1. "Consider Japan."

2. Dower, "Yoshida in the Scales of History," l; Sodei, Senryo , 164-174; Schaller, "MacArthur's Japan."

3. Sumimoto, Senryo hiroku , vol. 1, 119.

4. Sebald, With MacArthur , 98.

5. Ward and Sakamoto, "Introduction," in Ward and Sakamoto (eds.), Democratizing Japan , i; Ward, "Conclusion," in Ward and Sakamoto (eds.), Democratizing Japan , 401. Germany was also a major modern nation occupied after World War II, but it was initially divided into four zones and occupied by four powers; later it was formed into two zones, one occupied by the Soviet Union and the other by the three Western powers.

6. Dower, "Reform and Reconsolidation," 347.

1. White, "Episode in Tokyo Bay."

2. Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage (ed.), The Impact of the A-Bomb: Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1945-1985 , 19, 21, 46, 48, 59-60; S. Johnson, The Japanese Through American Eyes , 178, fn. 5. Widely varying statistics compiled by different agencies regarding A-bomb casualties can be partially reconciled by separating those who died at once or soon after the bombings from those whose later death could be attributed to the bomb. See also Bernstein, "Unravelling a Mystery"; Miles, "Hiroshima." The atomic bomb was successfully tested on July 16, 1945, two months after the surrender of Germany. There is no reason to believe the atomic bomb would not have been used against Germany if one had been ready in time.

3. Dower, War Without Mercy ; DOS, Occupation , 53-55; Butow, Japan's Decision , 145-146; Editorials, NYT , July 30 and 31, 1945.

4. Butow, Japan's Decision , 42, 150-153; Takemi, "Remembrances of the War."

5. Butow, Japan's Decision , 166-174.

1. Butow, Japan's Decision , 153, fn. 37, 175- 209; Arisue, Shusen hishi , 39-46. Sigal, Fighting to a Finish , is a detailed account of Japan's decision to surrender based in large part on oral statements by Japanese leaders after the war. In Japanese practice the emperor did not "decide" policies; he approved decisions of his ministers, and in 1945 he expressed a "desire" or gave ''advice" that the Allied terms be accepted, which the cabinet then adopted as its decision.

2. DOS, Occupation , 56-58; Butow, Japan's Decision , 207-208.

3. DOS, Occupation , 59-60.

4. Butow, Japan's Decision , 248.

5. "Voice of the crane" means a statement by the emperor.

6. Sumimoto, Senryo hiroku , vol. 1, 15-19; Asahi shimbun , Feb. 14. 1964, 8; FRUS, I945 , vol. 6, 702-708. See Pacific War Research Society (comp.), Japan's Longest Day , for a description of the events of August 14, 1945, in Tokyo.

7. KJ , vol. 4, 166-168.

8. Kosaka, One Hundred Million Japanese , 22-23; Eto (ed.), Senryo shir-oku , vol. 1, 70-97, 103; FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 647-650; Mashbir, I Was an American Spy , 278-299; Sumimoto, Senryo hiroku , vol. 1, 2-14.

9. Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 1, 107; Morison, Victory , 359.

10. Arisue, Shusen hishi , 76-79, 82; "Ichiban nori ga mita mono" (What the first plane saw), Shukan shincho , Aug. 24, 1968, 46.

11. Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 214; Willoughby (ed.), The Reports of General MacArthur , vol. 1, suppl. 31; MacArthur, Reminiscences , 270, fn.

12. Willoughby (ed.), The Reports of General MacArthur , vol. 1, 29.

13. Sodei, Makkasa no nisen nichi , 76.

14. Kawai, Japan's American Interlude , 12-13. This remains a classic study of the U.S. occupation of Japan.

15. PRJ , 740. The two volumes of PRJ are consecutively numbered.

16. Amakawa, "Senryo seisaku," 215-218; Butow, Japan's Decision , 198; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 1, 300-331; Matsumoto and Ando, "Daitoa senso," vol. 25, 238-239. Amakawa's "Senryo seisaku" is a careful study of official Japanese reactions and plans in the early occupation period.

17. Morison, Victory , 362-368. See also James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 2, 781-797; Kase, Journey to the "Missouri ." James's three-volume life of MacArthur is thorough and scholarly. For an offbeat study of MacArthur, see Schaller, Douglas MacArthur .

18. James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 2, 785.

19. Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny , 372; Sumimoto, Senryo biroku , vol. 1, 32-36. One reason advanced at the time to explain the willingness of Japanese leaders, especially military men, to go along with the surrender was the view that the United States and the Soviet Union would soon have a confrontation and Japan could "find a chance to regain its feet" (Hata, "The Postwar Period," 13-14).

20. PRJ , 736.

21. NYT , Sept. 3, 1945, 3; Murphy, Diplomat , 240-242. The crudely corrected copy of the Japanese-language text of the surrender instrument can be seen in the archives of the Foreign Office in Tokyo. The signing of the instrument of surrender by the Allied powers and Japan, according to the prevailing Japanese legal interpretation, made the surrender in 1945 one of a contractual nature, not an unconditional one (Taoka, "Sengo Nihon," English translation in author's possession).

22. PRJ , 737; DOS, Occupation , 65.

23. Statistics on Japanese casualties and damage vary widely. An authoritative study, made by the ESB and dated April 7, 1949, estimated Japan's war dead at 1,854,000 (1,555,000 military and 299,000 civilians). This report was summarized in POLAD desp. 249, "Transmission of Report on Losses Sustained by Japan as Result of the Pacific War," Apr. 22, 1949, 2, diplomatic file S 500, NRAS, RG 84, Box 2243. See also Dower, War Without Mercy , 297-298, 300.

     U.S. combat deaths in the Pacific War were about 100,000, and about 292,000 troops were recorded as wounded or missing. The total cost of the Pacific War to the United States in money has been estimated at about $100 billion (Hadley, Antitrust , 134).

24. Tsuru, Essays on Japanese Economic Development , 160; Patrick, "The Phoenix Risen."

25. DOS, Occupation , 51.

26. Ibid., 52-53; Bohlen, Witness to History , 197-198; FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 670.

27. Uchino, Japan's Postwar Economy , 17-18.

28. FRUS, Conference of Berlin, 1945 , vol. 1,908. One hundred fifty thousand Okinawan Japanese, or one-third of the island's population, were killed in the spring of 1945 (Dower, War Without Mercy , 298).

29. Shinobu, Sengo Nihon seijishi , vol. 1, 119-130.

30. Sodei, Senryo , 155-156.

1. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 30-32.

2. Ziegler, Mountbatten , 296-297.

3. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 282-284; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , 819.

4. Records of MacArthur, MMA, RG 5, Box 2. This is an office file of requests for appointments with the supreme commander. It is not a complete or fully accurate list of the meetings that actually took place, but it does provide useful reference material. James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 3, 693-694, lists those who had frequent contact with MacArthur in 1945-1951; Yoshida is the only Japanese listed. James briefly described the contacts MacArthur had with Japanese prime ministers and the emperor (vol. 3, 309-325).

5. Sebald, Oral History Regarding Occupation Period, 528, NL, Special Collection; Bowers, "The Late General MacArthur," 168; Inumaru, "Ma Gen-sui," 209-211.

6. Willoughby, Shirarezaru Nihon senryo, 59 . This book by MacArthur's intelligence chief is of interest not only as a sharp attack on many of the Americans who worked in GHQ SCAP, but also because it appeared only in Japan and in Japanese. See also Manchester, American Caesar , 633.

7. Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 1, 263-269; Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 5; Bouterse, Taylor, and Maas, "American Military Government Experience," 330.

8. Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 1,270-275; Inoki, Hyoden Yosbida , vol. 3, 219-220; Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny , 375-377; Amakawa, "Senryo seisaku," 218-220; Maki, "The Role of the Bureaucracy," 391.

9. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 677, 712. The statement of September 20, 1945, was the closest the United States came to making an issue of "unconditional surrender." See FRUS, 1944 , vol. 5, 1275-1285; Iokibe, "American Policy."

     The only case of what might be called determined resistance to the orders of the occupation grew out of this SCAP order for the turnover of Japan's diplomatic records ( FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 473). The Japanese consul general in Dublin, Beppu Setsuya, rejected the orders of the Foreign Office and Allied representatives and remained at his post for three years after the surrender, with the tacit support of the government of Ireland, and finally came back to Japan in 1948. At the insistence of SCAP he was tried for violation of occupation orders and lightly penalized. He was later reinstated and had a successful diplomatic career (int. with Beppu). (See Eto [ed.], Senryo shiroku , vol. 2, 347-365.)

     Regarding the knotty issue of who was sovereign during the occupation, Yoshida Shigeru told the Diet in 1946 that "Japan was a sovereign state but was limited by SCAP in the exercise of its sovereignty" ( SCAP Monthly Summation , para. 37, July 1946). The Japanese also put it another way: the supreme commander had supreme authority, but Japan retained its sovereignty.

10. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 42; Morley, "The First Seven Weeks."

11. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 41-42; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 97-104; Morley, "The First Seven Weeks," 160-162; Inoki, Hyoden Yosbida , vol. 3, 89-90; Koseki, Shinkempo no tanjo , 8-13. See also Atcheson's comments in FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 827, 841. Atcheson asserted the word constitution was used in error by the interpreter, but regardless of how it came up the record is clear that MacArthur did suggest Konoe might play a useful role in revising the constitution ( PRJ , 91, fn.).

12. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 750, 757-758.

13. Suzuki, Suzuki Tadakatsu-shi , 106.

14. YM , 62-63; this is a frank and personal account based on Yoshida's four-volume Kaiso junen and elegantly rendered in English by his son. Yoshida kept the portfolio of foreign minister until 1952, except for one year in 1947-1948.

15. Two excellent biographies have been written about Yoshida. Dower, Empire , is a painstaking and in many respects brilliant study of Yoshida. Inoki's three-volume biography, Hyoden Yoshida , contains many important details but is less given to critical commentary.

16. Dower, Empire , 74; Yoshida, Oiso zuiso , 86.

17. YM , 13; Shiroyama, War Criminal , 134-138.

18. Kosaka, Saisho Yoshida , 17-21; Dower, Empire , contains a graphic description of the Konoe "memorial to the emperor" and the Yoshida antiwar movement (227-272). See also FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 700-708.

19. Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 1, 290-292; "Yoshida genshusho no kaiso rokuon yoyaku" (Summary of recording containing recollections of former prime minister Yoshida), made in 1955, Asahi shimbun , Apr. 18, 1977. See also "Yoshida genshusho danwa yoshi" (Outline of talk with former prime minister Yoshida), Oct. 5, 1955, Shidehara Peace Collection, NDLT; Yoshida, KJ , vol: 1, 97.

20. The Japanese press at that time was carrying somewhat sensational reports of incidents such as thefts, rapes, and assaults by U.S. soldiers in Japan. SCAP quickly prohibited such reporting. Nevertheless, the Japanese press continued to report incidents without attributing them to Americans but in such a way that readers would readily understand—for example a theft by "a big man who did not speak Japanese."

21. KJ , vol. 1, 96; Aso Kazuko, "Kodomo no yo ni mujaki datta chichi" (My childlike father), Shukan Yomiuri , Oct. 1, 1978, 42-43. See Harry Kern, "Yoshida's Special Credentials," Yomiuri (English ed.), Sept. 9, 1979, 7. Yoshida spoke some years later of MacArthur's habit of talking as he strode up and down his office and said, "I could understand him well when he was facing towards me, but when he turned his back I did not understand a single word of what he was saying. It used to make me so angry but there was nothing I could do" (Sebald oral history, 1053).

22. Kojima, "Tenno to Amerika," 115-119. Kojima, an expert chronicler of modern Japanese history, advised the author that he obtained this record from official Japanese sources. MacArthur said he offered the emperor a cigarette. The Tenno, who did not smoke, took it. His hand shook as the general lit it for him ( Reminiscences , 287-288).

23. Asahi shimbun , Sept. 29, 1945, 1.

24. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 287; Diary of Iriye Sukemasa, at that time a chamberlain of the imperial household, entry of Sept. 27, 1945, Asahi shimbun , Jan. 26, 1989, 4.

25. NYT , Oct. 2, 1945, 5 . MacArthur did not pay a call on the emperor at any time.

26. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 287-288. MacArthur told his political adviser on October 27, one month after meeting with the emperor, that the Tenno had said he did not seek "to escape responsibility" for the attack on Pearl Harbor because "he was the leader of the Japanese people and he was responsible for the actions of the Japanese people." Memo of conversation, Oct. 27, 1945, DOS diplomatic file 800, NRAW.

