1. Rockmore, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy , 47.

2. Ibid., 48.

3. This aspect as well as the sections at the beginning of Division Two require a more detailed treatment. See my book Society, Comrnunity, Fate, and Decision: From Kant to Benjamin .

4. Hildegard Feick, Index zu Heideggers "Sein und Zeit " (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1991), 94.

5. In this—according to the standards of Heideggerians, deeply metaphysical— sense Heidegger adduces the notion of Ursprung, origin, in one of his lectures on Hölderlin:

The pure origin {Der reine Ursprung} is not one that just simply releases something out of it {entläßt} and leaves it to itself {überlßt}; rather, it is that beginning whose power constantly leaps over {überspringt } that-which-has-arisen from it { das Entsprungene}; it is that beginning that leaps ahead of {vor-springend}, and outlasts, that-which-has-arisen { from it}; in this way, the pure origin is present in the foundation of what-endures {des Bleibenden}, present not as some aftereffect of former times but rather as what leaps ahead { das Vorausspringende }; thus, as the beginning { Anfang } the pure origin is in reality at the same time the determining end, that is, the goal {Ziel}. (HH 241; for «das rein Entsprungene» see, for instance, ibid., 254).

6. Probably the phrase «in dem betonten Sinne des Entlaufens» does not mean «in the sense of running away from it, as we have just emphasized» but rather «in the emphatic sense of running away from it.»

7. Or, consider «What is the motive for this 'fugitive' {"flüchtige"} way of saying "I"? It is motivated by Dasein's falling; for as falling, it fiees in the face of itself into the "they" {Durch das Verfallen des Daseins, als welches es vor sich selbst flieht in das Man}» (BT 368; SZ 322). Note that in everyday language one uses «flüchtig» in the sense of «on the run» as predicate adjective («The escaped prisoners are still flüchtig [on the run].») but only rarely as a modifying adjective. The meaning of the modifying adjective is most often «transitory» or «short-lived» («der flüchtige Augen-blick»). The insertion of «''flüchtige"» does not contribute anything to the passage with the exception that in this way Heidegger characterizes the «I,» and thus Kant and the Enlightenment, as short-lived. This is one of Heidegger's peculiar etymologies of which «vorläufig» is another (see above, chapter 1, note 11).

8. As in these quotes concerning all the «"entspringen",» in the quote I gave from BT 377 (see p. 32), Heidegger puts «"Zeit"» into quotation marks to indicate that «the 'time' which is accessible to Dasein's common sense,» the later so-called ordinary concept of time, pretends to be the «real» time but, according to Heidegger, is by no means the «real» time.

9. On the difference between this motif in Guignon's and in my interpretation, see below and chapters 3 and 4.

10. See his letter to Engelbert Krebs, 9 January 1919, as in Hugo Ott's biography of Heidegger, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life , 106f.; German edition, 106f.

11. For instance, look at the entries for «Eigentlichkeit» in Hildegard Feick's Index zu Heideggers "Sein und Zeit" (Index zu Heideggers "Sein und Zeit, " 16f.). One cannot but read them as pointing to a state, a habit, and only secondarily to the activities accompanying that state or leading to it. Heidegger approved this index and, obviously, had helped her to some degree (ibid., ix).

Among the suggestions of terms Heidegger might have used if he had wanted to focus on an activity I included «Tätigkeit,» which Fichte uses (see above, n. 2 of chapter 1). It is the abstract noun of the verb «tun,» or «tätig sein,» which itself designates an activity. All other possible nouns without the ending «-keit» or «-heit» would have been too weak. Thus, «Tätigkeit» is an exception that confirms the rule. In the case of the verb «leiden,» however, Fichte could employ the articular infinitive, «Leiden,» and thus avoid any possible association to a state. Though there is the word «Wehlei-digkeit,» probably no one has ever used «Leidheit» or «Leidigkeit» as the abstract noun to «leiden.»

12. On the indefinite article in the English translation instead of the definite one in Heidegger see chapter 1, n. 17. To use in both occurrences the definite article certainly contributes to a sense of urgency and weakens the attitude of a detached observer.

13. In German, it reads: «Meist sind sie durch die Zweideutigkeit unkenntlich gemacht, aber doch bekannt» (SZ 383). This is probably an allusion to the famous sentence in the preface of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit , namely, «Das Bekannte tiberhaupt ist darum, weil es bekannt ist, nicht erkannt » ( Phänomenologie des Geistes , 28); English: «Quite generally, the familiar, just because it is familiar , is not cognitively understood» (Phenomenology of Spirit , 18). Note that Heidegger says not «are unrecognized,» but rather «have been made unrecognizable.» To anticipate my conclusions, the origin is present even though ordinary Dasein has fallen away from or leapt out of it. However, by the work of ambiguity, ordinary Dasein makes the ways in which the origin is present unrecognizable. Authentic Dasein sees through ordinary Dasein's work. Thus, authentic Dasein recognizes that what is covered up by ordinary Dasein's work of ambiguity are in fact the authentic possibilities, which it thereupon tums against ordinary Dasein. Thus, authentic Dasein erkennt what, due to ordinary Dasein's work of ambiguity, has been up to that point only bekannt. «Unkenntlich» is an adjective to «Unkenntnis,» which in turn is the negation of «Erkenntnis.» Thus, ordinary Dasein, so to speak, strikes through the «Er-» in Erkenntnis ( Er kenntnis) and thus falls into Unkenntnis. However, even as stricken through, the origin remains present, and bekannt. This enables authentic Dasein to strike through the «Un-» in Unkenntnis ( Un kenntnis) and thus to restore the «Er-» in Erkenntnis that ordinary Dasein has unsuccessfully tried to strike out.

14. At the end of Division One, Heidegger gathers all these structures into that of care in order to reinterpret them in Division Two from the more «ursprünglich» level of temporality. In Division Two, chapter 5, he understands these structures «noch ursprünglicher» (SZ 372; «more primordial,» BT 424; it should read «still more primordial»), namely, from the vantage point of historicality. There is no level that is «noch ursprünglicher» than historicality, that is, historicality is the ultimate primordial level.

