1. Dr. Paul Peppard (honorary co-chair, Citizens for Property Tax Relief; town council member for Palos Verdes Estates), interview with author's research project, Sociology Department, UCLA (Palos Verdes Estates, Calif.: July 17, 1987).

2. Marge Flynn (office manager, Citizens for Property Tax Relief), interview with author's research project, Sociology Department, UCLA (Redondo Beach, Calif.: July 23, 1987).

3. Bill Haber, interview.

4. Probusiness economists Milton Friedman and Arthur Laffer supported Prop. 13 in 1978 but were not involved in tax protests before then.

The conceptually clearest and the most elaborate sources for the revival of probusiness conservatism are books published after 1978. But before this time, the same ideas were publicized widely through magazines, newspapers, and broadcast journalism. These latter sources exposed tax protest activists of the 1970s to probusiness creeds.

5. Heritage Foundation, An Agenda for Progress (Washington, D.C.: The Foundation, 1981). William Simon, A Time for Truth (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1978). David A. Stockman, The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan Revolution Failed (New York: Harper and Row, 1986). Paul Craig Roberts, The Supply Side Revolution: An Insider's Account of Policymaking in Washington (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). Sidney Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political Power (New York: Times Books, 1986).

6. George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: Basic, 1981).

7. The monetarist emphasis on stringency sometimes provoked the ire of more expansionist supply siders. See Kevin Phillips, Post-Conservative America (New York: Random House, 1982), 138.

8. Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980). The Friedmans differ somewhat from the supply siders discussed above because the Friedmans' defense of capitalism rests on the argument that capitalism maximizes consumer sovereignty—that consumers can get it if they really want by purchasing on free markets.

9. Conflicts over consumption, what Weber called the "means of sustenance" (in contrast to the means of production) can become the most important form of conflict in a society. For example, Weber argues that through the Middle Ages, groups frequently contended over the price of bread. "This fight spread until it continue

involved all those commodities essential to the way of life." See Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 88, 93, 186. For an analysis of consumption in advanced industrial societies, see C. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle Classes (New York: Oxford, 1951).

10. Robert Kuttner, "The Declining Middle," Atlantic Monthly (July 1983), 60-72. Cf. Robert J. Samuelson, "Economic Report: Middle-Class Media Myth," National Journal 15 (December 1983). Bruce Steinberg, "The Mass Market Is Splitting Apart," Fortune (November 28, 1983), 76-81. "Population Puzzle: Is the U.S. Middle Class Shrinking Alarmingly?'' Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1984.

11. Robert Holsworth, Public Interest Liberalism and the Crisis of Affluence: Reflections on Nader, Environmentalism, and the Politics of a Sustainable Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1980). Hans Gorey, Nader and the Power of Everyman (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1975).

12. Paul Blumberg, Inequality in an Age of Decline (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 183, 202.

13. For a critique of individualistic theories and practices in American society, see Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, Anne Swidler, William M. Sullivan, and Steven M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1985).

14. Anthony Giddens, Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 109, has suggested that a major feature of the "structuration" of classes are "distributive groupings," which share similar patterns of consumption of goods. A prime example of such a distributive group is a segregated residential neighborhood. John Rex and Robert Moore, Race, Community, and Conflict (London, Oxford University Press, 1967), highlights the processes that formed three distinctive groupings of housing in England. The white middle class owns its own homes; the white working class occupies government-provided housing, whereas ethnic groups rent slum housing.

15. Morris Janowitz, The Community Press in an Urban Setting (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951). Community attachments are undercut when households move, but the extent of residential mobility in the United States should not be overestimated. Sixteen percent of the U.S. population (including children) changed dwellings between March 1982 and March 1983. Individuals aged twenty to twenty-nine did much of the moving; the middle-aged and the elderly, less. Of those between forty-five and fifty-four years of age, 8.1 percent moved in 1982-1983; between fifty-five and sixty-four, 5.9 percent, and sixty-five and older, 4.9 percent.

16. These processes are characterized by Gerald Suttles's phrase, "the defended neighborhood." Gerald Suttles, The Social Construction of Communities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 40, 240. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961). Jessie Bernard, The Sociology of Community (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman), 188.

17. James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's, continue

1973). Peter Saunders, Social Theory and the Urban Question (London: Hutchinson, 1981), 261.

18. "Directory of Taxpayer Groups," Taxpayer's Watchdog, (November 1976), 2. After Proposition 13 passed, the Los Angeles Times published a list of seventeen homeowners associations in the San Fernando Valley which held regular meetings.

