1. See Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

2. See Robert C. Stalnaker, Inquiry (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), ch. 1.

3. See, for instance, Bas C. van Fraassen, Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), ch. 1 and pp. 335-337; also, for an account of "empirical adequacy," van Fraassen's The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), ch. 3.

4. One of the most original recent explorations of this matter in terms of the notion of a "tradition" will be found in J. C. Nyíri, Tradition and Individuality : Essays (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992). I should perhaps say, without developing the point, that Nyíri tends to prioritize the "oral" over the "written" in the manner of a viable tradition, though his account is on the whole temperate. I don't deny that there are preliterate oral traditions, but I insist that, in whatever sense tradition is "oral," grounded in consensual habits and practices, a literate society is, qua literate, intrinsically also "oral": there is no disjunction, in literate societies, between the oral and the written. You will see that this bears directly on my use of Barthes's account of reading in chapter 1; also, of course, on my sympathy for certain themes in Derrida. For an overview of the complexities of the "oral" and the "written" (which Nyíri has consulted), see Walter J. Ong, The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

1. See P. E Strawson, writing about Gilbert Ryle's notion of a "category-mistake," in "Categories," Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974). Ryle's treatment appears to have been distinctly uncertain.

2. See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

3. This is indeed the view advanced in Monroe C. Beardsley, The Possibility of Criticism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979).

4. See The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce , ed. Charles Hart-shorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), 5.505.

5. I shall not attempt a full account of the Intentional here; I have indicated the terms of its use in the introduction. But the Intentional is, first of all, a complex attribute: one that involves the "intentional" ("aboutness," in a sense more Husserlian than Brentanoesque) and, indissolubly, the "intensional" or significative as a qualification of the intentional. For a helpful sense of the difference between Husserlian and Brentanoesque views on intentional-ity, see J. N. Mohanty, "Psychologism," in Perspectives on Psychologism , ed. Mark A. Notturno (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989), 5-7; for a larger overview, see J. N. Mohanty, Transcendental Phenomenology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), ch. 2. Second, it is a culturally emergent attribute, one that is paradigmatically linguistic or dependent on linguistic competence (as in the ballet, which is not in any obvious sense specifically executed in language). I call such competence "lingual." It is only parasitically ascribed (ascribed in a dependent way, logically) to nonlinguistic animals (anthropomorphically, as in attributing stalking intentions to lions). See, further, Joseph Margolis, Culture and Cultural Entities (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), ch. 1. Third, the Intentional is complex in a sense apart from that of the mere indissolubility of the intentional and the intensional: it (also) cannot obtain as an actual attribute of anything (I claim) except as (indissolubly) bound with ("incarnate" in) physical or biological attributes that independently qualify the referents in question. Fourth, the Intentional is not confined to the mental or psychological at all, but may directly characterize the work, products, deeds, actions, history, institutions and the like of the linguistically (and lingually) apt members of particular human societies. Fifth, Intentional properties are real properties. But since cultural realism cannot be explored in precisely the same way as the realism of the physical, questions arise about the objectivity of the human sciences—and of interpretive claims. (Nevertheless, "real" is used univocally in speaking of the physical and cultural worlds.) I am using "Intentional," then, as a term of art. It is clearly sui generis. The fourth feature is regularly neglected in the standard accounts of the (merely) "intentional," and the fifth is often disputed. In this sense, it would not be unreasonable to say that "the Intentional = the cultural," if taken in such a way that the mental or psychological is subsumed under the terms of the cultural—either literally, as in speaking of linguistically apt humans, or by way of anthropomorphized analogy, as in speaking of prelinguistic infants, nonlinguistic animals, and artifactual machines. (Notice, by the way, that interpretation may be lingual as well as linguistic—in the two senses of "interpretation.")

6. Rosalind E. Krauss, "Postmodernism and the Paraliterary," The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Myths (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), 292-293.

7. T. S. Eliot, "The Function of Criticism," Selected Essays 1917-1932 (London: Faber and Faber, 1932), 19.

8. Beardsley, "The Authority of the Text," The Possibility of Criticism , 16.

9. See Krauss, "Notes on the Index: Part 1" and "Notes on the Index: Part 2," The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths.

10. Krauss, "In the Name of Picasso," The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths , 28, 30, 32; italics added.

11. On referring, see Joseph Margolis, Texts without Referents: Reconciling Science and Narrative (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), chs. 7, 8. See also W. V. Quine, "On What There Is," From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).

12. See Margolis, Texts without Referents , ch. 8.

13. I confess that, in The Language of Art and Art Criticism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965) and Art and Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980), I had not fully appreciated these complexities. I see that I was drawn, in effect, to allow more than I specifically wished to commit myself to. This essay is part of an attempt to make good my full escape—and, at the same time, to recover what is recoverable from those earlier accounts. I have, here, been very much influenced by the entire development of Continental European philosophy moving through Husserl and Heidegger and Gadamer and Derrida and Barthes and Foucault. But I am pleased to acknowledge the fairness of a criticism of the apparent force of my previously published position, in Richard Shusterman, "Interpretation, Intention, and Truth," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46 (1988). I do believe that Shusterman himself fails to distinguish the logical and substantive issues, which gives a somewhat false impression of my earlier views. But that, doubtless, is due to my own former innocence; and, in any case, I should not protest too strenuously. See, also, Joseph Margolis, Texts without Referents, pt. 2.

14. Compare the rather labile view of the "new historicism," which, in Stephen Greenblatt's terms (the "founder's" terms, if there is an assignable founder), speaks only of "a practice rather than a doctrine": "Towards a Poetics of Culture," in The New Historicism , ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York: Routledge, 1989), 1; also, by way of excellent example, Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1988).

15. Roland Barthes, "From Work to Text," trans. Josué V. Harari, in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, ed. Josué V. Harari (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 74.

16. Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), 4. The closest English-language equivalent of Barthes's conception of "texts"—approached, however, from an entirely different point of view, one more disposed to the semantic than to the syntactic, though equally freewheeling in its attitude to codes or rules—is, of course, the one favored by Harold Bloom. The following brief passage from A Map of Misreading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), "Introduction: A Meditation upon Misreading," makes this quite clear: "Reading . . . is a belated and all-but-impossible act, and if strong is always a misreading. Literary meaning tends to become more underdetermined even as literary language becomes more over-determined . . ..

Influence, as I conceive it, means that there are no texts, but only relationships between texts. These relationships depend upon a critical act, a misreading or misprision, that one poet performs upon another, and that does not differ in kind from the necessary critical acts performed by every strong reader upon every text he encounters. The influence-relation governs reading as it governs writing, and reading is therefore a miswriting just as writing is a misreading. As literary history lengthens, all poetry necessarily becomes verse-criticism, just as all criticism becomes prose-poetry" (p. 3). It is worth mentioning that Barthes's conception does not preclude either the "author" of (what I am calling a "text") or reference to the "author's" intention in forming a responsible interpretation. His theory is certainly not a "Romantic" theory.

Also, of course, Barthes had once been strongly attracted to structuralism. Still, Barthes admits the "reader" in both readerly and writerly reading: so the admission of the "author" cannot be weaker or far behind. In admitting, in the informal way he does, a society's "codes" of reading, Barthes cannot have meant to preclude Intentional considerations: again, author's intentions, being a restriction of the larger Intentional space of a society's cultural practices, cannot be far behind. Hence, when E. D. Hirsch, Jr., reviewing his own position, treats the author's intention as "a historical intention," he makes a very plausible adjustment in his own Romantic thesis; but he neglects to address the import of having done that. Hirsch says, in an effort to clarify (but not alter fundamentally) his well-known position: "What is stable over time is a historical intention. Our best inferences about the nature of this intention serve as a normative principle for our interpretation"; see "Coming with Terms to Meaning," Critical Inquiry 12 (1968 ):628-629. But his clarification falls victim to both Gadamer's and Barthes's sort of challenge, for Hirsch never explains (did not originally explain) how, as the historically formed creatures we are, we could reliably fix (even "probabilistically") a historical intention.

17. Barthes, S/Z, 5.

18. Barthes, S/Z, 5-6.

19. See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology , trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 158, 161.

20. Barthes, S/Z, 6.

21. Barthes, S/Z, 90. It is worth remarking that van Fraassen (whose view of interpretation is mentioned in the introduction) himself notes the analogy between interpretation in art and science. He marks very briefly the relevance of Eco's treatment of a "closed" text, but (as I remarked earlier) he defends what appears to be a self-defeating thesis. See Bas C. van Fraassen, Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 11-12; also, Umberto Eco, The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1979).

22. Barthes, S/Z, 90.

23. See Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975).

24. Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text , 35-36. Cf. p. 34.

25. Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text , 34.

26. See Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), for instance, S6.

27. See Joseph Margolis, "The Defeat of the Computational Model of the Mind," Iyyun 41 (1992); and J. C. Nyíri, Tradition and Individuality: Essays (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992), particularly chs. 5-7.

28. Derrida, Of Grammatology, pt. 1, ch. 2.

29. I am pleased to take this phrasing from John D. Caputo, Radical Her-meneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 187.

30. Barthes, "From Work to Text," 79.

31. I have pursued this theme in a great number of places. See Margolis, Art and Philosophy, pt. 1; Culture and Cultural Entities, ch. 1; Texts without Referents, ch. 6.

32. For a fuller account of intentionality, intentionality, Intentionality, see Joseph Margolis, Science without Unity: Reconciling the Human and Natural Sciences (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), chs. 7, 9.

33. In Texts without Referents, chs. 6, 8, I offer the most compendious account of the matter I have been able to fashion to date.

34. Two specimen claims may be mentioned. In one, Daniel C. Dennett provocatively remarks: "Intentionality is not a mark that divides phenomena from phenomena, but sentences from sentences. . ..Intentional objects are not any kind of objects at all. [The tendency to treat them as distinct objects rests on] the dependence of Intentional objects on particular descriptions [that is, on the thesis that] to change the description is to change the object. What sort of thing is a different thing under different descriptions? Not any object. Can we not do without the objects altogether and talk most of descriptions? . . . Intentional sentences are intensional (nonextensional) sentences"; see Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), 28-29. But this, though quite characteristic of a certain analytic stance, is remarkably weak. First of all, even with respect to ordinary descriptive contexts, it is not true that the intentionality thesis holds that things are altered by altering descriptions; it holds, rather, that, under differing descriptions, we cannot always tell whether we are dealing with the same thing or not. Second, in the context of texts, which Dennett nowhere considers, it may be claimed that, because texts possess Intentional properties inherently, they are interpretable and, qua interpretable, their properties may actually be changed or affected by interpretation, but not in a way that would also change their merely physical features or change them for that reason alone.

