1. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties , rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 2965), pp. 402-403.

2. The New American Right , ed. Daniel Bell (New York: Criterion Books, 1955); The Radical Right , ed. Daniel Bell (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1963).

3. Bell, Radical Right , pp. 84-85.

4. Ibid., pp. 102, 233, 21-22, 16.

3. Bell, Radical Right , pp. 84-85.

4. Ibid., pp. 102, 233, 21-22, 16.

5. G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 307.

6. James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).

7. For a different way of making a similar point about sociology and the Right, see Alan Wolfe, "Sociology, Liberalism, and the Radical Right," New Left Review 128 (July-August 1981): 3-27.

8. Walter Dean Burnham, "The Eclipse of the Democratic Party," Society 21 (July-August 1984): 5-11.

9. George Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945 (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

10. William A. Rusher, The Rise of the Right (New York: Morrow, 1984); Alan Crawford, Thunder on the Right: The "New Right" and the Politics of Resentment (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); Kevin P. Phillips, Post-Conservative America: People, Politics, and Ideology in a Time of Crisis (New York: Random House, 1982).

11. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., and Charles D. Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s (New York: Norton, 1975); Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Re - soft

publican Majority (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969); idem, Mediacracy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975); idem, Post-Conservative America ; Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

12. Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Thomas Byrne Edsall, The New Politics of Inequality (New York: Norton, 1984); Sidney Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political Power (New York: Times Books, 1987).

1. Conservative Digest , April 1981, pp. 24, 26.

2. Frank S. Meyer, "Conservatism," in Left, Right and Center: Essays on Liberalism and Conservatism in the United States , ed. Robert Goldwin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 1-17, at p. 3 (emphasis added). See also George Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement , and William Rusher, The Rise of the Right .

3. For overviews of the New Deal, see William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); Carl N. Degler, Out of Our Past: The Forces That Shaped Modern America , 3d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 412-450; Michael W. Miles, The Odyssey of the American Right (New York: Oxford, 1980), pp. 29-56; and James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1967).

4. James Holt, "The New Deal and the American Anti-Statist Tradition," in The New Deal: The National Level , ed. John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975), pp. 27-49; Theda Skocpol, "The Legacies of New Deal Liberalism," in Liberalism Reconsidered , ed. Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allenheld, 1983), pp. 87-104; Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, The Politics of Social Policy in the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

5. Leuchtenberg, Roosevelt and the New Deal , pp. 326-336; Degler, Out of Our Past , pp. 444-447; Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 272-328.

6. Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics , 3d ed., rev. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 43-88; Walter Dean Burnham, The Current Crisis in American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, continue

1982), pp. 110-113, 146-147, 277-179; James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism .

7. For the vote on fair labor standards, see Patterson, Congressional Conservatism , p. 196. Figures on the outcomes of elections here and elsewhere in this chapter are from Elections '84 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly; 1984) and Presidential Elections since 1789 , 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly; 1979).

8. For overviews of American politics in the late 1940s and 1950s, see Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time: From World War II to Nixon, What Happened and Why (New York: Random House, 1976), pp. 3-98; Eric Goldman, The Crucial Decade—and After: America, 1945-1960 (New York: Random House, 1960); William H. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America since World War II (New York: Oxford, 1986), pp. 31-145; Miles, Odyssey of the American Right , pp. 80-238; and Alan Wolfe, America's Impasse: The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth (New York: Pantheon, 1981), pp. 13-48.

9. For voter turnout, see Walter Dean Burnham, "The 1980 Earthquake: Realignment, Reaction, or What?" in The Hidden Election , ed. Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers (New York: Pantheon, 1981), pp. 98-140, at p. 101. For Truman's campaign appeals, see Goldman, Crucial Decade , p. 85. For class polarization of vote, see Robert R. Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally; 1963); and Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections , rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1983), p. 105.

10. Goldman, Crucial Decade , p. 142; Whittaker Chambers, Witness (New York: Random House, 1952), pp. 793-794; Frank Meyer, The Conservative Mainstream (New Rochelle, N.Y.:Arlington House, 1969), pp. 187-193.

11. Goldman, Crucial Decade , pp. 59-60.

12. How much of a role the alleged communist threat at home and abroad played in the 1952 elections is a matter of some debate, but it certainly contributed to Eisenhower's margin of victory. See, for example, Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter , abridged ed. (New York: John Wiley; 1964), pp. 15-48; Stephen Hess and Michael Nelson, "Foreign Policy: Dominance and Decisiveness in Presidential Elections," in The Elections of 1984 , ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1985), pp. 129-154.

13. James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 218-244; George H. Mayer, The Re - soft

publican Party, 1854-1964 (New York: Oxford, 1964), pp. 504-505; Thomas E. Cavanagh and James L. Sundquist, "The New Two-Party System," in The New Direction in American Politics , ed. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 33-68, esp. p. 43.

14. Wolfe, America's Impasse , pp. 9-10, 24-31; Hodgson, America in Our Time , pp. 67-98.

15. Barry Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative (Shepherdsville, Ky.: Victor, 1960), pp. 67-89.

16. The following synopsis of the history of conservative and liberal as labels in American politics draws on my lengthier account, "The Career of a Concept," an unpublished manuscript. My approach differs from that of others in two ways. First, it focuses on the term conservative rather than liberal . Second, it argues that both terms came into common use in the Progressive Era rather than with the New Deal. For other accounts, see Samuel H. Beer, "Liberalism and the National Ideal," in Left, Right, and Center , ed. Goldwin, pp. 142-169; Ronald Rotunda, "The 'Liberal' Label: Roosevelt's Capture of a Symbol," Public Policy 17 (1968): 377-408.

17. Herbert Hoover, "The Consequences of the Proposed New Deal," in Opposition Politics: The Anti-New Deal Tradition , ed. Joseph Boskin (Beverly Hills: Glencoe Press, 1968), p. 42; Albert Jay Nock, "A Little Conserva-tive," The Atlantic Monthly 158 (October 1936): 481-489.

18. "The Faith of the Freeman," The Freeman 1 (1950): 5; William F. Buckley, Jr., God and Man at Yale: The Superstitions of "Academic Freedom" (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1951); Frank Chodorov, "What Individualism Is Not," National Review 2 (1956): 15-17; Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement , pp. 16-28, 30-31.

19. Editorial, National Review 1 (1955): 5-6; William F. Buckley, Jr., Up from Liberalism (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959); Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative; What Is Conservatism? ed. Frank Meyer (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964); Willmoore Kendall, The Conservative Affirmation (Chicago: Henry Regnery 1963); Rusher, Rise of the Right , p. 90; William F. Buckley, Jr., "Notes toward an Empirical Definition of Conservatism," in What Is Conservatism , ed. Meyer, pp. 211-226. A good example of conservatives defending their absolute right to their new name is their response to M. Morton Auerbach's The Conservative Illusion (New York: Columbia, 1959); see M. Stanton Evans, "Exorcising Conservatism," National Review 8 (1960): 81-82; Richard M. Weaver, "Illusions of Illusion," Modern Age continue

4 (1960): 316-320; and an exchange between Auerbach and various National Review editors in National Review 12 (1962): 57-59, 74.

1. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement , is the indispensable starting point for any examination of the making of contemporary conservative ideology. Its major shortcoming is that it looks at the process of ideological construction largely from the vantage point of the finished product and thus pays little attention to what got left out in the transformation and synthesis, or to the influence of social context on the formation of ideology. Other works of interest in understanding the construction of conservative ideology include Rusher, The Rise of the Right , pp. 11-53; Garry Wills, Confessions of a Conservative (New York: Penguin, 1980), pp. 3-70; John Chamberlain, A Life with the Printed Word (Chicago: Regnery Gateway 1982), pp. 134-167; Charles Lam Markmann, The Buckleys: A Family Examined (New York: Morrow, 1973); William F. Buckley, Jr., Introduction to Did You Ever See a Dream Walking? (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), pp. xv-xl; M. Stanton Evans, "Varieties of Conservative Experience," Modern Age 15 (1971): 130-137; Donald Atwell Zoll, "Philosophical Foundations of the American Right," Modern Age 15 (1971): 114-129; "A Generation of the Intellectual Right," Modern Age 26 (1982): 226-460; and Jeffrey Hart, The American Dissent: A Decade of American Conservatism (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966).

2. Meyer, "Conservatism," pp. 1-17, at 3-4.

3. Murray N. Rothbard, "The Transformation of the American Right," Continuum 2 (1964): 220-231, at p. 220; Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement , pp. 123-130.

4. My account of isolationism in the following paragraphs draws especially on Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966); Wayne S. Cole, America First: The Battle against Intervention , 2d ed. (1953; New York: Octagon, 1971); idem, Roosevelt and The Isolationists, 1932-1945 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983); Justus D. Doenecke, Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1979); and Michael Rogin, The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 75-84. For a good annotated bibliography of isolationist scholarship to the early 1970s, see Justus D. Doenecke, The Literature of Isolationism: A Guide to Non-Interventionist Scholarship, 1930-1972 (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1972). break

5. Miles, Odyssey of the American Right , pp. 49-79, falsely sees isolationism by the 1930s as monopolized by the Right and supported only by conservative arguments. Lubell, Future of American Politics , pp. 131-155, combines this political image of isolationism with an ethnic one by picturing German-Americans as its major constituency. (See n. 4 for sources that adequately refute both these notions.) In reaction to this image of a purely right-wing isolationism, Ronald Radosh, Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), bends over backward to portray some isolationist critics of American foreign policy in the late 1940s and 1950s as precursors of the New Left of the 1960s: "These conservatives raised issues and defined problems that . . . opened the way for liberal and leftist critics of a future epoch" (p. 15). This statement is true enough, but it omits a range of less radical arguments made by these same critics. Although 1950s isolationists like Robert Taft sometimes sounded like 1960s New Left critics of the Vietnam War, they also often sounded like Barry Goldwater. For a more balanced view of the fate of onetime isolationist themes in the 1960s and 1970s, see Jonas, Isolationism in America , pp. 273-287 and Doenecke, Not to the Swift , pp. 231-247.

6. Congressional Record , 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, 97, pt. 1: 55-69. For a fuller account of Taft's position, see Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1951). For a dissection of Taft's contradictions, see Alonzo L. Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers (New York: Oxford, 1985), pp. 106-115.

7. Congressional Record , 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, 96, pt. 12: 17018-17019.

8. Felix Morley, "The Early Days of Human Events ," Human Events 34 (April 27, 1974): 26, 28, 31; Frank Chodorov, One Is a Crowd (New York: Devin-Adair, 1952), p. 116; Aubrey Herbert [Murray Rothbard], "The Real Aggressor," Faith and Freedom , April 1954, pp. 22-27.

9. James Burnham, The Struggle for the World (New York: John Day, 1947); idem, The Coming Defeat of Communism (New York: John Day, 1950); idem, Containment or Liberation? (New York: John Day, 1953). As an example of the still unsettled political implications of interventionism and noninterventionism even in the late 1940s, Burnham's first foreign policy work received a favorable review from liberal and interventionist Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in The Nation , but a critical one from socialist and noninterventionist Norman Thomas in, of all places, the noninterventionist and soon-to-be conservative Human Events (Doenecke, Not to the Swift , pp. 37-40, 80). break

10. Burnham, Containment or Liberation? p. 41.

11. Ibid., p. 43.

10. Burnham, Containment or Liberation? p. 41.

11. Ibid., p. 43.

12. Burnham, Coming Defeat of Communism , p. 142; idem, Containment or Liberation?

13. For a detailed and insightful account of four who moved from the Left to the far Right, including Burnham, see John P. Diggins, Up from Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

14. Frank Chodorov, "The Return of 1940?" The Freeman 5 (1954): 81-82; William S. Schlamm, "But It Is Not 1940," The Freeman 5 (1954): 169-170; Frank Chodorov, "A War to Communize America," The Freeman 5 (1954): 171-174.

15. Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade—and After: America, 1945-1960 (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 114.

16. William F. Buckley, Jr., "Making a Man Out of a Soldier," The Freeman 5 (1954): 20-21.

17. William F. Buckley, Jr., "A Dilemma of Conservatives," The Freeman 5 (1954): 51-52.

18. Letter to the editor, The Freeman 5 (1955): 244.

19. Meyer, Conservative Mainstream , pp. 38-43. The ease with which conservatives accepted their ultimate position is reflected in the nonchalance of William Rusher's retrospective remark: "The fact that combatting communism sometimes requires a scope and level of government activity that made conservatives uncomfortable was simply one of those paradoxes in which politics abounds." William Rusher, "The New Right: Past and Prospects," in The New Right Papers , ed. Robert W. Whitaker (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 7.

20. Two examples of the debate are especially apt: Ronald Hamowy and William F. Buckley, Jr., "'National Review': Criticism and Reply," New Individualist Review 1 (November 1961): 3-11; and Murray N. Rothbard, "The New Libertarian Creed," New York Times , February 9, 1971, P. 39, and William F. Buckley, Jr., "The Conservative Reply," New York Times , February 16, 1971, p. 33. The debate between self-labeled conservatives and self-labeled libertarians ought not to be confused with the debate within conservatism between traditionalist and libertarian tendencies, though the arguments in each case sometimes overlap. The former involves disagreements over substantive policy issues; the latter involves disagreement over what general philosophical principles to use to justify a set of shared political positions. break

21. Barry Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative ; Richard A. Viguerie, The New Right: We're Ready to Lead (Falls Church, Va.: The Viguerie Company, 1980).

22. T. V. Smith and Robert A. Taft, Foundations of Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1939); George Wolfskill, The Revolt of the Conservatives: A History of the American Liberty League, 1934-1940 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962); Herbert Hoover, American Ideals versus the New Deal (New York: Scribner, 1936).

23. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), pp. 14, 17.

