1. Robert S. McNamara, excerpts from a speech delivered September 18, 1967, in San Francisco before a meeting of journalists, reprinted in ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System, ed. Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner (New York: New American Library, 1969), p. 237.

2. For the role of the refugee physicists, see Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, vol. 1: The New World, 1939-1946 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), pp. 14-19; Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed (New York: Knopf, 1975), pp. 18-30; and J. Stefan Dupré and Sanford A. Lakoff, Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 91-93.

3. Truman reached his decision after the question had been well aired within the executive branch. The General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission had recommended against a clash program, but the commissioners themselves favored proceeding with it by 3 to 2. Truman asked a subcommittee of the National Security Council, composed of AEC chairman David E. Lilienthal, Secretary of Defensè Louis Johnson, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, to review the matter for him. The subcommittee was in favor by 2 to 1. Truman's decision was supported by prominent nuclear physicists, including Karl T. Compton, Edward Teller, Ernest O. Lawrence, John von Neumann, and Luis Alvarez. See Herbert F. York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976).

4. Studies of defense policy making provide support for each of these factors. The role of "bureaucratic politics," i.e., the interplay of departments and agencies in the executive branch, acting out of organizational interest and perspective, is often stressed. Thus, in The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), Harvey M. Sapolsky notes that the success of the Polaris project was a result of the skill of its proponents in bureaucratic politics: "Competitors had to be eliminated; reviewing agencies had to be outmaneuvered; congressmen, admirals, newspapermen, and academicians had to be co-opted" (p. 244). In examining the controversy between the army and air force over which service should get responsibility for intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Michael H. Armacost also notes the importance of lobbying by the services and the applicability of the pressure-group model of analysis. He points out, however, that the services found it necessary to build consensus among journalists, members of Congress, analysts in quasi-autonomous "think tanks," and "an extensive network of scientific and technical advisory committees located within the Executive branch," and that this "very pluralism assured the government of a broad base of scientific and technical advice, and, superimposed upon service rivalries, this provided additional insurance that criticism of weapons programs was persistent and far from perfunctory" (The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy [New York: Columbia University Press, 1969], p. 256).

Ted Greenwood, in a study of the decision to adopt the MIRV principle for warheads, argues persuasively against adoption of any single-factor analysis, noting that the decision to adopt MIRV resulted from "the complex interplay of technological opportunity, bureaucratic politics, strategic and policy preferences of senior decisionmakers, and great uncertainty about Soviet activities" (Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making [Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975], p. xv). Other studies, such as Gordon Adams, The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1982), emphasize the role of the "iron triangle" (the federal bureaucracy, the key committees and members of Congress, and the defense contractors) in promoting military expenditures. Seymour Melman, in Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), contends that the managers of DOD "sell weapons-improvement programs to Congress and the public" (p. 70). None of these factors played a significant role in the decision to begin SDI, though they may well become important when and if the research phase is succeeded by a commitment to develop and deploy an SDI system, when the stakes will be much higher.

5. McNamara, in ABM: An Evaluation, p. 236. Graham T. Allison has suggested, however, that "U.S. research and development has been as much self-generated as Soviet-generated." See his "Questions About the Arms Race: Who's Racing Whom? A Bureaucratic Perspective," in Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), p. 42.

6. Herbert F. York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 238-39.

7. Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-84 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 190-92.

8. Testimony of Robert S. Cooper before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, 97th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 7, March 16, 1982, pp. 4845-76.

9. Reagan's solicitation of advice on SDI from "a highly selective group" that was, in addition, intensely loyal to him has been contrasted with Eisenhower's submission of the proposal for a nuclear test ban to a broadly representative group of scientists in the President's Science Advisory Committee in G. Allen Greb, Science Advice to Presidents: From Test Bans to the Strategic Defense Initiative, Research Paper no. 3 (La Jolla: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1987), p. 15.

10. For a detailed account of how Eisenhower reached these decisions, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 326-41.

11. Interview in Newsweek, March 18, 1985, quoted in Star Wars Quotes (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 1986), p. 26.

12. National Party Platforms of 1980, comp. Donald Bruce Johnson (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), p. 207. Richard V. Allen, who was to become President Reagan's first assistant for national security affairs, was influential in the adoption of the plank, according to his colleague, Martin Anderson, who was responsible for pressing Reagan's views on domestic policy with the platform drafters. See Martin Anderson, Revolution (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), p. 87.

13. See Garry Wills, Reagan's America: Innocents at Home (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1987), p. 361, and Michael Paul Rogin, Ronald Reagan, the Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 1-2. The finale of the movie recapitulates the classical myth in which Phaeton, claiming to be the son of Apollo, nearly destroys the world by driving Apollo's chariot of the sun erratically until Jupiter rescues the earth by loosing a thunderbolt and arresting the flight.

14. Quoted in Anderson, Revolution, p. 83.

15. Text of interview in Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 1982), pp. 232-33.

16. Anderson, Revolution, pp. 85-86.

17. The air force's "Space Master Plan" was publicized in July 1983 by Aviation Week & Space Technology. Stares, Militarization of Space, p. 219.

18. Quoted in Frank Greve, "Star Wars," San Jose Mercury News, November 17, 1985.

19. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 19, no. 13 (Washington, D.C.: White House, April 4, 1983), p. 453. Reagan had also used the same image years before: "As early as 1976, when he was challenging Gerald Ford for the Republican nomination, he criticized deterrence, comparing the arrangement to two people with guns cocked at each other's head." Michael Mandelbaum and Storbe Talbott, Reagan and Gorbachev (New York: Vintage, 1987), p. 126.

20. Daniel O. Graham, "Towards a New U.S. Strategy: Bold Strokes Rather Than Increments," Strategic Review (Spring 1981): 9-16.

21. Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier, A New National Strategy (Washington, D.C.: High Frontier, 1982), pp. 9, 18, 20.

22. Cooper testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 4635.

23. GAO, "DOD's Space-Based Laser Program—Potential, Progress, and Problems," Report by the Comptroller General of the United States (Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 26, 1982), pp. iii-iv.

24. In 1982 DOD established a space laser program, as recommended by DARPA, in cooperation with the air force and the army. The plan called for the expenditure of $800 million over the period from FY1982 through FY1988, under the supervision of the office of the assistant secretary for directed energy weapons.

25. Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: The President's Science Advisers from Roosevelt to Reagan, draft of chap. 6, p. 21. A substantial part of this chapter has been published as "The Earthly Origins of 'Star Wars,'" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (October 1987), pp. 20-28.

26. Pete V. Domenici, "Towards a Decision on Ballistic Missile Defense," Strategic Review (Winter 1982): 22-27.

27. William J. Broad, Star Warriors (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), pp. 39-40.

28. Edward Teller, "SDI: The Last Best Hope," Insight (October 20, 1985), pp. 75-79.

29. Broad, Star Warriors, p. 122. "In all," according to Broad, "Teller met with the President four times over the course of little more than a year." Teller, in a letter to the authors (September 21, 1987) claims to have had little direct influence on the president's decision: "Before the President's announcement of SDI, I had two very brief meetings with the President. I expressed no more than my general support and good hopes." In the September meeting, he recalls, "defense was mentioned but no subject like the X-ray laser was explicitly discussed." With respect to the X-ray laser, Teller's recollection does not jibe with Keyworth's. See Herken, Cardinal Choices, p. 23.

30. Quoted in Greve, "Star Wars."

31. Quoted by Broad, Star Warriors, p. 73.

32. Edward Teller with Allen Brown, The Legacy of Hiroshima (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 128-29.

33. Edward Teller (Address to the Faculty Seminar on International Security at the University of California, San Diego, December 12, 1983).

34. Anderson, Revolution, p. 95.

35. Ibid.

36. Greve, "Star Wars."

37. Statement by the assistant for directed energy weapons to the under secretary of defense for research and engineering before the U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 1983.

38. Richard DeLauer, quoted in Arms Control Reporter (November 10, 1983).

39. Richard DeLauer, interview in Government Executive (July-August 1983), quoted in Star Wars Quotes, p. 34.

40. Greve, "Star Wars."

41. Ibid.

42. Herken, Cardinal Choices, chap. 6, pp. 46-47.

43. John Bardeen, letter to the editor, Arms Control Today (July-August 1986), p. 2.

44. Greve, "Star Wars."

45. Hedrick Smith, The Power Game: How Washington Works (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 612-14.

46. Anderson, Revolution, p. 43.

47. Greve, "Star Wars."

48. Ibid.

49. Anderson, Revolution, p. 97.

50. Greve, "Star Wars."

51. Testimony of Robert C. McFarlane before the U.S. Congress, Defense Policy Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, May 17, 1988, typescript, pp. 167-68.

