1. Tan Shou, Ch'ing-ch'ao ch'üan-shih , p. 124. The tael is a Chinese ounce of silver. Except where payment was in kind or conversion to copper coins was allowed by local officials, all taxes in China were paid in weights of unminted silver. The Chinese terms for decimal fractions of an ounce were ch'ien (0.1), fen (0.01), li (0.001), and hao (0.0001).

2. Hsiao I-shan has estimated that the total income from salt, customs, and miscellaneous taxes in the late K'ang-hsi period was about 6,370,000 taels. Added to the approximately 23 million taels in land and head taxes designated for remittance to the central government, total central-government income in the late K'ang-hsi reign was about 29,370,000 taels. Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih , vol. 2, p. 354; Ta-ch'ing huitien, chüan 32, hu-pu 10, fu-i 2, ch'i-yün (hereafter cited as TCHT).

3. The most famous was the Kiangnan tax-arrears case of 1661 in which over 13,000 members of the Kiangnan gentry were implicated. For a discussion of the case, see Robert Oxnam, Ruling from Horseback, Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 1661-1669 , pp. 102-108.

4. Wang Yeh-chien, Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911 , p. 91.

5. Hsiao I-shan, vol. 2, p. 353.

6. Ibid. This sum includes revenues from the salt gabelle, which were difficult to collect during the first few years of the dynasty.

7. Ibid.

5. Hsiao I-shan, vol. 2, p. 353.

6. Ibid. This sum includes revenues from the salt gabelle, which were difficult to collect during the first few years of the dynasty.

7. Ibid.

5. Hsiao I-shan, vol. 2, p. 353.

6. Ibid. This sum includes revenues from the salt gabelle, which were difficult to collect during the first few years of the dynasty.

7. Ibid.

8. During this period there were smaller and much less costly expeditions to subdue Mongolian tribes and other non-Chinese peoples living along China's northwestern frontier.

9. The Ch'ing dynasty also protected the state from the exertion of undue imperial pressure on its finances by establishing an Imperial Household treasury separate from that of the state Board of Revenue and drawing upon its own sources of funds. See Chang Te-ch'ang, "The Economic Role of the Imperial Household in the Ch'ing Dynasty."

10. Ta-ch'ing shih-tsung hsien huang-ti shih-lu, chüan 3, YC 1,1,14 (hereafter cited as YCSL). Deficits at the central-government level may have resulted in part from the acceptance of bribes to ignore shortages in provincial remittances.

11. Kung-chung tang 4623, Prince I, no date (hereafter cited as KCT). This memorial is clearly from YC 1, because Huang Ping is named as governor of Shantung.

12. Yung-cheng chu-p'i yü-chih , Shansi Financial Commissioner Kao Ch'eng-ling, YC 3,10,4 (hereafter cited as CPYC).

13. KCT 14122, Kiangsi Governor P'ei Shuai-tu, YC 3,9,26; KCT continue

15129, Kiangsi Governor P'ei Shuai-tu, YC 2,12,18; Kung-chung tang Yung-cheng tsou-che , Chekiang Financial Commissioner Wang Ch'aoen, YC 2,1,25 (hereafter cited as KCTYCCTC). The list of provinces with deficits is a long one. Fukien reported a deficit of 109,000 taels resuiting from the shifting of regular tax funds to unauthorized purposes, and Kansu, with a total tax quota of only 250,000 taels, still owed the central government 290,000 taels in 1725. Although the evidence is not complete, few provinces seem to have escaped incurring some deficits. KCTYCCTC, Fukien Financial Commissioner Huang Shu-wan, YC 1,12,26; KCT 15827, Kansu Governor Shih Wen-cho, YC 3,11,16.

14. See, for example, CPYC, T'ien Wen-ching, YC 3,2,12; CPYC, T'ien Wen-ching, YC 6,7,11; Yung-cheng hu-k'o t'i-pen, t'an-wu , box 556, no. 0007 (hereafter cited as TP); TP, t'an-wu , box 568, no. 0107.