24. Ibid., pp. 21, 56.

25. Ibid., pp. 57-60, 112.

23. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), pp. 14, 17.

24. Ibid., pp. 21, 56.

25. Ibid., pp. 57-60, 112.

23. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), pp. 14, 17.

24. Ibid., pp. 21, 56.

25. Ibid., pp. 57-60, 112.

26. See, for example, Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); Robert Nisbet, The Quest for Community (New York: Oxford, 1953); Russell Kirk, A Program for Conservatives (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954); Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

27. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences , p. 3.

28. Ibid., p. 38.

29. Ibid., p. 171; Richard M. Weaver, "Up from Liberalism," Modern Age 3 (1958): 21-32.

27. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences , p. 3.

28. Ibid., p. 38.

29. Ibid., p. 171; Richard M. Weaver, "Up from Liberalism," Modern Age 3 (1958): 21-32.

27. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences , p. 3.

28. Ibid., p. 38.

29. Ibid., p. 171; Richard M. Weaver, "Up from Liberalism," Modern Age 3 (1958): 21-32.

30. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences , pp. 73-74.

31. Ibid., pp. 91, 113-114.

32. Ibid., pp. 130-133.

33. Ibid., pp. 133-134.

30. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences , pp. 73-74.

31. Ibid., pp. 91, 113-114.

32. Ibid., pp. 130-133.

33. Ibid., pp. 133-134.

30. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences , pp. 73-74.

31. Ibid., pp. 91, 113-114.

32. Ibid., pp. 130-133.

33. Ibid., pp. 133-134.

30. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences , pp. 73-74.

31. Ibid., pp. 91, 113-114.

32. Ibid., pp. 130-133.

33. Ibid., pp. 133-134.

34. Friedrich A. Hayek, "Why I Am Not a Conservative," in What is Conservatism? ed. Meyer, pp. 88-103; Frank S. Meyer, "Richard M. Weaver: An Appreciation," Modern Age 14 (1970): 243-248.

35. All self-respecting libertarians argue that they assume a set of absolute values; none makes a case for moral relativism. What they do contend, however, is that the formulation and pursuit of values belong properly to individuals in voluntary association with one another, not to the state and hence not to political philosophy. They argue that libertarianism as a political philosophy, not a moral or aesthetic one, is concerned only with "the important subset of moral theory that deals with the proper role of violence in social life," especially the organized, legitimate violence of the state. Since libertarians believe that the only legitimate use of violence is "to defend person and property against violence"—that is, to insure liberty—it has nothing to say about other values or goals not within its limited pur- soft

view; hence my use of the term moral agnosticism . See Murray N. Rothbard, "Myth and Truth about Libertarianism," Modern Age 24 (1980): 9-15. See also Frank Chodorov, "What Individualism Is Not," National Review 2 (June 20, 1956): 15-17; Murray Rothbard, "Conservatism and Freedom: A Libertarian Comment," Modern Age 5 (1961): 217-220; James M. O'Connell, "The New Conservatism," New Individualist Review 2 (Spring 1962): 17-21; Ralph Raico, "The Fusionists on Liberalism and Tradition," New Individualist Review 3 (August 1964): 29-36; Tibor Machan, "Libertarians and Conservatives," Modern Age 24 (1980): 21-33; idem, "Libertarians and Conservatives: Further Considerations," Modern Age 26 (1982): 39-48; and idem, The Libertarian Reader (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982).

36. Robert Nisbet, "Conservatives and Libertarians: Uneasy Cousins," Modern Age 24 (1980): 2-8; John East, "The American Conservative Movement of the 1980's: Are Traditional and Libertarian Dimensions Compatible?," Modern Age 24 (1980): 34-38; George W. Carey, "Conservatives and Libertarians View Fusionism: Its Origins, Possibilities, and Problems," Modern Age 26 (1982): 8-18; Dante Germino, "Traditionalism and Libertarianism: Two Views," Modern Age 26 (1982): 49-56. See also James C. Roberts, The Conservative Decade (Westport, Conn.: Arlington House, 1980), pp. 319-326.

37. John H. Hallowell, review of The Conservative Affirmation , by Willmoore Kendall, and In Defense of Freedom , by Frank S. Meyer, American Political Science Review 58 (1964): 687-688; Evans, "Varieties of Conservative Experience," p. 130; Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement , p. 340; Walter Berns, "The Need for Public Authority," Modern Age 24 (1980): 16-20; ISI Campus Report , Spring 1981, p. 7.

38. Meyer, "Conservatism," pp. 7-12.

39. Meyer, Conservative Mainstream , pp. 43-51. Other efforts by Meyer to reconcile libertarian and traditionalist themes include Conservative Mainstream , pp. 35-38; What Is Conservatism? pp. 7-20, 229-232; and "In Defense of John Stuart Mill," National Review 1 (March 28, 1956): 23-24.

40. Meyer, Conservative Mainstream , pp. 184-187.

41. William F. Buckley, Jr., Up from Liberalism (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959), pp. 161, 180-181; M. Stanton Evans, "A Conservative Case for Freedom," in What Is Conservatism? ed. Meyer, pp. 67-77.

42. Meyer, Conservative Mainstream , pp. 74-77.

43. Whittaker Chambers, "Big Sister Is Watching You," National Review 4 (1957): 594-596; M. Stanton Evans, "The Gospel according to Ayn Rand," National Review 19 (1967): 1059-1063. See also John continue

Chamberlain, "An Open Letter to Ayn Rand," National Review 5 (1958): 118; E. Merrill Root, "What about Ayn Rand?" National Review 8 (1960): 76-77; and Garry Wills, "But Is Ayn Rand Conservative?" National Review 8 (1960): 139. Only Root made a case for Rand, which Wills eviscerated in the next issue.

44. M. Stanton Evans, "Raico on Liberalism and Religion," New Individualist Review 4 (Winter 1966): 19-25. This is a reply to Raico, "Fusionists on Liberalism and Tradition"; Raico rejoins in "Reply to Mr. Evans," New Individualist Review 4 (Winter 1966): 25-31.

45. Frank S. Meyer, In Defense of Freedom: A Conservative Credo (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 128; idem, "Richard M. Weaver." For critical comments on Meyer's synthesis by important traditionalists, see Russell Kirk, "An Ideologue of Liberty," Sewanee Review 72 (1964): 349-350; Richard M. Weaver, "Anatomy of Freedom," National Review 13 (1962): 443-444; and L. Brent Bozell, "Freedom or Virtue?" National Review 13 (1962): 181-187, 206.

46. Theodore Draper, "Neoconservative History," The New York Review of Books , January 16, 1986, pp. 5-15.

1. See, for example, William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Chicago: Dorsey, 1975), and Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

2. The most important works used here for reconstructing the history of the conservative movement from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s include the following: Rusher, Rise of the Right ; Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement ; Miles, Odyssey of the American Right ; David W. Reinhard, The Republican Right since 1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983); Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein, Danger on the Right (New York: Random House, 1964); F. Clifton White and William J. Gill, Why Reagan Won: The Conservative Movement, 1964-1981 (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1981); M. Stanton Evans, Revolt on the Campus (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961); James C. Roberts, The Conservative Decade—Emerging Leaders of the 1980s (Westport, Conn.: Arlington House, 1980); Erling Jorstad, The Politics of Doomsday (Nashville: Abingdon, 1970); Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1977 , 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); K. Phillips, Post-Conservative America ; Viguerie, New Right ; and John T. Saloma III, Ominous Politics: The New Conservative Labyrinth (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984).

3. Reinhard, Republican Right , p. 153. break

4. Forster and Epstein, Danger on the Right , p. 212.

5. Reinhard, Republican Right , p. 140.

6. Jorstad, Politics of Doomsday , p. 80.

7. Forster and Epstein, Danger on the Right , pp. 11-46; Bell, Radical Right , p. 422.

8. Reinhard, Republican Right , p. 155.

9. Evans, Revolt on the Campus , p. 110.

10. Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement , p. 293.

11. Evans, Revolt on the Campus , p. 38.

12. Rusher, Rise of the Right , p. 161.

13. Rusher, Rise of the Right , pp. 119-121, 189-190; Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement , pp. 292-293; Forster and Epstein, Danger on the Right , pp. 217, 197-202, 108, 230; Group Research Reports 24 (1985): 25, 33. Rusher and Nash both play down the role of the Birch Society.

14. Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement , pp. 293-294.

15. Viguerie, New Right , pp. 26-27.

16. Rusher, Rise of the Right , pp. 154-155.

17. William F. Buckley, Jr., Inveighing We Will Go (New York: Berkley Publishing, 1973), p. 63.

18. Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement , pp. 293-294, 334-335.

19. K. Phillips, Emerging Republican Majority ; Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1970).

20. The classic statements of a status politics theory of the postwar American Right are found in Bell, Radical Right . Lipset and Raab, Politics of Unreason , extend the basic argument from the 1950s and 1960s backward and forward in history. Critics of the status politics thesis as applied to McCarthyism include Rogin, Intellectuals and McCarthy ; Nelson W. Polsby, "Toward an Explanation of McCarthyism," Political Studies 8 (1960): 250-271; Thomas C. Reeves, "McCarthyism: Interpretations since Hofstadter," Wisconsin Magazine of History 60 (Autumn 1976): 42-54. For a good summary of the literature on status politics, see Clarence Y. H. Lo, "Countermovements and Conservative Movements in the Contemporary U.S.," Annual Review of Sociology 8 (1982): 107-134.

21. Bell, Radical Right ; Lipset and Raab, Politics of Unreason .

22. Lipset and Raab, Politics of Unreason , p. 497. After an exhaustive examination of survey data on right-wing movements since the 1930s, Lipset and Raab concluded that right-wing leaders and organizations appeal to varying combinations of three groups: economic conservatives, whose high socioeconomic status gives them an interest in opposing the growth of government; status preservatists, continue

whose changing or inconsistent social status gives them a desire to return to an idealized past; and the less educated, whose values give them what Lipset and Raab call "low democratic restraint." See Politics of Unreason , especially pp. 474, 496.

23. I am not denying the real diversity of support for right-wing movements. I merely want to direct attention as well to a foundation of common support that is often ignored in the preoccupation with diversity. According to a 1954 Gallup Poll, those favorable to McCarthy were more likely than those unfavorable to have voted for Eisenhower in 1952 (76 to 49 percent), to intend to vote Republican in the 1954 Congressional elections (53 to 29 percent), and to consider themselves Republicans (46 to 24 percent). Polsby, "Explanation of McCarthyism," p. 262. See also Lipset and Raab, Politics of Unreason , p. 225. Seventy-two percent of Birch Society supporters in a 1962 California Poll (compared to 41 percent of the entire sample) were Republicans, as were 43 percent of supporters in a 1962 national Gallup Poll (compared to 28 percent of the entire sample). Seymour Martin Lipset," Three Decades of the Radical Right," in Bell, Radical Right , pp. 425, 429. Two-thirds of those attending a 1962 anticommunism school in Oakland, California, sponsored by the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade, called themselves Republicans, and 92 percent of those who voted in the 1960 presidential election supported Nixon. Raymond E. Wolfinger, Barbara Kaye Wolfinger, Kenneth Prewitt, and Sheilah Rosenhack, "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology," in Ideology and Discontent , ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964). A 1960 survey of ISI members found that about 63 percent reported that their parents were Republicans and 70 percent called themselves Republicans. Evans, Revolt on the Campus , pp. 46-50. A 1967 study of campus political activists found that YAF members were disproportionately Republican in comparison to a control group of inactive students (though not in comparison to a sample of Young Republicans). Richard G. Braungart, "Family Status, Socialization, and Student Politics: A Multivariate Analysis," American Journal of Sociology 77 (1971): 108-130. A study of the 1964 California delegation to the Republican National Convention found that Goldwater delegates were significantly more likely than Rockefeller delegates to have served on county (86 to 24 percent) and state (82 to 34 percent) committees, to have contributed more than one thousand dollars to the party in 1962 (51 to 17 percent), to have been a delegate to a previous national convention (41 to 21 percent), and to have been involved in the Republican party for twenty or more years (41 to 28 percent). Edmond Constantini and Kenneth H. Craik, "Competing continue

Elites within a Political Party: A Study of Republican Leadership," Western Political Quarterly 22 (1969): 879-903. See also James McEvoy III, Radicals or Conservatives: The Contemporary American Right (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971).

24. McCarthy's support among Texas businessmen, especially oilmen H. L. Hunt, Clint Murchison, and Roy Cullen, was legendary. He visited the state so often and received so much financial support from it that he was sometimes known as Texas's third senator. Charles J. V. Murphy, "McCarthy and the Businessman," Fortune , April 1954, pp. 156-158, 180-194; idem, "Texas Business and McCarthy," Fortune , May 1954, pp. 100-101, 208-216. See also Lipset and Raab, Politics of Unreason , pp. 227-228, 310-312; Alan F. Westin, "The John Birch Society," in Bell, Radical Right , pp. 249-250; and Forster and Epstein, Danger on the Right , pp. 8-9, 272-280.

25. Studies of Birch Society and Christian Anti-Communism Crusade activists in the mid-1960s found that from 17 to 40 percent (depending on the sample) earned more than fifteen thousand dollars a year (compared to 4 percent of all Americans), 30 to 52 percent were college graduates (compared to 10 percent of a national sample), and 31 to 58 percent had professional or managerial jobs (compared to 23 percent of a national sample). A 1962 California Poll found that Birch Society supporters tended to be of higher than average socioeconomic status: 36 percent had three or more years of college, in comparison to 27 percent of Birch opponents and 20 percent of the entire sample; 35 percent were classified as of a high economic level, in comparison to 23 percent of opponents and 26 percent of the entire sample. Lipset and Raab, Politics of Unreason , pp. 288-326, especially pp. 298-299; Lipset, "Three Decades," pp. 425, 429. See also Barbara S. Stone, "A Profile of the John Birch Society," Journal of Politics 36 (1974): 184-197. In a 1965 ad pitched to potential advertisers, the National Review claimed on the basis of a marketing survey that its subscribers had an average annual income of $19,500 and an average net worth of $151,000, that two-thirds were college graduates and one-third had postgraduate degrees, and that more than half owned two cars. National Review 17 (October 19, 1965): 903; Evans, Revolt on the Campus , p. 61.