52. Ronald W. Reagan, interview, U.S. News and World Report (November 18, 1985), p. 30.

53. Text of the "Star Wars" speech, New York Times, March 24, 1983.

54. McFarlane testimony, Defense Policy Subcommittee, pp. 165-66; Mr. McFarlane's testimony was not altogether clear at this point. We have therefore supplied (in brackets) some punctuation and the subjects of unclear pronoun referents not supplied in the original transcript yet needed for sense.

55. The CIA view was presented in the testimony by Robert M. Gates and Lawrence K. Gershwin before a joint session of the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, June 26, 1985. The Joint Chiefs' view is reported in Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Knopf, 1984), p. 224.

56. Helmut Sonnenfeldt (Address at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, November 29, 1986).

57. Thomas C. Schelling, "What Went Wrong with Arms Control?" Foreign Affairs 64 (Winter 1985-86): 217-33.

58. See Michael Novak, "Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age," National Review (April 1, 1983), pp. 354-62, and "The Bishops Speak Out," National Review (June 10, 1983), pp. 674-81.

59. "Star Wars" speech, New York Times.

60. Herken, Cardinal Choices, chap. 6, p. 49.

61. "Star Wars" speech, New York Times.

62. Ibid.

63. Excerpt from an interview with Andropov in Pravda, March 27, 1983, quoted in Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway, The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technical, Political, and Arms Control Assessment (Stanford, Calif.: Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 1984), appendix B, p. 105.

64. McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control," Foreign Affairs 63 (Winter 1984-85): 270-72.

65. Reagan interview with six journalists, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 19, no. 13 (Washington, D.C.: White House, April 4, 1983), p. 471.

66. A 1985 Sindlinger Poll found that 85 percent of the U.S. public favored development of a missile defense "even if it can't protect everyone." Jeffrey Hart, "A Surprising Poll on Star Wars," Washington Times, August 9, 1985. A Gallup Poll in November 1985 found 61 percent in favor of the United States proceeding with SDI. Christian Science Monitor, November 21, 1985.

67. Soviet Strategic Defense Program (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, October 1985).

68. On December 7, 1983, Secretary Weinberger was quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying: "I can't imagine a more destabilizing factor for the world than if the Soviets should acquire a thoroughly reliable defense against these missiles before we did." Cited in Star Wars Quotes, p. 52.

69. See Colin S. Gray, "Air Defence: A Sceptical View," Queens Quarterly 79 (Spring 1972): 9, where he notes that boost-phase interception of ICBMs "would take the lion's share of the current U.S. defence budget."

70. Colin S. Gray, American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapons Systems, and Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1982), pp. 15-16.

71. "The low incremental costs per kill ... could make lasers effective against other targets, such as bombers and cruise missiles. Given the ability to detect them, either could be attacked from space for the incremental cost of the fuel required. Space lasers could engage tactical aircraft at cost advantages of about 100:1." Gregory H. Canavan, "Defense Technologies for Europe," in Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance, ed. Sanford Lakoff and Randy Willoughby (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 49.

72. "A defended America could more reasonably make security guarantees to NATO-Europe because it would face fewer risks in doing so. A U.S. deterrent threat on behalf of its allies would be much more credible if that threat did not enable the potential destruction of the U.S." Keith B. Payne, Strategic Defense: "Star Wars" in Perspective (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton, 1986), p. 214.

73. See William D. Hartung et al., in The Strategic Defense Initiative: Costs, Contractors, and Consequences, ed. Alice Tepper Marlin and Paula Lippin (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1985); John P. Holdren and F. Bailey Green, "Military Spending, the SDI, and Government Support of Research and Development: Effects on the Economy and the Health of American Science," F.A.S. Public Interest Report 39 (September 1986); and Daniel S. Greenberg, "Civilian Research Spinoffs from SDI Are a Delusion," Los Angeles Times, September 9, 1986.

74. The potential economic benefits were stressed in Graham, High Frontier, pp. 89-98, and more recently in SDIO, Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: SDIO, April 1987), pp. viii, 2-5.

75. "You know, we only have a military-industrial complex until a time of danger, and then it becomes the arsenal of democracy. Spending for defense is investing in things that are priceless—peace and freedom." President Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, February 6, 1985, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 21, no. 6 (Washington, D.C.: White House, February 11, 1985), p. 143.

76. For a presentation of this conservative view, see Norman Podhoretz, The Present Danger (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), pp. 56-57.

77. Ibid.

78. For an exposition of the "Reagan doctrine" see Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "The Reagan Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy" (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1983) and "Implementing the Reagan Doctrine," National Security Record no. 82 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, August 1985). The doctrine is examined critically in Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "The Guns of July," Foreign Affairs 64 (Spring 1986): 698-714.

79. Garry Wills, Reagan, p. 360. The broad appeal of SDI is noted in Kevin Phillips, "Defense Beyond Thin Air: Space Holds the Audience," Los Angeles Times, March 10, 1985.

80. Fred S. Hoffman, study director, Ballistic Missile Defenses and U.S. National Security (Summary report prepared for the Future Security Strategy Group, October 1983).

81. "Given the drastically changed strategic balance and the developments in offensive arms control and BMD technology since the signing of the ABM Treaty, an important question is whether it serves a useful purpose." Payne, Strategic Defense, p. 161.

82. "We would see the transition period as a cooperative endeavor with the Soviets. Arms control would play a critical role. We would, for example, envisage continued reductions in offensive nuclear arms." Paul H. Nitze, "On the Road to a More Stable Peace" (address to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council, February 20, 1985); published as Current Policy no. 657 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs).

83. Ibid.

84. Alvin M. Weinberg and Jack N. Barkenbus, "Stabilizing Star Wars," Foreign Policy 54 (Spring 1984): 164-70, and Weinberg and Barkenbus, eds., Strategic Defenses and Arms Control (New York: Paragon House, 1987).

85. "To achieve agreements drastically reducing numbers of offensive weapons, and to provide assurance against clandestine violations of such agreements, some deployment of missile defenses may be helpful. In the long run, the transition from a world of assured destruction to a world of live-and-let-live must be accompanied by a transfer of emphasis from offensive to defensive weapons." Freeman Dyson, Weapons and Hope (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 281.

86. Reagan, quoted in New York Times, October 15, 1986.

87. See Thomas K. Longstreth, John E. Pike, and John B. Rhinelander, The Impact of U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty (Washington, D.C.: National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, March 1985), pp. 42-51, and Peter A. Clausen, "Transition Improbable: Arms Control and SDI," in Empty Promise: The Growing Case Against Star Wars, ed. John Tirman, Union of Concerned Scientists (Boston: Beacon, 1986), pp. 191—92.

88. Robert C. McFarlane, in a television interview, quoted in Arms Control Reporter (October 1985).

89. Ambassador Smith made this comment on October 6, 1985; quoted in Arms Control Reporter (October 1985).

90. Gerard C. Smith, letter to the editor, New York Times, October 23, 1985.

91. George P. Shultz (Address to the North Atlantic Assembly, San Francisco, October 14, 1985), quoted in Arms Control Reporter (October 1985).

92. Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: SDIO, June 1986), appendix C.

93. Thus, Sidney D. Drell has called for "a prudent, deliberate, and high-quality research program ... within ABM Treaty limits" at a level of roughly $2 billion per year. "Prudence and the 'Star Wars' Effort: Research Within the Bounds of ABM Treaty Can Aid Safer World," Los Angeles Times, March 10, 1985.

94. See especially Yevgeni Velikhov, Roald Sagdeyev, and Andrei Kokoshin, eds., Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security (Moscow: Mir Publishers, 1986), chap. 4, pp. 69-77, chap. 7, pp. 106-27.

95. "The Department of Defense Directed Energy Program and Its Relevance to Strategic Defense," statement by the assistant for directed energy weapons to the under secretary of defense for research and engineering before the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 98th Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 1983, p. 3.

1. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1986-1987 (London: IISS, 1986), p. 33.

2. Jeffrey Richelson, "Ballistic Missile Defense and Soviet Strategy," in The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, ed. Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 71.

3. Robert S. McNamara, Blundering Into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (New York: Pantheon, 1986), p. 42.

4. R. L. Maust, G. W. Goodman, Jr., and C. E. McLain, History of Strategic Defense, report prepared for Defense Science Board (Arlington, Va.: System Planning Corp., September 1981), pp. 11-12.

5. Edward Randolph Jayne II, "The ABM Debate: Strategic Defense and National Security" (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology), p. 32.

6. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

7. Ibid., p. 45. McElroy was originally quoted in Jack Raymond, New York Times, November 21, 1957.

8. Ibid., pp. 52-53.

9. Maust, Goodman, and McLain, Strategic Defense, p. 15.

10. McNamara, Blundering Into Disaster, p. 57.

11. Excerpts from a speech delivered by Robert S. McNamara on September 18, 1967, in San Francisco, in ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System, ed. Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner (New York: New American Library, 1969), p. 242.

12. See Anne Hessing Cahn, "American Scientists and the ABM: A Case Study in Controversy," in Scientists and Public Affairs, ed. Albert H. Teich (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), pp. 41-120.

13. Maust, Goodman, and McLain, Strategic Defense, pp. 18-19.

14. Richelson, "Ballistic Missile Defense," p. 70.

15. Quoted in Sayre Stevens, "The Soviet BMD Program," in Ballistic MissileDefense, ed. Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 194. The Malinovsky quote is from Pravda, October 25, 1961; Khrushchev was quoted in Theodore Shabad, New York Times, July 17, 1962.

16. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1986 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 44.

17. Ibid., p. 43.

18. Stevens, "Soviet BMD," p. 199; Richelson, "Ballistic Missile Defense," p. 71.

19. Robert M. Gates and Lawrence K. Gershwin, testimony before U.S. Congress, Defense Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Appropriations, June 26, 1985, quoted in David S. Yost, "Alliance Strategy and BMD," in Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance, ed. Sanford Lakoff and Randy Willoughby (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 71.

20. DOD, Soviet Military Power, p. 45.

21. Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 243-44.

22. DOD, Soviet Military Power, p. 54.

23. Ibid., p. 57.

24. Ibid., pp. 54-57.

25. Ibid., pp. 54-55.

26. The Reagan administration's complaint about the Soviets' new tracking radar was made in President Reagan's February 1985 report to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms-control agreements. Cited in David S. Yost, "Strategic Defenses in Soviet Doctrine and Force Posture," in Swords and Shields: NATO, the U.S.S.R., and New Choices for Long-Range Offense and Defense, ed. Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter, and David S. Yost (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 133.

27. DOD, Soviet Military Power, p. 57.

28. Yost, "Alliance Strategy," pp. 79-80.

29. DOD, Soviet Military Power, p. 53.

30. Ibid., p. 57.

31. Ibid., p. 46.

32. Ibid., p. 47.

33. Report in William J. Broad, New York Times, October 23, 1987, p. 11. See also Broad, "The Secrets of Soviet Star Wars," New York Times Magazine, June 28, 1987, pp. 22-28.

34. Yost, "Alliance Strategy," p. 75.

35. Stevens, "Soviet BMD," p. 219.

36. MccGwire, Military Objectives, p. 36.

37. Stevens, "Soviet BMD," p. 187.

38. MccGwire, Military Objectives, p. 242.

39. Bhupendra M. Jasani, ed., Space Weapons—The Arms Control Dilemma (London: Taylor and Francis, 1984), p. 5.

40. Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 55-57.

41. Ibid., p. 76.

42. Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 2.

43. Stares, Militarization of Space, p. 200.

44. Ibid., p. 232.

45. Science 240 (June 12, 1987).

1. Except for the quote by Haldane, these pessimistic predictions are cited in Kenneth Adelman, "Setting the Record Straight," Current Policy no. 730 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, August 7, 1985), and in Keith B. Payne, Strategic Defense: "Star Wars" in Perspective (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton, 1986), pp. 56-67. See J. B. S. Haldane, Callinicus (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1925), p. 17, for his comments.

2. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist who directed the Los Alamos Laboratory when the atomic bomb was developed, epitomized this sense of challenge and vocation when he later recommended against a crash program to develop the thermonclear bomb, at least partly on moral grounds, but abandoned his opposition when he learned of a promising new approach: "When you see something that is technologically sweet," he explained, "you go ahead and do it and argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success." In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Transcript of Hearing Before Personnel Security Board, Atomic Energy Commission (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 81. See also Sanford Lakoff, "The Trial of Dr. Oppenheimer," in Knowledge and Power: Essays on Science and Government, ed. Sanford Lakoff (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 80-82, and "Moral Responsibility and the 'Galilean Imperative,'" Ethics 91 (October 1980): 100-106.

3. William J. Broad, Star Warriors (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), p. 88.

4. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1985), p. 139.

5. McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control," Foreign Affairs 63 (Winter 1984-85): 267.

6. Report to the American Physical Society of the Study Group on Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons (New York: American Physical Society, 1987).

7. James T. Bruce, Bruce W. MacDonald, and Ronald L. Tammen, "Star Wars at the Crossroads: The Strategic Defense Initiative After Five Years" (U.S. Congress, staff report to senators J. Bennett Johnston, Dale Bumpers, and William Proxmire, typescript, June 12, 1988), p. 34.

8. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

9. Ibid., pp. 21, 41-45.

10. For a given payload weight, and certain other simplifying assumptions, a final velocity of 6 km per second (more precisely, twice the exhaust velocity) minimizes the SBKKVs' total weight in orbit. See Christopher T. Cunningham, Tom Morgan, and Phil Duffy, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, "Near-Term Ballistic Missile Defenses" (Draft paper, 1987; private communication with the authors), and "Kinetic Kill Vehicles," Energy and Technology Review (July 1987), p. 16, and Christopher T. Cunningham, "The Space-Based Interceptor," Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-99768, October 1988.

11. Marshall Institute, Report of the Technical Panel on Missile Defense in the 1990s (hereafter Marshall Report) (Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall Institute, February 1987), pp. 17-28.

12. Report to the APS, p. 4.

13. Ibid., p. 5.

14. Ibid.

15. The countermeasures of proliferation, maneuvering, decoys, and deception are described at length in a special addendum to the Marshall Report written by Edward Geary.

16. Michael M. May, "Safeguarding Our Space Assets" (Paper prepared for the Aspen Strategy Group, August 13, 1985), p. 11.

17. One such false alarm, discussed in Daniel Ford, The Button (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), pp. 78-79, occurred on June 3, 1980, when a computer disk costing forty-six cents malfunctioned, sending Strategic Air Command pilots racing to their planes.

18. Bruce, MacDonald, and Tammen, "Star Wars at the Crossroads," p. 52.

19. David Lorge Parnas, "Software Aspects of Strategic Defense Systems," American Scientist 73 (September-October 1985): 434-35.

20. From a statement by Dr. Frederick P. Brooks before the U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Force, Committee on Armed Services, 99-933, p. 54, quoted in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, SDI: Technology, Survivability, and Software, OTA-ISC-353 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1988), p. 221.

21. Philip M. Boffey, "Software Seen as Obstacle," New York Times, September 16, 1986, p. 15.

22. OTA, SDI, p. 4.

23. Report to the APS, p. 1.

24. Letter of the review committee to the APS council (April 20, 1987), Report to the APS.

25. Report to the APS, p. 2.

26. Statement issued by the APS council, April 24, 1987.

27. Transcript of press conference, April 23, 1987, at the Pentagon.

28. Statement by Dr. Frederick Seitz before the U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Defense Policy Panel and R&D Subcommittee, September 15, 1987.

29. Congressional Record, May 20, 1987, p. 2005.

30. Quoted in Collen Cordes, "6,500 Scientists Vow to Boycott Studies Aided by 'Star Wars,'" Chronicle of Higher Education 32 (May 27, 1986): 7.

31. "Joint Opening Statement of Drs. Lowell Wood and Gregory Canavan Before the House Republican Research Committee," May 19, 1987, typescript.

32. "APS Directed Energy Study Group Responses to Critiques by Wood and Canavan," June 8, 1987, typescript.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. "Joint Statement of Wood and Canavan," p. 4.

37. "APS Study Group Responses," p. 5.

38. Ibid.

39. As paraphrased in SDIO, Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: SDIO, June 1986), p. VII-F-13.

40. Ibid., pp. VII-F-14-15.

41. Addendum to letter from Joseph F. Salgado to Rep. Edward J. Markey, October 28, 1987.

42. Marshall Report, p. 6.

43. Text of Robert R. Everett's memorandum to Under Secretary Godwin was published in Strategic Defense 2 (July 30, 1987): 3.

