To Have and Have Not "nsd0e1285"

3 The Emerging Threat 1940

1. William Neumann, "How American Policy in the Pacific Contributed to War in the Pacific," in Harry Elmer Barnes (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1953), 242-243.

2. Ienaga Saburo, The Pacific War: World War H and the Japanese, 1931-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 37.

3. Henry Stimson and William Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harpers, 1948), 234.

4. Ibid., 243-244. See also quote from Herbert Hoover in Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1944), 25.

3. Henry Stimson and William Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harpers, 1948), 234.

4. Ibid., 243-244. See also quote from Herbert Hoover in Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1944), 25.

5. Neumann, "American Policy," 248-249; A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938), 446-448.

6. Ohata Tokushiro, "The Anti-Comintern Pact," in James William Morley (ed.), Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935-1940 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

7. Sumner Welles pulled together the group within the Far Eastern branch. Their December 5, 1938 memorandum, "Steps of a Positive Character Which the United States Might Take Against Japan in Retaliation for Japan's Injury to American Rights and Interests in China: Examination Thereof," is in box 1, Leo Pasvolsky office file, RG 59, National Archives. See also Laurence Salisbury (FE), "America's Economic Policy in the Far East," January 30, 1939, 793.94/14667 1/2, RG 59, National Archives.

8. George Gallup, "American Institute of Public Opinion Surveys, 1935-38," Public Opinion Quarterly 2 (July 1938), 389; Gallup, "American Institute of Public Opinion—Surveys, 1938-1939," Public Opinion Quarterly 3 (October 1939), 599. A propaganda piece by the California Committee on Pacific Friendship suggests why some residual admiration for Japan remained: "Japan has never harmed us. Japan is not threatening us. Japan has treated us better than any other world power in the matter of paying debts, courtesy to our visitors and residents, and never attempting to meddle in our affairs. Japan is the only world power that has paid back all sums borrowed without delay or default on a single penny. If we are going to answer this fair treatment

of us by enmity, no incentive is left for any country to treat us well in the future.'' Quoted in Neumann, "American Policy," 231.

9. Sherk, Pacific Trade Basin , 42. It is difficult to estimate China's share precisely because of Japan's control of Manchuria and the port of Kwantung. The United States sold $289 million worth of goods to Japan in 1937 but less than $90 million to China; even the Philippines offered a greater market than China. Furthermore the United States had a trade surplus of about $84 million with Japan but a deficit of almost $54 million with China proper. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce .

10. U.S. investment in China amounted to only $132 million in 1935, compared to $387 million in Japan, according to Department of Commerce figures from William Lockwood, Jr., "America's Stake in the Far East—II: Investments," Far Eastern Survey (August 12, 1936), 182. Total U.S. investments in China had never surpassed $250 million. See C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China (New York: Macmillan, 1933), 332-333. For more figures on U.S. investments in China and Japan, and for a discussion of Japan's superior record of repayment on U.S. loans, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, China and Japan , Information Department Papers No. 21 (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1938), 114, 121. On investment in the Philippines, see Helmut Callis, Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942), 11, and Catherine Parker, "The Philippines as an American Investment," Far Eastern Survey (September 25, 1940), 222.

11. America First Committee Speakers Bureau, "To what extent does our economic life depend on foreign trade?" 1941, in Doenecke, In Danger Undaunted , 152.

12. Griswold, Far Eastern Policy , 469. Admittedly, government officials have often have gone to great lengths to protect modest investments by influential corporations; consider the State Department's strenuous exertions on behalf of U.S. oil companies in Indonesia in the 1920s. As Harold Quigley argued, "While it would seem that an approximate total investment of $160,000,000 in these enterprises [U.S. businesses in China] would exert a negligible leverage upon American policy it must be presumed that our insistent reaffirmation of the 'Open Door' doctrine is directly related to these interests. In themselves and in their importance to trade they compose a considerable stake requiting protection from local and outside infringement." At the same time, however, these investments did not convince Washington to rethink its cautious, almost timid policy toward Japan in the 1930s. See Harold Quigley, The Far Eastern War 1937-1941 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942), 40-41.

