Preferred Citation: Waltz, Susan E. Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c1995 1995. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft2t1nb1vf/


 
Notes

Notes

1 Introduction

1. Michael Hudson, "After the War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World," Middle East Journal 45 (Summer 1992): 407-26, notes that through 1990, the Middle East was overlooked in major surveys of liberalizing transitions and draws attention to efforts at democratization in the region. See, too, John Esposito and James Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," in the same issue. Two years later, the Middle East Journal invited Richard Norton to edit a special issue on civil society. Several contributors to that issue were less than sanguine about the prospects for government- or party-led democratization but noted the rise of civic organizations throughout the region. See, in particular, Augustus Richard Norton, "The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East," Middle East Journal 47 (Spring 1993): 205-16, and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ''Crises, Elites, and Democratization in the Arab World," ibid.: 292-306.

2. Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberation: A Critique of Development Ideologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1990); Robert Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Mahmoud Hussein, Versant sud de la liberté (Paris: Editions de la découverte, 1989). In 1992 the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies in Cairo began publishing a monthly newsletter entitled Civil Society , with Saad Eddin Ibrahim as editor.

3. David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987).

4. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 27-29.

5. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984). In his Models of Democracy , Held also traces considerable variety and by implication shows the mutable nature of democracy.

6. Guiseppe DiPalma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 9.

7. These terms are borrowed and adapted from Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 14.

8. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 6.

9. Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," American Political Science Review 82 (September 1988): 799.

10. Ibid., 794-96.

11. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 316.

12. Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 50-53.

2 The Political Power of Human Rights

1. Jack Donnelly, "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis," International Organization 40 (Summer 1986): 617.

2. As discussed in Chapter 8, a change in the law of association temporarily dissolved the Tunisian League of Human Rights in 1992; it was granted legal status again in 1993.

3. Richard Falk, "Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights," in Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives , ed. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992).

4. Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1990), 12.

5. Rhoda E. Howard, "Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community," Human Rights Quarterly 15 (Summer 1993), 315-338.

6. Ibid., 320-322.

7. Reza Afshari, "An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 16 (Summer 1994), 255.

8. Ibid., 249.

9. Falk, "Cultural Foundations."

10. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), who analyzes a number of such texts.

11. The Salafist call for "reopening the door of ijtihad " is often cited in this regard. Mohamed-Cherif Ferjani, Islamisme: Laïcité et droits de l'homme (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1991) adds to that approach with an extended discussion of the theological basis of secular power that draws on the writings of the theologian Ali Abderraziq.

12. Compare Kevin Dwyer, Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 90, for example, with Mayer, Islam and Human Rights , 64.

13. Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 127.

14. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights , 223.

15. Binder, Islamic Liberalism , 129.

16. Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 49.

17. James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, Politics in the Middle East (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 46.

18. Dwyer, Arab Voices , 174.

19. Afshari, "An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism," 259-60.

20. Saad Edin Ibrahim. "The Future of Human Rights in the Arab World" (mimeograph, April 1986).

21. James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Community (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Sydney, Australia: Edward Elgar, 1993), 199-235; and Paul Ghils, "International Civil Society: International Non-Governmental Organizations in the International System," International Social Science Journal 44 (August 1992): 417-29.

22. The LADH and AMDH are "correspondent members" of the FIDH. The LTDH, LADDH, and OMDH are full affiliates.

23. Amnesty International Report, 1978 (London: AI Publications, 1979) and Amnesty International Report, 1993 (London: AI Publications, 1993.

24. Human Rights Internet Reporter 11, no. 3 (September 1986). Also see Lowell W. Livesey, Nongovernmental Organizations and the Ideas of Human Rights (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1988).

25. David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and World Politics (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 83-101.

26. Amnesty International, Torture in the Eighties (London: AI Publications, 1984).

27. Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), 26-32.

28. See David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1988), 9. Lars Schoultz offers an extended account of the origins and evolution of U.S. human rights legislation in Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981.)

29. Forsythe, Human Rights and World Politics , 110-14.

30. Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin America: Learning from History," in Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America , ed. id. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 260.

31. René Lemarchand discusses the perfidious effects of covert operations on democratic processes in "The C.I.A. in Africa: How Central? How Intelligent?" Journal of Modern African Studies 14 (1976): 401-26. Harry Howe Ransom, "Covert Intervention," in Intervention into the 90's , ed. Peter J. Schraeder (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 120, reports that according to William Colby, then CIA political operations chief in Rome, intervention in the 1958 Italian elections was the CIA's largest-ever covert program.

32. Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in Tran -

sitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives , ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 25.

33. Forsythe, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy , 161.

34. Ibid., 1.

35. This charge was relayed as an amendment to Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Act.

36. See ''Failure: The Reagan Administration's Human Rights Policy in 1983" (mimeograph, 1984), and ". . . In the Face of Cruelty": The Reagan Administration's Human Rights Record in 1984 (New York: N. p., 1985), both published jointly by Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch, and the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights.

37. Forsythe, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy , 126.

38. Ibid.

39. See Tamar Jacoby, "The Reagan Turnabout on Human Rights," Foreign Affairs 64 (Summer 1986): 1082. Jacoby was deputy editor of the New York Times op-ed section.

40. "L'Aide, les droits de l'homme et l'Occident," Jeune Afrique , no. 1401 (11 November 1987); David P. Forsythe, The Internationalization of Human Rights (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991), 119.

41. Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," 48.

42. Nancy Bermeo, "Rethinking Regime Change," Comparative Politics 22 (April 1990): 368.

43. Irving Lester Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

3 State and Society in the Maghrib

1. Binder, Islamic Liberalism , 34.

2. Samir Amin, The Maghreb in the Modern World , trans. Michael Perl (London: Penguin Books, 1970).

3. Hussein, Versant sud de la liberté .

4. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

5. The distinction between the terms patriarchy and patrimony merits clarification here. Patriarchy refers to the domination of elder male relatives over family members in both private and public spheres. Patrimonialism , as developed by Max Weber, refers to a political situation where a leader treats the polity as his private domain. In other words, patrimonialism is the application of patriarchal logic on a much larger scale. The terms neo-patriarchy and neo-patrimonialism have been coined to reflect adaptations of patterns associated with premodern, "traditional" societies, although a general resurgence of patriarchy in analyses of both Western and non-Western societies has tended to confuse that distinction. In this book I have attached no particular significance to the prefix neo -. See James A. Bill

and Carl Leiden, Politics in the Middle East (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 148-59; Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); C. Clapham, ed., Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Patronage in the Modern State (New York: Pinter, 1982.); Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford Univrsity Press, 1986); and Peter R. Knauss, The Persistence of Patriarchy: Class, Gender, and Ideology in Twentieth-Century Algeria (New York: Praeger, 1987).

6. Abdelwahab Boudhiba, A la recherche des normes perdues (Tunis: Maison tunisienne de l'edition, 1973), 173.

7. Hussain Bendahman, Personnalité maghrébine et fonction paternelle au Maghreb (Paris: La Pensée universelle, 1984), 76. Also see Halim Barakat, The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 97-102.

8. Bendahman, Personnalité maghrébine , 73.

9. Nefissa Zerdoumi, Enfants d'hier: L'Education de l'enfant en milieu traditionnel algérien (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1970), 42 (author's translation).

10. The Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi has treated this subject extensively in several books, the best known of which within the English-speaking world is Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).

11. Camille LaCoste-Dujardin explores the power of this relationship in Des mères contre les femmes: Maternité et patriarcat au Maghreb (Paris: Editions de la découverte, 1985).

12. Bendahman, Personnalité maghrébine , 222.

13. See Hildred Geertz, "The Meaning of Family Ties," in Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society , ed. Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, and Lawrence Rosen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 330-31.

14. Zerdoumi, Enfants d'hier , 44.

15. See Dale Eickelman, Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), 132-33.

16. Mohammed Kerrou, "La Mort au féminin," Cahiers intersignes , no. 2 (1991): 71-89.

17. Souad Khodja, Les Algériennes du quotidien (Algiers: Entreprise nationale du livre, 1985). See also Zerdoumi, Enfants d'hier , 38.

18. Mohamed Arkoun, "Préface: Les Tâches d'une pensée maghrébine," in L'Individu au Maghreb: Actes du colloque international de Beit al-Hikma (Tunis: Editions TS, 1993), xi-xx.

19. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965); Harry Eckstein, Patterns of Authority (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975).

20. Eickelman, Moroccan Islam , 123-54.

21. M. E. Combs-Schilling, Sacred Performances: Islam, Sexuality, and Sacrifice (New York: Columbia University Press, 223.

22. Sharabi, Neopatriarchy , 132.

23. Clement H. Moore, Tunisia since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), 89. In the early years following independence, Bourguiba regularly in-

structed his countrymen about health and hygiene, decent housing, the importance of sports and exercise, and the desirability of a sedentary life (see ibid., 47).

