1. Lillie went on to be a leading reproductive scientist and a senior statesman of American science, the only individual ever to serve simultaneously as the president of both the National Academy of Sciences (1935-39) and the National Research Council (1935-36) (Willier 1957). I take this story up in more detail in chapter 3 and elsewhere (Clarke 1991a, 1996).

2. Although the initial work was solely Papanicolaou's, by convention the head of the laboratory was listed as first author on all publications. Papanicolaou later objected, and Stockard agreed to end this practice (Carmichael 1973:49-50). Despite evidence that the vaginal smear, now known as the Pap smear in his honor, could provide indications of cancer or precancerous conditions in the vagina or uterus, Papanicolaou received no serious support for this research until 1939. Since then, the Pap smear has become one of the major cancer screening technologies in the world, used both diagnostically and for epidemiological purposes. See Carmichael (1973), Casper and Clarke (1997), and Clarke and Casper (1996).

3. ''His organization and maintenance of his monkey colony set the standard for such work in primate research centers to the present day, including his insistence upon daily observation," without which his key findings might well have been missed (Ramsay 1994:66-67). It is most appropriate to start this book with a story from George Corner's work since his wonderful autobiography was the first thing I read in my research. He was both reflective and reflexive, himself a historian of medicine and chronicler of the reproductive sciences (e.g., Corner 1965, 1960, 1951; Aberle and Corner 1953). I suspect he well knew that his autobiography would someday serve as data for others. A major recent review of reproductive research from antiquity to the late twentieth century (Gruhn and Kazer 1989) frames all the work reviewed as either "Before Corner" or "After Corner," making his contributions the turning point into modernity. In his spare time Corner wrote books for young people on sex: Attaining Manhood: A Doctor Talks to Boys about Sex (1938) and a girls' version (similarly titled) the following year (1939).

4. See RAC, RG3, 915, Box 1.7. Weaver's Report, February 14, 1934, pp. 2-3.

5. On Pincus's family background, see Stellhorn (1978). More generally and for this story, see Pauly (1987:186-94), Ingle (1971), and Reed (1983:319-33).

6. On the human/nonhuman distinction, see Haraway (1992), Callon (1985), and Latour (1987).

7. See Farber (1982a:132) and Gerson (1983) on disciplinary necessities and scientific social worlds.

8. I draw here on recent studies of knowledge production discussed below, which, in turn, draw generously on Foucault and others.

9. Farley (1982) ambitiously examined the study of reproduction in both flora and fauna up to ca. 1915. Greep and his colleagues (1976, 1977) thoroughly examined the mammalian reproductive sciences after about 1960, including elaborate conceptual mappings of earlier work; Hertz (1984) and Mastroianni, Donaldson, and Kane (1990) flesh out this account almost to the present.

10. See also Gasking (1967) and Bodemer (1976); on reproduction as creation and the creation of monsters by science, see Bann (1994).

11. For recent work on the indeterminacy of sex and sex hormones, see, for example, Fausto-Sterling (1993, 1998) and Oudshoorn (1994). There also is considerable debate regarding the sex-gender distinction (e.g., Barrett and Phillips 1992; Gatens 1996). My goal here is to be systematic and clear in my narrative, sometimes in contrast with the framings of the reproductive scientists themselves, who may have had other agendas. At the same time, I recognize the contradictions between my seemingly realist linguistic "definitions" and my own constructionist approach.

12. The terms modern, premodern, and postmodern are highly loaded and problematic. I use them advisedly, especially to mark historical eras. For premodern and early modern studies of reproduction, see Farley (1982), Gasking (1967), and Riddle (1992).

