1. Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1971), 294-95.

2. Roberto Vacca, The Coming Dark Age (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), 3-4.

3. Theodore Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends: Politics and Transcendence in Postindustrial Society (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), xix.

4. Lewis Mumford, The Pentagon of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 410.

5. See David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963); Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958); and John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

6. For additional views on these special difficulties, see Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 1984); and Todd R. LaPorte, "On the Design and Management of Nearly Error-Free Organizational Control Systems," in David L. Sills et al., eds., Accident at Three Mile Island: The Human Dimensions (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 185-200.

7. Donella Meadows, John Richardson, and Gerhart Bruckmann, Groping in the Dark: The First Decade of Global Modelling (New York: Wiley, 1982), 15.

8. Baruch Fischoff, Paul Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein, "Which continue

     Risks Are Acceptable?," Environment 21 (May 1979): 17-20, 32-38; quote from 35.

9. Compare the pessimistic perspective on environmental deterioration in Council on Environmental Quality, Global 2000 Report to the President of the U.S.: Entering the Twenty-First Century (New York: Pergamon, 1980) with the optimistic view of Julian Simon, The Ultimate Resource (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

10. For a crticism of AEC policy making, see Steven L. Del Sesto, Science, Politics, and Controversy: Civilian Nuclear Power, 1946-1976 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981). For a brief overview of common criticisms, see Edward J. Woodhouse, "The Politics of Nuclear Waste Management," in Charles A. Walker et al., eds., Too Hot to Handle?: Social and Policy Issues in the Management of Radioactive Wastes (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983), 151-83.

11. President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1979), 34. Those closest to the plant received an average dose equivalent to about 10 percent or less of the background radiation to which they are exposed each year. Total cancer deaths from the additional radiation could be as low as zero or as high as ten.

12. See, for example, Laura B. Ackerman, "Humans: Overview of Human Exposures to Dieldrin Residues in the Environment and Current Trends of Residue Levels in Tissue," Pesticides Monitoring Journal 14 (September 1980): 64-69.

13. A good, comprehensive review of cancer estimates is Richard Doll and Richard Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of Avoidable Risks of Cancer in the United States Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

14. Some U.S. government publications give figures as high as 38 percent, but such calculations do not stand up under scrutiny: the agencies issuing such statistics stand to gain higher budgets if their estimates are accepted. Samuel S. Epstein's The Politics of Cancer (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978) likewise overstates the contribution of industrial chemicals to cancer. For further detail, see Doll and Peto, The Causes of Cancer, Appendices C, D, and E.

15. A total of approximately 430,000 people per year died of cancer in the mid-1980s, and the number has been increasing each year owing to population growth. Good statistics on the incidence of cancer are unavailable, but the total effects of chemicals would have to be increased to take into account the percentage of people who are cured of cancer or go into remission and die of some other cause. break

1. For an excellent overview of pesticide effects on the environment and other aspects of the early feedback process, see James Whorton, Before Silent Spring: Pesticides and Public Health in Pre-DDT America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

2. Ibid., 23-25.

1. For an excellent overview of pesticide effects on the environment and other aspects of the early feedback process, see James Whorton, Before Silent Spring: Pesticides and Public Health in Pre-DDT America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

2. Ibid., 23-25.

3. T. H. Haskins, Garden and Forest 4 (1891): 247; quoted in Whorton, Before Silent Spring, 24.

4. See Whorton, Before Silent Spring, 24-25, 212-17.

5. Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).

6. The original studies were E. G. Hunt and A. I. Bischoff, "Inimical Effects on Wildlife of Periodic DDD Applications to Clear Lake," California Fish and Game 46 (1960): 91-106; and George J. Wallace, "Insecticides and Birds," Audubon Magazine 61 (January-February 1959): 10-12, 35.

7. Carson, Silent Spring, 129-52.

8. A. W. A. Brown, "The Progression of Resistance Mechanisms Developed Against Insecticides," in Jack R. Plimmer, ed., Pesticide Chemistry in the 20th Century (Washington, D.C.: American Chemical Society, 1977), 21-34.

9. Whorton, Before Silent Spring, 133-60.

10. Wayland J. Hayes, Jr., et al., "Storage of DDT and DDE in People with Different Degrees of Exposure to DDT," AMA Archives of Industrial Health 18 (1958): 398-406. Frank E. Guthrie, "Pesticides and Humans," in Frank E. Guthrie and Jerome J. Perry, eds., Introduction to Environmental Toxicology (New York: American Elsevier, 1980), 299-312.

11. For example, see Wayland J. Hayes, Jr., William E. Hale, and Carl I. Pirkle, "Evidence of Safety of Long-Term, High Oral Doses of DDT for Man," Archives of Environmental Health 22 (1971): 119-35.

12. For two such efforts, see President's Science Advisory Committee, Use of Pesticides (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963); and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Report of the Secretary's Commission on Pesticides and Their Relationship to Environmental Health (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969).

13. Some of the newer pesticides are more dangerous to agricultural workers, however. EPA's current pesticide regulatory efforts focus in part on worker safety. break

14. Roger D. Johnson, Dennis D. Manske, and David S. Podrebarac, "Pesticide, Metal, and Other Chemical Residues in Adult Total Diet Samples, (XII), August 1975-July 1976," Pesticides Monitoring Journal 15 (June 1981): 54-65. Also see F. L. McEwen and G. R. Stephenson, The Use and Significance of Pesticides in the Environment (New York: Wiley, 1979), especially 365-78.

15. For example, dieldrin levels declined steadily as the pesticide's use was phased out but then plateaued at about 0.2 ppm in human adipose tissues. It is impossible to determine whether there are health effects from such small amounts. Laura B. Ackerman, "Humans: Overview of Human Exposures to Dieldrin Residues".

16. For further details on early legislation and regulations, see Whorton, Before Silent Spring, and Edward J. Woodhouse, "Toxic Chemicals and Technological Society: Decision-Making Strategies When Errors Can Be Catastrophic" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1983).

17. The amendment has been interpreted to allow the FDA to block use of an additive, even though available evidence was merely suggestive of possible harm and was inadequate to judge the additive unsafe. See Certified Color Manufacturers Association v. Matthews, 543 F. 2d 284 (D.C. Cir., 1976).

18. Testimony of Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, in U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy, Natural Resources, and the Environment, Effects of 2,4,5-T on Man and the Environment: Hearings, June 17-18, 1970, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 62.

19. This interpretation was made by a court, on the basis of somewhat vague language in the actual statute. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F. 2d 998, 9 ERC 1433 (D.C. Cir., 1977).