15. Ray Huang, "Fiscal Administration During the Ming Dynasty," p. 83.

16. The gazetteer of Anyang hsien in northern Honan lists more than thirty items of local produce that were purchased with local taxes and sent to the capital to fill the imperial storehouses. An-yang hsien-chih, t'ien-fu chih , pp. 7-8.

17. Huang, "Fiscal Administration," p. 83.

18. Several excellent studies of these institutions are available in English. See Liang Fang-chung, "Local Tax Collectors in the Ming Dynasty"; John Watt, The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China ; Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China, Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century .

19. That the occasional liang-chang was rewarded for his service with entry into the regular bureaucracy does not change the basic extramural nature of the position.

20. See Liang, "Local Tax Collectors."

21. See Hsiao Kung-chuan, pp. 113-24.

22. Huang-ch'ao shih-huo chih, chüan 2, fu-i 1, SC 1 (hereafter cited as HCSHC).

23. Huang, "Fiscal Administration," pp. 87-89.

24. An-yang hsien-chih, t'ien-fu chih , p. 9; Kitamura Hironao, Shindai shakai keizai shih kenkyu * , pp. 50-87. During the early Ch'ing, local officials were urged to carry out a policy known as ting-sui-ti , in which the head tax was abolished and the revenues previously derived therefrom were apportioned into the tax on land.

25. Ray Huang, Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth Century Ming China , pp. 184-85.

26. The origins of this principle can probably be traced to Mencius. His principles of moral rule were the foundation of the neo-Confucian orthodoxy of the late-imperial period. The classical text bearing his name contains numerous references to low taxation as a criterion of benevolent rule. See, for example, bk. I, pt. A, sec. 5; bk. II, pt. A, sec. 5. Mencius appears to have had a very limited view of the purposes to which tax revenues were applied, seeing them mainly as a source of funds to support warfare or the luxurious life style of the political elite.

27. These should be distinguished from general tax amnesties in which continue

the emperor excused all or part of the population from tax payments in celebration of an imperial birthday, ascent to the throne, or other auspicious event. Both types of exemptions served as a kind of safety valve, periodically relieving the pressure of taxes on a rural economy poised on the margin of subsistence.

28. Several works discuss the role of tax farmers in traditional China. See for example Ch'u T'ung-tsu, Local Government in China under the Ch'ing , and Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China . The best study of pao-lan to date is Nishimura Gensho * , "Shincho * no horan."

29. Following a memorial by the censor Hsü Hsü-ling, suggesting reasons why previous efforts to open new land had failed, the K'ang-hsi emperor issued two orders designed to encourage reclamation through increased material incentives. He extended the period of tax exemption for newly opened lands from three to four, six, and ultimately ten years. In addition, the sponsorship of reclamation was made a road to official rank. Anyone opening twenty ch'ing and able to pass a literary examination would automatically receive the rank of assistant magistrate. If he could not pass the test he would receive the rank of pa-tsung , a low-level military position. A person ambitious enough to open 100 ch'ing would receive the rank of hsien magistrate after his literary competence was established and that of shou-pei , a second captain in the army, if it was not. Shang Hung-kuei, "Lueh-lun ch'ing-ch'u ching-chi hui-fu ho kung-ku ti tui-ch'eng chi ch'i ch'eng-chiu," p. 116.

30. Hsiao Kung-chuan, pp. 89-90.

31. HCSHC 2, fu-i , 6 KH 51; HCSHC 2, fu-i 5, KH 37. Only taxes earmarked for the Imperial Household treasury were exempt from such supervision. These funds included revenues derived from imperial domains, surplus customs duties, and certain fines and property confiscated from officials. They were not considered part of the regular tax revenues ( cheng-hsiang ), but even some of these were remitted first to the Board of Revenue before being sent to the Imperial Household.

32. HCSHC 2, fu-i 1, SC 1.

33. HCSHC 2, fu-i 4, KH 24.

34. For example, the Ming tax on artisan households ( chang-pan ), a vestige of earlier Ming occupational registration of the population, was eliminated. HCSHC 2, fu-i 5, KH 36, KH 39, and KH 41.

