1. T. S. Eliot, "Eyes that last I saw in tears," in Collected Poems 1909-1962 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1963), p. 55.

2. Denis Diderot, "Lettre sur les Aveugles à l'Usage de Ceux Qui Voient," in André Billy (ed.), Oeuvres , (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), p. 817; trans. by Derek Coltman, with the title "Letter on the Blind, for the Use of Those Who See," in Diderot's Selected Writings (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 15.

3. Eduardo Galeano, Memory of Fire , vol. 3: Century of the Wind (New York: Pantheon, 1988), p. 67.

1. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: New Left Books, Verso Editions, 1978), p. 247.

1. Plato, The Dialogues of Plato , trans. by Benjamin Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), vol. 2, pp. 483-84. Translation modified.

2. Ibid.

1. Plato, The Dialogues of Plato , trans. by Benjamin Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), vol. 2, pp. 483-84. Translation modified.

2. Ibid.

3. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 123.

4. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1956), p. 166. break

5. Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man," in Q. Lauer (ed.), Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 172.

6. Plato, Dialogues , Jowett trans., vol. 1, p. 351.

7. Michel Foucault, "Questions of Method," in K. Baynes, J. Bohman, and T. McCarthy (eds.), After Philosophy: End or Transformation? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), p. 112.

8. Foucault, The History of Sexuality , vol. 3: The Use of Pleasure (New York: Pantheon, 1985), p. 8.

9. Baruch Spinoza, Ethics (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1947), book 4, prop. 27, p. 249.

10. G. W. F. Hegel, "Inaugural Address," in Lectures on the Philosophy of History (New York: The Humanities Press, 1955), vol. 1, p. xiii.

11. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract , book 1, ch. 7, and book 2, ch. 6.

12. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: Verso, New Left Books, 1978), p. 151. Italics added.

13. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts , in Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1961), p. 134.

14. Ibid.

13. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts , in Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1961), p. 134.

14. Ibid.

15. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 314-15.

16. Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1974), p. 71. See Letter 13.

1. Walter Benjamin, "The Storyteller," in Illuminations (New York: Schocken, 1969), p. 84.

2. Theodor Adorno, Notes to Literature , vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 101.

3. Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience (London: New Left Books, Verso Edition, 1993), p. 13.

4. See Martin Jay, "Experience without a Subject: Walter Benjamin and the Novel," in New Formations , vol. 20 (summer 1995), pp. 28-45; "The Limits of Limit-Experience: Bataille and Foucault," in Constellations , vol. 2, no. 2 (1995), pp. 155-74; and "The Crisis of 'Experience' in a Post-Subjective Age," a workshop paper presented May 19, 1997, at the Alice Berline Kaplan Center for the Humanities, Northwestern University.

5. Adorno, "Subject and Object," in A. Arato and E. Gebhardt (eds.), The Essential Frankfurt School Reader (New York: Continuum, 1987), p. 503; "Zu Subjekt und Objekt," Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), vol. 10, part 2, p. 749.

6. Vladimir Jankélévitch, Le Je-ne-sais-quoi et le Presque-rien (Paris: Seuil, 1980), p. 12. break

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), §410, p. 221.

2. Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 301; Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), vol. 24, pp. 427-28.

3. Theodor Adorno, Sören Kierkegaard: The Construction of the Aesthetic (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 65.

4. Wallace Stevens, "Of the Surface of Things," in The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961), p. 57.

5. Franz Kafka, The Complete Stories (New York: Schocken, 1971), p. 387.

6. Ibid., p. 384.

5. Franz Kafka, The Complete Stories (New York: Schocken, 1971), p. 387.

6. Ibid., p. 384.

7. Joel Kovel, History and Spirit: An Inquiry into the Philosophy of Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), p. 42.

8. René Descartes, Méditations Métaphysiques , in Oeuvres de Descartes , vol. 1 (Paris: F. G. Levrault, 1824), p. 259.

9. See Robert Romanyshyn, Technology as Symptom and Dream (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1989).

10. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, trans. and ed. by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), p. 155.

11. Edmund Husserl, "The Crisis of European Man," in Quentin Lauer (ed.), Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 172. Also see his Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 35 and 37: the transcendental ego must establish itself as "disinterested onlooker," in a position "above the naively interested ego"; in order to think philosophically—for example, about ourselves and others—we must learn the role of "non-participant onlooker," relating in this way even towards ourselves.

12. Concerning the philosophical gaze in ancient Greece, and its historical permutations, see Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), especially pp. 143 and 163. Theoria , in Aristotle, is a "pure beholding." Heidegger explains that " theorein comes from the coalescing of two root words, thea and horao. Thea (cf. theatre) is the outward look, the aspect, in which something shows itself, the outward appearance in which it offers itself. Plato names this aspect in which what presences shows what it is, eidos . To have seen this aspect, eidenai , is to know [ wissen ]. The second root word in theorein , namely horao , means: to look at something attentively, to look it over, to view it closely. Thus it follows that theorein is . . . to look attentively on the outward appearance, wherein what presences becomes visible and, through such sight—seeing—to linger with it. "This archaeology enables us to measure just how far, and in what ways, our culture of vision has evolved. And it enables us, therefore, to reflect in a critical way, with some perspective on our cultural habits and practices, on the vision we take for granted. break

13. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , pp. 165-67.

14. Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 3.

15. Ibid., pp. 7, 9, 34, 8, and 7, respectively.

16. Ibid., p. 7.

17. Ibid., p. 9.

18. Ibid., p. 29.

19. Ibid., p. 14.

20. Ibid., p. 28.

14. Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 3.

15. Ibid., pp. 7, 9, 34, 8, and 7, respectively.

16. Ibid., p. 7.

17. Ibid., p. 9.

18. Ibid., p. 29.

19. Ibid., p. 14.

20. Ibid., p. 28.

14. Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 3.

15. Ibid., pp. 7, 9, 34, 8, and 7, respectively.

16. Ibid., p. 7.

17. Ibid., p. 9.

18. Ibid., p. 29.

19. Ibid., p. 14.

20. Ibid., p. 28.

14. Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 3.

15. Ibid., pp. 7, 9, 34, 8, and 7, respectively.

16. Ibid., p. 7.

17. Ibid., p. 9.

18. Ibid., p. 29.

19. Ibid., p. 14.

20. Ibid., p. 28.

14. Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 3.

15. Ibid., pp. 7, 9, 34, 8, and 7, respectively.

16. Ibid., p. 7.

17. Ibid., p. 9.

18. Ibid., p. 29.

19. Ibid., p. 14.

20. Ibid., p. 28.

14. Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 3.

15. Ibid., pp. 7, 9, 34, 8, and 7, respectively.

16. Ibid., p. 7.

17. Ibid., p. 9.

18. Ibid., p. 29.

19. Ibid., p. 14.

20. Ibid., p. 28.

14. Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 3.

15. Ibid., pp. 7, 9, 34, 8, and 7, respectively.

16. Ibid., p. 7.

17. Ibid., p. 9.

18. Ibid., p. 29.

19. Ibid., p. 14.

20. Ibid., p. 28.

21. See, for example, Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology , vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1931), pp. 223, 246, and 314.

22. Max Horkheimer, "The Problem of Truth," in Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. 333.

23. Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 82.

24. Ibid., p. 99.

25. Ibid., pp. 87-88. Italics added.

26. Ibid., p. 87.

27. Ibid., p. 116.

28. Ibid.

23. Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 82.

24. Ibid., p. 99.

25. Ibid., pp. 87-88. Italics added.

26. Ibid., p. 87.

27. Ibid., p. 116.

28. Ibid.

23. Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 82.

24. Ibid., p. 99.

25. Ibid., pp. 87-88. Italics added.

26. Ibid., p. 87.

27. Ibid., p. 116.

28. Ibid.

23. Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 82.

24. Ibid., p. 99.

25. Ibid., pp. 87-88. Italics added.

26. Ibid., p. 87.

27. Ibid., p. 116.

28. Ibid.

23. Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 82.

24. Ibid., p. 99.

25. Ibid., pp. 87-88. Italics added.

26. Ibid., p. 87.

27. Ibid., p. 116.

28. Ibid.

23. Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 82.

24. Ibid., p. 99.

25. Ibid., pp. 87-88. Italics added.

26. Ibid., p. 87.

27. Ibid., p. 116.

28. Ibid.

29. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 145.

30. Ibid.

29. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 145.

30. Ibid.

31. See Romanyshyn, Psychological Life: From Science to Metaphor (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), and "The Despotic Eye," in David M. Levin (ed.), Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 339-60.

32. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , p. 148.

33. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 161.

34. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , p. 149.

35. Ibid., p. 156.

34. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , p. 149.

35. Ibid., p. 156.

36. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (London: Macmillan, 1953), p. 221.

37. Ibid., p. 187.

36. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (London: Macmillan, 1953), p. 221.

37. Ibid., p. 187.

38. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 188.

39. Ibid., p. 195.

40. Ibid., p. 196.

41. Ibid., p. 187.

42. Ibid., p. 192.

38. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 188.

39. Ibid., p. 195.

40. Ibid., p. 196.

41. Ibid., p. 187.

42. Ibid., p. 192.

38. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 188.

39. Ibid., p. 195.

40. Ibid., p. 196.

41. Ibid., p. 187.

42. Ibid., p. 192.

38. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 188.

39. Ibid., p. 195.

40. Ibid., p. 196.

41. Ibid., p. 187.

42. Ibid., p. 192.

38. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , in Philosophical Works , vol. 1, p. 188.

39. Ibid., p. 195.

40. Ibid., p. 196.

41. Ibid., p. 187.

42. Ibid., p. 192.

43. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , p. 178.

44. Ibid. break

45. Ibid., §303, p. 102.

46. Ibid., p. 223.

47. Ibid., p. 203.

48. Ibid., p. 178.

49. Ibid., §420.

43. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , p. 178.

44. Ibid. break

45. Ibid., §303, p. 102.

46. Ibid., p. 223.

47. Ibid., p. 203.

48. Ibid., p. 178.

49. Ibid., §420.

43. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , p. 178.

44. Ibid. break

45. Ibid., §303, p. 102.

46. Ibid., p. 223.

47. Ibid., p. 203.

48. Ibid., p. 178.

49. Ibid., §420.

43. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , p. 178.

44. Ibid. break

45. Ibid., §303, p. 102.

46. Ibid., p. 223.

47. Ibid., p. 203.

48. Ibid., p. 178.

49. Ibid., §420.

43. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , p. 178.

44. Ibid. break

45. Ibid., §303, p. 102.

46. Ibid., p. 223.

47. Ibid., p. 203.

48. Ibid., p. 178.

49. Ibid., §420.

43. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , p. 178.

44. Ibid. break

45. Ibid., §303, p. 102.

46. Ibid., p. 223.

47. Ibid., p. 203.

48. Ibid., p. 178.

49. Ibid., §420.

43. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , p. 178.

44. Ibid. break

45. Ibid., §303, p. 102.

46. Ibid., p. 223.

47. Ibid., p. 203.

48. Ibid., p. 178.

49. Ibid., §420.

50. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from a Damaged Life (London: New Left Books, 1988), p. 105.

51. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in The Primacy of Perception (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 155.

52. Ibid.

51. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in The Primacy of Perception (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 155.

52. Ibid.

53. See in this regard Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 346-65, 375, 405.

54. Ibid., p. 374.

53. See in this regard Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 346-65, 375, 405.

54. Ibid., p. 374.

55. Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in Primacy of Perception , p. 118.

56. Ibid., p. 116.

55. Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in Primacy of Perception , p. 118.

56. Ibid., p. 116.

57. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , p. 223.

58. Ibid., p. 217.

57. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , p. 223.

58. Ibid., p. 217.

59. See Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in Primacy of Perception , p. 155, and my discussion of narcissism in vision in chapter 6.

60. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , p. 361.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 362.

63. Ibid., p. 353.

64. Ibid., p. 354. The "normal" situation is lucidly exemplified in L'Età Breve , a novel by Corrado Alvaro (Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1976, p. 86), in which the author describes the experience of a lonely young boy in boarding school who sees a young girl pass by outside his window and suddenly realizes how, by this sighting, he is connected to her, but also how this very connection means that his happiness must escape his possession: "Così egli si trovò legato a un filo invisibile, non più solo, con una felicità che possedeva e che tuttavia gli sfuggiva di continuo . . . e nello stesso tempo col senso di avere perduto qualche cosa . . . e lo ritrovava all'improvviso." What the boy thought he lost and then discovered, discovered again, is the prepersonal corporeal intentionality to which Merleau-Ponty calls our attention, an intentionality that he himself describes with words such as "threads" and "lacework."

60. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , p. 361.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 362.

63. Ibid., p. 353.

64. Ibid., p. 354. The "normal" situation is lucidly exemplified in L'Età Breve , a novel by Corrado Alvaro (Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1976, p. 86), in which the author describes the experience of a lonely young boy in boarding school who sees a young girl pass by outside his window and suddenly realizes how, by this sighting, he is connected to her, but also how this very connection means that his happiness must escape his possession: "Così egli si trovò legato a un filo invisibile, non più solo, con una felicità che possedeva e che tuttavia gli sfuggiva di continuo . . . e nello stesso tempo col senso di avere perduto qualche cosa . . . e lo ritrovava all'improvviso." What the boy thought he lost and then discovered, discovered again, is the prepersonal corporeal intentionality to which Merleau-Ponty calls our attention, an intentionality that he himself describes with words such as "threads" and "lacework."

60. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , p. 361.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 362.

63. Ibid., p. 353.

64. Ibid., p. 354. The "normal" situation is lucidly exemplified in L'Età Breve , a novel by Corrado Alvaro (Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1976, p. 86), in which the author describes the experience of a lonely young boy in boarding school who sees a young girl pass by outside his window and suddenly realizes how, by this sighting, he is connected to her, but also how this very connection means that his happiness must escape his possession: "Così egli si trovò legato a un filo invisibile, non più solo, con una felicità che possedeva e che tuttavia gli sfuggiva di continuo . . . e nello stesso tempo col senso di avere perduto qualche cosa . . . e lo ritrovava all'improvviso." What the boy thought he lost and then discovered, discovered again, is the prepersonal corporeal intentionality to which Merleau-Ponty calls our attention, an intentionality that he himself describes with words such as "threads" and "lacework."

60. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , p. 361.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 362.

63. Ibid., p. 353.

64. Ibid., p. 354. The "normal" situation is lucidly exemplified in L'Età Breve , a novel by Corrado Alvaro (Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1976, p. 86), in which the author describes the experience of a lonely young boy in boarding school who sees a young girl pass by outside his window and suddenly realizes how, by this sighting, he is connected to her, but also how this very connection means that his happiness must escape his possession: "Così egli si trovò legato a un filo invisibile, non più solo, con una felicità che possedeva e che tuttavia gli sfuggiva di continuo . . . e nello stesso tempo col senso di avere perduto qualche cosa . . . e lo ritrovava all'improvviso." What the boy thought he lost and then discovered, discovered again, is the prepersonal corporeal intentionality to which Merleau-Ponty calls our attention, an intentionality that he himself describes with words such as "threads" and "lacework."

60. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , p. 361.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 362.

63. Ibid., p. 353.

64. Ibid., p. 354. The "normal" situation is lucidly exemplified in L'Età Breve , a novel by Corrado Alvaro (Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1976, p. 86), in which the author describes the experience of a lonely young boy in boarding school who sees a young girl pass by outside his window and suddenly realizes how, by this sighting, he is connected to her, but also how this very connection means that his happiness must escape his possession: "Così egli si trovò legato a un filo invisibile, non più solo, con una felicità che possedeva e che tuttavia gli sfuggiva di continuo . . . e nello stesso tempo col senso di avere perduto qualche cosa . . . e lo ritrovava all'improvviso." What the boy thought he lost and then discovered, discovered again, is the prepersonal corporeal intentionality to which Merleau-Ponty calls our attention, an intentionality that he himself describes with words such as "threads" and "lacework."

65. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , p. 353.

66. Merleau-Ponty, "Interrogation and Dialectic," in The Visible and the Invisible , (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 78.

67. Ibid., p. 80.

66. Merleau-Ponty, "Interrogation and Dialectic," in The Visible and the Invisible , (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 78.

67. Ibid., p. 80.

68. See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , pp. 93-94, 184, 198, and 346-65, and "The Child's Relations with Others," in Primacy of Perception , pp. 114-16.

69. Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in Primacy of Perception , p. 115. break

70. Ibid., pp. 115-16. Italics added.

71. Ibid., p. 117.

72. Ibid., p. 124.

73. Ibid., p. 120.

69. Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in Primacy of Perception , p. 115. break

70. Ibid., pp. 115-16. Italics added.

71. Ibid., p. 117.

72. Ibid., p. 124.

73. Ibid., p. 120.

69. Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in Primacy of Perception , p. 115. break

70. Ibid., pp. 115-16. Italics added.

71. Ibid., p. 117.

72. Ibid., p. 124.

73. Ibid., p. 120.

69. Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in Primacy of Perception , p. 115. break

70. Ibid., pp. 115-16. Italics added.

71. Ibid., p. 117.

72. Ibid., p. 124.

73. Ibid., p. 120.

69. Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in Primacy of Perception , p. 115. break

70. Ibid., pp. 115-16. Italics added.

71. Ibid., p. 117.

72. Ibid., p. 124.

73. Ibid., p. 120.

74. Adorno, Minima Moralia , p. 105.

75. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 127. Also see Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), an excellent contribution to our understanding of these issues.

76. Ibid., p. 128.

77. Ibid., p. 130.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid., p. 117.

81. Ibid., p. 131.

82. See ibid., p. 147.

83. Ibid., p. 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

75. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 127. Also see Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), an excellent contribution to our understanding of these issues.

76. Ibid., p. 128.

77. Ibid., p. 130.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid., p. 117.

81. Ibid., p. 131.

82. See ibid., p. 147.

83. Ibid., p. 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

75. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 127. Also see Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), an excellent contribution to our understanding of these issues.

76. Ibid., p. 128.

77. Ibid., p. 130.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid., p. 117.

81. Ibid., p. 131.

82. See ibid., p. 147.

83. Ibid., p. 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

75. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 127. Also see Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), an excellent contribution to our understanding of these issues.

76. Ibid., p. 128.

77. Ibid., p. 130.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid., p. 117.

81. Ibid., p. 131.

82. See ibid., p. 147.

83. Ibid., p. 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

75. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 127. Also see Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), an excellent contribution to our understanding of these issues.

76. Ibid., p. 128.

77. Ibid., p. 130.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid., p. 117.

81. Ibid., p. 131.

82. See ibid., p. 147.

83. Ibid., p. 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

75. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 127. Also see Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), an excellent contribution to our understanding of these issues.

76. Ibid., p. 128.

77. Ibid., p. 130.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid., p. 117.

81. Ibid., p. 131.

82. See ibid., p. 147.

83. Ibid., p. 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

75. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 127. Also see Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), an excellent contribution to our understanding of these issues.

76. Ibid., p. 128.

77. Ibid., p. 130.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid., p. 117.

81. Ibid., p. 131.

82. See ibid., p. 147.

83. Ibid., p. 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

75. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 127. Also see Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), an excellent contribution to our understanding of these issues.

76. Ibid., p. 128.

77. Ibid., p. 130.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid., p. 117.

81. Ibid., p. 131.

82. See ibid., p. 147.

83. Ibid., p. 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

75. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 127. Also see Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), an excellent contribution to our understanding of these issues.

76. Ibid., p. 128.

77. Ibid., p. 130.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid., p. 117.

81. Ibid., p. 131.

82. See ibid., p. 147.

83. Ibid., p. 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

75. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 127. Also see Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), an excellent contribution to our understanding of these issues.

76. Ibid., p. 128.

77. Ibid., p. 130.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid., p. 117.

81. Ibid., p. 131.

82. See ibid., p. 147.

83. Ibid., p. 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

75. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 127. Also see Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), an excellent contribution to our understanding of these issues.

76. Ibid., p. 128.

77. Ibid., p. 130.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid., p. 117.

81. Ibid., p. 131.

82. See ibid., p. 147.

83. Ibid., p. 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

75. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 127. Also see Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), an excellent contribution to our understanding of these issues.