15. Botho Straufß, "Anschwellender Bocksgesang," in the weekly Der Spiegel , no. 6, 1993, 202ff. Botho Strauß has always had a high reputation for being especially delicate and subtle. In its editorial, Der Spiegel discreetly reminds its readers that the word der Dichter has chosen, Bocksgesang, is the literal translation of the Greek tragedy, namely, song of the he-goats (ibid., 203). Concerning the anschwellen, there is no need of explanation. Jubilation in a theater, or in a political meeting, if it increases, or an erecting penis, «schwillt an,» as does some strange buzzing in the air one cannot really locate. For a long time, Strauß had been regarded as a kind of leftist. Now he has realized: «How strange it is that one can call oneself 'leftist!' For from ancient times, left has been looked upon as synonym for what goes wrong {Fehlgehende}. Thus, one attaches to oneself a sign of what is bewitched and perverse {Verkehrten}. For full of enlightenment-haughtiness, one grounds one's politics on the alleged proof of the powerlessness of magical notions of order» (p. 203f.). His vocabulary and his motifs are quite obviously very close to the language of Heidegger, Spengler, and Scheler, though Strauß opts for some sort of elitarian arcane politics, or withdraws from politics, as did, for example, the George-Kreis. Has Botho Strauß undergone some transformation similar to St. Paul? Some people suspect that he always was a kind of conservative. In this latter case, it is the political situation in Germany that makes his fate «erst frei» (SZ 384; «free,» BT 436). One might also say that, so far, he was only bekannt. If one continued the last sentence along the lines suggested by Luther's German translation of the Holy Scripture, one would indeed «den Holzwegen der deutschen Sprache auf den Leim gegangen sein» (have fallen prey to the seductive force of the Holzwege of the German language) and one might have apologized: «Wann ich so schwerz bin, schuld ist nicht mein allein ..» Nonnetheless, some readers might have exclaimed, «Zu spat bekannt,» which might be translated as, « It is too late that you have confessed.» Quite surely, Heidegger generated the horizontal lines in his later texts by his fountain-pen guided by his hand, whereas most of the authors today will use the respective commands in the menu of their computer programs. What would he say if he had seen all the authors with their desk- and laptops? If the "real" Heidegger was the one criticized in Adorno's Jargon of Authenticity and Negative Dialectics , he certainly would have said: «Gott bewahre!» If Heidegger had been Derrida, he would have written a strong and eloquent «reciprocative rejoinder» (BT 438); or, he would have begun an Auseinandersetzung with Adorno. «Auseinandersetzung» is a word Heidegger might have used instead of «erwidert,» if he had wanted to say what Guignon and Birmingham think he said. However, Heidegger kept silent. But this was long ago. It was in the fifties and sixties when the paradigmatic German menu was still a fatty and thoroughly nourishing Eisbein mit Sauerkraut («Eine Kalorienbombe!») and not yet McDonald's with mousse au chocolat. Would Heidegger—who, after all, maintained that only a God can save us (MH 57)—have approved of the bio-technological revolutionary guerrilla war on the inter-net as advocated by Derrida: «Today, the general strike does not need to demobilize or mobilize a spectacular number of people: it is enough to cut the electricity in a few privileged places, for example the services, public and private, of postal service and telecommunications, or to introduce a few efficient viruses into a well-chosen computer network or, by analogy, to introduce the equivalent of AIDS into the organs of transmission, into the hermeneutic Gespräch» (Derrida, "The Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority'," in Drucilla Cornell et al., eds., Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice [New York: Routledge, 1992], 37f.)?

16. On «verfallen» see above, n. 11 of chapter 1. In ordinary language, mainly airplanes (of which all were military up to the twenties) «stürzen ab.» However, also other sorts of Abstürze, for instance the Abstürze of mountaineers, are often deadly. That Joseph Beuys survived his plane crash during World War II is the exception that confirms the rule. Some say, Beuys is a «very German artist,» and his art is his way of making good for his experiences in World War II. If that' s the case, it differs completely from the way in which Heidegger's Being and Time «makes good» for World War I. Beuys's art focuses on the resolute and tender gestures of rubbing the fragile human body, of wrapping it in fat and pelt to keep it alive. And it reaches out to the animals, the coyotes and the rabbits, he saw in the Russian steppe after the Kirghiz people helped him open his eyes anew after thirty days in a coma. It reaches out for all the creatures here on the ground without tying them up to a supposed Boden-ständigkeit (rootedness-in-the-soil) of each Dasein and being. Heidegger' s making up for World War I, however, consists in the appeal to enter the war plane again and, like the heroes of Verdun, to transgress the line to and in war again.

17. G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, Zweiter Teil , ed. G. Lasson (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969), 3. «The German language has preserved essence in the past participle [ gewesen ] of the verb to be ; for essence is past—but timelessly past—being» ( Hegel's Science of Logic , trans. A. V. Miller [Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993], 389).

18. Here and in all of what follows, I present ordinary Dasein as being involved in two different activities. It positively relies on and lives in certain possibilities provided by the «they,» the inauthentic possibilities. At the same time, like the «they,» it covers up certain other possibilities, the authentic ones. One might object that this misrepresents the passage beginning with «Proximally and for the most part» and ending with «in one's resolution» (BT 435; SZ 383). For Heidegger might say here that the «they» relates to all possibilities in the same way, namely, it has made each of them «unrecognizable by ambiguity» (BT 435; SZ 383). I see ordinary Dasein involved in two kinds of activities because of the passages on ordinary Dasein I discussed in the preceding section on the anschwellender Bocksgesang. In addition, Heidegger says «mostly» (BT 435; SZ 383) and not «always,» and other expressions in the passage seem to indicate that he thinks of the two activities I mentioned. However, for two reasons I need not elaborate this issue. First, even if one assumes that the «they» has made all possibilities unrecognizable, the result is the same. For once authentic Dasein has begun to undo the work of ambiguity with regard to some or all of the possibilities, ordinary Dasein sees that another Dasein, authentic Dasein, interprets a given possibility differently than ordinary Dasein itself does. From that moment on, a possibility, or even every possibility, is split up into two different ones. Ordinary Dasein sticks to its interpretation and is told by authentic Dasein that ordinary Dasein's interpretation is inauthentic and should be replaced with the authentic interpretation of the possibility. Thus, it might be the case that prior to the anschwellender Bocksgesang ordinary Dasein was engaged only in one type of activity. However, with the beginning of the anschwellender Bocksgesang, or at the latest with the beginning of the crisis, ordinary Dasein is engaged in two kinds of activities. Second, it will become clear in chapter 3 that the problem of whether prior to the beginning of the anschwellen-der Bocksgesang ordinary Dasein is engaged in only one activity or in two was indeed an interesting question for conservatives and right-wingers but that they didn't need to discuss it in detail. The brevity of Heidegger's passage on the issue in section 74 reflects this fact.