In other parts of the United States, homeowners were also particularly active in property tax reduction campaigns. Of the 29,000 persons in Milwaukee who signed an initiative in 1978 to limit property taxes to 1 percent, 74 percent were homeowners (56 percent in the adult population were homeowners). See Robert M. Stein, Keith E. Harem, and Patricia K. Freeman, "An Analysis of Support for Tax Limitation Referenda," Public Choice 40 (1983), 187-194.

19. Similarly, Oliver P. Williams's study of suburbia concludes that the residents wanted government to lower taxes, provide amenities, and preserve the social character of their communities. See Oliver P. Williams, Harold Herman, Charles Liebman, and Thomas Dye, Suburban Differences and Metropolitan Policies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), 216.

20. Marilyn Noorda (chair, taxation committee, Sherman Oaks Homeowners Association), interview with author's research project, Sociology Department, UCLA (Camarillo, Calif.: February 14, 1982). Frank Lalli, "The New Middle-Class Dream: I Just Want to Hang on to What I've Got," New West (October 25, 1976), 20-28. "Property Taxes: Increases Cut Deep into Budgets," Los Angeles Times (August 1, 1976), sec. II.

21. Harry Cimring, letter to the editor, Los Angeles Times (September 25, 1976), sec. II. Jean F. Noss, letter to the editor, Los Angeles Times (September 25, 1976), sec. II.

22. William B. Scott, In the Pursuit of Happiness: American Conceptions of Property from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press).

23. "Property Taxes: Increases Cut Deep into Budgets," Los Angeles Times, August 6, 1976, sec. II.

24. Lalli, "Middle-Class Dream," 25. As James Scott argues in The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976), taxes that are inflexible and ignore the peasants' ability to pay are likely to be viewed as unjust, thereby inciting rebellion. Chapter 1 of this book has traced how the property tax became inflexible because of "reform" measures; higher sale prices automatically produced higher tax bills with little leeway for adjustment or appeal. The property tax was determined not by the ability to pay and current income but by the current value of property.

25. Thompson, Working Class, 486. See Craig Calhoun, The Question of Class Struggle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) for a lengthy discussion of "reactionary radicals" in nineteenth-century England.

26. M. Stephen Weatherford, "Popular Participation and Representation in the Urban Environment: The School Desegregation Issue in Los Angeles," ERIC Reports ED166267 (1978). Noorda, interview. United Organizations of Taxpayers, board member (name withheld), interview with author's research continue

project, Sociology Department, UCLA (Los Angeles, February 16, 1982). The daily newspaper Valley News (Van Nuys, Calif.) provided the best coverage of the antibusing movement in the Valley.

27. Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 168. The two-question measure of racism was significantly correlated with support for the tax revolt (a total effect of 0.21, and a direct effect of 0.11 measured by the standardized coefficients in a multiple-regression model). Useem, "Anti-Busing."

28. Sears finds strong correlations between such racially prejudiced attitudes and the opposition to busing. David O. Sears, Carl P. Hensler, and Leslie K. Speer, "Whites' Opposition to 'Busing': Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?" American Political Science Review 73 (1979), 369-384. Miller argues that specific concerns about educational programs were not strong predictors of opposition to busing, compared to other predictors, racism and general program concerns (such as commitment to integration). Steven D. Miller, "Contemporary Racial Conflict: The Nature of White Opposition to Mandatory Busing," Ph.D. dissertation, Political Science Department, UCLA, 1981. One attempt to explain the opposition to a local school-busing plan concluded that the most important factors were a rejection of the goals of integration and a denial that the government should take action on such issues. Douglas S. Gatlin, Michael W. Giles, and Everett F. Catalo, "Policy Support within a Target Group: The Case of School Desegregation," American Political Science Review 72 (1978), 985-995.

However, some opinion polls indicate that whites who oppose school busing do not particularly espouse racial prejudice. Johnathan Kelly, "The Politics of School Busing," Public Opinion Quarterly 38 (1974), 23-39. Arthur L. Stinchcombe and D. Garth Taylor, On Democracy and School Integration (Plenum, 1980), 177-179.

29. Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), 109. Useem, "Anti-Busing." Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind (New York: Free Press, 1983), 39. The distinction made here between prejudice (discussed in the previous paragraph) versus other claims of ethnic advantage is similar to the distinction J. B. McConahay and J. C. Hough, Jr., make between "redneck racism" and "symbolic racism." ''Symbolic Racism," Journal of Social Issues 32 (1976), 23-45. See also David Wellman's distinction in Portraits of White Racism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) between "prejudice" and "white racism"; and Herbert Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," Pacific Sociological Review 1 (Spring, 1958), 3-7.

30. Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions (New York: A. M. Kelley, 1899; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). Weber, From Max, 189, emphasis added in the quotation. Weber extensively discussed ethnic status groups, which, because of custom and ritual, cannot easily intermingle or intermarry with members of dominant groups.

Chicago, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, Los Angeles, Houston, and other cities have long histories of neighborhood associations that have sought to exclude minority residents. Such associations have exerted social pressure on continue

white homeowners, have intimidated minority homebuyers, and have attempted to enforce covenants (restrictions included in deeds to real estate) forbidding sales to minorities. Neighborhood associations have also campaigned against government plans to locate low-income public housing in white communities.

31. Julia Wrigley's field research on the antibusing movement in Boston reveals that businesses larger than neighborhood retail outlets did not support the movement. Untitled manuscript, Sociology Department, UCLA, 1987.

32. Robert Ryan (president, Abalone Cove Homeowners Association; secretary, Peninsula Advisory Council, a coalition of homeowners groups), interview with the author's research project, Sociology Department, UCLA (Rancho Palos Verdes, Calif.: July 22, 1987).

33. Peppard, interview. Save Our Coastline, "The History of the 4th City Campaign, Palos Verdes Peninsula," 1972, document in the author's collection. 4th City Campaign Committee, letter to peninsula residents, April 1972, document in the author's collection.

34. Don Hill (homeowners association liaison and steering committee member, Citizens for Property Tax Relief), interview with the author's research project, Sociology Department, UCLA (Rancho Palos Verdes, Calif.: May 19, 1987). Marineland was later purchased by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich who, in a surprise shift, decided to support the incorporation of a new town. After the growth limiters won, Marineland suffered a fall in business and was closed down in 1987 as part of a corporate reorganization. One final petition drive sought to save the animals at Marineland. Flipper, his cousins, and related assets were not liquidated for use as glue in textbook bindings.

35. "Developers, Residents Clash at Open Space Hearing," Palos Verdes Peninsula News, September 27, 1972. President, Palos Verdes Peninsula Advisory Council, to Local Agency Formation Commission, "Application to Initiate Proceedings for Incorporations of Cities," c. 1972, document in the author's collection. "Dream of Fourth City on Peninsula Comes True,'' Los Angeles Times, August 30, 1973, Centinela South Bay Edition, Sec. VII.

36. " . . . Battling 'Bigness,'" Torrance Daily Breeze, c. 1972, document in the author's collection.

37. Robert Ryan, interview. Bryan Hardwick Associates, news release for Committee for Incorporation of the 4th City, August 17, 1973, document in the author's collection.

38. Don Hill, interview.

39. Tarzana Property Owners Association, Inc., topA Newsletter, November 1975, document in the author's collection.

40. Frank Popper, The Politics of Land Use Reform (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981).

41. Dan Shapiro (president, Studio City Residents Association), "L.A.: Its Luster Has Tarnished," Daily News, April 13, 1986.

42. Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 48, 57, 80, 86.

43. James A. Davis, "Conservative Weather in a Liberalizing Climate: Change in Selected NORC General Social Survey Items, 1972-78," Social Forces 58 (1980), 1129-1156. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., "What the Voters Really continue

Want," Fortune 98 (December 18, 1978), 40-48. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., with Marilyn Potter, Linda Basilick, Sally Daniels, and Dana Suszkiw, "The Polls: Taxing and Spending," Public Opinion Quarterly 43 (Spring, 1979), 126-135.

Two years after the passage of Proposition 13, pluralities still favored increases in spending on twelve services (but not welfare). In one study conducted immediately before the 1980 election, a plurality of the public favored no cuts in federal health and education services. During the Reagan administration, even when respondents were asked in general terms about government social spending, respondents expressed favorable attitudes. For example, majorities of 52 to 59 percent favored a "great deal more" or "somewhat more" spending for federal domestic programs in three polls taken between December 1983 and May 1984. Fifty-seven percent in January 1985 opposed Reagan's proposals to reduce spending on social services. Markus, Gregory B., "Political Attitudes during Election Year: A Report on the 1980 NES Panel Study," American Political Science Review 76 (1982), 538-560. Los Angeles Times, The Los Angeles Times Poll, no. 93 (January 24, 1985), question 29; no. 74 (December 15, 1983), question 38; no. 75 (February 9, 1984), question 18; no. 81 (May 3, 1984), question 30.