In a second specimen, Donald Davidson, speaking of what he terms "radical interpretation"—understanding what another says, either intralinguistically or interlinguistically—flatly and without the least argument (here or anywhere) affirms that, since it is true enough that "interpretable speeches are nothing but (that is, identical with) actions performed with assorted non-linguistic intentions (to warn, control, amuse, distract, insult), and these actions are in turn nothing but (identical with) intentional movements of the lips and larynx,. . .[these] non-linguistic goings-on must supply the evidential base for interpretation" (regardless of the fact that saying so "provides no clue as to how the evidence is related to what it surely is evident for"); see "Radical Interpretation," Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 126-127. But Davidson has not shown how to determine prior "non-linguistic" intentions or how to distinguish them from linguistically expressed intentions or how to construe them in extensionally compliant physicalist terms or how to construe linguistically expressed intentions in extensionally compliant terms. Failure to achieve such results must effectively count as the failure of the doctrine actually advanced. Alternatively put: "radical interpretation" (in Davidson's idiom) is tantamount to the denial of interpretation (in my account). This is, in effect, what Rorty discerns in Davidson's view, in speaking of his and Davidson's opposition to (interpretive) "tertia." See Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson , ed. Ernest LePore (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). I return to Davidson's theory in chapter 7. "Interpretation," in Davidson's sense, pretends to address the question of how first to construe nonlinguistic behavior as linguistic behavior; whereas, in the usual sense, interpretation concerns, first, how to construe the meanings of linguistic utterance or behavior and then (and only then), derivatively, non-linguistic behavior (or, anthropomorphically, the behavior of nonlinguistic animals). There is no sustained account of Davidson's sort (unless it is B. F. Skinner's failed behaviorism). See B. E Skinner, Verbal Behavior (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957). See, also, Joseph Margolis, "Donald David-son's Philosophical Strategies," in Artifacts, Representations and Social Practice: Essays for Marx Wartofsky , ed. Carol C. Gould and Robert S. Cohen (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994).

35. Theses 1-8 are, in effect, defended in the trilogy that includes Pragmatism without Foundations, Science without Unity, Texts without Referents.

36. Barthes, "From Work to Text," 76.

37. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans, from 2d ed. Garrett Burden and Robert Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 359.

38. Gadamer, Truth and Method , 337. The entire argument is effectively collected in Second Part, pt. 2, including Gadamer's resistance to relativism. It must be said as well, however, that, although Barthes clearly slights, and means to slight, the historical dimension of interpretation in his antimodernist (if not postmodernist) proposal, restoring that historical consideration—as with Gadamer—does not redeem the reliability of authorial intent or (against Gadamer) the reliability of a tradition's intent. The deeper puzzle involved here has somewhat eluded Alasdair MacIntyre's recent—and justified—critique of Barthes. So MacIntyre observes, against Barthes's "postmodernism" in Critique et verité (Paris: Seuil, 1966), particularly p. 56: "The understanding of the text is not [viewed by Barthes as] controlled by authorial intention or by any relationship to an audience with specific shared beliefs, for it is outside context except the context of interpretation"; see Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 386. What MacIntyre fails to demonstrate—though his criticism of Barthes stands—is that the recovery of tradition itself entails, within any tradition, a historicized openendedness of the sort Barthes explores, even if it is the case that Barthes himself, always suspicious of reliable histories, exaggerates the arbitrariness of writerly reading. It's reasonably clear that Barthes's own practice belies the rhetoric favored and that MacIntyre's corrective is committed to traditionalism. For an account of "traditionalism," see reference in n. 44, below.

39. Gadamer, Truth and Method , 253-258, 316-325.

40. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem," Philosophical Hermeneutics , trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1976).

41. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences , trans. (New York: Vintage, 1970), 308-309.

42. See Joseph Margolis, The Flux of History and the Flux of Science (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1993).

43. See, for instance, Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History: Applied Hermeneutics , trans. Lawrence Schmidt and Monica Reuss, ed. Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), particularly Gadamer's reading of a Celan poem, in "Are the Poets Falling Silent?" I have recently had the benefit of reading (in manuscript) Richard E. Palmer's "What's So Special about Gadamer's Aesthetics and Poetics?" scheduled to appear in Hans-Georg Gadamer (Library of Living Philosophers), ed. Lewis A. Hahn (possibly, 1994), which, to my mind, confirms the connection to New Criticism. Palmer seemed to confirm this impression during the discussion of his own interpretation of Gadamer's reading of one of Paul Celan's poems ("Du liegst ina grossen Gelausche") at the meeting (May 1993) of the International Association of Philosophy and Literature, at Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The reference is to Hans-Georg Gadamer's readings of Celan's poems, in Wet bin ich und wet bist du? Ein Kommentur zu Paul Celan Gedichtfolge "Atemkristall" (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1973; rev. and enl. 1986). To speak, here, of Gadamer's "retreat" back to "philological" evidence or "authorial intent" or the "universality" of the true poet's voice (Rilke's or Celan's) is to concede the salience of the received interpretation of Gadamer's views. That Gadamer has favored the views just mentioned las in his reading of Paul Celan) twenty years ago—and has only just recently authorized its translation—does not alter matters. It parallels in a way what we usually say of the "earlier" and "later" Wittgenstein, where we concede that Wittgenstein must have been at work on the themes of the Tractatus and the Investigations more or less at the same time. The fact remains that Gadamer's "retreat" is incompatible with the strong historicizing and constructivist account he himself offers of the "I and thou." That is the decisive matter.

44. See Joseph Margolis, The Truth about Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).

45. Perhaps the clearest formulation may be found in John F. Post, The Faces of Experience : An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cot-nell University Press, 1987). It derives from the published views of Donald Davidson.

46. See Herbert Feigl, The "Mental" and the "Physical": The Essay and a Postscript (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967). I believe the expression "many-many" does not occur in the essay, but I have heard Feigl refer to it in a number of discussions.

47. Donald Davidson, "Mental Events," Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 214. It is curious that Davidson mentions Feigl's essay (favorably), without reference to the "many-many" problem.

48. Colin McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness (Oxford: Basil Black-well, 1991), 204.

49. See Joseph Margolis, Science without Unity , ch. 10. I have, in a recent essay, pursued the issue of supervenience taken as the most fashionable strategy at the present time, among analytic philosophers, favoring the general program known as "naturalizing" (as in "naturalizing" epistemology, the philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, the computational model of the mind, and the like). The use of the term "naturalizing" derives from W. V. Quine's extraordinarily influential essay, "Epistemology Naturalized," Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). My own essay, "Naturalizing Computationality," was presented at the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium, August 1993, at Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, and is forthcoming in the Proceedings of the Symposium. I there argue the complete arbitrariness of the supervenience thesis.

1. Stanley Rosen, "Theory and Interpretation," Hermeneutics as Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 146.

2. Rosen, "Theory and Interpretation," 147.

3. I must warn the reader here (and add a word to Rosen as well). I have taken this citation from an earlier version of his essay which appeared in Literature and the Question of Philosophy , ed. Anthony J. Cascardi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 214. This does not appear (as far as I can see) in the version included in Hermeneutics as Politics. But it seems to me to catch Rosen's meaning.

4. Rosen, "Theory and Interpretation," 146. (This reads slightly differently in the earlier version [p. 214f.].)

5. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method , trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975).

6. See, for instance, the preface to the second edition of Truth and Method.

7. Joel Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), xi. See, also, ch. 2.

8. Perhaps the most compendious passages in Peirce that develop Peirce's own theory appear in The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols. ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1963), 5.448, 5.505. For an analysis, see Joseph Margolis, "Peirce's Views of the Vague and the Definite," presented at the Charles Sanders Peirce Sesquicentennial International Congress, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 1989, in Edward C. Moore, ed., Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Science (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993).

9. See The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce , 5.311, 5.565.

10. See Joseph Margolis, "Métaphysique radicale," Archives de philosophic 54 (1991).

11. See Joseph Margolis, The Truth about Relativism (Oxford: Basil Black-well, 1991).

12. See, also, the pop text, Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

13. See Jerry A. Fodor, The Language of Thought (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975).

14. Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), 125.

15. Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers , 42, 43. Kirk and Raven give a more perspicuous translation of Parmenides' poem. Cf. G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 245, 247. But we are not concerned, here, to dispute the full meaning of Parmenides' thesis.

16. See Joseph Margolis, "Three Puzzles for Gadamer's Hermeneutics" presented at a conference, "Hermeneutische Gespräche," University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, West Germany, August 1989. A related paper has appeared in French: "Les trois sortes d'universalité dans l'hermeneutique de H.-G. Gadamer," Archives de philosophic 53 (1990).

17. For a convenient summary, see Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory , ch. 6; also, Frank Kermode, The Classic: Literary Images of Permanence and Change (New York: Viking, 1975), cited by Wein-sheimer. I take Weinsheimer's discussion to be quite inconclusive—instructively so—since Weinsheimer is surely motivated, in exploring the matter, to explain Gadamer's use of the "classical" in the normative sense deployed in Gadamer's Truth and Method: see Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 135, 149-157.

18. Gadamer, Truth and Method , 292.

19. Gadamer, Truth and Method , 289.

20. See Weinsbeimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics , 135.

21. Gadamer, Truth and Method , 257.

22. This is essentially what Foucault means, for instance, by the "histurical a priori." See Michel Foucauit, The Order of Things , in trans. (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 244-245.

23. See, for example, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); and Hilary Putnam, "Why Reason Can't be Naturalized," Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

24. Aristotle, Metaphysics , trans. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (New York: Random House, 1941), bk. 4, ch. 3 (1005b). We must bear in mind here the distinctions of Topics, bk. 1, as well.

25. Aristotle, Metaphysics , 1007b.

26. For a sustained attack on the invariant structure of the laws of nature, see Bas C. van Fraassen, Law and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989). For a sense of Lévi-Strauss's awareness of the very point being made, see his remarks (against Sartre) in The Savage Mind , in trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), ch. 9.

27. See Ernst Mayr, Animal Species and Evolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), ch. 19.

28. See H. G. Alexander, ed., The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956), Leibniz's third paper.

29. See Benson Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 7. See Joseph Margolis, "The Autonomy of Folk Psychology," in The Future of Folk Psychology , ed. John D. Greenwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

30. See E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), ch. 3.

31. This goes against the influential account of how to retire reference from "improved" languages offered by W. V. Quine, in Word and Object (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), §§ 37-38. Leibniz, as is well known, opposes the alleged necessity. The notion of an "individual essence" has some footing in Aristotle and appears in its best-known but still unfinished form in the work of Saul Kripke. See Saul A. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," in Semantics of Natural Language , ed. Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972). But Kripke has curiously failed to note— all causal theorists of reference fail to do so—that conventional views of causality (particularly where they are reconciled with nomologiality) treat whatever enters into causal relations as instances of kinds of relations , never primarily as singulars marked as such. Alternatively, if causal factors were treated as singular, then they could not explain reference: they would entail reference themselves, and would then themselves call for a deeper explanation.