24. Zerdoumi, Enfants d'hier , 166-67. See also Bendahman, Personalité maghrébine , 222.

25. Germaine Tillon, The Republic of Cousins , trans. Quintin Hoare (Thetford, Norfolk: Al Saqi Books, 1983). Positivist methodology dominates the social sciences, and cultural explanations of political phenomena that reach into the psyche are not heavily favored. Omitting them from analysis, however, obscures the potentially perverse impact of symbols and belief frameworks, which at times may overshadow physical reality. M. E. Combs-Schilling illustrates this point in an analysis of Moroccan first marriage rites by which men become the cultural usurpers of the natural birth process. She notes: "Culture has at its disposal a convincing mechanism for a great sleight of hand. Culture can make its elaborations appear true by embedding them within the body's most basic biological truths. . . . When a 'body politic' exists, it becomes difficult to bring the system of political domination to the level of self-conscious scrutiny without doing real damage to oneself, without bringing the system as a whole, internal and external, into question, for it is precisely the whole that is at stake. Embedding a system of domination within the male-female division of the world, and within the acts of human reproduction, is, to borrow from Bourdieu, "the best founded of collective illusions'" ("Etching Patriarchal Rule: Ritual Dye, Erotic Potency, and the Moroccan Monarchy," Journal of the History of Sexuality 1, no. 4 [1991]: 678-79).

26. See James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), and id. Dominance and the Arts of Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

27. Sharabi, Neopatriarchy , 131. In the months following Tunisian Prime Minister Zine el Abidine Ben Ali's accession to power, journalists did not cloak their admiration for a head of state who appeared to work. See "Tunisie: Un Homme nouveau," Jeune Afrique , no. 1331 (7 July 1986).

28. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California. Press, 1982).

29. Cf. Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).

30. See, e.g., Sophie Bessis and Souhayr Belhassen, Femmes du Maghreb: L'enjeu (France: J. Clattès, 1992), as well as Aziz Krichen, "La Fracture de l'intelligentsia: Problèmes de la langue et de la culture nationales," 326-27, and, more generally, Soukeïna Bouraoui, "Ordre masculin et fait féminin," 343-71, both in Tunisie au présent: Une Modernité au-dessus de tout soupçon? ed. Michel Camau (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1987).

4 Tunisia: Strong State, Strong Society

1. Moore, Tunisia since Independence , 41.

2. Clement H. Moore, "The Era of the Neo-Destour," in Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization , ed. Charles Micaud (New York: Praeger, 1964), 127.

3. Kenneth J. Perkins, Tunisia: Crossroads of the Islamic and European Worlds (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986); Abdallah Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb: Un Essai de synthèse (Paris: François Maspero, 1982); Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

4. Perkins, Tunisia , pp. 63-67. Leon Carl Brown, The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey, 1837-1855 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). Also see Lisa Anderson, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), and Lucette Valensi, Tunisian Peasants in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

5. Brown, Tunisia of Abroad Bey , 7 and 353-78.

6. Anderson, State and Social Transformation , 143-44.

7. Ibid., 146.

8. Private habus constituted 1.5 million hectares in 1956. Whereas the yields of public habus directly served religious or social purposes, habus set up as the indivisible property of private families continued to benefit their owners, reverting to the public domain only at the extinction of blood heirs. In practice, habus was one effective tool for denying women access to their share of inherited property.

An 1898 law made provision for the gradual transfer of public habus property to the State Domains administration for resale to colonists. Private habus was less vulnerable, but even there a provision of perpetual annuity known as enzel gave unscrupulous settlers a means of transforming habus lands into mulk . The state in some cases acquired tenancy through enzel , registered the lands, and resold them as mulk (private or freehold property) to settlers. See Leon Carl Brown, "Stages in the Process of Change," in Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization , ed. Charles A. Micaud (New York: Praeger, 1963). For a general treatment of the Maghribi system of land tenure, see John Ruedy, Land Policy in Colonial Algeria (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 1-12, and Valensi, Tunisian Peasants , 61-71.

9. Anderson, State and Social Transformation , 152-57. For a discussion of the traditional sharecropping contract ( khammasat )—which was itself subject to exploitation—see Valensi, Tunisian Peasants , 107-9. While formally defined as an "associate," the khammas was in fact a hireling paid in kind from the produce of his harvest, and a beylical decree in 1874 had served further to reduce his limited freedoms—including the conditions under which the khammas could change occupation.

10. Beys were under pressure from both the nationalists and the French colonial rulers, and their political position became increasingly difficult during the final decades of the protectorate. Moncef Bey's nationalism was unacceptable to the French, and he was deposed on the pretext that he had collaborated with the Germans. His successor, Lamine Bey, was more conciliatory to the French, but on several occasions Neo-Destour leaders threatened to expose him for collaborating with the colonial overlords.

11. Both Bourguiba and Ben Youssef were among the Neo-Destour leaders arrested in April 1938 and subsequently interned in Marseille. Both were released by Axis forces in December 1942.

12. Sophie Bessis and Souhayr Belhassen, Bourguiba , vol. 1: A la conquête d'undestin (1901-1957) (Paris: Groupe Jeune Afrique, 1988), 120.

13. Ibid., 122-24.

14. Bourguiba had presented the Neo-Destour's seven-point program for independence in 1950. His banishment first to Remada and then to Galîte from January 1952 to May 1954, however, took him temporarily out of political circulation. When Mendès-France sought to open negotiations with Tunisia, Bouguiba was transferred to Brittany and made accessible to political figures in both France and Tunisia. (The Tunisian bey had effectively been stripped of both power and credibility and was never involved in independence talks.) Several Tunisians were included in the early talks, but according to Charles-André Julien, Et la Tunisie devint indépendante (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1985), 150-79, Bourguiba saved the negotiations at a critical moment by lending support to a process of incremental moves toward independence. In consequence, he was generally seen by the French as the only viable negotiator for the nationalists.

Ben Youssef had served in a national government headed by M'Hamed Chenik from 1950 to 1952, but according to Bessis and Belhassen ( Bourguiba , 1: 162), he was not regarded favorably by the less nationalist Tunisians who served in the bey's cabinet from 1954 on. Ben Youssef was less willing than Bourguiba to negotiate with France, and in the French view, his association with Nasser and Ben Bella counted as additional liabilities.

15. See Moore, Tunisia since Independence , 69, and Dwight L. Ling Tunisia: From Protectorate to Republic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), 177-81.

16. Bessis and Belhassen, Bourguiba , 1: 158-59. Public news of the decision was suppressed for several days, and Ben Youssef was apparently informed only on 13 October.

17. Norma Salem, Habib Bouguiba: Islam and the Creation of Tunisia (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 157. Tunis's total Tunisian population in 1956 numbered only 232,000.

18. Bessis and Belhassen, Bourguiba , 1: 159

19. Ibid., 170-71.

20. Ibid., 122-23.

21. Although voter participation nationwide was 84 percent, in Djerba more than two-thirds of the voters stayed home. Yet more significant, in the capital city, Youssefists contributed strongly to a 41 percent abstention rate (Moore, Tunisia since Independence , 74).

22. Ibid., 143-45.

23. Charles Debbasch, La République tunisienne (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1962), 44.

24. Tahar Belkhodja, for example, was a member of the PSD central committee and director of national security at the time of his arrest in 1968 for "abuse of power." He was released a few months later without trial. In 1973, he became minister of interior and accumulated considerable power until 1977, when at the apogee of his career he was removed as a political rival to the Tunisian embassy in West Germany. John Entelis, Comparative Politics of North Africa (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1980), 169, presents a litany of many similar personnel

changes that illustrate the importance of personal considerations in political appointments.

25. As a member of the Tunis bourgeoisie, Wassila Ben Ammar was ready and able to wield her own power. Bessis and Belhassen trace her considerable involvement in several momentous political events, including the dismissal of Ahmed Ben Salah, the labor unrest of December 1977 and January 1978, efforts to unseat Prime Minister Hedi Nouira, electoral fraud in 1981, and the bread riots of 1983. Habib Bourguiba, they claim, was not duped by the machinations of his wife but instead generally appreciated them as an added element of complexity in the game he controlled. His decision in 1983 to retain Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali and fire Interior Minister Driss Guiga was, however, partly intended to stem her impressive power. See Sophie Bessis and Souhayr Belhassen, Bourguiba , vol. 2: Un si long règne (1957-1989) (Paris: Japress, 1989), 144, 202, and passim.

26. See "A quoi sert un premier ministre," Jeune Afrique , no. 1504 (30 October 1989).

27. Moore, Tunisia since Independence , 188-94.

28. Asma Larif Beatrix, "L'Etat tutélaire, système politique et espace éthique," in Tunisie au présent: Une Modernité au-dessus de tout soupçon? ed. Michel Camau (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1987), 132.

29. Le Monde , 28 July 1990.

30. Bessis and Belhassen, Bourguiba , 1: 161.

31. According to Bessis and Belhassen, in 1954, Bourguiba issued formal orders to the Neo-Destour from his prison on Galîte to assassinate the bey's prime minister, Mohamed Salah Mzali ( Bourguiba , 1: 142).

32. Harold Nelson, ed., Tunisia: A Country Study , U.S. Government Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), 311.

33. "Tunisie: Un Homme nouveau," Jeune Afrique , no. 1331 (7 July: 1986).

34. Amnesty International, Tunisia: Summary of Amnesty International's Concerns (London: AI Publications, 1990).

35. Moore, Tunisia since Independence , 80.

36. Ben Youssef served as minister of justice in the 1950 Chenik government. See Julien, Et la Tunisie devint indépendante , 27.

37. Keith Callard, "The Republic of Bourguiba," International Journal (1961), cited by Moore, Tunisia since Independence , 89.

38. Le Maghreb , 26 December 1981.

39. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 1661. See also Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Critique: Review of the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992 (New York: N. p., 1993), 386-87.

40. The incident is recounted more fully in Susan Waltz, "Clientelism and Reform," in Political Economy of Reform in Tunisia , ed. I. W. Zartman (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner), 40. In 1990, Tunisian lawyers observed a two-hour strike to protest interference with the practice of law and due process ( Le Monde , 1 November 1990).