On the Conservative party, see Robert A. Schoenberger, "Conservatism, Personality, and Political Extremism," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 868-877. On McCarthy, see Lipset and Raab, Politics of Unreason , pp. 226-229. A 1960 study of ISI members found that about half came from families with annual incomes greater than five thousand dollars, half from families with incomes below that level. continue

Evans, Revolt on the Campus , pp. 46-50. A 1967 study at one major university classified 28 percent of YAF members as from upper middle-class families (defined by occupational status and education), about the same as for a control group (25 percent), but much less than for any other group of campus activists (Young Republicans, 59 percent; Young Democrats, 41 percent; Students for a Democratic Society, 55 percent). Braungart, "Student Politics," p. 119. See also David L. Westby and Richard G. Braungart, "Class and Politics in the Family Backgrounds of Student Political Activists," American Sociological Review 31 (1966): 690-692. Studies of national YAF samples gave similar results, but studies of YAF members at Harvard and other eastern universities showed them to be a more affluent lot. See summary in Student Politics , ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 213-224. For one way of reconciling these findings with theories of status politics and older theories of authoritarian personality, see Schoenberger, "Conservatism," who distinguishes "political" conservatism (conservative political affiliation) from "psychological" conservatism (conservative political belief).

For data on Wallace, see Lipset and Raab, Politics of Unreason , pp. 358-390, esp. pp. 380-382. In the 1964 Democratic primaries in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland, Wallace carried working-class districts in which Goldwater failed miserably a few months later in the general election. In his 1968 presidential bid Wallace did best among the lower strata. He got 17 percent of the vote of manual workers but only 9 percent of the vote of nonmanual workers; 19 percent of the vote of those with a grade-school education but only 9 percent of the vote of those with at least some college education; and about 18 percent of the vote of those with incomes of less than seven thousand dollars but only 6 percent of the vote of those with incomes of more than fifteen thousand dollars. All in all, this pattern of support is different from that of the conservative movement in the 1950s and 1960s.

Three qualifications need to be noted to this analysis of the class basis of the Wallace vote. First, in one instance, the Wisconsin Democratic primary in 1964, Wallace did run better in middle-class neighborhoods than in working-class ones, but that appears to have been an idiosyncratic result. In the Indiana and Maryland primaries that year the bases of his support were similar to those in the 1968 general election. Second, in 1968, outside the South, Wallace did a better job of winning the vote of middle-class sympathizers than of working-class sympathizers. Third, middle-class Wallace supporters tended to be more conservative in racial and economic views than his working- hard

class supporters. Michael Rogin, "Wallace and the Middle Class: The White Backlash in Wisconsin," Public Opinion Quarterly 30 (1966): 98-108; Michael Rogin, "Politics, Emotion, and the Wallace Vote," The British Journal of Sociology 20 (1969): 27-49; M. Margaret Conway, "The White Backlash Re-examined: Wallace and the 1964 Primaries," Social Science Quarterly 49 (1968): 710-719; Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, "The Wallace Whitelash" Trans-action 7 (December 1969): 23-35; Richard F. Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United States (New York: Wiley, 1972).

26. Kirkpatrick Sale, Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern Rim and Its Challenge to the Eastern Establishment (New York: Random House, 1975).

27. Murphy, "Texas Business and McCarthy"; Forster and Epstein, Danger on the Right , p. 39; Lipset and Raab, Politics of Unreason , p. 305.

28. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System , pp. 245-274.

29. Among white voters in presidential elections from 1944 to 1964 Democratic candidates on the average did 22 percentage points better among union members than nonmembers, 20 points better among voters from blue-collar families than among those from white-collar families, and 24 points better among Catholics than Protestants. (In each case, however, one exceptional year inflates the average—1948 for union membership and class, 1960 for religious affiliation.) In 1968 those differences were 13, 10, and 30; in 1972 they fell to 1, 2, and 13. In 1976 and 1980, however, they recovered much of the lost ground. See Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity , p. 105.

30. Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind (New York: Free Press, 1983).

31. Lipset and Raab, Politics of Unreason , p. 348; William F. Buckley, Jr., The Governor Listeth (New York: Putnam, 1970), pp. 57-71. See also Meyer, The Conservative Mainstream , pp. 285-288. As reported by Buckley, the Human Events poll had only 8 percent of conservatives supporting Wallace against Nixon and 23 percent supporting him against Rockefeller. About three-quarters of respondents said Wallace's candidacy would hurt the conservative movement in America.

32. Rusher, Rise of the Right , pp. 239-252. For the opinions of two later leaders of the New Right, see Howard Phillips, "A New Right Perspective," in The New Right at Harvard , ed. Howard Phillips (Vienna, Va.: Conservative Caucus, 1983), pp. 3-13, and Viguerie, New Right , pp. 31-32.

33. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., Where Have All the Voters Gone?: The continue

Fracturing of America's Political Parties (New York: Norton, 1982), p. 13; Jonathan Rieder, Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn against Liberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 5, 240-241.

34. Viguerie, New Right , p. 51.

35. Ibid., p. 52.

36. Ibid., pp. 32, 52, 53, 49.

34. Viguerie, New Right , p. 51.

35. Ibid., p. 52.

36. Ibid., pp. 32, 52, 53, 49.

34. Viguerie, New Right , p. 51.

35. Ibid., p. 52.

36. Ibid., pp. 32, 52, 53, 49.

37. The cover of the October 1980 issue of Conservative Digest , published until 1986 by Viguerie, pictured eight persons marching under a banner proclaiming "The New Right: We're Ready to Lead"—Viguerie, Phillips, Dolan, Weyrich, Helms, Blackwell, Schlafly and Falwell. In his insider's view of American conservatism, Burton Pines identified the "small circle of the movement's founding fathers" as including Viguerie, Phillips, Dolan, Weyrich, Feulner, and Blackwell, as well as Schlafly Helms, McAteer, and Billings. Burton Yale Pines, Back to Basics: The Traditionalist Movement That Is Sweeping Grass-Roots America (New York: Morrow, 1982), p. 293. The September 1983 Conservative Digest reported that Crane, Helms, and McDonald topped a preference poll of its readers as leaders most suited to succeed Reagan. Falwell, Buchanan, Crane, Helms, McDonald (posthumously), Kemp, and Schlafly all ranked high in Conservative Digest 's tenth anniversary list of "most admired conservatives of the decade" in its May 1985 issue. (Ronald and Nancy Reagan, Buckley, James Watt, Jeremiah Denton, Beverly LaHaye, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and Sandra Day O'Connor also made it into the top five in one of the three categories: conservatives in Congress, conservative men not in Congress, conservative women not in Congress.) Crane and Helms have perennially won among the highest ratings from conservative organizations for their congressional voting records. See, for example, Washington Times , November 14, 1986, p. 3A. Well into 1986 Kemp topped presidential preference polls of Conservative Digest readers. See, for example, Conservative Digest , April 1986, pp. 23-26.

38. "Conservative Cry: Our Time Has Come," U.S. News and World Report , February 26, 1979, pp. 52-54; E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Fund-Raising Data Worry Democrats," New York Times , September 25, 1980, p. 8; Adam Clymer, "Conservative Political Action Committee Evokes Both Fear and Adoration," New York Times , May 31, 1981, p. 1; Lee Edwards, "Paul Weyrich: Conscience of the New Right," Conservative Digest , July 1981, pp. 2-8.

39. Viguerie, New Right , pp. 32-33; Rusher, Rise of the Right , pp. 263-290.

40. Conservative Digest , October 1980, p. 17. For a more detailed discussion of the New Right and the social issues, see Jerome L. Him- soft

melstein, "The New Right," in The New Christian Right: Mobilization and Legitimation , ed. Robert Liebman and Robert Wuthnow (Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine, 1983), pp. 13-30. By the late 1980s the emphasis on social issues was being recycled as "cultural conservatism." See Paul Weyrich, "Reshaping the Political Debate: Cultural Conservatism and American Politics," Election Politics 4 (Fall 1987): 15-16.

41. Dudley Clendinen, "TV Evangelists and Small Group Lead 'Christian New Right's' Rush to Power," New York Times , August 18, 1980, p. 14; "Roundtable's President Ed McAteer Is Music Man of Religious Right," Conservative Digest , January 1981, pp. 2-7; James L. Guth, "The New Christian Right," in New Christian Right , ed. Liebman and Wuthnow, pp. 31-45.

42. Conservative Digest , November 1980, pp. 4, 5, 7, 40; Roberts, Conservative Decade ; Rusher, Rise of the Right , p. 310.

43. K. Phillips, Post-Conservative America , p. 14. "During the 1960s and 1970s," wrote Phillips in the same work, "the nature of 'conservatism' underwent a transformation—not complete by any means, but substantial. . . . Conservatism . . . increasingly took on the coloration of popular, even populist, animosity" (pp. 31-32). "The 'New' Right," he added, "did then and still does represent a major cultural and tactical departure for a 'conservative' politics" (p. 47) See Post-Conservative America , pp. 31-52. Others who made the neo-populist argument include Crawford, Thunder on the Right ; Gillian Peele, Revival and Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); John L. Kater, Jr., Christians on the Right (New York: Seabury Press, 1982.); Pines, Back to Basics ; and Nicholas Lemann, "The Evolution of the Conservative Mind," The Washington Monthly , May 1981, pp. 34-41. Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , also flirts with the populist analogy, though he confesses that if the New Right is populist, it is "populism turned on its head" (pp. 321-323). The irony of using a populist analogy to distinguish a new Right from an older one is that a prior generation of social commentators had used the same analogy to characterize the Old Right of the 1950s. See especially Hofstadter, Age of Reform , pp. 3-22, and Peter Viereck, "The Revolt against the Elite," in Radical Right , ed. Bell, pp. 161-183. The analogies are about equally misleading, drawing heavily on superficial similarities in rhetoric rather than real historical continuities or commonalities in policies. Certainly Rogin, Intellectuals and McCarthy , convincingly showed the flaws in that earlier use of the populist analogy. Others have criticized the neo-populist analogy as applied to the New Right, especially Saloma, Ominous Politics , pp. 38-49. break

44. Richard Viguerie, "Money, Message, and Marketing," in New Right at Harvard , ed. H. Phillips, p. 116.

45. Roberts, Conservative Decade , p. 7.

46. The brief political biographies in the following paragraphs are drawn from a number of sources. On Viguerie: Viguerie, New Right , pp. 19-37. On Phillips: H. Phillips, New Right at Harvard , pp. vii-viii, 3-10. On Dolan: Milton Ellerin and Alisa H. Kesten, "The New Right: What Is It?," Social Policy 11 (March-April 1982): 54-62. On Weyrich: Ellerin and Kesten, "The New Right"; Edwards, "Paul Weyrich." On Schlafly: Carol Felsenthal, The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981); Sasha Gregory-Lewis, "Stop-ERA: A Choice or an Echo?," The Advocate , November: 2, 1977, pp. 12-15, and November 16, 1977, pp. 6-8. On Crane: White and Gill, Why Reagan Won , p. 76; Viguerie, New Right , p. 74. On Buchanan: Rusher, Rise of the Right , pp. 197-198; White and Gill, Why Reagan Won , p. 77; Crawford, Thunder on the Right , p. 190. On McDonald: Newsweek , September 12, 1983, p. 27. On Blackwell: H. Phillips, New Right at Harvard , p. 133. On Feulner: ISI Campus Report , Spring 1981; Saloma, Ominous Politics , p. 42. On Kemp: Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Is He the GOP's Future?" Reader's Digest , June 1982, pp. 108-112; Washington Post , August 12, 1984, p. B8. On Helms: Elizabeth Drew, "Jesse Helms," The New Yorker , July 20, 1981, pp. 78-95; Bill Arthur, "Helms, Outspoken Symbol of the Right," Charlotte Observer , February 12, 1984, p. 1A. On Falwell: Dinesh D'Souza, Falwell: Before the Millennium (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1984); Frances Fitzgerald, "A Disciplined, Charging Army," The New Yorker , May 18, 1981, pp. 53-141. On McAteer: "Roundtable's President McAteer."

47. Roberts, Conservative Decade , pp. 19-35; ISI Campus Report , Spring 1981.

48. Viguerie, New Right , pp. 21, 39, 11, 41.

49. Conservative Digest , March 1981, pp. 2-7.

50. Ibid., p. 26.

51. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

49. Conservative Digest , March 1981, pp. 2-7.

50. Ibid., p. 26.

51. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

49. Conservative Digest , March 1981, pp. 2-7.

50. Ibid., p. 26.

51. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

52. Rebecca Klatch, "Perceptions of Gender among Women of the New Right," paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association, 1983. See also idem, Women of the New Right (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). In the latter work Klatch divides New Right women into "social conservatives" and "laissez-faire conservatives" and rightfully argues that most research has focused on the former. She exaggerates the division, however, by ignoring the ample number of hybrids and by lumping members of the Libertarian party among the laissez-faire group. Some observers continue

have seen in the traditionalist themes invoked by antifeminist women a nascent critique of both capitalism and patriarchy. See, for example, Andrea Dworkin, Right-Wing Women (New York: Putnam, 1983). There is, however, nothing inherently anticapitalist or antipatriarchal in traditionalist themes; their broader implications depend on the overall political position into which they are integrated. In Chapter 2 I have shown how conservatives have long since expunged the critical elements of traditionalism.

