1. The theme is Hegel's, of course. But one of the boldest and most sympathetic applications appears in Michel Foucault's "What Is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984). Foucault treats Kant's apriorism as the deliberate posit of a genealogical reflection—quite an ingenious maneuver.

2. In the Anglo-American analytic literature, the single clearest specimen of postmodernism appears in Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," in Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). Rorty's dismissal of legitimative questions rests on two themes: first, that any legitimation implicates some indefensible form of cognitive privilege (notably, something like Kant's transcendental reasoning); second, that the pretense of legitimation is itself little more than the effect of some socially entrenched form of hegemonic power. Rorty traces these themes in his influential Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), but you will look in vain for a supporting argument. (Remember Protepticus! ) What is important, here, is to grasp the strong convergence (less than agreement) between Rorty and Donald Davidson. See Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," also in the LePore volume. This confirms the sense in which postmodernism (Rorty) and naturalism (Davidson) converge. Late twentieth-century American (analytic) philosophy, I should say, hovers somewhere between Rorty's and Davidson's views. The best-known pop version of postmodernism, from continental Europe, takes an outrageous form in Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). The interesting thing about the second theme mentioned is that it converges somewhat

with the poststructuralist ( not postmodernist) thesis of pouvoir/savoir offered by Michel Foucault, for instance in "Truth and Power," in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon, 1980). Foucault's thesis affirms that every historical "regime" for determining what is to count as admissible truths arises from a society's contingent form of life. But, against postmodernism's complaint, pouvoir/savoir plays no criterial (second-order) or (naturalized) causal role (although it provides for causal questions), and it neither dismisses legitimative questions nor insists on cognitive privilege. Saying so marks a distinct lacuna in both postmodernism and naturalism and indicates a third option (which this primer favors).

3. The important point here is that postmodernism and poststructuralism are radically different but easily confused. The reason for insisting on the difference is that it signifies the convergent themes of recent Anglo-American and continental European thought, despite their relative isolation from each other. Curiously, the difference between the two is most conveniently marked in two slim volumes of Jean-françois Lyotard's: The Postmodern Condition and The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges van den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). The difference may be put this way: postmodernism opposes all forms of legitimation; poststructuralism pursues all discursive contexts in which l'autre (the "other") is implicated. By the "other" is meant conceptual categories, possible or actual, that are marginalized, precluded, exploited in terms of social power, or the like, within any discursive (or political or legal or similar) "space." The idea behind postmodernism is that legitimation is illicit; the idea behind poststructuralism is that no single conceptual scheme can be expected to accommodate all possible or all viable conceptual schemes. That is in fact the meaning of pouvoir/savoir .

4. I give notice here that I shall bring the theorem into play later. But, together with (1.5), it draws attention to the lacuna in arguments like Rorty's, which fail to recognize that legitimative arguments cannot be privileged (in Kant's or Descartes's or Husserl's way) and cannot be discounted as merely hegemonic. I mean to clear a space, therefore, for the argument that follows. It is surprising how many analytic thinkers believe that Rorty has mounted an argument that must be met. The matter is important enough to flag. It bears on the philosophical prospects of naturalism, which will occupy us later. Rorty's failure to produce an argument may be gleaned from his paper, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" in Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). As we shall see much later, the matter affects the fortunes of "naturalizing" philosophies.

1. What I am calling Aristotle's archism is the most strenuous, most unyielding, candidate theory in Western philosophy in favor of first principles: Aristotle holds that one cannot speak of what is real or have any knowledge of reality if one does not subscribe to the doctrine he advances. The claim is straightforwardly stated in Metaphysics, particularly in Book Gamma. What

Socrates says in Phaedrus regarding the "self-moving" mover may be taken to mark Plato's counterpart conjecture about first principles, just as the dictum "what is, is; and what is not, is not" marks Parmenides's judgment. In this sense, classical philosophy converges very strongly in the direction I have indicated. The history of philosophy, I suggest, is largely occupied with replacing Aristotle's first principle with others. You would be quite surprised to see how frequently such maneuvers still obtain in contemporary philosophy. For example, in an account very well received among analytic philosophers of science, Wesley Salmon explicitly follows Aristotle's archic thesis (in Posterior Analytics ) in his own strong theory of the laws of nature. See his Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Compare Carl G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965), which, although somewhat inexplicitly, is committed to the same thesis. One can also find contemporary formulations that are not "analytic" that are analogues of Aristotle's claim: for instance, in Stanley Rosen, ''Theory and Interpretation," in Hermeneutics as Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). I offer these merely as specimen views. The important thing is that such modal claims are nowhere defended: they are simply affirmed where useful. If they are offered as conceptual truths, then, for one thing, they cannot be more strenuous than Aristotle's claim; for another, they are as easily defeated by virtue of the plain fact that their denial is not demonstrably self-contradictory. If they are offered as truths about some sector of reality, then, on their face, they cannot be as strong as claims of conceptual necessity and they cannot be pertinently tested if it is not explained how that may be done. I know of no plausible instruction of this sort. Also, if I'm not mistaken, nothing substantive is lost by giving up such claims, except the bare notion of modal necessity itself. Much later in this primer, the contemporary doctrine of "supervenience" will surface. It is another analogue of Aristotle's claim.

2. For a recent specimen view sympathetic to Aristotle's archism in this regard, see Roderick M. Chisholm, On Metaphysics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).

3. See Michael Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). I regard Dummett's effort to disjoin metaphysics and semantics and to assign epistemic priority to the second over the first as providing a very clear specimen of what, very shortly, I shall term "externalism." In effect, this is to deny theorem (2.4). Dummett advances his proposal in a noticeably quiet way, but he gives no compelling argument. On the thesis I am developing, Dummett's general strategy is characteristic of a great deal of recent analytic philosophy. Dummett himself is ineluctably drawn to some inexplicit "first principle," some modal claim he nowhere explains. The evidence lies, I think, with his insisting on tertium non datur, after (apparently) challenging the principle of bivalence. I shall return to the issue very soon in this chapter and in a number of other places. See Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978). The issue will arise also in the context of considering Dummett and Hilary Putnam together.

4. Contemporary analytic epistemologies are almost always externalist, and naturalism is the dominant form of externalism at the present time. We are touching here on the essential themes of current analytic philosophy. For the moment, you will find a general impression of the new "naturalism" in Philip Kitcher, "The Naturalists Return," Philosophical Review, 101 (1992). The topic is of the greatest strategic importance: I return to it again and again in this primer. The best-known (analytic) opponent of externalism and naturalism is Hilary Putnam. See, for instance, The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle: Open Court, 1987).

5. See G. E. Moore, "Refutation of Idealism," Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922).

6. I find it impossible to reconcile in this regard W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), and Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960). The "Two Dogmas" paper seems to admit of no exceptions, and Word and Object insists on exceptions, namely, on whatever is logically prior to the play of "analytic hypotheses.''

7. Most briefly put, externalism and naturalism violate the theorem. Doing that, they lead back to all the forms of privilege and archic claims, whether they take a naturalist or a postmodernist form—to remind ourselves of references (in chapter 1) to Rorty and Davidson. On my reading, Immanuel Kant—who is not an externalist—nevertheless confirms the sense in which externalists need not be naturalists. I am running ahead of my story, but only in the interest of drawing attention to the gathering line of argument. The doctrine of symbiosis, I suggest, first appears in its distinctive form among the post-Kantian German Idealists, notably Fichte and Hegel. It is true that Kant construes the phenomenal world (to which we are cognitively confined) as a "construction," which, on Kant's theory, depends on the joint work of our understanding and whatever we passively receive from the independent world. That theory, I claim, is ultimately inconsistent, since, although we are thus confined, Kant is (somehow) able to determine what the a priori contribution of our subjective understanding is. I take that to be inadmissible on Kant's own conditions. Otherwise, Kant knows more about the noumenal world than he admits, and certainly more than he is entitled to admit. The German Idealists solved the problem by advocating a form of symbiosis: that is, first, by insisting that cognitive success presupposes an indissoluble internal relation between perceiving and what is perceived; and, second, by repudiating any principled disjunction between the real and the phenomenal. Kant fails in this regard, as may be seen from the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason . See Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, corr. (London: Macmillan, 1953). As will become clear, I regard this failure on Kant's part, and its correction by the Idealists, as leading directly to the theme of historicity—the postulate of this primer. Thus seen, naturalism and externalism prove to be regressive theories—"pre-Kantian," I should say. (I return to the issue later in these notes.)

8. I take this to be the mark of both Kant's and Husserl's philosophies. In fact, it marks the respect in which Husserl's philosophy is more Kantian than it would care to admit. See, for instance, Edmund Husserl's early essay, The Idea

of Phenomenology, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964). The correction of his earlier view favoring "psychologism" (the effect of Frege's critique of his Philosophy of Arithmetic ) signifies the sense in which Husserl distances himself from Kant ("naturalism") but yet remains drawn to Kant ("apriorism''). Husserl never managed to resolve the conceptual puzzle of the relationship between the "psychological" and the "subjective": were these notions meant to be disjoint or overlapping or (indeed) the same cognitive power (however differently applied); and, were they solipsistic, generic, socially shared, or sui generis? Husserl's failure to define the distinction satisfactorily (that is, to his own satisfaction) confirms the difficulty of overcoming a Kantian-like reading of his phenomenological project—against his own intentions. Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorian Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), marks his most promising resolution of the problem. Hegel is the principal philosopher committed to both a constructivist view of phenomenal reality and symbiosis. See G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). In our own late age, the Hegelian theme reappears in a pared-down form in John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, enlarged ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), particularly where Dewey opposes the "spectator theory," and in Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. (New York: Vintage Press, 1970), particularly where Foucault introduces the "historical a priori ." Dewey, I may say, distances himself from Hegel—possibly in reaction to Russell's provocation—by opposing what he calls "block universe monisms" (that is, an insuperable and all-inclusive holism: following the line of Peirce's criticism of Hegel). He insists (justifiably) on his "pluralism" (against Russell). A sympathetic reading of Hegel would confirm that Dewey remains a (remote) Hegelian and that Hegel was not a "Hegelian" of Russell's (or, of F. H. Bradley's) sort. See John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey, 2d ed. (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1951).

9. In my opinion, the most extreme experiment along these lines appears in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968). Merleau-Ponty loses control of his interesting effort to undermine the Cartesian idiom. I should say that he fails to distinguish satisfactorily between the "external" and "externalist" features of discourse.

10. I use the term in Gadamer's ingenious sense, that is, in accord with his interpretation of " Vorurteil ." On Gadamer's view, "prejudiced" = "prejudged" in the sense of what is "preformed" for judgment (tacit, often unconscious). See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. from 2d ed. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). In this sense, the argument is being prepared for the introduction of the historicist thesis, but the qualification does not yet entail it. I do not intend, however, to commit myself to Gadamer's particular theories.

11. Without prejudice to his preference for physicalist and extensionalist doctrines, I signal here my general acceptance of Quine's rejection of any principled disjunction between de re and de dicto distinctions (which I treat sym-

biotically), as well as Quine's rejection of any principled account of the analytic/synthetic distinction (for much the same reason). Quine's conception of "analytical hypotheses" is rather close to something like symbiosis, except that Quine nowhere explains how he arrives at his extensionalism or how he justifiably restricts the applicability of "analytical hypotheses." See Quine, Word and Object and ''Two Dogmas of Empiricism." Symbiosis would have entailed that "analytical hypotheses" obtain everywhere in discourse. Quine demurs.

12. Understandably, many suppose that Dummett is, in rejecting excluded middle, raising doubts about bivalence. I should say that that is very far from the truth. Dummett never challenges bivalence in any alethic sense, he merely challenges excluded middle methodologically (see note 3, above). There is no sustained challenge to bivalence in the analytic tradition; here and there, there are considerations regarding supplementary alethic resources.

13. Peirce offers a most ingenious and plausible account of conditions under which neither noncontradiction nor excluded middle have application in certain discursive contexts. Peirce ultimately overrides the potential danger of this concession (as he sees matters) by way of his strong evolutionism. But the thesis stands, even if we reject Peirce's teleological reading of evolution. Peirce's argument concerns the possibility of real indeterminacy and real vagueness, which would have been useful in the context of speaking of human culture. The issue bears on Peirce's conception of Thirdness. See Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), vol. 5.

1. I take the term pretty well in Austin's original sense, although Austin's distinction between the "constative" and the "performative" led him into an impasse. See J. L. Austin's "Performative-Constative," trans. G. J. Warnock, in Charles E. Caton (ed.), Philosophy and Ordinary Language (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963). Together with P. F. Strawson's "On Referring," Mind 19 (1950), and Austin's How To Do Things With Words (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962), it marks the principal line of opposition to the treatment of sentences as relatively freestanding, contextless bearers of truth and meaning—the dominant model of analytic philosophy favored by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, Alfred Tarski, R. M. Hare, Michael Dummett, and Donald Davidson. John R. Searle is an interesting hybrid among these philosophers. In his Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), Searle favors the speech-act model but actually neutralizes the point of its opposition to the sentential model by treating the "constative" (or "assertive") function more or less as the work of an external "assertion operator" (or "sign"). Effectively, this is Frege's preference: Searle treats speech acts as the production of token sentences. Hence, despite appearances, Searle is not actually committed to Austin's or Strawson's model. The decisive evidence concerns the "act" of reference, for, on a full-blown speech-act model, there are no isolabsle sentences in which the referring function can be discerned . That is also the point of sStrawson's devastating critique of Bertrand Russell's immensely

influential paper, "On Denoting," Mind 14 (1905). It marks the fundamental difference between the denoting function of expressions in sentences and the referring function of sentences in speech-act contexts. In this same sense, the quarrel leads directly to the contextedness of speech acts themselves in the even larger nonlinguistic practices of a viable society— which practices also bear on the meaning of what is uttered as sentences; hence, the quarrel leads directly to the confirmation of the symbiosis thesis (see (3.2).) A similar argument may be mounted for predication. The argument undermines the entire presumption of the autonomy of language.

2. Davidson's is one of the best-known attempts, in the analytic literature, to bring the troublesome complications of context and normally assigned speech acts within the terms of a sentential model, thereby combining in a new way elements of Tarski's account of truth and Frege's original motivation. See Donald Davidson, "Eternal and Ephemeral Events," in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980). See also his contribution to the symposium, "On Events and Event-Descriptions," in Joseph Margolis (ed.), Fact and Existence (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), and "Moods and Performances," Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). A careful reading will confirm how difficult and contorted the effort is obliged to be. I offer it as a specimen only. Even greater difficulties appear in Jaegwon Kim, "Events as Property Exemplification,'' in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

3. See Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference," trans. Max Black, in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960); compare with Frege's considerably earlier Begriffsschrift, trans. P. T. Geach, in the same volume. See, also, Bertrand Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," in Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1912). Frege seems to have speculated along ontological lines, but almost not at all along epistemological lines. Russell's account is rather heroic but betrays the impossibility of anything like an empiricist account of denotata . (Russell's account is, in fact, solipsistic.) But if, as I say, reference is intended in an epistemically effective way, then the various sentential (or sententially grounded) models Frege and Russell spawned cannot possibly satisfy us on reference. The most important payoff of this line of reasoning is, in my opinion, the complete subversion of Quine's famous resolution of the referring use of proper names, in Word and Object . I shall come to it in a moment. See, also, R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952).

4. There is a very pretty demonstration of the validity of this Leibnizian theme in Max Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," in Problems of Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954). I cannot see how Black's argument (which is restricted to metaphysical possibilities) can be resisted. But if you allow it, and if you concede that natural-language reference is essentially occupied with epistemic success, then the hopelessness of Quine's proposal stares you in the face. Of course, Quine cannot have been unaware of Leibniz's original finding along the same lines.

5. See Saul A. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" (with Addenda), in Donald

Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, 2d ed. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972). See, also, Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), ch. 3. Here, Putnam either clarifies, or retreats from, his (and Kripke's) apparent earlier commitment to the causal theory of reference.

6. The expression ( Lebensformen ) appears rather sparely in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: MacMillan, 1953). I find its full epistemic import much clearer in Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969). The idea seems to have been original with Wittgenstein, one of his numerous stunning inventions as an outsider in the Cambridge philosophical world. Certainly there is nothing in Russell or Moore to suggest the theme. On my own reading, it affords a very plausible bridge between the thin themes of the analytic speech-act model of language (although that is hardly its primary intention) and the "thicker" cultural themes of continental philosophy: Hegelian, Marxist, phenomenological, hermeneutic (although there is no basis for treating Wittgenstein's view as borrowed in any sense). The main fault with the idea lies with its complete lack of interest in the historical dimension of human life. Viewing it thus, I simply make (a practical) use of Wittgenstein's notion as a distant but congenial approximation to the post-Kantian Idealist themes mentioned earlier. That, of course, was never in Wittgenstein's mind. So I use Wittgenstein's idea in a way it was never intended for. See, also, Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: Free Press, 1990). In good part, my reason is due to the fact that analytic philosophy has learned to tolerate the idea of collective practices in Wittgenstein but not in Hegel. For an appreciation of Russell's and Moore's impact on analytic philosophy, see A. J. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage, 1954), ch. 2.

7. I cannot emphasize enough how extraordinarily important Wittgenstein's insight is here. The key passage, in Investigations, is probably I, § 202. See Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages: An Elementary Exposition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). My thought is this: "obeying a rule" is an indissoluble idiom—to be treated monadically, not relationally, so that, in the lebensformlich sense, it does not follow that, in obeying a rule, there is a rule that one follows (construed relationally). Skepticism (here) is the solipsistic thesis that the seemingly collective practice ( Lebensform ) can be analyzed in terms of a convergent aggregative pattern of individual speakers' obeying a rule (bringing their speech into conformity with a rule—by consulting the rule they intend to conform with). Wittgenstein demonstrates the inherent "informality" of natural language, its not being algorithmically ordered. To offer a rule that, in ordinary linguistic practice, we may be said to "follow'' is to interpret the practice we are "following": you may find such a formulation an apt "description" of our practice. But we are not bound in any conceptual regard by any such rules in following our practice; there may be alternative such rules proposed and judged perspicuous; and the continuation of our practice will invite replacing such interpretations by others. What is re-

quired is the analysis of a (collective) practice, not (solipsistic) rules that, aggregatively, somehow form a practice.

8. For a well-known and careful account of " Lebensform, " see Newton Garver, "Naturalism and Transcendentality: The Case of 'Form of Life'," in Souren Teghrarian (ed.), Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1994). I regard Garver's reading as quite reliable, even if open to dispute. But I depart from his reading on philosophical, not textual, grounds.

9. Both Davidson and Fodor offer, without any supporting argument that I have been able to find, very strong extensional programs: of truth and meaning (Davidson) and of predicative concepts (Fodor). See, for instance, Donald Davidson, "In Defense of Convention T" and "Semantics for Natural Languages," both in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation; and Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), and Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981). I don't deny that each has a rationale for his particular account, but I don't find an actual demonstration of the validity of their respective undertakings. (And, of course, as I argue, both fail.)