13. Useful studies include: John Masland, "American Attitudes Toward Japan," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May 1941), 160-165 [hereafter Annals ]; Masland, "Commercial Influences Upon Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1941," Pacific Historical Review 11 (September 1942), 281-299; Peter Hoffer, ''American Businessmen and the Japan Trade," Pacific Historical Review 41 (May 1972), 189-206; Roland Stromberg, "American Business and the Approach of War," Journal of Economic History (Winter 1953), 58-78; Mira Wilkins, "The Role of U.S. Business," in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History , 341-376. It is interesting to note that Masland, a critic of economic explanations of U.S. policy in the Far East, hints at the significance of imports from Southeast Asia when he admits, "The Netherlands East Indies assumed considerable importance as a source of tin, rubber, and other strategic materials" (Masland, "Commercial Influences," 284). Southern cotton interests, which were particularly dependent on the large market Japan provided, formed an especially unified lobby opposing retaliation against Japan. Will Clayton, the nation's greatest cotton industrialist and an important political figure, wrote Sen. Alben Barkley on February 23, 1940, protesting moves to limit U.S. trade with Japan—despite his voluntary refusal to trade with the European Axis powers. "I am sure it is unnecessary to point out to you," he wrote, "that American cotton would be the greatest sufferer from any serious interruption of trade between this country and Japan." See Dobney, Papers of Will Clayton , 47. See also Amerasia II (November 1938), 458-461 for a discussion of the pro-Japan bias of certain southern cotton journals.

14. William Johnstone, The United States and Japan's New Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), 216-217.

15. Tyler Dennett, "Alternative American Policies in the Far East," Foreign Affairs 16 (April 1938), 392. In this article, Dennett expressed serious concern that the Japanese threat to Southeast Asia could mean direct material losses to the United State. For a counterargument about Japanese-occupied China, predicting serious consequences to the U.S. economy if trade with it dried up, see Nathaniel Peffer, "Would Japan Shut the Open Door in China?" Foreign Affairs 17 (October 1938), 37-50.

16. Hoffer, "American Businessmen," 194-195; Masland, "Commercial Influences," 289, 293-294.

17. Fortune 22 (September 1940), 114. See also the statement of Nelson Johnson in Gardner, New Deal Diplomacy , 141-142.

18. Hoffer, "American Businessmen," 202, 204.

19. Larry W. Moses, "Soviet-Japanese Confrontation in Outer Mongolia: The Battle of Nomonhan-Khalkin Gol," Journal of Asian

History 1 (1967), 64-85; Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935-1939," in Morley, Deterrent Diplomacy , 115-178; Ienaga, The Pacific War , 82.

20. Adolf Berle, Jr., recorded in his diary for September 14, 1937, that although Roosevelt and Hull wanted very much to keep the United States out of war, Roosevelt showed great concern that "the Japanese were getting ready to seize the Island of Hainan which lies half way on the road to Singapore and which accordingly would threaten both French Indo-China and also the British trade route." Thus, when a year and a half later Japan did move into Hainan, the Administration's concern was quite understandable. See Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 135-136.

21. Hull, Memoirs , I, 628. For further evidence of the administration's strategic anxieties about Hainan, see Grew to Hull, March 31, 1939, in box 329, Hornbeck papers.

22. Ch'ao-Ting Chi, "Far Eastern Notes," Amerasia 1 (July 1937), 236. He noted, "Recent events indicate that control of Hainan Island is definitely an immediate objective of Japan's policy of southern expansion." See also ''Growing Interest in Hainan Mainly Strategic," Far Eastern Survey 7 (August 24, 1938), 203-204. As early as 1936, Japan's navy began drawing up contingency plans to seize Borneo's oil fields. See Tsunoda Jun, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," in James William Morley, ed., The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 241.

23. Andrew Roth, Japan Strikes South (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), 16.

24. Ibid., 16-17. When Hamilton, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, was informed of Japan's move by the counselor of the Japanese embassy, his first reaction was to remark that "the Sinnan Island Group appeared to be very near to the Philippine Islands" ( FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 277).

23. Andrew Roth, Japan Strikes South (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), 16.

25. Hull, Memoirs , I, 628.

26. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 4-5, 280-281.

27. Hull, Memoirs , I, 630. See also Tracy Kittredge, "Joint Strategic Planning, 1937-40," 41-43, in box 30, Kittredge papers.

New York Herald Tribune , January 26, 1939.

29. New York Herald Tribune , January 19, 1939.

30. Washington Evening Star , March 6, 1939.

31. Erle Dickover (Batavia) dispatch no. 274, June 27, 1939, 811.24 Raw Materials/221, RG 59, National Archives.

32. Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 230 (June 27, 1939 diary entry).