41. Moore, Tunisia since Independence , 80.

42. Bessis and Belhassen, Bourguiba , 1: 171.

43. Ling, Tunisia , 188.

44. See Clement H. Moore, Politics in North Africa (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 174-75, and Eqbal Ahmad; "Trade Unionism," in State and Society in Independent North Africa , ed. Leon Carl Brown (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1966), 146-91.

45. "Mzali-syndicats: Le Bras de fer," Jeune Afrique , no. 1207 (22 February 1984).

46. Cases of Trade Unionists Imprisoned in Tunisia (London: AI Publications, 1986).

47. See Khalil Zamiti, "La Question syndicale: Contradictions sociales et manipulations politiques," in Tunisie au Présent: Une Modernité au-dessus de tout soupçon? ed. Michel Camau (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1987),, 287-96.

48. See Africa Contemporary Record , vols. 2-8 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1969-76), for a detailed account of these events.

49. In an unconventional decision, Bourguiba allowed parties not yet approved to "try" themselves at the ballot boxes, with promises that parties showing more than 5 percent of the popular vote would be rewarded with recognition. The Tunisian Communist Party, however, was allowed to contest the elections as a formally recognized party, on the grounds that it had once been legal.

50. "La Fin de l'ère Mestiri?" Réalités , no. 377 (11 December 1992), and "Le Congrès de rupture," Réalités , no. 392 (2 April 1993).

51. The ban on the Tunisian Communist Party was lifted in 1981; and two left-wing parties, the Socialist Progressive Rally (RSP) and the Popular Unity Party (PUP), were recognized in 1988. Two other leftist parties, the "PUP2," led by Ben Salah, and the Tunisian Communist Workers' Party, remain unauthorized, as does the large Islamist party, al-Nahda.

52. See Anderson, State and Social Transformation , 249, and for a historical perspective, Clement H. Moore, "Politics in A Tunisian Village," Middle East Journal 17 (1963): 527-40.

53. See Lars Rudebeck, Party and People: A Study of Political Change in Tunisia (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1967).

54. Henri de Montety, "Old Families and New Elites in Tunisia," in Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib , ed. I. William Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1973), 176.

55. Abdelkader Zghal, "The New Strategy of the Movement of the Islamic Way: Manipulation or Expression of Political Culture?" in The Political Economy of Reform , ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner), 205-17. Also see Krichen, "La Fracture de l'intelligensia," in Tunisie au présent , 297-341.

56. See Elbaki Hermassi, "L'Etat tunisien et le mouvement islamiste," Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord 28 (1989): 297-308, and for background, Abdelkader Zghal, "Le Retour du sacré et la nouvelle demande idéologique des jeunes scolarisés" Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord 18 (1979): 41-64; and Mohammed Elbaki Hermassi, "La Société tunisienne au miroir islamiste,'' Maghreb, Machrek , no. 103 (Spring 1984): 39-56.

57. Several key figures, Ghannouchi among them, remained in exile.

58. I have argued this in "Islamist Appeal in Tunisia," Middle East Journal 40 (Autumn 1986): 651-70. See also Zghal, "New Strategy of the Movement of the

Islamic Way," and François Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa (Austin, Tex.: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1993).

59. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States , 206-37.

5 State versus Society in Algeria

1. John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 41-42.

2. Abdallah Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb (Paris: François Maspero, 1982), 248.

3. There is some dispute about the appropriate characterization of this relationship, which some have identified as feudal. In State and Revolution in Algeria (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), Rachid Tlemçani argues against this claim on several grounds, but his own presentation of the communal nature of Algerian society is also open to interpretation. At least by 1871, local social harmony had been undermined. As Peter von Sivers notes, the difficulty some notables had in rousing peasant support for resistance suggests that differences in interest were widely perceived ("Rural Uprisings as Political Movements in Colonial Algeria, 1851-1914," in Islam, Politics, and Social Movements , ed. Edmund Burke III and Ira M. Lapidus [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988], 39-59).

4. Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb , 250; see also Tlemçani, State and Revolution , 29.

5. Ruedy, Modern Algeria , 46-48.

6. Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb , 277-78.

7. Ruedy, Modern Algeria , 55-57.

8. Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb , 279-81, and Ruedy, Modern Algeria , 59.

9. Tlemçani, State and Revolution , 34-37, and Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb , 280. See also René Gallisot, Maghreb-Algérie: Classes et nation (Paris: Arcantère, 1987), 1: 107-56.

10. Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), 125-26.

11. Ibid., 139; Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 214-17.

12. Bourdieu, Algerians , 139.

13. Elbaki Hermassi, Leadership and National Development in North Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), 136.

14. Ironically, Ahmad Pasha's concerted efforts in Tunisia to raise an army and implement fiscal reforms were partially inspired by the recent installation of the French in Algeria. With more time, Ruedy argues, an Algerian state apparatus might have emerged. Drawing on Vatin and others, he directs attention to several developments in the early nineteenth century. In addition to tribal or religious leaders who, like Abd-al-Qadir, controlled local political structures with potential for expansion, either of the two Ottoman offices of dey and bey might have provided the foundation for an eventual Algerian state. From 1817 to 1930, the office of dey was gradually being converted into a monarchy, and the beys of both Oran and Constantine were consolidating links with the local elites on whom they de-

pended to legitimize their authority. French colonization, of course, truncated such developments. See Ruedy Modern Algeria , 32-37 and 42-44; Jean-Claude Vatin, L'Algérie politique: Histoire et société (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1983), 96-104.

15. Quoted by Alastair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York: Viking Press, 1977), 40.

16. William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), 25-42.

17. Hermassi, Leadership and National Development , 132.

18. Mohammed Harbi, Le F.L.N.: Mirage et réalité (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1980), 389.

19. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership , 92. The nine chefs historiques were Ahmed Ben Bella, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohammed Khider, Mohammed Boudiaf, Mustapha Ben Boulaid, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Mourad Didouche, Rabab Bitat, and Belkacem Krim. Ben Boulaid, Ben M'Hidi, Didouche, Bitat, and Krim were wilaya leaders.

20. Tlemcani, State and Revolution , 62-63. Harbi, Le F.L.N. , 143-62.

21. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership , 134-38.

22. Provoking some controversy, Ben Khedda left the conference early, before any decision on the Political Bureau had been made. Ben Bella would later claim that the Political Bureau had been supported by a majority of the CNRA at Tripoli, but regardless, it was not invested by a formal vote of two-thirds majority as required by the CNRA statutes. Further undermining the Political Bureau's legitimacy, or at least its ability to perform, two of the proposed members (Mohamed Boudiaf and Hocine Ait Ahmed) refused to be part of it (Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership , 165-67).

23. See, e.g., Mohammed Harbi, Les Archives de la révolution algérienne (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1981); id., Le F.L.N.; Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership; Gallisot, Maghreb-Algérie; .

24. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership , 164.

25. Ramdane Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie depuis 1962 (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1991), 45.

26. See Bourdieu, Algerians; LaCoste-Dujardin, Des mères contre les femmes .

27. See Moore, Politics in North Africa , 285.

28. An appendix to Harbi's Le F.L.N. lists many such noms de guerre and reveals how extensive the practice was. See also Benjamin Stora, Dictionnaire biographique de militants nationalistes algériens (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1965). According to the journalist Hamza Kaïdi, even after Chadli Bendjedid became president, few knew that his given name was Khemaïs and Chadli a nom de guerre ("Chadli: Pouvoir, famille, et farniente. . . ," Jeune Afrique , no. 1622 [6-12 February 1992]).

29. Only four of the chefs historiques played active roles in the guerrilla war, and three of them died in the conflict (Ben Boulaid, Ben M'Hidi, and Didouche). The other five—including Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, and Boudiaf—were arrested when their plane was intercepted by the French; they spent the entire war in French custody.

30. Jean Leca and Jean-Claude Vatin, Algérie politique: Institutions et régime (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1975), 393.

31. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership , 241-45.

32. Ibid., 246-51.

33. Cf. Zartman, "The Algerian Army in Politics," in Man, State, and Society in North Africa , ed. I. William Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1973), 211-24.

34. John P. Entelis, "Algeria: Technocratic Rule, Military Power," in Political Elites in Arab North Africa , ed. I. William Zartman (New York: Longman, 1982.), 94.

35. "Les Petits pas de Chadli," Jeune Afrique , no. 1099 (27 January 1982).

36. "Qui tient la barre?" Jeune Afrique , no. 1345 (15 October 1986).

37. "A la tête de l'Algérie: Deux généraux et deux civils," Jeune Afrique , no. 1619 (16-23 January 1992), 8.

38. Soldiers were called in to reestablish order in Algiers in 1988, and in 1991 a protracted general strike initiated by Islamists ended in the imposition of martial law. Previously the army had preferred a position on the sidelines, "observing the process carefully, with a discreet but always present eye" (Entelis, "Algeria: Technocratic Rule, Military Power," 97).

39. David Ottaway and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Republic (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), 199.

40. I. William Zartman, "Algeria: A Post-Revolutionary Elite," in Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East , ed. Frank Tachau (New York: Schenkman), cited by Entelis, "Algeria: Technocratic Rule, Military Power," 97.

41. All of these men were "rehabilitated" into the FLN posthumously in 1984, as were Belkacem Krim and Mohamed Khider ( Le Monde , 25 October 1984). It is estimated that as many as one-half of the leaders who survived the war of liberation were subsequently murdered by instruments of the FLN in power (Khalid Duran, "The Second Battle of Algiers," Orbis 33 [Summer 1989], 413).