44. Quoted in Strategic Defense 2 (July 5, 1987): 5.

45. Ibid., p. 6.

46. Philip J. Klass, Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 23, 1988), p. 23.

47. Colin Norman, "SDI Deployment Program Up in the Air," Science 241 (June 17, 1988): 1608-09.

48. Marshall Report, pp. 6, 8.

49. Everett memorandum, Strategic Defense, pp. 1-2.

50. Cunningham, Morgan, and Duffy, "Near-Term BMD."

51. Ibid.

52. Bruce, MacDonald, and Tammen, "Star Wars at the Crossroads," p. 104.

53. Cunningham, Morgan, and Duffy, "Near-Term BMD."

54. Bruce, MacDonald, and Tammen, "Star Wars at the Crossroads," p. 104.

55. Ibid., p. 105.

56. Paul Mann, "Nunn Redirects Antimissile Debate, Proposing Accidental Launch Shield," Aviation Week & Space Technology (January 25, 1988), p. 19. The OTA has reached a similar conclusion: "Insofar as the ERIS ground-launched interceptor relied on fixed, ground-based early-warning radars for launch-commit information, its effectivenss could be greatly reduced by nuclear or jamming attacks on those radars." OTA, SDI, p. 16.

57. Dan Stober, San Jose Mercury News, August 19, 1988.

58. Lowell Wood, "'Brilliant Pebbles' Missile Defense Concept Advocated by Livermore Scientist," Aviation Week & Space Technology (June 12, 1988), pp. 151-53.

59. Richard L. Garwin, "Enforcing BMD Against a Determined Adversary?," in Space Weapons and International Security, ed. Bhupendra Jasani (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 78.

60. Richard L. Garwin, letter to Howard Ris, Union of Concerned Scientists, August 15, 1988.

1. "The requirements process should be broadened to include an analysis of the desirability of deployment which includes a consideration of a two-sided BMD deployment." Memorandum for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) from the Defense Science Board Task Force Subgroup Strategic Air Defense—Strategic Defense Milestone (SDM) Panel, published in Strategic Defense 2 (July 30, 1987): 1.

2. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), p. 334. Quoted in Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's, 1981), p. xvii.

3. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Soviet Perspectives on SDI," in Strategic Defenses and Soviet-American Relations, ed. Samuel F. Wells, Jr., and Robert S. Litwak (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), p. 70. Emphasis in original.

4. For Zbigniew Brzezinski's views on strategic defense, see his "Mutual Strategic Security and Strategic Defense," in Promise or Peril: The Strategic Defense Initiative, ed. Zbigniew Brzezinski (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1986), pp. 64-66, where he recommends a "limited strategic defense." Henry Kissinger, in "Reducing the Risk of War," Promise or Peril, p. 98, argues that "a foolproof defense of civil population ... is a mirage" but that the existence of some active defenses would strengthen deterrence by adding greatly to the uncertainty of a potential attacker's calculation.

5. See Edward Teller, Better a Shield Than a Sword: Perspectives on Defense and Technology (New York: Free Press, 1987).

6. See Alvin M. Weinberg and Jack N. Barkenbus, "Moving to Defenses Through the Defense-Protected Build-Down (DPB)," and Alvin M. Weinberg, "Speculations on a Defense-Dominated World," in Strategic Defenses and Arms Control, ed. Weinberg and Barkenbus (New York: Paragon House, 1987), pp. 23-65, 89-110. For a responsive commentary on their views, see Sanford Lakoff, "Toward a Broader Framework for U.S.-Soviet Agreement," in ibid., pp. 66-88.

7. See Peter A. Clausen, "Limited Defense: The Unspoken Goal," in Empty Promises: The Growing Case Against Star Wars, ed. John Tirman, Union of Concerned Scientists (Boston: Beacon, 1986), esp. pp. 154-59.

8. Richard Ned Lebow, "Is Crisis Management Always Possible?" Political Science Quarterly 102 (Summer 1987): 182.

9. Fred C. Iklé, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" Foreign Affairs 51 (January 1973): 267-85, cited in Colin S. Gray, "The Missile Defense Debate in the Early 1970s," in Brzezinski, ed., Promise or Peril, p. 45.

10. The President's Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 4. David S. Yost suggests that, for Soviet strategists, a combination of offensive and defensive superiority is advantageous because it offers a way to defeat NATO's flexible-response strategy. Such superiority could be used to "persuade NATO governments either not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons or not to engage in more extensive use in the event selective strikes failed to achieve their intended purpose." Alliance Strategy and Ballistic Missile Defense," in Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance, ed. Sanford Lakoff and Randy Willoughby (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 73.

11. "I cannot envision any circumstance more threatening and dangerous to the free world than one in which our populations and military forces remain vulnerable to Soviet nuclear missiles while their population and military assets are immune to our retaliatory forces" (Address by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger before the National Space Foundation, Colorado Springs, Colorado, January 22, 1987), news release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

12. Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: SDIO, April 1987), p. II-11.

13. Paul H. Nitze, "On the Road to a More Stable Peace" (Address to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council, February 20, 1985); published as Current Policy no. 657 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs), p. 3.

14. Harold Brown, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Defense Systems and the Strategic Debate, Discussion Paper no. 104 (Santa Monica, Calif.: California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, March 1985), pp. 3-4.

15. Brent Scowcroft, Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 6, 1983), pp. 7-8, 17.

16. Robert S. McNamara, Blundering Into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (New York: Pantheon, 1986), p. 92.

17. Michael MccGwire, "Why the Soviets Are Serious About Arms Control," Brookings Review (Spring 1987): 11. For a different view, see Rebecca V. Strode, "Space-Based Lasers for Ballistic Missile Defense: Soviet Policy Options," in Laser Weapons in Space: Policy and Doctrine, ed. Keith B. Payne (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983). She contends that the Soviet leadership has not accepted the notion that mutual vulnerability is desirable and that the Soviet military leadership "retains a keen interest in the potential military advantages of reduced homeland vulnerability" (pp. 134-35). Statements by Soviet leaders, beginning with Leonid Brezhnev (acknowledging that no country can win a nuclear war), differ from those appearing in the Soviet military press and reflect either a propaganda effort to allay Western alarm over the Soviet military buildup or the views of some in the leadership who have not yet been able to bring about "major alterations in Soviet operational strategy" (p. 138).

18. For a good review of the various casualty estimates, see Paul P. Craig and John Jungerman, Nuclear Arms Race: Technology and Society (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), chap. 19, pp. 307-28.

19. The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response: A Pastoral Letter on War and Peace (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1983), pp. 56-58.

20. Iklé, "Nuclear Deterrence," p. 281.

21. As Michael Walzer observes, in Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), "deterrence and mass murder are very far apart. We threaten evil in order not to do it. ... The threat seems in comparison to be morally defensible." Cited in Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Knopf, 1985), n. 11, chap. 21, p. 372.

22. Leon Wieseltier, Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983), p. 73.

23. Cited in Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 15.

24. Admiral Gayler's remarks on nuclear deterrence are quoted in McNamara, Blundering Into Disaster, p. 112.

25. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 25.

26. See Herbert F. York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 183-94, and 337, and Richard L. Garwin, "Launch Under Attack to Redress Minuteman Vulnerability?" International Security 4 (Winter 1979-80): 117-39.

27. McNamara, Blundering Into Disaster, p. 49.

28. See the discussion of low-endoatmospheric technologies in Gregory H. Canavan, "Defensive Technologies for Europe," in Strategic Defense, ed. Lakoff and Willoughby, pp. 44-45.

29. McNamara, Blundering Into Disaster, p. 109.

30. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies (Washington, D.C.: OTA, 1985), pp. 95-98.

31. Ibid., p. 104.

32. Ibid., p. 113.

33. Ibid., p. 114.

34. The Reagan administration's attitude toward arms control, at least during the first term, has been well described by Strobe Talbott: "Until the buildup in Western defenses was well under way, nuclear arms control would be a matter of keeping up appearances, of limiting damage, of buying time, and of laying the groundwork for agreement later," in Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Knopf, 1984), p. 3.

35. Paul H. Nitze, "The Impact of SDI on U.S.-Soviet Relations (Address to a seminar sponsored by American Enterprise Institute-National Defense University, April 29, 1986); published as Current Policy no. 830 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs), p. 3.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 4.

38. Weinberg and Barkenbus, eds., Strategic Defenses.

39. The difficulties with the proposal for a defense-protected build-down are described in more detail in Sanford Lakoff, "A Framework for U.S.-Soviet Agreement," in ibid., pp. 67-69.

40. OTA, BMD Technologies (Executive Summary), p. 13.

41. Freeman Dyson, Weapons and Hope (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 280-81.

42. McNamara, Blundering Into Disaster, p. 108.

43. James T. Bruce, Bruce W. MacDonald, and Ronald L. Tammen, "Star Wars at the Crossroads: The Strategic Defense Initiative After Five Years" (U.S. Congress, staff report to senators J. Bennett Johnston, Dale Bumpers, and William Proxmire, June 12, 1988, typescript), p. 92.

