1. Van der Dussen's account of Collingwood's unpublished manuscripts appears to bear this out. It may be the only plausible conjecture about what Collingwood could have meant, though it is not itself plausibly developed. See W. J. van der Dussen, History as a Science: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), ch. 4. break

2. See Yirmiahu Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

3. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 239.

4. Collingwood, The Idea of History , 224-225.

5. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , 2d ed. enl. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

6. See Bas C. van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).

7. The most undisguised example appears in Adolf Grünbaum, The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984).

8. Carl G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965), 231.

9. See Maurice Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge (New York: Liveright, 1938), chs. 7-8; also, "Historical Explanation: The Problem of 'Covering Laws'," History and Theory 1 (1961).

10. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," 233, n. 1; italics added.

11. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," 238.

12. For some specimen views, see van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry ; and Carol G. Gould, Marx's Social Ontology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978).

13. Davidson's argument is really better known than Hempel's because it explicitly applies Hempel's argument to the analysis of "reasons" and "explanations by reasons." But it clearly confuses the analysis of alternative conceptions of cause and alternative conceptions of causal explanation. See, in particular, Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes'' and "Mental Acts," in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Claredon, 1980).

14. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," 231-233. 1 have italicized the terms "every," "kind," "will," and "always"—except for the last use of "kind."

15. See Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

16. See, for instance, Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), essay 6. This is not to endorse Cartwright's wholesale objection to theoretical laws.

17. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," 233.

18. See Stephen Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case against Belief (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983); and Paul M. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and Structure of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

19. See Davidson, "Mental Events."

20. Carl G. Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," in Aspects of Scientific Explanation , 263; italics added.

21. Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," 263. break

22. For a brief overview of the objections to physicalism, see Joseph Margolis, Texts without Referents: Reconciling Science and Narrative (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), ch. 6; see, also, Science without Unity: Reconciling the Human and the Natural Sciences (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), ch. 10.

23. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," 233.

24. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," 236.

25. See Carl G. Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," Aspects of Scientific Explanation .

26. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," 243.

27. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," 231.

28. See Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science ; and P. K. Feyerabend, "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem," Review of Metaphysics XVII (1963).

29. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," 239-241.

30. See Imre Lakatos, Philosophical Papers , vol. 1, ed. John Worall and Gregory Currie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), passim .

31. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," 243.

32. See Hilary Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).

33. See Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests , trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

34. I define relativism in just these terms. There is, however, no point in pressing the issue here, since Putnam does not favor it. But see, further, Joseph Margolis, The Truth about Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).

35. Hilary Putnam, "A Defense of Internal Realism," in Realism with a Human Face , ed. James Conalt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 41.

36. Putnam, "A Defense of Internal Realism," 41.

37. Hilary Putnam, "Realism and Reason," in Meaning and the Moral Sciences , 125.

38. Hilary Putnam, "William James's Ideas" (authored with Anna Putnam), in Realism with a Human Face , 225; italics added.

39. See Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle: Open Court, 1987), 53, 83.

40. It may be helpful to suggest that one source of the tension about truth which may be found in Putnam ( a fortiori , in Habermas) may be traced to the Frankfurt School's oscillation between an ahistorical and a historicized conception of reason. See, for instance, Richard Wolin, The Terms of Cultural Criticism: The Frankfurt School, Existentialism, Poststructuralism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), part I. In the American pragmatist tradition, it may (perhaps) be traced to the influence of Emerson. See Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: The Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).

41. See, for instance, Putnam's discussion of his differences with Dummett in Meaning and the Moral Sciences .

42. Putnam, "The John Locke Lectures (1976)," in Meaning and the Moral Sciences , lecture 2: 20. break

43. Putnam, "The John Locke Lectures," 21; italics added.

44. Putnam, "A Defense of Internal Realism," 40.

45. Putnam, "A Defense of Internal Realism," 41.

46. Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism , 26-27.

47. Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism , 28.

48. See Margolis, The Truth about Relativism . Putnam has never seriously considered the possibility of a coherent relativism. In his latest book (which I have only seen in manuscript), Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures, 1990), he returns (ch. 4) to trash once again the relativist who embraces self-referential paradoxes. In fact, he takes as his specimen Richard Rorty, who, in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), construed truth as agreement with one's peers; but Rorty also "recanted," in Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), xxv—which Putnam reports. It is difficult to understand why Putnam merely repeats the same objection in each new discussion of relativism. For one thing, it is a gloss on Plato's ancient argument (in Theaetetus ), which itself may be fairly read as misinterpreting Protagoras; and, for another, it hardly exhausts the resources of relativism.