20. U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Toxic Substances (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

21. The Chemical Abstracts Service, which is responsible for assigning a unique chemical number to each compound, later estimated the number at three hundred to five hundred new compounds annually, and some estimates placed the percentage of dangerous chemicals as low as 5 percent.

22. Senate report 94-698, reprinted in Ray M. Druley and Girard L. Ordway, The Toxic Substances Control Act, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1981), 302.

23. For a comparison of the U.S. and European regulations on new chemicals, see Sam Gusman et al., Public Policy Toward Chemicals: National and International Issues (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1980). TCSA also gave EPA new authority over existing chemicals. break

24. Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.) 29 (1973): 674 (emphasis added).

25. Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.) 32 (1976): 123.

26. Druley and Ordway, The Toxic Substances Control Act, 303.

27. In marked contrast, regulatory agencies still must prove the danger before they can regulate occupational exposures to toxic chemicals, air and water pollutants, drinking water contaminants, cosmetics, and existing chemicals covered by TSCA.

28. On burdens of proof, see David V. Doniger, "Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control," Ecology Law Quarterly 7 (1978): 497-677, especially 664-65.

29. Compiled from monthly status reports on premanufacture notification for new chemical substances, Federal Register, beginning with "Toxic Substances; Premanufacturing Notices; Monthly Status Report," Federal Register 44 (May 15, 1979): 28410.

30. For 1984, however, PMN chemicals actually entering production rose to more than 40 percent.

31. References herein to EPA staff and other participants are based on personal interviews conducted by the authors in Washington and by telephone with approximately a dozen high-ranking staff members from EPA, the Interagency Testing Committee, and relevant interest groups.

32. The staffing and budget figures are from internal Office of Toxic Substances budget memoranda supplied to the authors in personal communications.

33. Toxic Substances Reporter Update, 1 (August 7, 1981): 6-7. The exemption was requested only for dyes manufactured in annual quantities of 25,000 pounds or less, and the dye would have to meet safety criteria of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act or the American National Standard Institute.

34. See, for example, Office of Technology Assessment, The Information Content of Premanufacture Notices (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983); and U.S. General Accounting Office, EPA Implementation of Selected Aspects of the Toxic Substances Control Act (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, December 7, 1982).

35. Toxic Substances Reporter Update, 1 (August 7, 1981): 6.

36. Toxic Substances Control Act, section 4e.

37. For further details on testing of alkyltins, see "Eleventh Report of the Interagency Testing Committee to the Administrator," continue

      Federal Register 47 (December 3, 1982): 54626-44 (and sources cited therein).

38. NRDC v. Costle, 14 ERC 1858 (D.D.C. 1980).

39. See U.S. General Accounting Office, EPA Implementation .

40. For the NRDC view, see "Comments of the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., on Voluntary Testing Programs for the Alkyl Phthalates and the Chlorinated Paraffins: A Critical Review of Their Legal and Scientific Adequacy Under Section 4 of the Toxic Substances Control Act," EPA Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances memorandum 40009, October 20, 1981.

41. On the Significant New Use Rules program, see Edward J. Woodhouse, "External Influences on Productivity: EPA's Implementation of TSCA," Policy Studies Review 4 (1985): 497-503.

1. Early discussions on nuclear power included: "Reactor Hazards Predictable, Says Teller," Nucleonics (November 1953): 80; U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Government Indemnity for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956; Hearings on Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957; G. Weil, "Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants," Science 121 (1955): 315.

      Major studies in the 1970s included: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, Wash-1400 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975); and "Report to the APS by the Study Group on Light Water Reactor Safety," Reviews of Modern Physics 47 (1975), suppl. no. 1.

     See chapter 8 for recent stages of the controversy.

2. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947-1952 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969), 196.

3. AEC Reactor Safeguards Committee (RSC) meetings of June and September 1948; systematized in Edward Teller, "Statement on Danger Area Regulations and on Schenectady Intermediate Reactor," November 17, 1948, AEC Archives, discussed and cited in Atomic Shield, 1947-52 : 195, 204.

4. Letter from Walter H. Zinn, director of Argonne National Laboratory, to James B. Fisk, July 23, 1948, AEC Archives, cited in Atomic Shield, 1947-52 : 196.

5. Edward Teller, letter to George L. Weil on behalf of the RSC, continue

     September 10, 1948, AEC Archives, cited in Atomic Shield, 1947-52 : 203.

6. C. P. Russel, Reactor Safeguards (New York: MacMillan, 1962), 19.

7. Atomic Shield, 1947-52 : 186.

8. Russel, Reactor Safeguards, 20.

9. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 176.

10. Atomic Shield, 1947-52 : 188, 203.

11. The designs of the land-based versions for each type of reactor were nearly identical to the seafaring versions. The land-based versions served as trial runs. They provided experience in the construction of such reactors (no comparable reactors previously had been built) and they provided an opportunity to discover any serious flaws in the reactor designs before they were built into the seafaring versions.

12. E. S. Rolph, Nuclear Power and the Public Safety (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), 24.

13. Information on the nuclear submarines is still largely classified. Consequently the following discussion of the two tactics does not include specific examples of their application.

14. H. G. Rickover, in Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives," 96th Cong., 1st sess., May 22, 23, 24, 1979, 1042.

15. Ibid.

14. H. G. Rickover, in Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives," 96th Cong., 1st sess., May 22, 23, 24, 1979, 1042.

15. Ibid.

16. See Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Government Indemnity for Private Licensees, 47 ff.; Hearings on Indemnity and Reactor Safety, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1960, 20 ff.; Hearings on Licensing and Regulation of Nuclear Reactors, Part 1, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, 62-63, 308 ff.; C. K. Beck et al., "Reactor Safety, Hazards Evaluation and Inspection," in Proceedings of the Second U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (New York: United Nations, 1959), 17 ff.

17. On the emergency systems strategy, see Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Licensing and Regulation, 63.

18. C. K. Beck, "U.S. Reactor Experience and Power Reactor Siting," in Proceedings of the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, vol. 11 (New York: United Nations, 1965), 355.

19. W. K. Davis and W. B. Cottrell, "Containment and Engineered Safety of Nuclear Power Plants," in Proceedings of the Third continue

      International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, vol. 13 (New York: United Nations, 1965), 367.

20. Containment systems became increasingly sophisticated with time. By the early 1960s the shields were supplemented by systems for reducing postaccident temperatures and pressures in the area within the shield and for washing and filtering out the radioactive fission products released into the atmosphere within the shield. (By filtering the products out of the atmosphere, the small rate of leakage of fission products through the shield could be further reduced.) See ibid.