35. Saeki Tomi, Chukokushi kenkyu[kenkyū , p. 427. See Ta-ch'ing shih-tsu chang huang-ti shih-lu, chüan 25, SC 3,4, jen-yin .

36. Saeki, Chukokushi , p. 428. See Ta-ch'ing shih-tsu chang huang-ti shih-lu, chüan 57, SC 8,6, hsin-hsi .

37. Ta-ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, chüan 177, hu-pu, t'ien-fu, tsou-hsiao , SC 9 (hereafter cited as TCHTSL).

38. HCSHC 2, fu-i 4, KH 11.

39. This was a problem especially in areas undergoing extensive land reclamation. However, the practice of altering land- and head-tax receipts and account books to make paid taxes appear to be in arrears was also widespread.

40. HCSHC 2, fu-i 4, KH 28; HCSHC 2, fu-i 5, KH 39, hu-pu i-chun . break

41. For examples of fen-p'ei in practice, see KCT 20245, Tung Wanghsiang, no date; KCT 4623, Prince I, no date.

42. See Wang Yeh-chien, Land Taxation , p. 10.

43. TCHTSL, chüan 177, hu-pu, t'ien-fu, tsou-hsiao , KH 7 t'i-chun .

44. As we shall see, it was far more difficult for the central government to control receipts of these tax items because there was no rigid quota, a measure taken in recognition of the frequent fluctuations that could occur in the volume of trade and market transactions. See chap. 2 for the role of some of these items in the process of informal local-revenue accumulation. Some of them were later included in tsou-hsiao reports, but underreporting continued. HCSHC 2, fu-i 4.

45. TCHTSL, chüan 177, hu-pu, t'ien-fu, tsou-hsiao , KH 7 t'i-chun . The deadline for submission of the tsou-hsiao ts'e was changed by the Yung-cheng emperor to the fourth month of the following year for Chihli, Shantung, Honan, Shensi, and Shansi, the fifth month of the following year for Chekiang, Anhui, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, and Hukwang, and the sixth month of the following year for Fukien, Szechuan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, and Kweichow. This change was made to give high provincial officials enough time to check local accounts, which could not be submitted before the end of the year when tax collection was completed. It also allowed for distances between the province and the imperial capital, to which the ch'i-yün portion of the tax was delivered. The scattering of tsou-hsiao deadlines aided the Board in completing its audits by spreading out the receipt of taxes and accounts over a threemonth period. TCHTSL, chüan 177, hu-pu, t'ien-fu, tsou-hsiao , YC 7 i-chun .

46. For a while, local officials were even required to await Board approval of the latter before disbursing any funds. However, by the late K'ang-hsi period this seems to have given way to a system in which officials could disburse funds for routine expenditures and simultaneously report the amount spent to the Board. HCSHC 2, fu-i 6, KH 51; HCSHC 2, fu-i 5, KH 37.

47. Ch'ing-ch'ao wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao, chüan 41, k'uai-chi , KH 17, hu-pu i-tsou (hereafter cited as CCWHTK).

48. TCHTSL, chüan 177, KH 15 fu-chun .

49. TCHTSL, chüan 177, KH 22 t'i-chun .

50. See table 2.7 for a list of feng-yin granted to local- and provincial-level officials.

51. Wang Yeh-chien, "Ch'ing Yung-cheng nien ti ts'ai-cheng kai-ko," pp. 50-53

52. See chap. 2 for a discussion of chüan-feng as an example of the informal accumulation of provincial revenue.

53. HCSHC 2, fu-i 1, SC 1, memorials by Governor Fang Ta-yu and Censor Ning Ch'eng-hsün.

54. HCSHC 2, fu-i 4, KH 26 edict. The use of yu-tan was continued only in Kiangsu, where a small printing tax was already being levied as part of the land and head tax.