33. Henry Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1936), 138.

34. Stark to Richardson, March 15, 1940, in PHA Exhibits, XIV, 932. See also Neumann, "American Policy," 255-256. Quick action was taken in the autumn, probably as a result of the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, which relieved pressure on the Soviet Union's western front and effectively stymied any plans by Japan to invade Siberia. In fact, the State Department worried that the pact would force Japan to "limit its ambitions to the south. But the more its ambitions there were realized, the greater would be the menace to the Philippines and to the legitimate strategic and commercial interests of the United States in the southern reaches of the Pacific." Sumner Welles, "Roosevelt and the Far East," Harper's 202 (February 1951), 32.

35. Stark to Richardson, March 15, 1940, in PHA Exhibits, XIV, 932. Note also the Navy's viewpoint expressed in Stark to Richardson, January 18, 1940: "I have a letter from Tommy Hart [Commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet], just received, in which he thinks the situation in the Far East is very serious and that this year may prove to be a crucial and critical one. As I have written Bloch [former Commander in chief of the United States Fleet], and as you undoubtedly know, I have continually asked him to bear in mind what is going on to the Westward which in this particular period in this old world's history may be far more important to us than the troubles in Europe, especially if something should break and break quickly and without warning" (PHA Exhibits, XIV, 923).

36. Minutes of February 21, 1940 JB Meeting, cited in Kittredge, "United States Neutrality Policies . . ." in box 29, Kittredge papers.

37. Richardson testimony, PHA Hearings, I, 255; Stark to Richardson, April 8, 1940, PHA Exhibits, XIV, 933.

38. Jun, "Southern Strategy," 243-246.

39. New York Times , April 14, 1940, and April 15, 1940.

40. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 281; New York Times , April 16, 1940.

41. New York Times , April 17, 1940.

42. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 81.

43. Feis, Seen From E. A ., 55.

44. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 282.

45. For instance, in a public response to a later Japanese expression of "increased concern" for the fate of the Indies, Hull declared that in view of his April 17 statement, "commitments and expressions of intention to respect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies cannot be too often reiterated" ( FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 285). Undersecretary of State Welles stressed Hull's April 17 message and other affirmations of the status quo principle in an address before the Cleveland

Foreign Affairs Council in September ("Our Foreign Policy and National Defense," Department of State Bulletin , September 28, 1940, 243).

46. On April 19, the San Francisco Chronicle ran a front-page column on the problem by Royce Briar and an editorial inside praising Hull's statement: "This is to the good. The Dutch are admirable people. Also, their East Indies are the source of rubber and tin we must have for industry or national defense. Without them some of our factories would shut down and daddy would not get any more pay checks. Also there would be no tires on the car to take mother to the peace meetings."

47. Washington Star , April 18, 1940; New York Times , April 18, 1940, and April 19, 1940. The French complained that Japan would soon be in a position to "menace French positions in New Caledonia, which has one of the richest nickel deposits in the world, it was pointed out" ( New York Times , April 18, 1940).

48. Iron Age , May 16, 1940. The department's release said, "Richly endowed climatically and geologically, the Netherlands Indies ranks among the world's most important sources of rubber, tin, petroleum, sugar, coconut products, vegetable oils, tobacco, spices, and fibers, and one noted for a variety of minor tropical products which have become increasingly important in the markets of industrial countries. Practically a world monopoly is held in the production of quinine, while the special trade significance of many other products enhances the importance of the Netherlands Indies as a source of articles of present-day commerce; kapok for upholstering and other fibers for cordage manufacture, tanning and dyeing materials, palm oil for the preparation of soaps and margarine, cassava products for food and sizing purposes, flavoring extracts and raw materials for the manufacture of medicines" See Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, press release, "The Netherlands Indies," April 19, 1940, in box 311, Hornbeck papers; also reprinted in Amerasia 4 (May 1940), 121-122.

49. Iron Age , May 16, 1940; minutes of May 24, 1940, Business Advisory Council meeting in box 110, Hopkins papers.

50. Feis, Seen from E. A ., 56. For more on the administration's concern for raw materials, see William Langer and S. Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952), 587-588. In a memo to the Interdepartmental Committee on Strategic Materials, May 15, 1940, Feis wrote, "Recent events have convinced virtually everybody of the urgent necessity of trying to augment our stocks of these materials. The necessity rests not only on the needs of our fighting forces in the event of a war emergency, but on the needs of indus-

try. Shortage of supplies would greatly upset our whole economic situation" (box 302, Hopkins papers.

