Preferred Citation: Rouquié, Alain. The Military and the State in Latin America. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c1987 1987. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft9b69p386/

 
Notes

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Cecil Jane, Liberty and Despotism in Spanish America (preface by Salvador de Madariaga) (New York, 1966), p. 173 (1st ed., Oxford, 1929).

2. Edwin Lieuwen, "The Changing Role of the Military in Latin America," Journal of Latin American Studies (October 1961): 559569.

3. See especially the discussion of these ideas in Richard W. Morse, "Toward a Theory of Spanish American Government," in Hugh M. Hamill, ed., Dictatorship in Spanish America (New York, 1965), and Howard Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative-Model," World Politics (January 1973): 205-235.

4. Susanne Jonas and David Tobias, Guatemala. Una historia inmediata (México, 1976), p. 210.

5. See chapter 1 of Alain Rouquié, La Politique de Mars. Les processus politiques dans les partis militaires (Paris, 1981).

1— In Search of the Americas: Societies and Powers

1. An exception would be the marginal zones that lacked precious metals and an Indian working force, such as the plains of the La Plata River.

2. M. Le Lannou, Le Brésil (Paris, 1961), p. 44.

3. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques (Paris, 1965), p. 89.

4. According to the study of the Interamerican Committee on Agri- soft

cultural Development (CIDA) described by Solon Barraclough and Arthur Domke, "Agrarian Structure in Seven Latin American Countries," in Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ed., Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America (New York, 1970), p. 48.

5. República argentina, Congreso de la nación-Cámara de Diputados, Diario de sesiones (1932), 1:914, "Familias duñnas de más de 30,000 has . . ."

6. See Edelberto Torres Rivas, Centroamérica hoy (México, 1975), pp. 31-33.

7. See Albert Meister, Le Système mexicain. Les avatars d'une participation populaire au développement (Paris, 1971), pp. 61-65.

8. Michel Gutelman, Réforme et Mystification agraire en Amérique latine. Le cas du Mexique (Paris, 1969), p. 101.

9. For examples of this process, see the cases described in Germán Caycedo Castro, Colombia amarga (Bogotá, 1976), pp. 4-8. For a careful and in-depth study of the relations between la violencia and the capitalist modernization of the agrarian sector in Colombia, see Pierre Gilhods, La Question agraire en Colombie (Paris, 1974).

10. See especially Jaime Sautchuk, Horacio Martins de Carvalho, and Sergio Buarque de Gusmão, Projeto Jari, a invasão americana (São Paulo, 1979), and "Ludwig sem misterios," Movimento (São Paulo) (19 November 1979). This giant project seems to have suffered financial reverses, causing Ludwig to sell his empire in the Amazon to Brazilian businessmen in January 1982.

11. These systems of quasi-serfdom that have now been outlawed nearly everywhere established a common model for the provision of nonsalaried services. They are called by different names depending on the country: concertaje, colonato, huasipungo, yanaconaje, or pongaje . For an example of the type of limits placed on peasants employed under this system, one can read the study by Julio Cotler on a hacienda in the Peruvian highlands: "Traditional Haciendas and Communities in a Context of Political Mobilization in Peru," in Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ed., Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements, p. 545.

12. Manuel Scorza, Redoble por Rancas (Barcelona, 1970), pp. 113-121.

13. This was the case in the large sugar plantations of northern Argentina at the end of the thirties. See Ian Rutledge, "Plantations and Peasants in Northern Argentina: The Sugar Cane Industry of Salta and Jujuy," in David Rock, ed., Argentina in the Twentieth Century (London, 1975), pp. 89-113.

14. According to H. Favre, Changement et Continuity chez les Maéas du Mexique (Contribution à I'étude de la situation coloniale en Amérique latine) (Paris, 1971), p. 73. break

15. See the excellent Brazilian film Iracema directed by J. Bodansky. The investigative reporting by Robert Linhart in the sugar-producing areas of the Brazilian Northeast, Le Sucre et la Faim (Paris, 1980), emphasizes this transformation of labor relations.

16. At least this was what is claimed in the dominant ideology. The representatives of the Movement for the Defense of Brazilian Blacks cites numerous cases of discrimination and selective violence toward blacks. See "Movimento negro," Movimento (São Paulo), 19 May 1980.

17. In 1979 this was denounced for a full week by the official newspaper, Granma, through prescribed slogans (bandas) .

18. Milton Senna, Como não se faz un presidente (Rio de Janeiro, 1968), p. 22.

19. For Haiti see Kern Delince, Armée et Politique en Haiti (Paris, 1979), pp. 26-30, and Micheline Labelle, Idéologie de couleur et Classes sociales en Haiti (Montreal, 1978).

20. We base this definition rather freely on the one given by Charles Tilly in The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J., 1975), chap. 1, pp. 70-71.

21. Fernando Henrique Cardoso distinguishes between societies that have national control over their production, and societies that are dominated by enclave economies. See F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dépendance et développement en Amérique latine (Paris, 1978), pp. 94-125. ( Dependency and Development in Latin America, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1979).

22. Mario Benedetti, El País de la cola de paja (Montevideo, 1966), p. 56.

23. This is the thesis that is argued by Merle Kling in his article "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, Latin America: Reform or Revolution. A Reader (Greenwich, Conn., 1968), pp. 76-93.

2— The Establishment of the Military and the Birth of the State

1. Gabriel García Márquez, El Otoño de Patriarca (Bogotá, 1978), p. 14, English version. The Autumn of the Patriarch (New York, 1979).

2. Miguel Cané, "Mi estreno diplomático," in Prosa Ligera (Buenos Aires, 1919), p. 163.

3. This is the term used by the Uruguayan historian, Carlos Real de Azúa in "Ejéercito y política en Uruguay," Cuadernos de Marcha, (Montevideo) (March 1969):7. break

4. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 8.

5. On armies as complex and specific organizations, see chap. 1 of Rouquié, ed., La Politique de Mars .

6. On the military fueros and the colonial armies, see Lyie N. McAllister, The "Fuero Militar" in New Spain: 1764-1800 (Gainesville, Fla., 1957); Leon G. Campbell, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru: 1750-1810 (Philadelphia, 1978); J. Kuethe, Military reform and Society in New Granada: 1773-1808 (Gainesville, Fla., 1978).

7. See John Schulz, "O exército e o Imperio," in O Brasil monáarquico, vol. 3: Historia geral da civilizacão brasileira, ed. Sergio Buarque de Holanda (São Paulo, 1974), pp. 235 ff.

8. This was the case in Mexico where the war was ended with the adoption of the Plan of Iguala, and the establishment of the empire of Iturbide.

9. This is the Leninist formulation that is utilized by Agustín Cueva in his book, El Desarrollo del capitalismo en América latina (México, 1977).

10. Georg Lukács, Histoire et Conscience de classe (Paris, 1960), pp. 78-79.

11. Guillermo Bedregal, Los Militares en Bolivia. Ensayo de interpretación sociológica (LaPaz, 1971), p. 23.

12. Tulio Halperín Donghi, Historia contemporánea de América latino, (Madrid, 1969), chap. 3.

13. See Alain Joxe, Las Fuerzas Armadas en el sistema política de Chile (Santiago, 1970), pp. 44-45.

14. This is the thesis of the Ecuadorean historian, Enrique Ayala, especially in his article "Gabriel García Moreno y la gestctión del Estado nacional en el Ecuador," Crítica y Utopía (September 1981):126-163.

15. F. García Calderón, Les Démocraties de l'Amérique latine (Paris, 1912), p. 199.

16. John Reed, Le Mexique insurgé (Paris, 1975), p. 302 ( Insurgent Mexico, New York, 1969).

17. Ibid., p. 93.

16. John Reed, Le Mexique insurgé (Paris, 1975), p. 302 ( Insurgent Mexico, New York, 1969).

17. Ibid., p. 93.

18. Tata means "papa" in Quechua, an affectionate term that is given to a protector.

19. Samuel Finer, "State and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of the National State in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J., 1975), pp. 96-100. break

20. These involved the agrarian guerrilla war of Canudos and the peasant movement of the Contestado . These two social and religious uprisings that were linked to problems of land tenure also demonstrated the lack of material and technical preparation of the Brazilian army.

21. Quoted in Eduardo Acevedo, Manual de historia uruguaya (Montevideo, 1936), p. 141.

22. We can point to a popular insurrection in the northeast of Brazil in 1838-1840, A Balaiada, that originated as a protest against forced recruitment.

23. José Murilho de Carvalho, "As forcas armadas na primeira República. O poder desestabilizador," Cadernos do Departamento de ciência politica, no. 1 (March 1974): 132.

24. Although it was weak internally, the state, whether imperial or republican, was strong externally because of the support that it received from the classes that benefited from its actions; thus Brazil successfully opposed the prohibition of the slave trade by England for a period of several decades.

25. On the different interpretations of the role of the national guard, in addition to Schulz, Historia geral, see the article of Maria Auxiliadora Faria, "A guardia national en Mina Gerais," Revista brasileira de estudios politicos (July 1979).

3— Modernization by the Army

1. See Etienne Schweisguth, "L'institution militaire et son système de valeurs," Revue française de sociologie 19 (1978):385-390.

2. See especially the secret reports of Captain Salats to the Navy Ministry of France, série BB7 136, Archives SHM, Paris, cited by Manuel Domingos Neto, "L'Influence étrangère sur la modernisation de l'armée brésilienne, 1889-1930" (Master's thesis, University of Paris-III, 1979), pp. 140-150.

3. Ibid., p. 199.

2. See especially the secret reports of Captain Salats to the Navy Ministry of France, série BB7 136, Archives SHM, Paris, cited by Manuel Domingos Neto, "L'Influence étrangère sur la modernisation de l'armée brésilienne, 1889-1930" (Master's thesis, University of Paris-III, 1979), pp. 140-150.

3. Ibid., p. 199.

4. Joxe, Las Fuerzas armadas, p. 50.

5. This is the thesis of Frederick Nunn in "An Overview of the European Military Missions in Latin America," in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davis, eds., The Politics of Antipolitics in Latin America, (Lincoln, Neb., 1978).

6. Major Armando Duval, A Argentina, potencia militar (Rio de Janeiro, 1922), vol. 2, p. 368. break

7. A. Maligne, "El ejército en octubre 1910," Revista de derecho, historia y letras (Buenos Aires), (March 1911):271.

8. A Defesa nacional (Rio de Janeiro), no. 154 (10 October 1926), quoted by Manuel Domingos Neto in Alain Rouquié ed., Les Partis militaires au Brésil (Paris, 1980), p. 60.

9. Revista do Club militar (Rio de Janeiro), no. 53 (April 1940):35.

10. Jorge Amado, Fardo, fardão, camisola de dormir (Rio de Janiero, 1978), p. 66.

11. General Gamelin, Notes sur l'action de la mission militaire francaise au Brésil, Rio de Janeiro, April 1925, Archives SHA, Paris, quoted by Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira, "La Participation politique des militaires au Brésil, 1945-1964" (Ph.D. diss., Institute of Political Studies, Paris, 1980), p. 80.

12. Argentina, Cámara de diputados, Diario de sesiones (Buenos Aires, 1901), 1:620.

13. Bertoldo Klinger, "Apontamentos sobre a organisação militar do Peru," Fundação Getulio Vargas, CPDOC, 22.02.07 GER, B. Klinger Archives, p. 6.

14. See for Guatemala, Jerry L. Weaver, "La élite polttíca de un régimen dominado por militares: el ejempio de Guatemala," Revista latinoamericana de sociología (Buenos Aires), 1 (1969):21-37.

15. R. S. Adams, "El problema del desarrollo política a la luz de la reciente historia sociopolítica de Guatemala," Revista latinoamericana de sociología (Buenos Aires), no. 2 (1968):183.

16. Initially this simply meant legitimate birth. Cf. Guillermo Bedregal, Los Militares en Bolivia. Ensayo de interpretación sociológica (La Paz), 1971, p. 40.

17. Boletim do exército, no. 40 (1942), and no. 18 (1943), quoted by Carvalho in "Forças armadas e Política, 1930-1945," (Rio de Janiero, FGV-CPDOC, 1980, Mimeographed, p. 25. See also Werneck Sodrè, Memorias de um soldado (Rio de Janeiro, 1967), pp. 185-186.

18. Steve C. Ropp, "The Military and Urbanization in Latin America: Some Implications of Trends in Recruitment," Inter-American Affairs 24, no. 2 (Fall 1970):27-35.

19. See Carlos A. Astiz and José Garía, "El ejciréto peruano en el poder," Aportes 26 (October 1972), and Luigi Einaudi and Alfred Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives (Santa Monica, Calif., 1971), p. 56.

20. Luigi Einaudi, ibid.,, and Victor Villanueva, ¿Nueva Mentalidad militar en el Perú? (Buenos Aires, 1969), pp. 232 ff.

19. See Carlos A. Astiz and José Garía, "El ejciréto peruano en el poder," Aportes 26 (October 1972), and Luigi Einaudi and Alfred Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives (Santa Monica, Calif., 1971), p. 56.

20. Luigi Einaudi, ibid.,, and Victor Villanueva, ¿Nueva Mentalidad militar en el Perú? (Buenos Aires, 1969), pp. 232 ff.

21. According to Joseph Love, Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regional - soft

ism, 1882-1930 (Stanford, Calif., 1971), p. 117, cited by Carvalho, As Forças armadas, p. 147.