1. Paul H. Nitze sees the development of strategic defenses in the context of a cooperative "defense transition." See his "On the Road to a More Stable Peace" (Address to the World Affairs Council, February 20, 1985); published as Current Policy no. 657 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs). James C. Fletcher stresses the need to link deployment of defenses to agreements to reduce offensive arsenals. See his "The Technologies for Ballistic Missile Defense," Issues in Science and Technology 1 (Fall 1984): 15-26. Although he stops short of endorsing arms control, Zbigniew Brzezinski has called for unilateral U.S. efforts to achieve "limited strategic defense" in order to make the U.S.-Soviet relationship more stable and to improve prospects for "mutual accommodation." See his "Mutual Strategic Security and Strategic Defense," in Promise or Peril: The Strategic Defense Initiative, ed. Zbigniew Brzezinski (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1986), pp. 64-67.

2. See in particular the brief account of the McNamara-Brezhnev exchange at the Glassboro summit in Robert S. McNamara, Blundering Into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (New York: Pantheon, 1986), pp. 56-58.

3. Robert W. Buchheim and Philip J. Farley, "The U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission," in U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons, ed. Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 263.

4. Thomas K. Longstreth, John E. Pike, and John B. Rhinelander, The Impact of U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty (Washington, D.C.: National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, March 1985), p. 5.

5. Abraham D. Sofaer, "The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative," Harvard Law Review 99 (June 1986): 1972.

6. John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973), p. 230.

7. Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State, "The ABM Treaty" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, May 11, 1987), appendix A, p. 503. Typescript.

8. "Military Implications of the Treaty on Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," Hearings before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 2d sess. (June 6, 1972), pp. 40-41.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., pp. 274-75.

11. Ibid., p. 275.

12. Sen. Sam Nunn, "Interpretation of the ABM Treaty," Congressional Record 133, no. 38 (March 11, 1987): 8.

13. Maust, Goodman, and McLain, Strategic Defense, pp. 18-19.

14. Office of the Legal Advisor, State Department, "ABM Treaty," A-503.

15. Congressional Record 118 (1972): 26,700, cited in ibid., pt. II, appendix B, p. 55.

16. Ibid., 26,682, cited in Office of the Legal Advisor, State Department, "ABM Treaty," pt. II, appendix B, p. 54.

17. U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 1985 Arms Control Impact Statement, 98th Cong., 2d sess., 252 (1984), quoted in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "Testing and Development of 'Exotic' Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper," Harvard Law Review 99 (June 1986): 1969.

18. Robert McFarlane was quoted in Nunn, "Interpretation," p. 6.

19. Donald G. Brennan's letter to John Rhinelander is quoted in Raymond L. Garthoff, Policy Versus the Law: The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), n. 6, p. 6.

20. Raymond L. Garthoff, letter to International Security 2 (Summer 1977): 106-09.

21. Garthoff, Reinterpretation, n. 6, pp. 6-7.

22. Ibid., p. 7.

23. Ibid.

24. Perle's reaction to the legal review cited in Arms Control Reporter (1985), 603.B.75.

25. Garthoff, Reinterpretation, p. 8; Nitze had changed his mind about the interpretation of the treaty, according to Garthoff, because he "had no doubts about the traditional interpretation in 1977, or even in May 1985," ibid., n. 6, p. 7.

26. Ibid., pp. 8-10.

27. Quoted in Lou Cannon, Washington Post, July 10, 1985, and in Arms Control Reporter (1985), 603.B.72.

28. Quoted in ibid., 603.B.73.

29. Quoted in ibid.

30. Gerard C. Smith, "A Dangerous Dream: Why Reagan's Plan Threatens the Nuclear Balance," Baltimore Sun, March 29, 1983, and cited in Alan B. Sherr, Legal Issues of the "Star Wars" Defense Program (Boston: Lawyers' Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, June 1986), p. 10.

31. Suprgeon Keeney, quoted in Arms Control Reporter (October 11, 1985), 603.B.73.

32. George P. Shultz, "Arms Control, Strategic Stability, and Global Security" (Address before the North Atlantic Assembly, San Francisco, October 14, 1985), later published in State Department Bulletin 85 (December 1985): 23.

33. Quoted in Garthoff, Reinterpretation, p. 100.

34. Office of the Legal Advisor, State Department, "ABM Treaty," p. 3.

35. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

36. Ibid., pp. 29-37, 75-82.

37. Ibid., pp. 14-16.

38. Ibid., quoted pp. 16-17.

39. Ibid., quoted p. 17.

40. Ibid., quoted p. 18.

41. Ibid., quoted p. 19.

42. Ibid., quoted p. 23.

43. Ibid.

44. In addition to Garthoff, Reinterpretation, see Chayes and Chayes, "Exotic' Systems"; Sherr, Legal Issues; and Committee on International Arms Control and Security Affairs, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Interpretation Dispute (New York: Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1987). In March 1985 (before the reinterpretation was developed) DOD commissioned a study by two former members of the SALT negotiating team, Col. Charles L. Fitzgerald and Sidney Graybeal, which turned out to be supportive of the traditional interpretation: SALT I Negotiating History Relating to Limitations on Future ABM Systems and Components Based on "Other Physical Principles" (Arlington, Va.: System Planning Corp.: March 1985).

45. Garthoff, Reinterpretation, n. 7, p. 8.

46. Ibid.

47. See especially Chayes and Chayes, "'Exotic' Systems," pp. 1963-64.

48. Garthoff made his view clear in his response to Becker's letter, International Security 2 (Summer 1987): 107-08.

49. Chayes and Chayes, "'Exotic' Systems," pp. 1963-64.

50. Garthoff, Reinterpretation, pp. 33-37.

51. Marshal Grechko's statement, published in Pravda, September 30, 1972, is quoted in Garthoff, Reinterpretation, p. 76.

52. Longstreth, Pike, and Rhinelander, Impact of BMD, p. 23.

53. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

54. Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, testimony before the U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, February 27, 1985, quoted in ibid., p. 28.

55. Ibid., pp. 28-30.

56. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

57. Ibid., p. 43.

58. ACDA, quoted in ibid., p. 45.

59. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

60. U.S. Department of Defense, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, June 1986), p. C-3.

61. Ibid., pp. C-5-8.

62. Ibid., p. C-11.

63. Ibid., pp. C-9-11.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., pp. C-12-13.

66. See, in particular, Thomas K. Longstreth, "Space-Based Interceptors for Star Wars: Untestable Under Any Interpretation of the ABM Treaty" (Prepared for the Federation of American Scientists, October 1, 1987; draft).

67. New York Times, October 15, 1986.

68. James C. Fletcher, "The Technologies for Ballistic Missile Defense," Issues in Science and Technology (Fall 1984): 15-26.

69. The president made this comment at a meeting with the National Security Planning Group, also attended by Weinberger and Shultz, on February 3, 1987, according to minutes leaked to the press, as reported in Gregory A. Fossedal, "NSC Minutes Show President Leaning to SDI Deployment," Washington Times, February 6, 1987. Cited in Garthoff, Reinterpretation, p. 13.

70. Michael R. Gordon, "How the U.S. and Soviet Officials Agreed to Disagree on 'Star Wars,'" New York Times, December 12, 1987, pp. 1, 8.

71. R. W. Apple, Jr., "Reagan and Gorbachev Report Progress on Long-Range Arms; Mute Quarrel over 'Star Wars,'" New York Times, December 11, 1987, p. A-22.

72. The physicist Peter Zimmerman has argued that "the kinds of kinetic kill vehicles that have been proposed for use in a first-generation SDI system can be redesigned and rejiggered for offensive purposes." Quoted in William J. Broad, New York Times, February 22, 1987.

73. Quoted in Wall Street Journal, December 7, 1983, cited in Star Wars Quotes (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, July 1986), p. 52.

74. Quoted in Washington Times, May 13, 1985, cited in Star Wars Quotes, ibid.

1. Michael Howard, quoted in David Ignatius, Wall Street Journal, October 15, 1985.

2. Trevor Taylor, "The Implications of SDI for the Independent Nuclear Forces of Europe," in Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance, ed. Sanford Lakoff and Randy Willoughby (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 107.

3. Assembly of the Western European Union, "WEU and the Strategic Defense Initiative—the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance," document 1034, November 5, 1985, p. 10. Cited in Taylor, "Implications of SDI," p. 115.