10. Peirce identifies the notion as the "doctrine of scholastic realism," in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 5. But he pursues it in an extremely interesting way: in terms of his distinction between "exists" and "is real"—which also bears on his fundamental contrast between Secondness and Thirdness. As a consequence, although he admits real generality, he denies the existence of universals. I follow Peirce here, but I also find Peirce unsatisfactory in accounting for the operation of Thirdness in nature, apart from human minds . In this sense, Peirce is more Kantian than Hegelian: ultimately, he favors a curiously teleologized form of Kantian externalism. It may just be that it is this last theme that informs Putnam's internal realism and attracts him to Jürgen Habermas's philosophy. Both Putnam and Habermas are Peirceans who are in some sense close to Peirce's teleologism. (This is not the place to pursue the question, but it will come within our ken shortly.)

11. To appreciate Aristotle's concept, one must compare Metaphysics, Posterior Analytics, and De Anima . My own sense is that Aristotle "fits" the theory of nous to whatever he requires for his archism. He offers no genuinely independent epistemic analysis. In whatever sense his account might compare favorably with medieval accounts of "real generals," Aristotle has almost nothing to say about the actual epistemic process. Aristotle speaks only of the fait accompli . That may serve as a clue as to why the solution to the problem of "generality" cannot be successfully managed except in terms of lebensformlich practices. I return to the issue later.

12. The best-known contemporary nominalist is surely Nelson Goodman. You will find two sides to Goodman: for one thing, Goodman nowhere discusses nominalism in specifically epistemic terms—which of course is what is wanted; for another, when he suggests that nominalism is sufficient in cognitive contexts, he himself always betrays a "conceptualist" orientation (that is, an incipient "realism"), which he never explains. See, for instance, Nelson Goodman, "Seven

Strictures on Similarity," in Lawrence Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience & Theory (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970).

13. The phrasing is Pears's. I borrow it gladly. Pears's account helps to mark (though that is not its intention) the limitation of the analytic account of universals: Pears rightly sees the reductio of attempting to ensure a realism of universals along epistemic lines; but he does not consider the terms under which the problem can be solved. I suggest we treat Pears's account as a paradigm of the relative fruitfulness of an "externalist" and an "internalist" (or symbiotized) treatment of epistemic matters. See D. F. Pears, "Universals," Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1951).

14. The terms are Putnam's and are clearly demarcated in Hilary Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). The book represents a phase in Putnam's passage from his early days as a scientific realist (committed to the unity of science program), to his implicit acknowledgement of the defeat of his "Kantian" thesis in The Many Faces of Realism, where the principled distinction between the "subjective" and the "objective" is finally admitted to be untenable. This should have committed Putnam to a strong form of symbiosis, but he resists the final phase of his own theoretical slide. The issue catches up his debate with Michael Dummett, who has (as already remarked) never relented on his own externalism. I am bound to add that Popper, Putnam, Karl-Otto Apel, and Jürgen Habermas are all Peirceans and are either explicitly Kantian (as is Peirce) or are eccentrically linked to the Kantian conception. Popper may be the most difficult to place in this regard. But see Karl R. Popper, "Epistemology without a Knowing Subject,'' in Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972). On the "regulative" function of truth, Putnam and Popper are surprisingly close. See Karl R. Popper, Realism and the Aim of Science, ed. W. W. Bartley III (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), ch. 1.

15. The seriousness of Kant's difficulties in precluding the intrusion of the noumenal are not widely acknowledged in analytic philosophy. They bear decisively on the prospects for reinterpreting Kant in a way that is both pertinent to the perceived constraints on contemporary philosophy and on remaining true to Kant's first Critique . See, for instance, Kant's well-known letter (February 21, 1772) to Markus Herz. It appears in Immanuel Kants Werke, herausg. Ernst Cassirer: Band IX ( Briefe von und an Kant, Erster Teil, 1744-1789) (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1918). Together with the preface to the second edition of the first Critique, it pinpoints an essential feature of Kant's "Copernican revolution": viz., that the pure forms of the understanding are not abstracted from empirical phenomena. Of course, they could not be, one may imagine someone saying, if they are to be a priori, necessary. But the importance of this admission is regularly ignored. The usual maneuver among contemporary "Kantians" is to construe the first Critique in terms of the accommodating themes of the third Critique . See Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason . Perhaps the most serious and sustained effort along these lines is that of Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 3 vols., trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953, 1955, 1957). Habermas's resolution is, I should say, more characteristic of contemporary tastes, but it is an obviously failed program.

I shall return to it much later in these notes. What becomes clear is the attenuation of Kantian apriorism: we cannot say what "necessity" means under the condition of evolving sciences (biology, in Cassirer's case) or rational inquiry in general (in Habermas and Putnam); and, we cannot tell whether the sense of necessity is itself an artifact of our evolving history (as it appears to be in Habermas). The two likeliest efforts to save the Kantian theme (the theme of the first Critique ), under concessions to the history of an evolving science (and more), cannot but fail: the first is a teleologized evolution in which rational conjecture moves self-correctively toward what is necessary at the limit (Peirce's "long run"); the other is a reliably self-corrective regulative notion of truth that persists discernibly through all change (Putnam's Grenzbegriff ). See, for instance, Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Richard Rorty, "Putnam and the Menace of Relativism," Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993). Only some form of symbiosis can escape the Kantian dilemma—by rejecting it. This is the point of theorem (3.15): ''real generals" must be lebensformlich ((3.17)). This is why Cassirer yields in the direction of Hegel, all the while he tries to put his thesis in loyal Kantian terms. I believe the effort cannot succeed: apriorism must be abandoned.

16. See G. E. Moore, "Refutation of Idealism," in Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922). Moore's essay has been extraordinarily influential. It counts as one of the exemplars of the new analytic spirit Moore and Russell "imposed" on British philosophy (and, in effect, on early American analytic philosophy). It also shows how to emasculate Kant so that what may be salvaged makes Kantian philosophy appear to be not terribly different from "pre-Kantian" thought.

17. Tarski is well known for a celebrated treatment of truth along strong extensionalist lines. But Tarski was quite aware that his theory was not philosophically "neutral," contrary to what both Davidson and Putnam have claimed. He was rather doubtful that it would ever rightly apply to more than a very small fraction of natural language. In fact, Tarski doubted that it could apply to formalized languages without being severely restricted. Also, whatever initial optimism Tarski felt about the prospects for applying his account to natural languages, he soon confessed that they must be slimmer than he had originally supposed. For his part, Davidson has applied Tarski to natural language without restriction, but he has never demonstrated (with anything like Tarski's analytic care) how the model would work; he also insists, of course, that Tarski's account is philosophically neutral. But that would mean that natural languages were, in principle, extensionally structured —which is hardly obvious. Tarski seems to have been troubled by Davidson's use of the "semantic conception." See Alfred Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages," in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, 2d ed., trans. J. W. Woodger, ed. John Corcoran (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983). (Note the Postscript.) (I have been led to appreciate Tarski's unease by a private communication.)

1. This of course is the general theorem under which, in effect, Aristotle's archism was opposed. In its modern form, that archism is rightly viewed as

Fregean. See, for instance, Robert C. Stalnaker, Inquiry (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984). It also explains my reasons for opposing Michael Dummett's recovery of tertium non datur, in Truth and Other Enigmas . The important point is to see how plausible the resistance to bivalence may be made within the terms of symbiosis, and how arbitrary the insistence on bivalence will appear from the same vantage. It explains why bivalence is so often linked to externalism (as, indeed, it is in Dummett).

2. The remark is Quine's. It is a baffling admission, chiefly because it appears to concede "truth-value gaps" relative to Quine's holism—which it then denies; but, presumably, it cannot treat such an admission (or denial) as principled, since that would violate Quine's attack on the so-called analytic/synthetic "dogma." It also appears to require a principled disjunction between the epistemic treatment of "holophrastic" sentences and sentences "parsed" in terms of some form of ''ontic commitment," about which, apparently, there is "no fact of the matter." It is extremely difficult, to say the least, to reconcile these notions plausibly, and yet Quine nowhere provides a rationale. See Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Word and Object, and Pursuit of Truth, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). The failure of Quine's program, here, signifies the absence of any compelling objections, in analytic philosophy, against restricting or abandoning bivalence. That is an extraordinarily important finding. I do not say there are no other lines of objection, but the arbitrariness of Dummett's alternative suggests very strongly that the Fregean line lacks a sufficient rationale for its restrictions. Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Rorty, and Dummett are all Fregeans in this regard.

3. Hempel's account is standard. Probabilized values are qualified (non-detachably) in an evidentiary way, but, in principle, they are said to presuppose the usual bivalence. So relativistic values are utterly different from probabilistic values. See Carl G. Hempel, "Inductive Inconsistencies," in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965).

4. This is in effect the charge Plato has Socrates bring against Protagoras in Theaetetus . The passage has never been satisfactorily interpreted, unless along the lines of self-referential paradox, which makes Protagoras an idiot in logical matters. The extraordinary thing is that Plato's summary is very close to the argument contemporary opponents of relativism invoke—notably Putnam, in The Many Faces of Realism . I see no reason to read Protagoras as Plato does, and I see no reason to believe, with Putnam, that no relativism can escape the paradox. The issue bears on my own (tendentious) distinction between "relationalism" (the offending doctrine) and what I call "robust relativism." See, further, Joseph Margolis, The Truth about Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).

5. There is no logical difficulty with the doctrine of internal relations, so long as it does not play a criterial or epistemically operative role of its own. It is in fact ineluctable wherever we speak of the meanings of linguistic utterances or of cultural phenomena (or, I may add, of rationality and the like). Surely, whatever linguistic, semiotic, significative, or related function may be assigned language, determinate meanings are discerned only within some holistic "con-

ceptual space" (as we say). (I am speaking loosely here. But the idea is that meaning, significance, and the like cannot be disjoined from rationality. I return to the idea later.) The idea marks the difference between the physical and the human sciences. In any case, the point counts against F. H. Bradley, Principles of Logic, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1922), and fixes Bertrand Russell's correct motivation (opposing the epistemic function of holism) in dismissing the abuses of British Hegelianism. See Bertrand Russell, "The Monistic Theory of Truth," in Philosophical Essays (London: Longmans, Green, 1910). But it has no bearing, as such, on the fortunes of historicizing thought (as among the Hegelians or the American pragmatists). That is an irony. (Of course, Hegel was never a British Hegelian.) I take all this to go to the same point, however unlikely it may seem, that is at stake in Jacques Derrida's "deconstruction" of French structuralism (in particular, of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss). See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974). It suggests a basis for admitting Derrida's philosophical skills, so often arbitrarily discounted in the Anglo-American practice. Derrida is fatiguing, but I do not regard that as a philosophical objection.

6. There is a very curious appeal to Wittgensteinian Lebensformen, bearing on rules and rule-following, that relates (eccentrically) to the realist/idealist issue, in Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Languages: An Elementary Exposition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). Kripke manages to turn Wittgenstein on his head, thus finding support for a form of skepticism about rules. Many have found Kripke's account wrongheaded, in that it does not really attend to what is entailed by admitting Lebensformen . But the matter has been brought to bear on the relation between realism, idealism, and anti-realism (in Dummett's sense). See, further, John McDowell, "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule," Synthese 58 (1984), and "Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding," in H. Parret and J. Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and Understanding (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981). See, also, Crispin Wright, "Kripke's Account of the Argument against Private Language," Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), and Realism, Meaning and Truth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

7. Neurath seems to have scotched positivism almost at its inception, by demonstrating that there is no principled distinction between such sentences and any other first-person reports of experience (or Erlebnisse )—either logically or epistemically. Positivism failed in its "Cartesian" presumption quite apart from its hapless treatment of the puzzles of meaning and truth. See Otto Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," trans. George Schick, in A. J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959).

8. I read Foucault as offering a very natural unceremonious way of Hegelianizing Kant's ( a fortiori, Husserl's) philosophy: not to dismiss the Kantian theme but to neutralize its modal presumption. This is the force of Foucault's extraordinary essay, "What Is Enlightenment?" It affords an implicit interpretation of Foucault's notion, the "historical a priori, " which appears in The Order of Things . I believe it undermines Habermas's critique of Foucault—indeed, Habermas's entire review of Hegel and post-Hegelian philosophy. See Jürgen

Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).

9. I associate the phrasing with Derrida's dictum: "il n'y a pas de horstexte," which appears in Of Grammatology . It is, I think, Derrida's principal philosophical doctrine— not a form of deconstruction at all—and it is meant in a "post-Kantian" sense. But Derrida's handling of the doctrine is too florid for analytic tastes. I am trying to recover its import here in an "acceptable" way ((4.17)). It appears (implicitly) in the work of Roland Barthes as well (who was influenced in this regard by the younger Derrida). See Roland Barthes, "From Work to Text,'' in Image Music Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977).

10. I return here to the convergence of Davidson's naturalism and Rorty's postmodernism. That convergence is dubbed, by Rorty himself, as the new pragmatism . The pertinent texts are these: Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge"; and Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth." To grant (4.19) is, effectively, to dismiss, for cause, both Rorty's postmodernism (and postmodernism itself) and Davidson's naturalism (but not naturalism as such).

11. See St. Thomas's definition of truth, which, although suggestive and justly famous, requires a strenuous metaphysics and is not reconcilable with symbiosis: "The true is in the intellect insofar as it is conformed to the object understood" (adequation of thing and thought), in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vol. 1 (Westminister: Christian Classics, 1980), I ^a Q. 16. For James's notorious pragmatist definition and a sensible recovery, see William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (London: Longmans, Green, 1907), and The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to "Pragmatism" (London: Longmans, Green, 1909). James and Aquinas obviously hold very different theories, but what they confirm is the suspicion that, apart from "some apt" relationship between the cognizing mind and the cognized world, there is nothing one can say about truth except what conforms with particular theories of our understanding of the world. We cannot rely on the meaning of truth, for that is the very prize at stake in our competing theories. There is no assured or neutral account that could function criterially .

12. Quine subscribes to the doctrine in Pursuit of Truth . Rorty follows Quine here, in "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," but wrongly believes Davidson does as well. Davidson is tempted to read Tarski's "semantic conception of truth" as merely disquotational but resists the idea, in "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge." The whole point of its advocacy—or of any similar conception—is, ultimately, to preclude the need for any legitimative account of truth. This is in fact the purpose of Davidson's essay, which seeks to gain the same end "by other means." Accordingly, it is an important plank in naturalism's boat.

13. Quine is very clear (against Davidson) about the impossibility of avoiding regular reinterpretations of the accomplishments of science. Given only science's history, neither Davidson's nor Rorty's rejection of "interpretive tertia " makes good sense. See. W. V. Quine, "Postscript on Metaphor," in Theories and Things (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). See, also, for a con-

gruent specimen of recent views about the history of science, Paul Thagard, Conceptual Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); also, more adventurously, Karin D. Knorr, The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981).

14. I deliberately use Quine's term here (from Word and Object ) in order to replace Quine's sense of it in the context of his "indeterminacy of translation" thesis with another that fits the symbiosis doctrine I prefer. In this way, all of Quine's doubtful commitments can be discharged and can be seen to be reasonably dismissed. I take the essential defect of Quine's account (in this regard) to lie with his disjunctive treatment of interpretation, "analytical hypothesis," "ontic commitment," and the like—in a word, parsing —in terms of terms treated as artifactually assigned to antecedently specified ''holophrastic" sentences . But there are no sentences without words and no words without sentences. See Quine, Word and Object and Pursuit of Truth .

1. In their heyday, sense-data theories were the principal exemplars of theories of perception and of first-order knowledge possessing "foundationalist" standing. They dominated the analytic epistemologies of the first half of the twentieth century and have now nearly all disappeared. One reason is that it was discovered that sense data could not be individuated and reidentified except, dependently, by being indexed to the very "material objects" they were meant to replace. See, for instance, Wilfrid Sellars, "Phenomenalism," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963); also, J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, reconstructed by G. J. Warnock (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962). Very nearly the only version of the sense-datum (-like) theory still championed among analytic philosophers is that offered by Roderick Chisholm. Chisholm's thesis is an "adverbial" variant, which is to say, it begins with the "self-presenting" states of cognizing subjects, thereby escaping the aporia of the other versions. Nevertheless, it also requires an explanation of the relationship between such states and the real world in order to build (as Chisholm intends) a theory of knowledge of the independent world. Chisholm's may be the last of these theories: much admired for its skill but ultimately too implausible, too remote, too risky a methodological basis for, say, the palpable achievements of the empirical sciences. See Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), and Theory of Knowledge, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977). Sense-data theories of the first sort were very much favored by the Positivists, who had grave difficulties with attempts to ensure their meaningfulness (apart from Neurath's challenge to Protollsätze ). The attempt to find the right formula may be traced through A. J. Ayer's numerous accounts (all failed): for instance, The Problem of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1956), ch. 3. The more methodological difficulties are adumbrated in Carl G. Hempel, "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes" and "Postscript (1964)," in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New

York: Free Press, 1965). The general foundationalist theory of knowledge is analyzed in Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974). The most famous sense-datum theory is probably that offered by H. H. Price, Perception, 2d ed. rev. (London: Methuen, 1950).

2. Wittgenstein's analysis shows conclusively that Moore's attempt to recover a "Cartesian" source of epistemic certainty was uncompelling. In his remarkably effective way, Wittgenstein subverts the foundationalist presumption of all externalist accounts of knowledge and, at the same time, shows how abandoning foundationalism does not entail skepticism, if only the reliability (not secured criterially—hence, not secured in the Cartesian sense) is grounded in a lebensformlich way. See Wittgenstein, On Certainty . On my reading, the diverse lines of criticism offered by Neurath, Sellars, Austin, and Wittgenstein converge in preparing a ground for a symbiotized account of cognition, but they do not entail any such theory in advance.

3. It is an extraordinary fact that the Positivists believed (at least initially) that the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was concerned with the empirical foundations of science; whereas the fact is: (a) the Tractatus does not explicitly address empirical sources of knowledge at all; and (b) Wittgenstein meant to exclude all contingent factual claims from his text. His treatment of the problem of the compatibility of colors led him (partly through Frank Ramsey's prompting) to see that he could not satisfactorily draw a demarcation line between contingent and necessary truths regarding colors. He realized, therefore, that the entire project of the Tractatus was placed at risk—perhaps irremediably. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, rev. ed., trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness, corr. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972). For their part, the Positivists had hoped Protokollsätze would have functioned as the middle term between Wittgenstein's logical atomism and their own methodology of science. They were mistaken.