22. José Ibaré Costa Dantas, O Tenentismo en Sergipe (Petropolis, 1974), p. 71, following Dermeval Peixoto, Memorias de um velho soldado (Rio de Janeiro, 1960), p. 180.

23. Jacques Dumaine, Quai d'Orsay, 1945-1951 (Paris, 1955), p. 19.

24. Rouquié, Pouvoir militaire et Société politique en République argentine (Paris, 1978), p. 647.

25. Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brasil (Princeton, 1971), pp. 32, 33.

26. According to a study of R. A. Hansen, Military Culture and Organizational Decline: A Study of the Chilean Army (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1967). Microfilm. See Hansen, "Career Motivation and Military Ideology: The Case of Chile," in Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn, eds., On Military Ideology (Rotterdam, 1971), pp. 119-136. The results of Hansen's survey are commented upon by Liisa North, The Military in Chilean Politics (York University, Toronto, 1974), pp. 11 ff.

27. Einaudi and Stepan, Latin American, p. 14.

28. According to Daniel Van Eeuwen, Pouvoir militaire et Mutation de la société péruvienne (Ph.D. thesis, Aix-Marseille, 1979), p. 50.

29. See James Petras, "Los militares y la modernización del Perú," Estudios Internacionales (Santiago de Chile), no. 13 (June 1970):122123.

30. Stepan, The Military in Politics, pp. 32, 33.

31. Rouquié, Pouvoir militaire, p. 641.

32. Hansen, "Career Motivation," p. 135.

33. Lourival Coutinho, O General Goes Depõe (Rio de Janeiro, 1955), p. xii.

34. According to Neil Macaulay, A Coluna Prestes (Rio de Janeiro, 1977), p. 43.

35. Florencia Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux (Primeras exclusivas revelaciones del general Roberta Viaux desde la prisión) (Santiago, 1972).

36. Perón disclosed this during a personal interview that he granted us in Madrid in 1969.

37. Carvalho, Forças armadas e Política p. 24.

38. Olavio Bilac, A Defesa nacional (Discursos) (Rio de Janeiro, 1965, 1st ed. 1917), pp. 107, 70.

39. Bilac, A Defesa nacional pp. 26-27, 108-109, quoted by Frank McCann, "Origins of the 'New Professionalism' of the Brazilian continue

Military," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (November 1979):513.

40. Manuel Carlés, "Diplomacia y estrategia (Conferenda dada en el Colegio militar)," Supplement to no. 270 of Revista Militar (June 1915):13.

41. According to Joxe, Las Fuerzas armadas, p. 53.

42. XX, El Ejército argentino por dentro. Estudio para contribuir al restable-cimiento de nuestras instituciones militares arruinadas (Buenos Aires, 1904), p. 9.

43. R. N. Adams, "The Development of the Guatemalan Military," [Offprint Series, no. 90] (Austin: University of Texas, n.d.), p. 100.

44. Bedregal, Los Militares en Bolivia, pp. 42-45.

45. Mario Monteforte Toledo, Guatemala. Monografía sociológica (México, 1965), p. 360.

4— The Rise of the Power of the Military

1. This is the argument of Victor Villanueva in his book 100 Añas del ejército peruano. Frustraciones y cambios (Lima, 1971), p. 64.

2. See Captain Severino Sombra, "Lyautey e o Brasil," Revista do Clube militar (Rio de Janeiro), no. 48 (26 June 1937), 241-244.

3. This is proven by numerous publications. See for example, for Guatemala the book of Benjamín Paniagua Santizo, published for the centenary of the foundation of the Escuela politécnica: Vida y obra de militares ilustres, primer centenario de la fundación de la Escuela politécnica, 1873-1973 (Guatemala, 1973), 273 pp.

4. Speech of Juan D. Perón, 1 May 1944, in J. D. Perón, El Pueblo quiere saber de que se trata (Buenos Aires, 1944).

5. Speech, 25 June 1944, ibid.

6. Hipólito Yrigoyen, Pueblo y Gobierno, vol. 4: Mensajes (Buenos Aires, 1953), p. 322.

7. Francisco Reynolds, La Revolución del 6 septembre de 1930. Acción Militar (Buenos Aires, 1969), p. 11.

8. Ernesto Corvalán, "Pensamientos radicales," Revista argentina de ciencias políticas (12 July 1915), p. 412.

9. Vicente C. Gallo, "Aspectos y enseñanzas de una obra," Revista argentina de ciencias poliçicas (12 July 1915), p. 334.

10. See Maria Cecilia Spina Foriaz, Tenentismo e Politica (Rio de Janeiro, 1977), pp. 31-68. break

11. See Neil Macaulay, A Coluna Prestes, and Peter Flynn, Brazil: A Political Analysis (London, 1978), pp. 47-50.

12. See Francisco Frias, Manual de historia de Chile (Santiago, 1969), pp. 485-493.

13. According to Paul W. Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-52 (Urbana, Ill., 1978), p. 74.

14. Drake, ibid ., p. 76.

13. According to Paul W. Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-52 (Urbana, Ill., 1978), p. 74.

14. Drake, ibid ., p. 76.

15. The candidate of the opposition lost the elections because he was "too popular." See Frederick B. Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), p. 190.

16. According to the revolutionary proclamation of July 9. See Agustín Cueva, El Proceso de dominación política en Ecuador (Quito, 1974), p. 19.

17. This is a theory that has been widely held in Brazil since the pioneering work of Virgilio Santa Rosa, O que foi o tenentismo (Rio de Janeiro, 1936, reissued 1963). See the discussion of the question in the book of Forjaz, Tenentismo e Politíca, especially the introduction by Francisco Weffort.

18. This is the thesis of Stepan, The Military in Politics, p. 269.

19. See for Brazil the arguments in Decio Saes, Classes medias e politica na primeira Republica brasileira, 1889-1930 (Petropolis, 1975), pp. 15 ff. and in the classic work of Boris Fausto, A Revolução de 1930. Historiografia et história (São Paulo, 1979, 1st. ed. 1970), 118 pp.

20. Maligne, "El ejército en octubre 1910," p. 397.

21. Juan Ramón Beltrán, "Misión del oficial frente a los problemas sociales contemporáneos," Revista militar (September 1936):508.

22. A Defesa Nacional (Rio de Janeiro), no. 1 (1913).

23. Irving Louis Horowitz and Ellen Kay Trimberger, "State Power and Military Nationalism in Latin America," Comparative Politics 8, no. 2 (January 1976):223-243.

24. The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana was created and led by Haya de la Trrne. It was a party with continental aspirations, oriented toward the Indians, and very strong in the north of Peru. See Peter F. Klaren, Modernization, Dislocation, and Aprismo (Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party, 1870-1932) (Austin, Tex., 1967), chap. 7.

25. See François Bourricaud, Pouvoir et Société dans le Pérou contemporain (Paris, 1967), pp. 280-287.

26. According to Flynn, Brazil, p. 61.

27. Pedro Goes Monteiro, A Revolução de 30 e a Finalidade política do exército (esboço histórico) (Rio de Janeiro, n.d.), p. 183. break

28. Monteiro, ibid., p. 163.

27. Pedro Goes Monteiro, A Revolução de 30 e a Finalidade política do exército (esboço histórico) (Rio de Janeiro, n.d.), p. 183. break

28. Monteiro, ibid., p. 163.

5— The Sixth Side of the Pentagon?

1. As McCann shows with respect to Brazil where the representatives of the United States were favorable to the French military mission. See Frank McCann, "Foreign Influence and the Brazilian Army," (Rio de Janeiro, 1980, pp. 5-6, mimeographed).

2. According to Pablo González Casanova, Imperialismo y Liberación en América latina (México, 1978), pp. 15-16.

3. See Leslie Manigat, Évolutions et Révolutions: l'Amérique latine au XXe siècle. 1889-1939 (Paris, 1973), p. 334, and Hans Joachim Leu et al., Las Relaciones interamericanas. Una antología de documentos (Caracas, 1975), p. 20.

4. See Allan Reed Millet, The Politics of Intervention. The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-09 (Columbus, Ohio, 1968), pp. 40-41.

5. Undersecretary of State Robert Olds, in a confidential memorandum quoted by Richard Millett in his book Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the US-Created Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family (New York, 1977), p. 52.

6. According to American political circles in the period. See Dana G. Munro, former chargé d'affaires of the United States in Nicaragua and minister to Haiti, reply to Richard Millett, ibid., p. 41.

7. Luis A. Pérez, Jr., Army Politics in Cuba, 1898-1958 (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1976), p. xv.

8. Ibid., p. 45.

7. Luis A. Pérez, Jr., Army Politics in Cuba, 1898-1958 (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1976), p. xv.

8. Ibid., p. 45.

9. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, p. 21.

10. Ibid., p. 22.

9. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, p. 21.

10. Ibid., p. 22.

11. According to Jaime Wheelock, Imperialismo y Dictadura, Crisis de una formación social (México, 1975), pp. 104-107, and Edelberto Torres Rivas, Centroamérica hoy (México, 1977), pp. 98-100.

12. According to John Parke Young, Central American Currency and Finance (New York, 1925), quoted by Wheelock, Imperialismo y Dictadura, p. 109.

13. See Virgilio Godoy, "El ejército de Nicaragua," in La Crónica, 8 December 1970.

14. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, p. 125.

15. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1966: Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess., 16 April 1966, p. 239, quoted by Don L. Etchison, The United States and Militarism in Central America (New York, 1975), p. 106. break

16. Delince, Armée et Politique, p. 18.

17. Manigat, Évolutions et Révolutions, p. 363.

18. Delince, Armée et Politique, p. 19.

19. Paul Laraque, preface to Delince, Armée et Politique, p. 10. For an American and self-styled technical point of view, consult James H. McCrocklin, Garde d'Haïti, 1915-1934 (Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United States Marine Corps) (New York, 1956).

20. According to the phrase of Pedro F. Bono, quoted by Manigat, Évolutions et Révolutions, p. 348.

21. Marvin Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua (Gainesville, Fla., 1962), p. 21.

22. This is the title of a well-documented book by Germán Ornes, Trujillo, Little Caesar of the Caribbean (New York, 1958).

23. See F. Benham and H. A. Holley, A Short Introduction to the Economy of Latin America (London, 1960), p. 73.

24. According to the Organization of American States, Inter-American Economic and Social Council, Foreign Investment in Latin America (Washington, D.C.), p. 17, and United Nations, External Financing of Latin America (New York, 1965), pp. 15-32.

25. Joseph S. Tulchin, "Latin America: Focus for U.S. Aid," Current History (July 1966):28.

26. See David Green, "The Cold War comes to Latin America," in B. J. Bernstein, ed., Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration (Chicago, 1970), p. 165.

27. Ibid., p. 167.

26. See David Green, "The Cold War comes to Latin America," in B. J. Bernstein, ed., Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration (Chicago, 1970), p. 165.

27. Ibid., p. 167.

28. In March 1954 at Caracas the United States had an Inter-American conference vote a resolution condemning Communism and asserting that the establishment of a Communist regime in the continent was a danger to peace. That resolution preceded by several months the overthrow by U.S.-trained mercenaries of the democratic reformist regime of President Jacobo Arbenz, a government that was supported by the Communist party of Guatemala. This intervention was denounced by Guillermo Torriello, the Guatemalan foreign minister, as "international McCarthyism."

29. According to the official figures: U.S. Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations. Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1972 (Washington, D.C., 1973).

30. We only count these three programs and not, as do certain authors, the economic assistance of the Agency for International Development that was used to equip the police, and the Food for continue

Peace Program that included the "food weapon," to say nothing of the Peace Corps. If everything is military, then nothing is. By proving too much, you prove nothing.

31. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, 1967, 1971, 1975, quoted in Aportes (October 1967):55; Marcha (14 July 1972); NACLA Report, (January 1976).

32. According to Fernando Rivas Sánchez and Elisabeth Reimann Weigert, Las Fuerzas Armadas de Chile. Un caso de penetración imperialista (México, 1976), p. 50.

33. Ibid., pp. 44-50 and Etchison, The United States and Militarism, appendix B.

32. According to Fernando Rivas Sánchez and Elisabeth Reimann Weigert, Las Fuerzas Armadas de Chile. Un caso de penetración imperialista (México, 1976), p. 50.

33. Ibid., pp. 44-50 and Etchison, The United States and Militarism, appendix B.

34. U.S., House, Committee on Foreign Affairs [ Report of the Special Study Mission to Latin America on Military Assistance Training ], Sub committee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, H. Res. 143, p. 29.

35. This term comes from H. F. Walterhouse, "Good Neighbors in Uniform," Military Review 45, no. 2 (February 1965):10-18.

36. Gordon to Rusk, attn. Mann, 4 March 1964, CFB vol. 1 NSF, L. B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas, quoted by Phyllis Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964 (Austin, Tex., 1979).

37. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance and Foreign Sales Facts (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 2.

38. Nelson Rockefeller, "La Calidad de la vida en las Américas (Informe presentado por una misióon presidencial de los Estados Unidos al hemisferio occidental)," 30 August 1969 (Washington, D.C.), Mimeographed, pp. 18-22.

39. See for example. U.S., Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Military Policies and Programs in Latin America, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 91st Cong., 1969.