32. See Joseph Margolis, Texts without Referents: Reconciling Science and Narrative (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), chs. 6, 8.

33. Needless to say, this is to agree with the attack mounted in Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature but not with the defeatist spirit in which he would retire the canon.

34. Jacques Derrida, On Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Charkavorty Spi-yak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 61,158.

35. Jacques Derrida, "Différance," Margins of Philosophy , trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 7.

36. See Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987). I cannot stay to examine Putnam's thesis. I can say, however, that it both subverts Putnam's own earlier distinction between "objective" realism and idealism and fails to secure the "Grenzbegriff" of truth or rationality (or the link between the two) that Putnam had earlier favored. See The Many Faces of Realism, 26-28; also, Hilary Putnam, Reason , Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 216.

37. See W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).

38. Gadamer, Truth and Method , 267.

39. Gadamer, Truth and Method , 267.

40. Gadamer, Truth and Method , 401.

41. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 421.

42. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem," Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David Linge (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1976), 7.

43. Gadamer, Truth and Method , 271; italics added.

44. See Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology , trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 143.

45. See Jürgen Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" Communication and the Evolution of Society , trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1979). This may well be the earliest of Habermas's formulations and possibly also the clearest. It remains true nevertheless that Gadamer's defense of the "classical" requires some approximation at least to a cognizable normative invariance. He never addresses the question directly.

46. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Are the Poets Falling Silent?" Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History: Applied Hermeneutics , trans. Lawrence Schmidt and Monica Reuss, ed. Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nichol- son (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 75, 81.

47. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 172.

48. Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, 31. 49. See, for instance, Gadamer, Truth and Method, 253-258.

50. See Joseph Margolis, Pragmatism without Foundations: Reconciling Realism and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), ch. 2.

51. See Christopher Norris, "Methodological Postscript: Deconstruction versus Interpretation?" The Deconstructive Turn: Essays in the Rhetoric of Philosophy ( London: Methuen, 1983).

52. See Putnam, "Beyond Historicism," Philosophical Papers , vol. 3; and Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).

53. See Karl R. Popper, "The Aim of Science," Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972). It must be admitted, of course, that Popper is an essentialist manque, for he is committed, by his doctrine of verisimilitude, to the asymptotic approximation to the essentialist laws of nature. But for that very reason, Popper's concessions are instructive: verisimilitude, as Popper himself came to realize, was impossible to defend. More recent theorists have directly challenged the realism of the theoretical laws of physics. See van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry; and Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983).

54. See, for example, Michel Foucault, "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An Interview with Michel Foucault on January 20, 1984," in The Final Foucault , trans. J. D. Gauthier, ed. James Bernauer and David Rasmussen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988). Perhaps I may mention as well Bakhtin's extraordinary notion of "heteroglossia." In heteroglossia, Bakhtin manages to show, in synchronic terms, the historically and culturally "multiple" nature of the speaking voice—hence, the profoundly shifting, inconstant, diverse, conflicting, "dialogized," ununified "nature" of the lan-guaged self. See M. M. Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays , ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Garyl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), particularly pp. 272, 288.

55. Saul A. Kripke, "Addenda to Saul A. Kripke's Paper 'Naming and Necessity,'" in Davidson and Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language , 768-769.

56. See, for example, Keith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions," Philosophical Review 75 (1966), which suggests but does not supply a resolution of the deeper issue in Kripke.

57. See, for instance, Hilary Putnam, "Brains in a Vat" and "A Problem about Reference," Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

58. Harold Bloom, The Breaking of the Vessels (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 8.

59. Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

60. Bloom, A Map of Misreading , 4.

61. Bloom, A Map of Misreading , 19.

62. Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 5; see, also, pp. 30, 43.

63. Bloom, The Breaking of the Vessels , 17-18.

64. Bloom, The Breaking of the Vessels , 21-22.

65. See Richard Rorty, Contingency, bony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

66. On the individuation and reidentification of artworks and other cultural entities, see, further, Joseph Margolis, Art and Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980), chs. 2-3; Culture and Cultural Entities (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984), ch. 1; Texts without Referents, ch. 6.

67. Remember: I am not concerned to compare or assess the best of these new interpretive practices. There's no doubt in my mind that the specimens afforded by Barthes and Bloom and Foucault (Las Meninas) are among the best that could be named. Derrida's interpretations are sometimes quite extraordinary, but they tend to flaunt their arbitrariness. A more puzzling case is offered by Stanley Cavell's analysis of "the Hollywood remarriage comedy." See Stanley Cavell, Pursuit of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). See, also, Cavell's apologia for the extravagance of his interpretive practice, "The Thought of Movies," in his Themes Out of School: Effects and Causes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). I should say that Cavell's practice is closer to Bloom's than to Barthes's. But what is distinctive about it is that it strikes the ear at first as quite arbitrary, and yet it also appears to offer some nagging evidence that there may indeed be a systematic but hitherto unsuspected connection between the Hollywood film and the larger themes of the American ethos.

1. Hannah Areudt, "The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern," Between Past and Future , enl. ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 58.

2. Arendt, "The Concept of History," 67. See Joseph Margolis, "History, Nature, and Technology," in Technology and Contemporary Life , ed. Paul T. Durbin (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1988).

3. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 19.

4. Arendt, The Life of the Mind , 7f.

5. Arendt, The Life of the Mind , 96.

6. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 22.

7. See Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce , 8 vols., ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1963), 5.563; 8.330.

8. The point has been belatedly acknowledged by Hilary Putnam, who had, much earlier, opposed a similar admission on the part of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. See, for instance, Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987), lecture 2.

9. This conforms with, without actually endorsing, Hilary Putnam's (Kantian-like) notion of "internal realism." See Hilary Putnam, "Realism and Reason," Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). See note 8 above.

It is instructive to take note of the fact that Donald Davidson strongly opposes the "pragmatism" of Putnam's insistence on some "tertium quid" between our "beliefs" and "reality." The matter is important because, by this maneuver, Davidson opposes in the most global way every effort to "textualize" the world: to admit intransparency and symbiosis. His maneuver, therefore, is (on the argument being advanced) altogether regressive. But his immense influence testifies to the considerable lack of sympathy among "analytic" philosophers for even the mildest versions of historicism.

The curious thing is that Richard Rorty apparently finds Davidson's vision congenial to his own self-confessed pragmatism, though it must surely be incompatible with it. Davidson opposes, for the same reason, W. V. Quine's admission of intervening "analytic hypotheses"—which he sees as giving aid and comfort to the advocates of plural "conceptual schemes." (The disagreement between Davidson and Quine may surprise some.) But the argument is peculiarly slack and unsatisfactory. For the aficionados of philosophy, it will be enough to report that there are at least two quite indefensible claims in Davidson's countermove, on which the argument against "internalism" (the "textedness" of the world) depends—a fortiori, on which the possibility of plural (moderately divergent conceptual schemes) depends: first, a reading of Tarski's Convention T that completely disregards the (contentious but ineliminable) extensionalism of Tarski's formula; and second, a plain appeal to the fallacy of division in offering a realist reading of ordinary beliefs. Both of these oddities appear in Davidson's "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Ernest LePore (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). (I shall return to these matters in chapter 7.)

Here are the key remarks: first, "Truth is beautifully transparent compared to belief and coherence, and I take it as primitive. Truth, as applied to utterances of sentences, shows the disquotational feature enshrined in Tarski's Convention T, and that is enough to fit its domain of application. Relative to a language or a speaker, of course, so there is more to truth than Convention T; there is whatever carries over from language to language or speaker to speaker. What Convention T, and the trite sentences it declares true, like '"Grass is green" spoken by an English speaker, is true if and only if grass is green,' reveal is that the truth of an utterance depends on just two things: what the words as spoken mean, and how the world is arranged. There is no further relativism to a conceptual scheme, a way of viewing things, a perspective" (pp. 308-309); and second: "My argument has two parts. First I urge that a correct understanding of the speech, beliefs, desires, intentions and other propositional attitudes of a person lead to the conclusion that most of a person's beliefs must be true, and so there is a legitimate presumption that any one with thoughts, and so in particular anyone who wonders whether he has any reason to suppose he is generally right about the nature of his environment, must know what a belief is, and how in general beliefs are to be detected and interpreted" (p. 314).

These two comments run the serious danger of being no more than howlers: the first, because disquotation, in Tarski's account, cannot be disengaged from Tarski's claim regarding the syntactic connection between object language and metalanguage, because disquotation in the context of Davidson's remarks must rest on semantically interpreted factual claims about the world if truth is ever to be "beautifully transparent" (in effect, trivial); the second, because the holism (in effect, the pragmatism) in accord with which we suppose that "most of a person's beliefs must be true" justifies no confidence at all about the particular distributed beliefs within that ensemble, because we really have no way of counting all the pertinent beliefs that form that holist mass and, therefore, we have no sense of what, criterially, we should treat as (Davidson's sort of) "maximal" coherence. The reason for pressing the point is simply this: without a clear sense of just how to determine the "meaning" of what is uttered and the "arrangement" of nature (Davidson's two determinants of truth: the ones that putatively justify refusing to countenance divergent "conceptual schemes" and other such tertia ), there is no way to recover realism or to naturalize truth and knowledge. That, of course, is the presumption of my own argument. See, further, Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," in the same volume; also, Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," and "Radical Interpretation," Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). For an extended discussion of Davidson's theory, see Joseph Margolis, "Donald Davidson's Philosophical Strategies," in Artifacts, Representations and Social Practice, ed. Carol C. Gould and Robert S. Cohen (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993).

10. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method , trans, from 2d ed. Garrett Burden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 256.

11. Gadamer, Truth and Method , 271.

12. Arendt, "The Concept of History," 63.

13. Arendt, "The Concept of History," 61.

14. See, for instance, Bas C. van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon, 1898); and Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983).

15. Arendt, "The Concept of History," 87.

16. Arendt, "The Concept of History," 81.

17. Arendt, "The Concept of History," 77.

18. Arendt, "The Concept of History," 88.

19. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Introduction, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 27.

20. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History , 151.

21. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History , 138.