76. Ibid., p. 128.

77. Ibid., p. 130.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid., p. 117.

81. Ibid., p. 131.

82. See ibid., p. 147.

83. Ibid., p. 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 88. Also see ibid., pp. 68-69; the appendix to "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , pp. 165-67; and my large work on vision, The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 51-340, and 438-40.

88. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 133.

89. Ibid., p. 139.

90. Ibid., p. 140.

88. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 133.

89. Ibid., p. 139.

90. Ibid., p. 140.

88. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 133.

89. Ibid., p. 139.

90. Ibid., p. 140.

91. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 33.

92. I am pleased to find this point argued by Taylor in Sources of the Self , pp. 163-64.

93. Merleau-Ponty, "Interrogation and Dialectic," in The Visible and the Invisible , (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 77.

94. Vision and crying were discussed by Hegel in the Zusatz to §401, part 3, of his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences . See J. N. Findlay (ed.), Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 75-88.

95. This is the principal thesis of my 1988 book, The Opening of Vision —and also its source, its origin. As a scholar, I cannot refrain from pointing out that this book, the first draft of which was completed in the summer of 1980, preceded by some ten years Jacques Derrida's Mémoires d'Aveugle: L'Autoportrait et Autres Ruines (Paris: Éditions de la Réunion des Musées Nationaux, 1990), in which he touches on the fact that the eyes are the site for both seeing and weeping, and concludes quoting Andrew Marvell's poem "Eyes and Tears," continue

in which the poet observes "How wisely Nature did decree, / With the same eyes to weep and see!" But Derrida does little more than call attention to a connection. He does not attempt to explore its significance—a fact which perhaps suggests that, for him, the significance is merely metaphorical, merely rhetorical. A preliminary sketch of the account eventually elaborated in my book first appeared under the title, "The Opening of Vision: Seeing through the Veil of Tears," in Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry , vol. 16, nos. 1-3 (1978-79), pp. 113-46. In this sketch, I began my reflections on the significance of the connection.

96. See Romanyshyn, "The Despotic Eye," in D. M. Levin (ed.), Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision , pp. 339-60.

97. T. S. Eliot, "Eyes that I last saw in tears," in Collected Poems 1909-1962 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1964), p. 55.

98. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , p. 171n.

99. Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 21.

100. See J. Brown (ed.), The Sacred Pipe: Black Elk's Account of the Seven Rites of the Oglala Sioux (New York: Penguin, 1971).

101. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Journals , ed. by Joel Porte (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 160.

1. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Experience," in Essays and Lectures (New York: New American Library, 1983), p. 476.

2. Emmanuel Levinas, "No Identity," in Robert Bernasconi (ed.), Collected Philosophical Papers (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 148; "Sans Identité," L'Humanisme de l'Autre Homme (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1972), p. 95. Also see his book Autrement Qu'Être ou au delà de l'Essence (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 10, where he spells out a similar indictment: "A la réduction transcendentale de Husserl une mise entre parenthèses suffit-elle? Une façon d'écrire, de se commettre avec le monde qui colle comme l'encre aux mains qui l'écartent?"

3. Wallace Stevens, "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction," in The Collected Poems (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), I, ll. 5-6.

4. René Char, "Feuillets d'Hypnos," Oeuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), p. 216.

5. Char, "Aversions," La Nu Perdu, Oeuvres Complètes , p. 473.

6. Walter Benjamin, Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels , in Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (eds.), Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972), vol. 1, p. 330.

7. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 265. Hereafter this text will be designated by the abbreviation Crisis . For the original German, see Die continue

Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie, Gesammelte Werke , vol. 6, ed. by Walter Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 269. Hereafter, this text will be designated by the word Krisis .

8. Ibid., p. 290 in the English, p. 337 in the original German.

7. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 265. Hereafter this text will be designated by the abbreviation Crisis . For the original German, see Die continue

Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie, Gesammelte Werke , vol. 6, ed. by Walter Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 269. Hereafter, this text will be designated by the word Krisis .

8. Ibid., p. 290 in the English, p. 337 in the original German.

9. Husserl, "The Vienna Lecture," in Crisis , p. 277. For the German, see "Krisis," Gesammelte Werke , vol. 6, p. 322.

10. Husserl, "The Vienna Lecture," Crisis , p. 297. For the German, see Krisis , pp. 345-46.

11. Husserl, Crisis , p. 341; Krisis , p. 275.

12. Husserl, Crisis , p. 338; Krisis , p. 272.

13. Husserl, "The Vienna Lecture," in Crisis , p. 298; pp. 346 in the German.

14. Husserl, Crisis , p. 151; Krisis , p. 154.

15. Husserl, "The Vienna Lecture," in Crisis , p. 285; pp. 331-32 in the German.

16. Husserl, Crisis , p. 56; Krisis , p. 57.

17. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), §15, p. 35. Also see §15, p. 37, where Husserl speaks of a "non-participant on-looker." This text will hereafter be designated by the abbreviation "CM."

18. Ibid., §2, p. 6, and §1, p. 2.

17. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), §15, p. 35. Also see §15, p. 37, where Husserl speaks of a "non-participant on-looker." This text will hereafter be designated by the abbreviation "CM."

18. Ibid., §2, p. 6, and §1, p. 2.

19. Theodor Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982). For the German, see Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie: Studien über Husserl und die Phänomenologischen Antinomien (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972). See also his dialectically intricate analysis in "Subject and Object," in A. Arato and E. Gebhardt(eds.), The Frankfurt School Reader (New York: Continuum, 1987), pp. 497-511.

20. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 133.

21. Ibid., p. 134.

20. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 133.

21. Ibid., p. 134.

22. Adorno, "Husserl and the Problem of Idealism," in Vermischte Scriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), vol. 20, part 1, p. 124.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 121. In Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence , (Boston: Kluwer, 1991), Levinas also challenges Husserl along these same lines, referring (p. 29) to Husserl's assumption of an "immobile eternity."

22. Adorno, "Husserl and the Problem of Idealism," in Vermischte Scriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), vol. 20, part 1, p. 124.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 121. In Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence , (Boston: Kluwer, 1991), Levinas also challenges Husserl along these same lines, referring (p. 29) to Husserl's assumption of an "immobile eternity."

22. Adorno, "Husserl and the Problem of Idealism," in Vermischte Scriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), vol. 20, part 1, p. 124.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 121. In Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence , (Boston: Kluwer, 1991), Levinas also challenges Husserl along these same lines, referring (p. 29) to Husserl's assumption of an "immobile eternity."

25. Husserl, "Prolegomena zur reinen Logik," Logische Untersuchungen , vol. 1 (Halle: Niemeyer, 1922, 1928), p. 64.

26. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 197; Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie , p. 200.

27. Adorno, Against Epistemology , pp. 144-45; Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie , pp. 149-50.

28. Ibid.

27. Adorno, Against Epistemology , pp. 144-45; Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie , pp. 149-50.

28. Ibid.

29. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from a Damaged Life (London: New Left Books, Verso Editions, 1978), p. 247; Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem Beschädigten Leben, Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1951), vol. 4, p. 281.

30. Husserl, Ideas I: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology , trans. by W. R. Boyce-Gibson (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969), p. 39. break

31. Husserl, CM, p. 68.

32. Husserl, Ideas , §19, pp. 75-76.

33. Ibid., §33, p. 102.

32. Husserl, Ideas , §19, pp. 75-76.

33. Ibid., §33, p. 102.

34. Jacques Derrida, "Force and Signification," in Writing and Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 28.

35. Stephane Mallarmé, "Quant au Livre," Oeuvres Complètes (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1945), p. 386: "Les mots, d'eux-mêmes, s'exaltent à mainte facette reconnue la plus rare ou valant pour l'esprit, centre de suspens vibratoire; qui les perçoit indépendamment de la suite ordinaire, projetés, en parois de grotte, tant que dure leur mobilité ou principe, étant ce qui ne se dit pas du discours: prompts tous, avant extinction, à une réciprocité de feux distante ou présentée de biais comme contingence."

36. Levinas, Time and the Other (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), p. 64; Le Temps et l'Autre (Paris: Fata Morgana, Presses Universitaires de France, 1979), p. 92.

37. Ibid.

36. Levinas, Time and the Other (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), p. 64; Le Temps et l'Autre (Paris: Fata Morgana, Presses Universitaires de France, 1979), p. 92.

37. Ibid.

38. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 45; Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheories , p. 52.

39. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being , p. 20; Autrement Qu'être , pp. 24-25.

40. See Husserl, CM, §44, p. 96; Ideas , §33, p. 102, and §124, p. 320.

41. Husserl, Ideas , §92, p. 246.

42. Ibid., §124, p. 320.

43. Ibid. Also see Husserl, Ideas §66, pp. 175-76 (on "Faithful Expression of the Clearly Given: Unambiguous Terms"), and §84, pp. 224-26 ("Note on Terminology").

41. Husserl, Ideas , §92, p. 246.

42. Ibid., §124, p. 320.

43. Ibid. Also see Husserl, Ideas §66, pp. 175-76 (on "Faithful Expression of the Clearly Given: Unambiguous Terms"), and §84, pp. 224-26 ("Note on Terminology").

41. Husserl, Ideas , §92, p. 246.

42. Ibid., §124, p. 320.

43. Ibid. Also see Husserl, Ideas §66, pp. 175-76 (on "Faithful Expression of the Clearly Given: Unambiguous Terms"), and §84, pp. 224-26 ("Note on Terminology").

44. Derrida, "Force and Signification," in Writing and Difference , p. 27.

45. Ibid.

44. Derrida, "Force and Signification," in Writing and Difference , p. 27.

45. Ibid.

46. Derrida, " 'Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology," in Writing and Difference , pp. 154-68.

47. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 152; Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheories , p. 157.

48. Levinas, En Découvrant l'Existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: Vrin, 1949).

49. Husserl, Ideas , §92, p. 248.

50. Husserl, "Second Investigation," in Logical Investigations (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), vol. 1, §15, p. 368. Also see his Ideas , §43, pp. 122-24.

51. Husserl, "First Investigation," in Logical Investigations , vol. 1, §17, p. 300. Husserl's attack on the picture theory of meaning is mainly located in §17-§23, pp. 299-311.

52. Husserl, "First Investigation," in Logical Investigations , vol. 1, §19, p. 304.

53. Husserl, "Sixth Investigation," in Logical Investigations , vol. 2, §4, p. 680.

54. Husserl, "Fifth Investigation," in Logical Investigations , vol. 2, §11, p. 559. Also see §12-§14 and other parts of §11, pp. 557-69.

55. Husserl, CM, §38, p. 79. break

56. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 136; Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnisstheorie , p. 141. Also see p. 143 in the English translation and p. 148 in the original German text.

57. Stevens, "Tatoo," The Collected Poems , p. 81.

58. Levinas, "Diachrony and Representation," in Time and the Other , p. 99; Le Temps et l'Autre , p. 92.

59. Ibid.

58. Levinas, "Diachrony and Representation," in Time and the Other , p. 99; Le Temps et l'Autre , p. 92.

59. Ibid.

60. Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Double-day, 1961), p. 99. Italics added.

61. Husserl, "Fifth Investigation," in Logical Investigations , vol. 2, §38, p. 640.

62. Levinas, Le Temps et l'Autre , p. 11; Time and the Other , p. 33.

63. For a more elaborate discussion of this matter, see my The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation (New York: Routledge, 1988).

64. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 196; Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnisstheorie , p. 199. The phrase also appears on p. 216 in the English edition and on p. 219 in the German.

65. Emerson, "Circles," in Essays and Lectures , p. 403.

66. Emerson, "Nature," in Essays and Lectures , p. 9.

67. Husserl, "Second Investigation," in Logical Investigations , §21, p. 380.

68. Adorno, Minima Moralia , §98, p. 151.

69. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 151; Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie , p. 156.

70. Levinas broaches a similar criticism, puzzling over the "shining forth" of signification. See Levinas, Otherwise Than Being , p. 66; Autrement Qu'être , p. 83.

71. Husserl, "Third Investigation," in Logical Investigations , vol. 2, §6, p. 445.

72. Husserl, Ideas , §31, p. 97.

73. Husserl, "Prolegomenon," in Logical Investigations , vol. 1, §50, p. 191.

74. Husserl, Ideas , §46, p. 132.

75. Ibid.

74. Husserl, Ideas , §46, p. 132.

75. Ibid.

76. Husserl, Ideas , §78, p. 204. For Adorno's discussion of Husserlian "evidence," see Against Epistemology , pp. 56-57; Zur Metakritik , pp. 62-64.

77. Husserl, Logical Investigations , vol. 1, §6, p. 61.

78. Ibid., §51, p. 195.

79. Ibid., §62, p. 226. Also see his CM, §4, p. 10, and §5, pp. 12 and 14.

77. Husserl, Logical Investigations , vol. 1, §6, p. 61.

78. Ibid., §51, p. 195.

79. Ibid., §62, p. 226. Also see his CM, §4, p. 10, and §5, pp. 12 and 14.

77. Husserl, Logical Investigations , vol. 1, §6, p. 61.

78. Ibid., §51, p. 195.

79. Ibid., §62, p. 226. Also see his CM, §4, p. 10, and §5, pp. 12 and 14.

80. Husserl, Ideas , §88, p. 240.

81. Husserl, CM, §27, p. 60.

82. Ibid., §5, p. 12.

81. Husserl, CM, §27, p. 60.

82. Ibid., §5, p. 12.

83. Husserl, Ideas , §24, p. 83; Ideen , p. 43. For Adorno's discussion of this principle, see Against Epistemology , pp. 136-37; Zur Metakritik , pp. 141-42.

84. Husserl, CM, §15, p. 36.

85. Ibid., §15, p. 35.

84. Husserl, CM, §15, p. 36.

85. Ibid., §15, p. 35.

86. See Husserl, Ideas , §42, p. 121: "Ein Erlebnis schattet sich nicht ab." ("Lived experience is without any shadows.")

87. Ibid., §6, pp. 15-16. On apodeictic evidence, see also "Third Investigation," in Logical Investigations , vol. 2, §6, pp. 444-46. break

86. See Husserl, Ideas , §42, p. 121: "Ein Erlebnis schattet sich nicht ab." ("Lived experience is without any shadows.")

87. Ibid., §6, pp. 15-16. On apodeictic evidence, see also "Third Investigation," in Logical Investigations , vol. 2, §6, pp. 444-46. break

88. Husserl, "Prolegomenon to Pure Logic," in Logical Investigations , vol. 1, §63, p. 227.

89. On conflicts in what is seen, see Husserl, "Sixth Investigation," in Logical Investigations , vol. 2, §38-§39, pp. 764-70, and the appendix to this investigation, pp. 864-67. Also see Ideas , §19, p. 76.

90. Husserl, "Prolegomenon to Pure Logic," in Logical Investigations , vol. 1, §51, p. 196.

91. Ibid., §40, p. 159. Also see §49, pp. 187-88; §50, pp. 189-93; and §51, pp. 193-96.

90. Husserl, "Prolegomenon to Pure Logic," in Logical Investigations , vol. 1, §51, p. 196.

91. Ibid., §40, p. 159. Also see §49, pp. 187-88; §50, pp. 189-93; and §51, pp. 193-96.

92. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 100; Zur Metakritik , pp. 106-7.

93. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being , p. 38; Autrement Qu'être , p. 49. Also see, on the logic of the intricate interconnections among intentionality, truth, time, memory, and representation, p. 29 in the English translation and p. 36 in the original French.

94. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being , pp. 132-33; Autrement Qu'être , pp. 169-70.

95. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being , p. 133; Autrement Qu'être , pp. 169-70.

96. Husserl, "Preface," in Logical Investigations , vol. 1, p. xv. Also see p. 49.

97. Husserl, Ideas , §3, p. 50.

98. Husserl, CM, §34, pp. 70-71. Also see p. 72. Also see Ideas , §4, pp. 50-51. Adorno discusses eidetic variation in Against Epistemology , pp. 49, 117-23; Zur Metakritik , pp. 56, 123-29.

99. Husserl, Ideas , §70, p. 184; Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologische Philosophie , erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Gesammelte Werke , vol. 3 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p. 132.

100. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 207; Zur Metakritik , p. 210.

101. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 150; Zur Metakritik , p. 155.

102. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 190; Zur Metakritik , p. 193.

103. Ibid.

102. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 190; Zur Metakritik , p. 193.

103. Ibid.

104. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 189; Zur Metakritik , p. 193.

105. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being , p. 37; Autrement Qu'être , pp. 47-48.

106. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being , p. 30; Autrement Qu'être , p. 38.

107. Husserl, Ideas , §121, p. 314.

108. Husserl, CM, §8, pp. 18-19.

109. Ibid., §11, p. 25. Italics added.

110. Ibid., §44, p. 98. Italics added.

108. Husserl, CM, §8, pp. 18-19.

109. Ibid., §11, p. 25. Italics added.

110. Ibid., §44, p. 98. Italics added.

108. Husserl, CM, §8, pp. 18-19.

109. Ibid., §11, p. 25. Italics added.

110. Ibid., §44, p. 98. Italics added.

111. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being , p. 63; Autrement Qu'être , p. 86.

112. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being , p. 101; Autrement Qu'être , pp. 128-29.

113. Husserl, Ideas , §37, p. 111.

114. Ibid., §27, p. 93.

115. Ibid., §121, p. 314.

113. Husserl, Ideas , §37, p. 111.

114. Ibid., §27, p. 93.

115. Ibid., §121, p. 314.

113. Husserl, Ideas , §37, p. 111.

114. Ibid., §27, p. 93.

115. Ibid., §121, p. 314.

116. Husserl, "Fifth Investigation," Logical Investigations , vol. 2, §27, pp. 609-10.

117. See my chapter, in this book, on "Gestalt, Gestell, Geviert" (chapter 4). break

118. Salvatore S. Nigro, "The Secretary," in Rosario Villari (ed.), Baroque Personae (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 12995), p. 94.

119. Husserl, CM, §44, p. 94.

120. Husserl, Ideas , §137, p. 353.

121. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 61; Zur Metakritik , p. 68.

122. Adorno, Against Epistemology , p. 83; Zur Metakritik , p. 90.

123. Husserl, CM, §54, p. 118. Also see §50, pp. 108 and 111, and §55, p. 124

124. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 248; Le visible et L'invisible (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 301.

125. Novalis, Fragment 285, in Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 58.

126. T. S. Eliot, "The Hollow Men," in Collected Poems 1909-1962 (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, Inc., 1963), p. 81.

1. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Sämtliche Werke , bd. 17: Maximen und Reflexionen , ed. by von Gonthier-Louis Fink, Gerhardt Baumann, and Johannes John (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1991), note 575, p. 824.

2. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. xx; Phénoménologie de la Perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), p. xvi.

3. Henry James, letter to Robert Louis Stevenson (January 12, 1891), in Leon Edel (ed.), Henry James: Selected Letters (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 242.

4. Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 5: Das Passagenwerk (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982), p. 574 (N1a, 8). See also Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989).

5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), §66. References to this text will hereafter be designated by the initials "PI."

6. PI, p. 212e.

7. Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), §125.

8. See William J. Earle, "Ducks and Rabbits: Visuality in Wittgenstein," in David M. Levin (ed.), Sites of Vision: The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 293-314.

9. See P. M. S. Hacker, "The Rise and Fall of the Picture Theory," in Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), p. 195.

10. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , trans. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961).

11. Wittgenstein, Zettel (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), §265, p. 49e. break

12. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 79e.

13. On showing and exhibiting sensations and feelings, e.g., pain; on making one's sensations and feelings, e.g., pain, visible to others; on how to tell whether someone is in pain, and what it is to see another's pain, consult PI, §§283-317.

14. See Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1931), ch. 3, esp. §46.

15. Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), §323, p. 60.

16. Theodor Adorno, "The Actuality of Philosophy," Telos , vol. 31 (spring 1974), pp. 120, 126. Also see his Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 1: Philosophische Frühschriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973).

17. Ibid., p. 128.

16. Theodor Adorno, "The Actuality of Philosophy," Telos , vol. 31 (spring 1974), pp. 120, 126. Also see his Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 1: Philosophische Frühschriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973).