4. These notions are bound to sound alien to analytic ears. They do, however, mark the eccentric convergence between Derrida's critique of phenomenology (Husserl) and structuralism (Lévi-Strauss) and the critique I have been mounting against the local forms of privilege in analytic philosophy. Derrida's efforts touch on one or another of the strategies I've called "symbiotized," "post-Kantian," or "poststructuralist.'' Derrida's tactic tends to be reactive and parasitic—and verbally unusual. But the attack on the "originary" is an attack on externalism, and the attack on the "totalized" entails a recognition of the role of internal relations in comparing and assessing conceptual schemes. I don't find the convergence contrived, therefore, or useless. It signifies the possibility of a stronger and more explicit convergence between analytic and continental philosophy. I should say both Derrida's and Wittgenstein's correctives (the latter's, in the Investigations and On Certainty ) draw attention to the insuperability of context: to the pretense of closed conceptual systems and supposed criterial assurances of indubitable truth. What both lack is a clear sense of the historicity of context itself. Wittgenstein's use of the notion of Lebensformen is ultimately more promising (in my opinion) than Derrida's abstract and reactive analyses. Their analyses point beyond themselves to the remarkable (but somewhat muffled) intuition of historicity in Thomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific

Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), and the even more remarkable (but unemphatic) prescience of John Dewey's domesticated Hegelianism, for instance in Reconstruction in Philosophy . Both have been largely eclipsed by this time: Kuhn, partly through his own retreat—see, for instance, the Postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and also The Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). Dewey, largely through the selective coopting of pragmatist themes (compatible with externalism) in the American continuation of Russell's and Moore's dismissal of British Hegelianism and the close scanning of the uncongenial themes of American pragmatism, in the work of Quine and Davidson particularly. The result is the almost total eclipse of an interest in historicity in current American analytic philosophy. Continental European philosophy has, for the most part, featured the puzzles of history and social context in Hegelian, Marxist, Nietzschean, phenomenological, existential, hermeneutic, Frankfurt-Critical, and Heideggerean currents. In this sense, Foucault is more promising than either Derrida or Wittgenstein. For purposes of comparison, see Jacques Derrida, "Différance," in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); and Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon, 1980). A theorem like (5.2), I should add, is the beneficiary of a great many of these converging currents, short of endorsing historicity. But it needs to be said as well that recent European philosophy is (noticeably) also veering away from historicity. I think this is due in no small degree to the growing disenchantment with Marxism and communism evidenced well before the collapse of the Soviet empire and to the perceived confirmation of the triumph of the ahistorical mentality that the Gulf War has come to signify. The result is a palpable conceptual vacuum that, in retrospect, we may conjecture, had been filled by Marxist themes qualifying the principal work of Western thought. In my view, the confirmation appears most saliently among philosophers in Jürgen Habermas's about-face: in his displacing his Marxist and Franfurt-Critical perspective with a (pragmatized) Kantian one. Compare, for instance, Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), with his "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,'' in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990). In the United States, the "parallel" but more tepid retreat appears in the self-styled pragmatisms of Putnam and Rorty, who, in rather different ways, have had something to say about their earlier Marxist interests. See, for instance, Richard Rorty, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids," Common Knowledge 1 (1992). Habermas is conceptually more interesting in this regard, for Habermas is reenacting—post-Hegel and post-Marx—Kant's own inability to surmount his apriorism (along the lines I earlier associated with the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason and the letter to Markus Herz that bears on Kant's Copernican revolution). I take that to provide the essential clue to Habermas's own failed Kantianism (as in "Discourse Ethics"). The theme was always present in Habermas, however, as one can we see from the important early essay, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" in

Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979). I find Habermas's work to be dominated by the Peirceanized Kantianism of Apel—except, of course, that Habermas disastrously pretends to generate the benefits of apriorism through ("empirical" or "communicative") rational reflection. Compare Karl-Otto Apel, "From Kant to Peirce: The Semiotical Transformation of Transcendental Logic," in Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. Glen Adey and David Frisby (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).

5. It is quite extraordinary that Husserl, having grasped the implicit privilege in Kant's "naturalistic" program, "corrects" it by endorsing an even more profound form of "subjective" (or "Cartesian") privilege: partly by disjoining (or at any rate by obscuring the relationship between) the (phenomenologically) ''subjective" and the ("naturalistically") psychological; partly by disjoining (or at any rate by obscuring the relationship between) the "transcendental" powers of the reflective Ego and the culturally enabling resources of whatever reflexive powers human understanding may claim. As far as I can see, Husserl never resolved these puzzles satisfactorily, never fully acknowledged the lebensformlich sources of all our cognizing powers, and never came to terms with the general problem of historicity. In a very real sense, Husserl's philosophy must count as one of the most thoroughgoing violations of theorem (5.2) that modern philosophy affords. See Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970). It should be borne in mind that Derrida's earliest and most "analytic" work was directly addressed to unmasking the illicit privilege embedded in Husserl's account of geometry. The essay, "The Origin of Geometry," appears in the appendix to the Crisis volume. For Derrida's quite compelling treatment, see Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavey Jr. (New York: Nicolas Hays, 1978). Husserlians have always argued that Derrida was not up to reading Husserl accurately. But the study of the "Geometry" paper dispels the charge. In fact, it exposes Husserl's own uncertainties, even fudging, in a decisive way. (Husserl, one must remember, isolated the process of rational thought from the contingencies of linguistic expression: Derrida locks on to the pretensions of that maneuver with admirable precision.) Resistance to Husserl's failings in this regard has led, in rather different ways, to the divergent programs of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger. In this respect, late phenomenology has been more critical of Husserl than late analytic philosophy has been of the orienting function of Russell, Moore, and Quine at least. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations might have harbored the turning point in analytic philosophy, but the possibility has petered out. Neither have Dewey's or Kuhn's contributions succeeded in this regard. On the phenomenological side, the most promising criticism has gone astray. I refer to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's unfinished The Visible and the Invisible . But, at least roughly, analytic philosophy (including a strong externalist reading of Kant) and Husserlian phenomenology (but not late phenomenology) have played rather similar roles in their respective worlds.

6. The verbal distinctions may be a little too densely packed. The terms are used expressly by Husserl to identify the failing of the epistemological tradition

from Galileo to Kant ("naturalism") and his own corrective ("phenomenology"). The clearest account of Husserl's use is given in a pair of papers published in recent years as a small book. See Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper and Row, 1965). By theorem (5.6), I signal the fact that Husserl's disjunction can't possibly work, although it would be fair to say that "naturalism" must be phenomenologized and "phenomenology" naturalized. Hegel's usage is quite different, for Hegel is attempting to overcome the aporia of Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena. See Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit . See, also, Jean Hippolyte, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), especially part 7.

7. Without comparing their respective philosophical abilities, I should say that Jürgen Habermas plays a role with respect to Frankfurt Critical philosophy that is not very different from the role Quine plays with respect to pragmatism (particularly, Dewey's brand). For both outflank any trace of historicity. Habermas's effort is the odder of the two, since his work is regarded, somehow, as the fulfillment of the Frankfurt School's endeavor, whereas there is no sense of anything like that in Quine's work. (In a very thin way, something of the sort may be said of Putnam, who, as I have indicated, is also wrestling with a Kantian demon.) A great deal of the work of Horkheimer and Adorno was directed precisely at dismantling the conviction of Enlightenment philosophy—along historicist lines. I cannot say that Habermas is the apotheosis of Enlightenment mentality, but he aspires to something like it, replacing his original inspiration (Marx) with Kant. In this, he has fallen completely under the philosophical spell of Karl-Otto Apel, who is a frank apriorist of the Kantian sort, although an ingenious one. The theme of legitimation has troubled Habermas through his entire career: he has oscillated between a "transcendental" (Kantian) sense of legitimation and what he now calls a "pragmatic" form. But his difficulty here is the perfect analogue of Putnam's (analyzed earlier: that is, the difficulty associated with Putnam's use of the Kantian theme of the Grenzbegriff ). On the Frankfurt School philosophers, see Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973); Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1972); and, explicitly against Husserl and implicitly (in anticipation) against Habermas, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique, trans. Willis Domingo (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982). On Apel, see Towards a Transformation of Philosophy .

8. W. V. Quine plays a double game with "holism." By one strategy—generalizing well beyond Pierre Duhem's well-known thesis about a certain indeterminacy in disconfirming theoretical claims in science (among distributed propositions)—Quine arrives at his "indeterminacy of translation" thesis; by another—illicitly disjoining word and sentence—he leads us to the cognitive privilege associated with his use of "holophrastic" sentences. The first theme belongs chiefly to Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960) but is also thought to have the blessing of his treatment of the analytic/synthetic dogma. The second has a more obscure inning in Word and Object, particularly in

connection with the delayed relevance of "analytical hypotheses" (which, in effect, reserves a space in which sentences may escape the stalemate intended by the first sort of holism). It reappears, more robustly and more explicitly, in Pursuit of Truth, in the form of "holophrastic" sentences. There, effectively, Quine reverses the line of argument directly against Carnap and the search for Protokollsätze . For a sense of Duhem's rather different thesis, see Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans. Philip P. Wiener (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).

9. This is the generic form of nearly all analytic theories of knowledge. One may well claim that the late naturalism of the analytic sort is primarily concerned to construe JTB in suitably naturalized terms. This accounts in part for the interest in the disquotational theory of truth. For a sense of how recent efforts of the naturalizing kind have gone, see Alvin I. Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). For its application to the sciences, see Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science: Science without Legends, Objectivity without Illusions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). For an overview of the original doctrine, see Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge .

10. Quite early in his career, Davidson sought to construe rationalization ("explanation by reasons") as a species of causal explanation ("explanation by causes") on the grounds (independently reasonable) that "having a reason" could be a cause for one's action. The non sequitur is plain enough. But what is important about it concerns the fortunes of naturalism (in the late analytic sense). For, for one thing, it might (if it worked) undercut second-order legitimation; for another, it might smooth the way for a benign form of nonreductive physicalism (in effect, what is now called supervenience) by neutralizing the holism of our models of rationality. Davidson's insight here is more ingenious. The trouble is that there's no argument to back it up. See Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" and ''Mental Events," in Essays on Events and Actions (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980). I shall come to the second issue later.

11. See Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, ch. 3.

12. Edmund Gettier's famous little paper, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23 (1963), produced a cottage industry designed to recover JTB from obvious mortal threats. Its effect was misperceived by analytically minded philosophers. For what it actually demonstrates is, first, that there are always antecedent questions that must be answered before any "standard" logic can be supposed to be applicable to the fine-grained questions of the domain to which it is applied; and, second, that what is to count as "knowledge" cannot be altogether freed from legitimative concerns. It is an irony that Gettier's implicit challenge should have gone largely unexamined.

13. I regard it as a telltale clue that naturalistic epistemologists very often have no developed theory of persons or selves to offer. This is noticeably true of Quine, in "Epistemology Natualized" and in Goldman, Liaisons . The strategies that would be required if naturalism were to go through are easily specified, of course. But they are characteristically scanted. See, for instance, Davidson, "Mental Events"; and D. C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969). I shall introduce a little later the fashionable

notion "supervenience," which is perhaps the most potent feint the naturalists have perfected in order to obviate the difficulties now looming.

1. Parmenides seems to have dominated the entire Greek discussion of what exists and is real. Aristotle, in Metaphysics, exposes Parmenides's great confusion between the predicative and substantive issues. But Aristotle himself seems to have marked this in a most unfortunate way: hyle (matter) has no determinate function at all in that discussion; it plays no role either in individuation or in predicable change with respect to whatever is individuated. For his part, Quine introduces the notion of "ontic commitment" (by way of the use of the existential quantifier). But that too is unfortunate, for it means that Quine never actually addresses the question of what exists or of what it is to exist ! See W. V. Quine, "On What There Is," From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), and Word and Object . The well-known formula, "to be is to be the value of a bound variable," bears on the first notion ("commitment"), but not on the second ("existence''). The point has been effectively noted by William P. Alston in his "Ontic Commitment," Philosophical Studies 9 (1958). As far as I can see, there is no more compelling account of "exists" and "is real" than that offered by Peirce (in terms of Secondness and Thirdness). See Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 5. In effect, in what follows, I treat Quine's recommendation as purely "grammatical," although that is hardly Quine's intent.

2. See Searle, Speech Acts . Searle introduces the "Axiom of Existence" but instantly subverts it. The Axiom would make contradictory any would-be reference to what does not exist (fictional referents, therefore—Sherlock Holmes, for one). But Searle offers no sustained argument; his view clearly goes against ordinary usage. Restricting Quine's sense of ontic commitment to the "grammatical" helps to explain why nothing paradoxical results from reference to fiction, for it is entirely possible, on Quine's usage, that what we refer to (assuming it to exist) may not exist at all! In that regard, Quine's maneuver would lead to skepticism, construed in Searle's way. The only way to avoid this awkwardness is to treat reference grammatically. I find no provision for concluding that errors about what exists somehow also entail a failure of reference. The matter goes back, of course, to Russell's concern about "the present King of France" and Meinong's "golden mountain" and the like. But they are part of the folklore of the theory of reference. See Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting," Mind 14 (1905). Meinong's theory has been revived by Terence Parsons, Non-existent Objects (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). For a contrast with Searle's view of fiction, see Gregory Currie, The Nature of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Currie opposes Searle's puzzling solution, but, for his own part, he contrasts fiction with truth, which seems odd as well. It seems more reasonable to contrast fiction with reality and allow truth to range over the appropriate utterances, whether about reality or fiction.

3. I approach the matter only in the spirit of reducing the possibility of unwanted paradox. I see no benefit, for instance, in theorizing that the actual

world is merely "one" of many "real" possible worlds. I oppose without qualification the idea (Goodman's) of many actual worlds. See Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978). There's no point to such a provision if no criterion is supplied for individuating actual worlds. Goodman introduces his maneuver in order to avoid contradictory predications: wherever they threaten, Goodman sanctions an additional, separable world to keep true predications "apart." But he never explains how to tell the difference between incompatible predications (in one world) and predications that would be incompatible (in the same world) but now are not (being segregated to one or another actual world). As far as I can see, talk of "possible worlds" is a façon de parler for what is suitably nominalized regarding what may be predicated of the actual world (including what may be predicated counterfactually) or what may be grammatically posited (in the nominalized sense) as merely compossible. I take all this to be no more than a stylistic matter. For a more robust conception of possible worlds, see David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). Lewis regards the actual world as one among alternative (real) "possible worlds'' ("modal realism"). I confess I am not persuaded that this accommodation is needed. See, also, Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974).

4. In Word and Object Quine dismisses out of hand Brentano's famous distinction of "intentionality." It signifies Quine's most candid commitment to physicalism and extensionalism. But his remarks are in the form of an ontological manifesto. There is no supporting argument offered. There is no argument that Quine ever offered to shore up his summary dismissal. There can be no doubt that a great number of analytic philosophers have been emboldened by Quine's example to dismiss intentionality as well. But the plain truth is that analytic philosophy has only infrequently—perhaps now in a more forthcoming way than was true earlier—actually addressed the conceptual role and possible advantages of the various forms of the intentional idiom. For Brentano's own account, see Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, ed. Oskar Kraus, English edition ed. Linda L. McAlister, trans. Antos C. Rancurello et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973). For a sense of Husserl's treatment of Brentano's distinction, see Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2 vols., trans. J. W. Findley (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), particularly Investigation V.

5. I confess I find Dewey tiresome reading. But he is, nevertheless, the single American philosopher best "placed" for the line of argument I am developing. I take Dewey to be a "Hegelian" in the sense that: (a) he favors symbiosis; (b) he accepts historicity; and (c) he relies on the holist role of consensual life. See, for instance, Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy . I prefer Peirce as a philosopher—and, of course, Dewey is immensely indebted to Peirce. But Peirce veers off along teleologized lines (regarding some vaguely Emersonian cosmic mind: a source of Thirdness in nature apart from human interpretation, somehow required for "objectivity"). This disjunction makes Peirce a "Kantian" rather than a "Hegelian," although there are Hegelian aspects to his philosophy. Dewey is clearly "post-Kantian": very nearly "poststructuralist" avant la lettre . But I hasten to add that, as far as I can see, Rorty is not a Deweyan even though

he professes to be one. This is partly because he adheres to Davidson's strong naturalism and because he insists on a critical disjunction between the private and the public. See Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays 1972-1980 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), and Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). I believe there is no other important English-language philosopher who has constructed an alternative to the pared-down Hegelianism Dewey managed to work out. Its most distinctive features include an optimism that is not teleologized, an opposition to absolution, and an attack on all metaphysical dualisms. That is a theme of increasing importance as we approach the end of the century. For an impression of Dewey's early gauge of Hegel, which is still reasonably revealing, see John Dewey, "The Present Position of Logical Theory," in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), vol. 3.

6. For Carnap's treatment, see Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language, trans. Amethe Smeaton (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1937). On essentialism, see Richard Boyd, "On the Current Status of Scientific Realism," amended, in Richard Boyd, Philip Gosper, and J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).

7. Heidegger claims that his own thesis—that the defining existentiale of Dasein is Zeitlichkeit —does justice to the meaning of history in a way that is superior to Hegel's. Compare Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), and Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit . I find Heidegger's account instructive, particularly on the theme of avoiding teleologism. I am not convinced that Heidegger has Hegel right, and I don't find Heidegger clear about the conceptual relationship between the "ontic" and "ontological" dimensions of his account of Dasein and Seiende, which, in effect, answers to the Kantian and phenomenological aspects of his analysis. This is due partly to the original inadequacy (already broached) of Husserl's attempt to distinguish between the "naturalistic" and the "phenomenological" and partly to the fact that the relationship between Dasein and Sein (in Heidegger) cannot be straightforwardly discursive. (I should characterize it rather as ''mythic," in a sense I introduce later.) Kojève's well-known reading of Hegel is influenced by both Marx and Heidegger. For a sense of it, see Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel ( Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, assembled by Raymond Queneau), ed. Allen Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), particularly ch. 5. See, also, Herbert Marcuse, Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, trans. Seyla Benhabib (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).

8. I find Peirce very often preoccupied with the implications of George Berkeley's intuition about the necessity of a real similarity between our cognizing ideas and the objective "ideas" that constitute the material world. In Berkeley's Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (in The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, 9 vols., ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop [Edinburgh: Nelson, 1948-1957]), for instance, the notion effectively disallows John Locke's inescapable skepticism in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2 vols., ed. A. C. Fraser (New York: Dover, 1959). But Berkeley also anticipates, in an

eccentric way, the fundamental theme of the German Idealists attempting to root out an analogous skepticism at the heart of Kant's philosophy. I believe it is in this sense that Peirce found it impossible to yield altogether on his notion of an objective "mind" at work in nature apart from human intervention. The theme is at once Berkeleyan and Hegelian and teleologized in Peirce's treatment of the issue. (Peirce, I note, speaks of a "Schellingian" theme.) See Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 5-6. (In vol. 6, Peirce actually addresses the difference between his conception and Hegel's.)

9. The theorem confirms the sense in which legitimative issues are ubiquitous and unbidden. I view it, therefore, as making explicit the complete unten-ability of Davidson's naturalism and Rorty's postmodernism. See Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," and Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth."

10. It is undoubtedly something of a leap, but I associate the function of Peirce's Secondness (relative to the Hegelian vision) as similar to the function of Merleau-Ponty's "brute world" (relative to Husserl's phenomenology). The parallel comes out most clearly in the Working Notes appended to Merleau-Ponty's late unfinished work, where Merleau-Ponty obviously finds himself obliged to abandon Husserl's misdirection. See Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible .

11. Strawson considers the possibility but dismisses it as inherently unsatisfactory. See P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959). Davidson shows, though not intentionally, the inflexibility of the standard Fregean resources for accommodating events as substantives. See Donald Davidson's contribution to the symposium, "On Events and Event-Descriptions," in Joseph Margolis (ed.), Fact and Existence (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969). The principal analytically minded English-language philosopher who has featured an ontology of events is, of course, A. N. Whitehead—now, rather neglected. See Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929).