19. On destiny and fate see also chapter 3. In part, her misunderstanding of the passage might go back to the fact that the sentence on fateful Dasein that she quotes is falsely translated (see below, chapter 3, n. 3).

20. One can be sure that Guignon does not distinguish between «überkommene Ausgelegtheit» and «heritage» (or, rather, the only distinction he makes is that from the viewpoint of authentic Dasein what was labeled «überkommene Ausgelegtheit» becomes a source of choices and as such might be called «heritage»). For if he had made a distinction, he would have noted this in some way since it is the decisive point for the entire passage. Not distinguishing between the notions is a practice with a long history in English interpretations of Being and Time . In fact, I have not found any interpretations that distinguish between them.

21. Ordinary Dasein «understands itself in terms of» (BT 435; SZ 383) possibilities, but it doesn't «disclose» (BT 435; SZ 383) them. Rather, it lives quite as a matter of course in the possibilities its parents, peer group, etc. have instilled into it, and it has «made unrecognizable by ambiguity» (BT 435; SZ 383) the authentic possibilities by reducing them to something present at hand, that is, to something without any significance for Dasein. As to the authentic possibilities, ordinary Dasein, so to speak, «verschließt» (locks up) them. Authentic Dasein undoes this operation. The best expression for authentic Dasein's operation is indeed that it «erschließt» (SZ 383; «discloses,» BT 435) these possibilities, that is, unlocks them. Thus, authentic Dasein's operation is concerned only with a subset of all possibilities contained in the «way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» (BT 435; SZ 383). Heidegger introduces as the term for this subset the notion of heritage.

22. Heidegger can pun on «wieder» and «wider» (BT 438, n. 1) because he runs no risk of being misunderstood. For, as I have shown in chapter 1, his usage of erwidern is familiar to German speakers. In addition, because of the phrases, «But . . . at the same time» («aber zugleich») and «that which in the "today", is working itself out as the 'past'» («was im Heute sich als "Vergangenheit" auswirkt») (BT 438; SZ 386) native speakers of German recognize immediately (or after some thought) that the objects of erwidern and Widerruf are not the same. It is similar in the case of Hei-degger's usage of the preposition «aus.» Those who know German are familiar with the different meanings of «aus» as for instance in «Ich renne aus dem brennenden Haus» (I run out of the burning house) versus «Er kommt/ist aus dem Hause Windsor» (He comes/is from the house Windsor = he is a member of the Windsor family) or «Das besteht/ist gemacht aus Stahl» (This consists/is made out of steel).

23. When a soccer player normally not known for outstanding skills performs a brilliant move, one says, «Das war (schlicht und einfach) Glück/Zufall» (That was [simply] a matter of luck/chance). However, if the same move is made by a famous player, one might exclaim, «Das ist Können/Genialität/Professionalität!» (That is skill/the genius/professionalism!). When faced with a sad or tragic event that happened to oneself or someone else, one might exclaim, «Das war Schicksal!» (That was fate.) In all these sentences one points out the «real» cause and thus rejects other factors that could be adduced as causes of the event to be explained. The soccer player shouldn't pretend that he is capable of producing such moves by himself. It was not your fault that your friend was hit by a car after you had invited him or her for dinner and several drinks. It was fate. For those who believe in fate the word «fate» denotes God or some other overall power guiding affairs in this world. Those who don't believe in fate use the sentence «das war Schicksal» as a shorthand way of saying that the event happened due to a combination of factors that one could not be expected to foresee. The fact that in such sentences in such situations one always implicitly rejects other possible causes is probably the reason why one doesn't use any article with «Schicksal.» The indefinite or definite article would, so to speak, be «the breach into which» (IM 163; EM 124) not, as Heidegger says there, «the preponderant power of being {Sein}» (IM 163; EM 124) but the «power» of questioning and dialectics «bursts» (IM 163; EM 124) to challenge one's claim and to require one to explain why God or that entity called «fate» wanted to kill your friend and how it made the car do so. Thus, to leave out any article as Heidegger does with regard to «Erbschaft» rhetorically immunizes the sentence against possible criticism. As these examples show, the absence of any article can be used to serve the polemical function of the definite article (see above chapter 1, n. 17). In the case of a surprising and pleasant event, one uses the indefinite article with «Wunder» : «Das ist/war ein Wunder!» (That is/was a miracle.). The reason for the difference is probably that «Schick-sal» always denotes an agent acting continuously and over time or a web of intertwined causes acting over time, while a miracle is by definition a sudden break with such webs. The definite article with «Erbe» («aus dem Erbe,» SZ 383; «in terms of the heritage,» BT 435) is as polemical as the definite article with «Volk» (SZ 384; «people,» BT 435) (see chapter 1. n. 17) since two paragraphs after the one with the Erbe, Heidegger explains the Erbe as «community, of {the} people» (see chapter 3), and authentic Dasein will finally cancel the world of the «they» (see already chapter 1).