53. For a discussion of supply-side economics as part of conservative ideology, see Jerome L. Himmelstein, "God, Gilder, and Capitalism," Society 18 (September-October, 1981): 68-72. For detailed accounts of how it developed, see John Brooks, "Annals of Finance: The Supply Side," The New Yorker , April 19, 1982, pp. 97-150; and Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 166-209.

54. For the selling of supply-side economics to Republicans, see David A. Stockman, The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), pp. 47-76. For the conversion of Ronald Reagan in particular from a traditional Republican emphasis on austerity, balanced budgets, and painful solutions to the more optimistic approach of tax cuts and instant economic growth, see Robert W. Merry; "Growth Agent: Reagan Transformed," Wall Street Journal , September 13, 1985.

55. Cavanagh and Sundquist, "New Two-Party System," p. 37.

56. George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: Basic Books, 1980).

57. Viguerie, New Right , p. 59; National Review 1 (November 19, 1955), p. 5; John Dillin, "U.S. Conservatives on the March: Economic Philosophy and Outlook," Christian Science Monitor , March 18, 1986, p. 22.

58. John Judis, "Pop-Con Politics," The New Republic 191 (September 3, 1984): 20; Richard A. Viguerie, The Establishment vs. the People: Is a New Populist Revolt on the Way? (Chicago: Regnery Gateway; 1983). For a summary of conservative use of populist rhetoric, see Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement , pp. 250-251, 338. For another instance of the New Right playing up its populism, see Whitaker, New Right Papers .

59. See almost any issue of Conservative Digest between 1981 and 1988 for criticism of the Reagan administration, but especially February 1981, August 1981, February 1982, April 1982, July 1982, and September 1983. Human Events , March 7, 1981; National Review 35 (March 8, 1983): 294; Conservative Digest , May 1985; Group Research Report 24 (October 1985): 35. break

1. Jerry Falwell, Listen, America! (New York: Bantam, 1981), pp. 6, 60, 101.

2. J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," Annual Review of Sociology 9 (1983): 527-553.

3. Ladd and Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System , pp. xx, xxi.

4. See, for example, Louis Harris, The Anguish of Change (New York: Norton, 1973); Inglehart, Silent Revolution ; Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. "The New Lines Are Drawn: Class and Ideology in America," Public Opinion 1 (July 1978): 48-53, and 1 (September 1978): 4-20; Ladd and Hadley, Transformation of the American Party System ; K. Phillips, Mediacracy ; and Scammon and Wattenberg, Real Majority .

5. Harris, Anguish of Change , p. 52.

6. Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 98-117; Kathleen Gerson, Hard Choices: How Women Decide about Work, Career, and Motherhood (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 186-190; idem, "Emerging Social Divisions among Women: Implications for Welfare State Policies," Politics and Society 15 (1986-1987): 213-221; Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, "The Antiabortion Movement and the Rise of the New Right," in Abortion and Women's Choice: The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1984), pp. 241-285; Zillah R. Eisenstein, "Antifeminism in the Politics and Presidential Election of 1981," in Feminism and Sexual Equality: Crisis in Liberal America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984), pp. 19-39; Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984).

7. For a detailed discussion of these points, see Jerome L. Himmelstein, "The Social Basis of Antifeminism: Religious Networks and Culture," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 25 (1986): 1-15; Jerome L. Himmelstein and James A. McRae, Jr., "Social Issues and Socioeconomic Status," Public Opinion Quarterly 52 (1988): 492-512; Steven Brint, "'New Class' and Cumulative Trend Explanations of Liberal Political Attitudes of Professionals," American Journal of Sociology 90 (1984): 30-71; and idem, "The Political Attitudes of Professionals," Annual Review of Sociology 11 (1985): 389-414.

8. Donald Granberg, "The Abortion Activists," Family Planning Perspectives 13 (1981): 157-163; Donald Granberg and Donald Denney,"The Coathanger and the Rose," Society 19 (1982): 39-51; Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood , pp. 196-197. break

9. For a review of the literature on the determinants of beliefs on abortion and the ERA and for a more detailed discussion and documentation of the argument presented here, see Himmelstein, "Social Basis of Antifeminism." As Klatch points out in Women of the New Right , none of the factors discussed here distinguishes feminists from laissez-faire conservatives, both of whom tend to be secular and professional. She does not explain, however, what leads to the different political outcomes.

10. For a detailed account of the changing religious landscape, see Wade Clark Roof and William McKinney, American Mainline Religion: Its Changing Shape and Future (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987). The picture they paint belies the notion that secularization, at least in the form of a decline in personal religious belief and participation, is an inevitable part of modern industrial societies. Their conclusions simply confirm, however, that the United States is a striking exception to an otherwise valid rule. Aside from the United States, the level of economic development in a given society is inversely related to the percentage of its members declaring that their religious beliefs are important. The percentage of Americans declaring strong religious beliefs, however, is much greater than for other advanced industrial societies. Moreover, American church attendance has not declined markedly over the last half century. See Burnham, "The 1980 Earthquake"; and Michael Hout and Andrew M. Greeley, "Church Attendance in the United States," American Sociological Review 52 (1987): 325-345. Roof and McKinney's image of religious polarization also cuts the other way, however: if secularization is an inadequate notion, so is the idea of a major religious revival in America. The 1970s and early 1980s witnessed no surge in church attendance or in the importance given religion. Despite the rapid growth of conservative churches, their reach into the secular world was limited: their growing membership came primarily from more effective retention of old members and high birth rates. New members were overwhelmingly reaffiliates and the relatives and friends of old members. See John M. Benson, "The Polls: A Rebirth of Religion?" Public Opinion Quarterly 45 (1981): 576-585; Reginald W. Bibby, "Circulation of the Saints Revisited: A Longitudinal Look at Conservative Church Growth," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 22 (1983): 253-262; and Public Opinion , September-October 1988, pp. 24-25.

11. "The 70's; Decade of Second Thoughts," Public Opinion 2 (January 1980): 19-42; Carol Mueller, "In Search of a Constituency for the 'New Religious Right,'" Public Opinion Quarterly 47 (1983): 213-229; Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, "Policy Directions and Presi- soft

dential Leadership: Alternative Interpretations of the 1980 Presidential Election," British Journal of Political Science 12 (1982): 299-356; Baron Report , March 1, 1982. Pamela Johnston Conover and Virginia Gray, Feminism and the New Right (New York: Praeger, 1983), present a more mixed picture of the changing importance of issues like ERA and abortion than does Mueller. They agree that there was no heightened polarization on these issues in the 1970s, but they argue that position on abortion and ERA had a growing association with ideological label and party. The poll referred to in the Baron Report was a 1982 Harris Poll.

12. Michael J. Malbin, "The Conventions, Platforms, and Issue Activists," in The American Elections of 1980 , ed. Austin Ranney (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp. 99-141; Albert R. Hunt, "The Campaign and the Issues," in American Elections of 1980 , ed. Ranney, pp. 142-176; Adam Clymer, "Displeasure with Carter Turned Many to Reagan," New York Times , November 9, 1980, p. 18. For a more detailed analysis of the 1980 elections, see Jerome L. Himmelstein and James A. McRae, Jr., "Social Conservatism, New Republicans, and the 1980 Elections," Public Opinion Quarterly 48 (1984): 592-605. Even in the South, with its disproportionately high percentage of churchgoers and fundamentalists, the social issues have had uneven political impact. Hastings J. Wyman, Jr., "Yes, But Then Again, No: Social Issues and Southern Politics," Election Politics 4 (Summer 1987): 15-18.

13. Himmelstein, "Social Basis of Antifeminism." Similar results are found among pro-life and pro-choice activists. See Granberg, "Abortion Activists"; and Granberg and Denney, "Coathanger and Rose."

14. Carol Mueller and Thomas Dimieri, "The Structure of Belief Systems among Contending ERA Activists," Social Forces 60 (1982): 657-675; Donald Mathews and Jane DeHart Mathews, "The Threat of Equality: The Equal Rights Amendment and the Myth of Female Solidarity," unpublished manuscript. Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood , found similar differences in worldview among abortion activists. Gerson, Hard Choices , pp. 186-190, also found such differences between women who chose motherhood and women who chose careers. For other accounts of the worldview of antifeminists, see Dworkin, Right-Wing Women ; Deirdre English, "The War against Choice: Inside the Anti-Abortion Movement," Mother Jones 6 (1981): 16-32; Susan Harding, "Family Reform Movements: Recent Feminism and Its Opposition," Feminist Studies 7 (1981): 57-75; and Klatch, Women of the New Right , pp. 119-147. break

15. Theodore S. Arrington and Patricia A. Kyle, "Equal Rights Amendment Activists in North Carolina," Signs 3 (1978); 666-680; Iva E. Deutchman and Sandra Prince-Embury, "Political Ideology of Pro-and Anti-ERA Women," Women and Politics 2 (1982): 39-55; Mueller and Dimieri, "Structure of Belief Systems"; David Brady and Kent L. Tedin, "Ladies in Pink: Religion and Political Ideology in the Anti-ERA Movement," Social Science Quarterly 56 (1976): 564-575; Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood , pp. 138-139; Faye Ginsburg, Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American Community (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988).

16. James L. Guth, "Political Converts: Partisan Realignment among Southern Baptist Ministers," Election Politics 3 (Winter 1985-1986): 2-6.

17. James L. Guth and John C. Green, "Politics in a New Key: Religiosity and Activism Among Political Contributors," paper presented at the meetings of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Knoxville, Tenn., November 4-6, 1983; idem, "Party, PAC, and Denomination: Religiosity among Political Contributors," paper presented at the meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1-4, 1983; idem, "Faith and Politics: Religion and Ideology among Political Contributors," American Politics Quarterly 14 (1986): 186-200; idem, "The Christian Right in the Republican Party: The Case of Pat Robertson's Supporters," Journal of Politics 50 (1988): 150-165; idem, "God and the GOP: Varieties of Religiosity among Political Contributors," paper presented at the meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 3-6, 1987.

18. "Roundtable's President Ed McAteer Is Music Man of Religious Right," Conservative Digest , January 1981, pp. 2-7; D'Souza, Falwell ; Fitzgerald, "A Disciplined, Charging Army"; Arthur H. Miller and Martin P. Wattenberg, "Politics from the Pulpit: Religiosity and the 1980 Elections," Public Opinion Quarterly 48 (1984): 301-317; Stuart Rothenberg and Frank Newport, The Evangelical Voter: Religion and Politics in America (Washington, D.C.: Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, 1984).

19. George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism, 1870-1925 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 3; "America's Evangelicals: Genesis or Evolution?," Public Opinion , April-May 1981, pp. 22-27; James Davison Hunter, American Evangelicalism: Conservative Religion and the Quandary of Modernity (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983), pp. 49-60. For perceptive discussion of the analytic problems in defining evangelical , see Corwin Smidt, "Evangelicals in continue

Presidential Elections: A Look at the 1980s," Election Politics 5 (Spring 1988): 2-11; idem, "Evangelicals and the 1984 Election: Continuity or Change?" American Politics Quarterly 15 (1987): 419-444; Corwin Smidt and Lyman Kellstedt, "Evangelicalism and Survey Research: Interpretive Problems and Substantive Findings," in The Bible, Politics, and Democracy , ed. Richard J. Neuhaus (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1987). Charismatics, who emphasize the spiritual experience of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, overlap partly with evangelicals. See Smidt, "'Praise the Lord' Politics: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Characteristics and Political Views of American Evangelical and Charismatic Christians," Sociological Analysis , forth-coming.

20. "America's Evangelicals"; Hunter, American Evangelicalism , pp. 49-60; Lyman A. Kellstedt, "Evangelicals and Political Realignment," paper presented at the conference, "Evangelical Political Involvement in the 1980s," Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Mich., October 17-18, 1986; Miller and Wattenberg, "Politics from the Pulpit."

21. Hunter, American Evangelicalism , pp. 7-8; George Marsden, "The Evangelical Denomination," in Piety and Politics: Evangelicals and Fundamentalists Confront the World , ed. Richard John Neuhaus and Michael Cromartie (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1987), pp. 55-68; A. James Reichley, "The Evangelical and Fundamentalist Revolt," in Piety and Politics , ed. Neuhaus and Cromartie, pp. 69-95.

22. John H. Simpson, "Moral Issues and Status Politics," in The New Christian Right: Mobilization and Legitimation , ed. Robert Liebman and Robert Wuthnow (New York: Aldine, 1983), pp. 188-207; J. Milton Yinger and Stephan J. Cutler, "The Moral Majority Viewed Sociologically," in New Christian Politics , ed. David G. Bromley and Anson Shupe (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1984), pp. 69-90; Gary D. Gaddy, "Some Potential Causes and Consequences of the Use of Religious Broadcasts," in New Christian Politics , ed. Bromley and Shupe, pp. 117-128; James L. Guth, "Sex and the Single Issue Activist: Female Campaign Contributors in the 1982 Elections," paper presented at the meetings of Southern Political Science Association, Savannah, Ga., November 1-3, 1984; David Knoke, "Stratification and the Dimensions of American Political Orientations," American Journal of Political Science 23 (1979): 772-791; Himmelstein, "The Social Basis of Antifeminism"; Jeffrey K. Hadden and Charles E. Swann, Prime Time Preachers: The Rising Power of Televangelism (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1981). There has been considerable discussion over whether socioeconomic or cultural characteristics are most telling in continue

shaping social conservatism. See, for example, Charles L. Harper and Kevin Leicht, "Explaining the New Religious Right: Status Politics and Beyond," in New Christian Politics , ed. Bromley and Shupe, pp. 101-110; and Michael Wood and Michael Hughes, "The Moral Basis of Moral Reform: Status Discontent vs. Culture and Socialization as Explanations of Anti-Pornography Social Movement Adherence," American Sociological Review 49 (1984): 86-99.