27. U.K. Public Records Office, F 1849/15/23, FO 371/63690, ltr. from Gascoigne to Dening, Jan. 22, 1947; Hirohito-Krisher int., Newsweek , Sept. 29, 1975, 7. Saionji Kimmochi, the last survivor of Japan's genro , died in 1940. Regarding Hirohito's knowledge and support of plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor, see Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy , 830; Sugiyama, Sugiyama memo , vol. 1, 370; Kido, Kido Koichi nikki , vol. 2, 928. Titus, Palace and Politics , offers a persuasive explanation of the way in which imperial will was used to make basic national decisions in prewar Japan (316-321).

28. One Japanese authority has described the modern emperor institution as dualist in nature—absolutist/authoritarian versus liberal/democratic—and has argued that Showa was liberal in his outlook and hopeful of somehow merging the two strands. Takeda Kiyoko, "Showa no gekidoki to Hirohito tenno" (Emperor Hirohito and the Showa upheaval), Asahi shimbun , Jan. 8, 1989, 11.

29. Titus, Palace and Politics , 328; Ike (ed.), Japan's Decision for War , 151, fn. 36, 283; ltr. of Dec. 24, 1990, to author from N. Kojima.

30. K. Sansom, Sir George Sansom , 166.

31. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 288; K. Sansom, Sir George Sansom , 166. Of the eleven meetings between MacArthur and the emperor, only the first and the third have been reported in some detail. A partial report of the fourth meeting on May 6, 1947, quotes MacArthur as saying "the basic idea of the United States is to ensure the security of Japan" but not to "defend Japan as it would California," as has sometimes been attributed to MacArthur. Kojima, Nihon senryo , vol. 3, 25-30; PRJ , 769. (See Hata, Hirohito , 190-193.)

32. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 78; Fearey memo to Atcheson, Oct. 13, 1945, POLAD Tokyo, DS 800 01, NRAS, RG 84, Box 2275.

1. James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 2, 775; FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 648; U.K. Public Records Office F 5735/631/23, FO 371/46455, FO memo, Aug. 25, 1945; FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 150-151.

2. U.S. Senate, Military Situation , part 1, 54; SCAP, History of the Non-Military Activities , monograph 2.

3. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 282-283.

4. DOS, Occupation , 53-55; Borton, "The Allied Occupation," 34, fn. 3.

5. FRUS, The Conference of Berlin, 1945 , vol. 1, 894-897, 900-901; vol. 2, 68-69, 1268; Wolfe (ed.), Americans as Proconsuls , 42-44. The provision regarding possible retention of the emperor system was modified several days later by the State Department. See Masumi, Postwar Politics , 17-19. General MacArthur thought this provision should have been retained (James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 2, 775).

6. DOS, Occupation , 56-58; Matsumoto and Ando, "Daitoa senso," 237-238; Amakawa, "Senryo seisaku," 217-222.

7. PRJ , 423-426; Takemae, Senryo sengoshi , 30. Much of the presurrender U.S. planning was done by a small group of experts on Japan led by George H. Blakeslee and Hugh Borton. Former ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew had a minor advisory role. See Borton, "American Presurrender Planning," 22-23. A considerable degree of consensus existed in planning for postwar Japan, with little evidence of factionalism between so-called Japan hands and China hands in the State Department, although this categorization seems embedded in much occupation historiography.

8. Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 246-247.

9. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 581-584.

10. YM , 127; Reischauer, Japan , 222; PRJ , 774. Masumi termed the Potsdam Declaration and initial policy "ambiguous and contradiction-laden" ( Postwar Politics , 41).

11. DOS, Activities of the FEC , 49-58; PRJ , 774.

12. PRJ , 428-439; letter from Hull of War Department to Sutherland, SCAP chief of staff, OPD 381, Aug. 22, 1945, NRAW, Sutherland file; MacArthur message to Marshall, CA 51630, Sept. 3, 1945, NRAW, Sutherland file.

13. War Dept. message to MacArthur, WX 59245, Sept. 4, 1945, NRAW, Sutherland file; int. with Borton, who served in the Office of Japanese Affairs in the State Department for several years after the war.

14. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 3, 483-503. Named after Roosevelt's last secretary of treasury, the "Morgenthau concept" proposed the breakup of large industries and the "pastoralization" of Germany after the war.

15. T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 4. Cohen was an important official in the ESS and headed the labor division for a year.

16. Memo of conversation between Bishop of POLAD and Chamberlain, DCOS, SCAP, Feb. 11, 1946, NRAS, DS file 500.

17. Okita, Japan's Challenging Years , 25-29; Okita, Watakushi no rirekisho , 51-65.

18. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 61-63; Kosaka, Saisbo Yoshida , 19-20.

19. James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 1, 564.

20. Letter from Compton to Truman, Oct. 4, 1945, 6, NRAW, RG 59, Box 3812; "Japan's Fanatics Are MacArthur's Number One Problem," NYT, Aug. 26, 1945, E3; Truman, Memoirs , vol. 2, 520-521.

21. PRJ , 742. MacArthur's gesture in permitting the Japanese to disarm their forces was much appreciated by the Japanese military leaders. SCAP had initially opposed this ( FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 666-669, 671).

22. Bowers, "The Late General MacArthur," 164. Bowers served as a military aide to the general in 1945-1946 and has continued to be a great admirer of MacArthur, even if this irreverent article presents more "warts" than do most accounts about the supreme commander (int. with Bowers).

23. SCAP, Selected Data , contains charts, and descriptions of the SCAP/FEC organization (2, 6, 8, and 9).

24. Int. with Sackton, former chief of joint staff, GHQ, SCAP/FEC, Tokyo.

25. CLO memo, to SCAP, Sept. 8, 1945, MMA, RG 9, Box 41; Hata (ed.), Amerika no tai-nichi , 530, 532; Nanto, "The United States Role," 66, 145. The best information seems to be that depending on the method of calculation, Japan paid between $4.23 and $4.98 billion in occupation costs, while it received $1.95 billion in U.S. economic assistance.

26. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 655-656; FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 95-98; Atcheson memo to MacArthur, Sept. 24, 1945, regarding POLAD status, NILAS, RG 84, Box 2275. POLAD had a limited operational role for much of the occupation. In 1950 it was permitted to establish direct telegraphic communications with the State Department, thus acquiring independence and a degree of freedom from the watchful eye of SCAP officials.

27. See Mason, "The Liaison Offices."

28. PRJ , 192-193; Oppler, Legal Reform , 42, 330-331; McNelly, Politics and Government , 28. Imperial ordinances issued to carry out the instrument of surrender were popularly known as Potsdam ordinances.

29. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 80-82; NYT , Oct. 7, 1945, 29; Sebald, With MacArthur , 98-99.

30. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 741; Amakawa, "Senryo seisaku," 226-227.

31. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 85; Uchino, Japan's Postwar Economy , 253.

32. Kojima, Nihon senryo , vol. 1, 158; PRJ , 741; FO 371/46450, Sansom ltr. to FO, Oct. 12, 1945. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 293-294, gives a somewhat different version of the list, omitting any reference to the constitutional issue and putting some stress on "full employment in useful work of everyone."

33. Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 105-111; YM , 7.

34. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 19; "The Japanese Constitution," NYT, Oct. 28, 1945, E6; Editorial, New York Herald Tribune , Oct. 31, 1945; FRUS , 1945, vol. 6, 841, 969; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 272; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 114-115; Koseki, Shinkempo no tanjo , 8-29. See Emmerson, The Japanese Thread , 264-267.

35. J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 101-102, 175-177; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 139; McNelly, "Limited Voting," 2-5.

36. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 133-138; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 99-100; Emmerson, The Japanese Thread , 270; "Political Parties' Situation," desp. 17 from POLAD Tokyo to DOS, Oct. 15, 1945, NRAS, DOS file 800.

1. By 1940 Japan had experienced constitutional government for a half century, with no less success than some Western European countries had achieved. Japan had also some success in experimenting with political parties. See Watkins, "Prospects of Constitutional Democracy." "The Japanese had also made their transition to being an industrialized nation, a fully educated nation, and a modernized nation in the nineteenth century" (Reischauer, "Two Harvard Luminaries," 12).

2. Report of presidential envoy Locke to Truman, Oct. 19, 1945, president's secretary file, HSTL.

3. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 305-306, fn.

1. PRJ , 460; James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 3, 300-301.

2. Coughlin, Conquered Press , 21-22, 47; F 15685/2/23, FO 371/54109, Gascoigne ltr. to FO, Oct. 2, 1946; Mayo, "Civil Censorship"; Eto, "Genron tosei."

3. NYT , Sept. 14, 1945, 8; PRJ , 739.

4. NYT , Sept. 15, 1945, 4; Kojima, Nihon senryo , vol. 1, 100-102; PRJ , 740; S. Johnson, The Japanese Through American Eyes , 39-54.

5. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 715-719; NYT, Sept. 18, 1945, 3, and Sept. 23, 1945, 1, E3; Kojima, Nihon senryo , vol. 1, 113; Feis, Contest over Japan , 28-29.

6. RLED, Oct. 20, 1945.

7. PRJ , 463-465; Bouterse, Taylor, and Mass, "American Military Government Experience," 332.

8. Takemae, Senryo sengoshi , 99-107. The concept of kokutai referred to "the harmonious unity of the ruler and the people, the whole nation as one family under the rule of the emperor, his line unbroken for ages eternal" (Irokawa, The Culture of the Meiji Period , 247). When Japanese hear the word kokutai now, more than a generation later, they probably think of a national athletic contest, the acronyn for which is pronounced the same way.

9. Takemae, Senryo sengoshi , 156; SCAP, History of the Non-Military Activities , monograph 14, 8. Sixty percent of the senior officials of the Home Ministry were removed from office (C. Johnson, "Japan: Who Governs?" 20).

10. Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 1, 356-357; Sone, Watakushi no memoaru , 127.

11. Takemae, Senryo sengoshi , 125-128; desp. 200. 7, POLAD file 850, Oct. 10, 1945, NRAS, RG 84, Box 2275; Emmerson, The Japanese Thread , 70-71. Emmerson, one of the outstanding foreign service officers of his time, was never promoted to ambassador. Norman, who had taken part in Communist Party activities while a student at Cambridge University in the 1930s and who later rose to posts of great distinction in the foreign service of Canada, committed suicide in Cairo in 1957, a few days before a U.S. congressional committee began a lengthy investigation into communist activities in occupied Japan. See Dower, "Introduction," 98-101.

12. Uchino, Japan's Postwar Economy , 15-18; Patrick, "The Phoenix Risen," 306-307. See also J. Cohen, Japan's Economy , 417, 459; Gordon, Evolution of Labor Relations , 363.

13. T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 344-345, gave an estimate of ¥35 billion (about $2.5 billion). SCAP had issued an order earlier forbidding the Japanese to dispose of government property, but it was ignored. The Diet conducted an investigation of hoarded and stolen property in 1947, but little came of it, despite the huge sums that may have been involved.

     It is difficult to estimate the value of the Japanese yen in dollars during the occupation because there was heavy and rapid inflation during its early years and no unitary exchange rate was set until 1949. An approximate yen value is used in this book based on a dollar/yen comparative formula devised by Theodore Cohen, who served in the SCAPESS. These yen equivalents were based on the wholesale price index up to September 1946 and thereafter on the consumer price indexes, until an official rate was established in April 1949. The "Cohen formula" is set out in Remaking Japan (465):

14. See Uchino, Japan's Postwar Economy , 254; YM, 80; Reischauer, The Japanese , 222; Arisawa, Showa keizaishi , vol. 2, 4-5. Statistics on Japanese caloric intake in the early occupation period vary widely. In one famous episode in 1947 Tokyo district court judge Yamaguchi Yoshitada allegedly starved to death because he refused to eat food other than official rations (C. Johnson, MITI , 185).

15. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 313; SCAP, History of Non-Military Activities , monograph 4, 97-98.

16. Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy , 18-20; Lincoln, "Showa Economic Experience," 194.

17. Allen, Japan's Economic Recovery , 17-18; int. with Watanabe Takeshi. An intelligent and hard-working Ministry of Finance official who spoke excellent English, Watanabe was a conservative who seemed to feel that New Dealers had great influence during the occupation. SCAP did have a number of New Dealers, some of whom were highly effective, but it probably had at least as many conservatives and many more politically inert participants. Very few U.S. generals were New Dealers.

18. Levine, "Labor Laws," vol. 4, 351.

19. Tsurumi, Japanese Business , 82, 85; J. Cohen, Japan's Economy , 436.

20. PRJ , 58; Coughlin, Conquered Press , 80-110; T. Cohen, "Labor Democratization," 187-188; J. Moore, "Production Control," 2-26; Gordon, The Evolution of Labor , 480, fn. 18.

21. Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 79-81; Garon, The State and Labor , 236-237; T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 214-218.

22. Tsurumi, Japanese Business , 81; Gordon, The Evolution of Labor , 331; T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 199.

23. T. Cohen, "Labor Democratization," 176-177; Tsurumi, Japanese Business , 78. Japan's auto workers formed an industrywide union in 1947, but it broke up shortly after the occupation ended (Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile , 142-164).