22. See Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Karl Marx: Early Writings, trans, and ed. Tom Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964); and ``Marginal Notes on the Program of the German Worker's Party," Critique of the Gotha Program , in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, vol. 2 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1950).

23. See Monique Castillo, Kant et l'avenir de ia culture (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), particularly, in the appendix, Castillo's translation of Kant's views, as "Réflexions sur l'anthropologie."

24. Adolf Grünbaum, The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984), 17.

25. See C. G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965).

26. See W. V. Quine, "Naturalizing Epistemology," Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

27. See John Dewey, Experience and Nature , 2d ed. (New York: Dover, 1958).

28. See, for instance, Jürgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method ," trans. Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, in Understanding and Social Inquiry, ed. Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).

29. See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things , in trans. (New York: Vintage, 1970).

30. See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, trans. Kathleen Blarney and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), ch. 6; and Hayden White, Metahistory: Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 29-31.

31. Arthur C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). (This includes the text of Analytical Philosophy of History , 1968.) See Jürgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences , trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jerry Stark (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), chs. 2, 8.

32. See Jerry A. Fodor, The Language of Thought (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975); also, Joseph Margolis, Science without Unity: Reconciling the Natural and Human Sciences (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

33. See, for instance, the remarkably candid admission in W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), § 45.

34. Quine, Word and Object , § 37.

35. See Aristotle, Metaphysic s, bk. Gamma.

36. Aristotle, Metaphysics , bk. Zeta, ch. 3. See, also, Topics, bk. 1, ch. 5.

37. W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), § 38, particularly pp. 182-183.

38. See Joseph Margolis, Texts without Referents: Reconciling Science and Narrative (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), ch. 8; also, Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 110-134.

39. This is the strategic basis, for instance, for challenging Davidson's influential argument against plural conceptual schemes. See Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme"; also, Joseph Margolis, The Truth about Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 104-107.

40. See Saul A. Kripke, "Addenda to Saul A. Kripke's Paper 'Naming and Necessity,'" in Semantics of Natural Language , 2d ed., ed. Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972), 768-769.

41. See Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference , ed. John McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), ch. 11.

42. The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans, from 3d ed. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca: Gornell University Press, 1948), § 349.

43. The New Science of Giambattista Vico, § 331. I have been greatly helped here by Max H. Fisch, "Vico and Pragmatism," in Giambattista Vico: An International Symposium, ed. Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Hayden V. White (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969).

44. The New Science of Giambattista Vico, § 1108. I have benefited here particularly from a reading of Leon Pompa, Vico: A Study of the "New Science" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), ch. 5.

45. See, for instance, Jean-François Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute , trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), particularly "Preface: Reading Dossier" (P. xi).

46. That is the point, in Quine , as I say, of replacing "Socrates" by the predicate "socratizing."

47. See Morris Weitz, " Hamlet " and the Philosophy of Literary Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

48. See P. F. Strawson, Individuals : An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959), 18.

49. See Margolis, Texts without Referents , ch. 8.

50. Weitz, " Hamlet" and the Philosophy of Literary Criticism , 214.

51. Weitz, "Hamlet" and the Philosophy of Literary Criticism, 203-204.

52. Weitz, " Hamlet" and the Philosophy of Literary Criticism , 212, 213.

53. Weitz, " Hamlet" and the Philosophy of Literary Criticism , 318.

54. Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), 31.

55. Baudrillard, Simulations , 2, 11, 25. I had occasion to ask Baudrillard personally whether he ever explored the logic of referential paradox. He indicated he had no interest in it. It's possible he was joking, but I don't think so.

56. Baudrillard, Simulations , 31-32.

57. See Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974).

58. See Margolis, The Truth about Relativism .

59. For an impression of pertinent strategies, see Robert Stecker, "Incompatible Interpretations," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 10 (1992); Stephen Davies, "True Interpretations," Philosophy and Literature 12 (1988); Torsten Pettersson, "Incompatible Interpretations of Literature," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 45 (1986); David Novitz, Knowledge, Fiction, and Imagination (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), ch. 5; and Michael Krausz, Rightness and Reasons: Interpretations in Cultural Practices (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), chs. 2, 4.

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, Imagination: A Psychological Critique, trans. Forrest Williams (Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press, 1962).

2. It is worth remarking that, in his most recent work, which concerns the matter of moral realism, Alasdair MacIntyre has attempted to reconcile a strong sense of the historical nature of human existence and the "independence" of the real world (including, apparently, the moral norms of human life). See Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), particularly chs. 4, 6. But it is very difficult to see that MacIntyre actually demonstrates anywhere that his own realism, which owes much to St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, is dialectically superior to the "Kantian-like" alternative I have been favoring, or, indeed, defensible in its own terms. It looks very much as if MacIntyre's realism follows from the acceptance of the "tradition" in which such a realism is simply affirmed.

The following, for instance, is MacIntyre's admiring report of Augustine's view, which, though not entirely his own, is quite close to what he believes as far as being correctly oriented to the "real" is concerned: "The intellect and the desires do not naturally move towards that good which is at once the foundation for knowledge and that from which lesser goods flow. . .. Hence faith in authority has to precede rational understanding. . .. In learning therefore we move towards and not from first principles and we discover truth only insofar as we discover the conformity of particulars to the forms in relation to which those particulars become intelligible, a relationship apprehended only by the mind illuminated by God. Rational justification is thus essentially retrospective" (p. 84); see, also, pp. 88-89. It is difficult to see why this should not be construed as blatantly questionbegging—without, let it be said, opposing the sense that we must "begin" with our traditions. One might say (in a Wittgensteinian sense) that we cannot really "exit" from our tradition; but no mere tradition can directly answer serious conceptual questions regarding an independent reality "independently" arrived at. (Incidentally, this reading of Augustine, applied to Aquinas, yields a very curious assessment of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. )

3. For a convenient overview of the "incarnate" and the "embodied," see Joseph Margolis, Culture and Cultural Entities (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), ch. 1. On the various senses of "emergence" on which these distinctions depend, particularly "cultural emergence," see my "Emergence and the Unity of Science," Science without Unity: Reconciling the Human and Natural Sciences (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987). The ready confusion between the metaphysics of mind/body dualism and that underlying the conceptual contrast between what possesses and what lacks "Intentional" properties is, I claim, rampant in recent analytic philosophies centered on the cognitive sciences. You will find a telling clue in Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), ch. 2, a summary statement by one of the most imaginative of the advocates of an all-purpose physicalism. For example, Dennett treats consciousness as posing the threat of Cartesian dualism and sets about to relieve us of that burden. Consequently, he treats all intentional puzzles as essentially tethered in either a dualistic idiom in which it pretends to have a realist function or in a physicalist idiom in which it is confined functionally or heuristically. But he never allows for its use in the sense here intended, that is, to capture the effect of the twin themes of symbiosis and intransparency on our discourse and the world. This produces an excessively sanguine sense of the prospects for reducing the mental to the properties of the brain—and, of course, of the reasonable eliminability of the complexities of cultural and historical contexts.

4. Arthur Danto, who sees the difficulty of Sartre's theory, nevertheless follows him in theorizing about the perception of paintings: all of his very good puzzle cases regarding the "indiscernibility" between certain paintings and nonpaintings and sets of different paintings are fatally infected with this mistake. See, for instance, Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), particularly chs. 1-2. Thus, Danto characteristically affirms: "That there should exist indiscernible artworks—indiscernible at least with respect to anything the eye or ear can determine—has been evident . . ." (p. 33; italics added). See, also, Arthur C. Danto, "The Artworld," Journal of Philosophy 41 (1964); but also, his J ean-Paul Sartre (New York: Viking, 1976), 29-31. (I return to Danto in chapter 7.)

5. I find the evidence of this essential difficulty in the preface to the second edition of Kant's first Critique. See Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, corr. trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1953).

6. The most notorious pronouncement on the issue is Quine's dismissal of Brentano's distinction. Its influence has been extraordinary. See W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), 219-222.

7. For a sense of what is at stake here, see Joseph Margolis, "A Sense of Rapprochement between Analytic and Continental Philosophy," History of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1985); and Pragmatism without Foundations: Reconciling Realism and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), ch. 11.

8. One of the most influential brief developments of this theme appears in Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man" and "The Language of Theories," Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).

9. See my introduction, above.

10. There is some convergence here, but much to disagree with, with Danto's use of "aboutness"; see, for instance, The Transfiguration of the Cormmonplace , 84—85.

11. The theory is Nelson Goodman's, in Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), particularly ch. 2.

12. See Goodman, Languages of Art , 95.

13. For a discussion of Goodman's and Danto's views in this regard, see Joseph Margolis, "The Eclipse and Recovery of Analytic Aesthetics," in Analytical Aesthetics , ed. Richard Shusterman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

14. For a reasonably full account of the problem of the ontology of the cultural world, of the Intentional in particular, see Joseph Margolis, Texts without Referents: Reconciling Science and Narrative (Oxford: Basil Black-well, 1989), ch. 6.

15. You can see in this the sense, for instance, in which, on the argument I favor, Geertz's account of the Balinese cockfight falls within the same space of description and interpretation as does the study of representational art. The difference in referentiality—with respect to the actual behavior of the Balinese or with respect to what is "representationally" disclosed in the Vermeer—does not affect the intended congruity in any adverse way. See Clifford Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," in Interpretive Social Sciences: A Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1979).

16. Compare Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, 18-19, 71-78.

17. For fashionable specimens of these flawed alternatives, see, for instance, Paul M. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge: MIT, 1989), chs. 1-4; and Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

18. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pt. 1, §§ 19-25; Hans-Georg Gad-amer, Truth and Method, trans, from 2d ed. Garrett Barden and John Cum-ming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 261-267; Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 189.

19. See Joseph Margolis, The Truth about Relativism (Oxford: Basil Black-well, 1991).

20. If we may assume the inadequacy of physicalism (even if nonreductive), then this is the fatal flaw not only of Sartre's theory but of Danto's as well; for, following Sartre to this extent, Danto rightly emphasizes "the difference between a plain mark and a meaningful one" but he construes it to be the difference "between a thing and a rule for its interpretation," Jean-Paul Sartre , 30. No, on the argument, it concerns a difference between natural and cultural referents. The neglect of this difference undermines the force of Danto's well-known examples of what are said to be perceptually "indistinguishable"—but are only merely sensorily indistinguishable. (That is, Danto nowhere provides for treating artworks as referents.)

21. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 118.

