the instructions of the Porte to forestall the rise of political tension in the Mountain: see CL 1/21, nos. 21, 23, and 25, 14-21 S 1325 (March-April 1907).

48. GG 1013: pp. 160-161, 27-28 Ca 1325 (July 1907).

49. On the problems of Ottoman policy at this juncture, see Akarli,

"Problems," 65-69. For details on Yusuf's appointment, see Spagnolo, France , 235-237. On Habib's efforts, see CL 5/207: nos. 16 and 31.

50. Spagnolo, France , 236-239; and the Porte's letters to Yusuf praising his performance: GG 1019: 2 Z 1325 (Jan. 1908); CL 5/198: no. 1, 17 Te.s. 1323 (Nov. 1907), and no. 3, 2 Z 1325 (Jan. 1908).

51. The Union and Progress Society is commonly referred to as the Young Turks in modern literature. This denotation misleads the uninitiated reader to believe that the Society was composed of "Turks" alone and that it represented a nationalistic movement. The Society in 1908 was distinctly Ottomanist and as such it had an appeal among a broad range of the various ethnic groups within the Empire, particularly in its Anatolian and Arab provinces. There were prominent Arab, Jewish, Circassian, Albanian, Armenian, and Greek figures among the Society's membership. "Young Turks" was a term used in European languages, which also referred to the Ottoman Empire as the ''Turkish Empire." In Turkish and Arabic, the members of the Society were simply the "Unionists" ( ittihâdci/ ittihâdiyûn ). "Young Turks" became the common term under the influence of nationalistic and retrospective interpretations of history, which overlook the transformation of the Society from a basically liberal alliance in the early 1900s to a centrist and corporatist party emphasizing Turkish as the common parlance of the "modern" nation-society which it aspired to form. Although pan-Turkish nationalistic sentiments were always present as a latent force, and became dominant among the party leadership during the First World War, the emphasis placed on this dimension of the Union and Progress movement conceals the true scope of its historical influence on political life in the Empire, including Mount Lebanon and Beirut. Recent research on the Union and Progress movement informs us of its dynamics and the transformation it went through. See, e.g., Hasan kayali, "Arabs and Young Turks: Turkish-Arab Relations in the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1988).

52. See Feroz Ahmad, "Great Britain's Relations with the Young Turks," Middle Eastern Studies 2 (1966): 302-329; Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (Princeton, N.J., 1968), in the light of Feroz Ahmad's criticism of this book in Middle Eastern Studies 6 (1970): 100-105; and Hayri Mutluçag, ed., Sovyet Devlet Arsivi Belgelerinde Anadolu'nun Taksimi Plani (Istanbul, 1972), esp. 53-89.

53. See CL 5/198: no. 2, 15 Te.s. 1323 (Nov. 1907). Compare Spagnolo, France , 236-237.

54. Walid ' Awad, Ashâb al-fakhâma ruasâ Lubnân (Beirut, 1977), 78-84; CL 5/216: nos. 1-22, Za 1326-M 1327 (Nov. 1908-Jan. 1909); and Spagnolo, France , 248-254. Cf. GG 1013: p. 162, 12 Za 1326 (Dec. 1908), for the Porte's argument about how the Lebanese would benefit from

being represented in the Ottoman Parliament; and GG 1019: no. 137, 1 M 1327 (Jan. 1909), on some of the incidents that occurred during discussion of the issue among the Lebanese.

55. See CL 3/114: no. 26, 28 Haz. 1325 (July 1909), Yusuf paraphrasing a resolution of the Administrative Council; and no. 74, 2 Dec. 1909, petition from 33 people writing "on behalf of the 2,000 Lebanese in Amazonas, Brazil."

56. For Talat's views, see CL 3/114: nos. 27, 36, and 37 (June-Oct. 1909), and other correspondence mentioned in note 57.

57. GG 1019: nos. 41-42, 20 Za 1326 and S 1328 (Dec. 1908, Feb. 1910) and CL 3/114: nos. 22-82, Za 1326-S 1328 (Dec. 1908-Feb. 1910), official correspondence and various petitions from Lebanese and Beirutis. The decision barring sailing vessels along with steamships was taken on 22 Sept. 1909 and officially revised in early Feb. 1910, but the correspondence makes it clear that, pending a revision, the decision was ignored within a week. See esp. CL 3/114: nos. 41, 37, and 67. A summary of the most important correspondence is provided in documents no. 79 (ca. Jan. 1910) and no. 82 (ca. Feb. 1910). On France's position, see Spagnolo, France , 256-257.