40. The following is the eloquent chronology: break

Date

Country

President Overthrown

March 1962

Argentina

Arturo Frondizi

July 1962

Peru

Manuel Prado

March 1963

Guatemala

Ydígoras Fuentes

July 1963

Ecuador

C. Julio Arosemena Monroy

September 1963

Dominican Republic

Juan Bosch

October 1963

Honduras

R. Villeda Morales

April 1964

Brazil

J. Goulart

November 1964

Bolivia

V. Paz Estenssoro

June 1966

Argentina

Arturo Illía

41. B. H. Liddell-Hart, L'Alternative militaire. Deterrent ou défense (Paris, 1960), p. 279.

42. See "Chili: encore une preuve du role des USA dans le coup d'état. Un avion a coordonné toutes les opérations militaires du putsch," Libération (Paris), 16 November 1973.

43. The question has been discussed in the United States in a number of articles. For the figures in the debate, see John Duncan Powell, "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America," The Western Political Quarterly (June 1965):382-392, as well as John Samuel Fitch, "The Political Impact of U.S. Military Aid to Latin America," Armed Forces and Society 5, no. 3 (Spring 1979):360-386.

James Kurth has shown that the six countries that received the most military aid in the years 1962-70 range from conservative military (Brazil) to moderate civilian (Venezuela) to progressive civilian (Chile). See James Kurth, "United States Foreign Policy and Latin American Military Rule," in Philippe Schmitter, ed., Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences and Perspectives (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1973), p. 303.

44. According to Schmitter, "Foreign Military Assistance, National Military Spending and Military Rule in Latin America," in Schmitter, ed., Military Rule, p. 148.

45. Calculations made by Joxe, Las Fuerzas armadas, pp. 103-104.

46. Gilhodes, Paysans de Panama, chap. 17, "La garde nationale."

47. On the massacres of 1932 under the presidency of General Hernández Martínez, we follow the interpretation of Alejandro Marroquín in his article "El Salvador en los años treinta," in Casanova, ed., América latina en los años treinta (México, 1977), pp. 145-159.

On the participation and responsibility of the Communist party (whose general secretary was Farabundo Martí), and the uprising of 1932, see Roque Dalton and Miguel Mármol, Los Sucesos de 1932 en El Salvador (San José, Costa Rica, 1979).

48. "Turcios Lima. La révolution, sa raison d'étre jusqu'à la mort," Granma (Havana), international ed., 11 October 1970.

49. According to Fitch, The Military Coup d'État as a Political Process: Ecuador, 1948-1966 (Baltimore, Md., 1977), p. 118, quoted in J. S. Fitch, p. 366.

50. Stepan, The Military in Politics, pp. 236-247.

51. Project Camelot of SORO (Special Operations Research Office) at the American University in Washington, D.C., was denounced in the press and the Chilean Congress. It produced an abundant literature. The affair is discussed in the collective book, edited by continue

Horowitz, The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). The project created an uproar in the Latin American scientific community which thereafter was ready to see a spy behind every foreign sociologist.

52. R. N. Adams, "The Guatemalan Military," Studies in Comparative International Development 4, no. 5 (May 1968):91-109.

53. In October 1967 Peru decided to buy fifteen Mirage planes from France. For a general view at the beginning of the 1970s, see Alain Rouquié, "Les ventes d'armes françaises en Amérique latine," Politique aujourd'hui (January-February 1974):139-142.

54. See Rouquié, Pouvoir militaire, pp. 595-597.

55. Brazil equipped the Iraqi army selling it 200 Cascavel armored cars and 200 Urutu amphibian vehicles. It is not known how they performed at the Iranian front but the press has widely reported their presence. See "Para frente Cascavel," Isto É, 1 October 1980.

56. Fifteen to twenty percent of the total, but since the whole budget depended on direct American aid at that time, that figure is not very useful.

57. Juan Bosch, El Pentagonismo: sustituto del imperialismo (México, 1968).

58. In Chile the publicity given to the prohibition on the export to that country of successful Hollywood films seems to have been part of the psychological warfare against Allende; the frustration of the viewers was directed at the government.

59. Nearly $ 3 million went from the CIA to the Frei campaign without, it is reported, the candidate knowing the source of his financing. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973, Staff Rept., 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, pp. 9-15.

60. Philip Agee, Inside the Company, CIA Diary (New York, 1975), pp. 130-145.

61. We are referring to Antonio Arguedas, interior minister and "double agent" involved in 1969 in the incredible story of the diary of Che Guevara. See his confession to Carlos Cocciolo in L'Express (Paris), 29 June 1970. The Los Angeles Times reported in November 1978 that M. Hernán Cubillos, Foreign minister of Chile at the time, "is supposed to have belonged to the CIA" ( Le Monde, 16 November 1978). break

6— Praetorian Guards and the Patrimonial State

1. This is the description of Domingo Alberto Rangel, Los Andinos en el poder. Balance de una hevemonía, 1899-1945 (Caracas, 1964), p. 59.

2. Sergio Ramírez, "Balcanes y volcanes (Aproximación al proceso cultural contemporáneo de Centroamérica)," in Edelberto Torres Rivas, ed., Centroamérica hoy (México, 1973), pp. 336-337.

3. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, p. 55.

4. P. J. Chamorro, Estirpe sangrienta: los Somoza (México, 1978), p. 67.

5. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, p. 177.

6. Ibid., p. 184.

5. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, p. 177.

6. Ibid., p. 184.

7. According to William Krehm, Democracia y Tiranía en el Caribe (Havana, 1960), pp. 13-15, and Emiliano Chamorro, "Autobiografía," Revista conservadora (Managua), nos. 1-18, quoted by Wheelock, Imperialismo y Dictadura, p. 150.

8. According to Alejandro Bendana, "Crisis in Nicaragua," NACLA Report 12, no. 6 (November-December 1978):6-8, and Wheelock, Imperialismo y Dictadura, pp. 159-170.

9. "Nicaragua, la voie 'socialiste' de Tachito Somoza," Le Monde, 4 September 1971.

10. There were essentially two groups, corresponding in their regional base and activities to the two traditional dominant groups—the Conservatives and the Liberals. The ranchers and the sugar producers created the Banamerica (Banco de América) group, the coffee producers and the cotton growers of the northwest plus the businessmen in Managua supported the Banic (Banco de Nicaragua) group.

11. J. A. Robleto Siles, Yo deserté de la guardia nacional de Nicaragua (San José, Costa Rica, 1979), pp. 189-191.

12. "A Loyalty Test for the Guard," Newsweek, 16 July 1979.

13. Siles, Yo deserte, p. 52.

14. Pedro Joaquín Chamorro speaks of this from first hand knowledge. The editor of La Prensa whose assassination in 1978 set off the final offensive against the dynasty was tortured in the "sewing room" of the palace by Tachito himself after the assassination of Tacho in 1956. P. J. Chamorro, Estirpe sangrienta, p. 67.

15. Chamorro tells of some of the gross "jokes" played by the first Somoza on the opposition members of the upper bourgeoisie. Ibid., p. 142. break

16. This procedure was carried out either at the level of the voting booths or later in the Electoral Tribunal. See P. J. Chamorro, ibid, p. 59.

17. According to A. Klement, "Feds Target Foreign Agents," The National Law Journal (25 August 1980):10, quoted by Marie-France Toinet, "Le lobby latino-américain à Washington," Problémes d'Amérique latine, no. 60 (2d trimester, 1981):77. That official figure seems rather modest. No doubt it is only the tip of the iceberg.

18. Richard Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, pp. 235-237 and 241.

19. According to Howard J. Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo's Dominican Republic (Gainesville, Fla., 1968), p. 50.

20. See Juan Bosch, Trujillo. Causas de una tiranía sin ejemplo (Caracas, 1961), pp. 147-148.

21. With evocative names: The Kikuyus of the Andes, The Foreign Legion, and The Riders of the East. They totaled 5,000 men according to the Hispanic American Report 14:161.

22. This is the thesis of Abraham Lowenthal, "The Political Role of the Dominican Armed Forces: a note on the 1963 Overthrow of Juan Bosch and the 1965 Dominican Revolution," in Lowenthal, ed., Armies and Politics in Latin America (New York, 1976), pp. 314-316.

23. Hugh Thomas, Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom (London, 1971), p. 568.

24. Quoted in Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Army and Politics in Cuba, 1898-1958 (Pittsburgh, 1976), pp. 56-57.

25. Casanova, Imperialismo y Liberación, p. 183.

26. Pérez, Army and Politics, p. 84.

27. Thomas, Cuba, p. 580.

28. See Dennis B. Wood, "Las relaciones revolucionarias de clase y los conflictos políticas en Cuba, 1868-1968," Revista latinoamericana de sociologéa (Buenos Aires), no. 1 (1969):48-60.

29. According to Ramón de Armas, "Fulgencio Batista, principales circunstancias condicionantes de la instauración de sus dos peróodos dictatoriales," (Havana and Mexico City, Latin American Social Science Council [CLACSO], June 1980, mimeographed), pp. 14-18.

30. Thomas, Cuba, see chapter 60: "Batista and the Communists," and pp. 724-725.

31. Bias Roca (Francisco Calderío) and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, En defensa del pueblo (Havana, 1945), quoted by Thomas, Cuba., p. 736.

32. This is emphasized by Mario Llerena who sees the university as continue

the laboratory in which the Castro movement was born. See The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism (Ithaca N. Y., 1978), p. 41.

33. At least this is what is said by General Espaillat, his minister of the police in Arturo Espaillat, Les Dessous d'une dictature: Trujillo (Paris, 1966), p. 208. He himself considered Batista "a maladroit common type without class."

34. See American University-Foreign Area Studies, Area Handbook for Paraguay (Washington, D.C., 1972), p. 139.

35. Ibid., p. 274.

34. See American University-Foreign Area Studies, Area Handbook for Paraguay (Washington, D.C., 1972), p. 139.

35. Ibid., p. 274.

36. According to the majority of witnesses, especially the members of the Febrerista opposition. See "Partido febrerista. Sinopsis de la situación política paraguaya, 1972" in Nueva Sociedad (Caracas) (September-October 1972):49-71.

37. An opinion that is less frequently held. See Omar Díaz de Arce, Paraguay (Havana, 1967), p. 50.

38. See François Chartrain, La Republique du Paraguay (Paris, 1973), p. 35.

39. Since the 1967 constitution, the Liberal Radical party, the Liberal party, and the Febrerista party are tolerated. The Colorado party has two-thirds of the congressional seats. President Stroessner received 89.62 percent of the votes in the 1978 election.

40. See "Paraguay, la dictadura olvidada," in Altemativa (Bogotá), no. 226 (August 1979):31.

41. See Hector Borrat, "Contacto en el Paraguay,' Marcha (Montevideo), 16 June 1972, as well as "Joseph Ricord, un parrain déchu," Le Monde, 13 December 1972.

42. "Paraguay. The Price of Paz," Newsweek, 12 February 1973.

43. "Paraguay. Des prêtres dénoncent la terreur policiere dans le pays," Le Monde, 5 December 1974.

44. Frederic Hicks, "International Relations and Caudillismo in Paraguay," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (January 1971):89-111.

45. See Hicks, "Política, poder y el papel del cura de pueblo en el Paraguay," Suplemento Antropológico de la Revista del Ateneo Paraguayo (June 1969):35-44.

46. According to Hicks, "International Relations." In 1963 at the beginning of the school year the Colorado party distributed 20,000 school blouses, 40,000 notebooks, 100,000 pencils, and 66,500 readers. break

7— Model Democracies and Civilian Supremacy

1. That of General Federico Tinoco from 1917 to 1919. See Orlando Salazar Mora, "Le Système politique au Costa Rica, 1889-1919" (Ph.D. diss., Paris-III, Mimeographed), pp. 298-301.

For the problem of the army in Costa Rica we rely on the work of Constantino Urcuyo Fournier, espedally his Ph.D. diss., "Les Forces de sécurité publique et la Politique au Costa Rica, 1960-1978," (Paris-V, mimeographed), 432 pp.

2. See José Luis Vega Carballo, Costa Rica: Una interpretación sociopolítica de su desarrollo reciente (San José, 1977), p. 10, and the interview with José Figueres in Alfredo Peña, Democracia y Golpe militar. Entrevista a Juan Bosch (Caracas, 1979), p. 43.

3. Jose Figueres had a personal and paternalistic relationship to the members of the guard. He went to the funerals of those who had died, and assisted their families. See Constantino Urcuyo Fournier, "Les Raisons, les Fonctions et les Limites de l'abolition de l'armée au Costa Rica" (San José, 1979, Manuscript), p. 5.

4. Interview with Alain Rouquié, San José, Costa Rica, 29 April 1981.

5. According to the analysis of Rodolfo Cerdas, La Crisis de la democracia liberal en Costa Rica (San José, Costa Rica, 1976), p. 76.

6. Carballo, Costa >Rica, p. 16.

7. A Costa Rican deputy said recently to the author: "The Costa Rican people are very attached to democratic institutions. When two peasants have a conflict about their boundaries, they do not shoot each other as in our neighboring countries, they go to court."

8. On the rotation of members of the police force and their professional instability, see Fournier, Les Raisons, p. 9.

9. See Samuel Stone, "Las convulsiones del istmo centroamericano: raices de un conflicto entre elites," Estudios CIAPA (San José, Costa Rica), no. 1 (1979):23-24.

10. According to William Cline and Enrique Delgado, eds., Economic Integration in Central America (Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 68.

11. Carballo, Costa Rica., pp. 12 ff.

12. According to Winfield J. Burggraaff, The Venezuelan Armed Forces in Politics, 1935-1959 (Columbia, Mo., 1972), p. 13.