4. E. P. Thompson, "Folly's Comet," in Star Wars. Science-Fiction Fantasy or Serious Probability?, ed. E. P. Thompson (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1985), pp. 106-07.

5. Ibid., p. 148.

6. Geoffrey Howe (Address to the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, March 15, 1985). Excerpted in the Times (London), March 22, 1985.

7. Ibid.

8. President Mitterrand, quoted in Pierre Lellouche, "SDI and European Security: A View from France," in Strategic Defense, ed. Lakoff and Willoughby, n. 6, p. 145.

9. Senior official, French Foreign Ministry, quoted in Judith Miller, "Allies in West Lend Support to 'Star Wars,'" New York Times, December 30, 1985.

10. John Fenske, "France and the Strategic Defence Initiative: speeding up or putting on the brakes?" International Affairs 62 (Spring 1986): 233.

11. Heinz Riesenhuber, "Die EUREKA-Initiative zeigt eine beachtliche Dynamik," Die Welt, December 13, 1986. Riesenhuber was FRG minister for research and technology. Cited in Michael Lucas, "The Economic and Technological Impact of SDI on Western Europe," typescript.

12. Hans Rühle, quoted in North Atlantic Assembly, "General Report of the Scientific and Technical Committee" (San Francisco: North Atlantic Assembly, November 1984), p. 27.

13. Kai-Uwe von Hassel, "Uberlegungen zu einer Europaischen Verteidigungsinitiative" ["Reflections on a European Defense Initiative"], December 31, 1985, p. 24; also quoted in Thomas O. Enders, Missile Defense as Part of an Extended NATO Air Defense (St. Augustin, F.R.G.: Sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungsinstitut der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, May 1986), p. 6.

14. See Michael Lucas, "SDI and Europe," World Policy Journal 3 (Spring 1986): 229; Ernst-Otto Czempiel, "SDI and NATO: The Case of the Federal Republic of Germany," in Strategic Defense, ed. Lakoff and Willoughby, pp. 157-58; and Hans Günter Brauch, ed., Star Wars and European Defense, Implications for Europe: Perceptions and Assessments (New York: St. Martin's, 1987).

15. Interview with French Defense Minister Paul Quilès, Jane's Defence Weekly, March 8, 1986, p. 411, also in Taylor, "Implications of SDI," p. 108.

16. Michael Quinlan, senior civil servant responsible for nuclear issues, quoted in Lawrence Freedman, "British Nuclear Targeting," Defence Analysis 1 (June 1985): 94.

17. See David S. Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, Part I: Capabilities and Doctrines," Adelphi Paper no. 194 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1984-85), p. 15.

18. Commission d'Etudes sur les Armes Spatiales, Rapport de Synthèse présenté au Ministre de la Défense, January 30, 1986, trans. U.S. Congressional Research Service, p. 12. Cited in Taylor, "Implications of SDI," p. 81. This report is known as the "Delpech Report" because the commission was chaired by Jean François Delpech, director of research at the Centre National de la Récherche Scientifique.

19. Lellouche, "SDI and European Security," pp. 129-30.

20. Jacques Chirac, inaugural address before the National Assembly, reprinted in Le Monde, April 11, 1986, and quoted in Lellouche, ibid., p. 145.

21. Quoted in Taylor, "Implications of SDI," p. 113.

22. Czempiel, "SDI and NATO," p. 152. See also Hans Günter Brauch, "The West German Debate on the ABM Treaty" (Paper presented at the annual meeting, International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., April 14-18, 1987), and Brauch, ed., Star Wars and European Defense.

23. Jonathan Dean, Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 262-63.

24. Gallup Poll, Ltd., February 1985. Fifty-eight percent of those polled thought defensive weapons were being developed mainly to defend the United States, 23 percent thought they were intended to defend both the United States and Western Europe.

25. Between June 1982 and January 1986, the percentage of West Germans preferring to cooperate with the United States rather than the U.S.S.R. shrank from 52 percent to 32 percent. Among the young, support for unilateral disarmament rose from 44 to 55 percent. Czempiel, "SDI and NATO," p. 152.

26. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "SDI: Strategic Disengagement and Independence," in Arms Control, the FRG, and the Future of East-West Relations, ed. Wolfram F. Hanrieder (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987), p. 125.

27. Hugh De Santis, "An Anti-Tactical Missile Defense for Europe," SAIS Review 6 (Summer—Fall 1986): 101.

28. Quoted in George W. Ball, "The War for Star Wars," New York Review of Books, April 11, 1985, p. 41.

29. NATO Nuclear Planning Group Final Communiqué, text in Survival 27 (May-June 1985): 129.

30. Fred S. Hoffman, study director, Ballistic Missile Defenses and U.S. National Security (Summary report prepared for the Future Security Strategy Study, October 1983), p. 2.

31. Ibid., p. 3.

32. Ibid., pp. 3-5.

33. Ibid., p. 10.

34. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Strategic Defense and Anti-Satellite Weapons (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 17.

35. Text of Weinberger letter in Survival 27 (May-June 1985): 128.

36. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, "U.S. Plans for Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles," p. 5, cited in Ivo H. Daalder, "A Tactical Defense Initiative for Europe?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43 (May 1987): 34.

37. Dennis M. Gormley, "A New Dimension to Soviet Theater Strategy," Orbis 29 (Fall 1985): 541-54.

38. Dennis M. Gormley, "Emerging Attack Options in Soviet Theater Strategy," in Swords and Shields: NATO, the U.S.S.R., and New Choices for Long-Range Offense and Defense, ed. Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter, and David S. Yost (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 90-94.

39. Ibid., see also De Santis, "Anti-Tactical Missile Defense," 103-04.

40. See Andrew H. Cordesman, "SDI and Europe: Where Does Theatre Defense Fit In?," International Defense Review 20 (April 1987): 411.

41. Gormley, "New Dimension," 561-66.

42. Ibid., p. 563.

43. Ibid., p. 567.

44. Manfred Wörner, "A Missile Defense for NATO Europe," Strategic Review 14 (Winter 1986): 13-20. Similar views were advanced earlier by military analyst Uwe Nerlich in "Taktische oder erweiterte strategische Raketenverteidigung für Europa" ["Tactical or Extended Strategic Missile Defense for Europe"] (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 1985).

45. See Daalder, "Tactical Defense," p. 34.

46. Wörner, "Missile Defense," p. 15.

47. Daalder, "Missile Defense," p. 36.

48. Benoit Morel and Theodore A. Postol, "A Technical Assessment of Potential Threats to NATO from Non-Nuclear Soviet Tactical Missiles." This paper and another by the same authors, "Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles and NATO," prepared in 1987 for the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, were subsequently published in Donald Hafner and John Roper, eds., ATBMs and Western Security: Missile Defenses for Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988). See also Benoit Morel, "ATBM—A Solution in Search of a Problem," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43 (May 1987): 39-41.

49. According to a calculation by the Economist, January 12, 1985, pp. 30-40, cited in De Santis, "Anti-Tactical Missile Defense," p. 112.

50. David Rubenson and James Bonomo, "The Role of ATBM in NATO Strategy," Survival 24 (November-December 1982): 518-19.

51. De Santis, "Anti-Tactical Missile Defense," p. 112.

52. Ibid.

53. Science and Government Report (U.K.), June 1, 1987.

54. Times (London), June 19, 1987.

55. See Michael Lucas, "The United States and Post-INF Europe," World Policy Journal 5 (Spring 1988): 183-233.

1. For theoretical and empirical analyses of the involvement of the defense industries in government procurement and R & D, see Steven Rosen, ed., Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973). C. Wright Mills, in The Causes of World War III (New York: Ballantine, 1958), suggests that the concept applies both to the United States and U.S.S.R. in the sense that in both countries an alliance exists between heavy industry and the military services, buttressed by a commonly held ideological commitment to the cold war, which exerts strong influence in perpetuating high levels of military procurement and R & D. As a general structural principle, the concept undoubtedly has some merit. As an explanatory theory, however, it fails to account either for specific decisions or for incremental changes in overall defense expenditures. In some versions, the concept implies that military contracting is more lucrative than ordinary business, but a recent study indicates that although the data are not available to support a definitive analysis, no clear-cut evidence exists that defense industries earn "excess profits." The same study notes, however, that defense industry costs—including levels of compensation, payment for lobbying, and inefficiencies in production—tend to be higher than for civil industry. See David E. Kaun, Where Have All the Profits Gone? An Analysis of the Major U.S. Defense Contractors, 1950-1985, Research Paper no. 4 (La Jolla: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1988). For an insightful comparative examination of the links between technological advances and the superpower arms race, see Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

2. In a thoughtful historical study of the impact of atomic weapons on strategic concepts and practice, Lawrence Freedman rightly points out that the introduction of the atomic bomb did not immediately make previous conceptions of warfare obsolete. At first, most strategists were inclined to think of the new device as one that would extend and increase the importance of strategic bombing, which had already come to play a critical role in World War II. Only gradually, as the Soviet Union also became a nuclear power, as ICBMs entered the arsenals of two blocs, and as it became more and more obvious that nuclear war could not easily be kept limited, did the concept of stable deterrence become a commonly accepted framework for strategic planning. Within this framework there is still room for disagreement over counterforce targeting or assured destruction, levels of sufficiency, the role of first-strike and second-strike weapons, and a host of other similar issues. The basic framework is generally accepted and represents a fundamentally new way of thinking about warfare, allowing for a corresponding consensus on the value of arms control as a means of preserving parity and stability at the lowest possible levels of armament. Freedman is nevertheless right to warn that "an international order that rests upon a stability created by nuclear weapons will be the most terrible legacy with which each succeeding generation will endow the next. To believe that this can go on indefinitely without major disaster requires an optimism unjustified by an historical or political perspective. ... The major task for the future must be to address the problems of nuclear arsenals in a world of political change." Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's, 1981), p. 399.