12. I take this to be Peirce's ingenious formula ensuring the interpreted status of truth-claims. It is, in this sense, the basis on which (as a Peircean) Putnam opposes Davidson and Rorty. But, on my reading, Peirce himself spoils the formula by construing Thirdness as objectively present in nature without human intervention . (This is what I mean by Peirce's "Kantianism": the avoidance of symbiosis.) But that, too, reappears—vestigially, hardly convincingly—in Putnam. See, particularly, the closing remarks of Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

13. With Goodman, nominalism has pretty well ceased to be, as it was with William of Ockham, primarily a theory of certain conditions of cognitive competence. It has become a form of ontology only. Nevertheless, Goodman himself slips between the ontological and epistemological—since he implicitly invokes the first in drawing conclusions about the second. This may be seen by reading Nelson Goodman, "Seven Strictures on Similarity," in Lawrence Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), Truth & Experience (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), in the context of Goodman's The Structure of Appearance, 2d ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). Goodman means, by nominalism,

the denial that there are nonparticulars that are existent (without regard to whether particulars are abstract entities or not). A more recent line of argument, meant to test Quine's thesis that the admission of mathematical entities is needed in the explanations of physical science, is offered in Hartry A. Field, Science without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Field construes nominalism as denying the existence of abstract entities. Peirce's distinction between existence and reality applies quite readily to the issues both raise. But Peirce of course has the medieval controversy in mind as well, that is, the analysis of cognition. For a sense of Ockham's thesis, see Ockham's Theory of Terms, Part I of the Summa Logicae, trans. Michael J. Loux (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974).

14. See Strawson, Individuals, Part II. Here, Strawson picks up an important question Aristotle bruits in Categories, but without the "benefit" of Aristotle's metaphysics.

15. I can only offer my impressions here. My first effort to pursue the matter was, on what I took to be good advice, to consult the Kyoto school. But, of course, I soon discovered that reading the Kyoto philosophers was startlingly like reading Heidegger. Still, I think there is a reasonable connection there—philosophically, I mean—given Nietzsche's probable influence on Heidegger's notion of Sein . See, for instance, Kitaro Nishida, "The Intelligible World," in Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness, trans. Robert Schinzinger (Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1958); and Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, trans. Ian Van Bragt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

16. The point at issue is uncomplicated. Kant is quite right about the illicit use of "exists" as a predicate in St. Anselm's and St. Thomas's proofs. But the essential insight is not that "existence" cannot be a predicate; it is only that it cannot be a "first-order'' predicate like the "descriptive" predicates employed in describing a hundred Thaler . Many assume (following Quine, for instance) that "exists" cannot be a predicate at all, but I don't find the argument for it. I should say, against both Anselm and Aquinas, that there is no necessity for admitting "necessary existence" ((2.1)), but that depends, precisely, on being willing to construe "existence" as a predicate. See Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason .

17. One of the best-known efforts to bring Wittgenstein's view (in Investigations ) to bear on the problem of universals appears in Renford Bambrough, "Universals and Family Resemblances," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61 (1960-1961).

1. I emphasize the neutrality of the theorem—that is, it entails nothing regarding alternative theories of predicates, natures, or beings. It does not entail or preclude Aristotle's claim, in Metaphysics Gamma, on the necessity of invariant natures or essences, and it does not preclude or concede that God (in the Judaeo-Christian sense) has a nature or has a nature characterizable only in terms of predicables uniquely attributable to God. This, of course, has occa-

sioned the theory that God may be "characterized" by (divine) analogy only, that is, where the available predicates are first employed in discourse about the natural (or created) order. See, for instance, James F. Ross, Portraying Analogy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

2. Formulated negatively, thus, Heidegger is safe enough in collecting the entire Western tradition. The question remains, of course, of what else to say. My own view is that it is best to regard "being" sans phrase as a nominalization of "is" (or ''real") in its predicative use. Heidegger speaks, rather, of "Being" ( Sein ), so that the capital "S" takes on a second, potentially delusive meaning. Heidegger's account in Being and Time seems at first straightforward. "Sein" is used always in conjunction with " Dasein "—which is to say, in a constructive sense akin to that of Kant's transcendentalism (in effect, as "implicated" in admitting plural Seiende )—except that Dasein is not the site of the invariant categories of the understanding. I judge Heidegger's formula to be tantamount to being (at best) a radically historicized form of post-Kantian Idealism. But Heidegger himself calls all this into question in the Kehre of the notorious "Letter on Humanism." There, we are led to suppose that (the human) Dasein has a completely passive role in receiving some destinal message about Being from Being itself—or Being "thought" by some manifest Dasein different from human Dasein . This signifies a turn (in Heidegger's own mind) from the "subjective" emphasis of Being and Time to the "objective" (in a most mysterious sense). The entire maneuver is a philosophical disaster. See Heidegger, Being and Time and "Letter on Humanism," trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, with J. Glenn Gray and David Farrell Krell, in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). See, also, Otto Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking, trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1987).

3. I see no reason to think the doctrine of transcendental attributes is incoherent. But that is not to say that God exists, that there is anything that necessarily exists, that the relationship of Creator to created world is intelligible, or that the transcendentals applied uniquely to God are linked in some legible way to the ("privative") natural properties attributed to the "created" world. The relevant account is given in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 5 vols., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, rev. (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981); see particularly QQ. 3-4. Duns Scotus characterizes transcendentals as predicates (predicates of God) such that they "do not have genus [or predicate] above [them] except 'being'." For textual reference, see note 7, below.

4. See Lev Shestov, Athens and Jerusalem, trans. Bernard Martin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966).

5. Again, as with (7.1), the theorem is neutral as between alternative theories about the nature of reality. The minimal constraint is that of the compatibility of ascriptions, but that of course can be ensured in many ways, even where attributions seem at first incompatible. Similarly, the theorem sets no antecedent limits on the extension of "natures" or what may be truly (or admissibly) predicated of anything. Aristotle's Metaphysics affords one canonical view, of course, but Leibniz's philosophy offers an entirely different (quite radical) view.

Leibniz held that "the concept of the predicate is comprised in some way in that of the subject," that that is an ineliminable condition of truth, and that, as a consequence, "individual substances" (Alexander the Great, say) contain within themselves everything that has happened to them or will ever happen to them. ("Nominal definitions," it must be remembered, need not, for Leibniz, be compatible; "real definitions" are, for Leibniz, infinite.) This bears adversely, as I have remarked, on Quine's proposal to retire reference ( a fortiori, the denotational function of proper names) by predicative means. See Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, 2d ed. (London: Routledge, 1992). Leibniz himself affirms the point about the relation between subjects and predicates in many places, since it is an essential part of his mature theory. See for instance his letter to Arnauld (July 14, 1686) and Discourse on Metaphysics, in Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics and Correspondence with Arnauld, trans. G. R. Montgomery (La Salle: Open Court, 1902). In the correspondence with Samuel Clarke (Leibniz's fifth letter), the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is linked to the principle of sufficient reason. See Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. H. G. Alexander (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956).

6. I regard this theorem as central to Protagoras's theme of the flux and the point of his "relativism." Socrates "defeats" Protagoras, in Thaeatetus, by getting him to deny something like (7.6). But the defeat of Aristotle's modal claim shows that that was a trick. At any rate, Socrates's argument is inconclusive.

7. The concept is attributed to Duns Scotus. Philosophically, apart from the metaphysical status of universals, it must be clear that haecceity cannot contribute in any criterial sense to the individuation or reidentification of particulars: first of all, natures are no more than predicables ((7.1)); second, the maneuver requires that humans be capable of grasping "real definitions" in something like Leibniz's sense. Duns Scotus seems to have regarded haecceity as among the "ultimate differences" among different things, that is, as irreducibly simple (an irreducibly simple individuating difference). But this is impossible, since it is predicative. See, for a general impression of Scotus's views, John Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings: A Selection, 2d ed., trans. Allan Wolter (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987), particularly Section I ("Concerning Metaphysics"). For a sense of Peirce's use of Scotus, see Murray G. Murphey, The Development of Peirce's Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993), ch. 4.

8. Hume obviously realized that adherence to his own ("official") notion of numerical identity (which meant that the least change in quality entails a violation of identity) would make discourse utterly impossible. In this and in other important respects, Hume regularly falls back to some informal, more interesting account that cannot be reconciled with empiricism in any straightforward way (primarily because it involves some associative practice that is not itself explicable in empiricist terms). Here, Hume is clearly intrigued by the problem of individuation as distinct from that of numerical identity and reidentification. I find the distinction largely ignored in recent analytic philosophy, doubtless for reasons of a Fregean sort. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human

Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1888), especially bk. I, pt. iv. Compare P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Metheun, 1959); also, David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). Wiggins, incidentally, correctly regards haecceitas as an "absurd idea."

9. The theorem and its elaboration in part II of this Primer are largely my own construction. I know of no sustained analysis of cultural phenomena along similar lines. For further details, see Joseph Margolis, The Flux of History and the Flux of Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), Interpretation Radical But Not Unruly (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), and Culture and Cultural Entities (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984). Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), favors platonism. Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), fails to distinguish effectively between nature and culture. Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), construes the cultural, at least implicitly, as nothing more than a rhetorical projection. These three are the closest alternative proposals for a metaphysics of culture. It is worth noting that the most sustained interest in the question appears in the philosophy of art.

10. I cannot resist reporting a conversation, probably in the very early 1970s, with Peter Geach. I offered him the Lucy Westenra story, which he took to be incoherent—essentially, I judged, because of his adherence to a Thomist metaphysics. My frank impression was that he was unable to identify the reason for the incoherence he alleged. I was surprised and delighted to discover, however, that Norris Clarke, then-editor of the International Philosophical Quarterly, found my account of Dracula instructive about the triune nature of God! Clarke was kind enough to publish an early paper of mine on the topic, "Dracula the Man," vol. 4 (1964), a distant intuition of the theorems being developed—to which he then appended his own paper on the trinity! I regard his gesture as a mark of a rather startling philosophical generosity.

11. Bernard Williams presses the equivalence largely against Strawson's inadequate distinction between persons and bodies. See Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). But Williams fails to consider any alternative possibilities for individuating persons (as distinct from bodies): he does not, for instance, consider the import of different histories, and he treats what appears to be a minor or ill-formed objection (having to do with supposed reincarnation) as sufficient (without a full argument) for disallowing any metaphysical distinction between persons and bodies (that manage to avoid invoking dualism). Much more is clearly needed. Williams does not pursue the matter further.

12. Frege makes no provision for managing the problem of individuating the Morning Star and the Evening Star. Yet his discussion of the numerical identity of the "two" presupposes some resolution. See Frege, "On Sense and Reference." Regarding Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles, Bertrand Russell offers an extended discussion of notable clarity. See Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz . Russell explicitly remarks that, in Leibniz's fifth letter to Clarke, that principle is deduced with the aid of the

principle of sufficient reason; also, that Leibniz treats the (first) principle sometimes as contingent, sometimes as necessary, sometimes in epistemological terms, sometimes in metaphysical terms. Even more interestingly, Leibniz is clearly aware of complications that are due to intentional contexts. Among theoretical identities, however, Leibnizian strategies are outflanked since ("same-level") indiscernibilities are not at issue. The usual discussions are hardly satisfactory. See, for instance, J. J. C. Smart, "Sensations and Brains Processes," rev., in V. C. Chappell (ed.), The Philosophy of Mind (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1962); and Jerry A. Fodor, Psychological Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology (New York: Random House, 1968).

13. Bell's theorems are expressed in the language of classical mechanics. They confirm irresolvable paradoxes in the standard "ontology" of classical physics. At the present time, quantum physics has no legible "ontology" though its formal structure apparently accommodates, without risking paradox, the observations and predictions of standard physics. The technical issues are beyond my competence. For a sample of the discussion of the philosophical issues, see Bas C. van Fraassen, Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); Henry Krips, The Metaphysics of Quantum Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987); Arthur Fine, The Shaky Game; Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); and David Z. Albert, Quantum Mechanics and Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

14. I refer (once again) to Heidegger's excessively glib, philosophically disastrous "turning" in his relatively late essay, "Letter on Humanism." There, Heidegger undoes in a completely arbitrary way the strongest feature of Being and Time: by making Sein "speak" to Dasein by a kind of revelation not qualified in any way by the conceptual constraints originating from (human) Dasein . The result repudiates Kantian, post-Kantian, and Husserlian conceptions, which were very much in evidence in Being and Time . Literally, only a seer (Hölderlin or Hitler) could thereupon continue to do philosophy (or whatever rightly succeeds it).

15. A very telling example (touched on earlier) appears in Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World . Salmon appeals to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics in order to secure what he regards as the requisite sense of nomic universality—otherwise at intolerable risk, conceptually. I take this to betray the weakness of the unity of science program. Salmon was much influenced by Hans Reichenbach, but he feared that Reichenbach's own attempt to ensure nomic necessity (by way of the logic of probability) would ultimately prove insufficient for rescuing scientific realism! More recent theorists are quite prepared to repudiate ontic readings of nomic necessity and even the need for them. See, for instance, Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983); and Bas C. Van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989). Related doubts may be found in Ian Hacking and Arthur Fine. (See note 13, above.) For a sense of Reichenbach's theory, see Hans Reichenbach, Laws, Modalities, and Counterfactuals (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

16. There is no way to ensure the reidentification of theoretical entities

(which we take to be real) except intentionally, by appeal to a principle of charity or by way of theorizing economies. The only ground on which more would be possible presupposes the validity of something like the unity of science program itself. I have already argued that the reidentification of perceivable entities cannot fail to be informal and that nomic necessity is indemonstrable. I take this to be the basis for Putnam's rejection of any principled confidence in the reidentifiability of theoretical entities. In Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Putnam strongly favored reidentifiability—in the company of Richard Boyd. His change of mind has been dramatic. It was, in any case, required by (his) "internal realism": that is, by his rejection of externalism. See, for instance, Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism . The change of view is noted in Lecture II. (I don't know whether Boyd ever published the paper to which Putnam refers.)

17. On my reading, Kant is (in the first Critique ) a constructivist but not a "social constructivist." That is, he does not treat the constructed nature of the phenomenal world in a lebensformlich way. He draws (illicitly, I should say) what would have been the social dimension from the supposed species-specific (solipsistic) powers of each individual's understanding. Precisely the same difficulty appears in Husserl, despite Husserl's critique of Kant. The difficulty is transparent in Husserl; it is much more innocently muffled in Kant. See, for instance, Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, Fifth Meditation.

1. There is a straightforward explication of the notion in Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy . It is, I may say, entirely neutral to the fortunes of Husserl's own philosophical program—which, however, exploits the point (dubiously) in the service of neutralizing the import of historical and cultural divergence.

2. The theorem catches up the essential theme of poststructuralist criticism (e.g., of totalizing, certainty, privilege, the originary) that has now entrenched itself in more positive philosophies. (The explanation follows.) On the poststructuralist side, I find two principal currents: one, synchronic, largely against the "totalized" and "originary"; the other, historicist, largely concerned to confirm the profound contingency of thinking. The first is best illustrated in the work of Jacques Derrida, in, for instance, "Différance," and Speech and Phenomena and other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). The second is best illustrated in the work of Michel Foucault, in, for instance, his "archaeological" mode, in The Order of Things, and his "genealogical'' mode, in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. David F. Bouchard, trans. David E. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), and Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977). The bare theme of poststructuralism—of l'autre, as I explain shortly—appears in various bizarre forms: in Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute; Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, n.d.), in which Levinas invokes l'autrui ; and Luce Irigaray, This Sex

Which Is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter, with Carolyn Burke (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). Let me offer, as a plausible target, at least one that is standard: French structuralism, as in the seminal account of Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Forms of Kinship, rev. ed., trans. James Harle Bell et al., ed. Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). Another, more meaningful to the analytically oriented but less accessible to the strategies of French poststructuralism is Rudolf Carnap's early The Logical Structure of the World, 2d ed., trans. Rolf A. George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); also, Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus . Lévi-Strauss speaks with assurance of an underlying, essentially unconscious, inclusive system of thinking, in which the laws of thought are identical with the laws of physical nature, relative to which all mental phenomena are generated. Carnap envisages an analysis of reality in terms of the ultimate constituents of all there is. Wittgenstein's notion, I should say, is more complicated—and, in a way, less convincing, since it sets a finite limit to what it analyzes, but it does not rightly explain how this fixed order fits into the "one" universe of discourse. I return to it below.

3. See Rudolf Carnap, "Psychology in Physical Language," trans. George Schick, in A. J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959).

4. The notion ( l'autrui ) is Levinas's, and is contrasted with l'autre, in Totality and Infinity . Although widely influential, the idea, I'm afraid, is incoherent. Levinas attempts to isolate l'autrui as "absolutely other" (Section One), that is, as altogether outside all ordinary referential and predicative discourse: beyond "ontology." But the fact is that l'autrui (the other—the other person ) cannot fail to be individuated and identified (in some face-to-face encounter), hence to implicate ordinary linguistic categories. L'autre, by contrast, is "ontological," " 'other' like the bread I eat." Derrida, whom Levinas profoundly influenced, is well aware of this difficulty in Levinas— and he avoids it in his own writing . See Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,'' Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

5. Perhaps the most explicit and most confident statement among the structuralists favoring a closed system with regard to both nature and linguistic phenomena appears in the glossematics of the Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, trans. Francis J. Whitfield, rev. ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961). I cannot help feeling that Chomsky's grammatical universals are no more than conceptually idle modal idealizations of empirically contingent regularities projected in accord with something like Hjelmslev's conviction. In our own time, possibly the best-known opponent of closed systems, with respect to physical nature ( a fortiori, cultural phenomena), is Prigogine. See Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature (New York: Bantam Books, 1984); also, Karl R. Popper, who subscribes to Prigogine's general outlook, in The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism, ed. W. W. Bartley III (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982).

6. The theorem raises serious questions about the coherence of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, quite apart from the essential puzzle of the correspondence doctrine, which Wittgenstein abandoned. For the Tractatus is "totalized" in a

curious way: it divides the "universe" between what can be said in the Tractarian way and what cannot. That is, it affirms that everything that falls within the boundaries of the "world" of facts can be reported in Tractarian terms and that what cannot be thus cast ( which it identifies ) cannot belong among the facts. (See Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus .) On the affirmative side, the most ambitious modern philosophical vision accommodating (something like) the distinction between the constative and the mythic appears in Martin Heidegger, Being and Time . On my reading, this is what Heidegger should have meant in introducing the model of Sein and Dasein . He does not, however—or at least he does not do so consistently. He distinguishes between the "ontic" and the "ontological" and treats both discursively, in spite of the fact that it was his intention to call all essentialized metaphysics into question. In effect, he ends by entrenching a new metaphysics, which, despite his scruple (about the ''ontological"), instantiates what he himself intended to undermine. The same, I might say, holds for Husserl—his mentor—in calling Cartesian and Kantian thought into question: except that the irony dawned on Heidegger (but not, apparently, on Husserl). You have only to read Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, particularly the Fifth Meditation, where Husserl combats the charge of solipsism.