13. Silvio Villegas, "La Politique extérieure de Juan Vicente Gómez," vol. 1 (Ph.D. thesis, Paris-III, 1980), pp. 277 ff. Domingo Alberto Rangel, Los Andinos en el poder. Balance de una hegemonía, 1899-1945 (Caracas, 1964), p. 169. See also Robert L. Gilmore, continue

Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela, 1810-1910 (Athens, Ohio, 1964).

14. See Daniel H. Levine, "Venezuela since 1958: The consolidation of Democratic Politics," in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore, Md., 1978), p. 96, and Burggraaff, The Venezuelan Armed forces, p. 84.

15. Burggraaff, The Venezuelan Armed forces, p. 113.

16. Humberto Njaim et al., El Sistema política venezolano (Caracas, 1975), p. 12.

17. On the coalition AD, COPEI, URD (Democratic Republican Union) see Gene E. Bigler, "The Armed Forces and Patterns of Civil-Military Relations," in John Martz and D. Myers, eds., Venezuela: The Democratic Experience (New York, 1977), pp. 119-127.

18. We simply note that the income from petroleum helped to weaken if not to eliminate the large agrarian bourgeoisie as a social force and to retard the industrialization that no doubt facilitated the entrenchment of a stable representative system.

19. Njaim et al., El Sistema, pp. 41-56.

20. On 24 June 1960 Betancourt was the victim of an attack that cost the life of the head of his military staff. After they were arrested the organizers of the attack revealed that Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic, had been directly involved. See Rómulo Betancourt, Tres Años de gobierno democrático, vol. 2 (Caracas, 1962), p. 318.

21. See U.S. Army Area Handbook for Venezuela (Washington, D.C., 1965), chapter 18, pp. 545-547.

22. See Betancourt, "Palabras de optimismo y conciliación al comenzar 1961," in Tres Años, vol. 1, p. 413, as well as "Quatrième message présidentiel," ibid., vol. 2, pp. 320-321.

23. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 390, 414.

22. See Betancourt, "Palabras de optimismo y conciliación al comenzar 1961," in Tres Años, vol. 1, p. 413, as well as "Quatrième message présidentiel," ibid., vol. 2, pp. 320-321.

23. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 390, 414.

24. Peña, Conversaciones con Carlos Andrés Pérez, vol. 2 (Caracas, 1979), p. 122.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 123.

24. Peña, Conversaciones con Carlos Andrés Pérez, vol. 2 (Caracas, 1979), p. 122.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 123.

24. Peña, Conversaciones con Carlos Andrés Pérez, vol. 2 (Caracas, 1979), p. 122.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 123.

27. This is the term used by Casanova in "El partido del Estado, cincuenta años del PRI," Nexos (México) (April and May 1979).

28. See Franklin D. Margiotta, "Civilian Control and the Mexican Military: Changing Patterns of Political Influence," in C. Welsh, ed., Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries (Albany, N.Y., 1976), p. 233.

29. See Guillermo Boils, Los Militares y la Política en México, 1915-1974 (México, 1975), p. 54. break

30. This is the thesis of, among others, Jean Mayer, in La Révolution mexicaine, 1910-1940 (Paris, 1973), passim and pp. 305-307.

31. Jorge Alberto Lozoya, El Ejército mexicano, 1911-1965 (México, 1971), p. 65.

32. With around seventy thousand men in the armed forces, Mexico has spent less than 10 percent of the national budget since 1950 on defense. See Joseph Loftus, Latin American Defense Expenditures, 1938-1965 (Santa Monica, Calif., 1968). pp. 11-36.

33. Mexico, which has the second-largest population in the continent, is only in fourth place in numbers in the military, far behind Brazil (200,000 men), Cuba (120,000), and Argentina (150,000).

34. Novedades (Mexico City), 6 May 1967.

35. See Margiotta, Civilian Control, p. 234.

36. Ibid., pp. 236 and 237.

35. See Margiotta, Civilian Control, p. 234.

36. Ibid., pp. 236 and 237.

37. See Boils, Los Militares, pp. 112-113, and Margiotta, ibid., pp. 225-226.

38. Alexander W. Wilde, "Conversation among Gentlemen: Oligarchical Democracy in Colombia," in Linz and Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democracy (Baltimore, Md., 1979), p. 28.

39. Gilhodes, "Les eléctions colombiennes de 1978," Problémes d'Amériaue latine (Paris), no. 3 (July 1979):63-88.

40. In 1922, the Colombian infantry only had 1,500 men and 139 officers. See J. León Helguera, "The Changing Role of the Military in Colombia," Journal of Inter-American Studies (July 1961): 351-357, and Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerillas and Politics in Colombia (Lexington, Mass., 1973), pp. 6-56.

41. Francisco Leal Buitrago, "Polftica e intervención militar en Colombia," Revista mexicana de sociología 33, no. 3 (May-June 1970): 501-502.

42. See "Los sueldos militares," La República (Bogotá), 19 November 1980.

43. There are many works on la violencia . The classic work is that of Germán Guzmán et al., La Violencia en Colombia, 2 vols. (Bogotá, 1962, 1964). For an interpretative synthesis see Gilhodes, "La violence en Colombie, banditisme et guerre sociale," Cahiers du monde hispanique et luso-brésilien-Caravelle (Toulouse), no. 26 (1976): 69-81.

44. Thus the Firmes movement in which Gabriel García Márquez participated was led by Enrique Santos Calderón and Daniel Semper Pizano, both journalists and sons of the Liberal oligarchy linked to the large daily newspaper. El Tiempo .

45. This is the title of the penetrating article by Alexander Wilde cited in note 38, this chapter. break

46. Gilhodes, Politique et Violence. La question agraire en Colombie (Paris, 1974), p. 503.

47. According to Wilde a veritable "explosion of participation" took place in 1946 with a 60 to 70 percent voting turnout ("Conversation," p. 41.)

48. See Gilhodes, Politique et Violence, and Paul Oquist, Violencia, Conflicto y Politica en Colombia (Bogotá, 1978), pp. 277-290.

49. According to the interpretation of L. A. Costa Pinto, "Clase, partido, poder: el caso colombiano," Aportes (Paris) (October 1971): 100.

50. See Wilde, Conversations, pp. 62 ff. and Oquist, Violencia, pp. 327-332.

51. "Hablan los generales Gabriel Paris y Deogracias Fonseca," El Espectador (Bogotá), 18 December 1979.

52. See Jaime Carrillo Bedoya, Los Paros cívicos en Colombia (Bogotá, 1981), pp. 144 ff.

53. Gustave Gallón Girardo, Quince Años de estado de sitio en Colombia, 1958-1978 (Bogotá, 1979).

55. The Movimiento 19 de abril, because it is not Marxist and still less Leninist but rather is anchored in a national political tradition supposedly "based on the frustration of the Anapista masses after the electoral fraud carried out by the oligarchy in 1970" (pamphlet, May 1981) is more dangerous to the system. We recall that it was the seizure of the Dominican embassy where a number of diplomats were kept hostage by a commando group of M19 in February 1980 that made that organization known to the world.

56. Some headlines in the major newspapers: "New Military Court for Cocaine in the Gloria" (the navy training ship). El Tiempo, 7 March 1978; "Four Sergeants to Military Court for Drugs," E; Tiempo, 8 April 1978; "Eight Military Men Arrested for Marijuana," El Colombiano (Medellín), 21 September 1980; "Military Court for Military Men Linked to Drug Traffic," El Tiempo, 21 September 1980; "No Members of the Military Involved in Drug Traffic: Minister of Defense," El Espectador, 1 November 1980.

57. "Convening of Military Court to Judge Indians of the Cauca," El Espectador, 17 January 1980.

58. Not only Amnesty International or the International Association continue

for Human Rights, but a forum on human rights in which members of the Conservative and Liberal establishments participated, such as Vásquez Carrisoza and Díaz Callejas.

59. "La República tropical," El Espectador, 16 December 1979.

60. That is, following the Uruguayan model of a prolonged coup d'état during which the military kept the elected civilian president, Bordaberry, as head of state but took away his real power (see chap. 8).

61. After the Dominican embassy affair, El Espectador received (and published) numerous letters from readers who called for military rule to save the country's institutions (El Espectador, 29 March 1980). El Siglo (Conservative) has specialized in exaggerated praise for the virtues of the military. The following appeared in its number of 1 June 1979: "In an indolent and decadent country in which the modes of behavior are insipid, the stem confident and lofty presence of the military is an unusual phenomenon which provokes both admiration and hatred."

62. See on this point the view of the general who was head of the army in 1979, Fernando Landazábal Reyes, in his book La Subversión y el Conflicto social (Bogotá, 1980), pp. 112-113.

63. As is demonstrated by the operation of the Coffee Producers Federation, an autonomous but quasi-governmental agency.

64. This is the view of Fernando Rojas H., El Estado en los ochenta, un régimen policivo? (Bogotá, 1978).

65. See Daniel Pecaut, "La Colombie de 1974 a 1979, du 'mandat clair' à la 'crise morale,'" Problèmes d'Amériique latine 52, pp. 46-47, and Bedoya, Los Paros civicos, passim.

66. The Confederation of Colombian workers (CTC) is Liberal, the Union of Colombian workers (UTC) Conservative. The extreme left is strong in the independent unions (teachers, petroleum workers) and the Communist Confederation of Colombian Workers Unions (CSTC) has become stronger at the expense of the traditional parties. See Pecaut, ibid., pp. 42-45.

67. Pierre de Charentenay, "Bourgeoisie nouvelle en Colombie," Amérique latine (Paris), no. 5 (Spring 1981):50.

68. At least this seems to be indicated by the interviews with generals Matallana and Puyana that appeared in Alternativa (De cember 1979) (see El Espectador, 18 February 1979). General Valencia Tovar seems to share their point of view in "El pensamiento militar," El Tiempo, 22 February 1979. See also "La desilusión de los generales" by Femando Cepeda Ulloa in El Tiempo, 23 March 1979.

69. "'Communist subversion is spreading' says General Forero in continue

Conference of American Commanders," El Espectador, 31 October 1979. The appointment of General Landazabal Reyes as chief of the general staff follows the same lines. General Landazábal Reyes is the author of many works on subversion: Estrategia de la subversión y su desarrollo en América latina, Politica y tactica de la guerra revolucionaria, Guía de asuntos civiles para el mantenimiento del orden público, etc .

70. See Leal Buitrago, "Política e intervendon," pp. 509-510.

71. Bigler, "The Armed Forces," p. 128.

72. See "Doubts Plague Big Oil Producer," Financial Times Survey, 8 June 1981, and "Venezuela Growing Pains," Newsweek, 22 June 1981.

73. Hundreds of students demonstrating peacefully in the Plaza of the Three Cultures in the Tlatelolco section on the eve of the Olympic Games were dispersed by the army using its weapons. The exact number killed is not known but the figure involves several dozen. See Jorge Carrión et al., Tres Culturas en agonía. Tlatelolco (Mexico, 1968), 1971.

74. Rafael Segovia in Vuelta (Me xico City), August 1977, reprinted in Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, vol. 2. (Mexico City, 1977): p. 506.

75. Javier Lopez Moreno, La Reforma politica en Mexico (Mexico City, 1979).

76. In evaluating that figure it should be noted that participation in legislative elections is always lower than in those for the presidency. In addition, as Rafael Segovia notes in a study of the federal elections of 1979 in Foro Internacional (Mexico City) 20, no. 3, p. 398, the drop in participation may be due to increased reliability of voting lists because of the presence of representatives of the opposition parties.

77. To use the expression of Susan Eckstein, The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico (Princeton, N.J., 1977).

78. See Fournier, "Les Forces de securite," p. 290 ff.

8— From the Law-Abiding Military to the Terrorist State

1. See Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 27-28.

2. Theodor Wyckoff, "Tres modalidades del militarismo latinoamericano," Combate (San José, Costa Rica) (September-October 1960):15. break

3. Figures presented to the United Nations Subcommittee for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities. See Le Monde, 21-22 August 1977. See also the reports of Amnesty International.

4. According to an officer, Julio Cesar Cooper, in a press conference organized by Amnesty International. See "Uruguay: Filling Gaps," in Latin American Political Report (London) 9 March 1979. See also the revelations of a military man, H. W. Garía Rivas, in Proceso (México), 16 June 1980.

5. See "Répression en Uruguay. A côté des methodes de torture 'classique,' des techniques pharmacologiques sont de plus en plus souvent employées," Le Monde, 20 June 1978, and "Le laboratoire uruguayen," Le Monde, 14 June 1979.

6. The Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia, directly attached to the head of state was replaced in August 1977 by the National Center of Information, which had the same functions.

7. Except during the crisis of 1891 in which President Balmaceda opposed the Congress, ending in the suidde of the president after a brief civil war. Balmaceda favored a more active role for the state in the national economy. On the "enclave state" see among others Aníbal Pinto, "Desarrollo economico y relaciones sociales en Chile," Trimestre económico (Mexico City) (OctoberDecember 1963): 641-658.

8. See Antonio Garía, "Reflexiones sobre los cambios políticas en América latina. Las clases medias y el sistema de poder," Revista mexicana de sociologia (July-September 1968): 593-602.

9. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dépendence et développement en Amérique latine pp. 118-135.

10. Atilio Borón, "El estudio de la movilización política en América latina: la movilización electoral en la Argentina y Chile," Desarrollo económico (Buenos Aires) (July-September 1972):211-243. See also Ricardo Cruz Coke, Geografía electoral de Chile (Santiago, 1952), pp. 13-50.

11. Until 1937 peasant unions were illegal. Then they were tolerated but it was difficult to establish them legally. The exclusion of illiterates from voting also reduced the participation of the peasants.