3. For a fuller account of President Truman's decision to develop a thermonuclear bomb, see Herbert F. York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976).

4. "A powerful flow of people and money moves between the defense contractors, the Executive branch (DOD and NASA), and Congress, creating an 'iron triangle' on defense policy and procurement that excludes outsiders and alternative perspectives." Gordon Adams, The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1981), p. 3.

5. The Thor-Jupiter conflict is a classic instance of interservice rivalry in weapons innovation. For a useful critical account, see Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). The army's promotion of Jupiter is also "a textbook example of how personal determination and zeal, combined with interservice rivalry, can fuel the arms race and result in the production and deployment of needless weapons and in the needless expenditure of billions of dollars." Herbert F. York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 98.

6. Reagan had help in resuscitating the B-1, however, not only from the prime contractor, Rockwell, and the others organized by Rockwell to lobby for the plane, but also from two influential Democratic politicians, Sen. Alan Cranston (D., Calif.) and Sen. John Glenn (D., Ohio). In 1980 they sponsored a successful amendment to a bill calling for development of a "strategic weapons launcher," guaranteeing that the next president would have $350 million to spend and an early deadline for producing plans for a new aircraft. Bipartisan congressional support kept the program alive and enabled Reagan to fulfill his campaign pledge to reverse Carter's decision. See Nick Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder: Money, Politics, and the B-1 Bomber (New York: Pantheon, 1988), p. 194.

7. Lt. Gen. Harley Hughes, U.S. Air Force deputy chief of staff for plans and operations (Address to an Air Force Association symposium), quoted in Military Space, June 8, 1987, p. 8.

8. Louis Harris and Associates, October 22, 1984.

9. CBS News / New York Times, October 25, 1984.

10. CBS News / New York Times, January 2-4, 1985.

11. ABC News / Washington Post, October 14, 1986.

12. CBS News / New York Times, October 24-28, 1986.

13. Roper Organization, October 15-16, 1986.

14. NBC News / Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1986.

15. ABC News / Washington Post, November 10-13, 1985.

16. ABC News / Washington Post, October 24-28, 1985.

17. Gallup Organization, October 14, 1985.

18. Gallup Organization, November 13-14, 1985.

19. CBS News / New York Times, November 6-10, 1985.

20. Yankelovich, Clancy, Shulman, September 8-10, 1986.

21. CBS News / New York Times, January 4, 1985.

22. ABC News / Washington Post, October 24-28, 1985.

23. Los Angeles Times, November 1-7, 1985.

24. CBS News / New York Times, January 18-21, 1987.

25. William Schneider, a public-opinion analyst, has interpreted the poll data as indicating that the public "simply does not see any inconsistency between support for SDI and arms control." The Democrats in Congress opposed to SDI, he noted, were trying to "educate" the public to appreciate the difficulties SDI was posing for arms control. See William Schneider, "Congress Openly Defies Public Opinion on SDI," National Journal 19 (May 23, 1987): 1366. Although Schneider's analysis of the data is plausible, there is enough inconsistency in responses to questions that do and do not link SDI to arms control to suggest significant confusion and ambivalence.

26. Louis Marquet's comments on the costs of early deployment are quoted in Arms Control Reporter (January 19, 1987) 575.B.185.

27. Lloyd Dumas, The Overburdened Economy: Uncovering the Causes of Chronic Unemployment, Inflation, and National Decline (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), p. 211.

28. The document appeared to be typed on the stationery of the Heritage Foundation and was identified as "NSR [National Security Report?] #46: High Frontier: A New Option in Space." Excerpts were published in John Bosma, "A Proposed Plan for Project on BMD and Arms Control," in Harper's (June 1985), p. 22. In a letter to the British newspaper, The Observer, July 27, 1985, an official of the foundation disclaimed responsibility and attributed the report to High Frontier. See E. P. Thompson, "Folly's Comet," in Star Wars: Science-Fiction Fantasy or Serious Probability?, ed. E. P. Thompson (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1985), n. 4, p. 157. Thompson gives great weight to this document to support his blanket indictment of SDI as a deceptive conspiracy on the part of the munitions makers: "The cynicism of this well-funded salesmanship is such as to bring into question the integrity of all appearances. ... In the marketing of bad faith, the proponents of arguments about human destiny wear masks, and the zealous advocates of 'defence against missiles' (not only in the USA but in Europe) may have a secret retainer from the U.S. aerospace industry," ibid., p. 96. That a professional historian should attach so much significance to a document of such doubtful provenance and bearing is a striking illustration of the degree to which political passions often influence judgments on SDI.

29. Ashton B. Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space (Background paper prepared under contract for the Office of Technology Assessment [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, April 1984]).

30. See Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, and Henry W. Kendall, The Fallacy of Star Wars (New York: Random House, 1984), and John Tirman, ed., Union of Concerned Scientists, Empty Promise: The Growing Case Against Star Wars (Boston: Beacon, 1986).

31. Robert Jastrow, "Reagan vs. the Scientists: Why the President Is Right About Missile Defense," Commentary 77 (January 1984): 23-32 (an exchange of letters followed in the same magazine's June issue), and "The War Against 'Star Wars,'" Commentary 78 (December 1984): 19-25.

32. Harvey Brooks, "The Strategic Defense Initiative as Science Policy," International Security 11 (Fall 1986): 177-84.

33. John P. Holdren and F. Bailey Green, "Military Spending, the SDI, and Government Support of Research and Development: Effects on the Economy and the Health of American Science," F.A.S. Public Opinion Report 39 (September 1986): 1-17.

34. See Lisbeth Gronlund et al., "A Status Report on the Boycott of Star Wars Research by Academic Scientists and Engineers," May 13, 1986, typescript, and John Kogut and Michael Weissman, "Taking the Pledge Against Star Wars," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 42 (January 1986): 27-30.

35. Report on the NAS poll prepared by Peter Stein, professor of physics, Cornell University, December 17, 1986 See also Science 234 (November 14, 1986): 816.

36. Report by Michael Heylin, Chemical & Engineering News (July 21, 1986), p. 18.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Roy D. Woodruff, quoted in Robert Scheer, "The Man Who Blew the Whistle on Star Wars," Los Angeles Times Magazine, July 17, 1988. See also William J. Broad, New York Times, July 15, July 24, 1988.

40. Harvey Brooks, "The Military Innovation System and the Qualitative Arms Race," in Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control, ed. Franklin A. Long and George W. Rathjens (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 91.

41. David Lorge Parnas, "Software Aspects of Strategic Defense Systems," American Scientist 73 (September-October 1985): 432-40, and "SDI: A Violation of Professional Responsibility," Abacus 4 (Winter 1987): 46-52, rpt. in David Lorge Parnas and Danny Cohen, SDI: Two Views of Professional Responsibility, Policy Paper no. 5 (La Jolla: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1987).

42. "Joint Opening Statement of Drs. Lowell Wood and Gregory Canavan before the House Republican Research Committee, May 12, 1987" typescript. See also Gregory H. Canavan, Nicolaas Bloembergen, and C. Kumar Patel, "Debate on APS Directed-Energy Weapons Study," Physics Today 40 (November 1987): 48-53.