21. S. G. Kingsley, "The Licensing of Nuclear Power Reactors in the United States," Atomic Energy Law Journal 7 (1965): 341.

22. See especially David Okrent, Nuclear Reactor Safety: On the History of the Regulatory Process (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), chapter 8.

23. The most likely source of a serious accident in a light water reactor is a loss of coolant. When the coolant is lost--through a rupture of one of the main pipes, for example--the chain reaction ends. That is, the reactor shuts itself down. But although the chain reaction ends, the core continues to give off heat--not nearly as much as during the chain reaction, but still a substantial amount. The heat is generated by the energy released in the radioactive decay of the fission products that were produced during the chain reaction and that remain in the reactor core after the chain reaction ends. Normally, this "decay heat" is removed by the reactor coolant. Without the coolant, however, it cannot be removed, and if this happens, it will melt the material in which the fuel is enclosed and eventually the fuel itself. Once the fuel begins to melt, radioactive fission products are released from the core. The scale-up to more powerful reactors was important because of this decay heat problem. The more powerful the reactor, the greater the amount of fission products produced during operation, and consequently, the greater the amount of decay heat. The greater the amount of decay heat, the more severe the heat removal problem in a loss-of-coolant accident.

24. See, for example, Okrent, Nuclear Reactor Safety, chapters 8 and 11.

25. Ibid., 112.

24. See, for example, Okrent, Nuclear Reactor Safety, chapters 8 and 11.

25. Ibid., 112.

26. See, for instance, U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Nuclear Reactor Safety, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 34. More generally, see U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on AEC Licensing Procedure and Related Legislation, Parts I and II, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971; U.S. Con- soft

      gress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Nuclear Reactor Safety, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973; U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, The Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors and Related Facilities, Wash-1250, draft (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).

27. While it placed emphasis on prevention, the AEC did not drop the requirement that reactors be built with containment systems. Since these systems would still withstand at least some core melts and would therefore contain the fission products released in those melts, the AEC continued to require that reactors be built with containment systems.

28. W. B. Cottrell, "The ECCS Rule-Making Hearing," Atomic Energy Law Journal 16 (1975): 353.

29. Ibid. Also see U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, Wash-1400 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), Appendix XI, 37.

28. W. B. Cottrell, "The ECCS Rule-Making Hearing," Atomic Energy Law Journal 16 (1975): 353.

29. Ibid. Also see U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, Wash-1400 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), Appendix XI, 37.

30. Cottrell, "The ECCS Rule-Making Hearing," 354.

31. In addition to being designed redundantly, the new emergency cooling systems also were designed with wide margins of error. Over the course of the late 1960s and early 1970s, as a result of a series of controversies, these margins were repeatedly expanded. For a partial list of these margins, see AEC, The Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors and Related Facilities, 5-9.

32. Quoted in Z. D. Nikodem et al., "Nuclear Power Regulation," in Energy Policy Study, vol. 10 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, May 1980), 159.

33. See ibid. See also W. E. Mooz, Cost Analysis of Light Water Reactor Power Plants (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1978).

32. Quoted in Z. D. Nikodem et al., "Nuclear Power Regulation," in Energy Policy Study, vol. 10 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, May 1980), 159.

33. See ibid. See also W. E. Mooz, Cost Analysis of Light Water Reactor Power Plants (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1978).

34. President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1979), 56. See also David Okrent and David Moeller, "Implications for Reactor Safety of the Accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2," in J. Hollander, M. Simmons, and D. Wood, eds., Annual Review of Energy, vol. 6 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews, 1981).

35. Ibid., 56.

34. President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1979), 56. See also David Okrent and David Moeller, "Implications for Reactor Safety of the Accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2," in J. Hollander, M. Simmons, and D. Wood, eds., Annual Review of Energy, vol. 6 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews, 1981).

35. Ibid., 56.

36. "Assessment: The Impact and Influence of TMI," EPRI Journal 5 (June 1980): 30.

37. R. J. Breen, "Defense-in-Depth Approach to Safety in Light of the Three Mile Island Accident," Nuclear Safety 22 (1981): 562.

38. Ibid. break

37. R. J. Breen, "Defense-in-Depth Approach to Safety in Light of the Three Mile Island Accident," Nuclear Safety 22 (1981): 562.

38. Ibid. break

1. See for example, J. Walsh, "Public Attitude Toward Science Is Yes, but--," Science 215 (1982): 270; and Paul Slovic et al., "Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risks," in R. C. Schwing and W. A. Albers, eds., Societal Risk Assessment, (New York: Plenum, 1980).

2. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Institutes of Health, "Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines," Federal Register, Part II, July 7, 1976. These guidelines have the power of law only for rDNA research performed with NIH funds. Research performed with private funds and with funds from other federal agencies is not legally bound by the guidelines. Nevertheless, as far as can be determined, all recombinant DNA research in the United States has proceeded in accordance with the guidelines. Federal agencies other than the NIH that fund rDNA research require compliance with the guidelines, and privately funded researchers, primarily in industry, have voluntarily complied.

3. The NIH guidelines classified rDNA experiments into four groups according to the degree of hazard. The proposed facility was to be used for experiments falling in the second most hazardous of the four classes.

4. Clifford Grobstein, A Double Image of the Double Helix: The Recombinant DNA Controversy (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1979), 66.

5. William Bennett and Joel Gurin, "Science That Frightens Scientists: The Great Debate Over RDNA," Atlantic 239 (February 1977): 43; Liebe Cavalieri, "New Strains of Life or Death," The New York Times Magazine (August 22, 1976): 8; "Creating New Forms of Life--Blessing or Curse?" U.S. News and World Report 82 (April 11, 1977): 80; John Lear, Recombinant DNA, The Untold Story (New York: Crown, 1978); Michael Rogers, Biohazard (New York: Knopf, 1977); June Goodfield, Playing God: Genetic Engineering and the Manipulation of Life (New York: Random House, 1977).

6. Grobstein, A Double Image, 75.

7. Authors' interviews with congressional staff, fall 1981.

8. For related discussions, see A. Mazur, "Disputes Between Experts," Minerva, 11 (April 1973): 243-62; and Dorothy Nelkin, "The Role of Experts in a Nuclear Siting Controversy," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 30 (November 1974): 29-36.

9. Compare U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, Wash-1400 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of- soft

      fice, 1975); and "Report to the American Physical Society by the Study Group on Light-Water Reactor Safety," Reviews of Modern Physics 47 (Summer 1975): suppl. no. 1.