13. The premodern, modern, and postmodern are mutually constitutive. See Clarke (1995a) for my extended argument on this distinction. On the simultaneity of the premodern with the modern and with the postmodern, see also Riddle (1992) and Pickstone (1993a,b). Martin (1990, 1994) seems to argue for a less traversed boundary. In the modern mode, the lived body is to be controlled, and changes planned across the life course. The social goal is achieving the traditional heterosexual nuclear family ideal (biological mother, father, and two children, one of each sex) in a managed fashion. The reproductive body politic is centered on population control. Lives are "Taylored," reframed following the scientific management ethos of Frederick Taylor (Banta 1993). In contrast, in the postmodern mode, the lived body is manipulated, transformed, and customized with what Martin (1990) has called "tailor-made specificities," flexibly accumulating desired capacities. The social body is transformed with new and diverse social meanings for mother, father, and most especially for "family" (biological/social/surrogate/donor/other). Sexual preferences and/or identities become increasingly irrelevant to reproduction. Families—both traditional and nontraditional—become a new industry/market and policy niche.

14. See, for example, Robinson (1976), Foucault (1978), Birken (1988), Irvine (1990), and Bullough (1994).

15. During the era examined, contraceptives were used widely only on and by humans, who were viewed as the end users. Uses in animals in the "wild" and in zoos to regulate populations and reproduction are actually part of the postmodern era, transforming nature and animal bodies in the very ways discussed earlier.

16. Key studies that fall loosely in this vein include Edge and Mulkay (1976), Farber (1982a), Fye (1987), Kohler (1982), Law (1980), Mullins (1972), and Pickering (1984). Reviews of this "generation" of work are provided by Chubin (1976), Graham, Lepenies, and Weingart (1983), Lemaine et al. (1976), and Zuckerman (1989). See also Kohler (1981), and Whitley (1984).

17. Geison (1981) raised the issue of the relationships of parts (specialties, research schools, centers) to wholes (disciplines), asserting that in such ecologies, local centers of activity must be taken into account. Centers of research were crucial actors in my analysis. I was particularly sensitized to these historical and historiographic issues by the teaching of Dan Todes and Gert Brieger at the University of California, San Francisco, in the early 1980s, and the work and counsel of Gerald Geison, Charles Rosenberg, and Jane Maienschein in early phases of this project.

18. See, for example, Abir-Am (1982, 1985, 1993), Kohler (1976, 1978, 1991), Arnove (1980), Cueto, ed. (1994), Fisher (1990), Kay (1993a,b), Morawski (1986), and Fisher (1993).

19. Those who work in this vein also deprivilege certain knowledges, such as that of the sciences, asserting instead that valued knowledge, even if "unofficial," can be produced in any number of places. On this point see also Watson-Verran and Turnbull (1995).

20. Key interactionists here include Park (1952), Hughes (1971), and Blumer (1969/1993). For the ecological vision, see Rosenberg (1979b) and Star (1995).

21. See Mead (1938/1972:518) for this interesting early use of discourse. For explicit social worlds theory, see Strauss (1978, 1979, 1982, 1991, 1993) and Clarke (1990b, 1991b).

22. More specifically, in Strauss's words (1978:122, emphasis in original): "In each social world, at least one primary activity (along with related activities) is strikingly evident, i.e., ... researching, collecting. There are sites where activities occur: hence space and a shaped landscape are relevant. Technology (inherited or innovative means of carrying out the social world's activities) is always involved. ... In social worlds at their outset, there may be only a temporary division of labor, but once underway, organizations inevitably evolve to further one aspect or another of the world's activities."

23. For studies of different arenas in the arts, sciences, and computing, see Becker (1982), Wiener (1981), Clarke (1990a,b), Clarke and Montini (1993), Fujimura (1988), Kling and Gerson (1978), Star (1986, 1989), and Star and Griesemer (1989).

24. This, of course, creates the "problem of insider histories." See Clarke (1985:468-71) and Woolgar (1976) on the use of discovery accounts.

25. Of course the entire arena analysis is not necessarily presented in publications but is used in the research phase. I have told other stories about the reproductive sciences elsewhere (Clarke 1987, 1990a,b, 1991a, 1993, 1995a,b).

26. Greenhalgh (1996) argues that demography has had similar problems of illegitimacy and that it has dwelled at the margins, if not outside, of the academy for decades, with deleterious effects for its theoretical and methodological development.