24. "Notes on MacArthur-Townsend Conference," Mar. 18, 1947, MMA, RG 5, official correspondence, file 2.

25. T. Cohen, "Labor Democratization," 187-188.

26. Peter Frost, "Land Reforms of 1946," Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan , vol. 4, 364-365; Dore, Land Reform , 23-53; Takemae, GHQ , 128-130; Patrick, "The Phoenix Risen," 302-303.

27. Dore, Land Reform , 114-125; Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy , 170; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 250-252.

28. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 313; Dore, Land Reform , 131-132. See also T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 37-39.

29. Dore, Land Reform , 134-135; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 251; YM, 198-199; Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy , 170. Land reform was a matter upon which the Japanese took an independent initiative in 1945, but the occupation soon intervened to demand stronger measures. (See Amakawa, "Senryo seisaku," 223.)

30. PRJ , 425.

31. Hadley, Antitrust , 439. Eleanor Hadley has won great respect in Japan and the United States for her authoritative studies of the zaibatsu.

32. Cohen, Japan's Economy , 426.

33. F 8263/364/23, FO 371/46429/135, U.K. Economic and Industrial Planning Staff paper, Oct. 23, 1945; Lockwood, "Industrial Development." One general active in economic planning, Suzuki Teiichi, and two bureaucrats active in finance, Kaya Okinori and Hoshino Naoki, all of whom were connected with operations in China, were indicted and convicted as Class A war criminals.

34. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 308; FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 702.

35. J. Cohen, Japan's Economy , 102; Hadley, "Zaibatsu Dissolution," Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan , vol. 8, 364. See Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan , 6-32, for a description of zaibatsu history and organization.

36. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan , 24-25.

37. NYT, Oct. 20. 1945, 6; YM , 150-151; Hadley, Antitrust , 43-44; Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan , 70-71.

38. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan , 73-74, 81, 241-244; SCAPIN 249, Nov. 6, 1945; DOS, Occupation , 166-168.

39. Locke letter to Truman, Oct. 4, 1945, 5-6, HSTL.

40. Nishi, Unconditional Democracy , 18.

41. PRJ , 433.

42. Hall, Education for a New Japan , 2; MacArthur message to War Dept., Jan. 4, 1946, War Dept. file 894.42 A/1-1446, NRAW.

43. Nishi, Unconditional Democracy , 164-165, 173; Suzuki E., Nihon senryo , 68-71. Twenty-two percent of all teachers and school officials either resigned or were removed. See Maeda, "The Direction of Postwar Education."

44. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 286-287; Nishi, Unconditional Democracy , 51; Coleman, ''Harry Kelly"; DOS, Activities of the FEC, 109.

45. Nishi, Unconditional Democracy , 189, 193; Suzuki, Nihon senryo , 153.

46. DOS, Report of the First U.S. Education Mission .

47. Royall to Truman, Apr. 27, 1949, Truman correspondence, subject file, HSTL. Ray Moore of Amherst College has done extensive research on this subject and is the source of this reference.

48. Woodward, The Allied Occupation , 245; James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 2, 291-292.

49. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 310-311; Hall, Education for a New Japan , 75.

50. SCAPIN 448, PRJ , 467-469; Takemae, Senryo sengoshi , 269.

51. PRJ , 470; Woodward, The Allied Occupation , 317-321.

52. Int. with Fukushima, who helped Shidehara with both the English and Japanese texts; Murata, Japan , 388-391.

53. Ltr. of Dec. 31, 1945, MMA, RG 10, Box 2, VIP file—Yoshida.

54. PRJ , 471; MacArthur, Reminiscences , 311.

55. Kawai, Japan's American Interlude , 74; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 58.

56. F 1849/18442, FO 371/63690, Gascoigne ltr. to Dening, Jan. 22, 1947; Mainichi (ed.), Ichiokunin no showashi , vol. 5, 147-177. After the occupation the emperor did not make extensive trips of this kind.

57. Cary (ed.), War-Wasted Asia , 280-288.

58. Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Dec. 22, 1945, and Bunker reply, Dec. 27, 1945, MMA, RG 5, Box l-A, VIP file—Yoshida.

1. DOS, Occupation , 75.

2. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 630-631. On his own initiative Harriman turned down the Soviet proposal. John McCloy said later it was fortunate Harriman had done so because Washington "was so keen to get the fighting stopped that it would have accepted about anything the Russians came back with" (Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy , 501).

3. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 683-685; Blakeslee, The FEC , 2-11.

4. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 813.

5. Ibid., 765-773.

6. MacArthur message to War Dept., CA 53682, Oct. 22, 1945, Leahy file, NRAW.

7. DOS, Occupation , 69-73; PRJ , 421-422. See Feis, Contest over Japan , 31-118, for study of negotiations leading to agreement on the FEC and the ACJ.

8. PRJ , 740; MacArthur, Reminsicences , 292; SCAP message to DA, C-65957, Dec. 4, 1948, NSC 13/2 file, MMA, RG 5; Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 247.

9. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 293. For a frank and authoritative account by a ranking member of its secretariat of a useful and much misunderstood international body, see Stratton, "The Far Eastern Commission."

10. FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 124.

11. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 744-746, 762-765; PRJ , 440-441.

12. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 667-668, 670. Truman's reply to Stalin (670) seemed to constitute recognition of the Soviet claim to all the Kurile Islands. See desp. 416, June 27, 1949, RG 84, B. 229, DOS file, NRAS.

13. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 285

14. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 785. Stalin complained to Harriman that the Soviet representative in Japan was being treated "like a piece of extra furniture" by General MacArthur's headquarters ( FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 791).

15. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy , 531; YM, 52-53; Stephan, "Soviet Policy," 74. See FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 285-286, 337-339.

16. DOS, Occupation , 55, 80.

17. Borton, "The Allied Occupation," 401.

18. Pauley, Report on Japanese Reparations , 6-7.

19. Kosaka, One Hundred Million Japanese , 88.

20. FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 124.

21. Asakai, Shoki tainichi senryo seisaku ; Gordon, "The United States and Japan," 24.

22. SCAP, Summation of Non-Military Activities , 68,

23. Fearey memo to Atcheson, Oct 13, 1945, NRAS, RG 84, Box 2275.

24. WX 85811, JCS to CINCAFPAC, Nov. 30, 1945, NRAW, Leahy file; FRUS , vol. 8, 87-92. Ambassador Grew expressed the opinion in May 1945 that "the best we can hope for in Japan is the development of a constitutional monarchy, experience having shown that democracy in Japan would never work" ( FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 546). See G. Sansom, "Can Japan Be Reformed?"

25. Arisue, Shusen hishi , 212.

26. CA 57235 , MacArthur message to Eisenhower, Jan. 25, 1946, FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 395-397; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 59-60. This message bears traces of the thinking of MacArthur's psychological warfare expert, Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, about the role of the emperor. (See Fellers memo to CINC, Oct. 2, 1945, MMA, RG 5, Box 1-A.) SCAP records reflect only a perfunctory investigation of the emperor's prewar role in policymaking; the file consists mainly of letters to MacArthur sent by Japanese individuals after the war (IPS case no. 254, NRAS, RG 331).

27. FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 401.

28. Ibid., 423-428.

29. Ibid., 199-201. Edwin O. Reischauer asserted that in December 1945 while on military duty in Washington he drafted SWNNC 209, "Treatment of the Institution of the Emperor of Japan" (see FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 199-201), which advocated retention of the emperor institution as a constitutional monarchy. This position eventually became U.S. and Allied policy ( My Life , 106-107). The catalytic action, however, was without doubt the MacArthur telegram of January 25, 1946.

30. F 1826/2/23, FO 371/54082, Gascoigne tels. to London from Sansom, no. 95 and 101, Jan. 31, 1946; F 1849/18442, FO 371/63690, Gascoigne ltr. to Dening, Jan. 22, 1947.

31. Gluck, "'Dokuhaku' kara miete," 63; Kojima, Tenno , 141-151; Hata, Hirohito , 177-214.

1. Minear, Victors' Justice , 8-9, 49-50; Keenan and Brown, Crimes , 16.

2. Smith, The Road , 3, 45-47.

3. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free , 150-151.

4. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 318, 298.

5. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 921-923.

6. WX 62612, JCS to MacArthur, Sept. 12, 1945, GS file (B), NDLT; NYT , Sept. 12, 1945, 3; FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 960-961.

7. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 932-936.

8. PRJ , 431-432.

9. The IRAA was organized in 1940 to bring all political groups into one body that would "assist imperial rule" in fighting the war against China. Although sometimes compared with the Nazi Party in Hitler's Germany, the IRAA was never well organized or particularly effective even as a political association.

10. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 952-953, 962-963, 984-985.

11. Ibid., 963-966, 967-970, 977-978.

12. Ibid., 971-973, gives a brief description of the two memoranda, which were transmitted to the State Department. For Konoe's remark, see Emmerson, The Japanese Thread , 267.

13. DOS, Occupation , 147-153. See Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial," 483-493.

14. Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial," 498.

15. Ibid., 495-496; Hata, Nankin jiken , 32. Horwitz stated (495) that an executive committee of the prosecutors selected the suspects to be indicted.

16. FU 607815173, FO 371/57428, Gascoigne tel. 699 to London, June 24, 1946; Minear, Victors' Justice , 111, fns. 74, 75. Keenan told a news conference on June 17, 1946, that a decision was made "on high political levels" not to try the emperor and that although some prosecutors disagreed with this decision, Keenan personally felt the emperor was "a figurehead and fraud perpetrated on the Japanese people" (NYT, June 18, 1946, 1). MacArthur reportedly once told Keenan that if the emperor had been put on trial, he would have taken "all the responsibility" for Japan's entry into the war, presumably to shield others from punishment (POLAD desp. 782, Dec. 14, 1948, NRAW, RG 84, Box 2289).

17. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 288.

18. Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial," 496.

19. Ibid., 496. Two other defendants, Hoshino Naoki and Kaya Okinori, were bureaucrats who had held important financial positions in Manchuria before the war.

20. Kido, Kido Koichi nikki , vol. 2, for Dec. 10, 1945. See also Kojima, "Sempan risuto," 283-284.

21. Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial," 494; Liu, "The Tokyo Trial," 168-170.

22. In Re Yamashita , 327 U.S. 1 (1946), 28; Manchester, American Caesar , 487.

23. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 295-296. Lt. Samuel S. Stratton, a naval language officer who participated in the defense of Yamashita and later became a congressman from upstate New York, told MacArthur on October 28, 1945, that Yamashita had done his best to prevent atrocities by his forces. MacArthur said, "Let history decide" (int. with Stratton).

24. Homma v. Steyer , 327 U.S. 759 (1946); MacArthur, Reminiscences , 296-298; James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 3, 94-102.

25. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy , 544; Harry Kern, "Harry Kern's Story," Yomiuri shimbun (English ed.), Sept. 4, 1978, 7. MacArthur did not mention in his official review of the Homma case or in his Reminiscences that Homma had rejected Wainwright's offer to surrender.

26. Minear, Victors' Justice , 168, fn. 16; Kennan, Memoirs , 370; Weiner, "MacArthur Unjustifiably Accused." I am indebted to Charles Kades for giving me the Weiner article.

27. PRJ , 8-81, 482-488.

28. PRJ , 413.

29. PRJ , 431, Part I, para. 5 (b).

30. CINCAFPAC message to War Dept., CA 52394, Sept. 24, 1945, NRAW, Sutherland file; F 13031/2/23, FO 371/54105, Gascoigne ltr. no. 177 to Bevin, Sept. 9, 1946.

31. GS memo to chief of staff, "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office," Dec. 7, 1945, NRAS, RG 331, Box 2053.

32. CofS Marshall memo to chief, GS, Dec. 30, 1945, NRAS, RG 331, Box 2152; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 38-39; Baerwald, The Purge , 80; int. with Kades.

33. PRJ , 489.

34. Kades ltr. to Williams, July 17, 1974, JWC; Montgomery, Forced to Be Free , 26; PRJ , 42-44.

35. Int. with Kades; Borton, Japan's Modern Century , 412. Borton asserted the purge "went far beyond its original purpose .... Its arbitrary classifications brought unjust treatment to many." Reischauer, who was an army officer dealing with Japanese affairs during and after the war, said the purge affected many more Japanese than U.S. planners had anticipated (int. with Reischauer).

     SCAP might have tried more Japanese as war crimes suspects under the broad language of its directives from Washington but concluded that an "extensive exclusion from influential positions" was preferable (CLKL).

36. Morita, Made in Japan , 48-49.

37. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 103; Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 245-246. Yoshida asserted in his memoirs ( YM , 68) that he never had such a meeting with MacArthur, but as Inoki said, Yoshida was almost certainly wrong.