22. This inclination explains the conceptual gymnastics of Richard Woll-helm's analysis of painting as entirely physical; see Wollheim, Art and Its Objects. Wollheim ascribes expressive properties to paintings and sculptures construed as physical objects. He does so on the basis of an analogy with the expressiveness of the human face. But he fails to explain the basis of the analogy, for he says nothing about the reduction of the "animal" or "human" (not merely the biological) to the physical. This is the opposite of Hanslick's strategy regarding music. Treat music as "ordered sound," Hanslick recommends, and expressive properties inevitably reduce to no more than what is extrinsically ascribed. But if you ask for the reasons for construing music thus (in spite of its complexity)—perhaps why it is necessarily such—why it is nothing more than "ordered sound," you see at once the stubborn arbitrariness of Hanslick's argument. Hanslick makes no effort to bring music into line with the other arts or the rest of the cultural world. See Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful: A Contribution Toward the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music, trans, and ed. from 5th ed. Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980); also, Joseph Margolis, "Music as Ordered Sound: Some Complications Affecting Description and Interpretation," in The Interpretation of Music: Philosophicai Essays, ed. Michael Krausz (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).

23. I take this to be a clue to Foucault's puzzling remark: "Before the end of the eighteenth century, man did not exist . . .. He is a quite recent creature, which the demiurge of knowledge fabricated with its own hands less than two hundred years ago"; see The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences , trans. (New York: Vintage, 1973), 308. For a fashionable example of the opposed physicalist view, see D. C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (London: Rontledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), 189-190.

24. Robert Belle Burke, The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), vol. 1:232-233.

25. See Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), appendix; and Peter C. Sutton, org., "Masters of Dutch Genre Painting," Masters of Seventeenth-Century Dutch Genre Painting (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, distributed by University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984).

26. The principal advocate seems to be a certain E. de Jongh, whom Alpers identifies.

27. Alpers, The Art of Describing, 229.

28. Samuel Y. Edgerton, Jr., The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 87.

29. In current analytic philosophy, "upervenience" (as I have earlier remarked) is the doctrine that holds that, for phenomena that "supervene," it is in principle possible to replace statements true of them by extensionally equivalent statements about some more fundamental phenomena, salve veritate, without supposing that they are one and the same. Thus, mental phenomena are thought, by Donald Davidson, to yield (nonreductively) to physicalist replacement by virtue of supervenience. See Donald Davidson, "Mental Events," Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 214. Davidson holds in fact that "there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect." See, also, John F. Post, The Faces of Experience: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Colin McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness: Essay towards a Resolution (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 179-181.

The idea may be generalized for meaning, intentional properties, and the like. But, of course, if one admits historical, Intentional, contextual, and similar constraints, then this version of supervenience is obviously false. Arthur Dante's account of the indiscernibility of numerically distinct artworks or between artworks and nonartworks is something of an uneasy challenge to the supervenience thesis; see The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. The issue is an empirical one. Furthermore, supervenience in Davidson's sense signifies that what is supervenient can only be detected by way of what is "associated" with this or that physical phenomenon; I deny that that is adequate to what the cultural world requires. I say instead that the Intentional is incarnate in the physical; but it is hardly necessary to attribute what "emerges" rather than "supervenes" (in painting, say) as a projection of some sort from what is first discerned physically, as by the use of a rule. On the use of "emergent" see Margolis, Science without Unity, ch. 10. See, also, chapter 7, below.

30. The most elaborate recent version of the theory being opposed has been developed by Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980). Further, regarding Wolterstorff's view, see Joseph Margolis, Art and Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980), ch. 4. On the vexed matter of "universals"—hence, of meanings—see Joseph Margolis, "The Passing of Peirce's Realism," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 293 (1993).

31. Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art , 262-263.

32. See Goodman, Languages of Art , 27-31.

33. This is Goodman's characteristic emphasis, of course: Languages of Art, 27-31. Danto follows him to this extent: The Transfiguration of the Commonplace , ch. 3. See, also, the special number, "Representation," Social Research 51 (1984). See Margolis, Texts without Referents, ch. 6.

34. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace , 208.

35. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace , 208. See, also, Arthur C. Danto, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 21.

36. See Erwin Panofsky, Early Netherlandish Painting , vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 7. Panofsky observes that the Arnolfini "has four central vanishing points instead of one"; see, also, p. 202.

37. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences , trans. (New York: Random House, 1970), 16.

38. See Eleanor Rosch, "On the Internal Structure of Perceptual and Semantic Categories," in Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language , ed. T. M. Moore (New York: Academic Press, 1973); also "Classification of Real-World Objects: Origins and Representations in Cognition," in La Memoire sémantique, ed. S. Ehrlich and E. Tulving (Paris: Bulletin de psychologie, 1976).

39. The point is disputed, unconvincingly, by David Novitz, "Black Horse Pictures: Exposing the Picturing Relation," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 34 (1975). See, also, Meyer Schapiro's remarkable monograph, Words and Pictures (The Hague: Mouton, 1973).

40. See, further, Margolis, "The Passing of Peirce's Realism."

41. It is worth remarking that Foucauit, commenting on Magritte's paintings, which could easily be treated as merely representational (however fancifully), introduces a pointed distinction between "resemblance" and "similitude" (that is, in the French usage). Magritte himself seems to have been willing to follow Foucault in this. Things do not (both hold) have resemblances: resemblances are imposed by reference to artifactually introduced categorical systems serving representational functions; but things do have similitudes, that is, the capacity to invite a kind of "horizonal" slippage, as, as in Magritte's paintings, when a leaf takes the shape of a tree, and a ship at sea, the form of the sea. See Michel Foucault, This Is Not a Pipe, trans. James Harkness (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1982). This is extremely suggestive but still too general for our needs.

I may perhaps also draw your attention to the extraordinarily primitive way in which Bertrand Russell introduces (a kind of platonism regarding) predicative similarity early in our century. There is almost no elaboration of the problem of "similarity" (the one ineliminable universal or platonic Form, on Russell's view). Apart from Russell's view that universals answer (epistemically and ontically) to the formal advances of Principia Mathematics, it is very nearly the case that the subsequent flowering of Anglo-American analytic philosophy (which effectively issues from the work of Russell and G. E. Moore) has all but ignored (despite its featuring predicative strategies) the epistemic question of discerning similarities and the ontic question of universals. A large part of the argument of this book, of course, is that predicative similarities cannot be located in any way but in terms of lebensformlich practices. See Bertrand Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1912).

42. Nelson Goodman, "Seven Strictures of Similarity," Experience & Theory , ed. Lawrence Foster and J. W. Swanson (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), 25.

43. Goodman, Languages of Art , 8; see E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 2d ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1961), passim.

44. Goodman, Languages of Art , 38; italics added.

45. E. H. Gombrich, The Image and the Eye: Further Studies in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 279.

46. Goodman, Languages of Art, 8; see Gombrich, Art and Illusion, passim.

47. Gombrich, The Image and the Eye, 280, 287. The entire essay, "Image and Code: Scope and Limits of Conventionalism in Pictorial Representation" repays attention. See, also, E. H. Gombrich, "The 'What' and the 'How': Perspective Representation and the Phenomenal World," in Logic and Art: Essays in Honor of Nelson Goodman, ed. Richard Rudner and Israel Scheffler (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972); also, Marx W. Wartofsky, "Pictures, Representations, and the Understanding," in the same volume.

48. See Gombrich, "Experiment and Experience in the Arts," The Image and the Eye, 215.

49. See, for instance, Gerald Edelman, Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (New York: Basic Books, 1987), particularly ch. 9; also, for a more popular overview of recent work on memory, including Edel-man's, Israel Rosenfield, The Invention of Memory: A New View of the Brain (New York: Basic Books, 1988). See, also, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, for instance pt. 1, §§ 238-244; also, Foucault, The Order of Things, ch. 9.

50. J. Y. Lettvin, H. R. Maturana, W. S. McCulloch, and W. H. Pitts, "What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain," Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 47 (1959).

51. See The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols., ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1963), 5.93-101, 5.426; 8.13-14.

52. Goodman, Languages of Art , 10-19; Gombrich, "The 'What' and the 'How': Perspective Representation and the Phenomenal World," particularly p. 148.

53. See James J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966).

54. Gombrich, "The 'What' and the 'How'," 132.

55. Gombrich, "The 'What' and the 'How'," 138, 141.

56. Alan Tormey and Judith Fart Tormey, "Seeing, Believing, and Picturing," in Perception and Pictorial Representation , ed. Calvin E Nodine and Dennis R. Fisher (New York: Praeger, 1979), 294. For the least impression of the extraordinary scatter of current theories of perception, see David Mart, Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1982); James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979) ; and Patrick A. Heelan, Space-Perception and the Philosophy of Science (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1983). These books appeared within the same extremely short period of time.

57. Francisco Pacheco, Velázquez's father-in-law, shows a distinct interest in Alberti, for instance. See his Arte de la Pintura , 2 vols., ed. E J. Sánchez Cantón (Madrid: Instituto de Valencia de Don Juan, 1956).

58. This way of reading Velázquez's painting goes somewhat contrary to the one interestingly proposed by Searle. See John R. Searle, " Las Meninas and the Paradoxes of Pictorial Representation," Critical Inquiry 6 (1980). There are serious but irrelevant difficulties in Searle's interpretation. But what is important, here, is that Searle concedes no variability or tolerance if "classical representation" is invoked—a point quite alien to Foucault's reading. Thus it is that he takes too literally the notion that the representation must obtain from one determinate point of view. Gombrich had already observed (favoring Gibson) that realistic representation had to accommodate an ecologically shifting point of view. But if we also add that the point of view needs only to be salient, not in any sense strictly correct phenomenally (whether fixed or moving) to ensure realism, then we need not insist on Searle's preference for a fixed point of view. Not finding any such focus readily at hand and insisting on "classical representation," Searle favors instead the point of view "of the model and not . . . that of the artist" (p. 483)—that is, the point of view of Philip and Ana ("offstage"). The difference between Searle's and Foucault's interpretation is this: Searle believes Las Meninas to be a representation of a representation (p. 488), whereas Foucault takes it to be a representation of (the entire mode of illusion of classical) representation, that is, of the act of rendering or uttering representations. Velázquez's witty use of the paintings in the neighborhood of the mirror then makes novel sense-somewhat in the same way Matisse often exploits: in his practice of "confusing" representations of paintings and parts of paintings with representations of parts of natural scenes.

59. See Panofsky, Early Netherlandish Painting ; Edgerton, The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective.

60. The full account is conveniently provided in Edgerton, The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective ; also, in John White, The Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial Space, 2d ed. (Boston: Boston Book and Art Shop, 1967), ch. 8. The accounts are drawn from Antonio Manetti's Life of Brunelleschi, evidently written some decades later.