42. Moore, Politics in North Africa , 123-25.

43. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership , 195.

44. In an FFS memorandum written by Ali Mecili and reproduced in Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie , 194-202, allegations are made of military responsibility for the assassination of Khider. According to Redjala, Mecili was a member of the military intelligence forces before joining the FFS. He later became an attorney and close associate of Hocine Ait Ahmed; he was assassinated in Paris in 1987. See Hocine Ait Ahmed, L'Affaire Mecili (Paris: Editions de la découverte, 1989).

Harbi notes several victims of repression, listing the assassinations of Krim, Khider, and Cheikh Mesbah but also several "suicides" and "accidents" (Mohammed Harbi, "Sur les processus de relégitimation du pouvoir en Algérie," Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord 28 [1989], 134).

45. "Pas de condoléances pour la SM," Jeune Afrique , no. 1554 (10-16 October 1990). See also Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie , 170.

46. "Pas de condoléances pour la SM." See also Harbi, "Sur les processus de relégitimation."

47. Harbi, "Sur les processus de relégitimation," 134.

48. The entry on Algeria in the U.S. State Department's 1990 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990 notes: "In late 1990 the Government announced the abolition of the Algerian internal intelligence services, although this 'abolition' seems to represent a transfer of intelligence functions to other agencies rather than the end of governmental intelligence-gathering activity."

49. The wilaya of Kabylia was one of the last holdouts in the 1962 conflict, and FLN candidates from that region were among those excluded when electoral lists for the Constituent Assembly were revised.

50. See Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie , 161.

51. Ait Ahmad was condemned to death in April 1965 but was subsequently pardoned by Ben Bella. Before the Boumediene coup, he escaped from prison and went into exile, returning to Algeria only in December 1989.

52. Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie , pp 155-58.

53. These included the Organization of Popular Resistance and the Clandestine Organization of the Algerian Revolution. See Leca and Vatin, L'Algérie politique , 405-10.

54. ''Faible et divisée: L'Opposition algérienne," Jeune Afrique , no. 1350 (19 November 1986).

55. Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie , 164-67.

56. Ibid., 109.

57. Ibid., 128-32.

58. Ibid., 73, 171. From 1969 to 1975, democracy was not favored by the PRS (ibid., 109). See also Leca and Vatin, who note that Boudiaf's leadership within the PRS was commonly criticized for its authoritarian character and for the arbitrariness of decisions ( L'Algérie politique , 403).

59. Ibid., 122.

60. Kasdi Merbah, for example, head of the SM from 1962 to 1979 and prime minister from 1962 to l979, founded the Algerian Movement for Justice and Democracy. (He was assassinated in 1993.) In a separate effort Cherif Belkacem invited other figures prominent in the Boumediene era, including Abdel Aziz Bouteflika and Mohammed Salah Yahiaoui, to form a party.

61. World Bank, World Development Report, 1988 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 275, 281. By 1990, postsecondary education had reached 11 percent, and population had also grown, to 25 million ( World Development Report, 1992 ).

62. Duran, "Second Battle of Algiers."

63. "Algeria: Sectarian Clashes," Africa News , 11 April 1983.

64. "Chadli face aux intégristes," Jeune Afrique , no. 1296 (6 November 1985).

65. Several of his lieutenants survived and after a brief imprisonment would again take up armed struggle. In 1991, Abdelkader Chebouti revived the Armed Islamic Movement, which in 1992 under his direction became the backbone of the Army of Islamic Salvation (AIS, the armed branch of the Islamic Salvation Front, FIS), while Mansouri Meliani led an armed group near Blida from 1989 until his capture in 1992 (he was executed in 1993).

66. Duran, "Second Battle of Algiers," 405.

67. "Que vont faire les islamistes de leur victoire?" Jeune Afrique , no. 1538 (20-26 June 1990).

68. Ibid.

69. "La Dernière croisade des islamistes algériens," Jeune Afrique , no. 1568 (16-22 January 1991).

70. Several hundred Algerian Islamists served alongside Afghani rebels after 1980, and many of them have advocated armed struggle against the government.

Four radical groups were said to have surfaced, or resurfaced, by the end of 1991. One such group attacked military barracks in Guemmar in late November 1991 and in April 1992 were condemned to death by hanging. Although the FIS had a "hard" wing that advocated open confrontation with the government, it was not an armed movement at the time of its dissolution in February 1992.

71. See, e.g., Benjamin Storer "Huit clés pour comprendre," Jeune Afrique , no. 1539 (22 June-3 July 1990).

72. See "L'Arroseur arrosé," Jeune Afrique , no. 1588 (5-11 June 1991). In Djendel, Bir Oulad Khelifa, and Ben Allal, FIS municipal governments had actually been displaced.

73. "Kidnappers Give Foreigners '1 Month' to Leave," FBIS-NES-93-212 (4 November 1993). The statement accompanied the release of three French hostages kidnapped by a group calling itself the Armed Islamic Group, Jama'a al-islamiyya al-mussallah.

6 Morocco: God and King

1. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," World Politics 35 (October 1982): 1-24.

2. On the general connection between ritual and the construction of political relationships, see David L Kertzer, Ritual, Politics and Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

3. These dynasties were the al-Murabitin (Almoravids: 1069-1147); the al-Muwahhidun (Almohads: 1147-1269), and the Banu Marin (Merinids: 1258-1420). Their successive empires spanned the length of Morocco and large parts of the Iberian Peninsula and stretched across the breadth of the Maghrib. Berber dynasts presided over a centralized state apparatus, developed an administrative corps, and promoted a celebrated educational and judicial system. Fez, home to Ibn-Khaldun and Ibn-Rushd (Averroës) was renowned as a center of learning, and the architecturally exquisite residential colleges surrounding the Qarawiyin (Kairouine) mosque were monuments to Islamic scholarship, as well as to the rulers who commissioned them.

4. Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 208.

5. Ibid., 209.

6. Combs-Schilling, Sacred Performances , 157-74.

7. Ibid., 180.

8. See Jacques Berque, Ulemas, fondateurs, et insurges du Maghreb (Paris: Sindbad, 1982), 81, 122-23, 149.

9. Abun Nasr, History of the Maghrib , 227-30.

10. Berque, Ulemas, fondateurs, et insurges , 266-67.

11. Ibid., 235 and, more generally, 221-32.

12. Combs-Schilling, Sacred Performances , 249.

13. Ibid., 277, citing Charles-André Julien, Le Maroc face aux impérialismes (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1978), 90.

14. Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 81.

15. I. W. Zartman, "King Hassan's New Morocco," in The Political Economy of Morocco , ed. I. W. Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1987), 1-58.

16. Mark A. Tessler discusses this image of Morocco in "Image and Reality in the Moroccan Political Economy," in Political Economy of Morocco , ed. Zartman (cited in preceding note), 218-42.

17. Omar Bendourou treats the general relationship between monarch and parties in Le Pouvoir exécutif au Maroc depuis l'indépendence (Paris: Publisud, 1986).

18. These parties are often identified as the parliamentary opposition. They include the Istiqlal Party, the USFP, the OADP, the PPS, and the very small remnant of the UNFP.

19. Aherdane in turn formed a new party, the National Popular Movement, which won 14 of the 222 directly elected seats in the June 1993 parliamentary elections, as compared to the MP's 33.

20. In the first decade after independence, ministers from outside the royal coalition occasionally succceeded in depriving the king of a policy victory, but more commonly they got only enough rope to hang themselves. Unempowered, but seeming responsible to the electorate, many ultimately resigned. See I. William Zartman, Morocco: Problems of New Power (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), 208, and John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1970), 218.

For concerns underlying more contemporary ministerial appointments, see Mustapha Sehimi, "Les Elites ministérielles au Maroc: Constantes et variables," in Le Maroc actuel: Une Modernisation au miroir de la tradition? ed. Jean-Claude Santucci (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1992), 209-31.

21. Alain Claisse, 'Le Makhzen aujourd'hui," in Le Maroc Actuel , ed. Santucci (cited in preceding note), 296.

22. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful , 262-63.

23. Frank H. Braun, "Morocco: Anatomy of a Palace Revolution That Failed," International Journal of Middle East Studies 9, no. 1 (1978): 63-72, and John Damis, "The Moroccan Political Scene," Middle East Journal 26 (Winter 1972): 25-36.

24. Combs-Schilling, Sacred Performances , 306-9.

25. Constitutional changes allowed a greater proportion of parliamentary seats to be filled by direct election. Hassan II's disdain for parliament is well known; cf. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful , 157. With a certain amount of arrogance, he has frequently reiterated the basic position. In a speech to parliament in 1978 cited by Mohamed Tozy, he claimed that at that point his role as Prince of the Faithful made him equally responsible for executive and legislative functions of government (Tozy "Représentation / Intercession: Les Enjeux de pouvoir dans les 'champs politiques désamorcés' au Maroc," Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord 28 [1989]: 157). To European audiences he put it differently. It is generally recognized, he told French journalist Jean Daniel, that modernity requires the efficiency of a presidential regime ("Hassan II s'explique," Le Nouvel Observateur , 18 December 1989.) Also see Bendourou, Le Pouvoir executif .

26. Zartman, "King Hassan's New Morocco," in Political Economy of Morocco , ed. id., 6-18.

27. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful , 220.

28. Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 347; cited in Reinhart Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), 340.