10. See "Source Terms: The New Reactor Safety Debate," Science News 127 (1985): 250-53.

11. See, for example, Rae Goodell, "Scientists and the Press: The Case of Recombinant DNA," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, January 1980, 9; E. Wehr, "DNA Regulation Bill Hits Roadblock Again," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, May 27, 1978, 1331-35.

12. A muted version of the argument that scientists presented a unified front on rDNA research is offered in Sheldon Krimsky, Genetic Alchemy: The Social History of the Recombinant DNA Controversy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982).

13. For a summary of the NIH guidelines, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Impacts of Applied Genetics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), chapter 11.

14. Not all scientists agreed that biological containment would be entirely effective.

15. List adapted from Sheldon Krimsky, Genetic Alchemy, Appendix C, 372-76. This is only an illustrative list of rDNA concerns; it omits significant nonworkshop contributions (such as the July 1974 Berg letter), and it does not report the precise scientific issues (such as the Ascot Workshop's concern about cloning of DNA copies of viroids).

16. Working Group on Revision of the Guidelines, "Evaluation of the Risks Associated with Recombinant DNA Research," Recombinant DNA Technical Bulletin, vol. 4 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, December 1981), 178; V. W. Franco, "Ethics of Recombinant DNA Research and Technology," New York State Journal of Medicine 81 (June 1981): 1039.

17. S. L. Gorbach, letter to Donald Fredrickson, July 14, 1977, reprinted in National Institutes of Health, Environmental Impact Statement on NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, Part 2, October 1977, Appendix M: "Issues" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 25.

18. Sherwood L. Gorbach, "Recombinant DNA: An Infectious Disease Perspective," Journal of Infectious Diseases 137 (1978): 615-23; quote from p. 62.

19. S. B. Levy and B. Marshall, "Survival of E. coli Host-Vector Systems in the Human Intestinal Tract," Recombinant DNA Technical Bulletin 2 (July 1979): 77-80, describes an experiment in which a continue

      common manipulation rendered the enfeebled X1776 strain of E. coli K-12 more able to colonize the human intestinal tract. P. S. Cohen et al., "Fecal E. coli Strains in the Mouse GI Tract," Recombinant DNA Technical Bulletin 2 (November 1979): 106-13, reported on the increased susceptibility under antibiotic treatment.

20. Gorbach, "Recombinant DNA."

21. Working Group on Revision of the Guidelines, 171, 178.

22. W. A. Thomasson, "Recombinant DNA and Regulating Uncertainty," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 35 (December 1979): 26-32; quote from 27-28.

23. See MIT biology professors Jonathan King and Ethen Signer, letter to the editor, The New York Times, May 3, 1979, which read in part: "At least one application of the recombinant DNA technology results in the creation of a laboratory hybrid not found in nature which does represent a new source of infection. . . . Neither the public nor the scientific community is served when a positive result indicating a danger is buried in a mass of negative data and ignored. Such a situation is truly a hazard to us all."

24. See Barbara Rosenberg and Lee Simon, "Recombinant DNA: Have Recent Experiments Assessed All the Risks?," Nature 282 (December 1979): 773-74.

25. U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology of the Committee on Science and Technology, Genetic Engineering, Human Genetics, and Cell Biology--Evolution of the Technical Issues, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 26.

26. Working Group on Revision of the Guidelines, 172.

27. Ibid., 173.

26. Working Group on Revision of the Guidelines, 172.

27. Ibid., 173.

28. U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology, 26.

29. Among many other sources on genetic technologies and their social implications, see Robert H. Blank, The Political Implications of Human Genetic Technology (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981); Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Technologies: A New Frontier (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982); and Barbara J. Culliton, "New Biotech Review Board Planned," Science 229 (1985): 736-37.

1. The stratosphere begins at an altitude of approximately seven miles and gives way to the ionosphere which is about twenty-five miles above the earth. break

2. "Boeing Scientist Alters SST View," The New York Times , August 27, 1970, 19.

3. Ibid. Also see Halstead Harrison, "Stratospheric Ozone with Added Water Vapor: Influence of High-Altitude Aircraft," Science 170 (1970): 734-36.

2. "Boeing Scientist Alters SST View," The New York Times , August 27, 1970, 19.

3. Ibid. Also see Halstead Harrison, "Stratospheric Ozone with Added Water Vapor: Influence of High-Altitude Aircraft," Science 170 (1970): 734-36.

4. Study of Critical Environmental Problems (SCEP), Man's Impact on the Global Environment: Assessment and Recommendations for Action (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), 16.

5. Compare the relatively sensational claims in The New York Times , May 18, 1971, 78, with H. S. Johnston, "Reduction of Stratospheric Ozone by Nitrogen Oxide Catalysts from Supersonic Transport Exhaust," Science 173 (1971): 517-22.

6. "Making a Case: Theory That Aerosols Deplete Ozone Shield Is Attracting Support," Wall Street Journal , December 3, 1975, 1, 27. (Cited hereafter as WSJ, 1975.)

7. Ibid.

6. "Making a Case: Theory That Aerosols Deplete Ozone Shield Is Attracting Support," Wall Street Journal , December 3, 1975, 1, 27. (Cited hereafter as WSJ, 1975.)

7. Ibid.

8. M. J. Molina and F. S. Rowland, "Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine Atom Catalysed Destruction of Ozone," Nature 249 (1974): 810-12. For further detail, see F. S. Rowland and M. J. Molina, "Chlorofluoromethanes in the Environment," Review of Geophysics and Space Physics 13 (1975): 1-35.

9. The full process proposed by the chemists was complex, but the essential reaction involves chlorine and ozone reacting to produce oxygen and chlorine oxide: Cl + O 3 ® O 2 + ClO.

10. WSJ, 1975, 1.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

10. WSJ, 1975, 1.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

10. WSJ, 1975, 1.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Statement of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory atmospheric physicist Crofton B. Farmer, quoted in WSJ, 1975, 27.

14. For example, a number of scientists engaged in direct stratospheric measurements of chlorine oxide, which is one of the short-lived, intermediate products of the chemical sequence hypothesized by Molina and Rowland. See E. M. Weinstock, M. J. Phillips, and J. G. Anderson, "In-Situ Observations of ClO in the Stratosphere: A Review of Recent Results," Journal of Geophysical Research 86 (1981): 7273-78.