23. William G. McLoughlin, Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform: An Essay on Religion and Social Change in America, 1607-1977 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture (New York: Knopf, 1977); A. James Reichley, Religion in American Public Life (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985).

24. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture , p. 11.

25. Reichley, Religion in American Public Life .

26. The discussion of the transformation of evangelicalism in the following paragraphs draws on Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture ; Hunter, American Evangelicalism ; James A. Speer, "The New Christian Right and Its Parent Company: A Study in Political Contrasts," in New Christian Politics , ed. Bromley and Shupe, pp. 19-40; Gary Clabaugh, Thunder on the Right: The Protestant Fundamentalists (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1974).

27. The account of fundamentalism and evangelicalism since the 1920s draws on Jorstad, Politics of Doomsday ; Leo P. Ribuffo, The Old Christian Right (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983); Hunter, American Evangelicalism ; Clabaugh, Thunder on the Right ; and Speer, "New Christian Right."

28. Reichley, Religion in American Public Life ; James L. Guth, "The New Christian Right," in New Christian Right , ed. Liebman and Wuthnow, pp. 31-45.

29. Carol Flake, Redemptorama: Culture, Politics, and the New Evangelicalism (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 52, citing William Martin, Texas Monthly , September 1979.

30. "Northside Baptist Church and Dr. W. Jack Hudson Celebrating 30 Years of Service to the Carolinas," Charlotte Observer , September 6, 1984, special advertising supplement.

31. Hadden and Swann, Prime Time Preachers .

32. "Power, Glory, and Politics: Right-Wing Preachers Dominate the Dial," Time , February 17, 1986, pp. 62-69; Gaddy, "Causes and Consequences"; Razelle Frankl, Televangelism: The Marketing of Popular Religion (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987); Jeffrey K. Hadden, "Religious Broadcasting and the Mobilization of continue

the New Christian Right," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 26 (1987): 1-24.

33. Robert C. Liebman, "Mobilizing the Moral Majority," in New Christian Right , ed. Liebman and Wuthnow, pp. 50-74; Guth, "New Christian Right."

34. Although evangelicals tended to vote Republican in presidential elections, survey data suggest that until the early 1980s their party loyalties were Democratic. Albert J. Menendez, Religion at the Polls (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977); Kellstedt, "Evangelicals and Political Realignment."

35. Robert Wuthnow, "The Political Rebirth of American Evangelicals," in New Christian Right , ed. Liebman and Wuthnow, pp. 168-187; James L. Guth, "The Politics of Preachers: Southern Baptist Ministers and Christian Right Activism," in New Christian Politics , ed. Bromley and Shupe, pp. 235-250.

36. Speer, "New Christian Right."

37. D'Souza, Falwell , pp. 80-81.

38. D'Souza, Falwell ; Fitzgerald, "A Disciplined, Charging Army."

39. The discussion in this and the following two paragraphs draws especially on Guth, "New Christian Right"; and Liebman, "Mobilizing the Moral Majority."

40. "A Tide of Born-Again Politics," Newsweek , September 15, 1980, pp. 28-36.

41. Anson Shupe and William A. Stacey, "Public and Clergy Sentiments toward the Moral Majority: Evidence from the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex," in New Christian Politics , ed. Bromley and Shupe, pp. 91-100. See also Anson Shupe and William A. Stacey, Born-Again Politics and the Moral Majority: What Social Surveys Really Show (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1982); and Hadden and Swann, Prime Time Preachers .

42. "A Tide of Born-Again Politics"; "America's Evangelicals"; Frank M. Newport and V. Lance Tarrance, Jr., "Evangelicals, Fundamentalists, and Political Issues in the 1984 Elections," Election Politics 1 (Winter 1983-1984): 2-6; Rothenberg and Newport, Evangelical Voter ; D'Souza, Falwell , pp. 172-173; Reichley, "Evangelical and Fundamentalist Revolt." When evangelical or fundamentalist is defined more stringently, differences on social issues are more marked. A 1981 Roper Poll done for the National Broadcasting Company found that the 5 percent of respondents who scored "very high" on a fundamentalism scale opposed the ERA 60-28 percent (compared to 71-20 percent support among the quarter of respondents who scored continue

zero on the scale). Sixty-one percent of the fundamentalist group supported a law against all abortions in comparison to 9 percent of those who scored zero. National Broadcasting Company, "Sex, Profanity, and Violence: An Opinion Survey about Seventeen Television Programs," June 30, 1981.

43. James L. Guth, "Southern Baptist Clergy: Vanguard of the New Right," in New Christian Right , ed. Liebman and Wuthnow, pp. 118-132.

44. Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, "The Republican Surge in Congress," in American Elections of 1980 , ed. Ranney, pp. 263-302; Stephen Johnson and Joseph B. Tamney, "The Christian Right and the 1980 Presidential Election," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 21 (1982): 123-131; Robert Zwier, "The New Christian Right and the 1980 Election," in New Christian Politics , ed. Bromley and Shupe, pp. 173-194; Richard V. Pierard and James L. Wright, "No Hoosier Hospitality for Humanism: The Moral Majority in Indiana," in New Christian Politics , ed. Bromley and Shupe, pp. 195-212; Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, "The Elections and the Evangelicals," Commentary 71 (March 1981): 25-31; Himmelstein and McRae, "Social Conservatism"; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Revolt against Modernity," in Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures, and Nation-Building , ed. Per Torsvik (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1981); Smidt, "Evangelicals in Presidential Elections"; Miller and Wattenberg, "Politics from the Pulpit." My own analysis of 1980 National Election Study data suggests that neither religiosity nor born-again experience had much influence on whether or not Carter voters in 1976 defected to Reagan in 1980. Among 1976 Carter voters 61.9 percent of those claiming a born-again experience voted for Carter in 1980 and 21.6 percent went over to Reagan; among those not claiming a born-again experience the comparable figures were 61.1 percent and 24.1 percent. Of those 1976 Carter voters who said religion gave them a great deal of guidance, 65.7 percent voted for Carter in 1980 and 22.9 percent voted for Reagan. Among those who said religion was not important to them only 42.7 percent voted for Carter again, with 22.7 percent voting for Reagan and 16.4 percent for independent John Anderson.

45. The Elections of 1984 , ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1985), p. 290; Chubb and Peterson, New Direction in American Politics , p. 46; New York Times , November 6, 1986, p. A29; Smidt, "Evangelicals in Presidential Elections"; Kellstedt, "Evangelicals and Political Realignment." The political shift among continue

evangelicals as a religious group ought not to be confounded with that within the South as a region, though evangelicals represent a disproportionate percentage of the electorate in the South. If anything, the shift is more marked among evangelicals outside the South. The biggest shift to Reagan in 1984 came among nonsouthern evangelicals; moreover, turnout among this group rose in 1984 whereas it fell among southern evangelicals. By 1986 evangelicals may have been drifting back to the Democratic party in terms of party identification; but they were still more likely than nonevangelicals to support Republican presidential candidates, a difference that stayed significant even when region and party identification were controlled. Again, see Smidt, "Evangelicals in Presidential Elections."

46. "Power, Glory, and Politics"; Freedom Writer , October 1986; Washington Times , November 14, 1986, p. 2A.

47. John Herbers, "Reagan Beginning to Get Top Billing in Christian Bookstores for Policies," New York Times , September 28, 1984, p. A23.

48. Charlotte Observer , June 13, 1984, p. 1E; Raleigh News and Observer , June 17, 1984, p. 25A; New York Times , June 15, 1986, section 4, p. 6; Boston Globe , June 15, 1986, p. 11; Guth, "Political Converts."

49. Liebman, "Mobilizing of the Moral Majority," p. 57. See also Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution ; and John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977): 1212-1239.

50. Wuthnow, "Political Rebirth of American Evangelicals."

51. Liebman, "Mobilizing of the Moral Majority"; idem, "The Making of the New Christian Right," in New Christian Right , ed. Liebman and Wuthnow, pp. 227-238.

52. Corwin Smidt, "Partisanship of American Evangelicals: Changing Patterns over the Past Decade," paper presented at the meetings of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Washington, D.C., November 14-16, 1986; New York Times , March 10, 1988, p. A26. Among religious contributors to conservative political action committees in the early 1980s, strong support for the Moral Majority was limited to a few fundamentalist groups. See James L. Guth and John C. Green, "The Moralizing Minority: Christian Right Support Among Political Contributors," Social Science Quarterly 68 (1987): 598-610.

53. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA , pp. 74-77. See Ginsburg, Contested Lives , for a somewhat similar shift in antiabortion ranks in North Dakota.

54. Smidt, "Partisanship of American Evangelicals." break

1. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, The New Class War: Reagan's Attack on the Welfare State and Its Consequences (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), pp. xi, 9, 13; Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , pp. 46, 109; Jospeh G. Peschek, Policy-Planning Organizations: Elite Agendas and America's Rightward Turn (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). See also Dan Clawson and Mary Ann Clawson, "Reagan or Business? Foundations of the New Conservatism," in The Structure of Power in America: The Corporate Elite as Ruling Class , ed. Michael Schwartz (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), pp. 201-217.

2. Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , pp. 13-14.

3. Alan Wolfe, "Toward a Political Sociology of Reaganism," Contemporary Sociology 16 (1987): 31.

4. For a summary of these and related indicators, see Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , pp. 79-82; and Samuel Bowles, David M. Gordon, and Thomas E. Weisskopf, Beyond the Waste Land: A Democratic Alternative to Economic Decline (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983), pp. 19-61.

5. The argument in the following paragraphs draws especially on Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf, Beyond the Waste Land .

6. Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , p. 81.

7. Samuel Bowles, "The Post-Keynesian Capital-Labor Stalemate," Socialist Review 12 (September-October 1982): 45-72.

8. Piven and Cloward, New Class War , pp. 14-15.

9. Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , pp. 51-57.

10. Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf, Beyond the Waste Land , pp. 84-91; Piven and Cloward, New Class War , pp. 13-39.

11. Dan Clawson, Karen Johnson, and John Schall, "Fighting Union Busting in the 1980s," Radical America 16 (1982): 45-64; Dan Georgine, "From Brass Knuckles to Briefcases: The Modern Art of Union Busting," in The Big Business Reader , ed. Mark Green and Robert Massie, Jr. (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1980), pp. 91-110; Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, "The Knights of the Roundtable," The Nation 229 (1979): 620-628. For a general discussion of the strategies corporations used to cut labor costs, see Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone, The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and the Polarizing of America (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

12. Silk and Vogel, Ethics and Profits .

13. Silk and Vogel, Ethics and Profits , p. 52; Michael Useem, "Company vs. Classwide Rationality in Corporate Decision-Making," Administrative Science Quarterly 27 (1982): 199-226; idem, "Business and continue

Politics in the United States and the United Kingdom," Theory and Society 12 (1983): 281-308; idem, The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the U.S. and the U.K. (New York: Oxford, 1984); Murray Weidenbaum, "The High Cost of Government Regulation," Challenge , November-December 1981, pp. 32-39.

14. Silk and Vogel, Ethics and Profits , pp. 57-58.

15. Ibid., p. 75.

16. Ibid., pp. 104, 126.

14. Silk and Vogel, Ethics and Profits , pp. 57-58.

15. Ibid., p. 75.

16. Ibid., pp. 104, 126.

14. Silk and Vogel, Ethics and Profits , pp. 57-58.

15. Ibid., p. 75.

16. Ibid., pp. 104, 126.

17. "The Reindustrialization of America," Business Week , June 30, 1980, pp. 56-114; Silk and Vogel, Ethics and Profits , pp. 75-101.

18. Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , p. 128. Good overviews of the political mobilization of business in the 1970s and 1980s include Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , pp. 78-219; Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , pp. 107-140; Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 32-86; Saloma, Ominous Politics , pp. 7-37, 63-80; Pines, Back to Basics , pp. 31-98.

19. Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 336-368; G. William Domhoff, The Powers That Be: Processes of Ruling-Class Domination in America (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 53-60. Interestingly, corporate officials sometimes agree about the minimal role of the Chambers of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers in coordinating business political activity. These organizations may be good for exchanging information, they say, but not for organized political action. Conversations with Don Hendriksen, former vice president for government relations at Arco, and John Burton, a public-affairs officer first at Fluor Corporation and later at CooperVision, Sloan Workshop on Political Technology, Claremont, California, January 6, 1988.

20. Ferguson and Rogers, "Knights of the Roundtable," p. 621.

21. Ibid.; Peter Slavin, "The Business Roundtable: New Lobbying Arm of Big Business," Business and Society Review , Winter 1975-1976, pp. 28-32; Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , pp. 120-123; G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 135-136; Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 69-80; Kim McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power from FDR to Reagan (New York: Morrow, 1982), pp. 284-305.

20. Ferguson and Rogers, "Knights of the Roundtable," p. 621.

21. Ibid.; Peter Slavin, "The Business Roundtable: New Lobbying Arm of Big Business," Business and Society Review , Winter 1975-1976, pp. 28-32; Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , pp. 120-123; G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 135-136; Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 69-80; Kim McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power from FDR to Reagan (New York: Morrow, 1982), pp. 284-305.

22. See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of the impact of campaign reform laws and of electoral politics in general. In fact, the business elite played a major role in framing the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. See Tom Koenig, "Business Support for Dis- soft

closure of Corporate Campaign Contributions: An Instructive Paradox," in Schwartz, Structure of Power in America , pp. 82-96.

23. Gary C. Jacobson, "The Republican Advantage in Campaign Finance," in New Direction in American Politics , ed. Chubb and Peterson, p. 147; Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , p. 131; Useem, "Business and Politics," p. 299.

24. Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadtl, and James Bearden, "The Logic of Business Unity: Corporate Contributions to the 1980 Congressional Elections," American Sociological Review 51 (1986): 810.

25. Common Cause, 1972 Federal Campaign Finances (Washington, D.C.: Common Cause, 1973); idem, 1976 Federal Campaign Finances (Washington, D.C.: Common Cause, 1977); Federal Elections Commission, computer tape of PAC contributions to candidates for federal office, 1981; Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 469-471. Dan Clawson provided me with the data on the changing patterns of corporate PAC contributions to congressional candidates. Of course, a preference for incumbents could reflect an ideological strategy rather than a pragmatic one if indeed most corporate money so targeted went to incumbents in close races and hence reflected an intent to keep politically suitable persons in office. In fact, however, such money went disproportionately to incumbents who carried 60 percent of the vote or more in the previous election. This suggests the goal was not to save embattled incumbents with ideologies favorable to business but to win access to entrenched incumbents with considerable clout. See Dan Clawson and Alan Neustadtl, "Corporate Political Strategies: Classwide Rationality and Conservatism in PAC Contributions to the 1980 Congressional Elections," unpublished paper.

26. Clawson, Neustadtl, and Bearden, "Logic of Business Unity," p. 801. See also Stuart Rothenberg and Richard R. Roldan, Business PACs and Ideology: A Study of Contributions in the 1982 Elections (Washington, D.C.: Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, 1983).

27. For a lucid summary of different arguments about the bases of political divisions among corporations, see Val Burris, "The Political Partisanship of American Business: A Study of Corporate Political Action Committees," American Sociological Review 52 (1987): 732-744.

28. Dan Clawson, Allen Kaufman, and Alan Neustadtl, "Corporate PACs for a New Pax Americana," Insurgent Sociologist 13, no. 1-2 (1985): 63-77; Clawson and Neustadtl, "Corporate Political Strategies"; Burris, "Partisanship of American Business." In the first two continue

works the measures of centrality included total sales, foreign sales, capital intensity, and director interlocks. Only the last of these was significantly related to contribution strategy, with the more interlocked corporations more likely to support incumbents. In Burris's work the measures of centrality comprised these as well as profit rate, an oligopoly index, Business Roundtable membership, and several others. Only capital intensity was significantly related to contribution strategy, and then weakly. In both sets of studies the factor that best distinguished contribution strategies was relationship to government: corporations in traditional regulated industries with longstanding ties to specific government agencies and congressional committees and those with substantial government contracts were most likely to support incumbents. The finding of Clawson and his co-authors that the more interlocked corporations were most likely to pursue a contribution strategy rooted in a narrow company rationality runs counter to the idea that inner-circle corporations are apt to take a broad class view of politics.

29. Clawson, Neustadtl, and Bearden, "Logic of Business Unity," p. 803.

30. Elizabeth Drew, Power and Money (New York: Macmillan, 1983); Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , pp. 136-138; Alan Neustadtl and Dan Clawson, "Corporate Political Groupings: PAC Contributions to the 1980 Congressional Elections," American Sociological Review 53 (1988): 172-190. There are of course less formal modes of coordination. The chief contributions officers of individual corporations do not make decisions about political contributions in a vacuum. They share data bases and sometimes meet to listen to and discuss candidates. Conversations with Don Hendriksen.

31. David Vogel, "Business's 'New Class' Struggle," The Nation 229 (1979): 609, 625-628; Ann Crittenden, "The Economic Wind's Blowing toward the Right—for Now," New York Times , July 16, 1978, section 3, pp. 1, 9; Richard Goldstein, "The War for America's Mind," The Village Voice , June 8, 1982, pp. 1, 11-20; Useem, Inner Circle , pp. 129-132.

32. I noticed the ad in question in Commentary , June 1980. The resuits of the survey itself are from "The Vital Consensus: American Attitudes on Economic Growth," provided by Union Carbide on my request.

33. See, for example, Domhoff, Powers That Be , pp. 61-127. For a more thorough analysis, see Peschek, Policy-Planning Organizations .

34. William E. Simon, A Time for Truth (New York: Berkley, 1978), pp. 208-257; quotations at pp. 245, 248, 249. The growing power of continue

the New Class, its ideological unity, and its hostility to business were articles of faith among neoconservative intellectuals, who contributed to developing an image of America as a postindustrial society in which businessmen play a declining role. See the essays in The Third Century , ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979) and The New Class? ed. B. Bruce-Briggs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). See also Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America's Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), pp. 188-213. For the best analysis of the actual political beliefs of the New Class, see Steven Brint, "The Political Attitudes of Professionals," Annual Review of Sociology 11 (1985): 389-414; and idem, "'New Class' and Cumulative Trend Explanations of the Liberal Political Attitudes of Professionals," American Journal of Sociology 90 (1984): 30-71.

35. Crittenden, "Economic Wind's Blowing toward the Right"; Malcolm Scully, "More than GOP's 'Government in Exile,' " Chronicle of Higher Education 21 (December 15, 1980): 3; Peter Stone, "Conservative Brain Trust," New York Times Magazine , May 10, 1981, p. 18; "A Think Tank at the Brink," Newsweek , July 7, 1986, p. 87; "The Tale of Two Right-Wing 'Think Tanks,' " Group Research Reports 25 (1986): 22. Unpublished sources of expenditure figures cited here and in the following paragraphs include annual reports for the Heritage Foundation and the Brookings Institution; and conversations with public-affairs officers for AEI and the Hoover Institution. My thanks again to Dan Clawson for supplying many of these statistics. By 1988 at least one major corporation, Arco, which runs the largest corporate foundation, had decided it had given too much to right-wing think tanks and was moving back to the center. Arco, however, has a relatively liberal reputation among major corporations. Conversation with George Dunn, director of public affairs at Arco, Sloan Workshop on Political Technology, Claremont, California, January 6, 1988.

36. Crittenden, "Economic Wind's Blowing toward the Right"; Janet Hook, "Georgetown's 'Intellectual Brokerage House,' " Chronicle of Higher Education 21 (December 8, 1980): 3-4; Stewart McBride, "Leaning to the Right," Christian Science Monitor , April 2, 1980; Jack McCurdy, "A Reagan 'Brain Trust': Hoover Institution Finds It's in the Public Eye," Chronicle of Higher Education 21 (December 1, 1980): 3.

37. Morton Kondracke, "The Heritage Model," The New Republic 183 (December 20, 1980): 10; Dom Bonafede, "Issue-Oriented Heritage Foundation Hitches Its Wagon to Reagan's Star," National Journal , March 20, 1982, pp. 502-507; "Heritage Foundation Booms on the Right," Group Research Report 25 (1986): 22. break

38. The list included the Institute for Contemporary Studies, Center for Law and Economics, Center for Public Choice, Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, International Institute for Economic Research, Center for Free Enterprise, Center for Research in Government Policy and Business, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Center for the Study of American Business, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, National Strategy Information Center, the Manhattan Institute, the Lehrman Institute, and many others. Dan Morgan, "Conservatives: A Well-Financed Network," Washington Post , January 4, 1981, pp. A1, A14.

39. Karen Rothmyer, "Citizen Scaife," Columbia Journalism Review , July-August 1981, pp. 41-50; David Warner, "Scaife: Financier of the Right," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette , April 20, 1981; Bernard Weinraub, "Foundations Support Conservatism by Financing Scholars and Groups," New York Times , January 20, 1981, p. 17.

40. Peter Stone, "The Counter-Intelligentsia," Village Voice , October 27, 1979, pp. 14-19; Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 66-68.

41. Chris Welles, "The Supply-Side Cabal," This World , September 20, 1981, pp. 8-12; Geoffrey Norman, "Neo-Conservatism: An Idea Whose Time Is Now," Esquire , February 23, 1979, pp. 23-42; Walter Goodman, "Irving Kristol: Patron Saint of the New Right," New York Times Magazine , December 6, 1981, p. 90; Stone, "Counter-Intelligentsia." For detailed accounts of the development of supplyside economics, see Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 166-209; Stockman, Triumph of Politics , pp. 30-76; and Brooks, "Annals of Finance," pp. 97-150.

42. Peter Stone, "The I.E.A.—Teaching the Right Stuff," The Nation 233 (1981): 231-235; Goldstein, "War for America's Mind"; Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 66-68. After noting that as many as sixty conservative campus papers began publication in the early 1980s, one sympathetic observer candidly admitted, "Without IEA there would not be a conservative student newspaper movement to speak of." Stephen Weeks, "Notes from the Underground," National Review 38 (September 26, 1986): 36-40.

43. Bonafede, "Issue-Oriented Heritage Foundation"; Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration , ed. Charles Heatherly (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1981); Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 292-296.

44. Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , pp. 35-37, 328.

45. Alexander Haig, Reagan's first secretary of state, was president of United Technologies, a director of several other corporations, continue

and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. George Schultz, his successor, was president of the Bechtel Corporation and a director of the Council on Foreign Relations. Caspar Weinberger, Reagan's first defense secretary; was a vice president of Bechtel and a member of the Trilateral Commission. Finally; Donald Regan, first Reagan's treasury secretary and later his chief of staff, was head of Merrill Lynch, a trustee of the Committee for Economic Development, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. The first three all had prior governmental experience. See Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? pp. 139-140.

46. As I noted in Chapter 3, conservatives never lacked business support. What changed from the 1950s to the 1970s was the breadth of support. Where once one could identify an idiosyncratic business Right of rich individuals, family-owned companies, and a few corporations distinct from a corporate mainstream, by the late 1970s that mainstream too had moved right. See Forster and Epstein, Danger on the Right , for data on business contributions to right-wing groups in the 1950s and early 1960s.

47. Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment , p. 33.

48. William Spinrad, "Power in Local Communities," in Class, Status, and Power , ed. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, 2d ed. rev. (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 229.

49. Daniel Bell, End of Ideology , p. 45. See also idem, Radical Right , pp. 21-22.

50. Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," in C. Wright Mills and the Power Elite , ed. G. William Domhoff and Hoyt B. Ballard (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 25-36; Ivar Berg and Mayer Zald, "Business and Society," Annual Review of Sociology 4 (1978): 137; Bell, End of Ideology , pp. 39-45, 66; Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 101-102. For a recent revival of pluralism, see David Vogel, "The New Political Science of Corporate Power," The Public Interest 87 (Spring 1987): 63-79.

51. Edsall, New Politics of Inequality ; Piven and Cloward, New Class War ; Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment . The titles themselves imply a pluralist approach. Of the major works on the politics of big business in the 1970s and 1980s, only Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , avoids assuming that big business sat on its hands politically for years before the 1970s.

52. Useem, "Classwide Rationality," p. 221; idem, Inner Circle .

53. Useem, Inner Circle , pp. 34-48.

54. The instrumentalist/structuralist distinction was articulated in continue

the mid-1970s in two articles by Erik Olin Wright and his colleagues. See David Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Erik Olin Wright, "Some Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," Monthly Review 27 (October 1975): 29-43, and 27 (November 1975): 36-51; and Gosta Esping-Andersen, Rodger Friedland, and Erik Olin Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," Kapitalistate 4-5 (1976): 186-220. They certainly did not mean these categories to be static or final; indeed, in articulating them, these writers also sought to transcend them. In general, Marxist theories of the state and the broader discussion of which they are a part have for some time gone beyond the simple instrumentalist/structuralist dichotomy by stressing the independent impact of state structures and the range of possible capitalist states, the contradictory nature of the relationship between the state and capitalist relations of production, and the role of class struggle. For a general discussion, see Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Bob Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," Cambridge Journal of Economics 1 (1977): 353-373. See also Fred Block, "Beyond Corporate Liberalism," Social Problems 24 (1977): 352-361; idem, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State," Socialist Revolution 7 (1977): 6-28; and Theda Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal," Politics and Society 10 (1980): 155-201. The instrumentalist/structuralist dichotomy is also problematic because virtually no one has embraced the instrumentalist label. Domhoff in particular has rejected it vehemently. See G. William Domhoff, "I Am Not an 'Instrumentalist': A Reply to Kapitalistate Critics," Kapitalistate 4-5 (1976): 221-224. Although the terms thus have limited utility in describing contemporary ruling-class theories of the state, they still denote with some accuracy two ideal-typical images of the political role of the capitalist class, two poles toward which a diversity of theories of the state inevitably gravitate.

55. Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," in Ideology in Social Science , ed. Robin Blackburn (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 238-253; quotations at pp. 245-247.

56. Domhoff, Higher Circles ; idem, Powers That Be ; idem, Who Rules America Now? ; James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1967); Lawrence Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977).

57. For other works on policy-planning organizations, see Pes- soft

chek, Policy-Planning Organizations ; Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America? The Conservative Years , 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1986); Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust ; Robert Collins, The Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power .

58. Domhoff, Higher Circles , pp. 217-218.

59. Gold, Lo, and Wright, "Some Recent Developments," p. 48.

60. See, for example, Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State (New York: Schocken Books, 1979), pp. 111-179; Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984).

61. David Vogel, "Why Businessmen Distrust their State," British Journal of Political Science 8 (1978): 45-78. The combination of early democracy and late bureaucracy also helps to explain the late and uneven development of the U.S. welfare state. See Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol, Politics of Social Policy .

62. I mean this point to dovetail with major criticisms of the notion of corporate liberalism. See, for example, Block, "Beyond Corporate Liberalism," and Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis." See also Collins, Business Response to Keynes .

63. McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power , perhaps comes closest to capturing the image I have in mind.

1. Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970); idem, The Current Crisis in American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System ; Bruce A. Campbell and Richard J. Trilling, eds. Realignment in American Politics: Toward a Theory (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980; The Evolution of American Electoral Systems , ed. Paul Kleppner (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981); Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1980).