24. See below, note 25.

25. The assumption that Heidegger uses «"Güte"» (SZ 383; «'goodness',» BT 435) in the sense of a universal criterion is incompatible with the sentence in which the expression occurs. For it doesn't follow logically from an idea of the good that everything good is a heritage. In addition, it should not follow if one wants to develop the goodness as a criterion for criticism of a given form of life. Even if one assumes for the sake of the argument that it might follow, one would be curious to see an argument for this and not just the statement. However, Heidegger doesn't refer to something like an idea of the good as a criterion for criticism. Rather, the sentence is an example of his method of listening to language. Within that framework, the entire sentence makes sense, doesn't refer to some universal idea of the good, and doesn't imply a long argument either. If within a philosophical text «'goodness'» in the first instance seems to be the abstract noun for «'good'» (BT 435) and seems to point into the direction of a universally applicable standard or criterion, «'goodness'» is not a fortunate translation of Heidegger's German word «"Güte".» In everyday language as well as in philosophical language the abstract noun for «gut» (good) is usually not «Güte» but «das Gute» or «das Gut» (see, for instance in the index of Scheler, FE 620f.; FEe 613). Heidegger regarded philosophy of values as trapped in the ontology of beings as present-at-hand (BT 132; SZ 99; see IM 196ff, EM I49ff.). The word «Güte» is used in two ways. It can mean «quality,» the quality of products, for instance. In cam-parson to «Qualität» («this product is of the highest quality») or simple expressions such as «sehr gut» («this product is very good»), «Güte» («this product is of the highest Güte») sounds slightly old-fashioned or hypocritical, at least for all those who have a rather sober attitude toward current techniques of advertisement. For those who use «Güte» in that way try to take advantage of the second use of «Güte» and its sociological and economic implications. In what follows, I use «Güte» only in the second meaning, according to which at Heidegger's time «Güte» was a polemical notion, which it still is even today though probably to a lesser degree and though it has become somewhat old-fashioned. «Güte» denotes an inner core that manifests itself in a kind of atmosphere—Benjamin might say aura—that some things have and others do not. For instance, a well-crafted piece of furniture, an old piece of jewelry inherited from one's ancestors, or fruits produced by the farmer in the proper traditional way have Güte. Pieces manufactured by a craftsman have Güte, whereas things from the assembly line or the results of modern farming techniques with all their chemicals don't have Güte. The word most often implies that products of Gate are based on tradition and are for that reason better than products from the assembly line. Therefore, conservatives like to use the word Gate whereas most others get a little bit nervous when they hear it since the use of this word most of the time implies an appreciation of tradition and a denigration of what is new (that is, of what is there and is developed without presenting a long history and tradition), or of «das Moderne» (SZ 391; «the modem,» BT 444). Thus, Heidegger listens to the conservative use of the word Güte according to which exclusively things incorporating a tradition or being an Erbschaft have Gate whereas no modern thing has Güte, and from this he infers the etymology of the German adjective gut and the abstract noun Gut. For a conservative and right-winger like Heidegger, «gut» and «Gut» do not go back to «das Gute» but rather to «Güte» for there is no highest value «das Gute.» For a conservative and right-winger like Scheler, «gut» and «Gut» go back to «das Gute» but «das Gute» in turn goes back to «Güte» for «das Gut» has been properly realized only in precapitalist times with their Güte, whereas capitalism represents an overturning of values and has no Güte (see below, chapter 3, sections B, C, and D). All those who live in stable traditions are «good» because they partake in the «good» that keeps this tradition alive. Being the core of tradition, «das Gute» is transmitted from one generation to the next as estate. Only something that partakes in «das Gute» is good. According to Heidegger, there is no such thing «das Gute.» However, there is «Güte.» Something can be «gut» and have «Güte» only if it partakes in an estate. For nothing can be good independent of an estate. Partaking in an estate, something good is (a part of the) inheritance, or it is someone who is the heir of (a part of) an estate. Thus, Heidegger says that «everything 'good' {alles ''Gute"} is a heritage {Erbschaft}» (BT 435; SZ 383) and that «the character of 'goodness' {"Güte"} lies in making authentic existence possible» (BT 435; SZ 383). Heidegger might add that estate and everything partaking in estate has Güte in the sense of «grace, generosity,» since the estate provides Daseine with their identity, gives it to them as a gift, whereas the moderns don't have such a source of identity; a source that is gütig, kind-hearted, benevolent, generous to them. In this sense, Heidegger would say the subordinate clause is justified. The «if» indicates that he cannot give any other reason for this equation of «good» and «heritage.»