15. Atmospheric chemist James P. Lodge, Jr., quoted in WSJ, 1975, 1.

16. Ibid., 27.

15. Atmospheric chemist James P. Lodge, Jr., quoted in WSJ, 1975, 1.

16. Ibid., 27.

17. Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, "Fluorocarbon Battle Expected to Heat Up as the Regulators Move Beyond Aerosols," Wall Street Journal , January 19, 1978, 38.

18. Ibid. break

17. Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, "Fluorocarbon Battle Expected to Heat Up as the Regulators Move Beyond Aerosols," Wall Street Journal , January 19, 1978, 38.

18. Ibid. break

19. Federal Task Force on Inadvertent Modification of the Stratosphere, Council on Environmental Quality, Federal Council for Science and Technology, Fluorocarbons and the Environment (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).

20. A. D. Little & Co., Preliminary Economic Impact Assessment of Possible Regulatory Action to Control Atmospheric Emissions of Selected Halocarbons (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1975).

21. Panel on Atmospheric Chemistry of the Committee on Impacts of Stratospheric Change, National Research Council, Halocarbons: Effects on Stratospheric Ozone (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1976).

22. The National Research Council studies not cited elsewhere in this chapter have included: Environmental Impact of Stratospheric Flight: Biological and Climatic Effects of Aircraft Emissions in the Stratosphere , 1975; Halocarbons: Environmental Effects of Chlorofluormethane Release , 1976; Protection Against Depletion of Stratospheric Ozone by Chlorofluorocarbons , 1979. All are published by the National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

23. Formally sponsored governmental or United Nations studies outside the United States include, among many others: R. D. Hudson et al., eds., The Stratosphere 1981: Theory and Measurements , WMO Global Research and Monitoring Project Report no. 11 (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 1982); and A. C. Aiken, ed., Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute on Atmospheric Ozone: Its Variation and Human Influences (Washington, D.C.: Federal Aviation Administration, 1980).

24. See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Fluorocarbons--Impact on Health and Environment, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Public Health and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 17577 and 17545 , 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974.

25. Editorial: "The Dilemma of the Endangered Ozone," The New York Times , October 29, 1980, A30.

26. "45 Countries Adopt a Treaty to Safeguard Layer of Ozone," The New York Times , March 23, 1985, 4; and "U.S. and Common Market Take Opposite Sides in Ozone Dispute," Christian Science Monitor ," January 31, 1985, 14.

27. P. J. Crutzen, "Estimates of Possible Variations in Total Ozone Due to Natural Causes and Human Activities," Ambio 3 (1974): 201-10.

28. P. J. Crutzen, "Upper Limits in Atmospheric Ozone Reductions Following Increased Application of Fixed Nitrogen to the Soil," Geophysical Research Letter , 3 (1976): 169-72. break

29. For example, see S. C. Liu et al., "Limitation of Fertilizer Induced Ozone Reduction by the Long Lifetime of the Reservoir of Fixed Nitrogen," Geophysical Research Letter 3 (1976): 157-60.

30. Harold S. Johnston, "Analysis of the Independent Variables in the Perturbation of Stratospheric Ozone by Nitrogen Fertilizers," Journal of Geophysical Research 82 (1977): 1767-72.

31. National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council, Nitrates: An Environmental Assessment (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1978).

32. S. Fred Singer, "Stratospheric Water Vapour Increase Due to Human Activities," Nature 233 (1971): 543-45.

33. P. R. Zimmerman, J. P. Greenberg, S. O. Wandiga, and P. J. Crutzen, "Termites: A Potentially Large Source of Atmospheric Methane, Carbon Dioxide, and Molecular Hydrogen," Science 218 (1982): 563-65.

34. National Research Council, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion by Halocarbons: Chemistry and Transport (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1979).

35. V. Ramanathan, R. J. Cicerone, H. B. Singh, and J. T. Kiehl, "Trace Gas Trends and Their Potential Role in Climate Change," Journal of Geophysical Research 90 (1985): 5547-66.

36. Michael J. Prather, Michael B. McElroy, and Steven C. Wofsy, "Reductions in Ozone at High Concentrations of Stratospheric Halogens," Nature 312 (1984): 227-31.

37. National Research Council, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion by Halocarbons .

38. National Research Council, Causes and Effects of Stratospheric Ozone Reduction: An Update (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1982). The original research is reported in R. D. Hudson et al., The Stratosphere 1981: Theory and Measurements , WMO Global Research and Monitoring Project Report no. 11 (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 1982).

39. National Research Council, Causes and Effects , 29.

40. National Research Council, Causes and Effects of Changes in Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: Update 1983 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1984).

41. Prather et al., "Reductions in Ozone."

42. Boyce Rensberger, "EPA Finds Greater Peril to Earth's Ozone Shield," Washington Post , April 5, 1985, A4.

43. Philip Shabecoff, "Suit Is Filed to Bar Possible Harm to Earth's Protective Ozone Layer," The New York Times , November 28, 1984, A20. break

44. National Research Council, Causes and Effects . . . Update 1983 , 12.

45. A related idea for limiting the magnitude of error is the proposal that the government auction off the right to extract a fixed amount of scarce natural resources each year. Such action would not prevent depletion problems but would ameliorate them. See Herman E. Daly, The Steady-State Economy (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1977).

46. EPA Assistant Administrator for Toxic Substances Steven Jellinek, quoted in The New York Times , October 8, 1980, A18.

1. Roger Revelle and Walter Munk, "The Carbon Dioxide Cycle and the Biosphere," in National Research Council, Energy and Climate (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1977), 140-58.

2. V. Ramanathan et al., "Trace Gas Trends and Their Potential Role in Climate Change."

3. Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee, National Research Council, Changing Climate (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1983), 135, 138.

4. Among other sources, see Syukuro Manabe and Richard T. Wetherald, "On the Distribution of Climate Change Resulting from an Increase in CO 2 Content of the Atmosphere," Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 37 (1980): 99-118.

5. On the ramifications, see Charles F. Cooper, "What Might Man-Induced Climate Change Mean?," Foreign Affairs 56 (1978): 500-520; Walter Orr Roberts, "It Is Time to Prepare for Global Climate Changes," Conservation Foundation Letter , April 1983; William W. Kellogg and Robert Schware, Climate Change and Societal Consequences of Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981); and Hermann Flohn, Life on a Warmer Earth: Possible Climatic Consequences of Man-Made Global Warming (Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1981).

6. J. Hansen, D. Johnson, A. Lacis, S. Lebedeff, P. Lee, D. Rind, and G. Russell, "Climate Impact of Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide," Science 213 (1981): 957-66; quote from 965.