7. See Ruth G. Millikan, Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), for a specimen of current naturalistic treatments of norms. The issue is not altogether clearly understood by either its defenders or its opponents. When, for instance, truth is regarded as normative or "regulative" (as Putnam insists, for instance in Reason, Truth and History ), analytic philosophers, writing in the spirit of Quine's "Epistemology Naturalized," in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), either believe that norms may be psychologized or biologized (or dismissed in favor of causal accounts) or believe that legitimative questions are of no concern at all. But it may be argued that just as questions of truth, which are normative in first-order discourse, implicate second-order legitimative questions (which are also normative), so, too, any norms that are naturalized in first-order discourse implicate (further) legitimative questions that have not (yet) been shown to be naturalizable as well. (I believe they cannot be.) Putnam sometimes speaks as if the issue at stake was that of merely naturalizing norms, but that's not true.

8. I take this to be the essential theme of Michel Foucault's "genealogical" perception of his own "archaeological" writings, incipient for instance in The Order of Things . It explains, therefore, the sense in which (8.16)-(8.17) capture the poststructuralist thesis, without disallowing the historicized appearance of modal necessity. To grasp the point is to appreciate the importance of Foucault's fundamental intuition, which, against his own practice, may be straightforwardly recovered. The genealogical account is sketched—never fully explicated—in Foucault's Power/Knowledge . I may perhaps add, for clarification, that poststructuralism (in the sense in which Foucault is an exemplar) is diagonally most opposed to the notion of "modernity" as it appears, for instance, in Habermas. The point of conflict concerns "totalizing" and its bearing on presumptions of exceptionless universality—hence, on the powers of theoretical

and practical reason. See, for the contrast, Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).

9. Progressivism is simply totalizing cast as a historical achievement. This is the common failing in Peirce's "long run," Popper's "verisimilitude," Lakatos's "research programs," and Habermas's "dialogic" rationality. Compare Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 5; Karl R. Popper, Realism and the Aim of Science; Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs,'' in Philosophical Papers, ed. John Worrall and Gregory Currie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), vol. 1; and Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984, 1987). It is worth remarking that "progressivism" in science and moral and political contexts is indistinguishable, logically, for pragmatists (in effect, Peirceans and Deweyans). The key is this: both inductivism and falsificationism (Kuhn, Lakatos, Popper) and "dialogic" self-correction (Habermas) are thought to be "fallibilist." But fallibilism (in the strict sense) requires: (a) a teleologism along progressivist lines; (b) an invariant cognitive competence—reason—suited to theoretical and practical matters or, at least, a uniquely teleologized evolution of reason; and (c) grounds for believing that objectivity = epistemic neutrality. Liberalism in morality and politics is the upshot in practical terms (Habermas, Putnam, Rawls, Dworkin, and likeminded thinkers) of assuming the validity of fallibilism. By now, that is a very dubious assumption. I touch on the issue again in chapter 11. But it should be clear that symbiosis and historicity are incompatible with fallibilism.

10. I use the term more or less in Gadamer's sense, without commitment to his own themes of authenticity, the universal poet's voice, the "classical," the scaled-down adherence to Heidegger's conceptual orientation, or anything of the kind. I believe Gadamer affords a plausible sense in which the human world is historicized, without any temptation toward the teleologized, the apodictic, the necessarily invariant, or any of the other baggage of the archic orientation. The term appears also in Husserl, but Husserl is ultimately unable to come to terms with the open-ended nature of history. See Gadamer, Truth and Method, and Gadamer's effective critique of Habermas's opposed (ultimately, ahistorical) view, in "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," trans. G. B. Hess and R. E. Palmer, in Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. and trans. David G. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976). For a sense of Husserl's failed attempt to come to terms with the historical nature of human existence (partly, it seems, provoked by Max Weber's work), see Husserl, The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology . There is a very telling discussion, by Merleau-Ponty, of a letter Husserl wrote to the anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, which suggests that Husserl may have sensed the futility of a phenomenology that ignored its historical sources. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Philosopher and Sociology," in Signs, trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964). My sense is that if he had come to terms with what he took Lévy-Bruhl to have discovered about the "savage mind"—in effect, the historical variability of conceptual orientations—Husserl would have had to abandon all of his principal writings and yield in a

direction that would have brought him closer not only to Merleau-Ponty (and even Heidegger) but, strange as it may seem, to Foucault. I regard Husserl as a heroically failed figure, who returns again and again to recover the apodictic possibilities of phenomenology without ever making the decisive move that would have called his entire project into question. For an illuminating overview of Husserl's labor in pertinent respects, see Gail Soffer, Husserl and the Question of Relativism (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).

11. I use the term in a sense very close to that favored by Michael Polanyi, in Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), without subscribing to Polanyi's theory of science. I may say that Polanyi's usage very much influenced Kuhn's theory. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions; also, Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966).

12. I take the denial of incommensurabilities to be tantamount to claiming that we have at our disposal a conceptually neutral language by which to mediate among all interpretively prejudiced or perspectived theories. The strongest and best-known opponent of conceptual incommensurabilities, among analytic philosophers, is surely Donald Davidson. His objections belong to the conjoint claims of "The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), and "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge." Theorem (8.43) is specifically directed against Davidson's thesis in "The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.'' I must say, I know of no supporter of incommensurability (among those Davidson either mentions or is likely to have had in mind) who holds the view he ascribes to its advocates: that is, that incommensurability = unintelligibility = untranslatability. It cannot be found, for instance, in B. F. Whorf, "The Punctual and Segmentative Analysis of Verbs in Hopi," in Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, ed. J. B. Carroll (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1956); or T. S. Kuhn, "Reflections on My Critics," in Criticism and Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); or Paul Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (London: Verso, 1978). (Davidson mentions these sources.) A very plausible defense of incommensurability (much maligned and scandalously misread) is offered by Peter Winch, in "Understanding a Primitive Society," American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964), and in The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). See, also, Ian Hacking, "Language, Truth and Reason," in Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982). For what has become the usual reaction to Winch, see Alasdair MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1971), ch. 19. I would be negligent if I did not say straight out that Davidson's "The Very Idea" utterly misrepresents the incommensurability issue; also, that the presumption of a neutral language there indicated (which looks very much like an insistence on its modal necessity) is fleshed out in the "Coherence Theory" paper but is nowhere supported by way of a sustained argument. I find this extraordinary, given the unusual influence this pair of papers has exerted on recent American philosophy. As far as I am aware, there is no

successful demonstration (a) that there must be a neutral language, (b) that we must assume that there is, (c) that we possess a neutral language, (d) that we have compelling grounds for claiming to possess a neutral language, or (e) that the admission that we don't have, or don't know that we have, or can't demonstrate that we have, or must have, a neutral language entails the incoherence or paradoxicality of our epistemic claims.

13. Davidson invokes translatability in attacking the incommensurability thesis. He intends his charge mainly in the sense of invoking the necessity of a neutral language. This is the thesis of "The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." But, of course, it also reminds one of the Positivists' fatal endorsement of the so-called verifiability theory of meaning. For the most balanced overview of the Positivists' attempt, see Carl G. Hempel, "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance" (together with the 1964 postscript). Beyond that, as far as I know, no one pretends to have successfully formulated a theory or criterion of translat ability . Certainly, no one denies that meaningful expressions can be translated, but then, there are no compelling arguments to show that incommensurable distinctions are not also open to translation! Not only that, they are open to having their local incommensurabilities resolved! But that is hardly to say that conceptual incommensurability can be retired in principle, or that we possess a viable sense of the conditions of translatability, or that we can legitimately claim to possess a neutral language.

14. Foucault clearly has the antimony in mind, but he is not disposed to formulate it in just those terms. See, however, his "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge .

15. This is the key to (8.53). The point holds for both Wittgensteinian Lebensformen and for historicized analogues: for instance, Gadamerian horizons and Foucauldian epistemes . Any retreat leads directly back to archic privilege. In the Marxist literature, for instance, it leads directly to the Stalinist extreme of Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London: NCB, 1977), particularly "Marxism and Humanism."

16. The ultimate objection to naturalistic epistemologies is that they are question-begging. The appeal to the fruits of a scientific study of knowledge (Goldman) or to science's being the paradigm of rational success with regard to knowledge (Kitcher) are simply circular. See Goldman, Liaisons, particularly "Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology"; and Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and note 26 (regarding Duhem), p. 355.

17. This is one of the more fashionable doctrines of the newly naturalized epistemologies that (admirably) do not avoid admitting that ascriptions of knowledge are normative. In fact, such accounts often introduce epistemic "virtues." But you will look in vain for a detailed demonstration of how the argument works in real-life contexts. See, for instance, Goldman, Liaisons . There is an obvious circularity in the program, for the legitimation of what is to count as knowledge or "reliabilized" belief of the right sort cannot be rendered in causal terms, unless derivatively. The matter had already been attempted (without evident success) by the new sociologists of knowledge. See, for instance,

David C. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Inquiry (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976).

1. For a recent overview of the problem of history, see Margolis, The Flux of History and the Flux of Science .

2. Pared down to essentials, the key figures here are Fichte and Hegel (defining the trajectory of post-Kantian idealism) and Foucault and Dewey (as fair specimens of contemporary post-Hegelian historicism). For a sense of Fichte's "subject-centered" theory, however unsatisfactorily articulated, see Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Hegel's view is centered in the Phenomenology, of course; See his Phenomenology of Spirit . But see, also, the discussion of Fichte in G. W. F. Hegel, The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, trans. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977). For a sense of Foucault's thesis, see Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures." It is difficult to find a short account of Dewey's Hegelian heritage. In fact, the issue is hardly developed in the "appreciative" literature. For a sense of this, see R. W. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); and Paul Arthur Schlipp (ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey, 2d ed. (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1951).

3. For contemporary resumés of Brentano's and Husserl's views of intentionality, see (on Brentano) Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving A Philosophical Study (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), ch. 11; and Linda L. McAlister (ed.) The Philosophy of Brentano (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1976); and (on Husserl) Jitendra Nath Mohanty, The Concept of Intentionality (St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1972); and Hubert L. Dreyfus (ed.), with Harrison Hall, Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984). The most sustained recent attempt in the analytic literature to recover intentionality appears in John R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), which is, in principle, also solipsistic. The odd thing is that what I call the "Intentional" (marking the term by a typographical distinction) is, of course, commonplace in modern hermeneutics, both pre-Heideggerean (as in Dilthey) and post-Heideggeran (as in Gadamer), except that it is almost never brought into close accord with the debate about intentionality itself. See Rudolf A. Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), ch. 7. See, also, Gadamer, Truth and Method, second part, § 2; and Joel C. Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). The same, I should say, is true of Wittgenstein. See his Philosophical Investigations . I find it quite curious that Wittgenstein's emphasis on the collective aspects of Lebensformen should have been as widely ignored by his admirers as by his detractors. The theme (of intentionality) is much less explicit in Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, but it is surely there. It is also present in Dewey but, again, in a muted

form. See Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism, ch. 5. For a sense of Ranke's version of historicism, see Leopold von Ranke, The Theory of Practice of History, ed. Georg Iggers and Konrad von Moltke, trans. Wilma A. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1983).

4. I take Chomsky to hold one of the most extreme forms of solipsism, namely, nativism or innatism, the doctrine that our cognitive (in particular, our linguistic) capacities are, initially and in a profound sense, genetically determined, fixed in a species-specific way. Chomsky advances his claim on the grounds that there is no other option that is viable. But he nowhere explains how natural language is empirically acquired or how our innate competence is actually triggered among infants—or even how we function epistemically as apt linguistic agents . He offers no sustained account of the actual process of "acquiring" a first language in terms of the utterances of learning children. Characteristically, he offers idealized specimen sentences, taken atomically, as instantiating his grammatical theory and as (somehow) capturing the process of initial human speech. See, for instance, Noam Chomsky, Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin and Use (New York: Praeger, 1986). In a way, all this has been anticipated by Kant, as the letter to Herz (mentioned earlier) makes clear.

5. A very large part of Lévi-Strauss's polemical work has been taken up with opposing any and all forms of historicism, notably in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre. But Lévi-Strauss never explains the grounds on which he projects a timeless or transhistorically valid model of rationality. This is a point of considerable importance in assessing the plausibility of structuralism. As far as I can see, the thesis is entirely arbitrary. It leads directly to a descriptive deformation of the empirical facts about different societies. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), ch. 9, and The Elementary Forms of Kinship . Although (and with justice) Chomsky cannot be called a structuralist, his nativism is subject to the same large criticisms that can be brought against Lévi-Strauss. For an "exasperated" (original term), often naive, certainly unguarded, more or less "Wittgensteinian," nevertheless useful, and thoroughly charming critique of Chomsky's sense of linguistic system, see Ian Robinson, The New Grammarians' Funeral: A Critique of Noam Chomsky's Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). For a critique (of an altogether different sort) of Chomsky's conception of a "generative grammar"—that is, an algorithm-driven system of sentences, even if denumerably infinite—see D. Terence Langedoen and Paul M. Postal, The Vastness of Natural Languages (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984). See, also, Terry Winograd, Understanding Natural Language (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

6. If selves or subjects and the artifacts of their cultural world are construed in realist terms—and there is no viable argument by which a realism of selves (ourselves) can be denied—then, arguably, it is impossible to deny a realist reading of the Intentional features of artworks, languages, artifacts, and actions. That is an extremely powerful finding. Its denial leads directly to a profound incoherence. Danto professes to treat art, history, and action "rhetorically" (that is, not in realist terms), even though, quite obviously, he treats selves, human

persons, as real enough. I am persuaded that this leads to unresolvable paradox. See, for instance, Arthur C. Danto, "The Artworld," Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964), The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, and Narration and Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

7. Davidson's thesis (the two notions are not quite the same) appears in Donald Davidson, "Mental Events," Essays on Events and Actions (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980). This single paper has enjoyed the most remarkable reputation and has exerted an equally remarkable influence. It is, without doubt, one of a very small number of key papers that give a sense of direction to naturalistic philosophies of mind. It offers a fairly ample account of "anomalous monism" (in effect, nonreductive physicism) but no more than a sketch of "supervenience" (which has now eclipsed the other, among naturalists). But anomalous monism is inconsistent, and supervenience is arbitrary and undefended. It is also true that the "supervenientists" regularly assume that Moore's account of ''good" as a non-natural quality somehow introduced the supervenience thesis. That is a flat mistake, for, although Moore surely did believe that good depended on natural properties, he nowhere says (and I think he would never have said) that there was a determinate entailment relation between particular natural and nonnatural properties. But if not, then Moore's argument cannot help the naturalist and is (in fact) opposed to naturalism. See G. E. Moore, "Reply to My Critics," The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, 2d ed., ed. Paul Arthur Schlipp (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1952). See, for a clear sense of the supervenientists' tendency to depart from Moore's thesis—which Davidson plainly shares—Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

8. I have heard Feigl speak of the principle, but have not found it laid out in any text. It is plainly implicated, however, in Herbert Feigl, The "Mental" and the "Physical": The Essay and a Postscript (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967).

9. Popper believes that there are laws of nature, but, he thinks, nature is fathomless for humans. They cannot directly discern any asymptotic approximation to progressively improved formulations of the laws of nature (inductivism). Nevertheless, we do have rational strategies by which we can judge the "verisimilitude" of the would-be laws we formulate. I believe (and have some evidence) that Popper was influenced by Peirce in a general way. But Peirce's optimism about the "long run" is frankly teleologized, whereas Popper pretends that verisimilitude can be defended on rational or methodological grounds that need not rely on any teleologism. I find the argument unconvincing. See Karl R. Popper, "Two Faces of Common Sense: An Argument for Commonsense Realism and Against the Commonsense Theory of Knowledge," in Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), and, also, Realism and the Aim of Science, particularly ch. 1. The Realism book is one of three that, together, comprise Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery (1983, 1982, 1982). I take them to be largely committed (by somewhat different routes) to the defense of "absolute truth" as a "regulative idea" ( verisimilitude ). I have, I should add, already mentioned selected current views that call the realism of nomic invariance into question. On Popper's view of history, see Karl

R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, 3d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1960).

10. I should say that, among contemporary philosophers of the physical sciences, Feyerabend subscribed most completely to this theorem, in spite of the fact that he also strongly favored a form of eliminative physicalism. The truth is, he viewed eliminativism as a project for the dim future. See Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method, and Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

11. This goes against eliminativist (physicalist) tendencies in current philosophies of mind. As far as I can see, they are entirely undefended and utopian. Feyerabend, I have just noted, was frank enough to push the need to muster arguments in favor of its denial into a very remote future. The same is true of Stephen P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983). The same is true, for all its bluster, in Paul M. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). I cannot find a single specifiable argument in support of any of these accounts, except the bare claim that the "folk-theoretic" view must be mistaken. The same (physicalist) point had been made years ago by J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963). But Smart had the "advantage" that the unity of science seemed (then) to be in the ascendent. That is no longer true.

12. The most extreme statement of eliminationism in the context of the unity of science program is the one offered in Wilfrid Sellars, "The Language of Theories," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).

13. There is of course no single canonical "picture." For a sample of the spirit of the unity program, see the first three volumes of the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956, 1958, 1962), edited by Herbert Feigl and his associates. For an inordinately optimistic version of that picture (or something akin to it), see Mario Bunge, "Emergence and the Mind," Neuroscience 11 (1972), and "Levels and Reduction," American Journal of Physiology 103 (1977). The unity theorists and their allies have been much occupied with the problem of emergence in nature—reaching of course to the mental and the cultural—in terms of its reconcilability with a strict methodological canon. My own emphasis is, precisely, on the methodological discontinuity entailed by the admission of Intentionality. In effect, Peirce precludes any such admission—not for the unity theorist's reasons but—by adhering to his doctrine of ''objective" Thirdness (which obtains independently of the constituting work of human inquiry). Peirce's "cosmic mind" falls away from the post-Kantian constraint, but its evolutionism is obviously dated.

14. An extremely clear sense of the puzzles involving extensions and intensions—in sense (ii)—once we depart from something like Aristotle's archism is offered in Putnam's papers on semantics. See Hilary Putnam, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: University Press, 1975).

15. For a sense of Kant's treatment of history, see Yirmiahu Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

16. The whole thrust of Positivism, the unity of science program, and naturalism is to insist that it is unreasonable to construe the phenomena of the cultural world as not analyzable, ontically or epistemically—hence, also, conceptually or methodologically—in the non-Intentional terms thought to be apt for the physical sciences. For a somewhat overly optimistic (but revealing) specimen, see Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism . To press the point, I cannot see any fundamental difference in outlook, although I admit local refinements and variations, in the more recent specimen offered in D. C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).

17. For doubts about the standard interpretation, see Lilli Alanen, Studies in Cartesian Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind, Acta Philosophica Fennica 28 (1982), and "On Descartes's Argument for Dualism, and the Distinction between Different Kinds of Beings," in S. Knuutila and J. Hintikka (eds.), The Logic of Being (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986).