2. For critical perspectives on the notion of realignment, see Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale, Partisan Realignment ; David H. Nixon, "Methodological Issues in the Study of Realignment," in Realignment in American Politics , ed. Campbell and Trilling, pp. 52-65; Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , pp. 41-46.

3. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System .

4. K. Phillips, Emerging Republican Majority , was one of the first to voice this idea. See Chapter 4 of the present volume for a discussion continue

of theories that stress the emergence of new alignments in the 1960s and 1970s.

5. See Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), pp. 250-252, for data on governorships and state legislatures. Even after Reagan's 1984 landslide victory Republicans had only slightly narrowed the gap in state legislative seats. The Democratic edge in governorships varied erratically through much of the 1980s.

6. R. W. Apple, "Voters' Rebuff to Reagan's Vision," New York Times , November 6, 1986, p. 1.

7. For data on changes in the social bases of support for the major parties, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity , p. 105; Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., "Is Election '84 Really a Class Struggle?" Public Opinion , April-May 1984, pp. 41-47, 51; and Nelson, Elections of 1984 , pp. 106, 290. In 1984, according to the CBS News/ New York Times poll, Mondale got the votes of 44 percent of Catholics versus 26 percent of white Protestants, 53 percent of those earning under $12,500 versus 31 percent of those earning over $50, 000, 49 percent of those with less than a high-school education versus 40 percent of college graduates. The Washington Post /ABC News exit poll gave Mondale the vote of 44 percent of Catholics and 33 percent of Protestants, 51 percent of those without a high-school diploma and 37 percent of college graduates. In the 1986 midterm House elections only 36 percent of northerners from households with at least one union member voted Republican; 55 percent of that group had voted for Reagan in 1984. Nonunion Catholics, however, gave Republicans a 53 percent majority in both years. See Frederick T. Steeper and John R. Petrocik, "Ratification of the Reagan Realignment: The 1986 Election," Election Politics 4 (Winter 1986-1987): 10-13, and John R. Petrocik, "Realignment: New Party Coalitions and the Nationalization of the South," Journal of Politics 49 (1987): 347-375.

8. For summaries of public-opinion data, see Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Economy, Elections, and Public Opinion," Tocqueville Review 5 (1983): 431-470; Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., Marilyn Potter, Linda Basilick, Sally Daniels, and Dana Suszkiw, "The Polls: Taxing and Spending," Public Opinion Quarterly 43 (1979): 126-135; Donald Granberg and Beth Wellman Granberg, "Abortion Attitudes, 1965-1980: Trends and Determinants," Family Planning Perspectives 12 (1980): 250-261; "The 70's: Decade of Second Thoughts," Public Opinion , December-January 1980, pp. 19-42; Miller and Shanks, "Policy Directions and Presidential Leadership," pp. 299-356; John Magney, "Mountains, Molehills, and Media Hypes: The Curious Case of the New Conserv- soft

atism," Working Papers , May-June 1979, pp. 28-34; Warren E. Miller, "A New Context for Presidential Politics: The Reagan Legacy," Political Behavior 9 (1987): 91-113; and Public Opinion , March-April 1987, pp. 21-29, and November-December 1987, pp. 30-40. For analysis of the source of Republican gains, see Miller, "New Context for Presidential Politics." For discussions of the political effectiveness of conservative groups, see Loch Johnson and Charles S. Bullock III, "The New Religious Right and the 1980 Congressional Elections," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, San Antonio, Tex., March 17-21, 1982; Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, "The Elections and the Evangelicals," Commentary 71 (March 1981): 25-31; Michael J. Robinson, "The Media in 1980: Was the Message the Message?" in American Elections of 1980 , ed. Ranney, pp. 177-211; Marjorie Randon Hershey, "Single-Issue Groups and Political Campaigns: Six Senatorial Races and the Pro-Life Challenge in 1980," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1981; "Organized Right Took a Beating in the Elections," Group Research Report 25 (1986): 33.

9. Cavanagh and Sundquist, "New Two-Party System," p. 43.

10. Ibid., p. 46; Steeper and Petrocik, "Ratification of the Reagan Realignment." See also "Special Issue: The State of Public Opinion in the States," Election Politics 5 (Winter 1977-1978).

9. Cavanagh and Sundquist, "New Two-Party System," p. 43.

10. Ibid., p. 46; Steeper and Petrocik, "Ratification of the Reagan Realignment." See also "Special Issue: The State of Public Opinion in the States," Election Politics 5 (Winter 1977-1978).

11. Norman E. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, "The Decline of Partisanship," in Controversies in Voting Behavior , ed. Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1984), pp. 496-518; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Elections, the Economy, and Public Opinion," PS (Winter 1985): 35; Arthur Sanders, "Political Parties and the Mass Media," Election Politics 3 (Fall 1986): 21-25.

12. John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina, "Incumbency and Realignment in Congressional Elections," in New Direction in American Politics , ed. Chubb and Peterson, pp. 91-116; Public Opinion , January-February, 1989, p. 11.

13. Nelson, Elections of 1984 , pp. 106, 290; New York Times , November 6, 1986, p. A29.

14. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1987 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1988), pp. 6-9, 123-135, 235-237.

15. Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , p. 34.

16. Gregory B. Markus, "The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis," unpublished paper; Lipset, "The Economy, Elec- soft

tions, and Public Opinion." See also D. Roderick Kiewiet, Macro-Economics and Micro-Politics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); and Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting," American Journal of Political Science 23 (1979): 495-517.

17. Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn , pp. 27, 34; Markus, "Impact of Economic Conditions"; William Schneider, "An Uncertain Consensus," National Journal , November 10, 1984, pp. 2130-2132. See also Paul J. Quirk, "The Economy: Economists, Electoral Politics, and Reagan Economics," in Elections of 1984 , ed. Nelson, pp. 155-187; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Douglas Rivers, "The Economic Basis of Reagan's Appeal," in New Direction in American Politics , ed. Chubb and Peterson, pp. 69-90.

18. Nelson, Elections of 1984 , pp. 106, 290; Kellstedt, "Evangelicals and Political Realignment"; Smidt, "Partisanship of American Evangelicals"; New York Times , November 6, 1986, p. A29.

19. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System , pp. 245-274; "Right-Wing Drive to Control State Houses," Southern Exposure , January-February 1985, pp. 6-7; Steeper and Petrocik, "Ratification of the Reagan Realignment."

20. Cavanagh and Sundquist, "New Two-Party System," p. 46. Given the general shift of white southerners into the GOP and the disproportionate number of evangelicals in the South, it is tempting to see the religious shift as an artifact of the regional one. However, this is not the case. Evangelicals outside the South moved toward the Republican party as much as, or more than, their Southern counterparts. See Smidt, "Evangelicals in Presidential Elections."

21. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1986 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1987), p. 100; idem, Public Opinion 1987 , p. 322.

22. Cavanagh and Sundquist, "New Two-Party System" pp. 46, 48-49; Gallup, Public Opinion 1987 , pp. 7, 124, 236.

23. Gallup Poll, reported in Raleigh News and Observer , August 26, 1984, p. 15A; results of American Council on Education survey of college freshmen reported in New York Times , October 31, 1986. See also "The Conservative Student," Newsweek on Campus , March 1985, pp. 6-14. For a discussion of the College Republicans, see Crocker Coulson, "Lost Generation: The Politics of Youth," The New Republic 195 (December 1, 1986): 21-25. break

24. Charles O. Jones, "The Republican Challenge," Society 21 (July-August, 1984): 21-24. The following argument is similar to that in Robert Kuttner, The Life of the Party: Democratic Prospects in 1988 and Beyond (New York: Viking, 1987), pp. 72-108.

25. Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, "Strategy and Choice in the 1982 Elections," in Controversies in Voting Behavior , ed. Niemi and Weisberg, p. 240. See also Gregory B. Markus and Philip E. Converse, "A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice," in Controversies in Voting Behavior , ed. Niemi and Weisberg, pp. 132-153.

26. Gary C. Jacobson, "The Republican Advantage in Campaign Finance," in New Direction in American Politics , ed. Chubb and Peterson, pp. 143-174.

27. A. James Reichley, "The Rise of National Parties," in New Direction in American Politics , pp. 175-200; Jacobson, "Republican Advantage"; Edsall, New Politics of Inequality , pp. 67-106; idem, "Republican America," New York Review of Books , April 24, 1986, pp. 3-6; Larry J. Sabato, The Rise of the Political Consultants (New York: Basic Books, 1981), pp. 220-263; David C. Adamany, "Political Parties in the 1980s," in Money and Politics in the United States: Financing Elections in the 1980s , ed. Michael J. Malbin (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1984), pp. 70-121; for data on party fund-raising, see Malbin, Money and Politics , pp. 277-311.

28. Drew, Power and Money ; Jacobson, "Republican Advantage."

29. Jacobson, "Republican Advantage"; idem, "Congress: Politics after a Landslide without Coattails," in Elections of 1984 , ed. Nelson, pp. 215-238; idem, "Money in the 1980 and 1982 Congressional Elections," in Malbin, Money and Politics , pp. 38-69. Robert Kuttner, "Fat and Sassy," The New Republic 196 (February 23, 1987): 21-23.

30. Kuttner, "Fat and Sassy"; Alan Ehrenhalt, "Technology, Strategy Bring New Campaign Era," Congressional Quarterly 43 (1985): 2559-2565; Bob Davis, "Grand Old Party Tunes Up New Technology to Battle Democrats in Next Year's Election," Wall Street Journal , August 19, 1987, p. 38; Michael J. Bayer and Joseph Rodota, "Computerized Opposition Research: The Instant Parry," Campaigns and Elections 6 (Spring 1985): 25-29. At least one former member of the House Republican leadership staff told me in 1988, however, that the GOP's edge in technology is deceptive because information is used so poorly.

31. More precisely, politics in the 1980s has pitted a Democratic party whose strength (outside of the presidency, obviously) lies in the power of incumbency against a Republican party whose strength lies continue

in the capacity occasionally to counteract the effects of incumbency by systematically recruiting and funding good challengers and injecting national issues into local races.

32. Bob Hall, "Jesse Helms: The Meaning of His Money," Southern Exposure , January-February 1985, pp. 14-25.

33. Charlotte Observer , November 8, 1984, p. 13A. My data on the Helms-Hunt race come largely from reading two major North Carolina newspapers, the Charlotte Observer (hereafter CO ) and the Raleigh News and Observer (hereafter RNO ) from October 1983 through November 1984. For two especially insightful overviews of the race—one prospective, the other retrospective—see Rob Christensen, "Helms, Hunt Prepare for All-Out Battle," RNO , November 6, 1983, p. 1D, and Ken Eudy, "Sharply Drawn Images Define Senate Race," CO , November 4, 1984, p. 1A.

34. RNO , February 20, 1984, p. 11A. Data on previous North Carolina elections here and in the remainder of the chapter are from Richard Scammon and Alice V. McGillivray, America Votes 15 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1982), pp. 262-264.

35. The summary of the 1984 election results is from CO , November 7 and 8, 1984, and RNO , November 8, 1984.

36. Some of the best material on Helms and Hunt as political figures came from the daily reporting in RNO and CO . See, for example, Bill Arthur, "Helms: Outspoken Symbol of the Right," CO , February 12, 1984, p. 1A; idem, "Jesse Helms's Unwavering Conservatism," CO , September 29, 1984, p. 1A; Rob Christensen, "Helms' Career in Senate Series of Ideological Stands," RNO , October 21, 1984, p. 1A; Ken Eudy, "For Jim Hunt, Public Career Is a Calling," CO , February 5, 1984, p. 1A; Ken Eudy and Katherine White, "Hunt's Years: Practical Man Makes Mark," CO , October 6, 1984, p. 1A; Ginny Carroll, "Politics Taught Hunt 'What Government Can Do for People,' " RNO , October 7, 1984, p. 1A; and Elizabeth Leland, "Hunt Progressive Governor with a Cautious Approach," RNO , October 21, 1984, p. 1A. Outside of North Carolina, of course, Helms has also received intense scrutiny. See Drew, "Jesse Helms," pp. 78-95; Peter Ross Range, "Inside the New Right War Machine," Playboy , August 1981, pp. 99-102, 116, 216-221; and "The Helms Network," Congressional Quarterly Special Report , March 6, 1982, pp. 499-505.

37. Presidential Elections since 1789 , 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1979).

38. Thad L. Beyle and Peter B. Harkins, "North Carolina," in Explaining the Vote: Presidential Choices in the Nation and the States, 1968 , continue

ed. David M. Kovenock and James W. Prothro (Chapel Hill: Institute for Research in Social Science, 1973), pp. 376-424.

39. I wish to thank the School of Journalism of the University of North Carolina, Dr. Robert Stevenson, Dr. Jane Brown, and research assistant Stan Wearden for providing data from the School of Journalism poll. I also want to thank the Charlotte Observer , its marketing research director John Koslick, and research analyst Rob Daves for providing the data from the Observer poll. For a fuller discussion of this data, see Jerome L. Himmelstein, "Conservative Republicans in North Carolina," unpublished manuscript.

40. RNO , October 18, 1983, p. 1A; CO , December 18, 1983, p. 1A; RNO , February 5, 1984, p. 1A; CO , February 7, 1984, p. 1B; RNO , October 19, 1984, p. 1A; CO , November 4, 1984; CO , November 5, 1984, p. 1C.

41. Paul Luebke, Stephen Peters, and John Wilson, "The Political Economy of Microelectronics," in High Hopes for High Tech: The Microelectronics Industry in North Carolina , ed. Dale Whittington (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985); Paul Luebke, "North Carolina—Still in the Progressive Mold?," RNO , July 1985 (special North Carolina quartercentury edition).