61. This is perhaps the fatal difficulty of Searle's argument—which is not to say that it is the fatal difficulty of his interpretation of Velázquez's painting.

62. There is an inkling of this important theme in some of Barthes's relatively early, incompletely formed essays on the photograph. See, for instance, Roland Barthes, "The Photographic Message," Image Music Text , trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977). There, he speaks of the "press photograph," which "transmits" (as "message") "the scene itself, the literal reality. . .. Certainly [Barthes goes on] the image is not the reality but at least it is its perfect analogon and it is exactly this analogical perfection which, to common sense, defines the photograph." In that sense, "it is a message without a code" (p. 17). This naive conception (the opinion of "common sense") marks the antithesis of art in the mechanically produced artifactual image. The press photograph is supposed to lack context and intentional artifice and (for that reason) is supposed to invite no interpretive conjectures.

These are surely the suspicions that arise in our mind when we doubt that photographs can ever be artworks.

1. Michael Riffaterre, "Intertextual Representation: On Mimesis as Interpretive Discourse," Critical Inquiry 11 (1984):141. See, also, Michael Riffaterre, Fictional Truth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), particularly the introduction. See, also, Michael Riffaterre, "Describing Poetic Structures: Two Approaches to Baudelaire's les Chats," in Structuralism , ed. Jacques Ehrmann (Garden City: Doubleday, 1970). This early paper of Riffaterre's belongs to the famous special issue of Yale French Studies (1966), which, in effect, introduced (largely) Francophone structuralism to an American readership. It exhibits Riffaterre's great skill as a structuralist reader—but also his care in criticizing Roman Jakobson's and Claude Lévi-Strauss's reading of Baudelaire's poem. What is perhaps more important, for our purpose, is that Riffaterre himself raises larger theoretical questions that may, in all justice, be raised against his own practice. Against Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss he raises "the question as to whether unmodified structural linguistics is relevant at all to the analysis of poetry. The author's method is based on the assumption that any structural system they are able to define in the poem is necessarily a poetic structure" (p. 191). But the legitimacy of that query calls the universality of structuralism into question as well.

2. Riffaterre, "Intertextual Representation," 142.

3. Riffaterre, "Intertextual Representation," 142.

4. A very clear impression of this pervasive disorder, both in the sense of an accurate reporting and of the reporter's inability to surmount these puzzles, may be had from Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism : History, Theory, Fiction (New York: Routledge, 1988), especially ch. 9. As it happens, Hutcheon has been considerably influenced by Riffaterre.

5. Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism , 144.

6. Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism , 144.

7. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), for example the paradox of ch. 13. See, also, for a more "constructivist" account of science, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (Princeton University Press, 1986); and Karin Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981).

8. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , ch. 10.

9. See Gregory L. Lucente, Beautiful Fables: Self-consciousness in Italian Narrative from Manzoni to Calvino (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 318; quoted by Hutcheon.

10. See Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism , ch. 7.

11. See Rosalind E. Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Myths (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983); and Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983).

12. Still, this is not to endorse (with Hutcheon) the obvious misinterpretation of Roland Barthes's provocation: "'What takes place' in a narrative is from the referential (reality) point of view literally nothing ; 'what happens' is language alone, the adventure of language, the unceasing celebration of its coming," Image Music Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 124. First of all, what is happening concerns actual language; second, the remark says nothing about reference at all. Cf. Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, 144.

13. For a sustained discussion of the issue, see Joseph Margolis, Texts without Referents: Reconciling Science and Narrative (Oxford: Basil Black-well, 1989), ch. 7. See, also, Thomas Pavel, Fictional Worlds (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).

14. Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 62.

15. Eco, A Theory of Semiotics , 61.

16. Riffaterre, "Intertextual Representation," 159.

17. See John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 77.

18. Riffaterre, "Intertextual Representation," 159.

19. I may say that I participated in that symposium (as did Linda Hutch-eon and Thomas Pavel) and I took the occasion to show that Riffaterre's sort of intertextuality was, in that instance, just the wrong kind of intertextuality to prefer. So the question of the relevance of his strategy cannot be collapsed into that of the validity of determinate critical remarks that merely accord with his strategy.

20. The painting in question was probably Piet Mondrian's piece identified in Gahiers d'art (1931) as Composition de la ligne droite , which looks to be the same as, or very similar to, Composition (1926), also known as the "Mysterious Eighteenth Diamond." Cf. E. A. Garmean, Jr., Mondrian: The Diamond Compositions (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1979).

21. See Michael Riffaterre, Semiotics of Poetry (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), particularly the study of poems by Pierre de Ronsard and Olivier de Magny.

22. Riffaterre, "Intertextual Representation," 142-143.

23. See, also, Algirdas Julien Greimas, Du sens: Essais sémiotiques (Paris: Seuil, 1970); Du sens II: Essais sémiotiques (Paris: Seuil, 1983).

24. See Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), particularly introduction and ch. 1.

25. A sustained argument would require a full-dress comparison between the conceptual resources of a Saussurean and a Peircean semiotics. On this, see Joseph Margolis, "The Human Voice of Semiotics ," first presented at the Fourth Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies, Perpignan, France, Spring, 1988 and published in Semiotics of the World/La sémi-otique dans le monde, ed. Michel Balat and Janice Deledalle-Rhoades, vol. 3 of Signs of Humanity/L'homme et ses signes, ed. Gérard Deledalle (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter; 1992).

26. See Joseph Margolis, "Genres, Laws, Canons, Principles," in Rules and Conventions, ed. Mette Hjort (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).

27. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method , trans, from 2d ed. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), for instance pp. 225-234.

28. I feel bound to mention Stanley Fish's freewheeling correction, here, to anything like Riffaterre's adherence to "independent constraints" on interpretation by (his) falling back to the constraints afforded by "contexts of practice." I cannot rightly say that I "agree" with Fish: he is not an author one can simply agree with. But I am not inclined to resist his blithe sort of shaggy-dog story, which, in my opinion, is coherent, often brilliant, often tiring, and unnecessarily fleeting. (He does not, of course, discuss Riffaterre.) See Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), for instance at pp. 25-28.

29. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology , trans. Gayatri Spivak Chakravorty (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 158.

30. The issue has been much disputed. I find a very reasonable confirmation of my reading of Derrida in Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), particularly the entry under "Context," for instance at pp. 84, 85, 87, 89-90, 93. The entire passage may be taken to be a gloss on the "horstexte" line (p. 84). It does not seem to me to matter that this reading (the one offered by Bennington) is very close to a self-interpretation. It is a plausible reading. It also accords in general with the strong reading offered by Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); see the subsection titled "Text" in ch. 11, particularly pp. 279-280. Gasché makes two telling points: one, that "Derrida has never contested that texts, or for that matter 'literature,' are mimetic or referential"; the other, that "the idea of an outside [of a determinate text] makes sense only with regard to the common notions of text." Gasché adds: Derrida's pronouncement 'does not permit the conclusion that there is nothing else but text, or for that matter, that all is language" (p. 281). See, also, pp. 275-276, which touches on possible affinities and differences between Kant and Derrida. I part company with Gasché for another reason: Gasché tries to construe deconstruction as a philosophy. I deny that it is, but I believe Derrida does have a philosophical program of sorts, of which the "horstexte" line is a sign. I construe Wittgenstein's notion of philosophical therapy in an analogous way. It is not philosophy, though Wittgenstein has a philosophy.

31. Derrida, Of Grammatology , 159.

32. Derrida, Of Grammatology , 158.

33. Derrida, Of Grammatology , 158.

34. Derrida, Of Grammatology , 158.

35. Derrida, Of Grammatology , 159.

36. See E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

37. This points to the essential weakness of Christopher Norris's otherwise admirable The Deconstructive Turn : Essays in the Rhetoric of Philosophy (London: Methuen, 1983).

38. Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism , 118-119.

39. See W. V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth , rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

40. Paul de Man, "Criticism and Crisis," Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism , 2d ed. rev. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 17.

41. See de Man, "The Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida's Reading of Rousseau," Blindness and Insight , which is more temperate.

42. See Gerald Graff, Literature against Itself: Literary Ideas in Modern Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), ch. 6.

43. For an example, see Searle, Speech Acts , pp. 78-79. For a good sense of the current state of the discussion, see Grazer Philosophische Studien 25/26 (1985/1986).

44. See Monroe C. Beardsley, The Possibility of Criticism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979); and Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation. On the doctrine of "internal relations," which structuralists accept but which is not confined to their views—it appears among the Anglo-American Hegelians as well—see Richard M. Rorty, "Relations, Internal and External," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed. Paul Edwards, vol. 7 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 125-133.

45. See Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," Untimely Meditations , trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

46. See, for instance, Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), particularly p. 31, for a list of influential authors who have voiced the same thought; also, Fred Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall: An Essay on Interpretation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), particularly the notes to introduction and ch. 1, which effectively constitute an extraordinary case demonstrating the sense in which the New York Times Book Review (hardly usually considered the home of serious theorizing) has become a factory for the Nietzschean (if not the de Manian) thesis. See, also, Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, ch. 6.

47. See Aristotle, Poetics, ch. 9.

48. See Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism , 2d ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960); Carl G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965).

49. See, for example, Leopold yon Ranke, The Theory and Practice of History , trans. Wilma A. Iggers and Konrad yon Moltke, ed. Georg G. Iggers and Konrad yon Moltke (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973).

50. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind , in trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), ch. 9.

51. See Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact , trans. Fred Bradley and Thaddeus J. Trenn, ed. Thaddeus J. Trenn and Robert K. Merton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

52. See, for instance, Bas C. van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); and Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983).

53. See, for example, Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau , Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

54. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 9.

55. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 35.

56. See Michel Foucault, "The Discourse on Language," trans. Rupert Sawyer, bound with The Archaeology of Knowledge , trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 219.

57. See Joseph Margolis, The Truth about Relativism (Oxford: Basil Black-well, 1991); and "Redeeming Foucault," in Foucault and the Critique of Institutions, ed. John A. Caputo and Mark Yount (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992).

58. See, for instance, W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), ch. 2; Pursuit of Truth, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), ch. 1; and especially "Epistemology Naturalized," Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); also Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity," Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); "Solidarity," Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), and "Putnam and the Menace of Relativism," Journal of Philosophy 40 (1993).

59. In The Truth about Relativism , I give a full account of its alethic features. See prologue. See, also, my The Flux of History and the Flux of Science (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1993).