29. In June 1991, plans to publish an exposé of Moroccan finances won Moumen Diouri expulsion from France to Gabon, under a little-used French legal procedure and despite earlier recognition of his status as a political refugee. Following public outcry, Diouri was returned to France a month later. The book was eventually published, and in it Diouri makes prominent note of Article 168 of the Moroccan Penal Code, forbidding investigation into the finances and private affairs of the king and the extended royal family (Moumen Diouri, A qui apartient le Maroc? [Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1992,], 19).

30. Will D. Swearingen, Moroccan Mirages: Agrarian Dreams and Deceptions, 1912-1986 (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1987).

31. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful , 150.

32. See Tessler, "Image and Reality," and Gilles Perrault, Notre ami le roi (Paris: Gallimard, 1990).

33. In theory the constitutional reforms of 1992 altered this by giving the prime minister powers to appoint the ministerial cabinet, although the King retained power to appoint the prime minister. In practice, after the 1993 elections, Hassan II made direct offers of ministries to Kutla parties, apparently bypassing the prime minister.

34. The patronage system in Morocco has been extensively described. See John Waterbury, "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime," World Politics 25 (July 1973): 533-55, and Kenneth Brown, "Changing Forms of Patronage in a Moroccan City," in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies , ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Duckworth, 1977), 309-27. Also see Alain Claisse, "Makhzen Traditions and Administrative Channels," in The Political Economy of Morocco ,, ed. I. W. Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1987), 51.

35. "Par-delà la fête royale," Jeune Afrique , no. 1380 (17 June 1987).

36. "Subventions pour l'opposition au Maroc," Jeune Afrique , no. 1357 (7 January 1987).

37. See Driss Basri, L'Agent d'autorité: Mémoire du diplome d'études supérieures (Rabat: Imprimerie royale, 1975), and interview with the labor leader Mohammed Noubi Amaoui, "On ne négocie pas avec le roi," Jeune Afrique , no 1566 (2-8 January 1991).

38. Claisse, "Makhzen Traditions," in Political Economy of Morocco , ed. Zartman, 54. The Ministry of the Interior has taken over an office of rural affairs from the Ministry of Housing, and since 1985 Driss Basri has also held the Ministry of Information porfolio.

39. Remy Leveau, Le Fellah marocain, défenseur du trône (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale de science politique, 1985), 54. Also see Claisse, "Le Makhzen aujourd'hui."

40. Harold Nelson, ed., Morocco: A Country Study , U.S. Government Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 357-69.

41. Many Moroccan Arabs, and in particular the urban elite, have historically viewed themselves as culturally superior to the Berbers, and in a society where

bonds of lineage are primordial, cultural identification may be strong. The importance of ethnic identity can easily be overstated in the Moroccan case, however, as numerous authors have argued. See, e.g., Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 220; Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa (London: Lexington Books, 1972); and Lawrence Rosen, "The Social and Conceptual Framework of Arab-Berber Relations in Central Morocco," in Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society , ed. Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, and Lawrence Rosen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 155-74.

42. Claisse, "Makhzen Traditions," in Political Economy of Morocco , ed. Zartman, 39.

43. "Moulay Ahmed Alaoui: Le Ministre anti-ministre," Jeune Afrique , no. 1417 (2 March 1988).

44. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Moroccans—Citizens or Subjects? A People at the Crossroads," New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 26 (Fall 1993): 63-105.

45. The March 23 Movement derived its name from the 1965 riots in Casablanca that resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency and suspension of the constitution.

46. The PPS claims to have about 40,000 members.

47. "Les 'Gauchistes' de Sa Majesté," Jeune Afrique , no. 1306 (15 January 1986), and "Un Parti pas commes les autres," Jeune Afrique , no. 1364 (26 February 1987).

48. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful , 218-19.

49. Ibid., 295.

50. "Maroc: Les Révélations explosives du 'Fqih' Basri," Jeune Afrique , no. 1383 (8 July 1987).

51. See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Briefing on Morocco (Nottingham: Russell Press, 1977). There were eight major trials in July-August 1976 alone.

52. Perrault, Notre ami le roi , 153.

53. Ibid., 198-205, and Amnesty International, Briefing , 4.

54. Saïd Ihraï, Pouvoir et influence: Etat, partis et politique étrangère au Maroc (Rabat: Edino, 1986), 190-98.

55. USFP leaders publicly protested the king's endorsement of a proposal that emerged at the 1981 OAU summit in Nairobi, calling for a referendum on the disputed territory. They argued that the Sahara's link to Morocco was not debatable. Over the past ten years the Palace has approved a series of UN-negotiated terms, but without apparent enthusiasm. John Damis has discussed the Moroccan position in several articles, including most recently "The U. N. Settlement Plan for the Western Sahara: Problems and Prospects," Middle East Policy 1 (1992): 36-46." Also see "The Western Sahara: The Referendum Process in Danger. A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992).

56. Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights, "Morocco Briefing Memo" (photocopied, n.d. [c. 1984]), 51.

57. "On s'en sortirait créait son partie: Interview avec Mohamed Elyazghi," Jeune Afrique , no. 1728 (17-14 February 1994).

58. See "Les 'Gauchistes' de Sa Majesté."

59. "Le Procès des intégristes de Casablanca: Treize des soixante et onze accusés sont condamnés à mort," Le Monde , 2 August 1984.

60. "Le Procès des intégristes de Casablanca: Deux observateurs français protestent contre 'la disproportion du réquisitoire,'" Le Monde , 27 July 1984.

61. "Dix-neuf intégristes condamnés à perpétuité à Marrakech," Jeune Afrique , no. 1296 (6 November 1985). Enaamani led a group called "the Moudjahidin Movement" until his disappearance in September 1985. According to friends, he was "picked up" while living in France; followers of Muti claimed he was the victim of internal squabbles. Also see Henry Munson, Jr., "Morocco's Fundamentalists," Government and Opposition 26 (1991): 331-44.

62. "Le Temps de la clémence," Jeune Afrique , no. 1602 (11-17 September 1991).

63. Several arrests were made, but the security forces apparently did not intervene to stop the attacks. By contrast to the death sentences handed out to Islamists engaged in political protest in 1984, Islamists convicted of civil crimes resulting in death received penalities ranging from only six months to four years. See "23 Injured, 130 Arrested in University Clashes," FBIS-NES-91-211 (31 October 1991), and La Lettre de l'ASDHOM , no. 24 (20 November 1991).

64. Hassan II's own views on Islamism were made clear in an interview with Jean Daniel, "Je ne laisserai pas l'intégrisme déformer l'islam," Le Nouvel Observateur , 28 March-3 April 1986.

65. Amnesty International publications have covered these issues extensively. See the annual Amnesty International Report (London: AI Publications), 1978-92, as well as reports specific to Morocco: Briefing on Morocco (1977); Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Kingdom of Morocco (1982); Torture in Morocco (1986); Human Rights Violations in Garde-à-Vue Detention (1990); " Disappearances" of People of Western Saharan Origin and Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (1990); and Morocco: A Pattern of Political Imprisonment, "Disappearances" and Torture (1991).

66. Mustapha Sehimi, "Depuis un an . . . le Maroc," Grand Maghreb , no. 55 (2 February 1987): 45-46.

7 The Emergence of a Maghribi Human Rights Movement

1. Mohsen Toumi, La Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1989), 102-6; 118-19, gives a less sympathetic account of the LTDH, which Toumi saw at its inception as the handmaiden of the MDS and the Tunis bourgeoisie.

2. See Bessis and Belhassen, Bourguiba , 2: 175.

3. See Dwyer, Arab Voices , 143, and Susan Waltz, "Tunisia's League and the Pursuit of Human Rights," Maghreb Review 14, nos. 3-4 (1989): 214-25.

4. See Dwyer, Arab Voices , 143-44, and "Interview: Khemais Chemmari," Réalités , no. 77 (2 August 1985).

5. ''Mise en garde contre la Ligue des droits de l'homme," Le Monde , 12-13 April 1987.

6. Hamza Kaidi, "La Revendication berbère" Jeune Afrique , 30 April 1980.

7. See Salem Chaker, "Les Droits de l'homme, sont-ils mûrs en Algérie?" Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord 24 (1985): 489-503.

8. See Ramdane Bababji, "Le Phènomène associatif en Algérie: Génèse et perspectives," Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord 28 (1989): 239-41.

9. A third and more serious charge, that of conspiring against the security of the state, was dropped. See "The Imprisonment of Prisoners of Conscience in Algeria" (mimeo; London: AI Publications, August 1986).

10. Ibid.

11. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 1100.

12. Later Brahimi would grant several interviews to the Algerian press in which he relayed arrangements that had been made with the government. Authorization was granted speedily to Brahimi's group, and in response to those that questioned its political independence, Brahimi replied that the group's terms had been negotiated before formal recognition was sought. Bababji, "Le Phènomène associatif en Algérie."

13. See ibid., 240, and Brahim Brahimi, Le Pouvoir: La Presse et les intellectuels en Algérie (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1989), 135-36.

12. Later Brahimi would grant several interviews to the Algerian press in which he relayed arrangements that had been made with the government. Authorization was granted speedily to Brahimi's group, and in response to those that questioned its political independence, Brahimi replied that the group's terms had been negotiated before formal recognition was sought. Bababji, "Le Phènomène associatif en Algérie."

13. See ibid., 240, and Brahim Brahimi, Le Pouvoir: La Presse et les intellectuels en Algérie (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1989), 135-36.