18. Although modern atomic (and subatomic) theory is utterly unlike the original "atomic" theory of Democritus, there is much that links them still. Democritus, of course, meant his atoms (indivisible entities) to be construed literally as such. Hence, on Democritus's view, all perceptible change in nature is to be explained in terms of the combination of unalterable and impenetrable (ultimate) atoms and the distinction between the perceptual appearance of any combination of atoms and what combinations actually obtain at the atomic "level." Modern cosmologies have been forced to concede that subatomic structures (as presently conceived) cannot be ultimate, but it is clear that the search for microtheoretical entities is still largely motivated by the dream of capturing the ultimate compositional elements of physical nature. The present state of quantum physics has proved particularly baffling. I mention some specimen discussions in the notes in chapter 9. The plot gets much thicker. Quite a number of theorists, who oppose the optimistic physicalism of the unity of science model, nevertheless do believe that a unity can be recovered. Some of these have been led to believe that there must be a deeper connection between quantum physics and the structure of the mind. I have never found these accounts convincing, although I see the motivation for them. But then, I have never found the unity of science model convincing either. For specimens, see Roger Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Michael Lockwood, Mind, Brain and the Quantum: The Compound 'I' (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). The general strategy of these very different books is to urge us to appreciate the puzzling complexity of matter —which is, after all, a refreshing change. For a rather revealing set of reflections on the part of David Bohm, who has surely had as much as anyone to do with the attempt to link the mind/body problem to our interpretation of quantum physics, see David Bohm and F. David Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1987). My sense is that these accounts tend to confuse the requirements of symbiosis with the dream of a unified science.

19. The doctrine is the unfortunate consequence of attempting to treat, within the terms of a Fregean or Russellian logic, the analysis of particulars essentially in predicative terms. Hence, it is attracted to a kind of Platonism (as

in Russell), in that a "particular" is construed in terms of the site of a "bare particular" at which universals somehow are present. See, for instance, Edwin Allaire, "Bare Particulars," Philosophical Studies 16 (1963). The thesis is the result of trying to conform with certain of Russell's constraints without adhering to Russell's views about their import for knowledge "by acquaintance." See Gustav Bergmann, "Russell on Particulars,'' Philosophical Review 56 (1947).

20. It is a curious but undeniable fact that physicalists often agree, despite rejecting dualism, that dualism offers the only (or very nearly the only) serious alternative to physicalism itself. There's no doubt, for instance, that that supposition motivates the accounts of Churchland and Parfit. See, for instance, Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective; and Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). The confusion is palpable in Parfit, for, in one of the earliest of his papers leading to Reasons and Persons, Parfit actually conjectures that the issues of the numerical identity of persons may be retired in favor of certain predicative continuities. See Derek Parfit, "Personal Identity," Philosophical Review 80 (1971). But of course that deprives the predicative issue of any determinate application and leads (if psychological attributes are still to be invoked) to what Strawson calls (and criticizes as) the "no-ownership theory." See P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959). In any case, there's no point to debating dualism and reductionism without a firm commitment to the logic of reference and predication. Something similar (to Parfit's difficulty) appears in Dennett's Content and Consciousness, for Dennett, too, believes that the concept of persons can be retired. In principle, this would require that intentional predicates be "reduced" in some suitable way so that their replacements could be predicated of (non-Intentionally qualified) physical or biological entities. Dennett nowhere provides the required account. In fact, he has tried, more recently, to enrich the language of intentionality. See Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), and Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991). But the original intent is plainly still in play. Parfit's is more problematic, because Parfit does not broach any explicit, comparable reduction.

21. Strawson's very promising intuition about the difference between persons and physical bodies was spoiled, I believe, by his implicit adherence to a "dualism" of mental and physical properties. See Strawson, Individuals . This explains the ease with which Bernard Williams was able to show that Strawson had not satisfactorily distinguished his account from the dualism he wished to avoid. See Williams, Problems of the Self . If I am right in this, then the only conceptual option that respects the realism of the mental, the avoidance of dualism and reductionism, is the one I propose: that is, the view that the mental is "complex." To enrich the notion for what else is needed, I say that one must also construe the mental as Intentional, historicized, constructed. But the key maneuver rests with admitting the (cultural) emergence of the "complex."

22. I offer a short overview of the various relevant strategies of emergence in "Emergence and the Unity of Science," in my Science without Unity: Reconciling the Human and Natural Sciences (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

23. For a clear sense of the problem of reductionism and of distinguishing between the physical and the biological, see Marjorie Grene and Everett Men-

delsohn (eds.), Topics in the Philosophy of Biology (Dordrecht: D. Reide, 1976), especially parts II-III. For a very fair-minded recent overview, favoring (nevertheless) what he calls "the general redirection-replacement model," see Kenneth F. Schaffner, Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), particularly ch. 9.

24. For a sample of the sense in which the "functional" is invoked in biological and related contexts, see Larry Wright, Teleological Explanation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976). The most sustained (relatively early) discussion of functional explanations occurs, I believe, in Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964). (Taylor's work influenced Wright. Schaffner reviews the critical literature.) See, also, Marjorie Grene, The Understanding of Nature: Essays in the Philosophy of Biology (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974).

25. For a sense of the role of the "informational" in the development of contemporary genetic theory, see James D. Watson, Molecular Biology of the Gene, 2d ed. (Menlo Park: W. A. Benjamin, 1970). You cannot fail to see that the philosophical issue is nowhere present. The most recent sustained philosophical application (that I know) of the "informational" in ontic and epistemic terms congenial to analytic philosophy may be found in Fred I. Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981). It is, I think, wedded too obviously to notions of nomological necessity, which are not independently defended.

26. Broadly speaking, this is the gist of Millikan's strategy. See Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories . The strategy works wherever the function is merely heuristic or emergent in the way of biological phenomena. For a sense, for instance, of the "homeostatic," see Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1979), ch. 12. It's only when the normative specifically implicates the Intentional that the naturalizing strategy fails. See, also, Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).

27. See James J. Gibson, The Senses Considered As Perceptual Systems (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), and The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979). Among philosophers, Fodor is one of the most determined of those who would oppose "meaning holism" ( a fortiori, the holism of models of rationality) and, as a result, the conceptual (necessary) linkage between attributions of intentionality (and information) and such holist models. See Jerry A. Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).

28. The methodological complications of the theorem, or of the general admission of the reality of the cultural world, is amusingly and interestingly explored in Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). Dawkins seems to have become increasingly impressed with the promise of his model, although, of course, the constraints he favors (that is, cultural analogies with the "gene") are uncertain (that is, imposed without any independent analysis of the relevant cultural complexities: those of Intentionality). See

also Richard Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

29. One can, without difficulty, see that Popper and Danto converge, however remotely and with whatever difference in results, on the guidance of the unity of science program, at least as far as history is concerned. See Popper, The Poverty of Historicism; and Danto, Narrative and Knowledge .

30. It is not surprising that both Danto and Popper treat time univocally in the context of history and science. It is more surprising that Ricoeur does so as well, which actually generates insoluble paradoxes for his well-known account of history. Ricoeur cannot decide whether the narrative structure of history is real or merely rhetorical. Curiously, he seems to say that it is both! See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), and The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies in the Creation of Meaning in Language, trans. Robert Czerny, with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, S.J. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).

31. I take it as symptomatic that neither Davidson's naturalism nor Rorty's postmodernism comes to terms with the antinomies. I cannot see how the antinomies can be responsibly dismissed. See, for instance, Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," and Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," both in Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation .

32. I am unaware of any sustained theory along these lines within analytic philosophy except my own. I have explored it in a number of places, usually linking the discussion of "incarnate" attributes with that of "embodied" entities (the latter topic to appear in the next chapter). For earlier discussions, see, for instance, Margolis, Culture and Cultural Entities, and Texts without Referents: Reconciling Science and Narrative (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

33. What is conceptually unique about the "culturally emergent" is, of course, that it is only at that "level" that epistemically competent reflection is at all possible; a fortiori, it is only at that level, conceding symbiosis, that the structure of physical nature itself can be discerned and specified as obtaining at a "lower" (or "prior") "level''—from which the cultural is itself emergent. That was the point of the "antinomy of ontic priority." But to admit cultural emergence as sui generis (since it is not reducible or explicable, causally, in terms of the generative powers of any known "lower-level" phenomena) is to admit a tacit, endogenous limitation in our explanatory powers. The admission of the culturally emergent is, therefore, tantamount to the defeat of the unity of science program. Interestingly, the matter never really surfaced in this form for the strong advocates of the program. They were fearful that the "mental" might be "emergent" in the sense that it could not be explained in terms of the nonmental. I take that to have been weakly prescient about the larger issue: the sense in which the mind/body problem turns out to be a special case of the culture/nature problem. It is certainly clear that the problem of emergence was central to the work of the unity program. See, for instance, Herbert Feigl, The "Mental" and the "Physical": The Essay and a Postscript (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967); and Paul E. Meehl and Wilfrid Sellars, "The Concept of Emergence," in Herbert Feigl and Michael Seriven (eds.), Minnesota Studies in

the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1. (The volume is mentioned above for another reason.)

34. I have already cited Mario Bunge's views, above.

35. Paul Churchland is among the most energetic recent champions of the thesis ("eliminationism") that the folk-theoretic claim may be straightforwardly shown to be empirically false. I have not been able to find his argument (to that effect) anywhere, but I also have not found that he addresses the issues I have been collecting here. Frankly, I take that to be a sign of a certain failure to engage the relevant objections (which Churchland shares with a large company of like-minded theorists). See Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective, and Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). See, also, Patricia S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Understanding of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986).

1. This is a remarkably strenuous issue, largely neglected by analytic philosophers (and others as well). I have already suggested that Chomsky gives the matter very scant attention, intruding in effect a sense of "knowledge" of the deep structure of language (that we are unaware of) as an extension or analogue of the "ordinary" sense of "know"—which he does not bother to analyze. This, the most interesting part of his theory philosophically, is nowhere explicitly defended, except to say that there is really no other alternative. Piaget, however, offers the sketch of an alternative that is not unreasonable in its general outlines, except that it is an eccentrically ''structuralist" alternative. There is a very revealing exchange between Chomsky and Piaget in a volume devoted to a debate between them, that exposes the arbitrariness of each. See Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), particularly the opening papers by Piaget and Chomsky. On Piaget's view, see, also, Jean Piaget, Structuralism, trans. and edit. Chaninah Maschler (New York: Basic Books, 1970), which confirms that Piaget mysteriously supposed that the sequence of the developmental phases of our cognitional powers is somehow triggered by the external environment; Piaget, however, does not explain (Chomsky catches him out in this) why the developmental sequence is invariant. See, also, C. H. Waddington, The Strategy of the Genes: A Discussion of Some Aspects of Theoretical Biology (New York: Macmillan, 1920), and Evolution of an Evolutionist (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975). On his side, Piaget effectively challenges Chomsky's assumption that there is a determinate disjunction between what is "innate" and what is "acquired." Vygotsky criticizes the early Piaget in a telling way for the implicit solipsism of his account. See L. S. Vygotsky, Thought and Language, edit and trans. Eugenia Hanfman and Gertrude Vakar (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962), ch. 2. In a rather subtle way, Jerome Bruner draws attention to the likelihood of prelinguistic socialized invariants on which first-language learning depends—which, if granted, could easily admit forms of grammatical regularity short of the invariances of a "universal gram-

mar" (a hard-wired, species-specific grammar, the full meaning of which is hardly clear)—given that there is no obvious way to account for "informational" invariances of the sort in question. For a glimpse of Chomsky's view, see Noam Chomsky, Rules and Representations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). On Bruner, see Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), ch. 3.

2. An excellent recent specimen is provided in John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). It obviously admits social phenomena in its account, but effectively construes social significance in terms of some prior psychological endowment, which is itself identified with the brain's mode of functioning. This is precisely what I call "solipsistic." There is no convincing way to generate the "social" or ''collective" (for instance, in terms of language) from solipsistic mental resources. Searle promises a new book on the "social character of the mind" but he does not acknowledge the "anthropomorphized" nature of his present speculations about consciousness. So he holds that the mental is a feature of the brain. At best, the present argument is premature. I should add that Husserl is, in my opinion, guilty of a similar mistake, although it is frankly never quite clear just how Husserl distinguishes between the "psychological" and the "subjective." He clearly means to absorb the social in the (subjective) work of transcendental phenomenology. But it is doubtful that he succeeds; if he had succeeded, he would not be able to disjoin the psychological and the subjective, and then the search for the apodictic would have been compromised. See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, especially the Fifth Meditation. As I have already remarked, the generic version of this trick appears already in Kant's first Critique .

3. Fodor's indebtedness to Chomsky's conception is apparent in Jerry A. Fodor, The Language of Thought (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975). See, also, Fodor's contribution, "On the Impossibility of Acquiring 'More Powerful' Structures," in Massimo Piartelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning, which confirms that the thread runs through all of Fodor's work. In effect, both Chomsky and Fodor are Platonists, who have interpreted "recollection" as genetic invariance with respect to "knowing."

4. I mean, by "equilibration," a theorizing strategy, not an epistemic source. For its more or less standard use, see Nelson Goodman, "The New Riddle of Induction," in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, 2d ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

5. The reference is to Thomas Nagel's well-known paper, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Nagel has made a complete about-face on the analysis of mind, but his query does not improve our sense of the question. The reason, plainly, is that only humans can know what it is like to be a bat! Humans may make empirical mistakes about the matter, as perhaps they do in wondering whether lobsters feel pain on being boiled alive. But only humans can correct their conjectures, by interpolating within a range of cases that are reasonably clear-cut. But if this holds for Nagel's conjecture, it holds as well for Chomsky's and Fodor's. The truth is, their conjectures presuppose (but nowhere establish) something like

Hjelmslev's doctrine: that is, that for the process of natural-language discourse there must be a closed generative system adequate to it. They do not show the modal necessity for such a supposition. Nor do they notice the "anthropomorphic" nature of their own speculation. See Hjelsmlev, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language . Searle is at his most effective, in The Rediscovery of the Mind, in combatting Chomsky.

6. The essential pivot of Gadamer's hermeneutics is directed against the so-called Romantic hermeneuts, who claimed that the objective rule for determining the meaning of a linguistic (or literary) utterance was the speaker's (or author's) intention (in the intuitive psychological sense). Gadamer's thesis is simply that speakers' intentions can be reclaimed only in a constructivist sense—from the vantage of our present reflexive practice—and hence, that that recovery is subject to two conditions: one, that "authorial intent" is a function of what, from our present vantage, we determine to be the intentional ethos or tradition within which relevant utterances are uttered; the other, that the meaning or significance of what is uttered is tacitly affected by our horizonal interests and sense of significance. The first condition implicates the historicity of discerning authorial intent; the second implicates the historicity of discerning the significance of whatever is designated in accord with the first. Together, they mark the joint play of what Gadamer calls Horizontverschmelzung (the fusion of horizons) and wirkungsgeschlichtliches Bewusstsein (effective-historical consciousness). Together, they deny the possibility of closure and uniquely correct interpretations under the terms of the hermeneutic circle. See Gadamer, Truth and Method . Gadamer's entire theory may be fairly construed as "post-Heideggerean," meaning both that Gadamer was specifically influenced by the theory of time and history offered in Heidegger's Being and Time, and that, as a consequence, Gadamer avoids metaphysical fixities (notably in the human sphere). The upshot is that Gadamer's theory, like Heidegger's, emphasizes questions of "authentic" existence rather than of methodological objectivity. This, however, leaves the question of objectivity unresolved but still relevant. Moreover, Gadamer's own themes require an answer that he nowhere supplies. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Interview: Historicism and Romanticism,'' in Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History, Applied Hermeneutics, ed. Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson, trans. Lawrence Schmidt and Monica Reuss (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992).

7. Rightly seen, the theorem is the essential pivot for the defeat of the entire classical tradition of epistemology: from Descartes and Locke, through Hume, through Kant, up to Husserl— a fortiori, to all the naturalisms of the twentieth century. For (10.9) signifies that any and all accounts of the solipsistic or species-wide resources of cognizing agents are projected from within the terms of our lebensformlich competence. Applied to Quine, for instance, it raises a question (which Quine never addresses) of why "analytical hypotheses" are not called into play in every cognitive claim, why there is an interval reserved for certain "stimulus-meaning" or "holophrastic" utterances that are not subject to the influence of "analytical hypotheses." See Quine, Word and Object and Pursuit of Truth . This may be all the reassurance Donald Davidson needed for his claims

in "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge." There is a loose analogy here between Davidson's use of Quine and his use, elsewhere, of Tarski.

8. I cannot find any clear version of the theory of Forms in Plato's dialogues, and I cannot find clear evidence that Plato is committed to the theory of Forms. There's no question that he broaches the matter and appeals to myths involving the Forms. But I also cannot find any evidence that he repudiates the doctrine, or that Aristotle is mistaken in claiming that his own doctrine is closer to that of Socrates than is Plato's. See, for instance, Aristotle, Metaphysics . Aristotle says that Socrates "did not make the universals exist apart." By a similarly motivated reflection, I cannot see that Wittgenstein actually formulates his notion of Lebensformen sufficiently explicitly to answer relevant epistemic questions, although the clues he offers are more robust than Plato's with regard to the Forms. It would not take much to interpret Plato along lines not altogether distant from Wittgenstein's—if one cared. The conservative bent of Wittgenstein's thought is captured in J. C. Nyíri, Tradition and Individuality: Essays (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992).

9. The theorem draws attention, among other things, to two features of collective entities: one, that the (Intentional) predicables attributed to persons, artworks, and the like are, intrinsically, subject to changes due to historicity; another, that their "natures" are, accordingly, no more determinate than Intentional attributes can be. Notions like period style, for instance, are inherently informal. This bears on the fortunes of the various forms of hermeneutics. For an instant sense of the difference between the "semiotic" and "Romantic" views of style or genre, see Nelson Goodman, "The Status of Style," in Ways of World-making (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978); and E. D. Hirsch Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). Hirsch, in Appendix II, explicitly condemns Gadamer's "Heideggerean'' innovation. For Gadamer's use of "prejudice," see Gadamer, Truth and Method . To grasp the sense of (10.14) is to realize: (a) that the "nature" of any particular possessing collective, Intentional properties may be affected by pertinent changes in other particulars sharing similar properties (the "tragic" cast of Sophocles's Antigone may be affected by the later history of Shakespeare's Hamlet ); and (b) the cognitive competence of the individual members of the same society to understand one another is a function of their sharing a common Lebensform, in a sense that parallels the mutual interpretability of artworks possessing any of a range of associated genres or styles within a common cultural tradition. I have explored these connections further in my Interpretation Radical But Not Unruly . I should add, of course, that I certainly do not regard Goodman as a "Romantic" hermeneut; only that, like the Romantics, Goodman lacks a sense of historicity. (Goodman's theory is a kind of ahistorical semiotics.)

10. See Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Chatto and Windus, 1992), ch. 4. See, also Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche, Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

11. I take the acquisition of a first language to be an empirical mystery. I cannot see how it can be analogized, as Chomsky does, to the acquisition of a second language. That is simply Platonism. The idea plays a large part in Chomsky's debate with Nelson Goodman and Hilary Putnam, for instance, who are

noticeably flat-footed in response to Chomsky. But the image is the wrong one, for, on Chomsky's own view, "universal grammar" (which is said to be innate) cannot function apart from the acquisition of a first language in the usual intuitive sense. Chomsky nowhere discusses that, and the supposed possession of a universal grammar is nowhere convincingly shown to function criterially with respect to the acquisition of a "natural" language. Wittgensteinian Lebensformen, on the other hand, bear only on the fait accompli, not on the process of the acquisition. See the symposium on Chomsky's "innateness hypothesis" in Synthese 17 (1967), to which Noam Chomsky, Nelson Goodman, and Hilary Putnam contributed.