17. Ibid., p. 128.

18. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations (New York: Schocken, 1969), p. 257. I am referring, here, to Benjamin's interpretation of Paul Klee's Angelus Novus as the "angel of history."

19. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value , p. 3e.

20. Yehuda Amichai, Poems of Jerusalem (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), p. 32.

21. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value , p. 65e.

22. Ibid., p. 63e.

21. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value , p. 65e.

22. Ibid., p. 63e.

1. Samuel Beckett, The Unnameable (New York: Grove Press, 1970), p. 22.

2. F. W. J. Schelling, Schriften von 1794-1798 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980), p. 217. In the original, the last five words were not italicized. Translation: "As long as the human being remains within the domain of nature, he is in the true sense of the word master over nature as he is master over himself. He puts the objective world within its defined boundaries, over which it may not step. By representing the object, by giving it form and consistency, he masters it. . . . But as soon as he oversteps these boundaries, as soon as the object is no longer representable , that is, as soon as he himself has transgressed the limits of representation, he sees himself lost ."

3. Martin Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," in Henry Aiken and William Barrett (eds.), Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (New York: Random House, 1962), vol. 3, p. 265. Also see pp. 261 and 267. For the German, see Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit (Bern: Verlag A. Francke, 1947), p. 41. Heidegger's phrase is "Richtigkeit des Blickens."

4. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), vol. 65, p. 251.

5. Ibid., p. 251. Also see p. 260: Making an ontologically decisive distinction, Heidegger writes: "Das Seyn west; das Seiende ist. Seyn west als Ereignis." break

4. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), vol. 65, p. 251.

5. Ibid., p. 251. Also see p. 260: Making an ontologically decisive distinction, Heidegger writes: "Das Seyn west; das Seiende ist. Seyn west als Ereignis." break

6. I draw this word from Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949), p. 20. English translation: "On the Essence of Truth," in David F. Krell (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings (New York: Harper & Row, revised edition, 1993), p. 132.

7. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 306. I translate: a "recuperative return to the opening ground."

8. In "Le Prix du Progrès," one of the notes included in Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Continuum, 1986), Theodor Adorno laments "the loss of memory" in our modern culture. And he ends this note with the assertion that "all reification is a forgetting" (ibid., p. 230). Although there are major irreconcilable differences between Adorno and Heidegger with regard to how they think from this point of convergence, they at least agree, albeit abstractly, that remembrance, or recollection, is crucial to the overcoming of a reifying metaphysics and culture. They also agree that this recollection is the telling of the history of our suffering, a Leidensgeschichte , rescuing, if not redeeming, the victims of evil. But, beyond this, what is it that needs to be remembered, if reification is to be subverted? Here, of course, their differences begin. First and foremost, the difference is this: for Adorno, the object of remembrance is the suffering of the victims of oppression and violence, whereas for Heidegger, the object of recollection as a history of suffering is our "ontological need" in the conditions imposed through the abandonment of being. In Negative Dialectics , Adorno articulated a very sharp criticism of this concern for our "ontological need," reading it as a heartless abstraction which conceals the plight of the poor, the oppressed, the needy. This criticism, alas, carries the sting of truth. I broach this matter, however, as a way of setting in motion a useful dialogue on the role of recollection in transforming the conditions of a deeply suffering, deeply needful society.

9. Beckett, The Unnameable , pp. 11-12.

10. Heidegger, Being and Time , (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 190. This is one of several passages in which he refers to staring (in German, das schlichte Sehen ). The others are on pp. 88, 98, and 104. For the German, see Sein und Zeit (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1941), p. 149. Heidegger uses other words to make the same point. See note 28 below.

11. Heidegger, "Das Ge-stell," Gesamtausgabe , bd. 79 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), p. 36.

12. Ibid., p. 44.

13. Ibid., p. 32.

11. Heidegger, "Das Ge-stell," Gesamtausgabe , bd. 79 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), p. 36.

12. Ibid., p. 44.

13. Ibid., p. 32.

11. Heidegger, "Das Ge-stell," Gesamtausgabe , bd. 79 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), p. 36.

12. Ibid., p. 44.

13. Ibid., p. 32.

14. Heidegger, "Die Gefahr," Gesamtausgabe , bd. 79, pp. 46-47.

15. Ibid., p. 63.

14. Heidegger, "Die Gefahr," Gesamtausgabe , bd. 79, pp. 46-47.

15. Ibid., p. 63.

16. Heidegger, "The Turning," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 47. For the German, see "Die Kehre," in Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1962), p. 45: "Das Gestell ist, obzwar verschleiert, noch Blick, kein blindes Geschick im Sinne eines völlig verhangenen Verhängnisses." break

17. Heidegger, "The Turning," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 37; "Die Kehre," op. cit., p. 37.

18. Ibid.

17. Heidegger, "The Turning," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 37; "Die Kehre," op. cit., p. 37.

18. Ibid.

19. Heidegger, "The Turning," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 39; "Die Kehre," op. cit., p. 39: " . . . muß der neuzeitliche Mensch zuvor allererst in die Weite seines Wesensraumes zurückfinden."

20. Heidegger, "The Turning," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 45; "Die Kehre," op. cit., p. 44.

21. Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: God Is Dead," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays , pp. 83-84. For the German, see "Nietzsches Wort: 'Gott ist tot,' " Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), p. 221.

22. See Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 128. For the German, see "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," Holzwege , p. 81.

23. Heidegger, "Der Spruch des Anaximander," Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), p. 323. In English, see "The Anaximander Fragment," Early Greek Thinking (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 4. Hereafter, "EGT" will be substituted for the English title.

24. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 33. For the original German, see "Die Frage nach der Technik," Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1962), p. 33: "Einmal fordert das Ge-stell in das Rasende des Bestellens heraus, das jedem Blick in das Ereignis der Entbergung verstellt und so den Bezug zum Wesen der Wahrheit von Grund auf gefährdet."

25. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 31. For the German, see "Die Frage nach der Technik," op. cit., p. 31: "Denn das Ge-stell ist doch nach allem Gesagten ein Geschick, das in die herausfordende Entbergung versammelt."

26. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Question Concerning Technology , pp. 24, 31. For the German, see "Die Frage nach der Technik," op. cit., p. 31: Heidegger speaks there of "das Herausfordern in das Bestellen des Wirklichen als Bestand."

27. Heidegger, "What Are Poets For?," in A. Hofstadter (ed.), Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 110. For the German, see "Wozu Dichter?," Holzwege , p. 266: "Das Offene wird zum Gegenstand und so auf das Menschenwesen zu-gedreht."

28. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 52. For the German, see Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), p. 48: "Das ursprünglich aufgehende Sichaufrichten der Gewalten des Waltenden, das phainesthai , als Erscheinen im großen Sinne der Epiphanie einer Welt, wird jetzt zur herzeigbaren Sichtbarkeit vorhandener Dinge. Das Auge, das Sehen, das ursprünglich Schauend einstmals in das Walten erst den Entwurf hineinschaute, hineinsehend das Werk her-stellte, wird jetzt zum bloßen Ansehen und Besehen und Begaffen." break

29. Heidegger, Being and Time , p. 88. In Sein und Zeit , p. 61, Heidegger writes of "ein starres Begaffen eines puren Vorhandenen." Also see note 10 above.

30. Heidegger, Basic Concepts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 98; Grundbegriffe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981), §23, pp. 112-15. Also see Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics , pp. 159-61; Einführung der Metaphysik , pp. 145-47. Heidegger speaks here of "Vorhandenheit" and a certain "ständige Anwesenheit."

31. Heidegger, Being and Time , pp. 196-97. For the German, see Sein und Zeit , p. 155: "die 'Subjektsetzung' blendet das Seiende ab." One might say that it is a question of the grammar of our perceptual experience—that when our experience is structured by the subject-object polarization, our looking and seeing do not let things come into the clearing and lighting in a way that would grant them space for shimmering and radiant shining.

32. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 28. For the German, see "Die Frage nach der Technik," p. 27: "Das Ge-stell verstellt das Scheinen und Walten der Wahrheit."

33. Heidegger, Basic Concepts , §23, p. 97. For the German, see Grundbegriffe , §23, p. 113.

34. Ibid., §23, p. 98. Also see §24, p. 102. For the German, see Grundbegriffe , §23, pp. 113-14.

33. Heidegger, Basic Concepts , §23, p. 97. For the German, see Grundbegriffe , §23, p. 113.

34. Ibid., §23, p. 98. Also see §24, p. 102. For the German, see Grundbegriffe , §23, pp. 113-14.

35. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in Basic Writings , p. 125; Vom Wesen der Wahrheit , p. 14. Also see Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics , pp. 52-53, 57-61, 79; Einführung der Metaphysik , pp. 48-56, 71.

36. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in Basic Writings , p. 125. Italics added. For the German, see Vom Wesen der Wahrheit , p. 15: "Das Sicheinlassen auf die Entborgenheit des Seienden verliert sich nicht in dieser, sondern entfaltet sich zu einem Zurücktreten vor dem Seienden, damit dieses in dem, was es ist und wie es ist, sich offenbare und die vorstellende Angleichung aus ihm das Richtmaaß nehme."

37. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in Basic Writings , p. 130; Vom Wesen der Wahrheit , p. 19.

38. Wolfgang Köhler, Dynamics in Psychology (New York: Washington Square Press, 1965), p. 61.

39. Ibid., p. 102.

40. Ibid., p. 101n.

38. Wolfgang Köhler, Dynamics in Psychology (New York: Washington Square Press, 1965), p. 61.

39. Ibid., p. 102.

40. Ibid., p. 101n.

38. Wolfgang Köhler, Dynamics in Psychology (New York: Washington Square Press, 1965), p. 61.

39. Ibid., p. 102.

40. Ibid., p. 101n.

41. Herbert V. Guenther, The Dawn of Tantra (Berkeley: Shambhala Publishing Co., 1975), p. 27.

42. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in Basic Writings , p. 125; Vom Wesen der Wahrheit , p. 14. As already indicated, it is a question of a "Zurücktreten vor dem Seiende, damit dieses in dem, was es ist und wie es ist, sich offenbare."

43. There are many fascinating parallels between Heidegger's critique of the subject-object structure and the critique formulated by Adorno in his "Subject and Object," in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (eds.), The Essential Frankfurt School Reader (New York: Continuum, 1987), pp. 497-511. Of course, there are also enormous differences as well, for Adorno connects this critique continue

with an analysis of the bourgeoisie and brings out the intricate dialectic that turns the discourses of metaphysics into a concealed reflection of bourgeois ideology.

44. Heidegger, Basic Concepts , §24, p. 102; Grundbegriffe , §24, p. 119.

45. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics , p. 99; Einführung in die Metaphysik , p. 89.

46. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics , p. 52; Einführung in die Metaphysik , p. 48: "Das Auge, das Sehen, . . . wird zum bloßen Ansehen und Besehen und Begaffen."

47. Jacques Derrida, "Sending: On Representation," in Social Research , vol. 49 (1982), p. 309.

48. Ibid., p. 312.

47. Jacques Derrida, "Sending: On Representation," in Social Research , vol. 49 (1982), p. 309.

48. Ibid., p. 312.

49. Heidegger, Seminar in Zähringen 1973, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1986), bd. 15, p. 399.

50. Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Poetry, Language, Thought , p. 64. For the original German text, see "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," Holzwege , p. 52.

51. René Char, "Suzerain," Le Poème Pulvérisé, Oeuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), p. 261. This line is quoted by Michel Foucault in Folie et Déraison. Histoire de la Folie à l' Âge Classique (Paris: Plon, 1961), p.x. For Foucault, this articulates "the most urgent and restrained definition of truth." Foucault's use of the word "restrained" suggests that he does not read Char's sentence to be describing an assault on things, an attack such as is characteristic, and indeed—according to Heidegger—definitive of our modern age. For a quick first reading, Char seems to be describing a very aggressive relation to things: the poet would take away from things the illusion that protects them from us, thereby exposing them, leaving them defenseless and vulnerable to our will to power; and he would give them, or let them keep, what they have granted us to behold. In short, he would refuse the appearance as which things give themselves to us. This would thus place perception and the love of truth within the Gestell of the most extreme will to power: the poet would have them completely determined by the violence inherent in re-presentation. But the poet's sentence is much more complex, much more subtle. In his perception, which in German is said to be a Wahr-nehmung , literally, a "taking-of-truth," a "taking-to-be-true," the poet, recognizing appearance (the Schein of the Erscheinung ) as appearance, is attempting to break out of the spell of ordinary perceptual habits and wrest from things the deeper truth of their appearance— the truth, namely, of unconcealment. Foucault is right to speak, here, of "restraint," because the violent struggle is for the sake of the phenomenological epokhé , the restraint that lets the thing maintain its grounding in the interplay of concealment and unconcealment. There are other passages in Char's oeuvre which bear on these matters: "Faire un poème, c'est prendre possession d'un audelà; nuptial qui se trouve bien dans cette vie, très rattaché à elle, et cependant à proximité des urnes de la mort" ("Nous Avons," p. 409, Oeuvres Complètes ). "Le poète ne retient pas ce qu'il découvre; I'ayant transcrit, le perd bientôt." continue

("La bibliothèque en feu," ibid., p. 409). "La moindre clarté naît d'un acte violent, même une allumette que vous craquez, un phare d'auto que vous allumez. La Poèsie aime cette violence écumante et sa double saveur qui écoute aux portes du langage." ("Sous ma casquette amarante," ibid., p. 858). "L'imagination jouit surtout de ce qui ne lui est pas accordé, car elle seule possède l'éphémère en totalité" ("Moulin premier," Le Marteau sans Maître , ibid., p. 70). "Ces notes marquent la résistance d'un humanisme conscient de ses devoirs, discret sur ses vertus, désirant réserver l'inaccessible champ libre à la fantasie de ses soleils, et décidé à payer le prix pour cela." ( Feuillets d'Hypnos , ibid., p. 173).

52. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , pp. 296-97, 301-2.

53. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics , p. 105. For the German, see Einführung in der Metaphysik (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), p. 113.

54. Heidegger, Being and Time , p. 265. In German, see Sein und Zeit , p. 222: "Daher muß das Dasein wesenhaft das auch schon Entdeckte gegen den Schein und die Verstellung ausdrücklich zueignen und sich der Entedecktheit immer wieder versichern . . . Seiendes sieht so aus wie . . . , d.h. es ist in gewisser Weise schon entdeckt und doch nicht verstellt. Die Wahrheit (Entdecktheit) muß dem Seienden immer erst abgerungen werden. Das Seiende wird der Verborgenheit entrissen. Die jeweilige faktische Entdecktheit ist gleichsam immer ein Raub. Ist es Zufall, daß die Griechen sich über das Wesen der Wahrheit in einem privativen Ausdruck ( a-letheia ) aussprechen?"

55. Heidegger, "What are Poets For?," in Poetry, Language, Thought , p. 120. For the German, see "Wozu Dichter?," Holzwege , p. 275: Production ( Herstellen ) "ist nur in der Vergegenständlichung möglich. Sie sperrt uns jedoch gegen das Offene ab. Das wagende Wagen stellt keinen Schutz her."

56. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 237. For the original German, see Was Heisst Denken ? (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954), p. 144: "Solches Weilen erfahren die Griechen als Scheinen im Sinne des gelichteten leuchtenden Sichzeigens."

57. Heidegger, "A Dialogue on Language," in On the Way to Language (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 38. For the German, see "Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache," Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1959), p. 132.

58. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 28, cited earlier. For the German original, see "Die Frage nach der Technik," op. cit., p. 27.

59. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 34. For the German, see "Die Frage nach der Technik," op. cit., p. 34. Heidegger's phrase, here, is "Glanz des Scheinenden."

60. Heidegger, Being and Time , p. 177. Italics added. In Sein und Zeit , p. 138.

61. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics , pp. 153, 159. In Einführung in die Metaphysik , p. 145: "ein letzter Schein und Schimmer."

62. Heidegger, Being and Time , p. 197; Sein und Zeit , p. 155.

63. Heidegger, "The Turning," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 45. Also see p. 49. For the German, see "Die Kehre," Die Technik und die Kehre , continue

p. 43: "Im Blick und als Blick tritt das Wesen in sein eigenes Leuchten. Durch das Element seines Leuchtens hindurch birgt der Blick sein Erblicktes in das Blicken zurück. Das Blicken aber wahrt im Leuchten zugleich das verborgene Dunkel seiner Herkunft als das Ungelichtete." See also op. cit., pp. 46-47.

64. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 11.

65. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 13. This is an English translation of Nietzsche's 1873 translation from the Greek, a translation he proposed in his Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks . For the original German, see "Der Spruch des Anaximander," Holzwege , 4th edition (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1963), p. 296.

66. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 26. Here and throughout the chapter, I have reduced to a small "b" the capital "B" in the English translation of "Sein." For the German, see "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., p. 310: "Das Seiende selbst tritt nicht in dieses Licht des Seins. Die Unverborgenheit des Seienden, die ihm gewährte Helle, verdunkelt das Licht des Seins." "Das Sein entzieht sich, indem es sich in das Seiende entbirgt." "Dergestalt beirrt das Sein, es lichtend, das Seiende mit der Irre."

67. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 30. In the German text, p. 315: With regard to the "Weisen des sich lichtenden Auf- und Untergehen," the ways of luminous rising and decline, Heidegger writes of "das Gehen das dem Unverborgenen wieder ent-steht und in das Verborgene weg- und abgeht."

68. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 34. For the German, see "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., p. 319: "Das 'gegen' in gegenwärtig meint nicht das Gegenüber zu einem Subjekt, sondern die offene Gegend der Unverborgenheit, in die herein und innerhalb welcher das Beigekommene verweilt."

69. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 36. For the German, see "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., p. 322: "Die Inständigkeit in ihr [die Lichtung] ist das Gefüge aller menschliche Sinne."

70. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT p. 37. For the German, see "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., p. 322: "Wenn das Anwesende im vorhinein in der Sicht steht, west alles zusammen, eines bringt das andere mitsich, eines läßt das andere fahren. Das gegenwärtig in der Unverborgenheit Anwesende weilt in ihr als der offenen Gegend. Das gegenwärtig in die Gegend Weilende (Weilige) kommt in sie aus der Verborgenheit hervor und kommt in der Unverborgenheit an."

71. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 37. Italics added. For the German, see "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., p. 323: "Das jeweilige Anwesende, das Gegenwärtige, west aus dem Abwesen. Dies ist gerade vom eigentlich Anwesenden zu sagen, das unser gewöhnliches Vorstellen von allem Abwesen ausscheiden möchte."

72. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 41. For the German, see "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., p. 326: "Inwiefern ist das jeweilig Anwesende in der Ungerechtigkeit? Was ist am Anwesenden unrecht? continue

Ist es nicht das Rechte des Anwesenden, daß es je und je weilt und verweilt und so sein Anwesen erfüllt?"

73. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 42. For the German, see "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., pp. 327-28: "Das Angekommene kann gar auf seiner Weile bestehen, einzig um dadurch anwesender zu bleiben im Sinne des Beständigen. Das Je-Weilige beharrt auf seinem Anwesen. Dergestalt nimmt es sich aus seiner übergänglichen Weile heraus. Es spreizt sich in den Eigensinn des Beharrens auf. Es kehrt sich nicht mehr an das andere Anwesende. Es versteift sich, als sei dies das Verweilen, auf die Beständigkeit des Fortbestehens."

74. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 42. "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., p. 328: "In der Fuge der Weile wesend, geht das Anwesende aus ihr und ist als das Je-Weilige in der Un-Fuge. Alles Je-Weilige steht in der Un-Fuge."

75. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 43. "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., p. 328: "Die Un-Fuge besteht darin, daß das Je-Weilige sich auf die Weile im Sinne des nur beständigen zu versteifen sucht. Das Weilen als Beharren ist, von der Fuge der Weile hergedacht, der Aufstand in das bloße Andauern. Im Anwesen selbst, das je das Anwesende in die Gegend der Unverborgenheit ver-weilt, steht die Beständigung auf. Durch dieses Aufständische der Weile besteht das Je-Weilige auf der bloßen Beständigkeit."

76. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 46. "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., p. 331: "Doch dadurch spreizt sich auch schon jedes Weilige auf gegen das Andere. Keines achtet auf das Weilige Wesen des Anderen. Die Je-Weiligen sind gegen einander rücksichtslos, jedes je aus der im weilenden Anwesen selbst waltenden und von ihm nahegelegten Sucht des Beharrens."

77. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 44. "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., p. 329: "Insofern es in das Ungegenwärtige sich gehören läßt."

78. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 45. "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., p. 330: "Die je-weilig Anwesenden lassen Fug gehören allélois , einander."

79. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in EGT, p. 50. Italics in the original. "Der Spruch des Anaximander," op. cit., pp. 335-36: "Unversehens wird das Anwesen und das Anwesende je etwas für sich. Vom Anwesenden her vorgestellt, wird es zu dem über alles Anwesende her und so zum höchsten Anwesenden. Wenn das Anwesen genannt wird, ist schon Anwesendes vorgestellt. Im Grunde wird das Anwesen als ein solches gegen das Anwesende nicht unterschieden. Es gilt nur als das Allgemeinste und Höchste des Anwesenden und somit als ein solches. Das Wesen des Anwesens und mit ihm der Unterschied des Anwesens zum Anwesenden bleibt vergessen. Die Seinsvergessenheit ist die Vergessenheit des Unterschiedes des Seins zum Seienden ."

80. Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B50)," in EGT, p. 60. For the original German, see Vorträge und Aufsätze , 3rd edition (Pfullingen: Günther continue

Neske, 1967), p. 208: "Eigentlich bedeutet legein das sich und anderes sammelnde Nieder- und Vorlegen." In future references to the German book in which this text appears, the abbreviation "VA" will be used.

81. Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B50)," in EGT, p. 61. For the German, see VA, p. 209: "Sammeln ist jedoch mehr als bloßes Anhäufen. Zum Sammeln gehört das einholende Einbringen."

82. Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B50)," in EGT, p. 62. For the German, see VA, p. 210: "Vielmehr ist das Lesen schon dem Legen eingelegt. Jedes Lesen ist schon Legen. Alles Legen ist von sich her lesend. . . . Das Legen bringt zum Liegen, indem es beisammen-vor-liegen läßt."

83. Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B50)," in EGT, p. 64. For the German, see VA, 213: "Der Logos bringt das Erscheinende, das ins Vorliegen her-vor-Kommende, von ihm selbst her zum Scheinen, zum gelichteten Sichzeigen."

84. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , pp. 17 and 243.

85. Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B50)," in EGT, p. 67. Also see pp. 64-68 and 74-75. For the German, see VA, p. 217: "in der lesenden Lege, im Logos , beruht."

86. Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B50)," in EGT, p. 70. For the German, see VA, p. 220: "Das Legen ist ein Bergen. Es birgt alles Anwesende in sein Anwesen, aus dem es eigens als das jeweilige Anwesende durch das sterbliche legein ein- und her-vor-geholt werden kann."

87. Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B50)," in EGT, p. 71. For the German, see VA, p. 220: "Alles Entbergen enthebt Anwesendes der Verborgenheit. Das Entbergen braucht die Verborgenheit. Die A-letheia ruht in der Lethé , schöpft aus dieser, legt vor, was durch diese hinterlegt bleibt. Der Logos ist in sich zumal ein Entbergen und Verbergen. Er ist dies Aletheia ."

88. Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B50)," in EGT, p. 74. For the German, see VA, p. 224: "Wenn dem akouein der Sterblichen einzig am Logos , an der lesenden Lege, gelegen ist, dann hat sich das sterbliche legein in das Gesamt des Logos schicklich verlegt. Das sterbliche legein liegt im Logos geborgen. Vom Geschick her ist es in das homologein er-eignet. So bleibt es dem Logos vereignet. Auf solche Weise ist das sterbliche legein geschicklich. Aber es ist nie das Geschick selbst."

89. Heidegger, "Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)," in Early Greek Thinking (hereafter abbreviated "EGT"), p. 99. For the German, see Vorträge und Aufsätze (VA), p. 253: Heidegger's term, here is das alltägliches Vernehmen , which refers to apprehension generally, and not necessarily to perception as such.

90. Heidegger, "Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)," in EGT, p. 82. For the German, see VA, p. 234: "Die neuzeitliche Philosophie erfährt das Seiende als den Gegenstand. Es kommt zu seinem Entgegenstehen durch die Perception und für sie. Das percipere greift, was Leibniz deutlicher sah, als appetitus nach dem Seienden aus, greift es an, um es durch greifend im Begriff an sich zu bringen und seine Präsenz auf das percipere zurück zu beziehen ( repraesentare ). Die repraesentatio , die Vorstellung, bestimmt sich als das percipierende auf sich (das Ich) Zu-Stellen dessen, was erscheint." break

91. Heidegger, Parmenides (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 156. For the original German, see the Gesamtausgabe , II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923-44, vol. 54 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), p. 232.

92. Heidegger, "Moira," in EGT, p. 87. For the German, see VA, p. 241: "daß sich die Lichtung des Seins des Seienden als Lichtung verbirgt."

93. Heidegger, "Moira," in EGT, p. 96. For the German, see VA, p. 251: "Das Spiel des rufenden, entfaltenden und wachstümlichen Lichtes wird nicht eigens sichtbar. Es scheint so unscheinbar wie das Morgenlicht in der stillen Pracht der Lilien auf dem Felde und der Rosen im Garten."

94. Heidegger, "Moira," in EGT, p. 97. For the German, see VA, p. 252: "Das Wesen der Aletheia bleibt verhüllt. Die von ihr gewährte Sichtbarkeit läßt das Anwesen des Anwesenden als "Aussehen" ( eidos ) und als 'Gesicht' ( idea ) aufgehen. Demgemäß bestimmt sich die vernehmende Beziehung zum Anwesen des Anwesenden als ein Sehen ( eidenai ). Das von der visio her geprägte Wissen und dessen Evidenz können auch dort ihre Wesensherkunft aus der lichtenden Entbergung nicht verleugnen."

95. Heidegger, "Moira," in EGT, p. 99. For the German, see VA, pp. 253-54: "Diese [Sterblichen] nehmen auf . . . was sich ihnen unmittelbar, sogleich und zunächst, darbietet . . . Sie halten sich an das in ihr Entfaltete und zwar an jenes, was die Sterblichen unmittelbar beansprucht: an das Anwesende ohne Rücksicht auf das Anwesen."

96. Heidegger, "Moira," in EGT, pp. 99-100. For the German, see VA, pp. 254-55: "Und wo das gewohnte, aus den Wörtern sprechende Vernehmen das Aufgehen und Untergehen antrifft, begnügt es sich mit dem Sowohl-als auch des Entstehens, gignesthai , und Vergehens, hollusthai . . . . Das gewohnte Vernehmen bewegt sich zwar im Gelichteten des Anwesenden, sieht Scheinendes, phanon (VIII, 41), in der Farbe, aber tummelt sich in ihrem wechsel, ameibein , achtet nicht das stillen Lichtes der Lichtung, die aus der Entfaltung der Zwiefalt kommt."

97. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 242. I translate: "to be able to wait in this lighting, until the hints come."

98. Ibid., p. 240. I translate: "the protective watchfulness of humanity is the ground of another history."

97. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 242. I translate: "to be able to wait in this lighting, until the hints come."

98. Ibid., p. 240. I translate: "the protective watchfulness of humanity is the ground of another history."

99. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: Verso, New Left Books, 1978), pp. 227-28. For the original German, see Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 4 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1951), pp. 257-59.

100. Heidegger, "Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B16)," in EGT, p. 103. For the original German, see VA, p. 258: "Denn er [Heraklit] sagt das Lichtend, indem er versucht, dessen Scheinen in die Sprache des Denkens hervorzurufen. Das Lichtende währt, insofern es lichtet. Wir nennen sein Lichten die Lichtung. Was zu ihr gehört, wie sie geschieht, und wo, bleibt zu bedenken. Das Wort 'licht' bedeutet: leuchtend, strahlend, hellend. Das Lichten gewährt das Scheinen, gibt Scheinendes in ein Erscheinen frei. Das Freie ist der Bereich der Unverborgenheit. Ihn verwaltet das Entbergen." break

101. Ibid. The German reads as follows: "Wie kommt es, daß man auch dann, wenn man das Zusammengehören beider vermerkt, dieses von einer der beiden Seiten her zu erklären versucht oder aber ein drittes bezieht, was Objekt und Subjekt zusammengreifen soll?"

100. Heidegger, "Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B16)," in EGT, p. 103. For the original German, see VA, p. 258: "Denn er [Heraklit] sagt das Lichtend, indem er versucht, dessen Scheinen in die Sprache des Denkens hervorzurufen. Das Lichtende währt, insofern es lichtet. Wir nennen sein Lichten die Lichtung. Was zu ihr gehört, wie sie geschieht, und wo, bleibt zu bedenken. Das Wort 'licht' bedeutet: leuchtend, strahlend, hellend. Das Lichten gewährt das Scheinen, gibt Scheinendes in ein Erscheinen frei. Das Freie ist der Bereich der Unverborgenheit. Ihn verwaltet das Entbergen." break

101. Ibid. The German reads as follows: "Wie kommt es, daß man auch dann, wenn man das Zusammengehören beider vermerkt, dieses von einer der beiden Seiten her zu erklären versucht oder aber ein drittes bezieht, was Objekt und Subjekt zusammengreifen soll?"

102. Heidegger, "Aletheia," in EGT, p. 115. For the German, see VA, p. 272: "Die Fuge, dank deren sich Entbergen und Verbergen gegenwendig ineinanderfügen, das Unscheinbare alles Unscheinbaren bleiben muß, da es jedem Erscheinenden des Scheinen schenkt."

103. Heidegger, "Aletheia," in EGT, p. 118. For the German, see VA, p. 276: "Denken wir es [das Weltfeuer] als das reine Lichten, dann bringt dieses nicht nur die Helle, sondern zugleich das Freie, worin alles, zumal das Gegenwendige, ins Scheinen kommt. Lichten ist somit mehr als nur Erhellen, mehr auch als Freilegen. Lichten ist das sinnend-versammelnde Vorbringen ins Freie, ist Gewähren von Anwesen."

104. Ibid. My italics. The German reads as follows: "Das Ereignis der Lichtung ist die Welt. Das sinnend-versammelnde, ins Freie bringende Lichten ist Entbergen und beruht im Sichverbergen."

103. Heidegger, "Aletheia," in EGT, p. 118. For the German, see VA, p. 276: "Denken wir es [das Weltfeuer] als das reine Lichten, dann bringt dieses nicht nur die Helle, sondern zugleich das Freie, worin alles, zumal das Gegenwendige, ins Scheinen kommt. Lichten ist somit mehr als nur Erhellen, mehr auch als Freilegen. Lichten ist das sinnend-versammelnde Vorbringen ins Freie, ist Gewähren von Anwesen."

104. Ibid. My italics. The German reads as follows: "Das Ereignis der Lichtung ist die Welt. Das sinnend-versammelnde, ins Freie bringende Lichten ist Entbergen und beruht im Sichverbergen."

105. Heidegger, "Aletheia," in EGT, p. 119. For the German, see VA, pp. 277-78: "Demgemäß ist das Lichten kein bloßes Erhellen und Belichten. Weil Anwesen hei b t: aus der Verbergung her in die Entbergung vor währen, deshalb betrifft das entbergend-verbergende Lichten das Anwesen des Anwesenden."

106. Heidegger, "Aletheia," in EGT, p. 120. My italics. For the German, see VA, p. 278: "Die Lichtung beleuchtet Anwesendes nicht nur, sondern sie versammelt und birgt es zuvor ins Anwesen."

107. Heidegger, "Aletheia," in EGT, p. 119. For the German, see VA, pp. 278-79: "Sie sind in der Lichtung nicht nur beleuchtet, sondern aus ihr zu ihr er-leuchtet. So vermögen sie es denn auf ihre Weise, das Lichten zu vollbringen (ins Volle seines Wesens bringen) und dadurch die Lichtung zu hüten. Götter und Menschen sind nicht nur von einem Licht, und sei dies auch ein übersinnliches, belichtet, sodaß sie sich vor ihm nie in das Finstere verstecken können. Sie sind in ihrem Wesen gelichtet. Sie sind er-lichtet: in das Ereignis der Lichtung vereignet, darum nie verborgen, sondern ent-borgen, dies noch in einem anderen Sinne gedacht. Wie die Entfernten der Ferne gehören, so sind die indem jetzt zu denkenden Sinne Entborgenen der bergenden, sie haltenden und verhaltenden Lichtung zugetraut."

108. Heidegger, "Aletheia," in EGT, p. 122. For the German, see VA, p. 281: "Die Sterblichen sind unablässig dem entbergend-bergenden Versammeln zugekehrt, das alles Anwesende in sein Anwesen lichtet. Doch sie kehren sich dabei ab von der Lichtung und kehren sich nur an das Anwesende, das sie im alltäglichen Verkehr mit allem und jedem unmittelbar antreffen. Sie meinen, dieser Verkehr mit dem Anwesenden verschaffe ihnen wie von selbst die gemäße Vertrautheit. Und dennoch bleibt es ihnen fremd. Denn sie ahnen nichts von jenem, dem sie zugetraut sind: vom Anwesen, das lichtend jeweils erst Anwesendes zum Vorschein kommen läßt. Der Logos , in dessen Lichtung sie gehen und stehen, bleibt ihnen verborgen, ist für sie vergessen." break

109. Heidegger, "Aletheia," in EGT, p. 123. For the German, see VA, p. 281: "Aber das Goldene des unscheinbaren Scheinens der Lichtung läßt sich nicht greifen, weil es selbst kein Greifendes, sondern das reine Ereignen ist. Das unscheinbare Scheinen der Lichtung entströmt dem heilen Sichbergen in der ansichhaltenden Verwahrnis des Geschickes."

110. Heidegger, "Aletheia," in EGT, p. 120. For the German, see VA, p. 279: "[jene] ihrem Wesen nach Erlichtete und so in einem ausgezeichneten Sinne der Lichtung Zu-hörende und Zugehörige sind."

111. Heidegger, "Aletheia," in EGT, p. 121. For the German, see VA, p. 270: "diese [Götter und Menschen] nicht nur als Belichtete und Angeschaute in der Lichtung gehören, sondern as jene Unscheinbaren, die auf ihre Weise das Lichten mitbringen und es in seinem Währen verwahren und überliefern."

112. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , pp. 240 and 242.

113. Heidegger, Parmenides , pp. 145-46. For the German, see the Gesamtausgabe , vol. 54, pp. 216-17. This German text will hereafter be referred to as "GA 54."

114. Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B50)," in EGT, p. 65. For the German, see VA, p. 215.

115. Heidegger, Parmenides , p. 146. Italics added. For the German, see GA 54, p. 217.

116. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 216. In French: Phénomenologie de la Perception (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1945), p. 251.

117. Heidegger, "Language," in Hofstadter, Poetry, Language, Thought , p. 192. For the German, see "Die Sprache," Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1959), p. 14: "Die Sprache erwirkt und er-gibt erst den Menschen. So gedacht wäre der Mensch ein Versprechen der Sprache."

118. Heidegger, "Language," op. cit., p. 199. For the German, see "Die Sprache," op. cit., p. 22.

119. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics , p. 116. For the German, see Einführung in die Metaphysik , p. 105: "Vernehmen meint einmal: hinnehmen, auf einen Zukommenlassen, nämlich das, was sich zeigt, erscheint."

120. Adorno, "Anmerkungen zum philosophischen Denken," in Stichworte, Gesammelte Werke (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, vol. 10, part 2, p. 602.

121. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 256. The human being ( der Mensch ) is "dem Ereignis er-eignet": appropriated by, given over to, and comes into his or her own through the coming-to-pass and coming-into-its-own of being.

122. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 92. I translate: an essential unfolding of its truth."

123. Heidegger, "The Thing," in Poetry, Language, Thought , pp. 174-81. For the German, see "Das Ding," VA, pp. 163-81. Read in German, this essay is an especially good example of how Heidegger thinks by listening to language— and in particular, by letting the play of the sensuous word-sounds, all their continue

echoes, reverberations, overtones, and undertones, give him something to think about. It also illustrates, therefore, how thinking must let itself be guided by the metaphorical "truth" of aletheia , the interplay of concealment and unconcealment always at work beneath the level of statements and assertions—the level of propositional truth. Statements and assertions take place in a dimension of language closed to the meta-phorical dynamics of concealment and unconcealment—there where words sound and resound. Heidegger's discourse comes from the meta-phorical dimension of language, speaks a "truth" deeply rooted in this subsoil. The "truth" it speaks, coming from the clearing, the openness of the field of meaning in the interplay of concealment and unconcealment, is thereby capable of breaching the stasis of settled meanings belonging to the discourse of statements and assertions.

124. See Heidegger, "The End of Philosophy," in On Time and Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 67-71; Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), pp. 74-79.

125. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," in Daniel Breazeale (ed. and trans.), Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1979), p. 84.

126. Wallace Stevens, "On the Road Home," in The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1961), pp. 203-4.

127. See Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in The Primacy of Perception (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 96-155.

128. See Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), p. 48.

129. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 306.

130. Ibid., p. 253. Adorno is quite mistaken when, in Negative Dialectics , he accuses Heidegger of suppressing difference and contradiction in his concept of being, treating it "as an identity, as pure Being itself, devoid of its otherness" (New York: Continuum, 1973), p. 104. The fact of the matter is rather that Heidegger challenged the traditional ways of thinking the concept of being on precisely these grounds. His careful examination of the experience of being as nothingness, as groundless, and his emphasis on the interplay of presence and absence in the moment of unconcealment certainly attest to the persistence of Heidegger's concern in this regard. Heidegger's concept of being cannot possibly be articulated in terms of a logic of identity.

129. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 306.

130. Ibid., p. 253. Adorno is quite mistaken when, in Negative Dialectics , he accuses Heidegger of suppressing difference and contradiction in his concept of being, treating it "as an identity, as pure Being itself, devoid of its otherness" (New York: Continuum, 1973), p. 104. The fact of the matter is rather that Heidegger challenged the traditional ways of thinking the concept of being on precisely these grounds. His careful examination of the experience of being as nothingness, as groundless, and his emphasis on the interplay of presence and absence in the moment of unconcealment certainly attest to the persistence of Heidegger's concern in this regard. Heidegger's concept of being cannot possibly be articulated in terms of a logic of identity.

131. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 264.

132. Ibid., p. 332.

133. Ibid., p. 335.

134. Ibid., p. 387.

131. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 264.

132. Ibid., p. 332.

133. Ibid., p. 335.

134. Ibid., p. 387.

131. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 264.

132. Ibid., p. 332.

133. Ibid., p. 335.

134. Ibid., p. 387.

131. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 264.

132. Ibid., p. 332.

133. Ibid., p. 335.

134. Ibid., p. 387.

135. Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," in Walter Kaufman (ed. and trans.), Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York: Meridian, New American Library, 1975), p. 265. For the German, see Was Ist Metaphysik ? (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1955), p. 7. break

136. Heidegger, " . . . Poetically Man Dwells . . . , " in Poetry, Language, Thought , p. 223. For the original German, see " . . . Dichterisch Wohnet der Mensch . . . , " Vorträge und Aufsätze , p. 197.

137. Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1960), §78, p. 110.

138. G. W. F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences , in William Wallace (ed. and trans.), The Logic of Hegel , second edition revised and augmented (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), Part I, chapter 1, p. 20.

139. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 5.

140. Ibid., pp. 431-32.

141. Ibid., p. 112.

139. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 5.

140. Ibid., pp. 431-32.

141. Ibid., p. 112.

139. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie , p. 5.

140. Ibid., pp. 431-32.

141. Ibid., p. 112.

142. Walter Benjamin, "On Language as Such and On the Language of Man," in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken, 1986), p. 326.