7. For additional discussion and calculations, see John S. Hoffman, Dale Keyes, and James G. Titus, Projecting Future Sea Level Rise: Methodology, Estimates to the Year 2100, and Research Needs , continue

      2nd ed., rev. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Policy and Resources Management, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, October 24, 1983). For an example of the impact on a specific coastal city, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Effects and Value of Sea Level Rise on Charleston and Galveston (Washington, D.C.: EPA, 1983).

8. Council on Environmental Quality, Global Energy Futures and the Carbon Dioxide Problem (Washington, D.C.: Council on Environmental Quality, January 1981), p. 29.

9. J. Tyndall, "On Radiation Through the Earth's Atmosphere," Philosophical Magazine 4 (1863): 200.

10. Svante Arrhenius, "On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air Upon the Temperature of the Ground," Philosophical Magazine 41 (1896): 237-76.

11. T. C. Chamberlin, "An Attempt to Frame a Working Hypothesis of the Cause of Glacial Periods on an Atmospheric Basis," Journal of Geology 7 (1899): 545-84, 667-85, 751-87.

12. G. S. Callendar, "The Artificial Production of Carbon Dioxide and Its Influence on Temperature," Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 64 (1938): 223-40; and "Can Carbon Dioxide Influence Climate?" Weather 4 (1949): 310-14.

13. Gilbert N. Plass, "The Carbon Dioxide Theory of Climate Change," Tellus 8 (1956): 140-54.

14. Roger Revelle and Hans E. Suess, "Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between Atmosphere and Ocean and the Question of an Increase of Atmospheric CO 2 During the Past Decades," Tellus 9 (1957): 18-27.

15. The Conservation Foundation, Implications of Rising Carbon Dioxide Content of the Atmosphere (New York: Conservation Foundation, 1963).

16. President's Science Advisory Committee, Environmental Pollution Panel, Restoring the Quality of Our Environment (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1965), Appendix Y4, 112-33.

17. SCEP, Man's Impact on the Global Environment .

18. Study of Man's Impact on Climate (SMIC), Inadvertent Climate Modification (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971).

19. U.S. Committee for the Global Atmospheric Research Program, Understanding Climatic Change: A Program for Action (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1975); Joint Organizing Committee, The Physical Basis of Climate and Climate Modelling, (Geneva: Joint Planning Staff, Global Atmospheric Research Programme, 1975). break

20. B. Bolin, E. T. Degens, S. Kempe, and P. Ketner, eds., The Global Carbon Cycle, Proceedings of a SCOPE Workshop, Ratzeburg, German Federal Republic, March 21-26, 1977 (New York: Wiley, 1979); W. Stumm, ed., Global Chemical Cycles and Their Alterations by Man, Proceedings of the Dahlem Workshop, November 15-19, 1976 (Berlin: Berlin Abakon Verlagsgesellschaft, 1977).

21. Reported in Peter David, "Two Views on Whether More Means Doom," Nature 305 (October 27, 1983): 751.

      An example of the type of research being funded is an effort to use satellites to measure changes in global forestation and their carbon content; see G. M. Woodwell et al., Deforestation Measured by LANDSAT: Steps Toward a Method, prepared for the Carbon Dioxide Research Division, Department of Energy (New York: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1983).

22. See, for example, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Carbon Dioxide Accumulation in the Atmosphere, Synthetic Fuels, and Energy Policy: A Symposium, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979.

23. A. Lacis, J. Hansen, P. Lee, T. Mitchell, and S. Lebedeff, "Greenhouse Effect of Trace Gases, 1970-80," Geophysical Research Letters 8 (1981): 1035-38. For similar conclusions, see V. Ramanathan, "Climatic Effects of Anthropogenic Trace Gases," in Wilfrid Bach, J. Pankrath, and J. Williams, eds., Interactions of Energy and Climate (Hingham, Mass.: D. Reidel, 1980), 269-80; J. Chamberlain, H. Foley, G. MacDonald, and M. Ruderman, "Climate Effects of Minor Atmospheric Constituents," in William C. Clark, ed., Carbon Dioxide Review 1982 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); and Gordon J. MacDonald, ed., The Long-Term Impacts of Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Levels (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1982), 113-26.

24. Richard C. J. Somerville, Scripps Institute of Oceanography, paper delivered at the meeting of the American Geophysical Union, San Francisco, December 1984, quoted in Robert C. Cowen, "New CO 2 Data Undercuts Dire Prediction Icecaps Would Melt," Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1984, 29, 31; quote from 29.

25. David E. Lincoln, Nasser Sionit, and Boyd R. Strain, paper delivered at the meeting of the American Geophysical Union, San Francisco, December 1984, quoted in ibid.

      On stream runoff, see S. B. Idso and A. J. Brazel, "Rising Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Concentrations May Increase Stream Flow," Nature 312 (1984): 51-53.

26. An early view expressing concern about deforestation was B. Bolin, "Changes of Land Biota and Their Importance for the Carbon continue

      Cycle," Science 196 (1977): 613-15; the mainstream view was advanced in W. S. Broecker et al., "Fate of Fossil Fuel Carbon Dioxide and the Global Budget," Science 206 (1979): 409-18.

      A more recent statement of the dispute is in NRC, Changing Climate: compare the "Synthesis" by the full committee, especially 16-21, with the view of committee member George M. Woodwell, "Biotic Effects on the Concentration of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide: A Review and Projection," 216-41.

27. Lacis et al., "Greenhouse Effect of Trace Gases." Also see L. Donner and V. Ramanathan, "Methane and Nitrous Oxide: Their Effects on Terrestrial Climate," Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 37 (1980): 119-24.

28. On this point, see P. R. Bell, "Methane Hydrate and the Carbon Dioxide Question," in Clark, Carbon Dioxide Review; Roger R. Revelle, "Methane Hydrates in Continental Slope Sediments and Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide," in NRC, Changing Climate, 252-61.

29. Wei-Chyung Wang, Joseph P. Pinto, and Yuk Ling Yung, "Climatic Effects Due to Halogenated Compounds in the Earth's Atmosphere," Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 37 (1980): 333-38.

30. Ramanathan et al., "Trace Gas Trends," 5562.

31. William A. Nierenberg, quoted in James Gleick, "Rare Gases May Speed the Warming of the Earth," The New York Times, April 30, 1985, C1-C2; quote from C1.