14. Bababji, "Le Phènomène associatif en Algérie," 240.

15. "La Ligue des droits de l'homme fait le bilan de son action," Le Monde , 19 July 1988.

16. The Algerian press began to grow in 1985, with the FLN adding a French language newspaper and several regional papers appearing. As chronicled by Brahim Brahimi, however, prior to 1987, debates within the press were largely confined to disputes between "the government" and "the party." He credits not simply the 1987 conference but the general emergence of concern about human rights with freeing the press. See Brahimi, Le Pouvoir , 130-37.

17. Much of this discussion was previously published in Susan Waltz, "Making Waves: The Political Impact of Human Rights Groups in North Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies 29, no. 3 (1991): 481-504. Also see Ahmed Ben Othman, "Les Organisations non-gouvernementales: Maroc," Les Cahiers de l'Orient 20 (October 1990): 231-35.

18. In Europe, the Comité de lutte contre la répression au Maroc had been founded by the French wife of one of these prisoners, Abraham Serfaty. Some of the AMDH's early communiqués involved these prisoners and their families.

19. Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, "Morocco Briefing Memo" (photocopied, n.d.), 89.

20. See "Communiqué de l'Association marocaine des droits de l'homme au Maroc concernant l'arrestation de Maître Abderrahmane Ben Ameur, membre du Bureau central et celle de membres des families de détenus politiques" (Rabat, 12 December 1980), and Le Monde , 25 July 1981.

21. OMDH, "Rapport de la Commission préparatoire" (mimeographed, 10 December 1988), 4-5.

22. Ibid., 5.

23. OMDH, Commission préparatoire, "Une Nouvelle Association des droits de l'homme: Pourquoi et comment?" (mimeographed, n.d.), 3-4.

24. Morocco has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In 1993 it ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, with the proviso on Article 28 that it does not recognize the competence of the Committee against Torture to carry out investigations.

25. OMDH, "Une Nouvelle Association," 4.

26. OMDH, "Rapport de la Commission préparatoire," 6.

27. Le Monde , 1 June 1988. The government later clarified this objection; more than a decade earlier, the government had made charges against one individual, but these were dropped in 1976, the other individual had been pardoned in 1980 ( Le Monde , 27 July 1988).

28. Le Monde , 5 October 1988.

29. OMDH, "Déclaration à l'occasion du 100 ième jour de l'organisation" (mimeographed, 20 March 1989).

30. Le Monde , 28 March 1989.

31. This incident is recounted more fully in Waltz, "Making Waves."

32. Jill Crystal, "The Human Rights Movement in the Arab World" (paper presented to the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1990).

33. Amnesty International's rule preventing national groups from addressing violations in their own country puts these groups beyond the scope of this book.

8 Challenging the Political Order

1. Robert Wuthnow explores these ideas in Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 155-56.

2. Ibid., 159.

3. Burgat, Islamic Movement in North Africa , 183. Also see the autobiographical accounts of Rached Ghannouchi and Tareq al-Bishri reproduced in ibid, 53-62 and 49-53 respectively.

4. Some groups within the Islamist movement fall outside this characterization, locating the central problem in the believers. As a result, such groups are less politicized. See Douglas K. Magnuson, "Islamic Reform in Contemporary Tunisia: Unity and Diversity," in The Political Economy of Reform , ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner), 169-92.

5. Scholarly work on the politics of human rights commonly differentiates between the activities of promotion, implementation, and enforcement. Of the three, promotion regimes require the weakest degree of commitment. See Donnelly, "International Human Rights," 603-5, and Forsythe, Internationalization of Human Rights , 57-58.

6. See "Présentation du dossier de presse relatif aux prisonniers politiques," in OMDH, L'Organisation marocaine des droits de l'homme à travers ses communiqués et déclarations (Casablanca: Imprimerie Editions maghrébines, 1991), 67-68.

7. William A. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory , ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 68.

8. John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977): 1212-41; Bert Klandermans, "Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory," American Sociological Review 49 (October 1984): 583-600; and Jean L. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements," Social Research 52 (Winter 1985): 663-716.

9. Carol McClurg Mueller, "Building Social Movement Theory," in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory , ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 17, and Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," Social Research 52 (Winter 1985): 839-56.

10. Susan Eckstein, "Power and Popular Protest in Latin America," in Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements , ed. Susan Eckstein (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), and Gamson, "Social Psychology of Collective Action," 61.

11. David Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," American Sociological Review 51 (August 1986): 464-81.

12. Sidney Tarrow, "Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames: Constructing Meanings through Action," in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory , ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 189.

13. David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory , ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 144.

14. Eckstein, "Power and Protest," 39.

15. David Laitin, "Political Culture and Political Preferences," American Political Science Review 82, no. 2 (1988): 589-93, has argued that opposition traditions as well as traditions lending support to the regime in power must be included in consideration of political culture.

16. Wuthnow, Meaning and Moral Order , 198-99.

17. Ibid.

18. Susan Waltz, "Clientelism. and Reform in Ben Ali's Tunisia," in Political Economy of Reform in Tunisia ," ed. I. W. Zartman (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner), 31-33. Also see Michel Camau, "Tunisie au présent: Une Modernité au-dessus de tout soupçon?" in Tunisie au présent: Une Modernité au-dessus de tout soupçon? ed. id. (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1987), 11-49.

19. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974); also see Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes."

20. From at least 1980 to 1993, Hadj Mohamed Mustafa Tabet, commissaire principal de police , had raped literally hundreds of Moroccan women, some of them minors, and had kept extensive videotaped records. Questions were raised about inproprieties in 1980, but the victim committed suicide and the story was sup-

pressed. Tabet was transferred to headquarters of the Sûreté nationale in Rabat, where his career continued to advance. In 1985 he was made chief police superintendent of a Casablanca prefecture, one of the four largest in the country. A complaint of rape was lodged in 1990 but was suppressed. In 1993, however, the story could not be contained. Tabet was swiftly tried; he was sentenced to death and executed in August. See "Sexe, pouvoir et vidéo," Jeune Afrique , no. 1681 (25-31 March 1993).

21. See the annual Amnesty International Report , 1981-84.

22. Mueller, "Building Social Movement Theory," 15.

23. Ligue tunisienne pour la défense des droits de l'homme (LTDH), Premier congrès national, Tunis, 14 février 1982 (Tunis: Maghreb-Editions), 14.

24. Ligue tunisienne pour la défense des droits de l'homme,"2inline image congrès national, Amilcar, 23-24 Mars 1985. Rapport Moral" (photocopied), 4.

25. L'OMDH à travers ses communiqués , 88, 110.

26. The FIDH, like most other human rights groups, has maintained neutrality on the Western Sahara, occasionally referring to a right of self-determination. See Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990).

27. From August 1990 to May 1991, nine of the LTDH's thirteen communiques addressed some aspect of the Gulf conflict.

28. Following the onset of protests in September, the league issued a communique expressing concern about reports of political brutality, arrests, and illegal searches, and in December, an LTDH delegation visited the minister of interior to discuss these concerns. In general, however, concern over the Gulf greatly overshadowed domestic issues.

29. "Conférence internationale sur les droits des Palestinéens: Le coup de la ligue,' Réalités , no. 319 (18-24 October 1991).

30. Albert O. Hirshman, Getting Ahead Collectively: Grassroots Experiences in Latin America (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984).

9 Human Rights and Political Discourse

1. Tunisia and Algeria both acceded to the covenants in 1968. Morocco signed the treaties in 1977, ratifying them in 1979.

2. In 1983 the member from Tunisia led efforts to put pressure on Zaire, Forsythe notes ( Internationalization of Human Rights , 64).

3. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Bringing the State Back In , ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3-37, and esp. 20-21.

4. It is important to recognize here that relinquishing arbitrary powers does not necessarily and automatically result in a net loss of power for the state (see A. Stepan, "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society," in Bringing the State Back In , 317-43). Raw force constitutes only one of the state's several bases of power and by curtailing political repression, states can arguably increase their popular support. Arbitrary powers that translate into repression nevertheless remain an

important source of control and the patrimonial regimes of North Africa relied heavily on their use (see Chapters 2-5).

5. ''Hassan Speech on Human Rights Council Creation," FBIS-NES-90-091 (10 May 1990).

6. See Khalil Zamiti, "La Société tunisienne: Absolutisme et démocratie après la déposition du 'president à vie,'" Peuples méditérranéens , no. 47 (1989): 125-35.

7. See Article 19, The Press in Tunisia: Plus ça change (London: International Centre against Censorship, 1993).

8. An open letter widely circulated in April 1990 is reproduced in Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord 29 (1990): 804-9.

9. The League's communiques circulated freely at this time, and they elicited government response. See "La Guerre des communiqués," Le Maghreb , no. 198 (20 April 1990); "Des vagues qui s'apaisent," Réalités , no. 224 (26 April 1990); and "Interior Ministry Rebuts the League," FBIS-NES-90-073 (16 April 1990).

10. See "Reportage on President Ben Ali's U.S. Visit," FBIS-NES-90-097 (18 May 1990); "Ben Ali Interviewed on Results of U.S. Visit," FBIS-NES-90-101 (24 May 1990); and "Bush Meets with Leader of Tunisia," Washington Post , 16 May 1990.

11. "Ben Ali: Le Discours des quatre ruptures," Réalités , no. 260 (17-23 August 1990), 15.

12. Habib Boulares, then minister of foreign affairs, had a few years earlier authored a book on the dangers of militant Islam, L'Islam: La Peur et l'espérance (Paris: J-C Lattes, 1983).