51. Roosevelt press conference, 645-A, May 23, 1940. A copy of his speech to the Business Advisory Council and transcript of the meeting are in PSF: Harry L. Hopkins, Roosevelt papers. The council was not persuaded; it passed a resolution calling "in the strongest terms at its command" for a hugely expanded stockpiling program. "The international situation," they insisted, "will not permit continued delay and obstruction to this permanent strategic reserve without prejudicial and possibly very dangerous effect upon our national security." Two years later, with the country at war, Stanley Hornbeck expressed doubts as to whether the lessons of German raw material conservation could be applied at home: "It is believed that any . . . assumption that this country could within a few months or even within a few years readjust its economy along such lines [as] . . . that achieved by the Germans would lead to highly disappointing and very unfortunate consequences. . .. None but Germans, in Germany and under the Nazi system, can do what the Germans are doing. None but Japanese, in Japan and under the prevailing militant militaristic system of Japan can do what the Japanese are doing. . .. [O]ur national economy and our private economy are and long have been different from those of the Germans or the Japanese . . .'' See Hornbeck to Colonel Cortier, April 7, 1942, box 263, Hornbeck papers.

52. T. A. Bisson, "America's Dilemma in the Far East," Foreign Policy Reports (July 1, 1940), 105-106.

53. "Japanese Comment on US Naval Maneuvers," US Naval Attache (Tokyo) report, April 26, 1940, Naval Attache Tokyo file, II, PSF:Documents N, Roosevelt Library.

54. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation , 588.

55. Richardson testimony, PHA Hearings, I, 260.

56. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 933-934.

57. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 938.

58. PHA Exhibits XIV, 940-942, 943-950. For the debate within the administration, see Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 316 (May 21, 1940 entry).

59. FR, 1940 , IV, 19. But on May 13 Frederick Moore, a U.S. journalist hired by the Japanese "in an advisory capacity by the Japanese Embassy" and long associated with Japanese officials, reported to a U.S. official that the Japanese were "prepared to go" in the direction of the Netherlands East Indies and seemed "unwilling to believe that we would act in event of their moving on the Netherlands East Indies" ( FR, 1940 , IV, 16). Nor did Hornbeck agree with Grew that the Japa-

58. PHA Exhibits XIV, 940-942, 943-950. For the debate within the administration, see Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 316 (May 21, 1940 entry).

nese leaders recognized the United States' willingness to fight rather than lose the Indies. See ibid., fn 35.

60. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 288; Hull, Memoirs , I, 893.

61. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 46.

62. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 66. Arita made his speech just as the Japanese were undertaking a major military buildup on Hainan involving thousands of troops and many aircraft. Chinese officials felt Japan was capable of launching an attack from Hainan toward Indochina or the Netherlands East Indies. See Johnson to Hull, July 4, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 23.

63. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 68.

64. See June file, box 461, Hornbeck papers. Hornbeck also prepared a similar memorandum on June 24 consisting of a summary of Rupert Emerson's article, "Dutch East Indies Adrift."

65. June 15, 1940 memorandum in box 414, Hornbeck papers. Emphasis in original.

66. June 15, 1940 memorandum in boxes 414 and 461, Hornbeck papers.

67. Congressman John McCormack inserted it into the Congressional Record 88 (August 13, 1941), A3913, and the article was quoted in C. F. Remer, "American Interest in the Economic Future of the Pacific," in Mayling Soon Foundation, America's Future in the Pacific (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1947), 49. The Hornbeck quote and reprint are in his June 14, 1940 memorandum, in boxes 414 and 461, Hornbeck papers.

68. Historian James Thompson notes that "it was the Hornbeck memorandum, usually addressed to the secretary and undersecretary, that was the chief internal carrier of policy continuity toward the Far East" (Thompson, "The Role of the State Department," in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History , 88). Stimson called Hornbeck "the foremost expert in the State Department" on Far Eastern affairs (Stimson diary, September 11, 1940). Sumner Welles called him "one of the ablest men with whom I have ever been associated in the State Department'' (letter to Colonel Langhorne, September 12, 1950, in Horn-beck papers). Joseph Ballantine, another State Department official involved in policy toward Japan, said, "Hornbeck, with his disciplined mind, his clarity of thought, his fertility in useful ideas for dealing with questions presented, and his ripe experience, was invaluable in our deliberations" (Ballantine autobiography, chapter 10, "Prelude to Pearl Harbor," in box 1, Ballantine papers, Hoover Library). On Hornbeck's great influence throughout the administration, see also Kenneth McCarty, Jr., "Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Far East, 1931-1941" (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Duke University, 1970); Jonathan Utley,