42. RNO , October 15, 1984, p. 4C.

43. RNO , September 11, 1984, p. 3C; RNO , November 6, 1983, p. 7D; CO , December 18, 1983, p. 1A.

44. CO , October 19, 1983, p. 1A; John York, "Helms Showed Courage in Questioning King Holiday," CO , October 27, 1983, p. 1B; RNO , March 21, 1984, p. 9A.

45. RNO , February 26, 1984, p. 25A.

46. RNO , October 8, 1984, p. 9A; October 16, 1984, p. 1A; October 28, 1984, p. 1A; October 19, 1984, p. 1A.

47. CO , January 18, 1984, p. 2E; RNO , January 22, 1984, p. 1A; CO , July 7, 1984.

48. Ken Eudy, "N.C. Politics: Hunt, Mondale Are in Trouble," CO , September 16, 1984, p. 3B; idem, "'Registered' Democrat May Mean 'But I'll Vote for Helms,'" CO , September 12, 1984, p. 1E.

49. On Hunt's and Helms's fund-raising, see CO , April 27, 1984, p. 1C. For polls, see RNO , November 6, 1983, p. 1D; RNO , January 18, 1984, p. 1A; RNO , May 28, 1984, p. 1A; RNO , May 29, 1984, p. 1A; CO , July 1, 1984, p. 1A; CO , September 16, 1984, p. 1A; RNO , September 16, 1984, p. 1A; RNO , September 17, 1984, p. 1A; CO , October 7, 1984, p. 1A; and CO , October 30, 1984, p. 1A. The May Gallup Poll had Helms up 50-46 percent, but the June Observer Poll continue

gave Hunt a 47-42 percent lead. By September Helms had a slight lead in both polls (48.5-44.5 in the Gallup Poll, 48-45 in the Observer poll). An early October Observer poll had Hunt back in front, 46-42, but two polls in late October gave Helms the edge again, 49-46 and 47-43.

50. CO , December 30, 1983, p. 1A. A multivariate analysis of a February poll by the University of North Carolina School of Journalism showed that among whites, attitude toward the King holiday was second only to party loyalty in explaining preference for Helms or Hunt. RNO , June 24, 1984, p. 1D.

51. Paul Luebke, "Grass-Roots Organizing: The Hidden Side of the 1984 Helms Campaign," Election Politics 3 (Winter 1985-1986): 30-33; RNO , November 16, 1983, p. 1A; RNO , September 2, 1984, p. 1A; RNO , September 6, 1984, p. 19A.

52. RNO , September 11, 1984, p. 4C.

53. RNO , September 25, 1984, p. 16C.

54. RNO , October 15, 1984, pp. 4C-5C.

55. See Elizabeth Leland, "Pocketbook Issues Decided the Campaign That Had Everything," RNO , November 8, 1984, p. 15A.

1. William Schneider, "The Political Legacy of the Reagan Years," in The Reagan Legacy , ed. Sidney Blumenthal and Thomas Byrne Edsall (New York: Pantheon, 1988), pp. 51-98. See also John Judis, "Conservatism and the Price of Success," in The Reagan Legacy , pp. 135-171.

2. Viguerie, New Right ; E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Leaderless Conservatives Approach '88 in Splinters," New York Times , December 13, 1987, p. E4; Richard A. Viguerie, "What Reagan Revolution?" Washington Post , August 21, 1988, p. C2; Peter Osterlund, "New Right Gropes for Old Momentum," Christian Science Monitor , November 27, 1987, p. 1; R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., "The Coming Conservative Crack-up," The American Spectator 20 (September 1987): 17-19, 51. For other comments on the state of the conservative movement in the late 1980s by outside observers and by conservatives themselves, see Tim W. Ferguson, "What Next for the Conservative Movement?" The American Spectator 20 (January 1987): 14-18; Charlotte Low, "The Pro-Life Movement in Disarray," The American Spectator 20 (October 1987): 23-26; Amy Moritz, "The New Right: It's Time We Led," Policy Review 44 (Spring 1988): 22-25; George Nash, "Completing the Revolution: Challenges for Conservatism after Reagan," Policy Review (Spring continue

1986): 35-39; "Ten Years That Shook the World," Policy Review 41 (Summer 1987): 2-5, 72-79; E. J. Dionne, Jr., "High Tide for Conservatives, but Some Fear What Follows," New York Times , October 13, 1987, p. 1; Charlotte Saikowski, "Will 'Reagan Revolution' Leave Mark?" Christian Science Monitor , April 30, 1987, p. 1; David Shribman, "With Reagan Gone, Conservatives Weigh Strategy to Bring New Energy, Direction to Movement," Wall Street Journal , March 2, 1989, p. A18.

3. For the Right's response to Bush, see Fred Mann, "And They're Off," National Review 40 (February 5, 1988): 36-40; Richard Brookhiser, "The Establishment Man," National Review 40 (November 7, 1988): 34-38; Edwin Feulner, "A Conservative Manifesto: Bush Can Do for Right What Reagan Couldn't," Washington Post , December 4, 1988, p. L1; Charlotte Saikowski, "Bush Nominees Leave GOP Right Feeling Uneasy," Christian Science Monitor , December 16, 1988, p. 3; Howard Fineman, "Goodbye to the 'Old Sheriff': Will Reagan's Conservative Posse Follow Bush?" Newsweek , December 26, 1988, p. 26; Marcia Schwartz, "Conservatives Survey Post-Reagan Landscape," Washington Post , February 24, 1989, p. A5; E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Conservatives Like Bush, but They're Watching Him," New York Times , February 26, 1989, p. E4.

4. Larry Martz, "Trouble on the Far Right," Newsweek , April 14, 1986, pp. 24-25; David Brooks, "Please, Mr. Postman: The Travails of Richard Viguerie," National Review 38 (June 20, 1986): 28-32; Thomas B. Edsall, "Head of Conservative PAC Quits in Dispute with Board," Washington Post , March 1, 1987, p. A2; Wallace Turner, "Hard Times Descend upon an Anti-abortion PAC," New York Times , August 9, 1987, p. 25; "Money Problems at Birch Society," New York Times , August 9, 1987, p. 42; Judis, "Conservatism and the Price of Success"; "The John Birch Society Is Broke and Fighting Internally," Group Research Report 25 (1986): 25-26.

5. Shribman, "With Reagan Gone, Conservatives Weigh Strategy."

6. Fred Barnes, "Kemp and the Cons," The New Republic 198 (December 28, 1987): 10, 12-13; Viguerie quoted in New York Times , March 11, 1988, p. D16. See also William Schneider, "The Harumph of the Will," The New Republic 198 (December 21, 1987): 39-41.

7. E. J. Dionne, Jr., "It's Straight and Narrow for Architect of Right," New York Times , March 16, 1989, p. B12; Andrew Rosenthal, "Tower's Personal Life Is Scrutinized," New York Times , February 1, 1989, p. A14.; Robin Toner and Michael Oreskes, "Tower Vote: Heavy Blows, Deftly Dealt," New York Times , March 12, 1989, p. 1; Tom Morganthau, "Tower's Troubles," Newsweek , March 6, 1989, pp. 16-22.

8. New York Times , November 10, 1988, p. B6; Harrison Donnelly, continue

"Getting Religion into Politics," Editorial Research Reports , September l2, 1986, pp. 667-684; Richard W. Bruner, "GOP Mainstream Fights Right Wing," Christian Science Monitor , March 29, 1989, p. 8; Garry Wills, "'Save the Babies': Operation Rescue—A Case Study in Galvanizing the Antiabortion Movement," Time , May 1, 1989, pp. 26-27.

9. Ronald Smothers, "Baptists War over Hearts and Minds," New York Times , October 19, 1987, p. A18; Marshall Ingiverson, "Baptists Factions Struggle over Church Direction," Christian Science Monitor , November 23, 1987, p. 3; Marjorie Hoyer, "Moderate Baptists Rallying," Washington Post , November 16, 1987, p. A1; Peter Waldman, "Fundamentalists Fight to Capture the Soul of Southern Baptists," Wall Street Journal , March 7, 1988, p. 1; "Southern Baptist Election Is Won by Fundamentalist," Wall Street Journal , June 20, 1988, p. 18; Katherine S. Mangan, "Moderate Baptists Vote to Concede Control of Seminary to Fundamentalists and to Found Own Institution," The Chronicle of Higher Education , December 7, 1988, p. A15.

10. See Chapter 4.

11. Samuel G. Freedman, "Evangelicals Fight over Both Body and Soul," New York Times , May 31, 1987, p. 1; Laura Sessions Stepp, "TV Preachers Have a Devil of a Year," Washington Post , November 29, 1987, p. A14; "TV Preaching's 'Free Fall,'" Washington Post , July 19, 1987, p. A15; Marshall Ingiverson, "Troubles of Prominent TV Evangelists Ripple through Industry," Christian Science Monitor , June 1, 1988, p. 3; Larry Martz, "TV Preachers on the Rocks," Newsweek , July 11, 1988, pp. 26-28; Laura Sessions Stepp, "IRS Probes Evangelists' Operations," Washington Post , December 10, 1988, p. A1.

12. Alan Murray, "Lobbyists for Business Are Deeply Divided," Wall Street Journal , March 25, 1987, p. 1; Curtis M. Grimm and John M. Holcomb, "Choices among Encompassing Organizations: Business and the Budget Deficit," in Business Strategy and Public Policy , ed. Alfred A. Marcus, Allen M. Kaufman, and David R. Beam (New York: Quorum Books, 1987), pp. 105-118.

13. Theodore J. Eismeier and Philip H. Pollock III, Business, Money, and the Rise of Corporate PACs in American Elections (New York: Quorum Books, 1988), pp. 79-96; Dan Clawson, personal communication to author, June 1, 1989; Theodore J. Eismeier and Philip H. Pollock III, "The Retreat from Partisanship: Why the Dog Didn't Bark in the 1984 Election," in Business Strategy and Public Policy , ed. Marcus, Kaufman, and Beam, pp. 137-147. See also Ann B. Matasar, Corporate PACs and Federal Campaign Financing Laws (New York: Quorum Books, 1986), pp. 51-70; Tie-ting Su and Dan Clawson, "Corporate PACs and Conservative Realignment: A Comparison of 1980 and 1984," working continue

draft, May 1989; Tie-ting Su, Dan Clawson, and Alan Neustadtl, "A Dynamic Analysis of Corporate PAC Groupings, 1978-1986," paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Atlanta, August 1988; Theodore J. Eismeier and Philip H. Pollock III, "Politics and Markets: Corporate Money in American National Elections," British Journal of Political Science 16 (1986): 287-306.

14. Eismeier and Pollock, Business, Money, and Corporate PACs , p. 92; idem, "Politics and Markets."

15. Eismeier and Pollock, Business, Money and Corporate PACs , pp. 83-88.

16. Barbara Vobejda, "A Conservative Agenda for the Bush Administration," Washington Post , December 9, 1988, P. A8; Judith Havemann, "Bush to Get 2,500 Conservative Resumes," Washington Post , November 15, 1988, p. A17; Edward Sussman, "Conservative Think Tank Comes Back from Brink of Financial Disaster, Leaning More to Right," Wall Street Journal , September 3, 1987, p. 42; Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment ; Benjamin Hart, ed., The Third Generation: Young Conservatives Look to the Future (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1987); Judis, "Conservatism and the Price of Success."

17. Brooks Jackson, Honest Graft: Big Money and the American Political Process (New York: Knopf, 1988); Paul S. Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); Kuttner, The Life of the Party .

18. For the results of the 1988 elections generally, see "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion 11 (January-February 1989): 21-40; Washington Post , November 10, 1988, p. 1; New York Times , November 10, 1988, p. B6; E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Voters Delay Republican Hopes of Dominance in Post-Reagan Era," New York Times , November 10, 1988, p. A1; Thomas B. Edsall and Richard Morin, "Reagan's 1984 Voter Coalition Is Weakened in Bush Victory," Washington Post , November 9, 1988, P. A29, A34; R. W. Apple, "The G.O.P. Advantage," New York Times , November 9, 1988, p. A1; E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Bush Is Elected by a 6-5 Margin," New York Times , November 9, 1988, p. A1; Fred Barnes, "Dream On: The Republican Realignment Quest," The New Republic 200 (January 23, 1989): 9-10. The phrase "Donkey's Year" comes from Fred Barnes, "A Donkey's Year," The New Republic 199 (February 29, 1988): 16-18.

19. "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion 11 (January-February 1989): 21-40.

20. For an example of the debate over the ideological significance of the 1988 elections, see the articles on the Op-Ed page of the New York Times , November 13, 1988, p. C7, including George F. Will, continue

"There They Go Again . . . "; James A. Baker III, "It's Not a Triumph of Slick Campaigning"; Michael Barone, "Beware the Populist Trap"; Mark Green, "Liberalism Didn't Lose the Election."

21. "Conservatism and Liberalism: A National Review," Public Opinion 11 (November-December 1988): 30-35; Celinda Lake and Stanley Greenberg, "What's Left for Liberalism," Public Opinion 12 (March-April 1989): 4-7; John E. Robinson and John A. Fleishman, "Ideological Identification: Trends and Interpretations of the Liberal-Conservative Balance," Public Opinion Quarterly 52 (1988): 134-145.

22. Public Opinion 11 (January-February 1989): 27.

23. See "Opinion Roundup" in the following issues of Public Opinion : March-April 1987, 21-29; September-October 1987, 26-35; November-December, 1987, 30-40.

24. Keene quoted in Shribman, "With Reagan Gone, Conservatives Weigh Strategy."

25. Tamar Lewin, "Views on Abortion Are Sharply Split 16 Years after Supreme Court Ruling," New York Times , January 22, 1989, p. 21.

26. See n. 24.

27. Lake and Greenberg, "What's Left for Liberalism." This is hardly new; it has simply become more significant politically. The point was first emphasized over twenty years ago by Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967). break