Given this use of the word «Güte» and given the conclusions Heidegger draws from it, an association comes to one's mind he would probably not have objected to. Leave away the «e» in «Gute» («everything 'good'»), that is, take «Gut,» and add an «r» to «"Güte"» («'goodness'»), then we have «Gut» and «Güter,» the singular and the plural of «estate,» «farm,» that is, what aristocrats and, on a smaller scale, farmers have, namely, the land they cultivate. The farmers and aristocrats have a stable identity because the land they have inherited from their ancestors provides them with that identity. (Today, in German supermarkets one can find liverwurst, Sauerkraut, and other food advertised as having been produced «nach Gutsherrenart» [according to the way it was produced on the Güter of a gentleman farmer], which is supposed to convey that the respective product is much better than others of its kind.) The proletarians, however, by definition have nothing inherited and after their death they leave behind only their children without handing anything down to them. The farmers and aristocrats can lose their land; the proletarians, however, «have nothing to lose but their chains,» as Marx and Engels wrote at the end of the Communist Manifesto (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto , trans. S. Moore [London: Penguin Books, 1985], 121). Thus, the struggle between the Right and the Left over the proletarians. The Left offered the promise that by further developing the contradictions within Gesellschaft one can transform bourgeois Gesellschaft into a socialist Gesellschaft and thus get rid of Gemeinschaft (see chapter 4). The Right promised that by canceling Gesellschaft, that is, by ending the class struggle, canceling the realm of the public and political, and by identifying themselves with the Volksgemeinschaft, the proletarians would get something. Every proletarian would get his or her «fate,» that is, his or her share in «destiny» and Volk, that miraculous entity that has Güte for all of its members provided that they submit to its call (see chapter 3). Idle talk in Europe says that the United States is the country «without history and tradition,» and many U.S. citizens are proud of their «dynamism» and «creative attitude.» Still, sometimes some miss something. Thus, they like to go to Heidelberg, Rome, Tuscany, and all the other places with Güte. As is known, European companies try to cash in on this need for Güte. On the inner side of the back cover of The New Yorker , November 10, 1997, the Swiss watch company Patek Philippe placed an advertisement for its new watch, «Men's Neptune.» The advertisement shows a photo of a father and his son in winter coats playing chess in a park. The text reads: «You never actually own a Patek Philippe. You merely take care of it for the next generation.» It also says that the men's Neptune is «self-winding» and «hand-crafted in 18-karat solid gold.» Since Americans don't have traditions and since the average reader of The New Yorker is not a proletarian, the line under the photo of the men's Neptune reads: «Begin your own tradition.» On page 3 of the same issue of The New Yorker , a company for electronic goods, Sony, advertises its new «VAIO Notebook.» The advertisement suggests connecting Sony's portable data projector, its digital handycam camcorder, etc., lists other advantages, and concludes: «Then take a break and sneak off to your favorite hideaway for some intel-powered video gaming. Hey, who says you can't mix business with pleasure?» Sony would never advertise its notebook the way Patek Phillipe advertises its men's Neptune. Everyone knows that notebooks after some time look unsightly or somewhat dirty, that technically they are outdated after two years or so, and that they stop working after a few years anyway. In contrast to the men's Neptune, the VAIO notebook has no Güte. Still, it is a product of high quality. In Germany as in all other countries in Europe, industrialization and capitalism emerged in a country with old traditions and many products of Güte, and this was often experienced as a brutal offense and threat to the traditional ways of life, not only because of the economic crises coming along with capitalism. For an example of a piece of Güte see the baptismal font in Thomas Mann's novel The Magic Mountain (trans. H. T. Lowe-Porter [New York: Knopf, 1975], 30ff.). As was mentioned, a piece of Güte does not need to consist of gold. In his analysis of "The World-hood of the World" (BT 91ff; SZ 63ff), Heidegger refers to the world of a craftsman and the world in a village or small town. He points out that, in that world, Dasein «does not 'devour the kilometres'» (BT 140; «es "frißt nicht Kilometer",» SZ 106). Also, Dasein's suit is «cut to his figure {auf den Leib zugeschnitten}» in contrast to suits and other goods «produced by the dozen {Dutzendware}» (BT 100; SZ 70f.). Cars and other products from the assembly line have no Güte.

26. At that point, Heidegger uses the indefinite article with Erbe («the handing down of a heritage {eines Erbes} constitutes itself» [BT 435; SZ 435]). One might say that he should have said, «des Erbes» (of the heritage). However, the indefinite article is by no means a slip of the pen or imprecise. Rather, in this sentence he generalizes his model of the polemical aspect of the Erbe (see chapter 1, n. 17). In the German text, this is underscored by the word «je» (in each occurrence of such an happening or, as Staumbaugh has it, «always» [ Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, 351]), which Macquarrie and Robinson have left untranslated.

27. On athletes in Heidegger see below, chapter 6, n. 24. Heidegger's phrase «kon-stituiert sich» is the Latin word for the German word «sich zusammensetzen,» which he uses in the negative two paragraphs later in regard to destiny («Destiny is not something that puts itself together {setzt sich nicht . . . zusammen} out of individual fates» [BT 436; SZ 384]). See also below, this chapter n. 32, chapter 3, n. 51, and chapter 6, n. 24.

28. Schürmann, Heidegger: On Being and Acting—From Principles to Anarchy , n. p.

29. Reiner Schürmann, Des hégémonies brisées (Mauvezin: Trans-Europ-Repress, 1996). Readers of the book will hope that in a few years time it will be discussed as what it is, namely, by far the most powerful response (or «reciprocative rejoinder») [BT 438]) by Heideggerians to Hans Blumenberg's The Legitimacy of the Modern Age . An English translation with Indiana University Press is under way. Several messengers into the English language have already arrived: "Neoplatonic Henology as an Overcoming of Metaphysics: On a Strategy in the History of Philosophy," Research in Phenomenology 13 (1983), 25-41; "The Law of Nature and Pure Nature: A Thought-Experience in Meister Eckhart," Krisis 5-6 (1986-87), 148-169; ''Tragic Differing: The Law of the One and the Law of Contraries in Parmenides," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 13:1 (1988), 3-20; "Ultimate Double Binds," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 14:2-15:1 (1991), 213-236; ''Riveted to A Monstrous Site," Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore, eds., The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 313-330; "A Brutal Awakening to the Tragic Condition of Being: On Heidegger's Beiträge zur Philosophie, " Karsten Harries and Christopher Jamme, eds., Martin Heidegger: Art, Politics, and Technology (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1994), 89-105. A bibliography of Schürmann's writings can be found in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19:2-20:1 (1997), 73-78; the issue is a special issue "In Memoriam Reiner Schürmann." It should be noted that Schürmann regarded French as his native habitat.

30. On the different modes of solicitude in Heidegger see chapter 3, n. 25.

31. As Heidegger goes on, the «they» would of course not agree with his interpretation. However, it «would be a misunderstanding if we were to seek to have the explication of these phenomena confirmed by looking to the "they" for agreement» (BT 219; SZ 175).

32. It is the activity of the Erbe that constitutes the act in which it delivers itself into the present in order from now on to be active in the present. It demands of the Daseine to passively überliefern sich selbst, to hand themselves over, to the Erbe (see pp. 16ff. and what follows above in this section). In An Introduction to Metaphysics , Heidegger uses a military term for the same motif. Being breaks into the present like a group of soldiers breaking through the lines of the enemy: «The overpowering as such, in order to appear in its power, requires a place, a scene of disclosure. The essence of being-human opens up to us only when understood through this need compelled by being itself {das Sein selbst}. The being-there of historical man means: to be posited as the breach {Bresche} into which the preponderant power of being bursts in its appearing {in die die Übergewalt des Seins erscheinend hereinbricht} . . . . Thus the being-there of the historical man is the breach through which the being embodied in the essent can open. As such it is an incident [Zwischen-fall, a fall-between], the incident in which suddenly the unbound powers of being come forth and are accomplished as history» (IM 163f.).