44. Jarvis, I'm Mad, 118-123.

45. Zane L. Miller, Suburb: Neighborhood and Community in Forest Park, Ohio, 1935-1976 (Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press, 1981). Miller argues that in the 1970s there was a heightened emphasis on self-fulfillment through career and consumption at the expense of traditional civic virtues.

46. Terry N. Clark and Lorna Ferguson, City Money: Political Processes, Fiscal Strain, and Retrenchment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), also see the "new fiscal populism" as a mixture of liberal and conservative views, but a somewhat different mixture. Clark argues that the new fiscal populists avoided expressing antiminority views. In this he differs from the argument in this chapter and the findings of Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 210, who linked the tax revolt to symbolic racism.

47. Sears and Citrin claim that conservative voters were somewhat more likely to give retrospective support to a package of Proposition 13 and later tax initiatives. The direct effect, measured by the standardized coefficient, was 0.10 in a multivariate model. Tax Revolt, 210.

48. Phillips, Post-Conservative, 126.

49. Tribune Media Services, Inc., Orlando, Fla., The Harris Survey, no. 17 (February 28, 1985). Using an eight-point conservative-to-liberal scale, the Gallup Poll in 1978 found that 33 percent identified themselves as either "far right," "substantially right of center," or "moderately right of center." Those ''just slightly right of center" were tabulated with the 43 percent who were moderates. "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion 1 (September-October 1978), 33. The National Opinion Research Center found that 33.5 percent in 1978 identified themselves as extremely conservative, conservative, or slightly conservative. See Davis, "Conservative Survey," 1138.

50. "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion 1 (September-October 1978), 38. Davis, "Conservative Survey," 1138. Lipset and Schneider, Confidence Gap, continue

320. In addition, 69 percent of conservatives agree that the government should set safety standards in factories. See CBS News/ New York Times Poll, January 12, 1978.

51. Karl A. Lamb, As Orange Goes (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 221. Lloyd Free and Harvey Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967), characterized the American public as ideological conservatives and operational liberals. Americans seemed to articulate generalized conservative views but, at the same time, defended many specific liberal positions.

52. Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964). Converse went on to argue that large sections of the mass public possessed no meaningful belief systems about political matters. This assertion has been the source of much controversy. Norman R. Luttbeg, "The Structure of Beliefs among Leaders and the Public," Public Opinion Quarterly 32 (1968), 398-409, for example, argues that the mass public, like elites, does indeed articulate structured beliefs about local government policy. Luttbeg explains 65 percent of the variance in public opinions on issues (compared to 74 percent for a sample of elites) by using five factors pertaining to child rearing, taxation, inner-city areas, recreation, and growth. One need not accept the more extreme formulation of Converse's claims to argue that the political views of the mass public, like those of grass-roots activists, are not organized as coherent ideologies and are worlds apart from the programs of probusiness conservative leaders.

53. Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America (New York: Knopf, 1955), 8, uses the term "the conservatism of possession" to describe this phenomenon.

54. Converse, "Belief Systems." More recently, when a CBS News/ New York Times poll (April 1981, pt. 2) asked people to define the difference between a conservative and a liberal, 52 percent chose no opinion. George Horace Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972), 2244. Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identifications," American Journal of Political Science 25 (1981), 617-645; "How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Model,'' American Journal of Political Science 28 (1984), 95-123.

55. Willard Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," American Political Science Review 66 (June 1972), 498-510. Mullins contrasts this emphasis on purposive action with other approaches to ideology that stress the emotional response to symbols.

56. My focus is on how beliefs are shaped when groups interact with political structures, rather than on how individuals process their beliefs through a preexisting mental structure. My approach thus contrasts to that of Conover and Feldman, "Schematic Model," who draw on recent social-psychological literature and use the term "schema" to refer to a cognitive structure that processes information. My concept of group interpretations places more emphasis on the macro-sociological level. Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 76, also discusses schemata, which they define as a consistent set of political attitudes that are mildly intercorrelated and, when analyzed by factor analysis, load on the same factor. break

My concept of political interpretation also differs from their term "symbolic predisposition," which refers to the individual's attitudes toward an object or a narrow set of objects, for example, blacks and other ethnic minorities. Cf. Dennis Chong, Herbert McClosky, and John Zaller, "Patterns of Support for Democratic and Capitalist Values in the United States," British Journal of Political Science 13 (1982), 434, who discuss the apparently consistent attitudes that arise from the projection of psychological dispositions such as authoritarianism.