13. According to Amnesty International, more than five hundred people were arrested in this manner from September 1990 to March 1991. "Tunisia: Update on AI Concerns" (Amnesty International, MDE 30/11/91 [15 March 1991]). Also see Zakya Daoud, "Chronique tunisienne," Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord 29 (1990): 794-95.

14. Not surprisingly the Tunisian government was quick to broadcast Ghannouchi's words, and its Washington news bureau did so in a new publication, Issue Brief . See "The Failed Tactics of Religious Extremism in Tunisia," Issue Brief 1, no. 1 (June 1991): 4.

15. In less than six months, their cases were heard and appealed to two higher courts. Irregularities abounded in each of the hearings—perhaps most egregiously in the appeals court's statement that two of those allegedly involved had confessed to the crime, when in fact they remained fugitive and had been tried in absentia . The Supreme Court was apparently not troubled by such irregularities, and in fact, increased sentences from life to capital punishment when it issued its decision in July. The three defendants in custody were executed in October.

16. The stakes were raised even higher in this case when in September 1991 the government claimed that Islamists had procured a Stinger missile intended for use in assassinating Ben Ali and overthrowing the government. Even absent that claim, however, evidence to support government charges is subject to dispute: on display at an eventual trial were only a collection of guns, hand-made grenades, and miscellaneous office equipment, exhibits that in fact were never cited in the proceedings (Amnesty International, Tunisia: Heavy Sentences after Unfair Trials ,

AI MDE 30/23/92 [October 1992]). The Stinger missile was apparently not produced as evidence (see Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, The Mass Trial of Islamists before Military Courts in Tunisia [21 August 1992], and Human Rights Watch, Military Courts That Sentenced Islamist Leaders Violated Basic Fair-Trial Norms [October 1992]).

17. In general, the LTDH addressed its admonitions to all parties, although many of its complaints were made on the direct behalf of al-Nahda members. On 5 October 1989, however, it issued a stern rebuttal to a statement of political position published by al-Nahda three days earlier. Specifically the league made clear its objection to validating the notion of heresy, to narrowly defining the concept of umma (community), and to the general attempted monopolization of Islam by al-Nahda.

18. La Presse , 19 February 1991.

19. "Ben Ali Praises Progress in Human Rights," FBIS-NES-91-069 (10 April 1991). Also see Daoud, "Chronique tunisienne," 794.

20. From 1989 to 1990, the size of the Public Order Brigade alone increased from 2,000 to 3,500 (International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 1988-1989 and Military Balance, 1989-1990 (London: Brassey's, 1989 and 1990).

21. LTDH, "Communique," 14 June 1991. The thread of this developing conflict may be traced through LTDH communiques dated 18 May, 14 June, 29 June, and 26 July, as well as in "Les Droits de l'homme en Tunisie," Réalités , no. 304 (28 June-4 July 1991). Also see "Ben Ali Praises Progress in Human Rights," FBIS-NES-91-069 (10 April 1991), and ''Ben Ali Chairs Meeting on Rights Violations," FBIS-NES-91-121 (24 June 1991).

22. These included Hassib Ben Ammar, president of the Arab Institute of Human Rights, and Mahmoud Ben Romdhane, from the Tunisian section of Amnesty International. See "Les Droits de l'homme en Tunisie," 7, and "Ben Ali Chairs Meeting on Rights Violations.".

23. "Des agissements individuels ont provoque des abus," Le Temps (Tunis), 10 October 1991. See also Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Promise Unfulfilled: Human Rights in Tunisia Since 1987 (New York, 1993), 40-47.

24. Amnesty International, Prolonged Incommunicado Detention and Torture , MDE 30/04/92 (4 March 1992); Government of Tunisia, "Truth About Human Rights in Tunisia: A Response to Amnesty International" (photocopied, n.d.); Amnesty International, Tunisia: Amnesty International Welcomes Cooperation, Responds to Government Inaccuracies , MDE 30/WU 02/92 (2 April 1992).

25. Higher Committee for Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, Report to the President of the Republic on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry (Tunis: Republic of Tunisia, 1992). The report did not enjoy full credibility. Despite eyewitness accounts and an independent autopsy attributing one death to beating and torture, the second Driss Report maintained that the victim had died in a traffic accident (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 1096.

26. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992).

27. Republic of Tunisia, "The Military Court Examines the Case of the Plot against Internal State Security," and "The Guarantees for Those to Be Tried in Military Courts in Tunisia" (Tunis, photocopied, n.d.).

28. "La LTDH en équilibrise," Réalités , no. 321 (1-7 November 1991), 5.

29. "Polémique entre le gouvernment et la Ligue des droits de l'homme,' Le Monde , 18 December 1991.

30. "Précision," Réalités , no. 335 (14 February 1992), 10.

31. See Saloua Ben Youssef-Charfi, "La Ligue tunisienne pour la défense des droits de l'homme' (mémoire pour la Diplôme d'études approfondies des sciences politiques, Université de Tunis, Faculté de droit et des sciences politiques, June 1987), 277-82. An exchange of letters between Interior Minister Ben Ali and the LTDH is published as Annexes X and XI.

32. "Bataille autour d'une réforme," Réalités , no. 341 (27 March 1992), 12.

33. Arab Organization for Human Rights, Newsletter , 8 May 1987.

34. See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1989 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), and Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991).

35. Amnesty International, "Algeria: Deteriorating Human Rights under the State of Emergency," MDE 29/04/93 (March 1993).

36. Haroun was initially appointed as minister delegate for human rights, but in October 1991 the position was given full cabinet status and he became minister of human rights.

37. Foreign Broadcast Information Service , 17 January 1992, quoted in Human Rights in Algeria since the Halt of the Electoral Process (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992).

38. Algeria: Deteriorating Human Rights under State of Emergency , MDE 28/04/93 (London: AI Publications, 1993).

39. News item, Agence France Presse wire service, 6 June 1992; "Human Rights Watchdog Group Condemns Excesses," FBIS-NES-93-023 (5 February 1993).

40. "Les Conditions de détention dans le camp d'Ouargla sont 'extrêmement mauvaises,'" Le Monde , 11 March 1992.

41. "Les Médias reprochent au pouvoir de vouloir les domestiquer," Le Monde , 19 March 1992.

42. News item, Agence France Presse wire service, 2 June 1992.

43. "Thousands Participate in Marches against Terrorism," FBIS-NES-93-055 (24 March 1993).

44. "Hassan Speech on Human Rights Council Creation," FBIS-NES-90-091 (10 May 1990).

45. Among these were many individuals whose integrity was recognized and respected; questions were raised about the role of others, including Minister of Interior Driss Basri and Ahmed Afazaz, who was the presiding judge in the 1977 political trial in Casablanca.

46. "Discours historique de sa majesté le roi Hassan II à l'occasion de l'installation du Conseil consultatif des droits de l'homme, 8 May 1990" in Conseil consultatif des droits de l'homme (Rabat: Royaume du Maroc, 1992), 14.

47. Amnesty International, Morocco: Continuing Human Rights Violations ,

MDE-29/06/92 (October 1992). In one of these cases, the Moroccan government conducted an inquiry and charged two police officers with assault.

48. See "Memorandum adressé à la haute attention de sa majesté le roi Hassan II," in Conseil consultatif des droits de l'homme , 83; and "Council for Human Rights Outlines 1993 Program," FBIS-NES-93-035 (24 February 1993).

49. Their communique was then circulated by the Istiqlal Party paper L'Opinion . See "Un Memorandum demande la 'suspension immédiate' des procès,'" Le Monde , 2 January 1991, and "Human Rights Council Urges Suspension of Trials," FBIS-NES-91-001 (2 January 1991).

50. "Discours historique," 15-16.

51. Article 19, The Press in Tunisia: Plus ça change .

10 The International Dimension

1. See Packenham, Liberal America , and, more recently, Lowenthal, Exporting Democracy .

2. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics .

3. This was true not only of North African exiles but of Latin Americans as well. See Iain Guest, Behind the Disappearances (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 63, 67.

4. Redjala, L'Opposition en Algérie .

5. Watch Committee reports on the Maghrib were limited until the formation of Middle East Watch in 1990, but prior to that Maghribi countries were treated in the Watch Committees' more general reports. Following a mission in 1984, the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights prepared a report entitled "Morocco Briefing" (photocopied, n.d. [c. 1984]), and a second one in 1990 entitled Cleaning the Face of Morocco: Human Rights Abuses and Recent Developments . A report on Tunisia, Promise Unfulfilled: Human Rights in Tunisia since 1987 , was released in 1993.

6. An exception is Henry J. Steiner, Diverse Partners: Non-Governmental Organizations in the Human Rights Movement. The Report of a Retreat of Human Rights Activists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School Human Rights Program and Human Rights Internet, 1991).

7. Association internationale des juristes démocrates and International Association of Democratic Lawyers, La Faim pour la justice (Leiden, Netherlands: 1989).

8. "Tunis Expels Reporter over Rights Story," San Francisco Chronicle , 12 April 1991.

9. Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America . See also Kathyrn Sikkink, "The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe," in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Instituions, and Political Change , ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 139-70.

10. Tunisia Digest , a newsletter published intermittently by the Tunisian Information Office in Washington, D. C., for example, regularly prints news items concerning official promotion of human rights or rights-related activities.

11. In 1965, for example, William Coplin predicted that neither regional nor

international organizations would effectively challenge the assumptions of sovereignty embedded in the state system ("International Law and Assumptions about the State System," World Politics 17 [July 1965]: 615-35). Forsythe offers argument and evidence to show shortsightedness in these predictions ( Internationalization of Human Rights , 33-48).