38. PRJ , 17.

39. Whitney memo to supreme commander, Jan. 28, 1946, NRAS, RG 331, Box 2055. In an amicable meeting, Shidehara tried to get Whitney's agreement to a narrower interpretation of the purge order, but Whitney did not budge (CLKL).

40. Whitney memo to CINC, Feb. 11 1946, NRAS, RG 331, Box 2055.

41. Whitney memo to SC, Feb. 12, 1946, NRAS, RG 331, Box 2055. Whitney was indignant at this attempt to undercut purge policy, attributing it to a conservative cabal in headquarters (CLKL). Those who think SCAP was dominated by New Dealers do not realize that conservatives such as Willoughby and Bunker also had a lot of influence.

42. Sebald, Oral History, NL, Special Collection, 551-552; see J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 74-97, for a sympathetic portrait of Whitney.

43. Sone, Watakushi no memoaru , 132; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 33-51.

44. GS memo to CofS, Jan. 16, 1946, and GS memo to G-3, Jan. 25, 1946, NRAS, GS file, RG 331, Box 2187.

45. General Order no. 10, June 23, 1947, PRJ , 801.

46. Whitney memo to CINC, Feb. 11, 1946, NRAS, RG 331, Box 2055.

1. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 302.

2. KJ , vol. 2. 60. The Japanese was Sato Tatsuo, former head of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau and author of one of the best works in Japanese on the 1946 constitution: Sato, Nihonkoku kempo .

3. J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 40, 87, 284, fn. 14.

4. Atcheson memo to supreme commander, Oct. 4, 1945, NRAW, RG 84, Box 2276.

5. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 739-740, 757-758.

     Shidehara may not have understood on October 11, 1945, that the supreme commander had "directed ... the prime minister to initiate a constitutional revision" (FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, 841).

6. Ibid., 854-856. The basis for the supreme commander's optimism was not explained.

7. Ibid., 882-884. The text of SWNCC 228, which was not a directive to the supreme commander, is given in FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 99-103. A careful study of SWNCC 228 by Williams of GS seemed to indicate that the drafters of the constitution knew of its existence and made some, but not extensive, use of it (Williams ltr. to Kades, Mar. 20, 1964, and Kades reply to Williams, Mar. 25, 1964, JWC).

8. Blakeslee, The FEC, 65-66.

9. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 855; FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 169-172; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 23.

10. J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 102-103; FRUS , 1946, vol. 8, 124; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 12. A specialist on the GS staff, Milo Rowell, was at the time making a study of constitutional issues. Kades got the impression from the questions asked by the Philippine representative and to some extent by the French member that they thought SCAP should be doing more about revising the constitution. His memo on the meeting was read by Whitney and MacArthur, and MacArthur "may have thought there was an implied criticism of him in the interchange" (CLKL). Two weeks later MacArthur decided to act on the constitution.

11. PRJ , 622-623. Kades was assisted in drafting the study by two other GS attorneys, Alfred R. Hussey, Jr., and Milo Rowell. Kades said that he later had a long argument with his good friend, Ben Cohen, a prominent New Deal lawyer and postwar adviser to Secretary of State Byrnes, about the merits of the memo.

12. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 302; Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 247.

13. Mainichi , Feb. 1, 1946, 1; PRJ , 611-618; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 53; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 108; Koseki, Shinkempo no tanjo , 73-80. Whitney thought the Mainichi article might have been a trial balloon floated by Yoshida to test U.S. reactions.

14. Whitney memo to supreme commander, Feb. 2, 1946, Hussey Papers no. 2, NDLT.

15. Whitney memo to CINC, Feb. 19, 1946, Hussey Papers no. 2, NDLT.

16. More has been written in the United States and Japan about the constitution than about any other occupation subject. There are many good accounts: PRJ , 101-111; McNelly, "'Induced Revolution,'" 76-106; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 107-118; Takayanagi Kenzo, "Making the Japanese Constitution: What Really Happened," Japan Times , Mar. 16, 1959. One of the most authoritative accounts is contained in the documents prepared by one of the main participants, Alfred R. Hussey, and now filed as the Hussey Papers, Library of the University of Michigan, and a copy in the Shidehara Peace Collection, NDLT. The account of the making of the constitution by Sato, Nihon koku kempo , is more complete and analytical than those in English. Two important contributions appeared in 1989: Koseki's scholarly Shinkempo no tanjo , and Kades's authoritative "The American Role." If Japan's constitution could be said to have a father, Kades would have a strong claim.

17. Hussey Papers, undated memo, NDLT, listing the GS personnel who wrote the draft; Rizzo ltr. to Hellegers, June 7, 1974, JWC. Among the political party drafts of a new constitution were one prepared by the Social Democratic Party and another by Takano Iwasaburo of the University of Tokyo. (See Koseki, "Shocho tennosei.")

18. Whitney's statement about the use of force appears in the record of the meeting with the Japanese made by GS. But several of the GS participants including Kades do not recall it, and one wrote an affidavit challenging the accuracy of the GS record (CLKL).

19. PRJ , 102. Why MacArthur suggested a unicameral legislature is not known. It may have been because the membership and function of the upper house in a restructured Diet would not be much different than that of the lower house, particularly because the peerage had been abolished, or possibly because MacArthur was impressed by the unicameral system in states such as Nebraska and Nevada (Rizzo ltr. to Hellegers, June 7, 1974, JWC).

20. Whitney memo to CINC, Feb. 6, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT; Kades memo for record, Mar. 12, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT; Borton, Japan's Modern Century , 424, fn 7.

21. James Michener, "The Secret of America," Parade Magazine , Sept. 15, 1985, 6.

22. The first draft of this provision, prepared by two young reserve officers, Richard A. Poole and George Nelson, stated that "an Imperial Throne shall be the symbol of the State, and an Emperor shall be the symbolic personification thereof." The word symbol in reference to the future role of the emperor seems to have been in the minds of several leading figures in Washington and Tokyo, as was the concept of a pacifist Japan. Prince Takamatsu, the emperor's brother, once asked Whitney and Kades what "symbol" meant, and they replied that for Americans it was something like the American flag (CLKL).

23. See Kawashima, "The Americanization."

24. PRJ , 104; Kades, "Revisiting." Kades, "The American Role," contains much of the same material.

25. Account based on Hussey Papers, NDLT. "Aghast" is the adjective used by Masumi, Postwar Politics , 55.

26. Hussey Papers, NDLT.

27. Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 252; Hussey Papers, NDLT.

28. YM , 133.

29. Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 251; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 41-42. Shirasu told the author that the GS account was all a "lie" and that no B-29 flew over at any time during the meeting (int. with Shirasu).

30. PRJ , 624; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 219-223.

31. GS memo for record, Feb. 18, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 204-210.

32. Ashida Hitoshi, "Nikki," Tokyo shimbun , entry of Mar. 12, 1979, 8. Ashida was welfare minister in the Shidehara cabinet.

33. Whitney memos to MacArthur, February 19 and 21, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT.

34. Ashida, "Nikki."

35. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 61; Hata, Hirohito , 216.

36. PRJ , 106, states the emperor fully supported the SCAP draft. Yoshida's views are contained in a recording of his recollections published in Asahi shim-bun , Apr. 18, 1977, 2, and in YM , 135.

37. Memo of conversation between Narahashi and several GS officers, Feb. 25, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT.

38. Memo of meeting, Feb. 22, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT. The GS drafters opposed an amendment procedure requiring a two-thirds vote of all members of each house of the Diet and favored a two-thirds vote of the members of each house present and voting. Kades was at a loss to explain how the final version of the constitution came out with the more stringent provision and thought that General Whitney must have decided to go along with the Meiji Constitution version and Matsumoto Joji's position (CLKL). At the meeting with Matsumoto on February 22, 1946, Whitney had seemed amenable to compromise on this issue.

39. PRJ , 625-630; int. with Kades. The Americans claimed that the Japanese used translation devices to change the meanings of Japanese words. For example, they tried and failed to substitute the word seiji , meaning "politics," for the word seifu , meaning "government," and shiko , meaning "supremacy," for shuken , meaning "sovereignty." (See Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," 239.)

40. Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 236; ints. with Kades and Poole; CLKL. The first part of the thirty-hour session on March 4-5 was stormy. Not only did Matsumoto walk out of the meeting after his quarrel with Kades about translation points, but they had a curious tiff earlier over an unusual provision in the SCAP draft providing that "the ultimate fee to the land and to all natural resources reposes in the state as the collective responsibility of the people." Matsumoto opposed this. Williams called it the "Red Clause." The Americans agreed to delete the clause. (J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 115-116.) In land-short Japan, especially in urban areas, this provision might have helped control large private holdings of real estate and exorbitant prices. See comment of Tsuru, "Nihon senryo," 208.

41. FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 174; PRJ, 657 ; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 259-279, 279-288. When Shidehara showed the Tenno the final draft, he expressed the hope that the peerage could be retained, and Shidehara replied that would be quite impossible (int. with Eto). SCAP's original plan had been that the peerage would disappear as living peers died off, but when the Japanese side proposed immediate abolition, SCAP agreed (Takemae, "Kades Memoir," 284-285).

42. Borton, Japan's Modern Century , 424, fn. 7.

43. Blakeslee, The FEC , 48-55.

44. Ibid., 49.

45. Ibid., 50-51.

46. Ibid., 52.

47. Eto (ed.), Senyo shiroku , vol. 3, 43.

48. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 302-303; McNelly, "The Renunciation of War."

49. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 411; U.S. Congress, Selected Speeches — Douglas MacArthur , 86; McNelly, "General MacArthur's Pacifism."

50. Borton, Japan's Modem Century , 419-421; FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 153-155; FRUS, 1947 , vol. 6, 221.

51. Williams ltr. to author, Nov. 17, 1983; int. with Shirasu.

1. DOS, Occupation , 136; Blakeslee, The FEC , 58, 59-63.

2. SCAPIN 677, PRJ , 477; Reischauer, My Life , 107-108. General MacArthur assumed all powers of government over Korea south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel on September 7, 1945, as commander of U.S. Army forces in the Far East but delegated operational command to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the commanding general of U.S. Army forces in Korea. All Japanese administrative authority there was terminated by a SCAP order of October 2, 1945, following a storm of protest in Korea that Japanese officials were being permitted to continue administrative functions. Nevertheless, both GS and POLAD in Tokyo were for some months involved in advising on policy for Korea. U.S. military government was established in the Ryukyus (Okinawa) soon after the surrender of Japan; the Ryukyus were administered by the United States separately from Japan until 1972.

3. PRJ , 719-720.

4. Sone, Watakushi no memoaru , 138.

5. Ltrs. of May 4, 1947, JWC; PRJ , 494-495. The outstanding authority on the purge program in occupied Japan, Hans Baerwald, who served in GS, wrote that the purge of Hatoyama seemed to exemplify the view the "a case could be made supporting the purge of almost anyone" on the basis of the broad definitions in the January 4, 1946, purge directive ( The Purge , 24).

6. YM , 72.

7. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 144-152; YM , 72-74. Yoshida suggested several other possible candidates. One of these was Kojima Kazuo, an old-guard politician, who rejected the offer because of his age. The other was Matsudaira Tsuneo, a well-born former ambassador to the United States and minister of the imperial household, whom Hatoyama rejected. Some machine politicans in the Liberal Party opposed Yoshida as a political neophyte too old to be an effective leader.

8. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 149-150; YM , 72-74.

9. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 150-151; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 105-106; Takemi, Nihon ishakai , 12-14; YM , 75; Kosaka, One Hundred Million Japanese , 87; int. with Aso Kazuko.

10. YM , 75; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 105-106; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 106.

11. Yoshida ltr., May 15, 1946, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida.

12. For the Japanese, the occupation was "primarily a MacArthur operation, secondarily an American operation, and only remotely an Allied operation" (Kawai, Japan's American Interlude , 18 ).

13. Yoshida's service as prime minister in five cabinets: May 22, 1946-May 24, 1947; October 19, 1948-February 16, 1949; February 16, 1949-October 30, 1952; October 30, 1952-May 21, 1953; May 21, 1953-December 10, 1954. He also served concurrently as foreign minister to the end of April 1952, when the San Francisco peace treaty came into force.

14. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 186.

15. YM , 205; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 108; Iriye Sukemasa, Diary, entry of May 19, 1946, Asahi shimbun , Jan. 27, 1989, 4.

16. Sodei, Makkasa , 97-122; YM , 200-201.

17. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 165; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 110-111; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 166.

18. Gayn, Japan Diary , 223.

19. Blakeslee, The FEC , 176.

20. Blakeslee, The FEC , 178; PRJ , 749; Draper ltr. to secretary of agriculture, Oct. 22, 1947, NRAS, Draper file, RG 335, Box 54; POLAD desp. 403, July 1, 1948, NRAS, RG 84, Box 2290; SCAP, History of the Non-Military Activities , monograph 4, 89; T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 143-146.