32. Compare Hansen et al., "Climate Impact," with Roger Revelle, "Carbon Dioxide and World Climate," Scientific American 247 (August 1982): 35-43. The reassuring research relies on historical geological evidence, the alarming, on mathematical climate modeling.

33. The NRC had recently issued Climate Research Board, Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1979).

34. Energy Security Act of 1980, Public Law 96-294, June 30, 1980; 42 USC 8911, Title VII--Acid Precipitation Program and Carbon Dioxide Study; Subtitle B--Carbon Dioxide.

35. NRC, Changing Climate; and a companion volume, NRC, CO 2 and Climate: A Second Assessment (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1982).

36. NRC, Changing Climate, 26.

37. Ramanathan et al., "Trace Gas Trends," especially, 5557, 5559.

38. NRC, Changing Climate, 64.

39. For example, see W. Hafele et al., Energy in a Finite World: continue

      A Global Systems Analysis, 2 vols. (Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1981).

40. Walter Sullivan, "Report Urges Steps to Slow Down Climate Warming," The New York Times, January 3, 1984, C5.

41. On the flaws in recent projections and the problems likely to be encountered in the future, see U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, Energy Projections to the Year 2010 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1983).

42. Adapted from Stephen Seidel and Dale Keyes, Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming? (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, September 1983), 4/27. (Cited hereafter as Greenhouse Warming .)

43. In addition to the previously cited sources on the weaknesses of energy forecasting, see William L. Ascher, Forecasting: An Appraisal for Policy Makers and Planners (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

44. For details on the IEA/EPA model, see Jae Edmonds and John Reilly, "A Long-Term Global Energy-Economic Model of Carbon Dioxide Release from Fossil Fuel Use," Energy Economics 5 (1983): 74-88.

45. Seidel and Keyes, Greenhouse Warming, 4/28-4/32.

46. Ibid., 4/33-4/41.

45. Seidel and Keyes, Greenhouse Warming, 4/28-4/32.

46. Ibid., 4/33-4/41.

47. The original suggestion was from Cesare Marchetti, "On Geoengineering and the CO 2 Problem," Climatic Change 1 (1977): 59-68. Significant doubts are expressed in A. Albanese and M. Steinberg, Environmental Control Technology for Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (New York: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1980). A more hopeful view is in Philip H. Abelson, Editorial: "Carbon Dioxide Emissions," Science 222 (1983): 1228.

48. The first extended discussion of the idea apparently was by Freeman Dyson, "Can We Control the Amount of Carbon Dioxide in the Atmosphere?," (unpublished manuscript, Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 1976).

49. D. Greenberg, "Sequestering" (unpublished manuscript prepared for the Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., 1982); and Gordon J. MacDonald, ed., The Long-Term Impacts of Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Levels (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1982).

50. Seidel and Keyes, Greenhouse Warming, 6/10-6/12. The origi- soft

      nal calculations are in J. Brewbaker, ed., "Giant Leucaena (Koa Haole) Energy Tree Farm" (Hawaii Natural Energy Institute, 1980).

51. Seidel and Keyes, Greenhouse Warming, 6/13.

52. The concept of injecting sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere is reviewed briefly in ibid., 6/13-6/14, and in greater detail in W. S. Broeker, J. H. Nuckolls, P. S. Connell, and J. Chang, "SO 2 : Backstop Against a Bad CO 2 Trip?" (unpublished manuscript, 1983).

53. See, for example, Lester B. Lave, "A More Feasible Social Response," Technology Review 84 (November-December 1981): 23, 28-31.

54. Roberts, "Global Climate Changes," 8.

55. Recent research on ice core samples has suggested that preindustrial carbon dioxide levels were at the extreme low end of those generally believed credible. See D. Raymond and J. M. Barnola, "An Antarctic Ice Core Reveals Atmospheric CO 2 Variations Over the Past Few Centuries," Nature 315 (1985): 309-11.

56. Compare Climate Research Board, 1979; with NRC, CO 2 and Climate; Revelle, "Carbon Dioxide"; NRC, Changing Climate; and Seidel and Keyes, Greenhouse Warming .

57. Don G. Scroggin and Robert H. Harris, "Reduction at the Source," Technology Review 84 (November-December 1981): 22, 24-28; quote from 26-27. Because the issue of concern is the total level of CO 2 in the atmosphere, stabilization at a given level can be achieved either by high releases for a short period or lower releases for a longer period. The latter obviously is the conservative option.

58. NRC, Changing Climate, 65.

59. J. Hansen, G. Russell, A. Lacis, I. Fung, D. Rind, and P. Stone, "Climate Response Times: Dependence on Climate Sensitivity and Ocean Mixing," Science 229 (1985): 857-859; quote from 857.

1. Todd R. LaPorte, "On the Design and Management of Nearly Error-Free Organizational Control Systems," in David L. Sills et al., eds., Accident at Three Mile Island: The Human Dimensions (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1982), 185-200.

2. Strictly speaking, containment can never be 100 percent certain; it is a matter of degree. Relevant experts can be more or less confident that containment will hold--but never absolutely sure. For small reactors and most rDNA experiments, most members of the relevant scientific community were very confident about containment. break

3. "Test Wrecks Reactor, Delights Researchers," Science 229 (1985): 538.

4. Aaron Wildavsky, "The Assessment of Safety Goals and Achievements in Complex Technological Systems: The Integration of Technological and Institutional Considerations" (unpublished manuscript prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 1983), 84.

5. See, for example, any issue of the journal Risk Analysis .

6. In his early works, Simon referred to the analytic approach variously as the classical, economic, or objectively rational approach to decision making; Lindblom called it the synoptic, root-and-branch, or analytic approach. See Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1947, 1957); "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 (1955): 99-118; and (with James March) Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958). See Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review 19 (1959): 79-88; and (with David Bray-brooke) A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963). Also see John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) for an excellent review and critique of what he calls "the analytic paradigm."

7. EV = P 1 V 1 + P 2 V 2  . . . + P n V n , where "EV" is the expected value of a given alternative, each numerical subscript refers to one of the consequences of the alternative, "P" to probability, and "V" to value.

8. There are many applications of the analytic strategy: decision tree, cost-benefit, and risk-benefit analyses are prominent examples.

      There are also many variations in the strategy itself. The utility maximization decision rule is, under certain conditions, replaced by minimax or maximin. The exhaustive search, in some variations, is limited to feasible alternatives. In other variations, where alternatives are simply assumed to be available, search is not a part of the process. Finally, the requirement that the likelihoods of consequences be estimated is frequently modified to require that subjective estimates of likelihoods be made and then revised as information becomes available.