43. Edward Teller, "An Open Letter to Hans Bethe," Policy Review 39 (Winter 1987): 20, 23.

44. Erik Pratt, John Pike, and Daniel Lindley, "SDI Contracting: Building a Star Wars Constituency," in Lost in Space: The Domestic Politics of the Strategic Defense Initiative, ed. Gerald M. Steinberg (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988), p. 111.

45. Nathan Rosenberg, "Civilian Spillovers from Military R & D Spending: The U.S. Experience Since World War II," in Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance, ed. Sanford Lakoff and Randy Willoughby (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 174-75.

46. Pratt, Pike, and Lindley, "SDI Contracting," p. 114.

47. Ibid., pp. 115-17.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., p. 120.

50. William D. Hartung et al., with Jeb Brugman, in The Strategic Defense Initiative: Costs, Contractors & Consequences, ed. Alice Tepper Marlin and Paula Lippin (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1985), table 3.5, p. 33.

51. Holdren and Green, "Military Spending," p. 12.

52. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Pentagon's R & D Chief Roils the Waters," Science, April 25, 1986, pp. 443-45.

53. John E. Pike, "Corporate Interest in the SDI," F.A.S. Public Interest Report 40 (April 1987): 6.

54. Pratt, Pike, and Lindley, "SDI Contracting," p. 114.

55. Ibid., p. 138.

56. Gerold Yonas, quoted in David E. Sanger, New York Times, February 11, 1987.

57. President Ford made this remark during a question-and-answer session following a lecture delivered at the Faculty Seminar on International Security, the University of California, San Diego, February 4, 1986.

58. Jack Kemp, "The Politics of SDI," National Review 38 (December 31, 1986): 28-31.

59. Douglas Waller, James T. Bruce, and Douglas Cook, "SDI: Progress and Challenges" (U.S. Congress, staff report submitted to senators William Proxmire, J. Bennett Johnston, and Lawton Chiles, Washington, D.C., March 17, 1986, typescript).

60. Douglas Waller, James T. Bruce, and Douglas Cook, "SDI: Progress and Challenges, Part II" (U.S. Congress, staff report submitted to senators William Proxmire, J. Bennett Johnston, and Lawton Chiles, Washington, D.C., March 19, 1987, typescript).

61. James T. Bruce, Bruce W. MacDonald, and Ronald Tammen, "Star Wars at the Crossroads: The Strategic Defense Initiative After Five Years" (U.S. Congress, staff report to senators J. Bennett Johnston, Dale Bumpers, William Proxmire, Washington, D.C., June 12, 1988, typescript), p. 97.

62. Ibid., p. 98.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 99.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p. 38.

67. Ibid., pp. 69-71.

68. Ibid., p. 33.

69. Defense News, March 23, 1987.

70. For Senator Nunn's analysis, see "Interpretation of the ABM Treaty, Part One: The Senate Ratification Proceedings," Congressional Record 133 (March 11, 1987).

71. Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 77.

72. Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy (New York: Basic, 1976), p. 99.

73. See Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986).

1. James T. Bruce, Bruce W. MacDonald, and Ronald L. Tammen, "Star Wars at the Crossroads: The Strategic Defense Initiative After Five Years" (U.S. Congress, staff report to senators J. Bennett Johnston, Dale Bumpers, and William Proxmire, June 12, 1988, typescript), p. 66.

2. John P. Holdren and F. Bailey Green, "Military Spending, the SDI, and Government Support of Research and Development: Effects on the Economy and the Health of American Science," F.A.S. Public Interest Report 39 (September 1986): 10.

3. Bruce, MacDonald, and Tammen, "Star Wars at the Crossroads," p. 67.

4. John Pike, "Corporate Interests in the SDI," F.A.S. Public Interest Report 40 (April 1987): 3.

5. Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: SDIO, April 1987), chap. 2, p. 14.

6. Ibid., table 7.2

7. Ibid., chap. 4, p. 2.

8. Ibid., chap. 4, p. 3.

9. Ibid.

10. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies, OTA-ISC-254 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1985), p. 217.

11. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, SDI: Technology, Survivability and Software, OTA-ISC-353 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1988), p. 24.

12. Ashton B. Carter, "Ballistic Missile Defense Applications: Performance and Limitations," in Ballistic Missile Defense, ed. Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 119.

13. William D. Hartung et al., with Jeb Brugman, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Costs, Contractors & Consequences, ed. Alice Tepper Marlin and Paula Lippin (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1985), p. 121.

14. Office of the Secretary of Defense, SDIO, "Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space: With Comments," table 13, cited ibid., p. 127.

15. Ashton B. Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space (background paper prepared under contract for the Office of Technology Assessment [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, April 1984]), p. 130.

16. Hartung et al., Contractors & Consequences, pp. 70-72.

17. Ibid., p. 75.

18. Ibid., pp. 78-80.

19. Ibid., p. 79.

20. Bruce, MacDonald, and Tammen, "Star Wars at the Crossroads," p. 69.

21. Ibid., pp. 69-71.

22. Barry M. Blechman and Victor A. Utgoff, Fiscal and Economic Implications of Strategic Defenses, SAIS Papers in International Affairs no. 12 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview / Foreign Policy Institute [School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University], 1986).

23. Ibid., pp. 145-46.

24. William Loomis, quoted in SDI Monitor 2 (April 6, 1987): 94.

25. George C. Marshall Institute, Report of the Technical Panel on Missile Defense in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: Marshall Institute, February 1987), p. 3.

26. Ibid., p. 6.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

29. Ibid., pp. 8-11.

30. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

31. Harold Brown, "Too Much, Too Soon," Arms Control Today 17 (May 1987): 3.

32. Blechman and Utgoff, Implications of Strategic Defenses, p. 60.

33. Ibid., pp. 66-72.

34. R. G. Finke et al., Continuing Issues (FY 1985) Concerning Military Use of the Space Transportation System, IDA Paper P-1889 (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, December 1985).

35. Hartung et al., Contractors & Consequences, p. 111.

36. SDIO, Report to Congress, chap. 8, pp. 1-4.

37. Hartung et al., Contractors & Consequences, pp. 93-99. See also Council on Economic Priorities (CEP), Star Wars: The Economic Fallout (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), esp. chap. 8, pp. 119-44.

38. CEP, Star Wars, p. 106.

39. Ibid. See also Stewart Nozette and Robert Lawrence Kuhn, eds., Commercializing SDI Technologies (New York: Praeger, 1987), esp. pt. IV, "SDI Technologies and Spin-Offs," pp. 95-170.

1. Gerard C. Smith, letter to the editor, Issues in Science and Technology 1 (Winter 1985): 4, in reply to an article by George A. Keyworth II in the previous issue.

2. For a review of earlier examples of the same folly—attempting to achieve security by unilateral reliance on technology—see Herbert F. York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970).

3. See Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush & Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 1982).

4. In a television address reporting on the meeting at Reykjavík in 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev recounted his response to the United States' offer to share SDI technology: "Mr. President, I cannot take this idea of yours seriously, the idea that you will share the results with us. You do not want to share with us even equipment for dairy plants at this point, and now you're promising us that you're going to share results on S.D.I. development? This would be a second American Revolution if something like this happened, but revolutions don't happen that often," excerpted in New York Times, October 15, 1986.

5. General Rogers was interviewed by Robert Hutchinson, Jane's Defence Weekly, April 27, 1985, p. 724.

6. Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., quoted in Arms Control Reporter, January 21, 1987.

7. Gen. John Chain, quoted in Military Space, June 8, 1987, p. 8.

8. Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983), p. 56.

9. For a discussion of the difficulties in moving beyond the proposed initial reduction, see Sanford Lakoff, ed., Beyond Start? A Soviet Report with Commentaries, IGCC Policy Paper no. 7 (La Jolla, Calif.: 1988).

10. M. Stanton Evans, "SDI Facing 'Death by Research,'" Human Events 46 (August 9, 1986): 7.

11. Commenting on Reagan's proposal of SDI, Jonathan Schell wrote: "Only the order of events in his proposal was wrong. If we seek first to defend ourselves, and not to abolish nuclear weapons until after we have made that effort, we will never abolish them, because of the underlying, technically irreversible superiority of the offensive in the nuclear world. But if we abolish nuclear weapons first, and then build the defenses, as a hedge against cheating, we can succeed." Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (New York: Knopf, 1984), p. 115.

12. In a public opinion poll, Americans were asked "What is the most important element in the U.S. defense against an attack by Soviet nuclear missiles?" Forty-four percent of those polled said they "did not know," 13 percent said "our weapons," 12 percent said "early detection," and 5 percent said "Star Wars." Among the remaining responses, only 5 percent said that it was "Soviet fear of U.S. retaliation." Associated Press / Media General poll, June 20-28, 1986.