12. See Maurice Zeitlin, "The Social Determinants of Political Democracy in Chile," in James Petras et al., Latin America. Reform or Revolution? (Greenwich, Conn., 1968), pp. 220-234.

13. Ibid., p. 232; García, "Reflexiones sobre," p. 548.

12. See Maurice Zeitlin, "The Social Determinants of Political Democracy in Chile," in James Petras et al., Latin America. Reform or Revolution? (Greenwich, Conn., 1968), pp. 220-234.

13. Ibid., p. 232; García, "Reflexiones sobre," p. 548.

14. See Liliana de Riz, Sociedad y Politica en Chile (de Portales a Pinochet) (México, 1979), pp. 60-63. break

15. See Hansen, "Career Motivation," pp. 119-136, and Antonio Cavalla Rojas, "Organización y Estructura de las fuerzas armadas chilenas" (México, 1978, mimeographed), pp. 60-65.

16. Régis Debray, Entretiens avec Allende sur la situation au Chili (Paris, 1971), pp. 34-41 ( The Chilean Revolution, Conversations with Allende, New York, 1971).

17. The CIA was authorized to spend $ 3 million to assure the election of Frei. At least half of that sum was used. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973, Staff Rept, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, pp. 9-15. Frei is supposed to have received this aid without his knowledge.

18. The slow pace of the reform was made still worse by the exclusion of the temporary workers on the fundos from its benefits. In his first year and making use of the same law, Allende expropriated as many holdings as Frei had done between 1965 and 1970. He too had a problem with the temporary agricultural workers.

19. Fabio Vidigal Xavier de Silveira, Frei, el Kerensky chileno (Buenos Aires, 1968), 173 pp.

20. de Riz, Sociedad y Politica, p. 199.

21. See the declarations of the different parties, "Declaraciones para la historia," Punto Final (Santiago) 28 October 1969. See also the debates in the senate with the speech by A. M. Carrera in favor of the army, Republica de Chile, Diario de sesiones del Senado, 29 October 1969, pp. 130-134. Senator Aniceto Rodríguez was forced to answer accusations of golpismo in later statements while declaring that his party could not defend "a decadent ( trasnochado ) civilianism." See Ultima Hora (Santiago), 11 November 1969.

22. This is the claim at least of General Viaux. See Florencia Varas Conversaciones can Viaux (Santiago, 1972), p. 120. Allende is supposed to have offered him an ambassadorship.

23. See Augusto Varas, Felipe Aguero and Felipe Bustamente, Chile. Democracia, fuerzas armadas (Santiago, 1980), chap. 11, pp. 170-177.

24. Federico Fasano Mertens, Después de la derrota, un eslabón debil llamado Uruguay (México, 1980), p. 139.

25. Wyckoff, "Tres modalidades," pp. 13-14.

26. Uruguayan productivity is strikingly low compared to that of other specialized economies of the same type. For example, the productivity of milk production is one fourth that of New Zealand. Sheep produce 2.9 kilos of wool per head against 4.5 kilos for New Zealand. To produce a ton of meat it is necessary to have continue

twenty-seven cows in Uruguay; seventeen are sufficient in Argentina and thirteen in Holland. A lack of investment is one of the causes of that situation.

27. The rate of increase in production fluctuated around 0 percent between 1951 and 1968.

28. The annual rate of increase in per capita GNP was .7 percent between 1950 and 1960, and—.1 percent from 1960 until 1978. ONU-CEPAL (Economic Commission for Latin America), Estudio económico de América latina (New York, 1970).

29. The rise in the cost of living reached 136 percent in 1967.

30. On a scale in which 1957 represented 100, it was at a level of 60.2 compared with 91.4 for industry. Universidad de la República, Instituto de Economía, El Proceso económico en el Uruguay (Montevideo, 1969), pp. 274-330.

31. See, among others, the book by Gabriel Smimow, La Revolución desarmada, Chile 1970-1973 (Mexico City, 1977), 278 pp.

32. According to Joan Garces, one of the Allende's advisors. See especially "Allende, les militaires et la voie socialiste au Chili," Le Monde, 18 and 19 December 1973.

33. The incident of the "Cuban crates" addressed to the president's office that were unloaded at the international airport of Santiago suffices to prove the vigilance of the military. At the beginning of 1972 it was learned that mysterious crates coming from Cuba had arrived at Pudahuel. The opposition spoke of the importation of arms. The government responded that they contained works of art. The tension that followed led to the adoption of the Law on the Control of Arms that permitted the armed forces to carry out raids anywhere that they suspected that their monopoly was being violated. The law was used against the left by seditious sectors of the military. See Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1977), p. 183.

34. Carlos Altamirano, Chili, les raisons d'une défaite (Paris, 1979), p. 130. Altamirano attributes that suggestion to General Prats, the night before his resignation.

35. According to Régis Debray, "Il est mort dans sa loi," Le Nouvel Observatew, 17 September 1973.

36. Covert Action in Chile, pp. 9-15, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, Part 1, "The International Telephone and Telegraph Co. and Chile, 1970-1971." See also the Committee on Foreign Relations, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report, 1975. break

37. Alleged Assassination, pp. 240-248, and P. García, ed., El Caso Schneider (Santiago, 1972).

38. See Covert Action in Chile, p. 25, and "The International Telephone," pp. 626-720.

39. Thirteen million dollars were spent for that purpose. See Joán Garcés, Allende et l'Expérience chilienne (Paris, 1976), p. 62.

40. "The International Telephone," pp. 623-624.

41. Marcel Niedergang, "Le pouvoir derrière les fusils," Le Monde 2 November 1972.

42. U.S. Agency for International Development, Statistics and Report Division, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations: Obligation and Loan Authorizations, 1945-1972 (Washington D.C, 1973). See also U.S. House, United States-Chilean Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 6 May 1973, pp. 13-14.

43. According to the U.S. Defense Department, Military Assistance and Military Sales (Washington, D.C., 1967, 1971, 1975), reproduced in Aportes (Paris) (October 1967):55; Marcha (Montevideo), 14 July 1972; NACLA Report (New York) (January 1976).

44. Carlos Prats, Una vida por la legalidad (Mexico, 1976), p. 44. The memorandum presented by the generals to Allende in April 1973 insisted on two points—the delimitation of the sectors of the economy, and relations with the United States.

45. Ibid., p. 34.

44. Carlos Prats, Una vida por la legalidad (Mexico, 1976), p. 44. The memorandum presented by the generals to Allende in April 1973 insisted on two points—the delimitation of the sectors of the economy, and relations with the United States.

45. Ibid., p. 34.

46. The policy of economic expansion and the increase in the buying power of the workers raised the profits of the small- and medium-sized enterprises; the extension of social security to independent workers helped the middle classes. See the debate on the middle classes and a possible "historical compromise" in Punto Final, a publication close to the MIR, "En pos de las clases medias," 15 February 1972; "La clases medias y el poder de los trabajadores," 25 March 1972. Also Antonio Bandeira, Ideological Struggle in Chile: The Middle Class and the Military (Toronto, 1974).

47. The Twenty-Second Congress of the Chilean Socialist party in Chillán in 1967 supported "revolutionary violence (as) the only way that will lead to the taking of political and economic power," legal forms of actions being considered as leading to armed struggle. See Joxe, Le Chili sous Allende (Paris, 1974), pp. 38-39.

48. Garcés, Allende et l'Experience chilienne, (Paris, 1976) p. 177, and Joxe, ibid.

49. The split of the left of the Christian Democrats began in 1969 with continue

the creation of the MAPU (Movement for United Popular Action) by founders of the Christian Democratic party such as Rafael Gumucio and important personalities such as Jacques Chonchol. The MAPU was part of Popular Unity. In July 1971 another left group that supported Allende broke with the Christian Democrats to form the Izquierda Cristiana.

50. See Manuel Cabieses Donoso, "Una dictadura popular necesaria," Punto Final, 3 July 1973 for the point of view of the MIR. On popular power see the article of A. Silva and P. Santa Lucía, "Los cordones industriales,' Les Temps modernes (January 1975): 707-743.

51. From October to March 1971, 177 articles on page 1 of El Mercurio gave examples of that "disorder." See Garcés, Allende, p. 191.

52. In fact food supplies were taken over by popular councils, the JAP Provisioning and Price Committees, established in July 1971, which became transformed into a partisan political army. Food supplies were also handled by a secretariat for distribution and marketing that was headed from 1973 by General Alberto Bachelet.

53. See Garcés, "L'affaire Toha," in Le Probléms chilien. Démocratic et contre-révolution (Venders, Belgium, 1975), pp. 139-182.

54. Ricardo Cox, "Defensa social interna," in Institute de Estudios Generales, Fuerzas armadas y Seguridad nacional (Santiago, 1973), pp. 91-117.

55. This was revealed by General Pinochet in 1974. Le Monde, 15 March 1974.

56. See among others Federico Fasano Mertens, Después de la derrota, pp. 150-151.

57. See the detailed analysis of the events and resolutions in the article by Francois Lenin and Cristina Torres, "Les transformations institutionelles de l'Uruguay, 1973-1978," Problemes d'Amériaue latine, no. 49 (November 1978): 9-57.

58. In an interview with the Brazilian weekly, Veja, 30 December 1974.

59. From the name of the reformist Colorado president, Batlle y Ordoñez, founder of modern Uruguay.

60. As Act II, article 7, specifies, "The preservation of national security is the area of direct responsibility of the armed forces through the organs established by law." Diario oficial de la República oriental del Uruguay. Documentos, 28 June 1978, p. 3.

61. That act created a national council made up of the twenty-five members of the Council of State and the junta of generals that included twenty-one officers. That new council legislated by a continue

two-thirds majority, giving military a veto power. Its function was to name the president of the republic.

62. Actos institucionales, suplemento especial de El Soldado (n.d.), p. 31.

63. As stated in the introductory clauses of the Second Act: thanks to the "coherent and systematic action of the armed forces" the executive is the "backbone of the political organization of the nation," Diario oficial, p. 2.

64. See the anonymous report apparently of military origin published by the Mexican magazine, "Uruguay la vida cotidiana," Cuadernos del Tercer Mundo (January 1978):95. The official figures that appear in the Military Balance of London are much lower.

65. Thanks to the newly permitted press freedom in Brazil, the kidnapping of two refugees in Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul) by the Uruguayan police revealed what had been standard practice in earlier years. Since the political climate had changed in Brazil, the incident caused a certain amount of diplomatic tension between the two countries. See Veja, 29 November 1978, and Isto é, 29 November 1978.

66. There is a very complete report on the changes that took place and the policies followed in the dossier prepared by the International Organization of Professors (OIP) and the International Federation of Teachers Unions (FISE). This was submitted to the UNESCO General Assembly in Paris in October 1978, "Uruguay (1973-1978). Notes on Education, Science, Culture, Communication," mimeographed, 62 pp.

67. See the interview with Wilson Ferreira Aldunate by J. P. Clerc, Le Monde, 7 September 1978.

68. Interview with Garces, 13 November 1973. See also Paul W. Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-1952 (Urbana, Ill., 1978), pp. 333-335, and Joxe, "L'armée chilienne et les avatars de la transition," Les temps modernes (June 1973): 2006-2036.

69. See New York Times, 27 September 1973; Latin American Political Report (London), 9 November 1973; Le Monde, 15 September 1973; Le Nouvel Observateur, 1 and 8 October 1973; also, interview with J. Garcés, 13 November 1973.

70. See interview with General Pinochet published in Le Monde, 15 March 1974.

71. The Contraloría, an institution halfway between the French Council of State and the Court of Accounts, made life difficult for Salvador Allende.

72. In December 1977, The General Assembly of the United Nations condemned Chile for its violations of human rights. In January continue

      1978 General Pinochet organized a plebiscite asking the voters to choose, either supporting him or approving the UN resolution.

73. Augusto Pinochet, Geopolítica (Santiago, 1968).

74. Speech of Augusta Pinochet, El Mercurio (Santiago), international edition, 11 June 1977.

75. Quoted by Philippe Grenier, "Le Chile du général Pinochet," Problèmes d' Amérique latine, no. 58 (December 1980): 46.

76. El Mercurio, international edition 11 August 1975.

77. Sergio Bitar, "Libertad económica y dictadura política. La junta militar chilena, 1973-1978," Comercio exterior (México) 29 October 1979, p. 1070.

78. See the writings of Mario Lanzarotti and Carlos Ominami, especially "Vers une nouvelle régulation économique," Amérique latine (Paris), no. 6 (Summer 1981):42.

79. Ibid., p. 43. Banque Sudaméris, Études économiques. La situation économique du Chili (Paris, October 1980).

78. See the writings of Mario Lanzarotti and Carlos Ominami, especially "Vers une nouvelle régulation économique," Amérique latine (Paris), no. 6 (Summer 1981):42.

79. Ibid., p. 43. Banque Sudaméris, Études économiques. La situation économique du Chili (Paris, October 1980).

80. Bitar, "Libertad económica," p. 1074.

81. The protein consumption per person per day went from 53.2 grams in 1974 to 43.1 grams in 1978. See H. Vega, "Políticas económicas y desmultiplicación de los panes," Análisis (Santiago), no. 6 (1979). See also "Cómo vive nuestro trabajador? Los salaries reales," Mensaje (Santiago) (September 1977), and BID, Progreso económico y social en América latina (Washington, D. C., 1978).