12. Farrokh Jhabvala, "The Practice of the Covenant's Human Rights Committee, 1976-82: Review of State Party Reports," Human Rights Quarterly 6 (February 1984): 81-106.

13. See Robert Mortimer, "Maghreb Matters," Foreign Policy 76 (Fall 1989): 160-75, and Ahmed Aghrout and Keith Sutton, "Regional Economic Union in the Maghreb," Journal of Modern African Studies 28, no. 1 (1990): 115-30.

14. Participating groups dismissed that concern as the FIDH's fear of seeing its own influence eclipsed in the region.

15. Quoted by Jacques de Barrin, "Royal Privilege and Human Rights," Manchester Guardian , 18 December 1990.

16. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Arms for Morocco: U.S. Policy Toward the Conflict in the Western Sahara. Report of a Study Mission to Morocco, the Western Sahara, Mauritania, Algeria, Liberia, Spain and France, Aug. 5-18, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979).

17. "Peuvent-ils s'entendre?" Jeune Afrique , no. 1101 (10 February 1982).

18. "Morocco Emerging as Closest Arab Ally," New York Times , 1 February 1983.

19. Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, "Morocco Briefing Paper" 5. Shortly after presenting his credentials in November 1981, Reed declared, "The leadership of the Reagan Administration has stated that your country's concerns are my country's concerns. The United States will do its best to be helpful in every area of need that may arise. Count on us. We are with you." See "King Hassan Moves against His Foes," New York Times , 19 November 1981.

20. "Chronique d'une crise annoncée et contenue," Jeune Afrique , no. 1560 (21-27 November 1990).

21. Africa Research Bulletin , 15 August 1987.

22. Resolution B2-1128, 1136 and 1145/88, passed 15 December 1988.

23. "Le Maroc du silence" Le Monde diplomatique , December 1988.

24. Le Monde published at least seventeen articles directly relating to the OMDH and its concerns over a 15-month period spanning 1988 and 1989.

25. "L'Organisation des droits de l'homme s'inquiète du sort de grévistes de la faim," Le Monde , 17 June 1989.

26. U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill , report 101-131 (18 September 1989), 47-48.

27. Al, press release, "Morocco: Amnesty International Welcomes King's Invitation," MDE 40/WU 01/90 (5 January 1990).

28. Amnesty International Report, 1991 , 161.

29. J.-C. Santucci and M. Benhlal, "Chronique marocaine," Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord 29 (1990): 716. The Moroccan government also prepared, and circulated widely, a document entitled "Réponses au points soulevés par Amnesty International" (photocopied, n.d.). Inter alia, it included copies of instructions circulated to local authorities on penal legislation and une fiche réfutant la notion de ''détenus

politiques' que ne cesse d'évoquer Amnesty International ("a file refuting the notion of 'political detainees' incessantly raised by Amnesty International").

As a nonstate actor, AI apparently did not see its voice muffled by "dialogue" with the Moroccan government. The Moroccans, however, were outraged that the organization had published a report drafted before the first meeting without making any changes ( Human Rights in Garde-à-Vue Detention , MDE/29/01/90 [20 February 1990]). AI argued that its concerns had not been addressed, and that no changes were in order. See "Expulsion de deux représentants d'Amnesty International," Le Monde 17 March 1990; "Statement on Expulsion of Amnesty Representatives," released by the Moroccan Press Agency (MAP) and printed in FBIS-NES-90-053 (19 March 1990); and Amnesty International press release, "Moroccan Government Orders Amnesty International Delegates to Leave'' (16 March 1990).

30. Santucci and Benhlal, "Chronique marocaine," 718.

31. Jeune Afrique , in a rare critical piece on Morocco, ran a 6-page cover story on the human rights angle of the exposition, citing Jobert's admonitions. The glossy cover of the 16 April 1990 edition showed a document stamped "Amnesty International" and emblazoned with the headline "Droits de l'homme: Maroc sous haute surveillance" ( Jeune Afrique , 16 April 1990). The "Temps du Maroc" exhibition was cancelled by Morocco in October 1990 following publication of Gille Perrault's Notre ami le roi , which squelched any hopes of containing criticisms of the monarchy's human rights abuses.

32. "Une affaire de trop?" Jeune Afrique , no. 1558 (November 1990); "Culture, droits de l'homme et irritation royale" Le Monde , 12 September 1990; and "Rabat-Paris: Les Raisons d'une crise," L'Express , 16 November 1990.

33. "Morocco Seeks Ban on Perrault Book," FBIS-WEU-90-216 (7 November 1990).

34. "Rabat-Paris: Les Raisons d'une crise."

35. "Le Gouvernement français appelle Rabat au respect des droits de l'homme," Le Monde , 21 December 1990.

36. OMDH, Observations de l'Organisation marocaine des droits de l'homme au sujet du rapport gouvernemental au Comité des droits de l'homme des Nations-Unis (Rabat: Editions maghrébines, 1990), 87.

37. "Human Rights Committee Begins Consideration of Report from Morocco" and "Human Rights Committee Will Pursue at Later Session Its Consideration of Report from Morocco" (UN press releases HR/2673 [7 November 1990] and HR/2674 [8 November 1990]).

38. "La Délégation marocaine refuse que la télévision filme les débats," Le Monde , 13 July 1991.

39. "Statement of Amnesty International USA on Human Rights Abuses in North Africa before the Foreign Affairs' Subcommittees on Human Rights and Africa" (photocopied, 19 June 1991).

40. Abraham Serfaty was one of the few political prisoners ever individually identified by Hassan II, who publicly denounced his advocacy of Western Saharan self-determination as traitorous. To rationalize the release, a diplomatic loophole was crafted. Serfaty was not, it seems, Moroccan at all, but Brazilian . . . by virtue of his father's work-related travels at the time of his birth ("La Libération de Serfaty," Jeune Afrique , no. 1603 (18-24 1991).

41. Pamela Brogan, The Torturers' Lobby (Washington, D.C.: Center for Public Integrity), 17-19.

42. J. de Barrin, "Royal Privilege and Human Rights."

43. "Le Roi Hassan II assure qu'il n'y a plus de détenus politiques dans le pays," Le Monde , 7 July 1992. Less than a year earlier, Basri had recited for French television audiences: "As concerns the prison at Tazmamart, and I repeat what His Majesty the King said recently, it exists only in the mind and imagination of those who would malign Morocco" ("Déclaration de M. Driss Basri à 'TF-1,'" Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb , 19 September 1991.

44. Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America , passim.

45. The Free South Africa movement is now commonly acknowledged to have had an impact on events in South Africa, and a similar effect for Argentina is documented by Alison Brysk, "From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International Situation, and Human Rights in Argentina," Comparative Political Studies 26 (October 1993): 259-83. In more general works—from quite different perspectives—two prominent theorists have recently recognized the influence of the international human rights movement (Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics; Huntington, Third Wave ).

11 The Changing Face of North African Politics

1. In a well-publicized case in 1993, for example, a Tunisian professor at the Sorbonne in Paris was arrested while on a family visit to Tunisia and charged with belonging to al-Nahda. According to the FIDH, which sent observers to the original trial and an appeal trial, the court refused to examine the real circumstances of Taoufik Rajhi's arrest, and it accepted arrest documents whose dates had been modified to make the period of incommunicado detention conform to the law. Papers provided by Tunisian police showed that Rajhi was arrested on 11 August, whereas France Libertés had received a letter from his sister postmarked 30 July. In the course of the appeals trial on 8 October 1993, a defense attorney pointed out that several of the alleged offenses were committed exclusively in France and by provisions of Tunisian law could not be prosecuted unless the offenses were also punishable by French law. The appeals court upheld the conviction of the lower court but reduced the sentence (Fédération internationale des droits de l'homme, "Missions d'observations judiciaires: Procès de Taoufik Rajhi" [November 1993]). On 22 November the Tunisian parliament approved a modification of the penal code permitting prosecution of infractions committed outside Tunisian territor), even if the acts are not punishable in the country in which they take place (Law 93-113 of 22 November 1993).

2. Tunisian Information Office, Tunisia Digest 3, no. 1 (1994).

3. Jack Donnelly, Universal Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Forsythe, Human Rights and World Politics .

4. Camau, "Tunisie au présent."

5. "La Politique autrement," Jeune Afrique , no. 1588 (5-11 June 1991).

6. "Il y a une conscience nouvelle de la problematique des droits de l'homme,"

interview with Khalid Naciri, president of OMDH, Réalités , no. 259 (10 August 1990).

7. Almond and Verba, Civic Culture; Huntington, Third Wave .

8. Huntington, Third Wave .

EPILOGUE

1. "FIS, GIA, AIS . . . Où en sont-ils? Que veulent-ils? Une interview de Séverine Labat," Jeune Afrique , no. 1755 (25-31 August 1994).

2. "Interior Minister Calls for Respect for Law," FBIS-NES-94-106 (2 June 1994). Interior Minister Kallel's remarks echoed those made by Ben Ali to parliament a few weeks earlier ("Souveraineté, souveraineté," La Presse [Tunisia], 10 April 1994).

3. Cf. Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa," World Politics 46 (July 1994): 487. They argue that democratic transitions from neopatrimonial regimes are impeded by low levels of participation and competition.


Notes
 

Preferred Citation: Waltz, Susan E. Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c1995 1995. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft2t1nb1vf/