60. Barthes, "Change the Object Itself," Image Music Text , 167-168. It is instructive and ironic that, in this essay, Barthes uses the term "sociolect" to designate the object of "semioclasm" (replacing "writing," as in Writing Degree Zero [1953]; for, of course, Riffaterre has employed the term precisely to entrench his version of the first sort of textuality, which Barthes is here subverting.

61. Roland Barthes, "From Work to Text," Image Music Text , 160.

62. See E. H. Gombrich, "The 'What' and the 'How': Perspective Representation and the Phenomenal World," in Logic & Art: Essays in Honor of Nelson Goodman , ed. Richard Rudner and Israel Scheffler (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972); and James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Vi-sum Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), pt. 4.

63. The analogue for sensory perception in general is rather neatly developed in a formal way by Fred I. Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), except that Dretske favors an objectivist sense of how the world really is—hence, an objectivist view of how it would be correctly represented. We need not follow him in this. Let me cite, also, Marx M. Wartofsky, "Picturing and Representing," in Perception and Pictorial Representation , ed. Calvin E Nodine and Dennis E Fisher (New York: Praeger, 1979), which, though too extreme in not accommodating the biology of perception sufficiently, offers a relevantly bold possibility.

64. For a convenient collection of the pertinent paintings, see John Elder-field, Henri Matisse: A Retrospective (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1992). Elderfield organized the exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, "Henri Matisse: A Retrospective," September 24, 1992-January 12, 1993.

65. See Arthur C. Danto, "Narratives of the End of Art," Encounters Reflections: Art in the Historical Present (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1990). Danto has recently modified his theory in an ingenious way that calls the earlier thesis into radical question. See his "Learning to Live with Pluralism," Beyond the Brillo Box: The Visual Arts in Post-Historical Perspective (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1992). The thesis just now being advanced is the central finding of The Flux of History and the Flux of Science.

66. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and the Mind," trans. Carlton Dallery, in The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics , ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

1. Aristotle, Poetics , trans. Ingram Bywater, ch. 9: 1451a-b. For convenience of reference, I have used The Basic Works of Aristotle , ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941); also, for other of Aristotle's treatises.

2. See Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), Polemical Introduction and First Essay.

3. See Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

4. See Aristotle, Physics , bk. 4, chs. 10-11.

5. Aristotle, Physics, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, bk. IV: 220a; in McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle .

6. See Irwin C. Lieb, Past, Present, and Future (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992); also, Joseph Margolis, The Flux of History and the Flux of Science (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1993).

7. Aristotle, Physics , bk. 4: 221a.

8. Aristotle's passing remark about "the sea battle tomorrow" raises a question of logic more than a question about the nature of the future of human history. See Aristotle, On Interpretation, ch. 9, particularly 19a30-35, where it is clear that, as far as the future is concerned, Aristotle has in mind the openended nature of what is "potential." See, also, G. E. M. Anscombe, "Aristotle and the Sea Battle," Mind 65 (1956); also, Donald Williams, "The Sea Fight Tomorrow," in Structure, Method and Meaning, ed. Paul Henle et al. (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1951). The matter is usually regarded as concerned with the need for a three-valued logic.

9. See, for instance, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce , 8 vols., ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1963), 6.13, 6.101.

10. See Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983); and Bas C. van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).

11. See Ilya Prigogine, "Irreversibility and Space-Time Structure," in Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time , ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986).

12. See J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London: Rout-ledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), ch. 3.

13. See Aristotle, Physics, bk. 2; Metaphysics , bk. 9. It needs to be said that the model of science drawn from the Physics and the Posterior Analytics does not fit in an altogether satisfactory way the empirical features of Aristotle's biological tracts, although the discrepancies are open to considerable quarrel. For a sense of the contemporary treatment of the question, see Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox, eds., Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

14. Aristotle, Metaphysics , trans. W. D. Ross, bk. 9, ch. 8: 1049b; in McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle.

15. For example, it is the view of Arthur C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and, though not entirely consistently, of Adolf Grünbaum, The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984), introduction.

16. Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , vol. 3, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 23-27; see, also, Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. James S. Churchill, ed. Martin Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), introduction.

17. See, for instance, the intriguing exchange between Kurt Gödel and Albert Einstein, in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist , 3d ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1970), 555-562 and 687-688; also, Paul Horwich, Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).

18. See Kurt Gödel, "A Remark about the Relationship between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy," in Schilpp, Albert Einstein.

19. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Philosopher and Sociology," Signs , trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964); also, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man," trans. John Wild, The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenom-enological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics , ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964).

20. See Edmund Husserl, "The Origin of Geometry," appended in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology , trans. David Cart (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); and Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr., ed. David B. Allison (Stony Brook: Nicholas Hay, 1978), particularly SS. I must add that there has been something of a campaign to discredit Derrida's competence and accuracy as a philosophical critic, especially with regard to his account of Husserl's work. For a sample of the persistent charges, see J. Claude Evans, Strategies of Deconstruction: Derrida and the Myth of the Voice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). I confess I was inclined to give some credence to those charges. But, having now examined some of them with care, I must say they are unconvincing. I discuss a number of them in "Deferring to Derrida's Difference," publication pending. The matter bears in an important way on the issue under discussion.

21. For an overview of the topic of reference, see Joseph Margolis, Texts without Referents: Reconciling Science and Narrative (Oxford: Basil Black-well, 1989), ch. 7.

22. See, for instance, the different lines of argument in Bas C. van Fraas-sen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980); and Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Regarding theoretical entities, see Hilary Putnam, "The John Locke Lectures" (1976), Lecture 2 (regarding "the principle of charity"), in Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). Putnam has altered his views on reference considerably since the appearance of this book.

23. See, for instance, Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie . I am not, therefore, endorsing the rather different "positivisms" Cartwright and van Fraassen espouse.

24. Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight, 2d ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 17.

25. Fred Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall : An Essay on Interpretation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 12. The quoted phrase is from a remark of E. L. Doctorow's, in Bruce Weber, "The Myth Maker," The New York Times Magazine, 20 October 1985, 78.

26. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 161.

27. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 161.

28. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 12. Doctorow's remark is cited from Michiko Kakutani, "Mailer Talking," New York Times Book Review , 5 June 1982, 28-29.

29. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 1.

30. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 49-50. See, also, Alas-dair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2d ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), particularly pp. 113-120 and ch. 18; Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche, Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 191-199; but also p. 210; and Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), especially "The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality" and "Flawed Crystals: James's The Golden Bowl and Literature as Moral Philosophy." It is a foregone conclusion, of course, that neither MacIntyre nor Nehamas nor Nussbaum would subscribe to the suggestion being made here.

31. Cited from Nicola Chiaromonte, The Paradox of History: Stendhal, Tolstoy, Pasternak, and Others (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), xxi, in Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall, 13.

32. Cited, from Hayden White, review of Chiaromonte's The Paradox of History, New York Times Book Review , 22 September 1985, 7, in Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall, 13.

33. White, Tropics of Discourse , 22.

34. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 9; italics added.

35. See W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), ch. 2. Quine, it must be said, talks as if "there is no fact of the matter" where meanings are concerned; but, on his own view of the analytic/synthetic distinction, he cannot then show in a principled way how there could be "a fact of the matter" where the structure of reality is concerned. He nowhere addresses the distinction, and, on the argument (his own) that the analytic/synthetic distinction is a "dogma," he cannot. See Vt. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1953).

36. A good specimen of this sort of view, rather modestly formulated within the terms of reference of analytic—particularly pragmatist—philoso-phy, is afforded by Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987), Lectures 2 and 3. But it is important to say also that Putnam's account generates its own quite serious difficulties. The point is that the notion of an internal realism (which, effectively, captures what is least quarrelsome about "il n'y a pas de hors-texte"—philosophically rather than deconstructively—is coherent enough, without endorsing any particular version of realism.

37. See Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce , 5.503; 8.330.

38. See Hacking, Representing and Intervening , particularly ch. 16.

39. See, for instance, Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews , trans. Donald E Bouchard and Sherry Simon, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cot-nell University Press, 1977).

40. For a compendious account of the matter, see Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980). Genette, it may be said, is more influenced by the Slavic structuralists than the Francophone structuralists, which inclines him to take a good-humored attitude to the question of conceptual closure.

41. See, for instance, Fernand Braudel, On History , trans. Sarah Matthews (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

42. See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics , trans. Roy Harris, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechchaye, with Albert Riedlinger (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986).

43. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (New York: Basic Books, 1963), chs. 2, 15.

44. Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987),

45. I have italicized the phrase "found otherwise only." 45. See White, The Content of the Form , 45-46.

46. White, The Content of the Form , 44; see p. 43.

47. White, The Content of the Form, 47. See Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951).

48. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 142.

49. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 143.

50. Foucauk, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 153-154, 156.

51. For an impression of how easily serious historians drift into the confusion, see Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History , trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), introduction.

52. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 154.

53. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3. The citation is from White, Tropics of Discourse, 98; italics added by Ricoeur.

54. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 153. The citation is from White, Tropics of Discourse, 106; the italics are White's.

55. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. 3: 155.

56. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 152. The material cited is from Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 30; the italics in the cited material are White's, the italics that appear in Ricoeur's own text ("prior") have been added.

57. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 152.

58. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 153.

59. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 150, 154; italics added.

60. Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies otc the Creation of Meaning in Language , trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, SJ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 309-313.

61. The critical passage is this: "The central argument is that, with respect of the relation to reality, metaphor is to poetic language what the model is to scientific language. Now in scientific language, the model is essentially a heuristic instrument that seeks, by means of fiction, to break down an inadequate interpretation and to lay the way for a new, more adequate interpretation. In the language of Mary Hesse, another author close to [Max] Black, the model is an instrument of redescription. I will retain this expression for the duration of my analysis"; in Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 240.

Here, Ricoeur treats metaphor in only two ways: first, against the inadequacies of a nominalist theory of metaphor (against Nelson Goodman); and second, as a creative source for going beyond the horizonal limitations of our scientific vocabulary at any particular moment in time (with Max Black and Mary Hesse). (Later in The Rule of Metaphor, he tries to combine Black's vision with Heidegger's!) But there are two verbal slippages here (not verbal slips: deliberate slippages). First, Ricoeur replaces "redescription" (Black's and Hesse's term) by "interpretation" or by "new, more adequate interpretation," and then recovers the first usage—which misleadingly intrudes a specifically hermeneutic or poetic consideration that is then withdrawn—for, can we say that we "interpret" absent noumena? Of course not. Second, Ricoeur invents a formal analogy or ratio between poetry and science—metaphor:poetry::model: science—whereas Black and Hesse are concerned, as far as reference to reality is involved, to insist on the continuity and intended logically unified function of poetry and science. So, at the very least, Ricoeur's use of these materials is both idiosyncratic and arbitrary in an evidentiary sense. Also, of course, metaphors of Black's and Hesse's sort eventually settle into a benign catachresis, which casts considerable doubt on Ricoeur's use of the notion of a model—constructed, intervening, "prefiguring," suited better for explanation.