82. Sergio Spoerer, Los Desafíos del tiempo fecundo (Mexico City, 1980), p. 43.

83. R. Urzúa, "Salud: impacto de la recesión y deterioro de sus niveles," Mensaje (July 1977), and Bitar, "Libertad económica," p. 1076.

84. Ibid., p. 1073.

83. R. Urzúa, "Salud: impacto de la recesión y deterioro de sus niveles," Mensaje (July 1977), and Bitar, "Libertad económica," p. 1076.

84. Ibid., p. 1073.

85. Business Latin America, 30 March 1977, quoted by Carlos Ominami, "Libéralisation au Chili," Le Monde diplomatique (January 1981).

86. According to Bitar, "Libertad económica," p. 1073, and from 27.2 percent in 1970 to 24 percent in 1979 according to Ominami and Lanzarotti, "Vers une nouvelle," p. 42.

87. "Chile-ficción. La política en 1982," ¿Qué pasa? (Santiago) 26 April 1979.

88. See the classic Mapa de la extrema riqueza of F. Dahse (Santiago, 1979).

89. See "Chile's Radical Experiment," Newsweek 25 May 1981, and the dossier published by Amérique latine : "Chili, un projet de révo- soft

lution capitaliste." On the changes in mental attitudes see the economic supplement to Ercilla (Santiago), no. 6 (1981), explaining the advantages of the market system. On the capitalization system of retirement funds as opposed to that based on social solidarity, see "Reforma provisional: compare su futuro," Ercilla 26 November 1980, and the pertinent comments by Javier Martínez, "Chile Nuevo: une fois encore," Amériaue latine (Summer 1981):27-29.

90. El Día (Montevideo), 27 May 1977.

91. For a study of the theoretical foundations of the new economic policy see José Manuel Quijano, "Uruguay: balance de un modelo friedmaniano," Comercio exterior (Mexico City) (February 1978):173-211. For a more political interpretation of the relations between the military regime and the overall economic program, see Nelson Minello, La Militarización del Estado en América latina. Un análisis de Uruguay (México, 1976), 42 pp.

92. According to the neoliberal publication that speaks for Vegh Villegas, Busqueda (Montevideo) (May 1975).

93. Theotonio dos Santos, "Socialismo y fascismo en América latina," Revista mexicana de sociología (January-March 1977):186-187.

94. This is the thesis of colonial fascism advanced not long ago by Helio Jaguaribe for Brazil (see Le Temps modernes [October 1967]: 602), and often repeated today. See "Fascismo y colonialismo en el caso chileno," Chile-América (Rome) (July-August 1977): 70-80. For a criticism of these views see Atilio Borón, "El fascismo como categoría historica: en torno al problema de las dictaduras en América latina," Revista mexicana de sociología (April-June 1977): 481-530.

95. Manuel Antonio Garretoón, "Procesos políticas en un régimen autoritario. Dinámicas de institucionalización y oposición en Chile, 1973-1980" (Santiago, 1980, mimeographed), p. 9.

96. According to Federico Fasola Mertens, Después de la derrota, p. 148.

97. Sudaméris, Etudes économiques. La situation chilienne .

9— The Exception to the Rule: Praetorian Republics and Military Parties

1. See Rouquié, "Argentine 1977: anarchic militaire ou Etat terroriste?" Etudes (October 1977):325-339.

2. Thus the Communist party, which was legal at the time, commenting a year before the coup d'état on a speech of President continue

Isabel Perón already called for the "formation of a democratic coalition government made up of civilians and patriotic military men," ( Nuestra palabra, organ of the Argentine Communist party, 26 February 1976).

3. The movement of the Montoneros. The Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP) emerged out of Trotskyism.

4. Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964. An Experiment in Democracy (New York, 1967).

5. See Stepan, The Military in Politics pp. 85-88, and Luciano Martins, "Notes sur le role et le comportement des militaires au Brésil," in Anouar Abdel-Malek, L'Armée dans la nation (Alger, 1975), pp. 241-254.

6. See Lewis A. Tambs, "Five Times against the System: Brazilian Foreign Military Expeditions and their Effect on National Politics," in Henry H. Keith et al., eds., Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil (Tempe, Ariz., 1976), pp. 179-206.

7. According to the interpretation of Charles Morazé in his classic book Les Trois Ages du Brésil (Paris, 1954), pp. 80-88.

8. João Camilo Oliveira Torres, "As fôrças armadas como fôrça politica," Revista brasileira de estudios politicos (Belo Horizonte) (January 1966):39-41.

9. See Flynn, Brazil, p. 518.

10. See especially María Victoria Mesquita Benavides, O Governo de Kubitschek: Desenvolvimento economico e estabilidade política, 1956-1961 (Rio de Janeiro, 1976), pp. 158-165.

11. On the political role of the Clube Militar see Robert A. Hayes, "The Military Club and National Politics in Brazil," in Keith, et al., eds., Perspectives on Armed Politics, pp. 139-171 as well as Paul Manor, "Factions et idéologies dans l'armée brésilienne; nationalistes et liberaux, 1946-1951," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine (Paris) (October-December 1978):556-586, and Antonio Carlos Peixoto, "Le Clube militar et les affrontements au sein des forces armées, 1945-1964," in Rouquié, ed., Les Partis mililaires au Brésil (Paris, 1980), pp. 65-104.

12. We are borrowing the concept of Huntington without agreeing with his neoinstitutionalism. The "general politicization of all social forces and institutions" that characterizes "praetorian societies" is not explained by a tautological reference to the weakness of political institutions. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, C onn., 1967).

13. Quoted by Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, pp. 57-60.

14. Werneck Sodrè, Historia militar do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), especially pp. 405-408. break

15. The U.S. ambassador, Lincoln Gordon, did not hesitate to hail the fall of Goulart as "a great victory for the free world . . . in which the West could have lost all the South American republics." Message from Gordon to Dean Rusk, 2 April 1964, quoted by Phyllis R. Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964 (Austin, 1979), pp. 82-83.

16. Clearly expressed by the Foreign Minister of General Medici, Gibson Barbosa, to the representatives of Business International in 1970, Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro) (29 October 1970).

17. Flynn, Brazil, p. 274.

18. As a result of the sudden resignation of President Quadros who had been elected with the support of the UDN.

19. Several authors claim, even today, that the sergeants' revolt, as well as the later navy mutinies, were prepared and initiated by anti-Communist agents provocateurs .

20. As L. Martins correctly observes. Notes, p. 252.

21. General José Campos Aragão, "A revolução en marcha," A defesa nacional (Rio de Janeiro), (May-June 1965):14.

22. See Flynn, Brazil, p. 321.

23. See Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of Brazil: The Emergence of a Modernizing Authoritarian Regime, 1964-1970 (New York, 1971).

24. According to the thesis by Raymundo Faoro, Os Donos do poder (Formação de patronato político brasileiro ) (Rio de Janeiro, 1958), pp. 226-270.

25. L. Martins, Pouvoir et Développement économique. Formation et évolution des structures politiques au Brésil (Paris, 1976), p. 28.

26. See Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, "Uma revisão da crise brasileira," Cadernos braileiros (São Paulo) (November-December 1966): 51-57.

27. See Revista brasileira de estudios políticos (Belo Horizonte), special issue on national security (July 1966):136.

28. Monteiro, A Revolução, p. 181.

29. Lecture of General Garrastazú Medici at the Superior War School, 12 March 1970, reproduced in Estrategia (Buenos Aires), no. 5 (1970):59-60.

30. Cardoso, Autoritarismo e Democratiza>ção (Rio de Janeiro, 1975), p. 48.

31. Michel de Certeau, "Les chrétiens et la dictature au Brésil," Politique aujourd'hui (November 1969): 45.

32. See Carlos F. Díaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic (New Haven, Conn., 1970), pp. 370-400, and continue

Aldo Ferrer, La Economía argentina (Las etapas de su desarrollo y problemas actuales) (México, 1963), p. 250.

33. See UN-CEPAL (Economic Commission for Latin America), El Desarrollo económico y la Distribución del ingreso en la Argentina (New York, 1968), pp. 217 ff.

34. UN-CEPAL, El Desarrollo económico de la Argentina (New York, 1959), p. 23.

35. This has been well demonstrated for the beginning of the century by Jorge F. Sábato in his very suggestive, "Notas sobre la formación de la clase dominante en la Argentina moderna, 1880-1914" (Buenos Aires, CISEA, 1979, mimeographed). This was also noticed at the time by perceptive foreign observers such as Jules Huret, En Argentine: de Buenos Aires au grand Chaco (Paris, 1911), especially p. 36.

36. This is the expression of Horowitz, "The Norm of Illegitimacy: The Political Sociology of Latin America," in Irving Horowitz et al., Latin American Radicalism (London, 1969), p. 5.

37. During which a junta of ministers from the three services temporarily seized power removing the vice president, Pedro Aleixo, who was the constitutional successor.

38. See Cardoso, "Les impasses du régime autoritaire: les cas brésilien," Problémes d'Amérique latine, no. 54 (December 1979): 89-108.

39. On the "elections with variable rules" see Rouquié, "Le modèle brésilien à l'épreuve," Etudes (May, 1977), pp. 625-640.

40. According to Veja (Rio de Janeiro), 15 October 1969.

41. We know that two of its former heads became president. General Médici declared just before he took power: "The exercise of the direction of the organization of national information has enabled me to know the inside and outside of men and things." Industria e Produtividade (Rio de Janeiro) (November 1969).

42. There were 646 civilians among the 1,276 graduates of the ESG between 1950 and 1967, according to Barry Ames, Rhetoric and Reality in a Military Regime: Brazil since 1964 (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1975), pp. 8-9.

43. See J. E. Greño Velasco, "La controversia argentina-brasileña en el Alto Paraná," Reuista de política internacional (Madrid), no. 133 (May-June 1974):94-109, and Osny Duarte Pereira, Itaipú: pros e contras: breve analise da historia das relacoes entre Argentine, Uruguai e Brasil e ensaio político-juridico sobre o aproveitamento hidrelétrico do Rio Paraná (Rio de Janeiro, 1974), 667 pp.

44. Criterio (Buenos Aires), 23 March 1967.

45. This emerges from the first conclusions of the unpublished field- soft

work carried out in 1981 by the team of Dr. Roca of the Communitá di ricerca of Milan.

46. According to C. Andino Martínez, "El estamento militar en El Salvador," Estudios centro-americanos (San Salvador, July-August 1979):625.

47. "Ejército guerrillero del pueblo. Manifiesto internacional," communique published in El País (Madrid), 26 October 1979.

48. Hélène Rivière d'Arc, "L'armée aménageur et entrepreneur en Bolivie," L'Espace géographique (Paris), no. 2 (1979):93-103.

49. General Mosconi, the dynamic director of the national petroleum company, persuaded the state to decree a single price for petroleum products, to the considerable damage of the foreign companies.

50. Law No. 12,709, "Dirección general de fabricaciones militares," Boletín oficial (Buenos Aires), 9 October 1941.

51. Article 170 of the federal constitution of 1967.

52. Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), 2 October 1970.

53. Werner Baer, Richard Newfarmer, and Thomas Trebat, "On State Capitalism in Brazil: Some New Issues and Questions," in Interamerican Economic Affairs (Washington, D.C.) (Winter 1976):81.

54. Because of the Employment Guarantee Funds (FGTS) and the Program of Social Integration (PIS) to which the workers are obliged to contribute.

55. See Celso Lafer, O Sistema político brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro, 1975), p. 79.

56. See Riordan Roett, "The Brazilian Military and the Expansion of State Power: Implications for Sodal Change" (Washington, D.C., 1976, mimeographed), pp. 10-11; "'Quem é quem' as grandes empresas no Brasil," A opinião (São Paulo), 8 Oc tober 1973; "A Monopoly Game," Newsweek, 18 June 1979; Veja (Rio de aneiro), 22 July 1981.

57. See Movimento (São Paulo) February 1977) "Os empresarios brasileiros e a dernocracia," and Peter Evans, "Multinationals, State-Owned Corporations and the Transformation of Imperialism: A Brazilian Case Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change, (Chicago) (October 1977):56-60.

58. "O Estado abre espaço," Veja, 22 July 1981.

59. Editorial in O Estado de São Paulo, 16 January 1977, and "Brazil tolhe multinational, diz Wall Street Journal," Jomal do Brasil, 9 October 1976.

60. Cardoso, Autoritarismo e Democratização, p. 198.

61. Quoted by Latin America, Regional Reports, Southern Cone (London: continue

Latin American Newsletters), 26 June 1981. Búsqueda is the press organ of the former minister Vegh Villegas, who directed the Uruguayan reform after 1974.

62. Fidel Castro, La Historia me absolverá (Havana, 1967), p . 18.

63. Jerry Weaver, "La élite política de un régimen dominado por los militares: el ejemplo de Guatemala," Revista latinoamericana de sociología (Buenos Aires) 1 (1969):24.

64. "Bolivia: The Generation Gap," Latin America Political Report (London) 12 January 1979, p. 10.

65. Hugo Abreu, o Outro lado do Poder (Porto Alegre, 1978), p. 95.

66. Lowenthal, "The Political Role," pp. 314-316.

67. "Para-quedistas: democracia, volver?" MoVimento (São Paulo) 16 October 1978.

68. General Abreu backed the candidate of the dissident military, General Euler Bentes, who was supported by the civilian opposition against General Figueiredo in 1978. See "Hugo Abreu, o general dissidente," interview published in the periodical of the extreme left, Em tempo (São Paulo), 10 May 1979.