The German text of the sentence with the second occurrence of «breach» reads as follows: «Als die Bresche für die Eröffnung des ins Werk gesetzten Seins im Seienden ist das Dasein des geschichtlichen Menschen ein Zwischen-fall , der Zwischenfall, in dem plötzlich die Gewalten der losgebundenen Übergewalt des Seins aufgehen und ins Werk als Geschichte eingehen» (EM 125). Literally translated, it reads: «Being the breach for the opening/manifestation/revelation of Being having been put to work in the realm of the essents, the Dasein of the historical man is an in-cident ; that incident in which suddenly the powers of the unbound superior power of Being come forth and enter into/become the work as history.» «Being» («Sein») corresponds to «heritage» («Erbe»). «To have been put to work (by itself),» «to become the work,» and «to be unbound (by itself)» correspond to «Überlieferung» («handing down»), and «opening/manifestation/revelation» corresponds to «constitutes itself» («konstituiert sich»). It might also be the case that «to have been put to work (by itself),» «to become the work,» and «to be unbound (by itself)» correspond to «constitutes itself» («konstituiert sich»), and «opening/manifestation/revelation» corresponds to «Überlieferung» («handing down»). Since this question is immaterial for my purposes, I don't discuss it. The entire happening is the coming forth of the powers of the unbound superior powers of Being for which the humans are just the site and incident. «Manifestation,» «to have been put to work (by itself)» and «to be unbound» (either by itself or by someone else) also correspond to «become free» (BT 436; SZ 384). In each of these cases, that which has been put to work, etc., exists prior to the moment in which it is put to work, etc., as for instance, in the explosion of a nuclear plant the atomic energy slumbering in the reactor is all of a sudden «unbound.» In Being and Time , the sentence on handing down of the Erbe constituting itself is the beginning of the crisis the resolution of which consists in authentic Dasein bringing the Daseine out of their diaspora back to their native habitat through the repetition of the Erbe, that is, the Volksgemeinschaft (see chapter 3). In An Introduction to Metaphysics , being breaks into the breach in order for the essence of being-human to be «carried back to its ground» (IM 163f; EM 124f.).

Macquarrie and Robinson did not change the grammatical structure of the sentence with the handing down of the heritage. Stambaugh seems to have overlooked the reflexive pronoun «sich» in «konstituiert sich» (SZ 383; «constitutes itself,» BT 435). By this failure, she turns the sentence upside down and presents the happening in which the Erbe takes over the Daseine as though the handing down of the Erbe were passively grounded in authentic Dasein, which in this way remains the basic entity: «If everything "good" is a matter of heritage and if the character of "goodness" lies in making authentic existence possible, then handing down a heritage is always constituted in resoluteness» ( Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, 351). Probably it is also a matter of different philosophical and cultural traditions that make it difficult for Americans to understand such sentences in Heidegger. In Anglo-American philosophy, the empiricist and pragmatic strands are dominant, and American culture is about the self-invention of individuals (see section C of chapter 5), while in Germany entities like reason, Geist, tradition, and community have always been rather strong.

33. As I pointed out, in the sentence with «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» (BT 435; SZ 383) the preposition «aus» has several meanings. However, the same preposition in the sentence with « in terms of {aus} the heritage {Erbe} » has only one meaning, namely the same as in the sentences from Aristotle's Physics mentioned above. Heritage claims that each Dasein recognizes that Dasein can acquire identity and stability, that is, that Dasein can become «good» only if it gives up its ordinary way of life and submits itself to the Erbe and one of its slots. In the time of his engagement with National Socialism, Heidegger liked to use «aus» in the sense of the principle or origin to which one has to submit, because only in this way can one become «good.» I already mentioned Leo Schlageter, who was imprisoned and sentenced to death, and I already quoted some passages of Heidegger's speech on him in May 1933 (see chapter 1, n. 33). The first sentence of the speech was the following: «Wir wollen zu seiner Ehrung diesen Tod einen Augenblick bedenken, um aus diesem Tod unser Leben zu verstehen» (Farías, Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus , 144). In both Farías, Heidegger and Nazism (89) and Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy (40), the preposition «aus» is left out. To carry over its force one might translate: «We wish to honor him by reflecting, for a moment of vision, upon his death, in order to understand our own lives from out of {aus} this death.» At a later point in section 74 Heidegger talks about Dasein choosing its hero (BT 437; SZ 385). Schlageter was one of those possibilities covered up by ordinary Dasein. The preposition «aus» («from out of») designates one of the slots contained in the Erbe that, as the other quotes from Heidegger's speech show (see chapter 1, n. 33), «we» have to submit to as to «our» principle in order thereupon to cleanse ourselves of our ordinary way of life and to become authentic. As I already pointed out in chapter 1, the repetition of what-has-been-there does not mean that «we» repeat the past the way it has been present in the past. For the past recurs under changed circumstances. In addition, it is not necessary that we literally repeat the deeds of Schlageter. We need not go to Silesia. Rather, destiny and Schlageter himself, if properly understood, tell us that our place to repeat Schlageter is the Freiburg University. Authentic Dasein « übernimmt » (SZ 383; « takes over , » BT 435) the Erbe and its appropriate share in it. It realizes that the Erbe demands to take over the institutions of ordinary Dasein in order to drive out the spirit of the «they» and the bearers of that spirit and to reestablish the institutions in the right spirit of the Erbe. The first sentence of Heidegger's Rectorate Address reads: «The assumption of {Die Übemahme} the rectorate is the commitment to the spiritual {geistige } leadership of this institution of higher learning» (MH 5; see Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 29; SB 9). The commitment has its principle in the Erbe. Thus, in the second sentence Heidegger refers to the principle by means of the preposition «aus»: «The following of teachers and students only awakens and strengthens through a true and common rooted-ness in the essence of the German university {aus der wahrhaften und gemeinsamen Verwurzelung im Wesen der deutschen Universität} » (MH 5; see Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 29; SB 9). We have to re-submit to, and regain, the principle, the beginning of Greek philosophy. «All science remains bound to that beginning of philosophy and draws from it {Aus ihm schöpft sie} the strength of its essence» (Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 31; see MH 7; SB 11). Right at the end of the rectorate address, Heidegger says: «We can only fully understand the glory and greatness of this new beginning, however, if we carry within ourselves that deep and broad thoughtfulness upon which the ancient wisdom of the Greeks drew in uttering the words {aus der die alte griechische Weisheit das Wort gesprochen}: ta . . . megala panta episphale . . ."All that is great stands in the storm. . ." (Plato, Republic , 497d, 9)» (Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 39; see MH 13; SB 9). (See on the last quote section A of chapter 6.) As was mentioned, the beginning—community in Being and Time and the pre-Socratics in the later Heidegger—has disappeared; however, having disappeared it continues to exist; we have to regain and repeat it, and we can do so only because it hasn't disappeared after its disappearance. It is by no means my intention to ridicule such an assumption. To the contrary, with regard to community Tillich maintains that it was precisely the basic flaw of all the leftists to have neglected the presence of community after its disappearance, and he himself wanted to develop a politics that pays attention to that fact and that fulfills the needs embodied in communities (see section B of chapter 4). However, Heidegger refers to the assumed fact of the existence of the Greek beginning after its disappearance in an extremely reifying and violent way. See the long passage with the short sentence, «The beginning exists still» (Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 32; see MH 8; «Der Anfang ist noch,» SB 12). On a similar sentence with «ist» see my paper "On Brinks and Bridges in Heidegger," 148ff.