143. Herbert Marcuse, "On the Affirmative Character of Culture," in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986), p. 98.

1. Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), "On Goethe," in Philosophical Writings (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p. 118.

2. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 247; Le Visible et l'Invisible (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 300. The English translation will hereafter be cited as "VIE," and the French original will be cited as "VIF."

3. Theodor Adorno, "Sociology and Empirical Research," in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (London: Heineman, 1981), p. 69.

4. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, "Note," in Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Continuum Publishing, 19), p. 230.

5. For more on this, see my book, The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation (London: Routledge, 1988) and "Decline and Fall: Ocularcentrism in Heidegger's Reading of the History of Metaphysics," in D. M. Levin (ed.), Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994).

6. See Martin C. Dillon, "Gestalt Theory and Merleau-Ponty's Concept of Intentionality," in Man and World , vol. 4, no. 4 (November 1971), pp. 436-59.

7. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 406; Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), p. 465. Hereafter, the English will be cited as "PPE" and the French as "PPF."

8. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible , p. 185; Le Visible et l'Invisible , p. 239.

9. Martin Heidegger, 1973 Seminar in Zähringen, in Seminare, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1986), bd. 15, p. 385.

10. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment , p. 230. break

11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 194.

12. Walter Benjamin, "On the Mimetic Faculty," in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), p. 333.

13. Ibid., p. 334.

14. Ibid.

12. Walter Benjamin, "On the Mimetic Faculty," in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), p. 333.

13. Ibid., p. 334.

14. Ibid.

12. Walter Benjamin, "On the Mimetic Faculty," in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), p. 333.

13. Ibid., p. 334.

14. Ibid.

15. Heidegger, Parmenides (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 150. Italics added, and the translation has been altered: here, and throughout this present essay, the German word, Sein , will not be capitalized. For the German, see Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe , vol. 54 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992), p. 223. Hereafter, the English will be cited as "PE" and the German as "PG."

16. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in Basic Writings , revised and expanded edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1993), p. 125. Italics added. For the original German, see Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949), p. 15.

17. Michel Foucault, Interview, Le Monde , July 22, 1961.

18. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in Early Greek Thinking (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 36: "Der Spruch des Anaximander," Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), p. 322. Hereafter, the English will be cited as "AXE," the German by "AXG."

19. Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," in H. Aiken and W. Barrett (eds.), Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (New York: 1962), vol. 3, p. 265. Also see pp. 261 and 267. For the German original, see Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit (Bern: Verlag A. Francke, 1947), p. 41.

20. Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 58-59; Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1959), pp. 31-32. Hereafter, the English will be cited as "DT" and the German as "G."

21. Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, New Left Books, 1977), p. 36.

22. Heidegger, Basic Concepts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), §1, Introduction, p. 17.

23. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 237; Was Hei b t Denken? (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954), p. 144.

24. Heidegger, "What Are Poets For?," in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 110; "Wozu Dichter?" Holzwege , p. 266.

25. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 28. In German: Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Güenther Neske, 1962), p. 27.

26. Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: God Is Dead," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 107; "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot,'" Holzwege , p. 241.

27. Ibid.

26. Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: God Is Dead," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 107; "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot,'" Holzwege , p. 241.

27. Ibid.

28. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Doubleday Publishing Co., 1961), p. 52; Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), p. 48. break

29. Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 88; Sein und Zeit (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, fifth edition, 1941), p. 61.

30. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 151; "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," Holzwege , p. 101.

31. Heidegger, Basic Concepts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 98, 161; Grundbegriffe, Gesamtausgabe , vol. 51 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981), pp. 113-15.

32. Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Poetry, Language, Thought , pp. 25, 82; "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," Holzwege , pp. 15 and 66.

33. Heidegger, Basic Concepts , pp. 97-99; Grundbegriffe , pp. 113-15.

34. For more on the pathologies that are distinctive of our contemporary world, see D. M. Levin (ed.), Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies on Narcissism, Schizophrenia, and Depression (New York: New York University Press, 1987).

35. Heidegger, "What Are Poets For?," in Poetry, Language, Thought , p. 120; "Wozu Dichter?," p. Holzwege , p. 275.

36. See F. W. J. Schelling, Schriften von 1794-1798 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980), p. 217.

37. Quoted without any bibliographical information in Rainer Nägele, Theater, Theory, Speculation: Walter Benjamin and the Scenes of Modernity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 110.

38. There are striking and significant similarities between the Buddhist epistemology of the Abhidharmapitaka and Heidegger's phenomenology of perception and its Gestalt -formations. Heidegger's phenomenology is grounded in the hermeneutics of the ontological difference between being and beings, and recognizes this difference in, and as, the event ( Ereignis ) of opening-up ( Lichtung ) by grace of which there is ( Es gibt ) a field for the taking-place of perceptual experience. In Buddhist epistemology, there are two fundamental, and mutually implicative concepts: shunyata and pratityasamutpada . The second of these, conventionally translated as "dependent origination," refers to the interdependence and interconnectedness of all things—the fact that all entities are contextualized, situated in a field. The first of these, as Guenther and Trungpa assert, "can be explained in a very simple way. When we perceive, we usually attend to the delimited forms of objects. But these objects are perceived within a field. Attention can be directed either to the concrete limited forms or to the field in which these forms are situated. In the shunyata experience, the attention is on the field rather than on the contents. By 'contents', we mean here those forms which are the outstanding features of the field itself. . . . This open dimension is the basic dimension of shunyata ." Herbert V. Guenther and Chögyam Trungpa, The Dawn of Tantra (Berkeley: Shambhala Publishing Co., 1975), p. 27. They point out, further, that "this openness is present in and is actually presupposed by every determinate form. Every determinate entity evolves out of something indeterminate and to a certain extent maintains its connection with this indeterminacy; it is never completely isolated from it. Because the indeterminate entity is not isolated from the indeterminacy and be- soft

cause nevertheless there is no bridge between the two, our attention can shift back and forth between one and the other" (ibid.).

39. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics , p. 116. Italics added. For the German, see Einführung in die Metaphysik , p. 105.

40. Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Poetry, Language, Thought , p. 64. In Holzwege , see p. 52.

41. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in Basic Writings , p. 130. For the German original, see Vom Wesen der Wahrheit , p. 20.

42. Heidegger, "The Turning," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 45; "Die Kehre," Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1962), p. 44.

43. Heidegger, "The Turning," op. cit., p. 45. "Die Kehre," op. cit., p. 43.

44. Ibid.

43. Heidegger, "The Turning," op. cit., p. 45. "Die Kehre," op. cit., p. 43.

44. Ibid.

45. Rainer Maria Rilke, Sämtliche Werke (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1975), vol. 2, p. 697.

46. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980-), vol. 2, part 1, p. 311.

47. Merleau-Ponty, Signs (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 20.

48. The following texts have been useful in defining the classical conception of the Gestalt in the domain of psychology: Kurt Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology (New York: Humanities Press, 1935); Wolfgang Köhler, Gestalt Psychology (New York: New American Library, 1947) and Dynamics in Psychology (New York: Washington Square Press, 1965); Kurt Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935); and Mary Henle, Julian Jaynes, and John Sullivan (eds.), Historical Conceptions of Psychology (New York: Springer Publishing Co., 1973), especially the chapter by Edna Heidbreder, "Lewin's Principles of Topological Psychology" and the chapter by Fritz Heider, "Gestalt Theory: Early History and Reminiscences." Also useful: Fritz Perls, Gestalt Therapy: Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality (New York: Delta, 1951); Aron Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966) and Phenomenology and the Theory of Science (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974); Alphonso Lingis, "The Elemental Background," in James M. Edie (ed.), New Essays in Phenomenology (Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1969), pp. 24-38; and Samuel J. Todes, "Sensuous Abstraction and the Abstract Sense of Reality," in Edie (ed.), op. cit., pp. 15-23.

49. I have italicized my words, "to be seen as," words that should remind us of Wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing as" in his Philosophical Investigations , in order to bring out a point on which I have been insisting for many years, viz., that the logic of phenomenological "description" is not the logic of descriptive propositions, description pure and simple, but is in fact the logic of "performatives." In other words, the method of phenomenology cannot be understood in the static, reifying terms of the correspondence theory of truth, but must be understood in the dynamic, more radical terms of an "aletheic" theory of continue

disclosure. Also see Eugene Gendlin, "Experiential Phenomenology," in Maurice Natanson (ed.), Phenomenology and the Social Sciences (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 281-319.

50. For more material on his three major new concepts, the "intertwining," the "chiasm," and "reversibility," see "The Intertwining—The Chiasm" and "Working Notes," in The Visible and the Invisible . I would insist, though, that there are important, and quite unmistakable adumbrations of these concepts already at work in his much earlier work, the Phenomenology of Perception .

51. See my "Visions of Narcissism: Intersubjectivity and the Reversals of Reflection," in M. Dillon (ed.), Merleau-Ponty Vivant (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.

52. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Circles," in Joel Porte (ed.), Essays and Lectures (New York: Library of America, Viking Press, 1983), p. 403.

53. Heidegger, "The Turning," op. cit., p. 39; "Die Kehre," op. cit., p. 39.

54. Heidegger, "Aletheia: Heraclitus Fragment B16," in Early Greek Thinking , p. 103; for the German, see Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1954), p. 258. Hereafter the English will be cited as "AE" and the German as "AG."

55. Heidegger, "The Turning," op. cit., p. 47; "Die Kehre," op. cit., p. 45.

56. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," op. cit., p. 131; "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," op. cit., p. 83.

57. The passages that follow, with their titles and page numbers, may all be found in English translation, assembled under the title Early Greek Thinking (New York: Harper & Row, 1975). The "Aletheia" essay was written in 1943; "The Anaximander Fragment" was written in 1946; and the "Moira" essay dates back to 1954. The German text of "The Anaximander Fragment" may be found in Holzwege . As for the German texts of "Aletheia" and "Moira," they may be found in Vorträge und Aufsätze .

58. See Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in Basic Writings , pp. 117-38; Vom Wesen der Wahrheit , pp. 11-15, on the question of "exposure" ("Aussetzung in die Entborgenheit des Seienden").

59. Heidegger, On Time and Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 14-15; Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), p. 15.

60. Heidegger, "The Turning," op. cit., p. 37; "Die Kehre," op. cit., p. 37.

61. Samuel Beckett, Endgame (New York: Grove-Atlantic, 1983).

1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. xiv.

2. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 127; Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 2nd edition, 1945), p. 147. Hereafter, the English title will be cited as "PPE" and the original French as "PPF". break

3. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston, IL: North-western University Press, 1979), p. 151; Le Visible et l'Invisible (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 198. The English will be cited hereafter as "VIE," the French as "VIF."

4. Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 216.

5. Charles Baudelaire, "La fausse monnaie," Oeuvres Complètes (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1975), vol. 1, p. 319; Paris Spleen (New York: New Directions, 1970), p. 53.

6. Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in The Primacy of Perception (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 106; "Les Relations avec Autrui Chez l'Enfant" (Paris: Centre du Documentation Universitaire, 1975), p. 15. Hereafter, the English will be cited as "CRO," while the original French will be cited as "CROF."

7. Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind," in The Primacy of Perception , 1964), p. 188. Hereafter, references to this essay will be cited as "EM."

8. See my essay, "Tracework: Experience and Description in the Moral Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas," in a forthcoming collection edited by Wayne Froman and published by Northwestern University Press.

9. Merleau-Ponty, "The Concept of Nature" I, in Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France , 1952-1960 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 82; "Le Concept de Nature," 1956-57, in Résumés de Cours, Collège de France , 1952-1960 (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), p. 115.

10. See David Michael Levin, "Visions of Narcissism: Intersubjectivity and the Reversals of Reflection," in Martin C. Dillon (ed.), Merleau-Ponty Vivant (Albany: State University of New York, 1991), pp. 47-90.

11. See David Michael Levin, "Justice in the Flesh," in Galen A. Johnson and Michael B. Smith (eds.), Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1990), pp. 35-44.

12. See David Michael Levin, "Transpersonal Phenomenology and the Corporeal Schema," in The Humanistic Psychologist , vol. 16, no. 2 (autumn 1988), pp. 282-313. Also see Giorgio Agamben, Infanzia e Storia: Distruzione dell 'Esperienza e Origine della Storia (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1979), and Il Linguaggio e la Morte: Seminario sul Luogo della Negatività (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1982).

13. Stéphane Mallarmé, "Prose," in Oeuvres complètes , ed. by Henri Mondor and G. Jean-Aubry (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1945), p. 57.

14. Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-Sense (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 143; for the French original, see Sens et Non-sens (Paris: Editions Nagel, 1948), p. 252.

15. See David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World (New York: Pantheon, 1996). I have also benefited, in writing this chapter, from reading Martin C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty's Ontology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2nd edition, 1997), continue

Gary Brent Madison, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1981), and Samuel Mallin, Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979).

1. Anton Chekhov, "A Day in the Country," in Bernardine Kielty (ed.), A Treasury of Short Stories (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947), p. 57.

2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 1.

3. Jürgen Habermas, "Historical Consciousness and the Post-Traditional Identity: The Federal Republic's Orientation to the West," in The New Conservativism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), p. 251.

4. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from a Damaged Life (London: New Left Books, 1988), §68, p. 105; Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben, Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), bd. 4, p. 116.

5. Emmanuel Levinas, "Apropos of Buber: Some Notes," in Outside the Subject (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 43.

6. Levinas, "The Meaning of Meaning," in Outside the Subject , p. 94.

7. Adorno, Minima Moralia , p. 105 in the English, p. 116 in the German.

8. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1973), p. 191; Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973), Gesammelte Schriften , bd. 6, p. 192.

9. Henry David Thoreau, "Economy," in Walden , in Carl Bode (ed.), The Portable Thoreau (New York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 266.

10. Rainer Maria Rilke, "Arrival," in Poems 1912-1926 (Redding Ridge, CT: Black Swan Books, 1981), p. 113.

11. Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1985), p. 423.

12. Hermann Hesse, "Iris," in The Fairy Tales of Hermann Hesse (New York: Bantam Books, 1995), p. 245.

13. See the discussion by Martin Jay, "Hostage Philosophy: Levinas's Ethical Thought," in Tikkun , vol. 5, no. 6 (1994), pp. 85-87.

14. On the double tonality that figures in Heidegger's writing, and in the corresponding hermeneutical experience of "hearkening," see David M. Levin, The Listening Self (New York: Routledge, 1989).

15. On this process, see Eugene Gendlin, Experience and the Creation of Meaning (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2nd revised, 1997); "Experiential Phenomenology," in Maurice Natanson (ed.), Phenomenology and the Social Sciences (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973); and "How Philosophy Cannot Appeal to Experience—and How It Can," in David M. Levin (ed.), Language Beyond Postmodernism (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997). break

16. Martin Heidegger, "The Essence of Truth," in David F. Krell (ed.), Basic Writings of Martin Heidegger (New York: Harper & Row, 1994), pp. 126 and 129; Das Wesen der Wahrheit (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949), pp. 15 and 18.

17. Levinas, "Paix et Proximité," Les Cahiers de la nuit surveillée , ed. by Jacques Rolland (Lagrasse: Verdier, 1984), p. 343; quoted in Adriaan Peperzak et al., Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 166.

18. See Simon Critchley, "Diskussion zu Axel Honneth: 'Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit,'" Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie , vol. 42, no. 6 (1994), pp. 1028-29.

19. Levinas, "Language and Proximity," in Collected Philosophical Papers , trans. by Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 124.

20. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence , trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, p. 193; Autrement qu'être, ou au-delà de l'Essence (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 120. Hereafter the English translation will be cited as OB and the French original as AE. Also see Paul Davies, "On Resorting to an Ethical Language," in Adriaan Peperzak (ed.), Ethics as First Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 95-104.

21. See Critchley, "Diskussion zu Axel Honneth," pp. 1028-29. Critchley argues that, "insofar as his [Levinas's] theses are phenomenological, they are descriptive and not prescriptive, and they claim to bring out something of the deep structure of subjectivity that remains hidden at the level of the empirical or the natural attitude." He is quite right with regard to what he takes to be their claim; but I would argue that the phenomenological descriptivity of Levinas's discourse is not incompatible with its being also prescriptive—or, as I would prefer to say, performative. For Levinas is no longer working in terms of the static correspondence theory of truth.

22. See Axel Honneth, "The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism," in Stephen White (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Habermas (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 289-323. The original paper, "Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit," was published in the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie , vol. 2 (1994), p. 195ff. Also see Honneth's Kommunitarianismus: Eine Debatte über die moralischen Grundlagen moderner Gesellschaften (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1993).

23. Critchley, "Diskussion zu Axel Honneth," pp. 1025-36.

24. See Max Pensky, "The Limits of Solidarity: Discourse Ethics, Levinas, and the Moral Point of View," unpublished manuscript. Pensky attempts to think, after Levinas, the embodiment of moral experience; but he unfortunately perpetuates the old metaphysical dualism by continuing to think of a "physical substrate." This makes it quite impossible to understand how we could ever form a bodily felt sense of moral responsibility for the other in response to the face-to-face presence of the other. But he is correct in pointing out that Levinas's work shows that "Moral theory . . . cannot follow those [everyday] moral intuitions to the level of bodily movement itself." The task that this continue

problem poses is, therefore, to work out a phenomenology of moral experience capable of thinking how the dispositions of our bodily nature figure in our moral development and moral judgment. I take Levinas to have made some important moves in this direction, but his phenomenology is ultimately disappointing because of its abstractness and thinness.

25. See Heidegger, "The Origin of the Artwork," in Krell (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings , pp. 192 and 198, where he speaks for the importance of escaping "captivity in that which is" and argues that "language alone brings what is, as something that is, into the Open for the first time."

26. See the discussion of "indirect communication" in Sören Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), book 2, part 2, chs. 2 and 3 (especially perhaps p. 247, but also pp. 216-17, 221, 232, 235, 318, and 321 in this first Princeton edition).

27. I would like to mention, as especially helpful for my thinking in this study, the following texts: Robert Bernasconi, "Deconstruction and the Possibility of Ethics," in John Sallis (ed.), Deconstruction and Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 122-139; Bernasconi, "The Trace of Levinas in Derrida," in David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (eds.), Derrida and Différance (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. 13-29; Bernasconi, "Levinas and Derrida: The Question of the Closure of Metaphysics," in Richard Cohen (ed.), Face to Face with Levinas (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), pp. 181-202; Bernasconi, "Failure of Communication as a Surplus: Dialogue and Lack of Dialogue between Buber and Levinas," in Bernasconi and Wood (eds.), The Provocation of Levinas (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 100-135; Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992); Critchley, "Eine Vertieferuing der ethischen Sprache und Methode: Levinas' 'Jenseits des Seins oder anders als Sein geschieht,'" Deutshce Zeitschrift für Philosophie , vol. 42, no. 4 (1994), pp. 643-51; Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas's Ethical Discourse Between Individuation and Universality," in Bernasconi and Critchley (eds.), Re-Reading Levinas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 85-105; Richard Cohen, "The Face of Truth in Rosenzweig, Levinas and Jewish Mysticism," in Daniel Guerriere (ed.), Phenomenology of the Truth Proper to Religion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); Paul Davies, "The Face and the Caress: Levinas's Alterations of Sensibility," in David M. Levin (ed.), Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 252-72; Alphonso Lingis, "Face to Face: A Phenomenological Meditation," in International Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 19, no. 2 (June 1979), pp. 151-63; Adriaan Peperzak, "From Intentionality to Responsibility: On Levinas's Philosophy of Language," in Arleen Dallery and Charles Scott (eds.), The Question of the Other in Contemporary Continental Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 3-22; Peperzak, "Some Remarks on Hegel, Kant, and Levinas," in Richard Cohen (ed.), Face to Face , pp. 205-17; Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas continue

(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997); Laszlo Tengelyi, Der Zwitterbegriff Lebensgeschichte (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1998); and Edith Wyschogrod, "Doing Before Hearing: On the Primacy of Touch," in Francois Laruelle (ed.), Textes pour Emmanuel Levinas (Paris: Editions Jean-Michel Place, 1980), pp. 179-202.