21. Ladejinsky, "The Occupation and Japanese Agriculture, Oct. 1945 to Apr. 1952," desp. 164, June 3, 1952, NRAW, DOS file 894.20/6-352; Ball, Japan , 87-90. According to Nanto, "The United States' Role," U.S. aid in the form not only of food but also of grains and agricultural supplies and fertilizer during the occupation totaled about $1.8 billion.

22. Kosaka, One Hundred Million Japanese , 92.

23. PRJ , 750.

24. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 301; Maki (trans. and ed.), Japan's Commission , 80; PRJ , 110-111; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 188; Koseki, Shinkempo no tanjo , 166-172.

25. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 191, 195-197.

26. Ibid., 198-199; YM , 140.

27. Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," 236-238, states that recent research has established that Kanamori Tokujiro, not Ashida, was the author of the revised language approved by the House Subcommittee on the Constitution. Kades was certain, however, that Ashida, who was chairman of the subcommittee, brought the revision to him for approval, which he readily gave (int. with Kades). Earlier writers had all ascribed the concept and wording to Ashida. (See Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 200-202; Hata, Nihon saigumbi , 71-74.)

28. Int. with Hata; Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," 236-238.

29. Kades, "The American Role," 238.

30. Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," 235-236. See Takemae, "Kedeisu Nihon," 276. Kades later explained that because aliens in the United States did not in all cases in 1946 receive equal treatment with that of citizens, SCAP felt it would have been hypocritical to oppose the Japanese amendment (Kades ltr. of July 5, 1989, to author).

31. Whitney memo to MacArthur, July 17, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT; J. Williams, "Making the Japanese Constitution," 677. Williams staunchly defends the role of MacArthur and GS and lauds Yoshida's contribution; he makes only passing reference to the FEC.

32. Oppler, Legal Reform , 50.

33. DOS, Activities of the FEC , 65-67; Blakeslee, The FEC , 52-54; PRJ , 660.

34. DOS, Activities of the FEC , 65-66; Blakeslee, The FEC , 54-55.

35. DOS, Activities of the FEC , 65-66; Blakeslee, The FEC , 57; Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," 238; Kades, "The American Role," 30.

36. DOS, Activities of the FEC , 67; Blakeslee, The FEC , 58-61.

37. YM , 144-145; FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 626-627. The Ashida government, which was in office when SCAP suggested the constitution be reviewed, started an examination but soon left office. The incoming Yoshida cabinet did not pursue the matter.

38. Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 143; Bisson, Nihon senryo , 239.

39. J. Williams, "Making the Japanese Constitution," 676-678; PRJ , 111; Oppler, Legal Reform , 48.

40. SCAP Monthly Summation (Nov. 1946): 22-23.

41. PRJ , 682-683.

42. Maki (trans. and ed.), Japan's Commission ; Ward, "The Commission."

43. MacArthur's letter is quoted in an article by commission chairman Takayanagi Kenzo in the Japan Times , Mar. 16, 1959, 8.

44. Yoshida ltr. to commission, "Kempo chosakai daihachi-kai sokai gijiroku'' (Commission on the constitution, minutes of 8th plenary meeting), Dec. 17, 1957, 1-11.

45. Maki (trans. and ed.), Japan's Commission , 85-86.

46. Kawashima T, Nihonjin no hoishiki , 39.

47. "Emperor Vows to Remain 'At One with the People,'" Japan Times (Weekly overseas ed.), Jan. 28, 1989.

1. Yoshida-MacArthur ltrs., Sept. 27, 1947, MMA, RG 10, Box 11.

2. KJ , vol. 1, 114-116; memo by Yamada, Sept. 17, 1946, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Records Office, reel 0226, Tokyo; YM , 54.

3. MacArthur said in Reminiscences (294), no doubt speaking for the record, that "the whole occupation would fail if we did not proceed from this one basic assumption—the reform had to come from the Japanese."

4. Sodei and Fukushima (eds.), Makkasa no kiroku , 176; Hussey/Tilton memo to Whitney, Feb. 14, 1947, Hussey Papers, NDLT; Sodei, Senryo , 200.

5. Int. with Kades.

6. G-2 memo to chief of staff, June 7, 1947, "Leftist Personnel in GHQ," MMA, RG 23, Box 18, describes the background and activities of eleven alleged leftists in SCAP. Some of them were foreign born, and most reportedly had some connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Suspicion was also aroused because some were said to be friendly with American newsmen thought to be leftists. The memos were drafted by C. Nelson Spinks, a Stanford University Ph.D. and specialist in extremist movements in prewar Japan, who was then serving in G-2 and later became a senior officer in the State Department. Interestingly, Sir George Sansom remarked in his notes on his trip to Japan in 1946 that "many of ... the younger men in SCAP drawn from civilian life have communistic leanings" and "these are visible in their work" (F 3595/2/23, FO 371/54086, Mar. 9, 1946). Only in very few cases was hard evidence produced that there were communists in SCAP.

7. Ozaki Shinae, the daughter of the famed octagenarian liberal and Diet member, Ozaki Yukio, once called Bunker to ask if her father could ride in the passenger car set aside for occupation personnel on Japanese trains when he traveled back and forth from his home in the country to Tokyo for Diet sessions. Bunker fixed this up (Bunker memo to MacArthur, Feb. 5, 1947, MMA, RG 5, Box 63).

8. PRJ , 30-31, 48, 435; Bisson, Nihon senryo , 122.

9. See Sodei and Fukushima (eds.), Makkasa no kiroku , 191-202; Sodei, Haikei makkasa Gensui-sama , an analysis of letters to MacArthur from Japanese. MacArthur received about one thousand letters a day, which the translation section scanned and sometimes translated (Mainichi [ed.], Ichiokunin no showashi , vol. 2, 106).

10. Yoshida ltr. to the supreme commander, Oct. 22, 1946, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida.

11. Whitney memo to CINC, Nov. 8, 1946, GS file, NRAS, RG 331, Box 2055.

12. PRJ , 496-498.

13. YM , 155-156; Yamada, Beranme gaikokan , 86-89.

14. PRJ , 499, 500.

15. F 17621, FO 371/54163, Gascoigne ltr. to FO, Nov. 14, 1946. MacArthur also told Gascoigne he was planning to order a new election in the spring.

16. Ibid.

17. PRJ , 501-548; Baerwald, The Purge , 92, 94.

18. FJ 1017/44, FO 371/83807, Gascoigne desp. no. 162, June 7, 1950.

19. J. Cohen, Japan's Economy , 429; Yoshida-MacArthur ltrs., July 16, 19, and 25, 1946, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida. The two tax laws enacted in October and November 1946 were the Wartime Indemnity Special Measures Law and the Capital Levy Law.

20. PRJ , 40; GS memo for record, Apr. 30, 1947, NRAS, GS file, RG 331, Box 2151; memo from Kades to Whitney, Oct. 25, 1947, Ishibashi file, GS (B) 03110, NDLT; Nolte, Liberalism , 305-320.

21. DOS, Report of the Mission on Japanese Combines , part 1. (Edwards Report)

22. T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 368-369, 364. FEC-230 was sent to SCAP "for information" but not as an "interim directive" from the U.S. government. For various SCAP reservations about the Edwards report, see Hadley, Antitrust , 126-127.

23. Hadley, Antitrust , 163-165; remarks by Tristan Beplat, in Redford (ed.), The Occupation , 236-244; C. Johnson, MITI , 174-175.

24. Ball, Japan , 113-120.

25. PRJ , 753; YM , 200.

26. YM , 200.

27. PRJ , 577; Dore, Land Reform , 172-173. See Dore, Shinohata , 57-61, for a case study of the land reform program.

28. PRJ , 760; YM , 201-203; int. with Kades.

29. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 215; F 3595/2/23, FO 371/54086, Mar. 9, 1946, Sansom diary, 34; YM , 168.

30. "6-3-3 System Not Imposed," Japan Times Weekly (International ed.), Oct. 4, 1986.

31. Wray, "The Trilateral Relationship"; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 214-219; Kosaka, One Hundred Million Japanese , 91; YM , 168-169.

32. Atcheson ltr. to Hilldring, Dec. 14, 1946, DOS file 840.2, NRAW. According to Reischauer, use of Chinese ideographs "is likely to fade slowly into primarily scholarly and official use," but even so language barriers contribute to making Japan "an isolated, inward-looking country beneath its cosmopolitan sheen," thus helping to create a psychological problem that "is probably the most significant fact about Japan today'' ( The Japanese Today , 384, 394).

33. Nishi, Unconditional Democracy , 196-198. In June 1948, at the instigation of GS, the Diet passed a resolution declaring that the imperial rescript on education was without effect and should be withdrawn from the education system, which would thereafter be governed by the concepts of the fundamental Law of Education (J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 49).

34. YM , 167-175.

35. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 279; ltr. of Aug. 15, 1946, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida; KJ , vol. 1, 117. When American newsmen later criticized Yoshida for opposing MacArthur and his reforms, Yoshida reportedly denied the charge and stated that he followed Admiral Suzuki's advice—namely, go along with the general (Matsumoto, "Kaiso").

36. Naganuma, "Tenno-Makkasa," 27-30.

37. Toyoshita, "Tenno-Makkasa."

38. F 13031/2/23, FO 371/54105, Gascoigne tel. 177 to Bevin, Sept. 9, 1946.

1. See Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 157-177; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 115-135, for accounts of the 1947 strike threat.

2. PRJ , 762; T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 294. Although Cohen claimed he and Marquat wrote MacArthur's statement (286), MacArthur did it himself, according to Frank Sackton, then a colonel who was secretary of the joint SCAP/FEC staff (int. with Sackton).

3. Borton, "The Allied Occupation," 397-398; Farley, Aspects , 39, 190.

4. DOS, Activities of the FEC , vol. 1, 91-93; Takemae, "GHQ Labor Policy," 102.

5. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 113-115; Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 158; J. Moore, Japanese Workers , 229-233.

6. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 271-272; F 15640 G, FO 317/54109, Gascoigne tel. to FO, Oct. 25, 1946; Farley, Aspects , 186.

7. Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 161-162.

8. T. Cohen, "Labor Democratization," 187.

9. The unions were asking for a ¥1,800 monthly wage, about equal to $22.50; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 119.

10. RLED, Jan. 26, 29, and 30, 1947, May 10, 1947.

11. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 130-132; Asahi Shimbun (ed.), The Pacific Rivals , 174-177; J. Moore, Japanese Workers , 239.

12. PRJ , 424, 436, 433; Bisson, Nihon senryo , 174; Garon, "The Imperial Bureaucracy," 450.

13. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3,273.

14. KJ , vol. 1, 146; Shinobu, Sengo Nihon seiji-shi , vol. 2, 458; int. with Inoki; Farley, Aspects , 154.

15. F 1618, FO 371/63690, Gascoigne tel. to FO, Feb. 6, 1947; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 268.

16. J. Moore, Japanese Workers , 241-243.

17. Gluck, "Entangling Illusions," 206. "Reverse course" has various meanings for students of the occupation. Interpreted narrowly, its meaning is generally accepted as emphasis on economic recovery over reform, beginning in about 1947. The extreme interpretation by some scholars—Japanese and American—is that the occupation began in about 1947 to abandon reform, or even cancel some reforms, and increasingly sought to involve Japan in cold war politics as a partner of the United States and its allies. See Dower, "Rethinking World War II," 166, for a moderate revisionist interpretation of shifting trends during the occupation.

18. Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 246-247. See Ohtake, "Postwar Politics"; J. Moore, "Production Control," 2-3; J. Moore, Japanese Workers , 101-108.

19. Garon, The State and Labor , 237.

20. PRJ , 721.

21. F 15640, F0371/54109, Gascoigne tel. to FO, Oct. 25, 1946; F 17576, FO 371/54163, Gascoigne tel. 1454. to FO, Dec. 7, 1946.

22. F 1618, FO 371/63696, Gascoigne tel. 163, Feb. 9, 1947; Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Feb. 10, 1947, JWC.

23. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 175-177; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 281-282. The view in SCAP, and probably that of General MacArthur, seemed to be that neither of the two electoral systems the Japanese had used could be said to be dearly more democratic than the other (Takemae, "Kedeisu Nihon," 286-288).

24. KJ , vol. 1, 151-152; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 283-284.

25. GS files states that Yoshida was "screened and passed" on Mar. 12, 1947, because he had retired to private life in 1938 and was not drawn into any wartime or nationalist activities "that might compromise his present position" as president of the Democratic Liberal Party (GS name file, NDLT).

26. Kawashima T., Nihonjin no boishiki , 39.

27. Blakeslee, The FEC , 61-63; James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 3, 139-141.

28. PRJ , 196-198, 679, 680, 724-725; Oppler, Legal Reform , 75, 165-168; Oppler memo to Whitney, Apr. 30, 1947, NRAS, GS file, RG 331, Box 2142; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 273-279; Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan , vol. 5, 65-66; Yamada, Beranme gaikokan , 102-105.