34. For Heidegger's «'provisional'» («"vorläufige"») see above, n. 11 of chapter 1. Heidegger puts his «"vorläufig"» into quotation marks because he wants us to hear in vorläiufig in the sense of «provisional» ordinary Dasein's running forward on the time-line (and the other way round). Ordinary Dasein is engaged in all its vulgar possibilities. The call calls it back from them. Thus, ordinary Dasein's vorlaufende possibilities are vorläufig, that is, provisional.

35. «So if it wants to come to itself {zu ihm selbst}, it must first pull itself {sich} together from {aus} the dispersion and disconnectedness of the very things that have 'come to pass'» (BT 441f.; SZ 390). In this sentence, too, Heidegger could have written «sich selbst» instead of «ihm selbst.» However, for him «sich selbst» would not have carried sufficiently the soteriological aspect, so to speak, of the happening he is talking about. For by becoming authentic, Dasein hands itself down to the Volksgemeinschaft and is relieved from the burden of autonomy of the bourgeois subject and from isolation from others in bourgeois society (see chapter 3 and section C of chapter 5). The fact that the English translators don't bring out the difference between «sich selbst» and «ihm selbst» (and probably cannot do so without commentary) contributes to the «American» understanding of the passage and the entire section 74 according to which the individual Dasein does not give up its individuality but remains the focal point of historicality (see section C of chapter 5).

As I show in this chapter at least to some degree, the motif of repetition in section 74—that in authenticity the Daseine are called upon to cancel the present world in order to repeat a world that has-been-there—doesn't break into Being and Time out of the blue. Rather, it is well prepared in the course of the book up to that section. In regard to this and sentences such as the one quoted at the beginning of this note, Heidegger's use of notions like «dispersion» and especially his use of the preposition «zurück» («back») require a detailed treatment. They contribute to the atmosphere of the Bocksgesang—that we must go back and repeat—especially when they don't contribute directly anything to the thought he presents in the respective paragraph. I mentioned Schürmann's acknowledgment in his book on Heidegger, where he presents an expansion of territory as the regaining of lost territory. Of course, in a framework of history as the repetition of a lost world the problem becomes urgent why ordinary Dasein left this world to begin with. It is interesting that this problem caused something like a Freudian slip of the tongue in Being and Time . In section 75 Heidegger says that the question concerning the connectedness of life asks «in which of its own kinds of Being Dasein loses itself in such a manner {verliert es sich so} that it must, as it were, only subsequently pull itself together out of its dispersal {sich. . . aus der Zerstreuung zusammenholen}, and think up for itself a unity in which that "together" is embraced» (BT 442; SZ 390). This is the question of why ordinary Dasein left the original world. However, as also the following sentences show, the question is raised just in passing and as instrumental to the main question, namely, how subsequently to pull oneself together out of dispersion. The translators remark that the older editions have «verliert es sich nicht so» instead of «verliert es sich so» (BT 442, n. 1). That is, in the older editions the question was «in which of its own kinds of Being Dasein does not lose itself in such a manner.» This question gives a sharper edge to the instrumental question of the later editions and even asks for the conditions rendering the main question of the later editions superfluous: Under which conditions would Dasein not have fallen into dispersion? It would have been better, if it hadn't done so. If it hadn't fallen into dispersion, we would not have to deal with the main question of the later editions, namely, how to pull oneself together out of dispersion. (To «pull itself together» is required of Dasein in the moment when the handing down of the heritage pulls itself together or «constitutes itself» [BT 435; SZ 383].) Right at the beginning of the sections on conscience, Heidegger talks about «Dasein's lostness in the "they"» (BT 312; SZ 268) and writes: «So Dasein makes no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity. This process can be reversed {rückgängig gemacht werden} only if Dasein specifically brings itself back to itself {zurückholt zu ihm selbst} from its lostness in the ''they". But this bringing-back {Dieses Zurückholen} must have that kind of Being by the neglect of which Dasein has lost itself in inauthenticity. When Dasein thus brings itself back [Das Sichzurückholen] from the "they'', the they-self is modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes authentic Being-one's-Self. This must be accomplished by making up for not choosing [ Nachholen einer Wahl ]. But "making up" for not choosing signifies choosing to make this choice {Wählen dieser Wahl }—deciding for a potentiality-for-Being, and making this decision from one's own Self» (BT 312f.; SZ 268). Here, too, Heidegger could have said «zu sich selbst,» but for the reason mentioned above preferred to say «zu ihm selbst.» Contrary to Birmingham, to become authentic does not mean to break with each and every past. Contrary to Guignon, it does not mean either to screen the different possibilities offered by the past and choose the one that fits one's utopian ideal best. Rather, to become authentic means to repeat the possibility that Dasein has been before it lost that possibility by losing that possibility and itself in the «they.» To become authentic is a «Wieder-holung» (SZ 385; hyphen mine, J. F.; «repetition,» BT 437). Authentic Dasein brings (holen) back (wieder) Dasein's own past, which has disappeared since Dasein has lost itself in the «they.» Authentic Dasein does so by bringing (holen) up again for reconsideration, or re-decision, (nach) a choice that it failed to make. This choice (against the «they») would have prevented Dasein from loosing itself in the «they.» Since Dasein failed to make the choice, the past has disappeared and the «they» have taken over. Thus, authentic Dasein's «choosing to make this choice» (BT 313; SZ 268) chooses against the world of the «they» in order to repeat the past, which has disappeared since Dasein failed to choose against the «they» and to keep the past alive. In section 74 the past, which has been pushed aside by the «they,» raises its voice as heritage and «constitutes itself» (BT 435; SZ 383) by calling upon Dasein to choose to make the choice, that is, to cancel the «they,» society, in order to rerealize heritage, or community, which has been pushed aside by society. In this sense, one is entitled to read the phrase «ursprüngliche» («primordial») in «the whole of existence stretched along. . . in a way which is primordial and not lost» (BT 442; SZ 390) in a temporal sense, as this is, by the way, the sense in which «ursprünglich» is used in everyday language most of the time.