28. Levinas, "Diachrony and Representation," in Time and the Other (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), pp. 97-98; "Diachronie et Représentation," Entre Nous: Essais sur le Penser-à-l' Autre (Paris: Editions Grasset et Fasquelle, 1991), p. 165. Hereafter, the English will be designated by "TO."

29. Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Writing and Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978), p. 91.

30. See Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience and the Origin of History (London: New Left Books, Verso Edition, 1993), p. 94; Infanzia e Storia: Distruzione dell'Esperienza e Origine della Storia (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1978), also p. 94.

31. Ibid., p. 92.

32. Ibid.

30. See Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience and the Origin of History (London: New Left Books, Verso Edition, 1993), p. 94; Infanzia e Storia: Distruzione dell'Esperienza e Origine della Storia (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1978), also p. 94.

31. Ibid., p. 92.

32. Ibid.

30. See Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience and the Origin of History (London: New Left Books, Verso Edition, 1993), p. 94; Infanzia e Storia: Distruzione dell'Esperienza e Origine della Storia (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1978), also p. 94.

31. Ibid., p. 92.

32. Ibid.

33. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 78; for the French, see Totalité et Infini: Essai sur Extériorité (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. 51. Hereafter, the English will be referred to by the symbols "TaI," the French by "TeI."

34. See Paul Davies, "The Face and the Caress: Levinas's Ethical Alterations of Sensibility," in Levin (ed.), Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision , pp. 252-72.

35. Adorno, "Trying to Understand Endgame ," in Notes to Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), vol. 1, p. 247.

36. For more on Levinas's relation to light, see, for example, Levinas, Totality and Infinity , pp. 189f, and Existence and Existents (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), pp. 46-51.

37. Levinas, Time and the Other , p. 68. For the French text, see Le Temps et l' Autre , p. 53. Hereafter, the English will be designated by "TO," the French by "TA."

38. See Levinas, "Diachrony and Representation," in TO, pp. 99-100; "Diachronie et Représentation," Entre Nous , p. 166.

39. Walter Benjamin, "Einbahnstraße," Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1955), vol. 1, p. 558.

40. Benjamin, Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels, Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1955), vol. 1, pp. 150-51. For the English translation, see The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, New Left Books, 1977), pp. 35-36.

41. Levinas, "Language and Proximity," in Collected Philosophical Papers , p. 118.

42. See, for example, Levinas, "The Transcendence of Words: On Michel Leiris's Biffures ," in Outside the Subject , p. 147. This text originally appeared, in French, in 1949. Also see "Diachrony and Representation," in Time and the continue

Other , p. 98; "Diachronie et Représentation," Entre Nous , p. 166: in our culture, the other, says Levinas, is typically seized by perception, by an ego-logical gaze, and re-presented, by this gaze, to itself.

43. On this question, see Paul Davies, "The Face and the Caress," in Levin (ed.), Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision .

44. Max Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985), vol. 7, pp. 385-404.

45. Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama , p. 31. For the original German text, see Benjamin's Schriften , vol. 1, p. 146:" . . . daß Wahrheit nicht Enthüllung ist, die das Geheimnis vernichtet, sondern Offenbarung, die ihm gerecht wird."

46. Levinas, "In Memory of Alphonse de Waelhens," in Outside the Subject , p. 115.

47. Levinas, "L'Ontologie Est-elle Fondamentale?," Entre Nous , p. 19. My translation.

48. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity , p. 60.

49. On intentionality, also see Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence , pp. 65-72, 96-97, and 101; Autrement Qu'Être, ou au-delà de l'Essence , pp. 81-91, 122-24, and 128-29. Also see "Bad Conscience and the Inexorable," in Cohen (ed.), Face to Face with Levinas , pp. 35-40.

50. See Rosenzweig, op. cit., pp. 213-14, 239, and 268-69: Rosenzweig here undertakes a critique of the bourgeois conception of the subject and its freedom that is quite similar to the critique that Levinas makes.

51. Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality: an Interview with Emmanuel Levinas," in Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (eds.), The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 178.

52. The problem that the prohibition on utopian images must address is that there is a temptation to idolatry not conducive, of course, to transformative experience—all the more tragic when the images are images of a utopian fulfillment of desire. Idolatry would accordingly be desire fixated on the utopian image, rather than on making use of the image for the transformation of desire.

53. Levinas, "Diachrony and Representation," in Time and the Other , pp. 99-100; "Diachronie et Représentation," Entre Nous , p. 167. My translation.

54. Levinas, "L'Autre, Utopie, et Justice," Entre Nous , p. 239. My translation. Also see OB 116, AE 147. These are just two of the many instances where Levinas works with this double meaning.

55. Levinas, "The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other," in Outside the Subject , p. 124.

56. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being , p. 27; Autrement Qu'Être , p. 34. Also see pp. 29-30 in the English, pp. 37-38 in the French.

57. Levinas, Difficult Freedom (London: Athlone Press, 1990), p. 293.

58. Levinas, "On Jewish Philosophy," in In the Time of Nations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 182. Also see Bernhard Waldenfels, "Re- soft

sponse and Responsibility in Levinas," in Adriaan Peperzak (ed.), Ethics as First Philosophy , pp. 39-52.

59. Michel de Montaigne, "Apology for Raymond Sebond," in Donald Frame (ed.), The Complete Essays (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), book 2, no. 12, p. 436.

60. Ibid., p. 437.

59. Michel de Montaigne, "Apology for Raymond Sebond," in Donald Frame (ed.), The Complete Essays (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), book 2, no. 12, p. 436.

60. Ibid., p. 437.

61. Levinas, "L'Autre, Utopie et Justice," Entre Nous , p. 244. My translation.

62. See Rosenzweig, op. cit., p. 228.

63. Levinas, "The Pact," in Séan Hand (ed.), The Levinas Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 211-26. For the French original, see L'Au-Delà du Verset (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1981), pp. 82-106.

64. See Rosenzweig, op. cit., pp. 213-14, 217-18, 234-35, 252, and 259.

65. Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 168. The passage quoted comes from a 1972 lecture.

66. Levinas, "The Meaning of Meaning," in Outside the Subject , pp. 93-94.

67. Ibid.

66. Levinas, "The Meaning of Meaning," in Outside the Subject , pp. 93-94.

67. Ibid.

68. See Derrida, Speech and Phenomena (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 45 and 103.

69. Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Krell (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings , p. 192. Italics added. Also see p. 198, where he remarks that "language alone brings what is, as something that is, into the Open for the first time."

70. Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality," op. cit., p. 176.

71. Ibid., p. 168.

72. Ibid., p. 171.

73. Ibid., pp. 176 and 169.

70. Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality," op. cit., p. 176.

71. Ibid., p. 168.

72. Ibid., p. 171.

73. Ibid., pp. 176 and 169.

70. Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality," op. cit., p. 176.

71. Ibid., p. 168.

72. Ibid., p. 171.

73. Ibid., pp. 176 and 169.

70. Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality," op. cit., p. 176.

71. Ibid., p. 168.

72. Ibid., p. 171.

73. Ibid., pp. 176 and 169.

74. Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," in Collected Philosophical Papers , p. 102. Also see p. 104.

75. Ibid., p. 102.

74. Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," in Collected Philosophical Papers , p. 102. Also see p. 104.

75. Ibid., p. 102.

76. Levinas, "On Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty," in Outside the Subject , p. 115.

77. Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity," in Collected Philosophical Papers , pp. 55, 56, and 59.

78. Levinas, "L'Ontologie Est-elle Fondamentale?" Entre Nous , p. 22. My translation.

79. Ibid.

78. Levinas, "L'Ontologie Est-elle Fondamentale?" Entre Nous , p. 22. My translation.

79. Ibid.

80. Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings , p. 168.

81. Levinas, "Diachrony and Representation," op. cit., p. 109; "Diachronie et Représentation," Entre Nous , p. 175.

82. For an anticipation of Levinas's distinction between le Dit and le Dire , see Rosenzweig, op. cit., pp. 108-11, 131-33, 145-51, 227-35, 250-53, and 295-96. On pp. 199 and 231-32, Rosenzweig distinguishes between the contents said by the saying and the tonality of the saying. He himself at times makes use of an incantatory rhetorical mode of discourse. break

83. Benjamin, "Theses," in Illuminations (New York: Schocken, 1969), pp. 253-64.

84. Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," in Collected Philosophical Papers , pp. 100-2. Italics added.

85. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 351-52. The abbreviated reference to this text will be "PhP."

86. Ibid., p. 242.

87. Ibid., p. 347.

85. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 351-52. The abbreviated reference to this text will be "PhP."

86. Ibid., p. 242.

87. Ibid., p. 347.

85. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 351-52. The abbreviated reference to this text will be "PhP."

86. Ibid., p. 242.

87. Ibid., p. 347.

88. Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," op. cit., p. 103

89. Ibid., p. 106.

90. Ibid., p. 104.

88. Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," op. cit., p. 103

89. Ibid., p. 106.

90. Ibid., p. 104.

88. Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," op. cit., p. 103

89. Ibid., p. 106.

90. Ibid., p. 104.

91. For further discussion of Levinas's struggles with the language of phenomenology, see my "Tracework: Experience and Description in the Moral Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas," forthcoming in a collection edited by Bernard Flynn and Wayne Froman which will be published by Northwestern University Press.

92. See my "Tracework: Myself and Others in the Moral Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas," in the International Journal of Philosophical Studies , vol.6, no. 3 (1998), pp. 345-92.

93. Levinas, "The Ego and Totality," in Collected Philosophical Papers , p. 34; "Le Moi et la Totalité," Entre Nous , p. 34.

94. Levinas, "The Ego and Totality," op. cit., p. 42; "Le Moi et la Totalité," op. cit., p. 43. Concerning the question of whether or not the animal may be said to have a face, see "The Paradox of Morality," op. cit., pp. 169-72.

95. Karl Marx, Capital , vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p. 72.

96. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking ? (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 61. See also Levinas's essay, "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity," in Collected Philosophical Papers , p. 55: Levinas here says the same thing as Heidegger in defining the difference between the animal's head and the human face: the animal "is not yet in touch with itself." Heidegger says that the animal does not perceive itself, does not enjoy apperception, and cannot talk. However, in opposition to Heidegger, Levinas extends the ethical to all sentient beings: "It is clear," he says, "that, without considering animals as human beings, the ethical extends to all living beings." (Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality," op. cit., p. 172.)

97. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? , p. 62.

98. Horkheimer, "The Authoritarian State," in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (eds.), The Essential Frankfurt School Reader (New York: Continuum, 1987), p. 116.

99. Levinas, "And God Created Woman," a 1972 lecture published in Nine Talmudic Readings (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 168.

100. Rilke, The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge (New York: W. W. Norton, 1949), pp. 15-16.

101. Levinas, "And God Created Woman," a 1972 lecture published in Nine Talmudic Readings , p. 168. On masks and faces in relation to racial identity and continue

racism, see Linda Alcoff, "Toward a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment," forthcoming in Robert Bernasconi (ed.), Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy (Indiana University Press).

102. Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), p. 196. For the German, see Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 3, part 2, p. 443.

103. Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," in Sean Hand (ed.), The Levinas Reader , p. 83.

104. See J. Hillis Miller, Hawthorne and History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 57.

105. On the face of the other as angel of judgment, as bringing judgment and awakening one's sense of "bad conscience," see "Diachrony and Representation," in Collected Philosophical Papers , pp. 117-18; "Diachronie et Représentation," Entre Nous , p. 182.

106. Rosenzweig's discussion of Gyges's ring in Star of Redemption (p. 207) may have suggested the story to Levinas.

107. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future , trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), part 2, §40, p. 51.

108. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Elective Affinities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 216.

109. Levinas, In the Time of Nations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 182; À l'Heure des Nations (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1988), p. 214.

110. Levinas, "Diachrony and Representation," in Collected Philosophical Papers , p. 107; "Diachronie et Représentation," Entre Nous , p. 173.

111. Levinas, In the Time of Nations , p. 182; À l'Heure des Nations , p. 214.

112. I am indebted to Miller's reading of Hawthorne for parts of the interpretation I am formulating here.

113. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 1, part 1, p. 211. For the English, see The Origin of German Tragic Drama , p. 31.

114. Levinas, Totality and Infinity , pp. 65-66. For the French, see Totalité et Infini , p. 37.

115. Levinas, En Découvrant l'Existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: Vrin, 1988), p. 208.

116. Rebecca Comay, "Facies Hippocratica," in Adriaan Peperzak (ed.), Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 227. Levinas also writes of the need to "efface" ( dévisager ) the face in order to let the "universal" claimed for justice shine forth. See, e.g., "On Jewish Philosophy," in In the Time of Nations , pp. 174-75.

117. Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism (London: Verso, 1983), pp. 147f.

118. Ibid., pp. 150-51. For the German, see Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980-89), vol. 1, part 2, p. 648: "Blicke dürften continue

um so bezwingender wirken, je tiefer die Abwesenheit des Schauenden, die ihnen bewältigt wurde. In spiegelnden Augen bleibt sie unvermindert. Eben darum wissen diese Augen von der Ferne nichts."

117. Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism (London: Verso, 1983), pp. 147f.

118. Ibid., pp. 150-51. For the German, see Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980-89), vol. 1, part 2, p. 648: "Blicke dürften continue

um so bezwingender wirken, je tiefer die Abwesenheit des Schauenden, die ihnen bewältigt wurde. In spiegelnden Augen bleibt sie unvermindert. Eben darum wissen diese Augen von der Ferne nichts."

119. Benjamin, fascinated by the allegorical significance of the baroque image of the death's-head, discusses it in a number of different texts: [1] The Origin of German Tragic Drama , p. 166. [2] "Baudelaire," Das Passagen-Werk , in Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 19), vol. 5, part 1, p. 463, J78, 4. [3] "Einbahnstraße," Schriften , vol. 1, p. 544: "Unvergleichliche Sprache des Totenkopfes: völlige Ausdruckslosigkeit—das Schwarz seiner Augenhöhlen—vereint er mit wildesten Ausdruck—den grinsenden Zahnreihen."

120. Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels , in Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1955), vol. 1, p. 289.

121. Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, Schriften , vol. 1, pp. 289-90. For the English translation, see The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, New Left Books, 1977), pp. 165-66. In the "Introduction" to The Genuine Works of Hippocrates (New York: William Wood, 1886), p. 195, Francis Adams explains the facies hippocratica as follows: This countenance, suffering from "the worst," is marked by "a sharp nose, hollow eyes, collapsed temples, the ears cold, contracted, and their lobes turned out: the skin about the forehead being rough, distended and parched; the color of the whole face being green, black, livid, or lead-colored."

122. Daniel Casper von Lohenstein, Hyacinthen , quoted by Benjamin in his Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels, Schriften , vol. 1, p. 340; also see pp. 357-58. For English translation, see p. 215; also see pp. 232-33.

123. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 1, part 2, p. 682. Also see vol. 5, p. 72. Benjamin probably derived this dialectical image from Marx's reference to the Medusa-head in Das Kapital . See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1962), vol. 23, pp. 15, 146f. In the "Preface" ( Vorwort ) to the first (1867) edition, Marx writes: "Im Vergleich zur englischen ist die soziale Statistik Deutschlands und des übrigen kontinentalen Westeuropas elend. Dennoch lüftet sie den Schleier grade genug, um hinter demselben ein Medusenhaupt ahnen zu lassen." ("In comparison with those of England, the social statistics of Germany and the rest of continental Western Europe are wretchedly compiled. Nevertheless, they [the social statistics of continental Europe] lift the veil just enough to let us glimpse the Medusa-head behind it.") On the same page in this preface, Marx also draws on the mythic story of Perseus to call attention to the monsters of capitalism, from the sight of which we obstruct our gaze: "Perseus brauchte eine Nebelkappe zur Verfolgung von Ungeheurn. Wir ziehen die Nebelkappe tief über Aug und Ohr, um die Existenz der Ungeheuer wegleugnen zu können." ("Perseus wore a magic cap in order to hunt down the monsters [without their seeing him]. We pull the magic cap down over our eyes and ears—in order to deny the existence of the monsters.")

124. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , p. 361.

125. Ibid., p. 362. break

126. Ibid., p. 352. Also see pp. 129, 216, 254, and 352-53.

124. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , p. 361.

125. Ibid., p. 362. break

126. Ibid., p. 352. Also see pp. 129, 216, 254, and 352-53.

124. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , p. 361.

125. Ibid., p. 362. break

126. Ibid., p. 352. Also see pp. 129, 216, 254, and 352-53.

127. The fullest presentation of this point is to be found in Merleau-Ponty's published lecture material on "The Child's Relations with Others," in The Primacy of Perception (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964). For a discussion of this material, see my chapter on Merleau-Ponty in this book.

128. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Continuum, 1986), pp. 102-3.

129. Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama , p. 166; "Der Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels," Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 1, part 1, p. 343.

130. Berthold Brecht, "Die Auslöschung," Werke , Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe, Stücke, 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), vol. 3, p. 78.

131. Interviews with Subcomandante Marcos, in John Ross, "Introduction," and Frank Bardacke (ed. and trans.), Shadows of Tender Fury (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995), pp. 88, 102-5, 195-201, 205, and 246.

132. Adorno, "Trying to Understand Endgame ," in Notes to Literature , vol. 1, p. 249.

133. Levinas, Difficult Freedom (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 135, 140.

134. Horkheimer, Critique of Instrumental Reason (New York: Continuum, 1974), p. 22.

135. René Char, "Recherche de la base et du sommet," Oeuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), p. 728.

136. Char, "Sur la poésie," Oeuvres Complètes , p. 1298. Also in Feuillets d'Hypnos (Paris: Gallimard, 1946), p. 83: "Le poète, conservateur des infinis visages du vivant."

137. Robert Coles, "Children as Moral Observers," in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values , vol. 2 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1981), p. 138.

138. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity , p. 92.

139. See Patrizia Magli, "The Face and the Soul," in Michel Feher (ed.), with Ramona Nadoff and Nadia Tazi, Fragments for a History of the Human Body , part 2 (New York: Zone Press, 1989), pp. 87-127.

140. See Robert Bernasconi, "Sartre's Gaze Returned: The Transformation of the Phenomenology of Racism," in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal , vol. 18, no. 2 (1995), pp. 201-21, and "The Double Face of the Political and the Social: Hannah Arendt and America's Racial Divisions," in Research in Phenomenology , vol. 16 (1996), pp. 3-24.

141. Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea (New York: New Directions, 1964), p. 120.

142. Levinas, "Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel and Philosophy," in H. Gordon and J. Bloch (eds.), Martin Buber: A Centenary Volume (1984), p. 320. Also see Levinas, "The Meaning of Meaning," in Outside the Subject , p. 94.

143. Michel Foucault, "How much does it cost for reason to tell the truth?" in Foucault Live: Interviews 1966-84 (New York: Columbia University Press, Semiotext(e) Foreign Agent Series, 1989), p. 252. This reference to the face is all the more remarkable, coming as it does some years after his comments on the face in The Order of Things (Les Mots et les Choses) . In the later reference, continue

the face belongs to a singular, concrete other, and expresses the incorporation of social interactions and practices. In the two earlier references, appearing near the end of The Order of Things , the face is the face of Man, an abstract other, and it is identified with a metaphysics committed to essence, totality, homogeneity and a logic of the same. In the earlier references, the face, as the face of Man, is condemned to death. Here are the two references: "What Nietzsche's thought announces is not so much the death of God . . . as the end of his murderer; it is the shattering of man's face in laughter, and the return of masks." See Les Mots et les Choses (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), pp. 396-97. In the second, he says: "Man will be effaced, like a face traced in the sand at the edge of the sea" (op. cit., p. 398). The face in question here belongs to the modern representations of Man. This theme of the death of God and finally the death of Man was already prefigured by Foucault's Introduction to Kant's 1798 Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht . Foucault wrote this as an Introduction to his doctoral thesis. See David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault (New York: Pantheon, 1993), p. 89.

144. Levinas, Totality and Infinity , p. 219; p. 194 in French.

145. There is a useful paper in this regard by Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas's Ethical Discourse between Individuation and Universality," in Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (eds.), Re-Reading Levinas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).

146. Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity," in Collected Philosophical Papers , p. 69.

147. See Rosenzweig, op. cit., pp. 176, 185-86, 200, and 228, where there are discussions of the "third person" position that prefigure Levinas's discussions of the "le tiers," "third party."

148. See Derrida, "The Politics of Friendship," in Journal of Philosophy , vol. 85 (1988), pp. 632-45.

149. Levinas, In the Time of Nations , p. 174; à; l'Heure des Nations , p. 205.

150. Honneth, "The Other of Justice," op. cit., p. 291.

151. Thomas McCarthy, review of Stephen White (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Habermas , in Ethics (January 1997), p. 372.

152. Nietzsche, The Will to Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), note 18, p. 16: "The most universal sign of the modern age: man has lost dignity in his own eyes to an incredible extent."

153. Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in Krell (ed.), Basic Writings , pp. 213-65.

154. See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals , trans. by Mary J. Gregor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 37; Gesammelte Schriften , ed. Königliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902), vol. 6, p. 379. Also see Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), §§38-39, where, in reference to the " Dasein in man," the "essence" of man, he speaks of the need "to liberate the humanity in man." For the original German, see Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt , continue

Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983, 1992), §§38-39. For the argument that mirroring double-crosses narcissism, see my "Visions of Narcissism: Intersubjectivity and the Reversals of Reflection," in Martin C. Dillon (ed.), Merleau-Ponty Vivant (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 47-90.

155. See Bernhard Waldenfels, Ordnung und Zwielicht (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987) on the ethical asymmetry of Responsivität and the moral-political symmetry of Verantwortung .

156. Levinas, "The Temptation of Temptation," in Nine Talmudic Readings , p. 47.

157. In the preface to the 1987 German translation of Totalité et Infini , Levinas says that, in the original French edition, justice is thought as a synonym for the ethical, just as Derrida had charged in "Force of Law." In Otherwise Than Being , however, he distinguishes these two and emphasizes that the question of justice first arises when the third, who presses for a decision between competing moral claims and puts the face-to-face ethical relation to the other in a specific sociopolitical context, comes on the scene. See, for example, OB, ch. 5, §3: "From the Saying to the Said, or the Wisdom of Desire" ("Du Dire au Dit, ou la Sagesse du Désir"). Also see "The Paradox of Morality," an interview by Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, and Alison Ainley, in Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (eds.), The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other , p. 171: "In Totality and Infinity I used the word 'justice' for ethics, for the relationship between two people. I spoke of 'justice', although now 'justice' is for me something which is a calculation, which is knowledge, and which supposes politics; it is inseparable from the political. It is something which I distinguish from ethics, which is primary. However, in Totality and Infinity , the word 'ethical' and the word 'just' are the same word, the same question, the same language. When I use the word 'justice' there, it is not in the technical sense as something opposed to or distinct from the moral."

158. Levinas, "Humanism and An-archy," in Collected Philosophical Papers , pp. 135-36; "L'Humanisme et An-archie," Entre Nous , pp. 77-78.

159. Levinas, "The Youth of Israel," in Nine Talmudic Readings , p. 135.

160. Levinas, "Le Moi et la Totalité," Entre Nous , p. 38.

161. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston, IL: North-western University Press, 1968, p. 148; Le Visible et l'Invisible (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 195. Hereafter, the English translation will be cited as "VIE," and the French original will be cited as "VIF."

162. Merleau-Ponty, VIE 152, VIF 199.

163. Merleau-Ponty, VIE 260, VIF 313.

164. Benjamin, "On the Mimetic Faculty," in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken, 1986), p. 336. Also see Levinas, "The Trace of the Other," in Mark Taylor (ed.), Deconstruction in Context (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 345-59, and "Enigma and Phenomenon," in Collected Philosophical Papers , p. 68. I also recommend Edward Casey, "Levinas on Memory and the Trace," in J. Sallis, G. Moneta, and J. continue

Taminiaux (eds.), The Collegium Phaenomenologicum (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988).

165. Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," in Sean Hand (ed.), The Levinas Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 84.

166. Alphonso Lingis, "The Sensuality and the Sensitivity," in Cohen (ed.), Face to Face with Levinas , p. 227.

167. Adriaan Peperzak, "Some Remarks on Kant, Hegel, and Levinas," in Cohen (ed.), Face to Face with Levinas , p. 212.

168. See Robert Bernasconi, " 'Only the Persecuted': Language of the Oppressor, Language of the Oppressed," in Adriaan Peperzak (ed.), Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 77-86.

169. Levinas, Difficile liberté: Essais sur le Judaisme (Paris: Albin Michel, 2nd edition, 1976), p. 290.

170. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: Double-day, 1965), ch. 7, p. 80. Translation modified.

171. Levinas, "Messianic Texts," Difficult Freedom , p. 78.

172. Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings , pp. 114-15.

173. For further discussion on the problematic of language and the problem of retrieving the trace, see my "Tracework: Experience and Description in the Moral Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas," forthcoming in an anthology on Merleau-Ponty edited by Bernard Flynn and Wayne Froman.

174. Adorno, Negative Dialectics , pp. 365-68; Negative Dialektik , in Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973), vol. 6, pp. 358-61. English translation modified, italics added.

175. Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama , p. 175; Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels , p. 299.

176. Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 140.

177. Levinas, Difficult Freedom , p. 135.

178. Ibid., p. 140.

177. Levinas, Difficult Freedom , p. 135.

178. Ibid., p. 140.

179. Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," in The Primacy of Perception , p. 146.

180. Merleau-Ponty, VIE 159; VIF 211.

181. See Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). This is an important book. Reading it after I had thought this chapter finished, I realized that I needed to say something here that would remind us that intercorporeality is not necessarily liberating and that the "persecution" and "trauma" of which Levinas speaks can be the "subjection" of oppression, of a recognition withheld, as well as the origin of responsibility and obligation. Thus I was provoked to add a new final section, indebted to her argument on behalf of the many whose lives have been irrevocably damaged by the pressures for normalization inherent in all processes of socialization, all forms of subjection.

182. On this theme, see Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History , cited earlier. break

183. Horkheimer, "The Authoritarian State," in Arato and Gebhardt (eds.), Frankfurt School Reader , p. 102.

184. Levinas, "De l'Unicité," Entre Nous , p. 202.

1. Walter Benjamin, quoted in Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (New York: Continuum, 1973), p. 359. Translation slightly modified.

2. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: New Left Books, 1974), §128, p. 200.

3. Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in David Krell (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings , revised second edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1994), p. 192. For the German text, see "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," Holzwege (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), p. 55. Here, and in all my other transcriptions of translations made by others, I have reduced the word "Being," beginning with a capital letter, to "being," beginning with a small letter. Capitalization unnecessarily encourages metaphysical hypostatization, and only gives critics an easy reason to accuse Heidegger of metaphysical mystification.

4. Herbert Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character of Culture," in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 98.

5. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 167.

6. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in Early Greek Thinking (New York; Harper & Row, 1975), p. 13. The German text is to be found in "Der continue

Spruch des Anaximander," Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), p. 296.

7. But for Benjamin, "Andenken" has a quite different meaning: "What are sold in the arcades are Andenken [mementos, souvenirs]. In the arcades, the ' Andenken ' perpetuate the form of commodities." Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982), vol. 5, part 2, p. 1034.

8. See Stephen David Ross, Injustice and Restitution: The Ordinance of Time (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), and want to note my indebtedness.

9. See Benjamin's letter to Gershom Scholem, dated January 20, 1930, GS, vol. 5, part 2, p. 1094.

10. For Benjamin's distinction, see his "Prologue" for the Trauerspiel essay, where he distinguishes between a "revelation" of truth and its totalizing, reifying "exposure": "truth is not a process of exposure [ Enthüllung ] which destroys the secret, but a revelation [ Offenbarung ] which does justice to it," from Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: New Left Books, 1977), p. 31; Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels , in Schriften , (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1955), vol. 1, p. 146. This is related to his thesis that the truth—at least the truth of revelation, is "an intentionless state of being" and that the "proper approach" to it is "not one of intention and knowledge, but rather total immersion and absorption [ Eingehen und Verschwinden ] in it." "Truth," he argued, "is the death of intention" OGT 35-36; UDT 150-51. For Heidegger's equivalent, formulated in terms of a distinction between "truth" and "unconcealment" ( aletheia ), see Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), §§33-34 and §44, and also his essay on "The Essence of Truth," in Krell (ed.), Basic Writings , pp. 115-38.

11. For an important and insightful discussion of the question of justice in Heidegger, see Robert Bernasconi, "Justice and the Twilight Zone of Morality," in John Sallis (ed.), Reading Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 80-94.

12. Theodor W. Adorno, Notes to Literature , vol. II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 165.

13. Adorno, "On the Final Scene of Faust," in Notes to Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), vol. 1, p. 120.

14. Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments , trans. by Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), §80, p. 27.

15. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 13-14. Habermas clearly recognizes, here, the difference between "fate" and "destiny." This is a crucial distinction for Heidegger, who uses "Schicksal" to refer to fate, a predetermined chain of events, and "Geschick" to refer to destiny, a future that can come to pass only if our appropriation of the past prepares for its arrival.

16. Schlegel, op. cit., §330, p. 66.

17. Benjamin, "Rückblick auf Stefan George," Schriften , vol. 1, p. 323: "Prophetie ist ein Vorgang in der moralischen Welt. Was der Prophet vo- soft

raussieht, sind die Strafgerichte." My translation. It can be useful to keep in mind that Benjamin's conception of the interaction between imagination and remembrance can be traced back to Novalis's discussion of Erinnerung and Ahnung in what he calls "Poesie," the work of the "poëtische Philosoph." Novalis, in turn, derived many of his thoughts (e.g., Spielraum and Zufälligkeit ) from Fichte's Grundriß des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre (1795) as well as from Fichte's Grundlage of 1794-95.

18. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Continuum, 1986), p. 230.

19. In this regard, see Howard Caygill's excellent discussion of the affinities and differences between Heidegger and Benjamin, in his chapter, "Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition," in Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne (eds.), Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 1-31.

20. See, for example, Benjamin's elegiac lament over the loss of narrative memory in modern, late capitalist culture, beautifully articulated in "The Storyteller," in Illuminations (New York; Schocken Books, 1969), pp. 83-109.

21. Adorno, "Was bedeutet Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?" in G. Knädelbach (ed.), Erziehung zur Mündigkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), p. 13. Quoted by Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 99.

22. Benjamin, "Zum Bilde Prousts," in Schriften , vol. 2 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1955), p. 133.

23. Benjamin, GS, vol. 1, part 3, p. 1064.

24. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations , p. 254; Schriften I, p. 495.

25. Concerning the dialectical antinomies in Benjamin's relationship to images of redemption, see Rebecca Comay, "Materialist Mutations of the Bilderverbot ," in David M. Levin (ed.), Sites of Vision: The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 337-78, and "Redeeming Revenge: Nietzsche, Benjamin, Heidegger, and the Politics of Memory," in Clayton Koelb (ed.), Nietzsche as Post-Modernist: Essays Pro and Con (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990). Also see Michael W. Jennings, Dialectical Images: Walter Benjamin's Theory of Literary Criticism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Charles Rosen, "The Ruins of Walter Benjamin," in Gary Smith (ed.), On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 129-75; Rolf Tiedemann, "Dialectics at a Standstill: Approaches to the Passagen-Werk ," in Smith (ed.), On Walter Benjamin , pp. 260-91; Hans Robert Jauss, "Reflections on the Chapter 'Modernity' in Benjamin's Baudelaire Fragments," in Smith (ed.), On Walter Benjamin , pp. 176-84; Habermas, "Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique," in Smith (ed.), On Walter Benjamin , pp. 90-128. I am also greatly indebted to Susan Buck-Morss, whose work, published in The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), has not only made my own work much easier, but enabled me to take my thinking much further than otherwise would have been possible. break

26. Benjamin, "Imagination," in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings , 1913-1926, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 280.

27. Ibid., p. 282.

26. Benjamin, "Imagination," in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings , 1913-1926, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 280.

27. Ibid., p. 282.

28. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations , p. 260; Schriften , vol. 1, p. 502.

29. Ibid., p. 256 in the English; p. 497 in the German.

28. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations , p. 260; Schriften , vol. 1, p. 502.

29. Ibid., p. 256 in the English; p. 497 in the German.

30. Irving Wohlfarth, "On the Messianic Structure of Walter Benjamin's Last Reflections," in Glyph, Johns Hopkins Textual Studies , vol. 3 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 152. This is an excellent study, one from which I have learned much.

31. Benjamin, "The Storyteller," in Illuminations , p. 98; Schriften , vol. 2, pp. 245-46.

32. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), pp. 74 and 99; Totalité et Infini: Essai sur l'Extériorité (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), pp. 47 and 92.

33. Levinas, Totality and Infinity , p. 28; Totalité et Infini , p. xvi.

34. See, for example, Heidegger's Being and Time , §44-45, pp. 256-273; Sein und Zeit (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, fifth edition, 1941), pp. 212-230.

35. Benjamin, "Theses," in Illuminations , p. 255; Schriften , vol. 1, p. 497.

36. Ibid, p. 257 in the English; p. 499 in the German.

35. Benjamin, "Theses," in Illuminations , p. 255; Schriften , vol. 1, p. 497.

36. Ibid, p. 257 in the English; p. 499 in the German.

37. Caygill, op. cit., p. 21.

38. Ibid., p. 18.

37. Caygill, op. cit., p. 21.

38. Ibid., p. 18.

39. Benjamin, "Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress," in Gary Smith (ed.), Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 70. The Smith anthology contains a good translation of this important text. For the German, see "Zur Erkenntnistheoretisches, Theorie des Fortschritts," GS, vol. 5, part 1, pp. 598-99.

40. Benjamin, GS, vol. 5, part 2, p. 1027.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid. Also see p. 1021

40. Benjamin, GS, vol. 5, part 2, p. 1027.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid. Also see p. 1021

40. Benjamin, GS, vol. 5, part 2, p. 1027.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid. Also see p. 1021

40. Benjamin, GS, vol. 5, part 2, p. 1027.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid. Also see p. 1021

44. Benjamin, "Der Sammler," GS, vol. 5, part 1, p. 279.

45. Ibid., p. 271.

44. Benjamin, "Der Sammler," GS, vol. 5, part 1, p. 279.

45. Ibid., p. 271.

46. Benjamin, GS, vol. 5, part 2, 1027.

47. Benjamin, GS, vol. 5, part 2, p. 1036. See also p. 1027.

48. Benjamin, GS, vol. 5, part 1, p. 279.

49. See Benjamin, GS, vol. 5, part 1, pp. 993-1038, especially 524-69.

50. See Benjamin, GS, vol. 5, part 2, pp. 1052-53.

51. See Benjamin, "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," in Illuminations , pp. 166-74. Schriften , vol. 1, pp. 437-46.

52. Adorno, "Introduction to Benjamin's Schriften ," in B, p. 9. This description echoes Benjamin's own "description of the world that emerges under the gaze of the melancholic." See Benjamin, GS, vol. 1, p. 318. break

53. Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" in Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld, and David Carlson (eds.), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 44.

54. See Max Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics: Walter Benjamin's Play of Mourning (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993). Pensky articulates the dialectical intricacies of mourning with admirable lucidity.

55. For more on the phenomenology of the essential relation between vision and weeping, see my book, The Opening of Vision (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988). I argue there that crying is the root of seeing, and that, in terms of human experience, it is not mere coincidence that the eyes both weep and see.

56. Max Horkheimer, "Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen," an interview with Helmut Gumnior (Hamburg: Furche, 1970).

57. Benjamin, "Baudelaire," GS, vol. 5, part 1, p. 465.

58. Ibid., p. 466.

59. Ibid., p. 439.

60. Ibid., p. 466.

57. Benjamin, "Baudelaire," GS, vol. 5, part 1, p. 465.

58. Ibid., p. 466.

59. Ibid., p. 439.

60. Ibid., p. 466.

57. Benjamin, "Baudelaire," GS, vol. 5, part 1, p. 465.

58. Ibid., p. 466.

59. Ibid., p. 439.

60. Ibid., p. 466.

57. Benjamin, "Baudelaire," GS, vol. 5, part 1, p. 465.

58. Ibid., p. 466.

59. Ibid., p. 439.

60. Ibid., p. 466.

61. See Pensky, op. cit., p. 121 for a discussion of the phases of this allegorical dialectic. For Benjamin's remark about the "death of intention," see OGT 35-36, UDT 150-51.

62. Benjamin, "Paris: Capital of the Nineteenth Century," in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), p. 162; "Paris: Die Hauptstadt des XIX. Jahrhunderts," Schriften , vol. 1, p. 422.

63. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 126.

64. Pensky, p. 124.

65. Ibid., p. 122.

64. Pensky, p. 124.

65. Ibid., p. 122.

66. Adorno, "A Portrait of Walter Benjamin," in Prisms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), p. 235.

67. Benjamin, "Re the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress," in B, p. 51. For the German original, see GS, vol. 5, part 1, p. 578.

68. Benjamin, GS, vol. 2, p. 299.

69. Benjamin, "On the Topic of Individual Disciplines and Philosophy," in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings 1913-1926 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), vol. 1, p. 405.

70. Benjamin, Angelus Novus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966), pp. 202 and 215. This description also appears many times elsewhere, e.g., in the essay on Surrealism.

71. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations , p. 254; Schriften , vol. 1, p. 496.

72. Benjamin, GS, vol. 1, part 3, p. 1233.

73. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," op. cit., p. 263 in the English; p. 506 in the German. break

74. Benjamin, GS, vol. 1, part 3, p. 1243.

75. See Howard Caygill, "Benjamin, Heidegger, and the Destruction of Tradition," in Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne (eds.), Walter Benjamin's Philosophy , pp. 12-21. Caygill argues that a significant difference between Heidegger and Benjamin consists in the fact that the former, at least in Being and Time , continues to think of the site where tradition is gathered into the present, received and handed down, in terms of a subject. Although this is only in a certain sense correct—it must be kept in mind, first, that in the Dasein of Being and Time Heidegger attempts a deconstruction of the traditional subject, and second, that after his Kehre he carried this deconstruction so far that his critics, misunderstanding his philosophical moves, disturbed by his visionary turn to Ereignis , accused him of mystification and fatalism—it must not be overlooked, as Pensky astutely points out (op. cit., pp. 215-19), that Benjamin's virtual eradication of the subject, his insistence that the dialectical gaze be without intention, that it attempt to be purely receptive, holding itself open to involuntary memories, make the political relevance of this gaze and its images extremely problematic. As Foucault seemed to realize near the end of his life, the dangers in preserving the subject are matched by equal dangers in totally eliminating it. What is needed, instead, is a radical reconfiguration of the site occupied much too long by the conceit of the philosopher's "subject."

76. Benjamin, "Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia," in Reflections , p. 192.

77. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), note 3, p. 194; Autrement Qu'Être, ou au-delà de l'Essence (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), note 3, p. 128.

78. Ibid., note 4, p. 194 in English; note 4, p. 128 in the French original.

77. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), note 3, p. 194; Autrement Qu'Être, ou au-delà de l'Essence (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), note 3, p. 128.

78. Ibid., note 4, p. 194 in English; note 4, p. 128 in the French original.

79. Benjamin, "The Critique of Violence," in Reflections , p. 300; "Kritik der Gewalt," Schriften , vol. 1, p. 28.

80. Benjamin, GS, vol. 1, part 3, p. 1245.

81. Adorno, "The Actuality of Philosophy," in Telos 31 (spring 1974), pp. 120, 126; Gesammelte Schriften I: Philosophische Frühschriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973), p. 76.

82. Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie , GA, vol. 24 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), p. 244; The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 171. Translation altered.

83. Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics," in The End of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 110; "Überwindung der Metaphysik," Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1954), p. 99. English translation of Ereignis significantly modified.

84. Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 241.

85. Ibid., pp. 236-37.

84. Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 241.