"The Department of State and the Far East, 1937-1941," (Ph.D dissertation, University of Illinois, 1970), 9; Spotswood, "Japan's Southward Advance," 86-88. For opposing evidence, see Breckinridge Long's diary for October 9, 1940, in Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 139. Long told Hull that Hornbeck's influence extended too far outside the department and should be curbed, especially given "the lengths to which his rather violent mentality will lead him." Hull apparently agreed and noted that he would seek more advice from Hamilton, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. However, on key matters such as the importance of Southeast Asia to the national interest and tactical issues such as the need to aid China to keep Japan's troops bogged down, there was widespread consensus.

69. The Japanese also demanded that the French hand over all Chinese silver on deposit in French banks in Tientsin. The French authorities agreed, and Japan assumed de facto control of the city on June 20. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 50-52; Hull, Memoirs , I, 896. Note that aid to Chungking via Indochina was ended completely by July 11 ( FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 94-95; FR, 1940 , 30-31).

70. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 86.

71. Memorandum by Grew, June 24, 1940, in FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 88-89.

72. The influential Asahi daily announced a similar line, with particular reference to Southeast Asia (Roth, Japan Strikes South , 53).

73. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 92, 94.

74. Hornbeck to Wells, June 25, 1940, box 493, Hornbeck papers.

75. Hull, Memoirs , I, 896-899.

76. Barnhart, Japan Prepares , 159-175; Jun, "Southern Strategy," 247; Hosoya Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact, 1939-1940," in Morley, Deterrent Diplomacy , 207-211.

77. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 107.

78. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 946. For other samples of Navy opinion, see memo prepared for Stark, Marshall, and directors of the War Plans Divisions of the Navy and Army, "Decisions as to National Action," in box 30, Kittredge papers.

79. Memorandum of conversation by Grew, June 10, 1940, in FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 69-70.

80. Richardson testimony, PHA Hearings, I, 282.

81. Richardson testimony, PHA Hearings, I, 297.

82. PHA Exhibits, XVI, 1989-1996; also in box 461, Hornbeck papers. On July 24, Stimson sent Morgenthau a copy of this memo. See Stimson diary, July 24, 1940. For more on Hornbeck's views, see Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 316 (May 21, 1940 entry); Horn-beck memo to Welles, July 24, 1940, box 155, Hornbeck papers. See

also Hornbeck memo, "Reflections on the Situation in Europe, the Situation in the Far East . . ." June 17, 1940, box 309, Hornbeck papers.

83. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 289.

84. FR, 1940 , IV, 381-383.

85. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 95-100.

86. Ibid., 101; Hull, Memoirs , I, 900-901. When the Yunnan-Indochina railroad was closed, all tungsten shipped out of China came over the Burma Road. See Harry Holmes, Strategic Materials and National Defense (New York: Macmillan, 1942), 39. On December 3, 1941, Roosevelt wrote Hull and Welles a memorandum showing that keeping the Burma Road open was as much in the United States' interest as in China's, as two-thirds of U.S. tungsten came out through that route. He told them: "I think it is well worthwhile that this aspect of closing the Burma Road should be brought out. The Burma Road is China's life-line for goods going in but it is also a very important lifeline for our very much needed tungsten and tung oil." Elliott Roosevelt, (ed.,) FDR, His Personal Letters, 1928-1945 , Volume II (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), 1249.

85. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 95-100.

87. Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact, 1939-1940," 285.

88. Hull, Memoirs , I, 894.

89. Press release issued by the White House on July 2, 1940, Department of State Bulletin , July 6, 1940, 11.

90. Morgenthau diary (unpublished), v. 284, 122; v. 286, 86ff; v. 287, 151ff, 163-164; v. 173, 287, Roosevelt Library; Stimson diary, July 18, 19, 24, 26, 1940; Julius Pratt, Cordell Hull , Volume II (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), 469—470; Wells, "Roosevelt and the Far East," 33; and Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 299. For an excellent account of the bureaucratic maneuvering over licensing, see Utley, "Department of State," 97-100.

91. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 218-219; Roth, Japan Strikes South , 58.