12. For Bourdieu's use of the term, see Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), and In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

13. I find Marx unwaveringly clear—implicitly—about this theorem. It is the key both to the joke about "Robinsonades" and to the criticism of Pierre Joseph Proudhon. See Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolas (New York: Random House, 1973), Introduction. Marx's emphasis is invariably on the historicized nature of collectively enabled cognitive powers—what Marx clearly means by " praxis ." The term is Aristotle's, originally; also, Marx does not discuss the notion in a sustained and systematic way. For what seems to me to be the most convincing elaboration of what Marx may have had in mind, see Karel Kosík, Dialectics of the Concrete: A Study on Problems of Man and World, trans. Karel Kovanda and James Schmidt (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976). Here you have the clue regarding my deformation of Wittgenstein's Lebensformen and Gadamer's horizonal sense of "tradition." For, of course, neither Wittgenstein nor Gadamer has anything to say about the dynamics of social history.

14. On the very different behaviorisms of Skinner and Pavlov, see B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1953), and About Behaviorism (New York: Knopf, 1974); and I. P. Pavlov, Conditioned Reflexes, trans. G. V. Anrep (London: Humphrey Milford, 1927), and Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes, trans. W. H. Grant (New York: International Publishers, 1928). Of course, Pavlov is neither a reductionist nor an eliminativist regarding human minds or selves.

15. I draw attention, here, to two important themes: first, epistemology is inseparable from the metaphysics of persons; second, epistemology is inseparable from moral philosophy. Both are ignored in analytic philosophy. Within the terms of symbiosis, theorem (10.29) strengthens the artifactual standing of both truth-claims in general and claims of moral objectivity in particular. This is the consequence of conceding that knowing is inseparable from what we are able to do as agents . I take this to be the most abstract consequence of endorsing something like Marx's notion of praxis . The issue will occupy us in chapter 11. I may perhaps say that Rorty's pretense to restore historicity to philosophy is nowhere more transparent than in his advocacy of Davidson's ahistorical epistemology and in his disjunction between the private and public spheres of in-

terest among human agents. These moves are simply incoherent on the acceptance of anything like (10.29). See Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," and Contingency, Irony and Solidarity .

16. For a sense of various standard ways of distinguishing between the two, see Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge ; and Fred I. Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). I offer these as specimen views only. Chisholm's favors a foundationalism I cannot endorse, and Dretske's an externalism I cannot endorse.

17. Hume, who is a very likeable and ingenious philosopher, is almost never taken to task by his analytic admirers for the hopeless muddle that lies at the very heart of his theory. He offers his "official" account in terms of sensory "impressions" and "ideas," but, in doing so, he appeals to our sensibilities in discerning these . Now, Hume nowhere develops the issue of how to understand the continuous perceptual and cognitive competence of selves in virtue of which (alone) his entire argument makes sense. One might suppose Hume had missed the question in some way or other. But I know of no empiricist who has seriously considered the bearing of Hume's doctrine on the existence and nature of selves! (If anything, they typically—and wrongly—take Hume to deny that there are selves.) By parity of reasoning, I find most analytic accounts of perception and cognition (however they depart from empiricism) to neglect in general (unless they are out and out Kantian) a theory of selves as cogniscient agents apt for the perceptions attributed to them. In this sense, Hume's influence among analytic philosophers is "clinically" instructive. See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature .

18. Causal accounts of perception and knowledge are very popular among analytic philosophers. Nevertheless, I know of no explicit, sustained, and convincing account that comes to terms with the ineliminable propositional element of cognitive states. Two points need to be stressed: one, to the effect that the admission of the propositional ingredient inevitably leads to the ineliminability of legitimative matters; the second, to the effect that naturalizing epistemology leads to a causal theory of perceptual (and similar sorts of) belief. The second seems to free matters for a causal theory, but it does not really do so for we have no satisfactory account of the causal conditions of intentional states —certainly none that could be said to behave in nomologically regular ways. Clearly, a causal theory of belief is bound to implicate a model of rationality (along lines already sketched, to which I shall return in a moment). Also, the judgment that suitably caused beliefs constitute knowledge remains a nagging question that the causal theory cannot itself resolve. See, for specimens, H. P. Grice, "The Causal Theory of Perception," in Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); and Alan White, with H. P. Grice, in "Symposium: The Causal Theory of Perception," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 4 (1961). On the most recent version of the naturalist's causal account of knowledge, see Alvin I. Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing," in Liaisons, and Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), ch. 3.

19. I take Wittgenstein's account of pain avowal to betray the fact that he, too, is an externalist. This suggests that he does not construe his Lebensformen

in the way I have deliberately exploited. For, if he had, he would have construed persons and their perceptions as artifacts of our Lebensformen, and then he would have had to be hospitable to the idea that avowals of pain could function reportorially (in their distinctive way) every bit as much as constative utterances about sensory perception. See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations . For an appreciation of Wittgenstein's account, see George Pitcher, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), ch. 12.

20. On Brentano's view, see Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, bk. 2.

21. Freud treats the unconscious as a theoretical posit invoked in explanatory contexts. It plays no reportorial role in first-person contexts. See Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious," in Collected Papers, vol. 4, trans. under supervision of Joan Riviere (New York: Basic Books, 1959). It helps, therefore, in clarifying the fact that "belief" often plays an explanatory role in ordinary contexts, where it is "unconscious" in a familiar sense. Chomsky's version of the "unconscious" (''innate," "species-specific") does no explanatory work that I can see. It has no variable or variably structured function in different linguistic contexts. It amounts to no more than an en bloc pronouncement that whatever we rightly claim are the invariant and exceptionless grammatical structures of natural language are innately present in the biological resources of humans. It does not explain how these structures work and it does not confirm that there are any such structures. See Chomsky, Rules and Representations, and Knowledge of Language .

22. Here I generalize in a way linked to Locke's theory, except that Locke (who is of course profoundly "pre-Kantian") does not realize that construing persons forensically alerts us to the possibility that both persons and their perceptions may be artifacts of a deeper process. Locke treats persons as independent existents— but forensically; whereas I treat them as artifactual existents— hence forensically. This suggests why Locke has no difficulty reconciling his "Cartesian" view of natural rights with his empiricism. It also explains why, although Hume is cleverer, Locke is more solid and more plausible. That Hume is on his way to some sort of constructivism is clear, but Kant's example shows that it needn't have led to the doctrine of symbiosis or to that of historicity. So the novelty of (10.40) becomes clearer. See Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and, also, Two Treatises of Government, edit. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

23. I take Putnam to have had a strong disposition favoring the collective, lebensformlich, constructivist theory of persons the post-Kantian tradition has championed, without quite grasping the full import of that line of reasoning. See Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'meaning'," in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). It helps to explain the collapse of Putnam's epistemology and metaphysics in The Many Faces of Realism, while not yet abandoning the vestiges of a Kantian externalism.

24. A very reasonable account of the need to posit theoretical entities is offered in Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For an account along different lines, see Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie .

Van Fraassen, who is more of a purist in the way of positivism than Cartwright, tries to interpret the laws of nature in empiricist terms: except that, in his appealing but self-defeating candor, van Fraassen admits that there is no principled demarcation between theoretical and perceptual distinctions. See Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980).

25. I am not certain how, precisely, the notion of the "folk-theoretic" became a term in the eliminationist idiom. I feel sure that it has its immediate sources in Wilfrid Sellars, "The Language of Theories" and "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in Science, Truth and Reality ; and in papers like that by Feyerabend, "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem," Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963). But it appeared in what seemed an instantly established usage in Stephen P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983); and is associated in my mind with the views of such figures as Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective ; and Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Montgomery: Bradford Books, 1978). But to be able to affirm (10.45) on the strength of the foregoing argument is to expose the rather surprising laxness of the entire company of eliminativists, who fail to a man to explain precisely how they mean to dispose of the ''subject" or "self" or cognizing "agent." Feyerabend suggests that we wait as long as the "folk" tradition has held sway; Churchland says that anything like (10.45) is simply "empirically" false; Stich says what he would replace the folk idiom with but admits he cannot see how to do so quite yet.

26. The double lesson of the theorem is that "objectivity" is an artifact of lebensformlich practices and, as such, belongs to the realism of the cultural, but only (or initially) in a holist way. I construe holism here in a sense akin to that of Wittgenstein's appeal to Lebensformen (or, a "language game" within the terms of a Lebensform ), that is, acts and utterances in which we are entitled to claim a sense of congruity with our enabling practices but not yet with rules or criteria in virtue of which our claims may be judged to be right or valid. We simply "know how to go on" within our "form of life," and whatever we assign as the criteria of correctness will, similarly, conform with those encompassing practices. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), and On Certainty . The important point to bear in mind is that Quine's "holism," in Word and Object and Pursuit of Truth, is altogether different—a heterdox and doubtful interpretation of Duhem's more interesting holism. Quine's, I'm afraid, is incoherent: it tries to combine the "indeterminacy of translation" doctrine (which looks at first glance like a generalization of Duhem's theory) with some sort of minimal empiricism (which is supposed to be metaphysically neutral, as in the way of "holophrastic sentences"). But Duhem's emphasis is applied only to the empirical testing of theories, without our being able to say precisely which propositions within those theories are being tested (and why that is so), whereas Quine's maneuver is meant to subvert the pretensions of something like a "folk" science and metaphysics. See Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory .

27. The hermeneutic circle is the central theme of so-called hermeneutic philosophies. Originally, it was applied to the interpretation of texts for which

canons might be claimed: sacred, legal, and, more recently, literary. In that form, in the tradition from Schleiermacher to, say, E. D. Hirsch, it simply signifies the part/whole relation of interpretable texts: the meaning of any part depends on the meaning of the whole, and the meaning of the whole depends on the meaning of its parts. In post-Heideggerean hermeneutics—Gadamer's, preeminently—societal life itself conforms with the terms of the hermeneutic circle. In that sense, the "circle" signifies the consensual nature of interpretation, the absence of ahistorical canons, the historicized and openended nature of interpretation itself. I am simply usurping the term in that sense, in a way that, contrary to Gadamer's usage, permits us to reconsider what objectivity may mean within the human sciences and human studies. My own argument emphasizes, of course, that the objectivity accorded the natural sciences is also affected. (I shall come to this in a moment.) For a sense of the "Romantic" view, see Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation ; for the post-Heideggerean, see Gadamer, Truth and Method .

28. I have isolated the "hermeneutic circle" for particular mention. But there are a great many different influential views of the relationship of interpreting agents and interpretable materials that trade on the same part/whole relationship. I see the same theme in Marx's notion of praxis and in Roland Barthes's semiotized (poststructuralist) literary criticism; also, of course, in Foucault's archaeologies. See Roland Barthes, S/Z: An Essay, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974); also, Foucault, The Order of Things .

29. Ernest Jones's Hamlet and Oepidus (New York: Norton, 1949) is a well-known example, literal-minded though it is. A more interesting case is offered by George Thompson, Aeschylus and Athens (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1941), who shows us how to construe the Oresteia in Marxist terms. I view these examples both metaphysically and epistemologically. The idea that these plays are simply being cleverly interpreted misses the essential challenge. My thesis is that the cultural world is "permeable," "porous," and (as I shall say in a moment) "labile''—metaphysically—because of its Intentional properties, and that objectivity in the human sciences is affected—consensually—because, in the human world, perceiver and perceived are one (10.51)-(10.56). I hold that persons and artworks are very similar, ontologically, with regard to the fixity of their "natures."

30. I find it difficult to account for Dennett's blunder. See Dennett, Content and Consciousness . Dennett does not correct his mistake in The Intentional Stance . At bottom, Dennett is an eliminationist, but he is also put off by the crudity and haste of the usual eliminationists. Hence, he keeps lengthening the postponement of the "inevitable" eliminativist coup. But he never supplies the decisive argument.

31. For a remarkable disconfirmation of Freud's speculations about Leonardo da Vinci, see Meyer Schapiro, "Leonardo and Freud: An Art-Historical Study," Journal of the History of Ideas 17 (1956). See Sigmund Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. under the general editorship of James Strachey, vol. 11 (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1957). Shapiro's superb command of the art-historical materials as well as what pertains to Freudian psychoanalysis shows, by example,

something of the recoverability of a sense of objective claims within the human sciences. Here, I should say, somewhat against Schapiro's view of his own procedure, that where he disconfirms Freud's conjectures (about the import of treating Mary and St. Anne as being of the same age), the evidence leads to a more decisive finding than when he attempts to support his own affirmative conjectures about the psychoanalytic import of further details (for instance, about the alleged homosexual import of treating Jesus and John the Baptist as children of about the same age). I don't mean this in a merely art-historical sense—that is, in a merely evidentiary sense. What I have in mind is that truth and falsity play asymmetrical roles in a relativistic logic (chapter 4) and that art-historical arguments favor, in my opinion, a relativistic rather than a bivalent logic.

32. Actions and historical events are extraordinarily difficult to individuate—hence, difficult to reidentify through redescriptions. For one thing, they have Intentional identities, and, for another, there are no clear criteria for deciding the aptness of alternative descriptions for particular actions and particular historical events. Donald Davidson has offered a remarkably confident thesis, congruent with a moderate physicalism and sympathetic with supervenience, for identifying actions in terms of minimal physical movements ("primitive actions"). But this supposes that there is a legible relationship between actions and movements favoring the rule, "one movement, one action" (rather like William's policy of "one body, one person''). If, however, cultural emergence is, as I have argued, a sui generis form of emergence, the thesis is at the very least question-begging. See Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons and Causes" and "Agency," in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980). Alvin I. Goldman has, in A Theory of Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), constructed an alternative theory, rather on the extravagant side, one that threatens paradox here and there, that nevertheless allows for indefinitely many different actions to be conceptually linked to a single bodily movement. My own view is that neither of these accounts can be said to have isolated anything that is modally necessary. Neither is particularly plausible. And neither conforms very closely to the actual practice of natural-language discourse. The important point is that any policy falling between Davidson's and Goldman's options will upset the effectiveness of an extensional treatment of actions— a fortiori, an extensional treatment of historical events.

33. The cultural world, I am arguing, depends essentially on the role of individual persons as competent agents. I have shown how entities other than culturally apt human persons may, anthropomorphically, be construed as agents. The most interesting extension involves collective agents: societies, classes, families, clans, peoples, and the like. The Annaliste school has, in its effort to make history a science, been attracted to the possibility that individual human agents may be marginalized or eliminated. But this is to misunderstand (in a way not altogether distant from the structuralist temptation) the conceptual relationship between individual agents and the collective features of the culture human aggregates share. See Fernand Braudel, On History, trans. Sarah Matthews (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). War, for instance, can only (on the usual theories) be fought by collective agents, but, on the argument, there are no collective agents, they are fictions (10.72). Hence, wars implicate

ideologies by which aggregates of individuals believe they are serving the interests of a collective agent.

34. I believe I have invented a unique "relational" notion, suited exclusively for cultural phenomena, but comparable in an interesting way with the member/class and instance/kind "relationship." I take it that classes, kinds, and types do not exist but may mark real attributes. The notion of "tokens'' and "types" originates with Peirce, I believe. Peirce's account treats types as universals of some sort. I construe the "relation" as one "between" individuals—one that is heuristically introduced. See Joseph Margolis, Art and Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1980). The principal alternative interpretations appear in Wollheim, Art and Its Objects; and Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art . Both of these views admit real universals.

35. See John Searle, Minds, Brains and Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

1. "Queer" is Mackie's skeptical and derogatory term for any favorable realist reading of the ontic status of moral norms and values. See John Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977). I draw attention to two considerations. For one, Mackie assumes that what is real regarding the natural world is not (in any comparable sense) "invented"—it is, rather, securely "there," independent of our conceptual interventions. So his epithet conveys an externalist's complaint. He does not provide the supporting argument. The second consideration is simply that Hume, before him, had made a related move regarding the distinction between the ("realist") import of the copulas, "is" and "ought." See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, III, I, i. Hume is more transparent, since Hume does not altogether disallow a favorable empiricist reading of value-laden and normative predicates. Hume singles out the copula "ought" for adverse criticism. I argue that you cannot disallow the pertinent (realist) use of "ought" if you do not disallow normative predicates in general and that you cannot make the would-be economy convincing if you cannot interpret the regulative function of "true" conformably. Mackie does not address the matter; Hume picks and chooses in a peculiarly arbitrary way just what (in Mackie's terms) we should regard as "queer." There are additional infelicities that depend on Hume's empiricism, of course. Hume cannot account satisfactorily for any full-blooded posit of cognizing selves. This is the deep point of Kant's great compliment to Hume and of Reid's contempt for Hume's puzzlement (and perhaps more) regarding the existence of selves. See Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Cambridge: MIT, 1969), essay 6, ch. 5. A little later, in this chapter, I suggest that "ought" may be read as "oughtful," that is, predicatively. If so, then Hume's concessions on normative predications subvert his own resistance to the strong categorical use of "ought," and Mackie's failure to acknowledge that a similar concession may be needed for "true" ( on externalist grounds) confirms the inherent limitations of the strongest forms of empiricism. My own suggestion is that both Hume and Mackie have conflated first- and second-order considerations in the naturalist's

way, and that that (rather than externalism) accounts for the seeming plausibility of the conceptual impoverishment each is inclined to favor. (Empiricism is largely extraneous at this point.)

2. The thinnest form of "moral realism" (in the philosophical sense) is the version offered by Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), Introduction and ch. 8. It is actually not an argument, but a plea for such an argument. (Nagel believes "the methods needed to understand ourselves do not yet exist.") Compare Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), chs. 1, 9. Furthermore, Nagel construes the issue as involving in an essential way some form of (moral) neutrality. I suppose this really means that his statement is also the most attenuated version possible of Rawls's ''original position." See Rawls, A Theory of Justice . Still, the trouble with "the view from nowhere" is that it issues "from nowhere" and yields no conceptual fruit. That cannot be said of Rawls's thesis. It pretends to have been issued "from nowhere" (that is, from a neutral vantage). But it is surely the principal American examplar of a moral ideology (liberalism). A similar weakness appears in Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), except that Dworkin's undertaking is meant to be constrained by the legal and political institutions of the United States. That qualification is less compelling in his Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).

3. The term "metaphysical realism," I believe, is Putnam's. I find it first in his Meaning and the Moral Sciences . It is meant to mark the conceptual oddity of combining the advocacy of an uncompromising externalism and its detachment from any conceptual dependence on the epistemic function of truth. Here, Putnam succeeds (at an unfortunate price) in exposing the ultimate incoherence of the "correspondence theory of truth." This explains why I bring Putnam's account of the quarrel between the metaphysical realist and the "internal realist" (Putnam) to bear on the puzzle Mackie raises. The disagreement with Dummett (about excluded middle and Dummett's intuitionistic scruple) is beside the point, for Dummett, as I have shown, is himself an externalist! Putnam fails to grasp the full picture because he also hankers after the externalist's assurance. It is only when he comes to The Many Faces of Realism that he begins to yield on the externalist issue, but it is much too late for the rest of his theory. See also on Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas . On a constructivist view, let me say—that is, on an "idealist" view, in Crispin Wright's idiom—and assuming that the constituting subject is not a transcendental subject, bivalence cannot be defended in a principled way (as Dummett pretends to do and as, I believe, Putnam also thinks possible). Once you yield on bivalence, both Dummett's and Putnam's views become untenable. Since, as I shall very shortly argue, we cannot, in moral matters, avoid subscribing to "cultural realism" (which is constructivist or "idealist" in the sense supplied), we are well on our way to relativism. See Crispin Wright, Realism, Meaning and Truth, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). But, if so, moral theory shows epistemology the way.