55. HCSHC 2, fu-i 5, KH 30. break

56. HCSHC 2, fu-i 5, KH 39, hu-pu i-chun .

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid. Further evidence of the emphasis on wrapping one's own taxes and depositing them personally in the tax chest ( tzu-feng t'ou-kuei ) is provided in K'ang-hsi's attack on the division of taxpayers in some provinces into ta-hu and hsiao-hu . For example, under the li-chia system as practiced in Hunan, the ta-hu contracted to collect and pay the taxes of the hsiao-hu . Powerful local strongmen or members of wealthy households, persons registered as ta-hu , sometimes treated the hsiao-hu as their virtual slaves. K'ang-hsi issued a strongly worded prohibition of the practice and ordered that the two groups be separated on the tax rolls. In addition, the emperor warned that if practices such as tax farming, tax resistance, extortion, and levying illegal surcharges persisted, the governors and governors-general of the provinces concerned would be impeached and punished. CCWHTK, chüan 2, fu-i 2, KH 35.

56. HCSHC 2, fu-i 5, KH 39, hu-pu i-chun .

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid. Further evidence of the emphasis on wrapping one's own taxes and depositing them personally in the tax chest ( tzu-feng t'ou-kuei ) is provided in K'ang-hsi's attack on the division of taxpayers in some provinces into ta-hu and hsiao-hu . For example, under the li-chia system as practiced in Hunan, the ta-hu contracted to collect and pay the taxes of the hsiao-hu . Powerful local strongmen or members of wealthy households, persons registered as ta-hu , sometimes treated the hsiao-hu as their virtual slaves. K'ang-hsi issued a strongly worded prohibition of the practice and ordered that the two groups be separated on the tax rolls. In addition, the emperor warned that if practices such as tax farming, tax resistance, extortion, and levying illegal surcharges persisted, the governors and governors-general of the provinces concerned would be impeached and punished. CCWHTK, chüan 2, fu-i 2, KH 35.

56. HCSHC 2, fu-i 5, KH 39, hu-pu i-chun .

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid. Further evidence of the emphasis on wrapping one's own taxes and depositing them personally in the tax chest ( tzu-feng t'ou-kuei ) is provided in K'ang-hsi's attack on the division of taxpayers in some provinces into ta-hu and hsiao-hu . For example, under the li-chia system as practiced in Hunan, the ta-hu contracted to collect and pay the taxes of the hsiao-hu . Powerful local strongmen or members of wealthy households, persons registered as ta-hu , sometimes treated the hsiao-hu as their virtual slaves. K'ang-hsi issued a strongly worded prohibition of the practice and ordered that the two groups be separated on the tax rolls. In addition, the emperor warned that if practices such as tax farming, tax resistance, extortion, and levying illegal surcharges persisted, the governors and governors-general of the provinces concerned would be impeached and punished. CCWHTK, chüan 2, fu-i 2, KH 35.

59. See, for example, TP, t'an-wu , box 570, no. 0131. In one hsien in Shantung, clerks admitted that in a portion of the taxes they collected, only one-tenth of every tael collected was recorded in the tax-collection registers. In this way they were able to steal almost 10,000 taels of the taxes submitted by the people of their hsien between KH 61 and YC 6. TP, t'an-wu , box 569, no. 123.

60. HCSHC, fu-i 4, KH 28; HCSHC, fu-i 5, KH 43.

61. See chap. 6.

62. HCSHC 2, fu-i 6, KH 49.

63. Wang Yeh-chien, "Ts'ai-cheng kai-ko," pp. 50-53.

64. CPYC, T'ien Wen-ching, YC 2, jun 4,6.

65. HCSHC, fu-i 6, KH 51.

66. Early Ch'ing tax quotas were based on the quotas found in the Ming dynasty Wan-li period (1573-1619) revisions of the Fu-i ch'üan-shu .

67. Yin-lou referred to taxes that were collected but not reported to the central government, whereas hidden lands were technically lands that had been opened to cultivation but not registered for taxation.