9. In addition to the works already cited, see Amitai Etzioni, Social Problems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976); and Yzekiel Dror, Ventures in Policy Sciences (New York: American Elsevier, 1971).

10. For further discussion of this point, see the criticisms of the Rasmussen Report on reactor safety by an American Physical Society continue

      study group in "Report to the APS by the Study Group on Light Water Reactor Safety," Reviews of Modern Physics 47 (1975): suppl. no. 1.

11. See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, Probabilistic Risk Assessment: An Emerging Aid to Nuclear Power Plant Safety Regulation (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, June 19, 1985).

12. Other observers have been coming to similar conclusions. For example, Schmandt has noted that "regulatory science has not yet helped in setting priorities and rationalizing agency actions." He wants it to become "a tool for selecting and focusing on the most serious health and environmental dangers." See Jurgen Schmandt, "Regulation and Science," Science, Technology and Human Values 9 (1984): 23-38; quote from 33-34.

      For a related view, see Giandomenico Majone, "Science and Trans-Science in Standard Setting," Science, Technology, and Human Values 9 (1984): 15-21.

13. There has been some attention to variations in the institutional settings within which decisions are made. Lindblom's strategy, for example, is adapted to pluralistic, fragmented arenas. March and Simon's is intended for formal organizations in general, Steinbruner's for formal government organizations, and Cyert and March's for business organizations. Different institutions tend to tackle somewhat different types of problems, of course, but the correspondence is very loose.

14. A well-known example is the case of changes in Connecticut traffic laws that "caused" a spurious drop in accidents. See Donald T. Campbell, "Reforms as Experiments," American Psychologist 24 (1969): 409-20.

15. Todd R. LaPorte, ed., Organized Social Complexity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

      A good statement of the presumption about decomposability is in Herbert A. Simon, "The Architecture of Complexity," General Systems Yearbook 10 (1975): 63-76.

16. For risky technologies, problematic causal links are less of a problem than is the potential for catastrophe. If the severe consequences were to emerge, we would have a pretty fair idea of what caused them. Unclear causal links do complicate some of the issues, of course--such as the difficulty of linking observed temperature changes to CO 2 emissions or of tracing a health effect to a particular chemical.

17. Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1979). break

18. On the difficulties of quasi-experiments, see Walter Williams and Richard F. Elmore, Studying Implementation: Methodological and Administrative Issues (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1982).

19. See, for example, Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1971).

20. Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: a Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977).

21. For another effort to characterize decision problems, see David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963), 78.

22. A handful of other attempts have been made to think systematically about the structure of political problems and the need to match problem and strategy, including Ian Lustick, "Explaining the Variable Utility of Disjointed Incrementalism: Four Propositions," American Political Science Review 74 (1980), 342-53; Paul R. Schulman, Large-Scale Policy Making (New York: American Elsevier, 1980); and Robert Goodin and Ilmar Waldner, "Thinking Big, Thinking Small, and Not Thinking at All," Public Policy 27 (1979): 1-24.

1. On the recent criticisms, see Marjorie Sun, "Food Dyes Fuel Debate Over Delaney," Science 229 (1985): 739-41.

2. There is a large and growing literature on the subject of acceptable risk. An early statement was William W. Lowrance's, Of Acceptable Risk: Science and the Determination of Safety (Los Altos, Calif.: William Kaufman, 1976); a recent overview is William W. Lowrance's, Modern Science and Human Values (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). Also see Richard C. Schwing and Walter A. Albers, Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe Is Safe Enough? (New York: Plenum, 1980).

3. See, for example, A. V. Cohen and D. K. Pritchard, Comparative Risks of Electricity Production Systems: A Critical Survey of the Literature, Health and Safety Executive, Research Paper no. 11 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980).

4. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Safety Goal for Nuclear Power Plants: A Discussion Paper (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982).

5. Ibid., xi. break

4. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Safety Goal for Nuclear Power Plants: A Discussion Paper (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982).

5. Ibid., xi. break

6.

7. For a discussion of the uncertainty and associated controversy surrounding the size of the source term--the amount of fission products that escape in a serious accident--see "Source Terms: The New Reactor Safety Debate," Science News 127 (1984): 250-53.

8. For a typical example, see Edmund A. C. Crouch and Richard Wilson, Risk/Benefit Analysis (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1982).

9. J. G. U. Adams, " . . . And How Much for Your Grandmother?," reprinted in Steven E. Rhoads, ed., Valuing Life: Public Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 135-46.

10. Anthony V. Nero, Jr., "The Indoor Radon Story," Technology Review 89 (January 1986): 28-40.

11. This example is adapted from Table 6, p. 534, in E. P O'Donnell and J. J. Mauro, "A Cost-Benefit Comparison of Nuclear and Nonnuclear Health and Safety Protective Measures and Regulations," Nuclear Safety 20 (1979): 525-40. For a different analysis that makes the same basic point, see Crouch and Wilson, Risk/Benefit Analysis .

12. See, for example, the brief reference in NRC, Changing Climate , 4.

13. Alvin M. Weinberg and Irving Spiewak, "Inherently Safe Reactors and a Second Nuclear Era," Science 224 (1984): 1398-1402.

14. See NRDC v. Train , 8 ERC 2120 (D.D.C. 1976) and NRDC v. Costle , 12 ERC 1830 (D.D.C. 1979).

15. For a more extended analysis of this issue, see Giandomenico Majone, "Science and Trans-Science in Standard Setting."

16. NRC, Changing Climate , 3.

17. President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1979), 56.

18. Alvin M. Weinberg et al., "The Second Nuclear Era," research memorandum ORAU/IEA-84-(M) (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: Institute for Energy Analysis, February 1984), 57.

19. And there are other methods to promote learning. For example, one possible benefit of "energy parks," with a number of reactors close together, is that learning could occur via informal contacts among personnel; see Alvin M. Weinberg, "Nuclear Safety and Public Acceptance," presented at the International ENS/ANS Con- soft

      Cycles, Brussels, April 30, 1982.

20. On the Bhopal incident, see the special issue of Chemical and Engineering News 63 (February 11, 1985), and the investigative reports in The New York Times , January 28 through February 3, 1985.

21. Stuart Diamond, "Carbide Asserts String of Errors Caused Gas Leak," The New York Times , August 24, 1985, 1.

22. For an overview of chemical plant safety issues, see Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 101-22.

23. Lewis Mumford, The Pentagon of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 410.

24. Jacques Ellul, The Technological System (New York: Continuum, 1980), 117.

25. Albert Schweitzer, quoted in Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), v. break