29. MacArthur ltr. to Yoshida, Mar. 22, 1947, MMA, RG 10, VIP file— Yoshida; Inoki, Hoyden Yoshida , vol. 3, 296.

30. Int. with Tsuru; Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Mar. 28, 1947, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida.

31. C. Johnson, MITI , 181-183; J. Cohen, Japan's Economy , 448; Patrick, "The Phoenix Risen," 306.

32. Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Dec. 3, 1946, MMA, RG 10, Box 11; Arisawa (ed.), Showa keizaishi , vol. 2, 55-59; Uchino, Japan's Postwar Economy , 36-37; Okita, Watakushi no rirekisho , 70-74; Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Dec. 11, 1946, MMA, RG 10, Box 11.

33. J. Cohen, Japan's Economy , 470; Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Dec. 11, 1946, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida; C. Johnson, MITI , 185.

34. Dickover letter to McCoy, file of U.S. delegation to FEC, NRAW, RG 43, Box 239; Schonberger, Aftermath of War , 99-102; Tsurumi, Japanese Business , 84-85.

35. Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 343.

36. PRJ , 323-337; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 289-290; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 139-141.

37. PRJ , 767.

38. Ibid., 348-349; YM , 85-86.

39. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 141-146; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 291-292; Katayama Naikaku, Katayama Tetsu , 222-223.

40. Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, May 24, 1947, MMA, RG 5, Box 62, military secretary correspondence .

41. Yoshida-Whitney exchange, JWC.

42. YM , 83-84.

43. Borton, "Proposals," 19.

1. PRJ , 422, 746-748. The supreme commander instructed that all directives to the Japanese government on substantive matters be sent in advance to the ACJ for comment or concurrence (CofS memo, Apr. 19, 1946, CIE file, RG 84, Box 5148, NDLT). The Australian member of the ACJ also represented the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and India.

2. Early in the occupation MacArthur considered that he held the protocol rank of "semi-sovereign," equal to that of a viceroy (MacArthur tel. to Steyer, June, 26, 1946, MMA, RG 5, Box 2). In remarks to the political adviser in 1950, MacArthur gave himself a promotion; he said he did not see why he should meet with the chiefs of foreign diplomatic missions in Tokyo. "And why, as a sovereign, should I? President Truman doesn't do so, nor does the King of England" (Sebald, With MacArthur , 119).

3. F 13031/2/23, FO 371/54105, Gascoigne ltr. 177 to Bevin, Sept. 9, 1946. Malik was a Japan specialist in the Soviet diplomatic service. He played a key role in negotiations at the United Nations in 1949 to end the Berlin airlift.

4. Minutes of second ACJ meeting, NRAW, RG 59, Box 3815; Ball, Japan , 25-26; memo entitled "Allied Council—General Whitney," Apr. 25, 1946, JWC.

5. POLAD cable 3353 to Washington, Apr. 5, 1946, NRAW, file 740.0019—Japan.

6. See Sebald, With MacArthur , 126-150, for an authoritative account of ACJ proceedings.

7. Ibid., 136-137. The Soviet government stated on May 20, 1949, that only 594,000 Japanese military personnel were taken prisoner at the end of the war. The Soviets added that 70,880 were immediately freed, 418,166 were repatriated to Japan between December 1, 1946, and May 1, 1949, and the remaining 95,000 [ sic ] would be returned by November 1949, except for a few war crimes suspects still under investigation ( FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 754). In 1990 a Soviet official stated that 60,000 Japanese prisoners of war had died in captivity and that the USSR would give Japan a list of their names and gravesites ( Japan Times [Weekly international ed.], Dec. 3-9, 1990, 4).

8. FRUS, 1947 , vol. 7, 177-179.

9. Ibid., 323-325.

10. Tucker, "Gen. S. M. Chu"; Dingman, "The View"; Atcheson ltr. to Acheson, Dec. 6, 1946, NRAW, file 740.00119 Control (Japan)/12-646; Atcheson letter to Penfield, NRAW, 740.00119 Control (Japan)/12-1046; FRUS , 1946, vol. 8, 354-356.

11. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 292. MacArthur thought the United States should have used its veto power freely to prevent undesirable FEC actions. U.S. representatives wished to avoid use of the veto as far as was practical.

12. Asakai, Shoki tainichi , vol. 1, 211-252.

13. FRUS , 1945 , vol. 6, 603-609; DOS, Occupation , 89-94; Willoughby (ed.), The Reports of General MacArthur , vol. 1, supplement, 62-63.

14. DOS memo for record by Green, Jan. 25, 1949, NRAW, RG 84, Box 2293.

15. FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 329-332; War Dept. memo to DOS, May 23, 1946, DOS general file.

16. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy , 533-534 ; Blakeslee, The FEC , 132.

17. DOS, Activities of the FEC , vol. 1, 68-76; ltrs. of Oct. 23 and Nov. 10, 1946, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida.

18. Blakeslee, The FEC , 135-141. The United States used its authority under the terms of reference of the FEC to issue interim directives only a few times.

19. PRJ , 765-767; Sebald, With MacArthur , 244.

20. F 15640 G, FO 371/54109, tel. 1257 to London, Oct. 26, 1946.

21. F 3970/1/23, FO 371/63646, tel. 364 to London, Mar. 20, 1947.

22. "Washington Deaf to MacArthur Plan," NYT , Mar. 19, 1947; Hill-dring memo to Peterson, May 31, 1947, DOS files, RG 59, 740.0011, Peace, NRAW; FRUS, 1947 , vol. 6, 453.

23. Borton, "The Allied Occupation," 422.

24. Dunn, Peace-Making , 56 , fn.

25. Murphy, Diplomat , 307.

26. YM , 136.

27. See Manchester, American Caesar , 308-312, 353-363. Schonberger, "The General," gives a detailed account of MacArthur's presidential efforts.

28. RLED, Oct. 20, 1945; Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries , 325; RLED, July 26 and Sept. 11, 1947; Clifton Daniel, NYT Magazine , June 3, 1984, 17. MacArthur also told the representative of the British prime minister in Tokyo in late 1947 that he thought it unlikely Eisenhower could get the Republican nomination "as he was not considered a good Republican and as he had Jewish blood in his veins" (F 16902/23G, FO 371/63830, UKLM 1645, Dec. 26, 1947). MacArthur wrote in Reminiscences (96) that FDR once told him, "I think you are our best general, but I believe you would be our worst politician."

29. MacArthur ltr. to MacNider, Oct. 14, 1947, GS files, NRAS, RG 331, box 2155.

30. NYT , Jan. 24, 1948, 2; CLM desp. 110, Apr. 13, 1948, Ottawa file 521-2

31. Manchester, American Caesar , 521-522.

32. John Osborne, "My Dear General," Life , Nov. 27, 1950, 127-141.

33. Sebald, With MacArthur , 106.

34. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 319.

35. Two senior staff officers who saw MacArthur frequently, Sebald and Bunker, said they did not hear any talk about American politics around headquarters at that time (ints. with Sebald and Bunker).

36. Newsweek , Dec. 1, 1947, 36-38; Schonberger, "Zaibatsu Dissolution," 327-359. See Fortune (Sept. 1948), 6, 10; U.S. Senate, Congressional Record , 80th Cong., 2nd sess. (1947-1948), 94, pt. 1, 116-119, 299-301.

37. PRJ , 780, 783.

38. Ibid., 783. By 1948 MacArthur had become equivocal on the zaibatsu issue. W. R. Herod, an American businessman, on Jan. 12, 1948, rephrased the general as saying, "Thank God he had stopped FEC-230 by putting it in his desk. He said that neither Lovett nor Marshall had even read it." "Harry Kern's Story (5)," Yomiuri (English ed.), Sept. 8, 1979, 7.

39. Newsweek , Jan. 27, 1947, 40; PRJ , 549; Newsweek , June 23, 1947, 37-42.

40. "American Council on Japan Formed," Yomiuri (English ed.), Sept. 5, 1979; Schonberger, "The Japanese Lobby," 327-359; Millis (ed.), The Forres-tal Diaries , 328. Little hard evidence has been unearthed, despite considerable scholarly activity, to show that American policies toward Japan were much influenced by the American Council. For example, Kennan said in 1981 that he knew little about Kern or the American Council (int. with Kennan). Sebald said much the same thing (int. with Sebald). Kern, however, felt that some decisions in Washington had been influenced by his reports, including the decision in 1951 to relieve MacArthur (int. with Kern). Kern's articles in Newsweek probably had more influence than the work of the American Council on Japan.

41. James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 3, 304. On one occasion MacArthur was so incensed by an article in the Times of London that he had the British ambassador called out of a reception celebrating the king's birthday, at which the ambassador was host, to demand a retraction by the correspondent, Frank Hawley, who was a frequent target of complaint by both MacArthur and Yoshida (FJ 1611/5, FO 371/84037, Gascoigne tel. 382, June 8, 1950).

42. Coughlin, Conquered Press , 51-52.

43. Baldwin, Oral History, No. 159A, Columbia University Library, 1961; "Trial Balance," Time , July 14, 1947, 11-12. In response to Baldwin's criticisms, MacArthur wrote Draper on July 29, 1948, that he was reducing controls (precensorship of the press and media may have been one of these) but could not eliminate them completely (Draper file, NRAS, RG 335, Box 53). G-2 SCAP considered Baldwin "favorable to communism" (G-2 memo of July 15, 1950, to CIE, NRAS, RG 331, Box 509). It is noteworthy that MacArthur maintained a large and active intelligence organization throughout the occupation (SCAP, History of the Non-Military Activities , monograph 8, 231-267).

1. PRJ , 770; Ball, Japan , 73-75.

2. SCAP Monthly Summation (May 1947), 28; Sodei and Fukushima, Makkasa no kiroku , 214.

3. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 147; PRJ , 726.

4. Katayama ltr. of Sept. 4, 1947, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Katayama.

5. War tel. 91108 from Royall to MacArthur, Nov. 23, 1947, and tel. from MacArthur to Royall, Dec. 9, 1947, both in Draper file, NRAS, RG 335, Box 18; Watanabe T., Senryoka , 74.

6. Amakawa, Senryo seisaku , 225-227.

7. PR], 291-304; Pulliam memo, Aug. 18, 1947, NRAS, RG 331, Box 277; memo from Willoughby to Bratton, Aug. 24, 1947, NRAS, RG 331, Box 277.

8. PRJ, 703-704, 705-706. MacArthur met with his experts on September 5 and instructed them to work out their differences (Pulliam memo, Dec. 1. 1947, NRAS, RG 331, Box 278).

9. PRJ , 297.

10. Fifty-eighth special meeting of the ACJ, Apr. 28, 1948, NRAW, RG 59, Box 3825; Auer, The Postwar Rearmament, 4 .

11. Int. with Shirasu; Garon, The State and Labor , 244-245.

12. Pharr, "The Politics of Women's Rights," 234-245; Upham, Law and Change , 156-165,214-218.

13. PRJ , 215; Oppler, Legal Reform , 119.

14. PRJ , 770.

15. Nugent memo to supreme commander, Oct. 7, 1947, MMA, RG 5, Box 11.

16. Memo of Jan. 26, 1948, GS (B) file 01287, RG 5, Box 2152, NDLT; Unconditional Democracy , 44-45.

17. Int. with Nichols; Bowers, "The Late General MacArthur," 164; James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 3, 292; Gunther, The Riddle , 75; F 1416/1015/23, FO 371/76179, Gascoigne tel. 11 of Jan. 8, 1949, enclosing ltr. of CLM reporting on talk with MacArthur.

18. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 149-151; Baerwald, The Purge , 54-57; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 302-303; Oppler, Legal Reform , 227-229; memo for record, Kades's conference with prime minister, Oct. 25, 1947, NRAS, GS file, RG 331; memo for record, Oppler's conference with Chief Justice Tanaka, June 19, 1950, NRAS, GS—Napier file, RG 331.

19. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 151-155; PRJ , 714.

20. F 3588, FO 371/69519, desp. 36 to London, Feb. 13, 1948.

21. 1947 constitution, Art. 7, Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan , vol. 2, 10.

22. F 4984, FO 371/69820, desp. 67 to London, Mar. 19, 1948.

23. Katayama Naikaku, Katayama Tetsu , 397-399; Morito, "Katayama naikaku," vol. 6, 127.

24. F 3588, FO 371/69519, desp. 36 to London, Feb. 13, 1948.

25. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 157; GS/CIE press statement of Feb. 24, 1948, GS file, NRAS, RG 331, Box 272; Bunker memo to CINC, Feb. 27, 1948, MMA, RG 5, Box 63.