69. Rigoberto Padilla, "El proceso democratizador en Honduras," Revista internacional (Prague), no. 12 (1974):69.

70. "Crónica internacional. Consideraçõs sobre a guerra de Coreia," Revista do Clube militar (Rio de Janeiro) (July 1950):75-80, quoted by Paul Manor, "Factions et idéologies," pp. 556-586.

71. Correio da Manha, 16 December 1950, quoted by Peixoto, "Le Clube militar," p. 88.

72. Document published by Helio Silva in 1964: Golpe o Contragolpe (Rio de Janeiro, 1975), pp. 200-201.

73. See especially Leonel Gómez and Bruce Cameron, "El Salvador: the Current Danger. American Myths," in Foreign Policy, no. 43 (Summer 1981):75.

74. R. N. Adams, "The Development of the Guatemalan Military", pp. 101-102.

10— Revolution by the General Staff

1. See the significant headlines of some articles published in France in 1969. For example, C. Morange, "Y a-t-il des gorilles progressistes?" La Nouvelle Critique (April 1969), and P. Nourry, "Pérou: des militaires pas comme les autres," Croissance des jeunes nations (October 1969). break

2. See chapter 4.

3. See Jacques Lambert, Ameriaue latine. Structures sociales et institutions politiques (Pa ris, 1963), pp. 291-293.

4. On this military progressivism see the case studies published in the collective work, La Politique de Mars. Les processus politiaues au sein des partis militaires, ed . and intro. A. Rouquie (Paris, 1981), as well as A. Rouquie, "Le camarade et le commandant, reformisme militaire et legitimite institudonnelle," Revue francaise de science politique (Ju ne 1979).

5. See the quotations published by Manuel Urriza in his book, Peru: cuando los militares se van (Caracas, 1978), pp. 165-166.

6. According to the Estatuto del gobierno revolucionario, which became Decree-Law 17.063.

7. "Manifesto del gobierno revolucionario," El Comercio (Lima), 4 October 1968.

8. See especially J. Velasco Alvarado in La Voz de la revolución, vol. 2 (Lima, 1971), pp. 10-12.

9. See Plan Inca. Plan del gobierno revolucionario de la fuerza armada (Lima, n.d.), pp. 46-47.

10. In a "Message to the Nation," published in La Político del gobierno revolucionario (Lima) (July 1973), pp. 17-18.

11. Castro mentioned the Peruvian military regime in favorable terms for the first time on 14 July 1969, in a speech to thirty thousand sugar workers at the beginning of the ten-million-ton sugar harvest.

12. See, among others, Bourricaud, "Perú: ¿Los militares porqu>CH:233>y para qué?" Aportes (Paris) (April 1970), and Nelson Rimensnyder, "Los militares y la modernización del Perú," Estudios internacionales (Santiago de Chile) (April-June 1970), p. 91.

13. Because of the application of an amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act that provided for the suspension of military sales to Peru, the government responded by expelling the North American military mission and refusing a visit by Nelson Rockefeller (May 1969).

14. According to the 1961 census, 83.2 percent of the rural properties were less than 5 hectares in size, and comprised 7 percent of the cultivated land, while. 4 percent of the agricultural units were over 500 hectares and comprised 75.6 percent of the land in use. See E. Flores, "La reforma agraria en el Perú," Trimestre económico (July-September 1970), and Hernando Aguirre Gamio, "El proceso de la reforma agraria en el Perú," Mundo nuevo (Buenos Aires, Paris) (January 1970). break

15. "Presidential Message to the Nation," Lima, 24 June 1969, published in Estudios internacionales (Santiago de Chile) (October-December, 1969):395.

16. "Decreto-Ley no., 17, 716, article 3 (ley de reforma agraria)" in Nueva Legislación sobre reforma agraria (Lima, 1970).

17. A first regulation issued in 1972 aimed at limiting the influence of the APRA-dominated unions excluded from the elections to the administrative bodies of the cooperatives all the former political party and union officers.

18. Ley de reforma agraria, article 39.

19. "Message to the Nation," p. 387.

20. See Jean Piel, "Réforme, problèmes et conflits agraires au Pérou. La situation en 1975," in Problèms d'Amérique latine, no. 36 (May 1975):75, and Ute Schirmer, "Reforma agraria y cooperativismo en el Perú," Revista mexicana de sociología (July-September 1977): 799-847.

21. "Message to the Nation," p. 388.

22. Ley de reforma agraria, Article 181. That possibility was not utilized by those who held the agrarian reform bonds, it is true.

23. The marketing of iron ore was transferred to the state in 1971, the export of fishmeal was also taken over in 1970. In 1973, the production of fishmeal was nationalized. It is true that the fishmeal companies were in a very difficult financial situation because of the drop in prices and the reduction in marine life. Fishmeal, in which Peru ranks first in the world in exports, constituted its most important export.

24. See José Martínez, Una nueva etapa en el proceso revolucionario. La clase obrera ante la ley de industrias (Informe presentado al comité central del partido comunista peruano ) (Lima, 29 and 30 August 1970), p. 24.

25. The Financial Development Corporation, created in 1971 to provide financing to state enterprises and to the social sector (the future enterprises to be created by the workers themselves).

26. The major idea of the regime in its attempt to distinguish itself from capitalism and communism, which was to provide it with its political identity, was the creation of a self-managed area of Social Property. A law was finally issued (Decree-Law 20,558) in April 1974, but its application was soon suspended as a result of the change of government that took place in 1975. It called for a special property sector made up of enterprises created by the workers. The opposition of the military did not permit that form continue

of property to develop. See Carlos Franco, Perú Participación popular (Lima, 1979), pp. 122-126.

27. The Peruvian government initiated campaigns to attract capital through its embassies, governmental missions, and the international press (See New York Times, 28 September 1969). The foreign investment was to be carried out on the basis of a contract of limited duration with the state.

28. The second phase of the revolution after the overthrow of General Velasco Alvarado in 1975 led by General Morales Bermudez took steps to cut back or limit the impact of the reforms of the earlier regime before handing back the government to the civilians in 1980.

29. In the opinion of General Velasco Alvarado when he was interviewed by Le Monde, 3 February 1973. See the protest of the employers' organization against the "collectivist" orientation of the government, Expreso (Li ma), 12 August 1970.

30. See Lowenthal, "Peru's Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces. Background and Context," in Catherine McArdle Kelleher, ed., Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1974), p. 148.

31. This is the title of a book by Albert Meister on what he calls "the Peruvian experiment in the management of underdevelopment," (Toulouse, 1981).

32. These words were often used by the minister of mines. General Fernández Maldonado, one of the "initiators" of the process.

33. See Villanueva,¿ ^Nueva Mentalidad ? Villanueva is a former commander in the Peruvian army who labored in the ranks of the APRA.

34. This is the theory of Einaudi and Stepan in their study, Latin American Institutional Development .

35. Put forward by Henry Pease García in El Ocaso del poder olig>CH:225>rquico (Lima, 1977).

36. See, for a sophisticated interpretation along these lines, the study by George E. Philip, The Rise and Fall of the Peruvian Military Radicals (London, 1978), p. 40.

37. This is the opinion of Villanueva, ¿ Nueva Mentalidad ? and of Einaudi and Stepan, Latin American . See also Luis Valdez, "Antecedentes de la nueva orientación de las fuerzas armadas en el Perú," Aportes (Paris) (January 1971):175-178.

38. Such as General Tantaleáan or even Velasco Alvarado. On the influence of the writings of the founder of the APRA, Haya de la Torre, see Franco, Perú, Participación popular, p. 18. break

39. As Urriza correctly notes in his book, Perú, pp. 90-92.

40. Interview in Croissance des jeunes nations, 1 February 1974, p. 11. See also Edgar Mercado Jarrín, "La seguridad integral en el proceso peruano," Estrategia (Buenos Aires) (March 1973):74-84.

41. See "Acciún nacionalista revoludonaria. Programa de principios," El Diario (La Paz), 31 August 1969, and "Proclamaron a Ovando en Quillacollo," El Diario, 13 September 1969.

42. Domitila Barrios de Chungara, Domitila. Si on me donne la parole. La vie d'une femme de la mine bolivienne, interview by Moema Viezzer (Paris, 1980), p. 177.

43. René Zavaleta Mercado, "Bolivia, de la Asamblea popular al combate de agosto," in James Petras et al., América latina. Economía y Política (Buenos Aires, 1972).

44. Augusto Céspedes, "Bolivia, un Vietnam simbúlico y barato," Marcha (Mo ntevideo), 1 October 1971.

45. This gave him real popularity after the anti-American demonstrations in 1964. See Larry Piffim, "The Challenge in Panama," Current History (Ja nuary 1966): 6.

46. Speech by Torrijos, 9 August 1971, quoted by Gilhodes in his book, Paysans de Panama .

47. "Panama: Confrontation," Latin America Weekly Report (London), 14 April 1972.

48. See Gilhodes, Paysans de Panama, pp. 196-200.

49. According to Valeurs actuelles, "Les coffres de Panama," 21 June 1971.

50. "Panama: Another Round," Latin America Weekly Report, 30 November 1973. The opposition accused the governor of preparing a celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the attack by Fidel Castro on the Moncada Barracks.

51. The role of the United States in the coup and counter coup of Torrijos remains unclear. Nevertheless, the support by all the pro-American elements of the removal of the leader of the revolution was evident. We should also note that a number of claims have been made that attribute the plane acident that took Torrijos's life to sabotage by the American intelligence services. However, no material proof has yet been produced.

52. According to article 277 of the transitional provisions of 1972, quoted in Gilhodes, Paysans de Panama, p. 75.

53. See "Panama After Torrijos," Newsweek, 17 August 1981.

54. According to the text entitled, Filosofía y Plan de acción del gobierno revolucionario nacionalista (Quito, 1972).

55. See César Verduga, "El proceso económico ecuatoriano contem- soft

por,CH:225>neo (an,CH:225>lisis del período 1975-1977)," in G. Drekonja et al., eds., Ecuador hoy (Bogotá, 1978), pp. 61-64.

56. According to Lineamientos fundamentales del plan integral de transformaci,ón y desarrollo (Quito, 1972), quoted by Emmanuel Fauroux in his article: "Equateur: les lendemains d'une réforme agraire," Problèmes d'Amérique latine, no. 56, p. 106.

57. Jaime Galarza Zavala, "Ecuador, el oro y la pobreza," in Ecuador hoy, p. 37.

58. In the words of Stephen Llaidman in the Washington Post, 9 December 1973 ("Peru's Junta Tries to Forge a New Society by Decree").

59. "Velasco habla para la revista Visão," in La Autonomía revolucionaria (Lima) (April-May 1974):6-7.

60. See K. J. Middlebrook and D. Scott Palmer, Military Government and Political Development: Lessons from Perú (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1975), p. 16, and Hugo Neira, Perú: informe urgente (El papel de las fuerzas armadas en el proceso revolucionario) (Madrid, 1971).

61. This program, published by the radical military in 1974, is supposed to have been developed in 1968 and therefore to have had the support of the entire armed forces.

62. See Franco, Perú Partóipación popular, p. 47.

63. Middlebrook and Palmer, Military Government, p. 21.

64. See Richard W. Patch, "Peasantry and National Revolution, Bolivia," in K. H. Silvert, Expectant Peoples (Nacionalism and Development) (New York, 1961), pp. 95-126. Carlos Montenegro, who inspired Bolivian nationalism, wrote in a classic book in 1943: "It was in the Chaco that Bolivian national feeling which had disappeared for half a century was reawakened." Nationalismo y Coloniaje (Buenos Aires, 1967), p. 221.

65. This was the case with General Juan José Torres who told a French journalist to justify his actions: "In the 1930's we had a conflict with Paraguay which was much more important than the guerrillas, a fratricidal war waged at the instigation of imperialist petroleum interests. My father was killed. He died for the defense of the nation." Le Monde, 22 October 1970.

66. Speech of General Ovando, 17 October 1969. Text published in "Bolivia: ¿ La segunda revolutión nacional?" Cuadernos de Marcha (Montevideo) (October 1969):62.

67. See Mario Monteforte Toledo, Centroamérica. Subdesarrollo y dependencia, vol. 2 (México, 1972), p. 128. Also, El Salvador, Ministerio de Defensa, Principios y Objetivos del gobierno revolucionario (San Salvador, 1955) (see especially no. 2).

68. Charles W. Anderson, "El Salvador, the Army as Reformer," in continue

Martin C. Needler, Political Systems of Latin America (New York, 1970), pp. 70-77.

69. W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (New York, 1966).

70. "Changing Role of U.S. Interview with William P. Rogers, Secretary of State," US News and World Report, 26 January 1970.

71. El Espectador (Bogotá) 27 September 1968.

72. See the book by Louis Mercier-Vega, La Révolution par l'Etat (Une nouvelle classe dirigeante en Amérique latine ) (Paris, 1978).

11— The Military State and Its Future: Adventures and Misadventures of Demilitarization

1. We are speaking of General Manuel Odría who gave up power in July 1956 and organized free elections in which his candidate was defeated. On the waves of militarism, see Lieuwen, Generals versus Presidents, Neo-Militarism in Latin America (London, 1964).

2. See Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," Working Paper (Washington, D.C., mimeographed, 1979), pp. 5-8.

3. The idea of a "permanent military government" seems as outdated as that of an irresistible rise of democracy. See Mario Esteban Carranza, Fuerzas armadas y Estado de excepción en América latina (México, 1978), chapter 5.