92. FR, 1940 , IV, 59.

93. Ibid. 60, 63.

94. Ibid., 63-64; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903.

92. FR, 1940 , IV, 59.

93. Ibid. 60, 63.

94. Ibid., 63-64; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903.

92. FR, 1940 , IV, 59.

93. Ibid. 60, 63.

94. Ibid., 63-64; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903.

95. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 289-291.

96. FR, 1940 , IV, 65.

97. Ibid.; see also Welles to Murphy (at Vichy), August 7, 1940, 66, etc.; Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to Hull, August 7, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 67; see also Grew to Hull, August 9, 1940, ibid., 69-70.

98. Matthews to Hull, August 27, 1940, ibid., 86-87.

99. Reed to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 92-93; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 93; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 93-94.

96. FR, 1940 , IV, 65.

97. Ibid.; see also Welles to Murphy (at Vichy), August 7, 1940, 66, etc.; Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to Hull, August 7, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 67; see also Grew to Hull, August 9, 1940, ibid., 69-70.

98. Matthews to Hull, August 27, 1940, ibid., 86-87.

99. Reed to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 92-93; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 93; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 93-94.

96. FR, 1940 , IV, 65.

97. Ibid.; see also Welles to Murphy (at Vichy), August 7, 1940, 66, etc.; Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to Hull, August 7, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 67; see also Grew to Hull, August 9, 1940, ibid., 69-70.

98. Matthews to Hull, August 27, 1940, ibid., 86-87.

99. Reed to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 92-93; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 93; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 93-94.

96. FR, 1940 , IV, 65.

97. Ibid.; see also Welles to Murphy (at Vichy), August 7, 1940, 66, etc.; Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to Hull, August 7, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 67; see also Grew to Hull, August 9, 1940, ibid., 69-70.

98. Matthews to Hull, August 27, 1940, ibid., 86-87.

99. Reed to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 92-93; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 93; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 93-94.

100. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 291-293.

101. The British government actually encouraged Washington to make this decision, figuring that the U.S. naval presence in the Pacific would relieve pressure on Singapore and allow the British to focus all their resources in Europe and the Middle East. See Miner, "United States Policy," 36-37.

102. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 64; Washington Post , September 5, 1940.

103. Hull, Memoirs , I, 903-904; Roth, Japan Strikes South , 65.

104. FR, 1940 , IV, 106-107.

105. Washington Post , September 11, 1940.

106. Joseph Grew, Turbulent Era , Volume II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 1228; Department of State, Peace and War , 571-572.

107. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 221-222.

108. Pratt, Cordell Hull , 470-471. At this point, Hornbeck once again fought off all attempts to shift part of the fleet away from Hawaii. See memos in PHA Exhibits, XVI, 2001-2013. Advocates of a cautious response had to weigh the possibility, raised by one Japanese admiral, that Japan could survive an embargo better than the United States could survive the ensuing loss of Southeast Asia, "when she will no longer be able to obtain rubber and tin" (Rear Adm. Gumpei Sekine [sic], quoted in U.S. Naval Attache [Tokyo] report no. 131-140, September 5, 1940, in PSF: Documents N. Naval Attache Tokyo, v. II, Roosevelt papers.

109. Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact," 238-240.

110. FR, 1940 , IV, 131; FR, Japan 1931-1941, , II, 294-296.

111. Department of State Bulletin , September 28, 1940, 253.

112. Furthermore, the French already had about ninety unused U.S. planes stationed in Martinique, which the Vichy Government refused to release to Indochina. Hull, Memoirs , I, 907; FR, 1940 , IV, 146-147.

113. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 222-223; New York Times , September 26 and 27, 1940. Utley notes that the China loan had been approved in July 1940 but was slow to be disbursed owing to bureaucratic infighting over where the money should come from (105).

114. Breckinridge Long noted in his diary on September 28, 1940, after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, "And so we go—more and more—farther and farther along the road to war. But we are not ready to fight any war now—to say nothing of a war on two oceans at once—and that is what the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo agreement means. Nor will we be ready to fight any war for eighteen months in the future" (Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 132).

115. The wording of the pact is from Herbert, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 111; the

Asahi quote is from David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1971), 728-729.

116. Department of State Bulletin , September 28, 1940, 251.

117. Stimson diary, September 27, 1940.

118. Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor , 122n.

119. Los Angeles Times , September 28, 1940.

120. Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War , 34.