27. See Aronson (1984) and Gieryn (1983, 1995).

28. On classical anatomy see, for example, Tuana (1993), Laqueur (1990), Jordanova (1989), Schiebinger (1989, 1993), and Moore and Clarke (1995). On physiology, see Shuttleworth (1990); on gynecology, see Moscucci (1990) and Dally (1992); on neuroendocrinology, see van den Wijngaard (1991); on neurology, see Fausto-Sterling (1992); on genetics, see Rapp (1990), and Hubbard (1990); and on space biology, see Casper and Moore (1995). On the rhetorical and other practices of many sciences there are a number of important works (e.g., Stepan 1986; Schiebinger 1989, 1993; Martin 1987/1992, 1994; Keller 1992; Harding 1991; and Treichler 1993).

29. See Borell (1976a,b,c, 1978, 1985, 1987a), (Long) Hall (1974, 1976, 1978, 1979), Long (1987, 1990), Oudshoorn (1994, 1995, 1996a,b), and Rechter (1997). For other recent science studies works on reproductive topics see van den Wijngaard (1994), Pfeffer (1993), Courey (1994), Casper (1994a,b, 1995, 1998), and Dugdale (1995).

30. See, for example, Fausto-Sterling (1993, 1998), Terry (1990), Hirachauer (1991), Chase (1997), and Balsamo (1996).

31. See, for example, on the women's health movements, Ruzek (1978), Lewin and Olesen (1985), Dixon-Mueller (1993a,b), Boston Women's Health Book Collective (1992), and Fee and Krieger (1994).

32. See Farley (1982), Star (1986, 1989), and Russett (1989) for discussion of triangulation of robustness.

33. See, for example, Churchill (1979), Farley (1982), Fausto-Sterling (1989, 1998), and Longino and Doell (1983).

34. The recent intersections of feminist, technoscience, and cultural studies provide provocative directions in which to seek answers (e.g., McNeil and Franklin 1991). On feminist theory, see, for example, Haraway (1989, 1991), Collins (1990), Butler (1993), and Barrett and Phillips (1992).

35. See Clarke (1995a) for a detailed definition of industrialization. See, for example, Aronson (1979) on the industrialization of food and Fitzgerald (in progress) on the industrialization of agriculture in the early to mid-twentieth century.

36. See, for example, Haraway (1992, 1995), Lock (1993), Rabinow (1992), Latour (1993), and Cronon (1995).

37. See, for example, Maier (1984) and Banta (1993) on ideologies of industrial management; Cohen and Skull (1983) and Mayer (1983) on social control and the state in the early twentieth century; and Burnham (1972) on medical specialties and social control ideologies in the Progressive Era.

38. Haraway's (1995) discussion and charts of biological projects across the twentieth century are riveting. Controlling race (ca. 1900-1930s) and population (ca.1940-1970s) were part of what I have termed the modernist frame (Clarke 1995a). Controlling evolution (1975-1990s) goes far beyond that. Haraway (1995:349) notes that "biotechnology in the service of corporate profit is a revolutionary force for remaking the inhabitants of planet earth, from viruses and bacteria right up the now repudiated chain of being to Homo sapiens and beyond."

39. Kay finds parallel developments in the social sciences, which also gleaned Rockefeller Foundation support during this era, focusing on behaviorist approaches, personality, and socialization. Allan Gregg's emphasis on the development of psychiatry through the Medical Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, which he headed as the "golden age" of the reproductive sciences was ending in the 1930s and 1940s, raises the important point of the continuities of foundation investments in terms of goals of actually applying scientific knowledge, not merely producing it (Pressman 1997). Morawski (1986:219-20) fleshes this out with the story of Yale's Institute of Human Relations, which received $4.5 million from the Rockefeller Foundation during its first decade 1929-39 to help solve "problems of man's individual and group conduct ... to achieve the rational control of human behavior."

40. See Riddle (1992), Riessman (1983), and Folbre (1994).