It is interesting that the change of the negation into an affirmation on page 390 of Sein und Zeit (BT 442) didn't require any changes in the following sentences. It is also interesting that the question of the older editions (as well as the instrumental question of the later editions) is raised just to disappear, and that Heidegger doesn't give any reason for his claim that authentic Dasein's choice is «choosing to make this choice [Wählen dieser Wahl]» (BT 313; SZ 268). For right-wingers didn't like to go into the issue. It is simply destiny or fate. The only more detailed answer was Hitler' s, which not everyone wanted to subscribe to, though Scheler did so for some time (see below, chapter 3, sections A and D). «Destiny» and «fate» were polemical notions gaining their strength and appeal from their denial of leftist theories (see chapter 3; see also this chapter, n. 23)

The edition of Sein und Zeit as volume 2 of the Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977) is a reprint of the seventh edition and contains Heidegger's notes in the margins of his «Hüttenexemplar,» that is, the copy he used in his hut. However, it doesn't contain the changes Heidegger made from the second edition onward. (Upon Heidegger's request, the editor, Friedrich-Wilhelm Herrmann, even made changes of the text of the seventh edition without indicating them as such; see ibid., 579.) Independent of the Gesamtausgabe and its publishing house, Rainer A. Bast and Heinrich P. Delfosse have produced the Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heideggers ' Sein und Zeit, ' vol. 1: Stellenindizes: Philologisch-kritischer Apparat (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1979). It contains a word index based on the fourteenth edition, «examples» (ibid., 388) of the changes in the second edition, an index of the changes in the seventh edition, an index of the misprints, the list of misprints included in Sein und Zeit from the first to the sixth edition, and several other indices and material. In none of the indices is the change from the negative to the affirmative form on page 390 listed. Klaus Heinrich, chair of the Institut for Reli-gionswissenschaften (located in the Paul Tillich-Haus) at the Freie Universität Berlin, in one of his lectures in the mid-seventies talked about page 390 of Sein und Zeit . His occasional comments on Heidegger (for instance, tertium datur: Eine religionsphilosophische Einführung in die Logik [Frankfurt: Stroemfeld/Roter Stem, 1981], 65ff.; vol. 1 of Klaus Heinrich, Dahlemer Vorlesungen ) are invaluable, and so were all his lectures.

36. Note that, as in «Die . . . sich überliefemde Entschlossenheit» (SZ 385; BT 437; see above, pp. 16ff.), here too one has an instance of a missing dative object. The context, however, makes it unavoidable to add as the dative object «fate» and «heritage» of the preceding paragraph. Thus, this sentence confirms, or makes explicit, that «ihm selbst» in the preceding paragraph ultimately refers to «fate» and «heritage.»

37. I pointed out Schürmann's attitude toward the English translation of his French book on Heidegger and Heidegger's assumption that even after its disappearance the origin still exists (see n. 33 of this chapter). I also pointed out the Freudian slip of the tongue in Heidegger and the fact that the change of the negative into an affirmative expression didn't require any changes in the subsequent text (see n. 35 of this chapter). One can see all these problems also in regard to the passage I discussed in this section: «As thrown, it has been submitted to a 'world', and exists factically with Others. Proximally and for the most part the Self is lost in the "they." It understands itself in terms of {aus} those possibilities of existence which 'circulate' in the 'average' public way of interpreting Dasein today. These possibilities have mostly been made unrecognizable by ambiguity; yet they are well known to us. The authentic existentiell understanding is so far from extricating itself from the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us, that in each case it is in terms of this interpretation {aus ihr}, against it, and yet again for it, that any possibility one has chosen is seized upon in one's resolution» (BT 435; SZ 383). The passage allows for two interpretations. The phrase, «those possibilities of existence which 'circulate' in the 'average' public way of interpreting Dasein today» might refer to the possibilities of the original world w 1 ; in that case, the phrase, «These possibilities . . . known to us,» means that living in w 2 ordinary Dasein has, so to speak, perverted the possibilities of the original world w 1 . However, the phrase, «those possibilities of existence which 'circulate' in the 'average' public way of interpreting Dasein today» might also refer to the possibilities in w 2 . In that case, the phrase, «These possibilities . . . known to us,» means that living in w 2 ordinary Dasein covers up by ambiguity all those possibilities, or all those aspects of all of its possibilities, in which w 1 has always been present or in which it raises its voice once the Bocksgesang begins. (According to the second interpretation, both occurrences of «aus» have the ambiguity I pointed out; in the first interpretation, only the second one has it, while the first «aus» is used the way it is used in the sentences on the Erbe.) However, this doesn't mean that Heidegger speaks unclearly or imprecisely. For from the viewpoint of authentic Dasein both interpretations amount to the same. Or in the first interpretation the issue is formulated more from the perspective of the estate, w 1 , and in the second interpretation it is formulated from the perspective of the heirs of w 1 (see this chapter, n. 25). Both issues are the same problem, for the estate demands of its heirs to be rerealized. In addition, the problem and its aspects are familiar to conservatives and right-wingers (see in this chapter, nn. 25 and 35).