Ricoeur goes on to consider the bearing of "metaphorical truth on the definition of reality," The Rule of Metaphor, 256. The question is the topic of Ricoeur's final chapter, study 9. But, there, Ricoeur is concerned primarily with demonstrating that the "aporetic" interpretation of Aristotle's Meta physics in the light of the Categories (acceding thus far to the destructive critique of Pierre Aubenque and Jules Vuillemin) is recovered not by way of a deductive system of categorical distinctions grounded in Aristotle's original essentialism but (more or less following Heidegger) by way of an irreducible analogia entis. Ultimately, Ricoeur recovers his thesis by announcing the "universal metaphoricity of philosophical discourse" (p. 286), which must also mean, in a sense quite opposed to Black's, the "metaphoricity" of science as well. (This is Ricoeur's reading of Heidegger's pronouncement: "The metaphorical exists only within the metaphysical" [cf. p. 311].) But the whole exercise makes sense only in terms of the paradox of noumenal being that we "recover" through and only through the mode of "being-as"—that is, metaphorized being. There is no other instrument (here) that Ricoeur offers for the interpretation of the historical past.

62. See Frye, Anatomy of Criticism , Polemical Introduction and First Essay.

63. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 1.

64. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 35; cf. also ch. 3.

65. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 155.

66. See Aristotle, Physics , 191a25-34; Metaphysics, 994a1-28.

67. For a fuller account of the "incarnate" and the relation between the cultural and physical, see Margolis, Texts without Referents, ch. 6.

1. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method , trans, from 2d ed. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 304.

2. See Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations , trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pt. 1,§§ 19-25; and W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960),§§ 15-16.

3. This is the essential theme of Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

4. The seminal paper on which this entire movement depends is, of course, W. V. Quine's "Epistemo1ogy Naturalized," Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). Nelson Goodman gives the tantalizing impression of being on the point of offering a fundamentally different model of truth and knowledge—or, better, grounds for replacing the standard model (replacing "truth" by "rightness" and "knowledge" by "understanding"). I find his suggestions perceptive; but, as with so much of Goodman's latest work, it is difficult to be sure of his actual line of argument as opposed to his intuitions. See Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin, Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences (Indianapolis: Hack-ett Publishing Co., 1988), pt. 3. I cannot see how to reconcile Goodman's early (best-known) work with his latest proposals; but I agree that the recent "naturalizing" tendencies of analytic philosophy cannot overtake the difficulties he mentions.

5. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce , 8 vols., ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1963), 5.313, 5.314, 5.317. These are drawn from the published material collected as "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" and form the most succinct key to Peirce's profound dialectic regarding Cartesian and Scotist philosophy. One crucial consequence, which I shall draw on, rests on the fact that contemporary views of the "Cartesian" mentality subsume a strong reading of "consciousness" as cognitional under the notion of "consciousness" as essentially private, dualistic, and mental, whereas Peirce's own prescient "Scotist" tendencies treat the interpretive and cognitional as primary and, therefore, treat the "mental" as privative and subordinate though real enough.

6. See Vincent Michael Colapietro, Peirce's Approach to the Self : A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).

7. See Alvin I. Goldman, "What Is Justified Belief?" in Justification and Knowledge , ed. George Pappas (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979). The essential issue is not broached, but is implicated in Goldman's use of expressions like "reliable cognitive process." See, also, Alvin I. Goldman, Liaisons (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).

8. See Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), pt. 1. See, also, Philip Kitcher, "The Naturalists Return," Philosophical Review 101 (1992); and Hilary Kornblith, "What Is Naturalistic Epistemology?" in Naturalizing Epistemology, ed. Hilary Korn-blith (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985). Goldman, for instance, is prepared to "naturalize" the normative aspects of epistemology; but he does not explore the naturalizing of the legitimative aspects of epistemology. There's the difficulty. See Goldman, "What Is Justified Belief?"

9. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," 75-76.

10. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," 76.

11. See W. V. Quine, "The Nature of Natural Knowledge," in Mind and Language, ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975). For an excellent discussion of the issue in terms of Quine's and Hume's views, see Barry Stroud, "The Significance of Naturalized Epistemology," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 6 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).

12. For a clear sense of the restricted program of "naturalistic" epistemologies, see Kornblith, "What Is Naturalistic Epistemology?"; also, Alvin I. Goldman, "Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition," Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978).

13. Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?," Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23.

14. Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?," 21.

15. On the force of these distinctions, see Joseph Margolis, The Truth about Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).

16. See Margolis, The Truth about Relativism, prologue.

17. Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald David-son, ed. Ernest LePore (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 314.

18. On the issue of truth, see Hilary Putnam, "On Truth," in How Many Questions, ed. Leigh S. Cauman et al. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983).

19. Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,' 312; compare p. 313. Needless to say, Davidson's view here is profoundly anti-Peircean and unsympathetic to the ubiquity of the interpretive function.

20. See Donald Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990):281.

21. Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," 313.

22. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1888), bk. 1, pt. 4,§ ii (p. 207);§ vi (p. 252).

23. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. 1, pt. 4,§ ii (p. 189);§ vi (p. 253).

24. See, for instance, Bertrand Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1912); and G. E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922).

25. I don't believe this aspect of Russell's systematic program against definite descriptions has been rightly assessed. See Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting," Mind 14 (1905).

26. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. 1, pt. 4,§ vi (p. 252).

27. See G(eorge) E(dward) Moore, "Proof of an External World," Philosophical Papers (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959).

28. Paul M. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 6. A somewhat different (seemingly muted) eliminationist view appears in Daniel Dennett's homuncularism: D. C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), ch. 10. An ingenious mingling of reductive and eliminationist themes appears in Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), pt. 3.

29. I take this to suggest the deep weakness of John R. Searle's recent effort, in The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), to account for the mental primarily in causal terms involving the powers of the brain. Searle promises an account of the social dimension of mind; but then, his admitting (here) that he does not yet understand the matter makes it hard to see how he can be philosophically sanguine about what he has so far claimed. See, for instance, pp. 127-128. Thus: if anything like the account I am developing is valid, then Searle's (predicative) confinement of the "mental" to the brain cannot possibly be right. In any case, Searle offers no reason to believe that what may be said about the social provenance of the mental can simply be added to what can first be said about the neurophysiology of the mental.

30. See Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge."

31. Donald Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 125.

32. Davidson, "Thought and Talk," Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation , 168-169.

33. Davidson, "Thought and Talk," 168.

34. Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," 137; italics added.

35. W. V. Quine, "Speaking of Objects," Ontological Relativity and Other Essays , particularly p. 5.

36. The difference between the two readings given (against "massive error" and in favor of "massive agreement" in belief) is somewhat ambiguously managed in essays 9-12 of Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation . For instance, in "Radical Interpretation," Davidson says: "A good place to begin [in understanding what another says] is with the attitude of holding a sentence true, of accepting it as true. This is, of course, a belief, but it is a single attitude applicable to all sentences, and so does not ask us to be able to make finely discriminated distinctions among beliefs. It is an attitude an interpreter may plausibly be taken to be able to identify before he can interpret, since he may know that a person intends to express a truth in uttering a sentence without having any idea what truth. Not that sincere assertion is the only reason to suppose that a person holds a sentence to be true" (p. 135).

37. Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," 135.

38. Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," 131.

39. See Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge."

40. See Putnam, "On Truth."

41. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," 128, in the context of the entire paper.

42. On normative matters, see Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition , introduction and ch. 1.

43. Donald Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation , 134.

44. See Hilary Putnam, "Fact and Value," Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 128-129.

45. See Donald Davidson, "In Defense of Conception T" and "True to the Facts," Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation.

46. See Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge."

47. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," 148.

48. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," 148. See Donald David-son, "Radical Interpretation," Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation.

49. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue , 2d ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 93. The thesis is Karl Popper's, of course. It is not quite so straightforward as Popper or MacIntyre supposes; but the complications cannot comfort the "naturalists." See Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, 3d ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), preface.

50. For a compendious account of these issues, see Joseph Margolis, Texts without Referents: Reconciling Science and Narrative (Oxford: Basil Black-well, 1991), ch. 6.

51. It is worth remarking that J'ürgen Habermas finds himself attracted to Danto's theory, give or take a detail or two; for Habermas's endorsement confirms his own avoidance of what may be called the hermeneutic conception of history—using that term a little unorthodoxly, as ranging over theories as different as those of Gadamer and Foucault. See Jürgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences , trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jerry Stark (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 143-170.

52. See Gadamer, Truth and Method.

53. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem," Philosophical Hermeneutics , trans, and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1976).

54. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," trans. G. B. Hess and R. E. Palmer, Philosophical Hermeneutics.

55. See Arthur C. Danto, An Analytical Theory of Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). This characterization may be taken as lightly as one wishes. Nothing essential hangs on it. For the most sustained account of nonreductive physicalism, see John F. Post, The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (New York: Paragon Press, 1990).

56. Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 4-5.

57. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, 1-2. (This is in fact the way the book begins.)

58. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace , 5; italics added. This is a sort of gloss on Sartre's rather arch thesis that art is too important to be "merely real."

59. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, 5. Here, Richard Wollheim implicitly demurs, favoring a more robust metaphysics. See Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

60. Arthur Danto, "The Artworld," Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964):580; italics added.

61. Danto, "The Artworld," 575.

62. Danto, "The Artworld," 582.

63. Arthur C. Danto, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 45-46; I have italicized "constituted" and "misconstituted." But see, also, "The Artworld," 576, which suggests how easily Danto could have taken a more robust stand on actions and per-sons—but did not.

64. Arthur C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 148, 151.

65. Danto, Narration and Knowledge , 293; see, also, p. 292.

66. Danto, Narration and Knowledge , 329; see, also, p. 330. (The issue does not depend on the fictional nature of Danto's illustration.)

67. The entire issue of relativism is discussed in Margolis, The Truth about Relativism.

68. A colleague, Tom Rockmore, has pointed out to me that Nietzsche makes mention of the infinitude of interpretations in The Gay Science . See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science , trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974),§ 374.

69. Some find an abandonment of a belief in the discipline of such judgments in Derrida; but this may be entirely due to a misunderstanding of what deconstruction is about: it is certainly not a philosophical skepticism. See Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman, Glyph: Johns Hopkins Textual Studies 7 (1977).

70. Gadamer, Truth and Method , 245.