121. FR, 1940 , I, 658. See also Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), 340-342.

122. Washington Post , September 28, 1940.

123. San Francisco Chronicle September 28, 1940.

124. October 1, 1940 memorandum, box 4, Hornbeck papers; Stimson diary, October 1-2, 1940.

125. The New York Times , in an editorial on September 26, argued for more aid to China instead: "There is only one real check upon Japan's freedom of action and that is the stubborn opposition of the people and the Government of China. So long as this opposition continues, Japan cannot use her full power elsewhere. But the moment Japan has crushed China's resistance, that moment Japan is wholly free to embark upon aggressive action in any other part of the Pacific area; against Indo-China; against the Philippines; against the Dutch East Indies, source of raw materials of the utmost importance to us; against Singapore, the eastern outpost of the British Empire."

126. Nancy Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 330-331.

127. Ibid., 331-332.

128. Ibid., 333.

129. Ibid., 334.

126. Nancy Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 330-331.

127. Ibid., 331-332.

128. Ibid., 333.

129. Ibid., 334.

126. Nancy Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 330-331.

127. Ibid., 331-332.

128. Ibid., 333.

129. Ibid., 334.

126. Nancy Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 330-331.

127. Ibid., 331-332.

128. Ibid., 333.

129. Ibid., 334.

130. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , October 7, 1940, 136.

131. Ibid., 912; FR, 1940 , IV, passim (October).

130. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , October 7, 1940, 136.

131. Ibid., 912; FR, 1940 , IV, passim (October).

132. Miner, "United States Policy," 52.

133. Stimson to FDR, October 12, 1940; quoted in Leonard Baker, Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970) 115; cf. Stimson diary, October 12, 1940.

134. PHA Hearings (Richardson testimony), I, 265-266. Richardson claimed that Roosevelt told him, "if the Japanese attack Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies, we would not enter the war; that even if they attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes, and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded, sooner or later they would make a mistake and we could enter the war" (PHA Hearings, I, 266). Admiral Leahy, who participated

in the conversation, could not remember Roosevelt uttering such a statement but concluded that it was possible and that the president was despondent over the public's disinclination to fight. Roosevelt himself, Leahy insisted, would have gone to war to protect the Philippines if given the chance. See Leahy testimony, PHA Hearings, I, 356-357.

135. FR, 1940 , IV, 180; 185-186.

136. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , November 7, 1940, 150-151.

137. Stimson diary, November 6 and 12, 1940.

138. FR, 1940 , IV, 211.

139. December 1940 file, box 461, Hornbeck papers.

140. On its wide distribution, see accompanying papers in ibid. The State Department sent it to Roosevelt (see PSF:State Deptarment, June-December 1940, Roosevelt Library; also Gardner, New Deal Diplomacy , 145, and Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War , 309n). Lauchlin Currie's favorable comments appear in box 389, Hornbeck papers; Grew, Ten Years in Japan , 370; and Grew to Hull, February 7, 1941, in PHA Hearings, VI, 2917-2919. Wells liked it enough to send it off to Westmore Wilcox, Jr., who was convinced. See Wilcox to Welles, April 2, 1941, 740.0011 PW/241, RG 59, National Archives. Hornbeck also showed the memorandum to a number of appreciative business leaders in the Council on Foreign Relations, including Allen Dulles and T. W. Lamont (see boxes 151 and 272, Hornbeck papers). The only negative comments Hornbeck received came from General Marshall, who sent a short note to Stimson complaining that the memo did not sufficiently emphasize the Atlantic. Hornbeck responded in typical fashion with a twenty-page rebuttal, sent to Stimson on June 9, 1941. Copies of both can be found in boxes 389 and 462, Hornbeck papers.

139. December 1940 file, box 461, Hornbeck papers.

141. Grew, Turbulent Era , II, 1255-1257.

142. FR, 1941 , IV, 6-8; also in PHA Hearings, II, 632-633. An almost identical letter, again drafted by Hornbeck, was sent by Roosevelt to Francis Sayre, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, on December 31, after Sayre had written expressing his fear that "any day Japan may start moving southwards." See E. Roosevelt, Personal Letters , II, 1093-1095, and miscellaneous folders, box 525, Hornbeck papers.

143. December 19, 1940 instructions, cited in Miner, "United States Policy," 78.

144. Joseph Ballantine, "Far Eastern Affairs," November 22, 1940 lecture to Naval War College, in box 127, Hornbeck papers.

145. Hull, Memoirs , I, 905.