85. Ibid., pp. 236-37.

86. Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 86; "Überwindung der Metaphysik," op. cit., p. 72. break

87. Ibid., p. 110 in the English; p. 99 in the German.

86. Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 86; "Überwindung der Metaphysik," op. cit., p. 72. break

87. Ibid., p. 110 in the English; p. 99 in the German.

88. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 166; Was Hei b t Denken? (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954), p. 104. In part 1, lecture 1, and part 2, lectures 3-5 (1951-52), Heidegger discusses memory as gathering and attempts to think it, by way of its etymology, as a process of thanking.

89. Ibid.

88. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 166; Was Hei b t Denken? (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954), p. 104. In part 1, lecture 1, and part 2, lectures 3-5 (1951-52), Heidegger discusses memory as gathering and attempts to think it, by way of its etymology, as a process of thanking.

89. Ibid.

90. Heidegger, "Recollection in Metaphysics," in The End of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 83; "Die Erinnerung in die Metaphysik," Nietzsche , vol. 2 (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1961), p. 490. Translation of Ereignis as "Appropriation" altered.

91. Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 96; p. 83 in the German text. Also see his Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Gesamtausgabe , vol. 65 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), especially §§89-100.

92. Heidegger, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," in On Time and Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 57; "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens," Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), pp. 62-63.

93. Heidegger, Basic Concepts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 105; Grundbegriffe, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981), vol. 51, p. 123.

94. See Immanuel Kant, Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie, Gesammelte Schriften , ed. Königliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1902), vol. 8, p. 405.

95. Basic Concepts , p. 73 in the English, p. 86 in the German.

96. Ibid., p. 73 in the English, p. 87 in the German.

97. Ibid., p. 87 in the English, p. 101 in the German.

98. Ibid., p. 13 in the English, p. 15 in the German.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., p. 78 in the English, p. 92 in the German.

101. Ibid., p. 10 in the English, p. 13 in the German.

95. Basic Concepts , p. 73 in the English, p. 86 in the German.

96. Ibid., p. 73 in the English, p. 87 in the German.

97. Ibid., p. 87 in the English, p. 101 in the German.

98. Ibid., p. 13 in the English, p. 15 in the German.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., p. 78 in the English, p. 92 in the German.

101. Ibid., p. 10 in the English, p. 13 in the German.

95. Basic Concepts , p. 73 in the English, p. 86 in the German.

96. Ibid., p. 73 in the English, p. 87 in the German.

97. Ibid., p. 87 in the English, p. 101 in the German.

98. Ibid., p. 13 in the English, p. 15 in the German.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., p. 78 in the English, p. 92 in the German.

101. Ibid., p. 10 in the English, p. 13 in the German.

95. Basic Concepts , p. 73 in the English, p. 86 in the German.

96. Ibid., p. 73 in the English, p. 87 in the German.

97. Ibid., p. 87 in the English, p. 101 in the German.

98. Ibid., p. 13 in the English, p. 15 in the German.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., p. 78 in the English, p. 92 in the German.

101. Ibid., p. 10 in the English, p. 13 in the German.

95. Basic Concepts , p. 73 in the English, p. 86 in the German.

96. Ibid., p. 73 in the English, p. 87 in the German.

97. Ibid., p. 87 in the English, p. 101 in the German.

98. Ibid., p. 13 in the English, p. 15 in the German.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., p. 78 in the English, p. 92 in the German.

101. Ibid., p. 10 in the English, p. 13 in the German.

95. Basic Concepts , p. 73 in the English, p. 86 in the German.

96. Ibid., p. 73 in the English, p. 87 in the German.

97. Ibid., p. 87 in the English, p. 101 in the German.

98. Ibid., p. 13 in the English, p. 15 in the German.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., p. 78 in the English, p. 92 in the German.

101. Ibid., p. 10 in the English, p. 13 in the German.

95. Basic Concepts , p. 73 in the English, p. 86 in the German.

96. Ibid., p. 73 in the English, p. 87 in the German.

97. Ibid., p. 87 in the English, p. 101 in the German.

98. Ibid., p. 13 in the English, p. 15 in the German.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., p. 78 in the English, p. 92 in the German.

101. Ibid., p. 10 in the English, p. 13 in the German.

102. Heidegger, "Der Zeitbegriff in der Geisteswissenschaft," Frühe Schriften (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), p. 368; trans. by Harry Taylor and Hans Uffelmann as "The Concept of Time in the Science of History," in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology , vol. 9, no. 1 (January 1978), p. 8.

103. Heidegger, Being and Time , p. 359; Sein und Zeit , p. 311.

104. Heidegger, "The Turning," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 38; "Die Kehre," Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1962), p. 38.

105. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German.

106. Ibid., p. 37 in both the English and the German.

107. Ibid., p. 49 in the English, p. 46 in the German.

108. Ibid., p. 44 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

109. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German. break

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., p. 45 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

104. Heidegger, "The Turning," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 38; "Die Kehre," Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1962), p. 38.

105. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German.

106. Ibid., p. 37 in both the English and the German.

107. Ibid., p. 49 in the English, p. 46 in the German.

108. Ibid., p. 44 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

109. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German. break

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., p. 45 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

104. Heidegger, "The Turning," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 38; "Die Kehre," Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1962), p. 38.

105. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German.

106. Ibid., p. 37 in both the English and the German.

107. Ibid., p. 49 in the English, p. 46 in the German.

108. Ibid., p. 44 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

109. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German. break

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., p. 45 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

104. Heidegger, "The Turning," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 38; "Die Kehre," Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1962), p. 38.

105. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German.

106. Ibid., p. 37 in both the English and the German.

107. Ibid., p. 49 in the English, p. 46 in the German.

108. Ibid., p. 44 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

109. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German. break

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., p. 45 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

104. Heidegger, "The Turning," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 38; "Die Kehre," Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1962), p. 38.

105. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German.

106. Ibid., p. 37 in both the English and the German.

107. Ibid., p. 49 in the English, p. 46 in the German.

108. Ibid., p. 44 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

109. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German. break

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., p. 45 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

104. Heidegger, "The Turning," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 38; "Die Kehre," Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1962), p. 38.

105. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German.

106. Ibid., p. 37 in both the English and the German.

107. Ibid., p. 49 in the English, p. 46 in the German.

108. Ibid., p. 44 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

109. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German. break

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., p. 45 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

104. Heidegger, "The Turning," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 38; "Die Kehre," Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1962), p. 38.

105. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German.

106. Ibid., p. 37 in both the English and the German.

107. Ibid., p. 49 in the English, p. 46 in the German.

108. Ibid., p. 44 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

109. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German. break

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., p. 45 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

104. Heidegger, "The Turning," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 38; "Die Kehre," Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1962), p. 38.

105. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German.

106. Ibid., p. 37 in both the English and the German.

107. Ibid., p. 49 in the English, p. 46 in the German.

108. Ibid., p. 44 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

109. Ibid., p. 47 in the English, p. 45 in the German. break

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., p. 45 in the English, p. 43 in the German.

112. Heidegger, Parmenides (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 144-51; Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe , vol. 54 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), pp. 214-26.

113. Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), vol. 29/30, p. 225.

114. Theodor Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), p. 494.

115. Heidegger, BT, p. 185; SZ, p. 145.

116. Caygill, op. cit., p. 10.

117. Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 59; "Die Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," Holzwege (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), p. 47.

118. Benjamin, "Theologico-Political Fragment," in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings , p. 313.

119. Heidegger, GA, vol. 65, pp. 83-84.

120. See P. Christopher Smith, "Agon kai katallagê, Kampf und Versöhnung in Heidegger's Readings of the Antigone ," in 1997 Proceedings of the Thirty-first Heidegger Conference (Penn State University). In this important paper, Smith undertakes a reading of Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics and his essay on Hölderlin's hymn, "Der Ister," in order to document the changes in Heidegger's thinking about "resoluteness," the violence of heroic self-assertion, struggling against the forces of nature and the injustices of fate. The seer in some ways resembles the tragic hero of the Introduction to Metaphysics , in that he also "bolts into the unsaid, . . . breaks into the unthought, . . . forces what has not happened into happening, and makes the never-seen appear. . . . " See Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), p. 123. But unlike this tragic hero, whose defiant self-assertion can only end in defeat and catastrophe, the seer undertakes a recollection of the justice, the Diké , of being, choosing to learn both the possible and the inevitable from its secret ordinance.

121. Heidegger, AX, p. 25; for the German, see H, p. 309.

122. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 135; Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), p. 123.

123. Ibid.

122. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 135; Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), p. 123.

123. Ibid.

124. Heidegger, Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), p. 191.

125. Heidegger, Nietzsche , trans. by David F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art; Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961), vol. 1, p. 194.

126. Ibid., p. 165-66 in the English; p. 193-94 in the German.

125. Heidegger, Nietzsche , trans. by David F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art; Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961), vol. 1, p. 194.

126. Ibid., p. 165-66 in the English; p. 193-94 in the German.

127. See Heidegger's discussion of justice in the context of critical reflections on Nietzsche, in "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is dead,'" in Question Con - soft

cerning Technology , pp. 88-93; "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot,'" Holzwege , pp. 224-29. I would argue that, with regard to the question of justice, the reading of Heidegger that I have laid out here is supported by Heidegger's discussion of justice in relation to Nietzsche. Heidegger challenges Nietzsche's conception of justice on the grounds that it is a manifestation of the ego-logical subject's will to power, its drive towards a nihilism that is willfully forgetful of being. "The justice thought by Nietzsche," he says, "is the truth of what is—which now is in the mode of the will to power." Rejecting a justice that is anthropocentric and grounded in domination, in the will to power, Heidegger pushes towards a representation of justice that is oriented, instead, by the questioning thought of being.

128. Adorno, Minima Moralia , §153, p. 247.

129. Benjamin, GS, vol. 3, part 1: Kritik und Rezensionen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972), p. 259. My translation.

130. Adorno, Minima Moralia , §153, p. 247.

131. Novalis, Friedrich von Hardenberg, Heinrich von Ofterdingen , in Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel (eds.), Schriften , vol. 1: Das Dichterische Werk (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, third enlarged and revised edition, 1977), p. 286, ll. 6-7.

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 1e.

2. Theodor Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 126.

3. Wallace Stevens, The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 305.

4. Friedrich Nietzsche, Gay Science (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 203. For the original German, see Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1982), p. 158: "Gedanken sind die Schatten unserer Empfindungen—immer dunkler, leerer, einfacher als diese."

5. René Char, "Pour un Prométhée Saxifrage: En touchant la main éolienne de Hölderlin," Oeuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), p. 399: "God had lived too powerfully among us. We no longer knew how to rise and depart. The stars are dead in our eyes, after being sovereign in his gaze." (My translation.)

6. Walter Benjamin, "Das Passagen-Werk," Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982), vol. 5, p. 702 (T 2, 5), cited by Susan Buck-Morss in The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), p. 308.

7. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1956), p. 166.

8. Blaise Pascal, Pensées (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1958), §206, p. 61. See also §72, p. 17. break

9. Georg Lukács, Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), p. 29.

10. Benjamin, "Das Passagen-Werk," Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 5, part 1, (K6, 4), p. 505. My translation.

11. G. W. F. Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History , trans. by Leo Rauch (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), p. 14.

12. Char, Oeuvres Complètes , p. 424. My translation: "They take for clarity the jaundiced laughter of shadows."

13. Plato, "The Republic," in Benjamin Jowett (ed. and trans.), The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random House, 1937), vol. 1, p. 739.

14. Ibid., p. 761.

13. Plato, "The Republic," in Benjamin Jowett (ed. and trans.), The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random House, 1937), vol. 1, p. 739.

14. Ibid., p. 761.

15. See Martin Heidegger, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit (Bern: A. Francke, 1947).

16. Char, "Éclore en hiver," Oeuvres Complètes , p. 503. My translation: "to see, nearing, a shadow giving birth to a shadow through the slant of a luminous shaft, and to scrutinize it."

17. Nietzsche, The Will to Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), book 1, §91, p. 55.

18. Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: Ein Lyriker im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus," Zentralpark , part 3, §28, Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 1, part 2, p. 676. My translation.

19. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 1, part 3, p. 1165. My translation.

20. Char, "Dans la Marche," Oeuvres Complètes , p. 411. My translation: "We can live only in the openness of the intermediate, precisely on the hermetic dividing line between shadow and light."

21. Rudolf Borchardt, "Epilegomena zu Dante, I" Schriften (Berlin: E. Rowohlt, 1923), pp. 56-57, quoted by Benjamin in N1, 8, "Re: The Theory of Knowledge, Knowledge of Theory," in Gary Smith (ed.), Benjamin: Philosophy, History, Aesthetics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 44. For the original quotation, see Benjamin, "Das Passagen-Werk," Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 5, part 1, p. 571: "Das bildschaffende Medium in uns zu dem stereoskopischen und dimensionalen Sehen in die Tiefe der geschichtlichen Schatten zu erziehen."

22. Benjamin, "Das Passagen-Werk," Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 4: Kritik und Rezensionen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972), p. 259.

1. Henry David Thoreau, The Journal of Henry David Thoreau , vol. 2, ed. by B. Torry and F. Allen (New York: Dover, 1906), p. 43. Journal entry for June 21, 1852.

2. I would like to mention, here, Is There Truth in Art? by Herman Rapaport. This book, published in 1997 by Cornell University Press, has been of great value, not only as a stimulus and provocation, but also as a measured force of restraint. break

3. Wallace Stevens, The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 203-4. In "Eye and Mind," an essay on vision and painting, Maurice Merleau-Ponty observes that "no grape was ever what it is in the most figurative painting and that no painting, no matter how abstract, can get away from being, that even Caravaggio's grape is the grape itself." This remark carries the implication that truth in painting cannot be understood in terms of its correctness, its correspondence with a fixed reality. See Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 188.

4. Plato, The Republic , in Benjamin Jowett (ed. and trans.), The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random House, 1937), vol. 2, book 5, p. 739.

5. Ibid., book 6, p. 761.

6. Ibid., book 7, p. 797.

7. Ibid., book 6, p. 770.

8. Ibid., book 7, pp. 791, 797.

9. Plato, Symposium , in ibid., pp. 301-45.

10. Plato, Phaedrus , in ibid., pp. 253-55.

4. Plato, The Republic , in Benjamin Jowett (ed. and trans.), The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random House, 1937), vol. 2, book 5, p. 739.

5. Ibid., book 6, p. 761.

6. Ibid., book 7, p. 797.

7. Ibid., book 6, p. 770.

8. Ibid., book 7, pp. 791, 797.

9. Plato, Symposium , in ibid., pp. 301-45.

10. Plato, Phaedrus , in ibid., pp. 253-55.

4. Plato, The Republic , in Benjamin Jowett (ed. and trans.), The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random House, 1937), vol. 2, book 5, p. 739.

5. Ibid., book 6, p. 761.

6. Ibid., book 7, p. 797.

7. Ibid., book 6, p. 770.

8. Ibid., book 7, pp. 791, 797.

9. Plato, Symposium , in ibid., pp. 301-45.

10. Plato, Phaedrus , in ibid., pp. 253-55.

4. Plato, The Republic , in Benjamin Jowett (ed. and trans.), The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random House, 1937), vol. 2, book 5, p. 739.

5. Ibid., book 6, p. 761.

6. Ibid., book 7, p. 797.

7. Ibid., book 6, p. 770.

8. Ibid., book 7, pp. 791, 797.

9. Plato, Symposium , in ibid., pp. 301-45.

10. Plato, Phaedrus , in ibid., pp. 253-55.

4. Plato, The Republic , in Benjamin Jowett (ed. and trans.), The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random House, 1937), vol. 2, book 5, p. 739.

5. Ibid., book 6, p. 761.

6. Ibid., book 7, p. 797.

7. Ibid., book 6, p. 770.

8. Ibid., book 7, pp. 791, 797.

9. Plato, Symposium , in ibid., pp. 301-45.

10. Plato, Phaedrus , in ibid., pp. 253-55.

4. Plato, The Republic , in Benjamin Jowett (ed. and trans.), The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random House, 1937), vol. 2, book 5, p. 739.

5. Ibid., book 6, p. 761.

6. Ibid., book 7, p. 797.

7. Ibid., book 6, p. 770.

8. Ibid., book 7, pp. 791, 797.

9. Plato, Symposium , in ibid., pp. 301-45.

10. Plato, Phaedrus , in ibid., pp. 253-55.

4. Plato, The Republic , in Benjamin Jowett (ed. and trans.), The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random House, 1937), vol. 2, book 5, p. 739.

5. Ibid., book 6, p. 761.

6. Ibid., book 7, p. 797.

7. Ibid., book 6, p. 770.

8. Ibid., book 7, pp. 791, 797.

9. Plato, Symposium , in ibid., pp. 301-45.

10. Plato, Phaedrus , in ibid., pp. 253-55.

11. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: New Left Books, 1977), p. 31; Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1955), vol. 1, p. 145.

12. See, for example, Martin Heidegger, "Der Spruch des Anaximander," Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), p. 321; "The Anaximander Fragment," in Early Greek Thinking (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 36.

13. Benjamin, German Tragic Drama , p. 31 in the English, p. 146 in the German.

14. Benjamin, German Tragic Drama , p. 33 in English; p.148.

15. Stevens, Collected Poems , p. 373.

16. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche , vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art , trans. by David F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 166; Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961), vol. 1, p. 195. Hereafter, the English will be designated "NA," the German "NK," the "A" standing in for "Art," the "K" standing in for "Kunst." I will use Krell's exemplary translations and follow them in every detail, except for one: I will not, anywhere in this chapter, write "being" with a capital letter. In my opinion, the capital letter only subjects being to unnecessary temptations to reify it or capture it for another ontotheological discourse.

17. Heidegger, "What Are Poets For?," in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 120; "Wozu Dichter?," Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), p. 275.

18. See Heidegger, Being and Time , trans. by Macquarrie and Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 177 and 197; Sein und Zeit (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1941), pp. 138 and 155. Heidegger's word is "abgeblendet."

19. John Sallis, "Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible," in Research in Phenomenology , vol. 18 (1987), pp. 16-17. This essay has been reprinted in Double Truth (Albany: State University of New York, 1995), pp. 75-96. My continue

page references (hereafter "TF," followed by the page number) will, however, use the journal publication. Also see Sallis's important earlier work, Being and Logos: The Way of Platonic Dialogue (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1986), pp. 153-59, where he takes up the question of Plato's metaphysical dualism, separating the sensuous and the intelligible. Also relevant is his Echoes: After Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

20. See Heidegger, Being and Time , §§33-34 and 44, pp. 195-211 and 257-73; Sein und Zeit , pp. 153-67 and 212-30.

21. Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Poetry, Language, Thought , p. 56; "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," Holzwege , p. 44. Henceforth, the English translation will be cited as "PLT" and the German as "H."

22. Heidegger, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," in David F. Krell (ed. and trans.), Basic Writings (New York: Harper & Row, first edition, 1977), p. 386; "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens," in Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), p. 74. Hereafter, the English translation will be cited as "BW," while the German will be cited as "SD."

23. See Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in Basic Writings , p. 123; Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949), p. 11.

24. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 34; "Die Frage nach der Technik," in Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Neske, 1962), p. 34.

25. Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is dead,'" in Question Concerning Technology , p. 83; "Nietzsches Wort: 'Gott ist tot,'" Holzwege , p. 220.

26. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Question Concerning Technology , p. 28; "Die Frage nach der Technik," op. cit., p. 27.

27. Theodor Adorno, Philosophie der neuen Musik (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1958), p. 126.

28. Rainer Maria Rilke, Poems 1912-1926, trans. by Michael Hamburger (Redding Ridge, CT: Black Swan Books, 1981), pp. 48-49: "Werk des Gesichts ist getan, / tue nun Herz-werk / an den Bildern in dir, jenen gefangenen; denn du / überwältigst sie: aber nun kennst du sie nicht."

29. Rilke, Duino Elegies , trans. by J. B. Leishman and Stephen Spender (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), pp. 20-21. I have significantly modified their translation, staying closer to the original German, which is also provided in this edition, next to the English translation: "Denn das Schöne ist nichts / als das Schrecklichen Anfang. . . . " break