58. Ottoman documents make it clear that as a consequence of a series of agreements between the Debt Administration and the government from 1903 onward, the former became far more active in the Governorate of Beirut, which had jurisdiction over the coasts of Mount Lebanon as well. Thus it was demanded that the saltworks of Mount Lebanon be put under the Debt Administration's control; fees were collected from all forest products, including charcoal and lumber, exported from Mount Lebanon to the neighboring provinces, and the Lebanese were obliged to pay fees for certain types of commercial fishing and for sponges they gathered. See, e.g., GG 1019: 8-27 Sh and 24 L 1327 (Aug.-Nov. 1909); 22 L-6 Z 1329 (Oct.-Nov. 1911); 24 Ra-10 C 1330 (March-May 1912), and CL 7/266: nos. 1-3, 22 L 1329 (Oct. 1911). On renewed reaction to tobacco monopolies, see CL 6/239: nos. 1-9, M 1328 (Jan. 1910). Besides, whereas under Abdulhamid contraband was generally tolerated, after 1908 (esp. after 1912-13) the central government became far more zealous on this issue: see CL 6/248: nos. 1-5 (1910); Talat's letter mentioned in note 56; and GG 1019: passim (esp. after 1912-13). Lebanese clearly regretted these developments, as witnessed by the resurgence of the Junia issue. On intensification of the desire for independence or greater autonomy among the Lebanese, see Chapters 4 and 5. The Ottoman central government was particularly sensitive about Lebanese activities and publications in Egypt; see, e.g., GG 1019: 2 C 1330 (May 1912); and CL 3/114: no. 64, 17 Za 1327 (Nov. 1909). On the position of France and Great Britain, see Spagnolo, France , 259-267.

59. See the next chapter for the dispute between the governor and the

Council. For Yusuf's point of view see, esp., CL 1/21: no. 34, 6 Shu. 1325 (Feb. 1910), and CL 6/233: göm. 2, no. 58, 12 May 1910. For Spagnolo's account, see France , 257-267.

60. GG 1019: 23 S 1329 (Feb. 1911). On Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, see Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom , 195-209.

61. That this was a deliberate aspect of Abdulhamid II's foreign policy is seen, e.g., in his memorandum to Grand Vizier Cevad Pasha in April 1884, summarized in my "Friction," 14-15.

62. That is, to an extent which no student of the mutasarrifiyya period can afford to overlook.

63. For the Ottoman position and concerns in these negotiations, see GG 1013: pp. 163-169, 18 Te.s.-22 Ka.s. 1328 (Dec. 1912-Feb. 1913). See Spagnolo, France , 274-288, on France's position and concerns. Shorrock's account French Imperialism is superficial because of his insufficient knowledge of the Lebanese scene.

64. By far the greatest portion of the Ottoman correspondence dating from the first 22 months of Ohannes Pasha's term--i.e., from Jan. 1913 to Nov. 1914--revolves around this issue. See GG 1019; CL 7/275; CL 7/277-5; CL 7/277-6, and CL 7/286, and note 56 above. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

65. On Ohannes' position and personality, see especially Yusuf al-Hakim, Bairût wa Lubnân fi'ahd âl'Uthmân , 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1980), 60-68, 78-83, and passim. Compare Khater, 190-200. Ohannes' letters to the Porte in the files mentioned in note 62 clearly manifest the intermediary role he played.

66. For the Cabinet decisions and imperial decrees on the earlier executions, see CL 7/292: nos. 1-13, 10 R-27 C 1333 (Feb.-May 1915). Ohannes resigned on 5 June 1915, and the protocols were abrogated by the central government on 11 July 1915 (28 Sh 1333). There is an impression in existing literature (e.g., Spagnolo, France , 298) that the protocols were abrogated along with the capitulations on 9 Sept. 1914. This is not true. The harsh rule of military authorities in Beirut and Mount Lebanon under the command of Cemal Pasha is a well-worked subject. See, e.g., Hitti, 483-486; al-Hakim, 153-311; and Muhâkamât al-harakat al-'arabiyya fi Lubnân , Beirut, 1982.