4. I take the theorem to capture at least "half" of the best work of the post-Kantian Idealists. I don't deny that Hegel's philosophy is an indigestible extravagance. But it correctly grasped, once Kant came to dominate modern philos-

ophy, the need to reject the disjunction between noumena and phenomena. I endorse that decision in endorsing symbiosis . The other "half" of Hegel's grand achievement is marked by what I call historicity . My reading of this is that the world is "constructed" within the terms of symbiosis and in a historically evolving way. In this sense, the argument of the present chapter is, frankly, "Hegelian." But I eliminate Hegel's teleologism, the purple fiction of the Geist, and every trace of an evolving (internal) ontic necessity. I take that labor to be in accord with what is most likely to be the most promising philosophical work of the next century. See, in this regard, Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, and Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. corr. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1945).

5. I offer Platts only as a specimen. See Mark Platts, "Moral Reality and the End of Desire," in Mark Platts (ed.), Reference, Truth and Reality. Essays on the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge, and Kegan Paul, 1950). Platts, I feel sure, was jointly influenced by Davidson's naturalism and Wiggins's sensitivity to the problematic of moral philosophy (which is explicit in his own paper). Davidson himself signals the difficulty of treating moral judgment in terms of "supervenience." See Donald Davidson, "Mental Events." Wiggins I take to be the originator (to the extent that that can be determined) of the new "moral realism''—whatever his own intentions may have been. His role in this belongs chiefly to his Inaugural Lecture, "Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life," in Needs, Values, Truth, 2d ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). The new "moral realists" are not Aristotelians, however they may recover (or wish to recover) Aristotle, for, both implicitly and explicitly, they attempt to meet Mackie's charge of "queerness." That is, they expressly avoid Aristotle's realism. This is why Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2d ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) is not a "moral realist," although (of course) MacIntyre is a realist about moral matters in an (adjusted) Aristotelian sense. "Moral realism" begins to diversify almost at once. The most interesting claim, I believe, is the version offered by Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). I note for the moment that Lovibond is sympathetic both to Wittgenstein's appeal to Lebensformen and Hegel's use of the sittlich . These themes are more or less ignored or discounted in the analytic literature. The reason, already adumbrated in Wiggins, is that if the realist argument is to go through, one must overcome the externalism of the empiricists. The English-language philosophers, however, are noticeably disinclined to abandon externalism. Lovibond's position threatens (weakly) to challenge externalism itself. Further, for a recent analytic appreciation of Aristotle, see John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," The Monist 62 (1979). The "moral realist," but not every "realist" about morality, avoids "discovering" objective moral norms in human nature.

6. I merely remind you that Putnam's The Many Faces of Realism completely undermines the thesis of Meaning and the Moral Sciences . Putnam's continued insistence on truth or reason functioning as a " Grenzbegriff " is quite incompatible with the thrust of his most recent argument.

7. I take Kant to have set the sense of "categorical" obligation that is now very nearly ineliminable in moral philosophy. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations

of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959). See, also, Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1963). This is not to endorse Kant's theory, of course. Many have tried to "naturalize" Kant's imperativism: for instance, Hare, The Language of Morals . See, also, on naturalizing Kant's universalizability principle, R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). I offer Hare only as a specimen. For a careful analysis of Kant's view, see H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). In a sense, Kant seems to have "invented" moral duty, in writing the Foundations .

8. For a closely reasoned critique of Mackie, along somewhat slimmer cognitivist lines, see John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). McDowell, like Mackie, holds (here at least) what I shall call an "adequational" theory of the self.

9. These distinctions are offered as large simplications, for the purpose at hand, of a kind of linguistic care that is nicely pursued in such well-known accounts as those of J. O. Urmson, "On Grading," Mind 59 (1956); and P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1954).

10. The Philosophy of Right is Hegel's most sustained alternative to Kant, of course, in terms of the distinction between Moralität and Sittlichkeit . But the entire point of the replacement rests on a closer look at the internal difficulties of Kant's abstract account. See, also, G. W. F. Hegel, Natural Law, trans. T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975). For a brief but careful overview and "balance sheet" on Kant and Hegel, see Timothy O'Hagan, "On Hegel's Critique of Kant's Moral and Political Philosophy," in Stephen Priest (ed.), Hegel's Critique of Kant (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987).

11. A strong teleologism would oblige us to read Hegel as identifying the two (under some suitable criterion). Interestingly, something very similar is true of Peirce's account of truth and belief as viewed in the "long run." But, although it is true that, at least sometimes, Hegel does appear to be committed to the inherent telos of history (the so-called "right-wing" view), it is certainly not clear that he believes human inquirers can be said to discern what, thus construed, would accord with that imputed telos, and "that" telos is not construed by Hegel as a potency present and gradually actualized through the entire course of history (the themes of the "left-wing" view). Something similar is also true of Peirce, although Peirce is more obviously a fallibilist —that's to say, a progressivist. In any case, recent appeals to Hegel (as also to Marx and Peirce) are less and less disposed to accept the fiction of Geist's self-discovery or of a cosmic mind somehow drawing the course of history to its appointed end. Read thus, the merely sittlich reading of ''what is" and "what ought to be" is insufficient for legitimating anything like the "categorical" or "prescriptive" sense of moral norms derived from the Kantian theme, if not from Kant's own vision. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right; and Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 5.

12. The term wertfrei is Max Weber's of course. Weber sought a wertfrei methodology for the human and social sciences but was ultimately convinced

that that was impossible. Weber is remarkably difficult to characterize. My sense is that he accepted, within what I shall call the empirical space of practicing social scientists, the sittlich world Hegel (and Marx) defined, without subscribing to Hegel's idealism or Marx's materialism, without accepting any teleologism, and without adopting any a priori or doctrinaire or en bloc theory of the processes of social change. I suggest that Weber's search for a wertfrei science signifies the marginal relevance of the Hegelian themes; his acknowledgement that he could find no compelling arguments in support of such a ( wertfrei ) picture signifies his (reluctant) return to the Hegelian parameters. See, for instance, Max Weber, " 'Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy," The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and edit. Edward A. Shils and Harry A. Finch (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949). See, also, Otto Stummer (ed.), Max Weber and Sociology Today (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

13. There is, in epistemology, a well-established literature committed to one or another form of foundationalism—which, of course, goes hand in hand with externalism. For a relatively recent overview, see Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974). But externalism is very difficult to defend (nowadays) in moral philosophy. This is precisely why current "moral realists" tend to avoid Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (although they may long to get back to it). Also, as with Mackie, epistemology tends not to perceive that its own concern with truth is at least at sittlich as our interest in moral norms. The question remains: can objectivity in either science or morality survive (and if so, how) if the question must be answered under the terms of symbiosis? My answer, I may as well say, is: yes and no. The strategy I favor is akin to what (I surmise) Plato has in mind in Statesman and Laws, in speaking of the "second-best" state. What I mean is this. Since the Forms are not epistemically accessible, we theorize about normative matters (and about science) by dialectically comparing the seeming strengths and weaknesses of competing conjectures. My view is that a morality can claim a plausible objective standing if it is at least as convincing as others that enjoy a strong endorsement in sittlich life and among the prevailing theories about such norms. If one insists on more, I confess there's nothing stronger to be had. But then, there's nothing stronger in science either—which hardly disables science or the theory of science.

14. This is the pons of Kuhn's very interesting theory of science. I may say I see a small but instructive parallel between Kuhn's and Weber's views of objectivity and scientific neutrality. Neither theorist resolves the competing tensions in his account. For a sense of Kuhn's indecisiveness—that is, his inclination to treat the work of science as progressively uncovering the structure of the independent world—see Thomas S. Kuhn, "Postscript—1969," in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

15. I am quite prepared to admit that Rorty has effectively defeated Putnam on his own grounds. See Rorty, "Putnam and the Menace of Relativism." I take Rorty to have shown the internal weakness of "internal realism," but not that of a symbiotized recovery of legitimative questions. Here, the inadequacy of Putnam's, Rorty's, and Davidson's philosophies converge. The payoff is particularly noticeable in the context of moral philosophy.

16. I should like you to think of the theorem as a way of recovering a "He-

gelian" treatment of normative values without subscribing to Hegel's teleologism (if indeed Hegel does subscribe to it—as, for instance, in The Philosophy of Right ). The irony is, I suggest, that the "moral realists" have found a clever way to commit themselves to what, in effect, is the dubious "Hegelian" denial of (11.13). See, for instance, Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics . I pursue this line of thinking at (11.16) and (11.22)-(11.23).

17. This is the point at stake in the celebrated symposium between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson, "Truth," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 24 (1950). See, also, J. L. Austin, "Unfair to Facts," in Philosophical Papers, edit. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961).

18. This is the pons of naturalistic moral theories. For a sense of the ingenious lengths to which naturalists are prepared to go, see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).

19. This is what Searle does, quite reasonably, in his well-known analysis of promising. See Searle, Speech Acts, ch. 3. But, of course, Searle was challenged (correctly) on the grounds that that secured only (what I am calling) prima-facie legitimation. Searle does not go further. This is the point at stake in (11.25), which, in my view, leads to the "second-best" forms of legitimation mentioned just above. It is in this sense that I treat Foucault's genealogies as "Hegelian."

20. This, in effect, is the formula for my deformation of Wittgenstein's Lebensformen in the direction of Hegel's sense of historicity and for disallowing a teleologized reading of Hegel's use of the sittlich .

21. This points once again to the question-begging sense in which recent naturalized epistemologies that do not preclude normative assessments pretend to eliminate legitimative questions in favor of first-order causal questions. See Goldman, Liaisons; and Kitcher, The Advancement of Science . The parallel between epistemology and moral philosophy is difficult to ignore. Hence, given the obvious puzzle confronting moral philosophy, there can be no convincing reason for not admitting its analogue in epistemology. This is precisely what is conveyed by (11.30).

22. I take theorems (11.32)-(11.36) to contribute to making Foucault's genealogizing of truth suitably operational. See Foucault, "Two Lectures."

23. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q.16. I reject, of course, Aquinas's epistemic and ontic presumptions. I treat "facts" and "propositions" as heuristically introduced, or idealized, for the sake of the correspondence idiom. As far as I can see, they function honorifically only—which is not surprising, since knowledge is itself honorific ((10.37), (10.39)). It's the issue in the debate between John Austin and Peter Strawson, and it's the point jointly captured by (11.38) and (11.39).

24. This theorem and (11.43) are discussed in greater detail in Joseph Margolis, Values and Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971). I also introduce, there, the use of "oughtful" detailed just below.

25. I agree that, in central cases, "ought implies can," but I deny that, in any particular instance, where the precept does not hold (as in being obliged to pay one's taxes when one has gambled the money away), anything untoward follows from the qualification. Failure to appreciate the point has led to unnec-

essary extravagances regarding freedom, choice, agency, akrasia, and the like. See, for instance, Hare, Freedom and Reason . The deeper reason for such embarrassment concerns, of course, the reconcilability of freedom and cauality (another unfortunate Kantian legacy). Once you grant (11.43), however, you begin to see the unavoidability of a "top-down" or "folk-theoretic" orientation. This obviates the need for such accounts as those of C. A. Campbell, "Is 'Free Will' a Pseudo-problem?" Mind 60 (1951); and of Nowell-Smith, Ethics, chs. 19-20; and endorses the corrective of J. L. Austin, "Ifs and Cans," in Philosophical Papers, edit. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961).

26. See Roderick M. Chisholm, "Human Freedom and the Self," in John Bricke (ed.), Freedom and Morality (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1976). Theorem (11.47), which follows, catches up the entire argument in a spare way. Thus, for instance, it shows, by the slightest of strategies, the tendentiousness of the unity of science conception of determinism. See Sellars, "The Language of Theories," which explicitly notes the bearing of the underlying theory on the elimination of persons; but, also, Carl G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965), which leads to much the same conclusion but obscures the fact. See also, Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), ch. 8.

27. Nearly all analytic moral philosophy is "adequational" in the sense given: in effect, continuous with eighteenth-century philosophies interrupted by the "existential" and historicist philosophies of the post-Hegelian world. The exemplar is John Rawls, most recently in Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), notably Lecture III. I am particularly interested here in the parallel between moral philosophy and epistemology in general. What I suggest is that modern epistemologies linking cognizing subjects and cognized objects have moved through four phases: correspondentist, constructivist, symbiotized, and historicized. Most analytic views, both epistemological and moral (that is, with regard to theories of moral agents and their competence as agents), are either correspondentist (for instance, moral intuitionism) or constructivist (Kant). Kant is, of course, difficult to place in any simple way. But certainly in the first Critique (or in much of it) and in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant lends himself to being annexed by analytic philosophers. There are grounds for treating Kant somewhat more in accord with symbiosis and historicity, as for instance in the work of Dilthey and Cassirer. But I know of no convincing account along these lines specifically focused on Kant's moral philosophy. This sets the background, for instance, for the recent confrontation between critical legal studies and liberalism, although Rawls does not mention Roberto Unger or the studies, in Political Liberalism, and although Unger does not mention Rawls in his multivolume manifesto. See, for a sample of Unger's radical liberalism, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983). For a sample of the confrontation from the liberal side favoring Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, see Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). I should point out that Unger uses the term "existentialist" in speaking of views critical of "objectivism" and "modernism" that he finds inadequate. My own intention would accommodate Unger's historicism, but the matter is merely terminological. The important point is that Rawls presumes to have canvased nearly all relevant alternatives, but he never actually considers any theories of the artifactual nature of reason and moral agents.

28. "Aristotelians" about practical reasoning, like Anscombe and (more marginally) Hare, presuming, somehow, that "externalist" moral judgments are straightforwardly confirmable, tend to draw a robust conclusion—they say—from "practical" rationality; whereas, in truth, that depends not only on rationality but on the epistemic standing of moral judgments. See Hare, Freedom and Reason; and G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958).

29. It is commonplace in contemporary moral philosophy to suppose that an unresolved conflict between moral judgments is a sign of conceptual or evidentiary error. But that is because moral philosophers are so often "externalists" or "moral realists." The Greek tragedies are more "realistic." In the Oresteia, Oedipus Rex, and Antigone, it is quite clear (as Hegel had already remarked) that the moral world may come into conflict on internal grounds. Once you give up externalism, the matter seems obvious. See the discussion of tragedy in G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Fine Art, 4 vols., trans. F. P. B. Osmaston (London: Bell, 1920). I find myself in sympathy, therefore, with John D. Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), particularly chs. 1 and 10. As my argument makes clear, however, I am more sanguine about characterizing the structure of the moral world.

30. There are actually very few kinds of moral systems that pretend to do more, apart from the Kantian (apriorist and constructivist) and Aristotelian (realist) options. In the analytic literature, the principal options are those of utilitarianism and rational self-interest. The latter are best represented in peculiarly American forms: liberalism, as in Rawls, A Theory of Justice, and libertarianism, as in Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). Both are completely ahistorical, utterly without regard for sittlich complications. Rawls makes a virtue of this (disinterested reason, in "the original position"); Nozick pretends that there is some original Lockeian "mixing of labor" with the land (or material things). Neither considers the Hegelian objection or that justice makes no sense apart from an interpreted history of injustice! In short, both are forms of political ideology masquerading as neutral moral philosophies. Both are weaker in this respect than Roberto Unger's more radical liberalism. It is as ideological as theirs, but it makes no pretense at discerning invariant norms. It favors historicity and a sense of the changing collective practices of a people, and, above all, it considers the plausibility of projected norms in terms of the enlarged possibilities the actual history of perceived injustice is able to support. See Roberto Magnabeira Unger, Social Theory: Its Structure and Its Task (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). For a sense of the current drift of utilitarian thinking, which is now also cast in terms of rational self-interest, see J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and

Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). I cannot see that the original conceptual puzzle noted by Sidgwick has yet been met, particularly since the presumption of an ideal convergence between utilitarianism and egoism is clearly unconvincing. See Henry Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 6th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1901).

31. I should like to acknowledge the as yet unpublished work of my dear friend, Henry Hiz, who experienced the effect of the Nazi invasion of Poland and who thought of summum malum rather in the manner (if I understand him correctly) of a moral first principle. I heard Hiz present a brief sketch of his conception and was struck by the convergence in our ideas. But I must also emphasize that I view the "perception" of summum malum (also, minimum bonum, as I shall indicate in a moment) as not a moral intuition or moral discernment of any sort, but rather a remarkably widespread human sensibility (a sympathy for creatures like ourselves, I should say) that, dialectically, could be made to "yield" a moral norm—as reasonable as any that are known to have been invoked. It would count, as I have already suggested, as a "second-best" conception.

32. The archic defense of human rights, widespread though it is, is sheer ideology. And yet, the doctrine could be reinterpreted as a theme projected from a perception like that of summum malum and minimum bonum . So seen, it would have to be viewed as a plausible alternative, dialectically, among others ("second-best"). But that would be good enough. I am reminded of Marx's opposition to any such doctrine as the archic reading of human rights: in particular, his criticism of Lassalle. See Karl Marx, "Critique of The Gotha Program," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works, 2 vols. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1950). See, also, Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Karl Marx: Early Writings, trans. and edit. Tom Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

33. Friedrich Nietzsche is a paradoxical figure in moral theory. There is the genealogical side of his work, a forerunner (largely in a critical sense) of Foucault's genealogies (notably, in On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Horace B. Samuel, in The Philosophy of Nietzsche [New York: Modern Library, n.d.]). There is the elite "morality" of the Übermensch opposed to the moralities of the herd (in, say, Thus Spake Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann, in The Portable Nietzsche [New York: Viking, 1954]). And there is the vision of the flux within which all projected moralities, theories, philosophies obtain (tantalizingly, in The Will To Power, edit. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale [New York: Vintage, 1968]). I find it difficult to suppose that Nietzsche was committed to any explicit moral theory, but I cannot imagine any thoughtful recent theory not informed by Nietzsche's penetrating grasp of the entire puzzle. See, also, Nehamas, Nietzsche, Life as Literature .

34. In Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), John Rawls pretty well concedes the indefensibility of the assumed moral (or critical) universalism of A Theory of Justice, although he does not abandon it: he simply diminishes our reliance on it in political circumstances. He also accepts (in Political Liberalism ) Isaiah Berlin's devastating criticism against any universalized or exceptionlessly principled liberalism: that is, any that does not ac-

knowledge that there must be some sacrifice of the master goods of a society, under the historical and structural conditions it favors. See Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (New York: Knopf, 1991). Hare partly confuses mere consistency of usage with universalized (or generalized) values; when he considers the second ("generalization"), he does little more than fall back to his own intuitions. See Hare, The Language of Morals . Habermas tries to afford a sense of what is "necessary" (universally) in practice, from a moral point of view, but his examples, partly drawn from Karl-Otto Apel, are plainly uncompelling. Habermas makes no effort at all to demonstrate how one moves from stage to stage in the direction of "dialogic" universality. See Habermas, "Discourse Ethics." See, also, Karl-Otto Apel, "The A Priori of the Communicative Community and the Foundations of Ethics,'' in Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).