4. See Rouquié, Pouvoir militaire, passim.

5. See Rouquié, "L'Uruguay, de l'Etat providence à I'Etat garnison," Etudes (Paris) (June 1979): 750.

6. Speech of General Pinochet on 11 September 1973, quoted by Cristina Hurtado-Beca, "Le processus d'institutionnalisation au Chili," Problèmes d'Amérique latine 58 (December 1980):78.

7. See El Mercurio (Santiago), 26 and 28 September 1975.

8. Jorge De Esteban and Luis López Guerra, La Crisis del Estado franquista (Madrid, 1977), pp. 28-29.

9. See Carlos Semprún Maura, Franco est mort dans son lit (Paris, 1978).

10. See Yves Le Bot, "Bolivie. Les militaires, l'Etat, la dépendance: une décennie de pillage," Amérique latine (Paris) (July-September 1980):8.

11. According to Rivas, "Vie et mort au Guatemala, réflexions sur la continue

crise et la violence politique," Amérique latine (Paris) (April-June, 1980):5.

12. See "El Salvador: The Process of Political Development and Modernization," in Ronald McDonald, Party Systems and Election in Latin America (Chicago, 1971), pp. 260-263.

13. It is not alone. El Salvador, Election Fact book (Washington, D.C.: Operations and Policy Research, Inc., Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1967), p. 13, states: "Ninety percent of the dozens of political parties which have functioned since 1944 have been in reality military cliques or factions in disguise."

14. See Latin America Weekly Report (London), "Mixed Blessings for Government in Panamanian Poll Result," 3 October 1980.

15. See "La visite à Paris du président Royo," Le Monde, 8 May 1979.

16. Victor Meza, "Honduras: crisis del reformismo military coyuntura politíca," Boletín del Instituto de investigaciones económicas y sociales, no. 98 (Tegucigalpa, September 1980).

17. Ibid., and Latin America Weekly Report (London), 22 August 1980.

16. Victor Meza, "Honduras: crisis del reformismo military coyuntura politíca," Boletín del Instituto de investigaciones económicas y sociales, no. 98 (Tegucigalpa, September 1980).

17. Ibid., and Latin America Weekly Report (London), 22 August 1980.

18. See Salvador Sánchez Estrada, "La répression des Indiens dans la frange transversale nord du Guatemala," Amérique latine (April-June 1980):73-77.

19. The anti-Communist right consisted of six parties in 1979, while the legal opposition included the Christian Democratic party, the Social Democratic party, and the United Front of the Revolution. The opposition parties lost a large number of their activists because they were assassinated by paramilitary forces. See Gabriel Aguilera Peralta et al., Dialéctica del terror en Guatemala (San José, Costa Rica, 1981), pp. 35, 59.

20. See Jones and Tobias, Guatemala, p. 318.

21. In the words of José Alvaro Moises, "Crise política e democracia: a transição difícil," Revista de cultura e política (São Paulo), no. 2 (August 1980):13.

22. See L. Martins, "La réorganisation des partis politiques et la crise économique au Brésil," Problémes d'Amérique latine 55 (March 1980):23.

23. See Rouquié, "Le modèle brésilien à l'épreuve," Etudes (May 1977):628-632.

24. Cardoso, "Les impasses du régime autoritaire: le cas brésilien," Problèmes d'Amérique latine 54 (December 1979):104.

25. The electoral reforms aimed at giving advantages and the vote of the conservative parties to the government, combined with sophisticated forms of "gerrymandering," are supposed to guarantee a comfortable majority to the system. break

26. See Le Monde, 29 November 1980, and La Prensa (Buenos Aires), 2 December 1980.

27. See Luis Rico Ortiz, Uruguay. Un análisis del plebiscito (Paris, 1981, mimeographed), 37 pp.

28. See Rouquié, "Le retour du général Perón au pouvoir. Les élections générales du 11 mars 1973 et l'élection présidentielle du 23 septembre," Problèmes d'Amérique latine 33 (September 1974):20.

29. Ibid., p. 31.

28. See Rouquié, "Le retour du général Perón au pouvoir. Les élections générales du 11 mars 1973 et l'élection présidentielle du 23 septembre," Problèmes d'Amérique latine 33 (September 1974):20.

29. Ibid., p. 31.

30. Le Monde, 14 July 1978.

31. See Rouquié, "Argentine: les fausses sorties de l'armée et l'institutionnalisation du pouvoir militaire," Problèmes d'Amèrique latine 54 (December 1979):109-129.

32. In 1874 General Pavía at the head of an infantry battalion dissolved the Cortes and put an end to the ephemeral republic before handing over power to Serrano, who ruled as a dictator. See F. G. Bruguera, Histoire contemporaine d'Espagne, 1789-1950 (1953), p. 286, and Manuel Tuñon de Lara, La España del siglo XIX, 1808-1914 (Paris, 1961), p. 194.

33. dos Santos, "A ciência pol,ítica na América latina (Notas preliminares de autocrítica)," Dados (Rio de Janeiro) 23, no. 1 (1980):24.

34. See Spoerer, América latina. Los desafíos del tiempo fecundo (México, 1980).

35. Thus, henceforth, pensions were to be based on a system of individual "capitalization" and not on the principle of national solidarity; see "Reforma previsional. Compare su futuro," Ercilla (Santiago), 26 November 1980.

36. On this theme we refer the reader to Rouquié, "Revolutions militaires et indépendance nationale en Amérique latine, 1968-1971," Revue française de science politique 21, nos. 5 and 6 (October and December 1971).

37. See "Declaración del Pacto Andino contra el golpe militar," El País (Madrid), 14 November 1979.

38. J. Schumpeter, Capitalisme, Socialisme, et Democratie (Paris, 1965), p. 368, ( Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York, 1950).

39. Mariano Grondona, Visión (México, 1976). See the discussion of this point of view by Daniel Waksman Schinca in El Día (Mexico City), 11 May 1976 ("Algo más que simples dictaduras").

40. According to Lucia Pinochet, the daughter of the president, Hoy, no. 151 (11 June 1980), quoted by C. Hurtado Beca, "Le processus d'institutionnalisation," p. 89.

41. See Rouquié, "La hipótesis bonapartista y el surgimiento de sistemas políticos semi-competitivos," Revista mexicana de sociología, no. E (1978):164-165. break

42. On this point see Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira, "Conflicts militaires et décisions sous la présidence du général Geisel," in Rouquié, ed., Les Partis militaires au Brésil (Paris, 1980), pp. 134-139.

43. de Oliveira, ibid., and As Forças armadas. Política e ideología no Brasil, 1964-1969 (Petropolis, 1976), pp. 10-11.

42. On this point see Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira, "Conflicts militaires et décisions sous la présidence du général Geisel," in Rouquié, ed., Les Partis militaires au Brésil (Paris, 1980), pp. 134-139.

43. de Oliveira, ibid., and As Forças armadas. Política e ideología no Brasil, 1964-1969 (Petropolis, 1976), pp. 10-11.

44. As at various times Goes Monteiro, Dutra, Teixeira Lott, or Albuquerque Lima.

45. This is what Cardoso believes: "Uma consntuinte convocada depois de forte derrota do regime nas eleiçoes de 82 significará o fim da dictadura (Entrevista com F.H.C.) ," Movimento (São Paulo), 23 February 1981.

46. This is how it was explained by General Morales Bermudez in an interview in April 1979: "Un entretien avec le président du Pérou," Le Monde, 13 April 1979.

47. According to Hugo Neira, "Au Peéou, le retour de l'oligarchie," Etudes (October 1980):304.

48. "Posición oficial ante la Comisión fue expuesta anoche al país por Harguídeguy," La Nación (Buenos Aires), 24 September 1979.

49. Movimento (São Paulo), 23 February 1981.

50. This was the term used by Ricardo Balbín, leader of the Argentine Radical party, who was willing to accept the imposition of this law.

51. The relationship with the drug mafia and the protection of the drug traffic by the new masters of the country—from which they benefited (see Newsweek, 2 February and 9 March 1981, and Le Matin-Magazine, 18 October 1981)—in fact concealed permanent structural phenomena that one can call the "privatization of the state" or "the patrimonialization of the bureaucracy." Laurence Whitehead has described it as "the absence of relations of legitimate authority" and "group domination" in his article, "El Estado y los intereses seccionales: el caso boliviano," Estudios andinos (La Paz), no. 10 (1974-1975).

52. See the conclusion of Rouquié, Pouvoir militaire,

53. Gérard Fenoy, "L'armée en Colombie," Cahiers du monde hispanique et luso-br>CH:233>silien (Toulouse) 26 (1976):86-87. Only the supporters of the Conservative, Laureano Gómez, were opposed to a military solution of the crisis.

54. See Constantino Urcuyo Fournier, "Les Forces de s>CH:233>curité publiques et la Politique au Costa Rica, 1960-1978" (thesis, Paris, September 1978), chap. 1.

55. Debray, "Nicaragua, une modération radicale," Le Monde diplomatique (September 1979).

56. This is apparent when one reads the military program of the continue

Sandinista government. See, "Organización de un nuevo ejercito nacional," in "Programa de la junta de gobierno de reconstrucción nacional de Nicaragua," published in Bohemia (Havana), 3 August 1979.

57. Jorge T. Dominguez, "The Civic Soldier in Cuba," in Kelleher, ed., Political-Military Systems , pp. 209-237.

58. See Alfonso Camacho P., "Bolivia: militares en la política," Aportes (Paris) (October 1971):73-76.

59. This is the position of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) against its left wing. This position was strengthened by the failed coup of February 24, 1981. See the interview with Felipe Gonzàlez, secretary general of the PSOE in l'Unité, 7 March 1981.

60. During the large demonstration in support of democracy after the antipariiamentary coup, former Francoite leaders such as Fraga Iribarne could be seen side by side with Communist, Socialist, and labor leaders of the opposition.

61. Turkey after Kemal Atatürk provides this kind of scenario in the framework of an elective regime granted by the postmilitary state. However with a coup d'état every ten years since 1960 it is hard to cite it as an example of the demilitarization of the political system. See Ergun Ozbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Origins," in Al Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., Ataturk, Founder of a Modern State (London, 1951), pp. 79-102.

62. Self-criticism is rather common in this area on the part of the parties that belonged to Popular Unity in Chile. Moreover the reflection and study on the problem of the military in Chile that have been carried out by the left in exile since 1973 are quite remarkable.

63. See especially the colloquium organized by the University of Vincennes on this subject in 1979, published as Pierre Dommergues, ed., Le Nouvel Ordre interieur (Paris, 1980). See also Le Monde Diplomatique (March 1979), and Bertram Gross, "Friendly Fascism, A Model for America, " Social Policy (November-December 1970).

64. Guy Hermet, "Dictatures bourgeoises et modernisation conservatrice, problèmés methodologiques de l'analyse des situations autoritaires," Revue Française de Science Politique (December 1975): 1038-1052.

65. Obviously we are referring to the series of reports that were prepared by the commission on the crisis of democracy. See M. Crozier and S. Huntington, The Crisis of Democracy (New York, 1976). break

Epilogue (1986): The Twilight of the Legions: Demilitarization Revisited

1. To be complete we should include Surinam among the continuing military regimes. There has been a partial opening with regard to the former political parties, but the dictatorship of Colonel Deysi Bouterse does not seem to be about to hand over power to an elected civilian government.

2. From 1930 to 1976, 51 percent of the changes of government in Latin America resulted from coups, and 49 percent followed constitutional procedures.

3. See Rouquié, "Argentina, the Departure of the Military: End of a Political Cycle or Just an Episode?" International Affairs (London) (Fall 1983).

4. See the official version of the Colorado party in the pamphlet published by the Office of the President in March 1985, entitled, "Uruguay, el Cambio en Paz" (Montevideo). See also Juan Rial, Partidos Politicos, Democracia, y Autoritarismo, vol. 2 (Montevideo 1984).

5. See Aníbal Delgado Fiallos, Honduras, Elecciones 85, Mas Allá de la Fiesta Civica (Tegucigalpa, 1986).

6. Bolivar Lamounier, "A Trajectoria de un Martir," Afinal (São Paulo), 30 April 1985.

7. de Oliveira, "Forças Armadas e TransiçCH:227>o Politica, a Politica Militar do Governo Figueiredo," (Campinas, UNICAMP, March 1985, Mimeographed), p. 24.

8. German W. Rama, "La Democratic en Uruguay; un Essai d'Interpretation," Problèmes d'Amérique Latine, no. 78 (4th quarter 1985).

9. Juan Rial, "Los Militares en tanto Partido Politico Sustitutivo Frente a la Redemocratizacion" (Santiago, CLASCO, May 1985, mimeographed). See also Cristina Torres, "Las Fuerzas Armadas en la Transición hacia la Democracia," in Charles Gillespie et al., Uruguay y la Democracia, vol. 2 (Montevideo, 1985), pp. 161-170.

10. See Rivas, Crisis del Poder en Centroamérica (San Jose, Costa Rica, 1981), pp. 145-159. See also Gabriel Aguilera Peralta and Jorge Romeo Imergy, Dialectica del Terror en Guatemala (San José, Costa Rica, 1981).

11. Rouquié, "Amérique Latine: Demande Democratique et Désir de Révolution," Projet (Paris) (June 1983).

12. See "Nova Republica Sees Resurgence of the Old Right," Latin American Newsletters (London), Brazil Report, 9 August 1985. break

Notes
 

Preferred Citation: Rouquié, Alain. The Military and the State in Latin America. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c1987 1987. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft9b69p386/