26. Baerwald, The Purge , 95-96.

27. CLM desp. no. 110 to Ottawa, Apr. 13, 1948, 40 50061 v. 4; F 14233/ 5129/23, UKLM quarterly report, Oct. 1, 1947.

28. PRJ , 734; CLM desp. no. 176 to Ottawa, May 27, 1947, 40 50061 v. 4.

29. Memo on Ashida, Draper conference, Mar. 24, 1948, Draper/Dupuy file, NRAS, RG 319, Box 19; PRJ , 581-583; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 217. See Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 209-250, for an account of the revision of the NPSL.

30. PRJ , 258; MacArthur appointment schedule, July 6, 1948, MMA, RG 5, Box 65; Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 231. Kades letter to Williams, June 3, 1974 , JWC. Some confusion exists in the records as to whether the MacArthur meeting was on July 6 or July 21, but the latter date seems probable (T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 390).

31. PRJ , 581-583.

32. Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 236-237.

33. SD , Aug. 9 and July 30, 1948.

34. Blakeslee, The FEC , 172-175; CLM desp. no. 383 to Ottawa, Sept. 13, 1948, 40 50061, v. 4; F 14472, F 14107/144/25, FO 371/69824, Gascoigne tel. to London 1172, Oct. 16, 1948.

35. C 63093, SCAP tel. to Draper, Aug. 18, 1948, MMA, RG 9, Blue Binder series, Labor; Z 21291, SCAP to DA, Aug. 29, 1948, MMA, RG 9, Blue Binder series, Labor. The State Department, presumably through the Department of the Army, sent General MacArthur a long and dosely reasoned telegram in early October commending his handling of the issues but recommending clearer separation of employees of the Japanese government engaged in industrial activities from other civil servants and further refinement of the types of industrial employees involved ( FR US , 1948, vol. 6, 866-870). Speaking through General Whitney, MacArthur replied that there was no policy statement applicable to public servants; therefore, he had discretion to act as the sole executive authority of the Allied powers, implying that he was free to act as he saw fit. This of course begged the key question, which was whether the FEC policy applied to all workers or only to those in private sector-type activities (C-64458, SCAP tel. to Draper, Oct. 12, 1948, MMA, RG 9, Blue Binder series, Labor).

36. Farley, Aspects , 205-207; C. Johnson, Japan's Public Policy Companies , 28-30. As part of this reorganization, the government obtained passage of the Public Coporations and National Enterprises Labor Relations Law.

37. Memos of conversations between Whitney and chief cabinet secretary Masuda, Nov. 19 and 25, 1949, reel 0046,0048, Japanese FO files. See also GS memo, "Reply to Aide Memoire Dated Dec. 2, 1949," Dec. 6, 1949, GS file, NDLT.

38. Whitney-Masuda coversations, reel 0046,0048, Japanese FO file; Watanabe T., Watanabe Takeshi nikki , 688-689; int. with Suzuki G.; SCAP, History of the Non-Military Activities , monograph 13, 66; Pempel, "The Tar Baby Target," 179; C. Johnson, MITI , 43.

39. Baerwald, The Purge , 80; Shimoda, Sengo Nihon gaiko , vol. 1, 39; Suzuki E., Nihon senryo , 68-71. A GS report in 1946 stated, "The Japanese bureaucrat...has been nurtured on the idea that the government is supreme, that the authority of the state is unchallengeable by the people and that the government knows what is good for the people and does what it wills toward the people" (Maki memo to Whitney, "The Japanese Bureaucracy," July 18, 1946, GS [B], NDLT). See Pempel, ''The Tar Baby Target," 165-167; Wol-feren, The Enigma of Japanese Power , 348. Of the 1,809 purged government employees, two-thirds were members of the Dai Nihon Butokukai (Japan Military Virtue Society), a government-supported society that promoted martial arts ( PRJ , 67-72).

40. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 158-161; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 316-318.

41. PRJ , 307-313; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 45-47; T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 334-350.

42. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 159-161; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 318-319. Kades was rumored to have been involved, but no credible evidence was produced to implicate him.

1. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 898-907. Harries and Harries, Sheathing the Sword , 95-182, gives a good account of the Tokyo trial.

2. Rö1ing and Rüter (eds.), The Tokyo Judgment , vol. 1, 22. This book contains in two volumes the counts of the indictment, the judgment, the concurring and dissenting opinions, and the sentences.

3. NYT , Oct. 2, 1946, 1, 20; Sebald, With MacArthur , 167-169.

4. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 908.

5. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 328-329; Hata, Nankin jiken , 25. General MacArthur told President Truman at their conference on Wake Island on Oct. 15, 1950, that "war crimes trials don't work, they don't deter" (MMA, RG 5, Box lB).

6. Brackman, The Other Nuremberg , 350: Ball, Japan , 110. Colonel J. Stanton Babcock, who had served in Japan before the war as an army attaché and who went there in early 1946 with the FEAC, reported on the basis of talks with many Japanese that "there was no feeling of guilt; not even that they had made a mistake. The attitude was that of men who had taken a desperate but necessary gamble, done everything possible to ensure success, but had lost.... They had had to go to war. They knew that their only chance lay in prolonging the war to the point where we would tire and give up. They failed" ( FRUS , 1946 , vol. 8, 162).

7. Minear, Victors' Justice , 114-115.

8. Rö1ing and Rüter (eds.), The Tokyo Judgment , vol. 1, 380. The Japanese note could be interpreted as an ultimatum and therefore constituted adequate notice to the United States of Japan's intention to commence hostilities.

9. F 2130/48/23, FO 371/69831, Gascoigne desp. 19 to London, Jan. 25, 1948; Brackman, The Other Nuremberg , 154-162.

10. U 8295/5/73, FO 371/57428, FO minute, Jan. 7, 1947.

11. Sebald, With MacArthur , 157; F 14947/12434/23, FO 371/63820, Nov. 10, 1947, Gascoigne tel. 1492; CLM desp. to Ottawa, no. 185, July 2, 1948, 40 50061 v. 4.

12. Rö1ing and Rüter (eds.), The Tokyo Judgment , vol. 1, 27-43, 439-442; Comyns-Carr, "The Tokyo War Crimes Trial," 109-110.

13. Ibid., 514, 496; Sebald, With MacArthur , 164. See Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy , ix-xv.

14. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial , 29-31; Rö1ing and Rüter (eds.), The Tokyo Judgment , vol. 2, 517-1148.

15. 338 U.S. Reports 197, June 29, 1949; FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 937.

16. This account including the Tojo poem is from Sebald, With MacArthur , 172-176.

17. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 318-319. MacArthur was ordered by Royall, with the agreement of Truman, to permit photographers at the executions (War tel. 80163, Nov. 25, 1948, Draper file, NRAS, RG 335, Box 18). MacArthur objected and proposed that the issue be taken to the FEC (SCAP tel. 65707, Nov. 26, 1948, Draper file, NRAS, RG 335, Box 18). Royall backed down and authorized MacArthur to handle the matter (personal unnumbered tel. from Royall to MacArthur, Nov. 26, 1948, Draper file, NRAS, RG 335, Box 18). This was one of only two occasions during the occupation where the supreme commander opposed direct orders by his superiors in Washington. The other was War tel. 91108 of Nov. 25, 1947, Draper file, NRAS, RG 335, Box 18, regarding deconcentration.

18. Sanmonji, "Tokyo gunji saiban," vol. 5, 302-308; Washington Post , Apr. 21, 1979 , 3.

19. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 936-937. SCAP wanted to try seventeen of them as Class B and C war criminals, but Washington said this would require the approval of the FEC. After studying the IMTFE judgment, SCAP lawyers decided against trial of all but two, both former admirals, who were then tried for Class B and C war crimes. Some observers have claimed that failure to try important suspects like Kishi and Kodama reflected a reversal in U.S. war crimes policy. A more realistic view is that Washington and SCAP felt that one Class A trial was enough.

20. Mainichi (ed.), Ichiokunin no showashi , vol. 2, 192-193, 202.

21. Yoshida request, Dec. 8, 1948, MMA, RG 5, Box 63; Inoki, Hyodem Yoshida , vol. 3, 384-386. This action won Yoshida considerable goodwill from former Japanese military men. Yoshida also submitted a deposition in Shigemit-su's defense in the Class A trial.

22. Mainchi (ed.), Ichiokunin no showashi , vol. 2, 192; Reischauer, The United States and Japan , 242-243.

23. CINCFE tel. C 53663, June 27, 1947, MMA, RG 9, Box 155; Brack-man, The Other Nuremberg , 196-197.

24. CINCFE tel. C 52423, May 6, 1947, MMA, RG 9, Box 155; SWNCC 351/3, Mar. 11, 1948, NRAW, Military Records, Taylor biological warfare file; OSD historian Goldberg memo to Oldaker, Apr. 14, 1977, NRAW, Military Records, Taylor biological warfare file.

25. Japan Times , Aug. 29, 1982, 12; CINCFE tel. C 52423, May 6, 1947, MMA, RG 9, WC 147; Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial , 150-154; Japan Times , Sept. 5, 1982, 10. See F 18863/1661/23, FO 371/76254, Gascoigne tel. 1358, Dec. 15, 1949.

26. DOSB , Feb. 13, 1950, 244; DA tel. W 99564, Feb. 15, 1950, MMA, RG 9, WC 307; SCAP tel. C 55407, Mar. 15, 1950, MMA, RG 9, WC 312.

27. Brackman, The Other Nuremberg , 200; U.S. House, The Treatment , 3-5, 9, 16-18, 33, 63. The Japanese involved allegedly told American interrogators that no experiments were performed on Americans for fear of possible retaliation by the United States ( NYT , Mar. 22, 1983, A2).

28. Gomer, Powell, and Rö1ing, "Japan's Biological Weapons"; Morimura, Akuma no hoshoku .

29. P. Williams and Wallace, Unit 731, xiv, 130, 133, 207.

30. Takeyama, "Questions"; Onuma, "Beyond Victor's Justice."

31. See Smith, Road , 132-151.

32. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 319; Kawai, Japan's American Interlude , 23-24.

33. Shiroyama, War Criminal , 290.

34. CLM desp. to Ottawa, no. 196, June 17, 1948, file 104-C(S).

35. Ibid.

36. Sebald, With MacArtbur , 162; SD , Oct. 8, 1948, and Oct. 28, 1948; Sebald ltr. to Benninghoff, Oct. 29, 1948, NRAW, DOS file, 894.001/10.2948.

37. Tajima ltr. to supreme commander, Nov. 12, 1948, MMA, RG 5, Box 27; Yomiuri shimbun , Aug. 15, 1978, 1; Reuters ticker, R 940, Dec. 4, 1979; Iriye Sukemasa, Diary entry of Nov. 12, 1948, Asahi shimbun , Feb. 1, 1989, 4; F 1380, FO 371/70256, Gascoigne ltr. no. 11, Jan. 13, 1949. Sebald asserted that by late 1948 "the throne...was established as an invaluable adjunct of SCA?" ( With MacArthur , 164).

38. F 1380, FO 371/70256, Gascoigne ltr. no. 11 to FO, Jan. 13, 1949.

39. FJ 10111/34, FO 371/83815, Gascoigne desp. no. 148, May 22, 1950; FJ 10111/39, FO 371/83815, Gascoigne desp. no. 158, May 31, 1950. The English tutor would presumably have taken the place of Elizabeth Gray Vining, an American Quaker, who served as tutor to the crown prince from 1946 to 1950. MacArthur arranged a meeting between the emperor and Henry R. Luce, the editor of Time , on Nov. 6, 1946. Luce said that he asked the emperor how it felt to be a mortal after having been a god for so long, but the interpreter politely reworded the question into something innocuous (Swanberg, Lute , 249). The general also arranged for Lord and Lady Killearn to call on their majesties, who obviously enjoyed hobnobbing with British nobility (F 20241 2023/23, FO 371/69912, en clair tel. to London, Feb. 6, 1948).

1. Sherwood Fine, "Summary and Evaluation of Japan's Economic Recovery Under the Occupation," Briefings presented to the supreme commander for the Allied powers, JWC, Apr. 1952, 3. Fine was the well-trained economic adviser to SCAP who played a key part in the execution of its policies and plans.

2. DOSB, May 8, 1947, vol. 16, 991-994; DOSB, vol. 16, June 15, 1947, 1159-1160.

3. Minutes of meeting of secretaries of state, war and navy, Apr. 16, 1947, DOS files, 740.00119/9-1947.285, NRAW, RG 59, Box 3820; FRUS , 1947 , vol. 6, 200-201, 265-266; F 3970/1/23, FO 371/63646, Gascoigne tel. no. 364, Mar. 20. 1947.

4. Draper memo to Royall, Oct. 1, 1947, Draper file, NRAS, RG 335, Box 53. See Schonberger, Aftermath of War , 161-163.

5. T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 361; Hadley, Antitrust , 147-165. In 1982 the U,S. Congress, with the Japanese model in mind, enacted a trading company act to promote U.S. trade; more than one hundred companies have been certified under the act, but it has yet to produce significant results.

6. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 654-656; Royall "Speech, January 6, 1948," 117.

7. Fine, "Summary and Evaluation," 3-4; Schonberger, Aftermath of War , 163-165.

8. Blakeslee, The FEC, 123; FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 609-614.

9. FRUS , 1948, vol. 6, 710-711; Reuters ticker from Tokyo, no. 0342, July 31, 1980.

10. J. Cohen, Japan's Economy, 425.

11. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 985.

12. FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 735-736, 744; Morishima, Why Has Japan 'Succeeded '? 163-164; Blakeslee, The FEC , 158.

13. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 1056-1059; T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 372.

14. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution , 145-146; FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 1017-1019, 1054-1056; Royall tel. to MacArthur, War 80376, Apr. 25, 1948, Draper file, NRAS, RG 335, Box 53.

15. Hata (ed.), Amerika , 368.

16. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution , 154-156. ESS trustbusters developed a plan to divide Japan into three banking districts with banking operations limited to one of the three. This was another American model and probably an impractical one. The finance division in ESS successfully opposed this plan. The banking system was the only industry in Japan that SCAP did not break up. It is a strong and intensively competitive system today. Tristan Beplat, a former finance division officer, discussed this issue in the panel dicussion on Deconcen-tration in Post-war Japan, in the proceedings of the symposium The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform, MMA, Apr. 13-15, 1978, 236-245.

17. CLM to Ottawa no. 110, Apr. 7, 1948, file 104-C, 50061, v. 4, Canadian FO; CLM to Ottawa no. 109, Apr. 28, 1948, file 104-C, 50061, v. 4, Canadian FO; Hadley, Antitrust , 445-453; McCraw (ed.), America Versus Japan , 20-21; Shirai, "A Supplement," 370. The statement about the success of zaibatu dissolution was attributed to Uemura Kogoro, president of Keidanren ( Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan , vol. 8, 366).

18. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 857-862.

19. Kennan, Memoirs , 368-369, 375-377.

20. Ibid., 373, 376.

21. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 322; Kennan, Memoirs , 382.

22. Kennan, Memoirs , 384; FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 697-699.

23. FRUS , 1948, vol. 6, 699-706.

24. Ibid., 700-701.

25. Ibid., 702-703.

26. Ibid., 703-706.

27. Ibid., 706-712.

28. PPS no. 28, "Recommendations on U.S. Policy," Mar. 28, 1948, DOS file, NRAW, 740, 00119 control Japan; FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 689-690, 716-719; Kennan ltrs. to Butterworth, Mar. 9, 14, and 16, 1948, NRAW, PPS file, Box 19.

29. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 691; Kennan, Memoirs , 386-387.

30. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 691-696. Commodore Perry had recommended in 1853 that the United States take control of Okinawa if his mission to open Japan to international intercourse failed. In 1943 Franklin Roosevelt thought Okinawa should be turned over to Nationalist China (Borton, Japan's Modem Century , 36; FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran , 1943 , 324, 869).

31. Kennan, Memoirs , 390; int. with Kennan; Dupuy memo of Mar. 24, 1948, Draper file, NRAS, RG 335, Box 53; Paul memo to Schuyler, Apr. 30, 1948, Plans and Operations Division, Army staff, NRAS, RG 319, Box 19. Some writers have claimed that Kennan recommended an increase in the size of Japan's police forces, but he did not do so.

32. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 819-823.

33. SCAP message C-65997 to DA, Dec. 4, 1948, MMA, RG 5, NSC 13/2 file; SCAP message C-66402 to DA, Dec. 18, 1948, MMA, RG 5, NSC 13/2 file; SCAP message C-67296 to DA, Jan. 23, 1949, MMA, RG 5, NSC 13/2 file; FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 932-934.

34. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 938-942; SCAP message C-66402 to DA, Dec. 18, 1948, Draper file, NRAS, RG 335, Box 53.

35. FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 724-727. The final text of NSC 13/3 was adopted on May 6, 1949 ( FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 730-736).

36. POLAD desp. no. 298, "Launching of Program to Effect Relaxation of Occupation Controls in Japan," May 10, 1949, File 360/125.4, NRAW; FRUS , 1949, vol. 7, 743-744.

37. J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 216, commenting that "these and other moves were already in the works."

38. Kennan, Memoirs , 393. Kennan made clear (358-359) that his concept did not mean "containment by military means of a military threat, but the political containment of a political threat."

39. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 713.

40. Kennan, Memoirs , 393.

41. Kennan talk on "The Current Situation," at the CIA, Oct. 13, 1949, Kennan Papers, Box 17, Princeton University Library.

42. FR US, 1949 , vol. 7, 831; Kennan, Memoirs , 392-393.

1. KJ , vol. 1, 156; YM, 88.

2. J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 50; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 319. The Williams papers in the East Asia collection, University of Maryland (JWC), contain a series of memos from Williams to Whitney on the political maneuverings during October and November 1948.

3. YM , 88.

4. YM , 88; Yoshida, Sekai to Nihon , 90; Uchida, "Kokunai seijika, 163.

5. The following account is based on Miki ltr. to author, Mar. 18, 1981.

6. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 319-321; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 166; Williams memo to Whitney, Oct. 14, 1948, JWC.

7. F 14563/44/23, FO 371/69824, Gascoigne tel. no. 1176 to London, Oct. 16, 1948.

8. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 321; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 164.

9. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 322; Bunker memo to MacArthur, Oct. 19, 1948, MMA, RG 5, Box 64; Takeuchi (ed.), Yoshida naikaku , 550.

10. J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 217-218.

11. Watanabe T., Senryoka , 177-178; J. Williams, Japan's Political Rev. olution , 68.

12. Katayama's resignation in February 1948 automatically brought about the resignation of his cabinet but did not dissolve the lower house. In November Yoshida "insisted on the right of the government to dissolve the Diet under Article 7" ( YM , 89). GS, which had carefully drafted the dissolution provisions of the constitution to make dissolution dependent on Diet authorization, vigorously opposed this interpretation.

13. Williams memo to Whitney, Nov. 26, 1948, JWC; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 218-219; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 332-333; YM , 89. MacArthur wobbled on the timing of dissolution; at first he seemed to accept Yoshida's proposal for a dissolution called by the prime minister after the NPSL amendments were enacted, but "later he had to renege on his commitment" (Williams memo to author, Nov. 3, 1978).

14. Kades memo for record, Nov. 29, 1948, JWC; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 334; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 220-221.

15. Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Nov. 28, 1948, JWC.

16. Ibid.

17. J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 221; Watanbe T., Senryoka , 178-179; KJ , vol. 3, 198.

18. J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 91-92; T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 430.

19. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 338; FRUS , 1948 , vol. 6, 605-607.

20. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 339-340.

21. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 180.

22. F 19974, FO 371/76203, Gascoigne desp. no. 24, Jan. 27, 1949.

23. Ibid.; Dower, "Yoshida in the Scales of History," 5.

24. F 2420/1015/23, FO 371/76179, Gascoigne desp. no. 30, Feb. 2, 1949.

25. MacArthur and GS explained the election results in terms of left and right: the combined vote for the Democratic Liberals and the Democrats on the right and for the Socialists and Communists on the left was not greatly different from the previous election in 1947. Therefore, GS felt no great cause for concern about the results. See POLAD desp. no. 114, Feb. 21, 1949, NRAW, 894.00/2-2149.

26. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3,338. Of those elected in 1949, 18.2 percent were former officials. This level has held fairly constant since then (C. Johnson, MITI , 46). Many of these politicians have brought technical expertise and sophistication to Japanese politics even if they had been trained in prewar Japan.

27. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 460-468; Yoshida ltr. to Sebald, Apr. 6, 1949, MMA, VIP file—Yoshida; Sebald, With MacArthur , 72-74, 301-302; DOS, TIAS Series 1911, " Awa Maru Claim," signed at Tokyo, Apr. 11, 1949.

28. CLM desp. no. 48 to Ottawa, Feb. 14, 1949, file 104-C 50061, v. 4; POLAD desp. 314, May 16, 1949, NRAW, DOS file 894.00/5-1649.

29. FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 660, 663.

30. Int. with Kades; Shukan Shincho Henshubu (ed.), "Kadeisu taisa," 335-336; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 167. Kades's departure from Japan in late 1948 is sometimes regarded as a significant turning point in American policy. His unpublished speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on May 10, 1949, was approved by MacArthur and presented what might be termed an official SCAP view on occupation goals and policies; copy in author's file.

31. MacArthur ltr., Dec. 19, 1948, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida; FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 1066-1067.

32. Marquat memo of July 15, 1948, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida; Yoshida ltr., Dec. 19, 1948, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida; Watanabe T., Senryoka , 152-153.

33. Saltzman memo to Acheson, Jan. 26, 1949, DOS file, RG 59, Box 3825, NRAW.

34. SCAP message C 66236 to DA, Dec. 12, 1948, MMA, RG 10, Box 11; CLM desp. no. 183 to Ottawa, Mar. 18, 1949, file 104-C 50061, v. 4. MacArthur did not like to be given orders or advice from outside his own camp. On the wall of his office in Tokyo he had placed a quotation from the Roman historian Livy, citing a speech by the Roman general, Lucius Aemilius Paulus, who fought the Macedonians in 168 B.C. It ended with the words "Rest assured that we shall pay no attention to any councils but such as shall be framed within our own camp." At the bottom of the quotation MacArthur had written the words "Amen. Douglas MacArthur" (Gunther, The Riddle , 55-56).

35. T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 431-435; Watanabe T., Senryoka , 189-195; Halberstam, The Reckoning , 125-130.

36. Hunsberger, Japan and the United States , 106; Hata (ed.), Amerika , 391-395; J. Cohen, Japan's Economy , 84-86. To promote trade SCAP developed a large office in ESS. This office worked closely with MITI. Some Japanese believe this large staff in ESS had the long-term effect of imposing tight governmental control over the economy (see Yoshino, "A Private Matter," 13).

37. KJ , vol. 3, 204-211; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 342.

38. Watanabe T., Senryoka , 190; Miyazawa, Tokyo-Washinton , 14.

39. Miyazawa, Tokyo-Washinton , 21-22.

40. Uchino, Japan's Postwar Economy , 48-51; Watanabe T., Senryoka , 189-190.

41. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 350.

42. Suzuki G., "Impact of the Korean War: A Memoir," and "Impact of the Korean War: An Overview."

43. See McDiarmid, "The Japanese Exchange Rate"; Suzuki G., "Japan's Experience," 2-6.

44. Suzuki G., "Japan's Experience," 6; Dick K. Nanto, "Shoup Mission," Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan , vol. 7, 172-173; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , val. 3, 360.

45. Ints. with Shirasu and Takeuchi Ryuji. See C. Johnson, MITI , 191-194; this book contains a thorough study of twentieth-century Japanese trade and industrial policy. Yoshida, who had a particular interest in commercial policy throughout his diplomatic career, was careful to provide MITI with some top-drawer diplomatic talent (McCraw [ed.], America Versus Japan , 122).

46. C. Johnson, MITI , 194-195; Watanabe T., Senryoka , 257-263.

47. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1134; Schaller, The American Occupation , viii; Borden, The Pacific Alliance , 191-222; James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 3, 234-235.

48. FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 1215-1220; FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, 33-63; Acheson speech, "Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy," DOSB , Jan. 23, 1950, 111-118; Watanabe A., "Southeast Asia," 80-95; Hunsberger, Japan and the United States , 184-185. See Yamamoto, "The Cold War." The term great crescent was used in the early draft of a State Department policy planning staff paper, PPS 51 ( FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 1128-113), but was omitted in later versions, which became the NSC 48 series. Hayes, The Beginning of American Aid , 3-58, gives a careful summary of U.S. aid to Southeast Asia up to June 1951: the total programmed for Indochina, Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia amounted to $49 million in various forms of technical assistance; deliveries to recipient countries lagged between one and three years after the programs were authorized (46-51). Indonesia also received a $100 million credit from the U.S. Export-Import Bank in 1950 (49).

49. Suzuki G., "Impact of the Korean War: A Memoir," 7-11; int. with Nagano.

50. F 6745/1615/23, FO 371/76182, Pink letter to FO, Apr. 30, 1949.

51. Int. with Aso Kazuko; CLM desp. no. 183 to Ottawa, Mar. 18, 1949, 104-C, 50061 v. 4; KJ , vol. 4, 67-69.

52. Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy , 38-39; "Consider Japan," Sept. 1, 1962, 795; Tsutsui, Banking Policy , 105-106.

53. Comment of Bronfenbrenner, proceedings of the symposium The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform, MMA, Apr. 13-15, 1978, 77 ; T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 442.

1. CLM desp. no. 183 to Ottawa, enclosure entitled "Notes on Talk with General MacArthur," Mar. 18. 1949, file 104 C 50061, v. 4.

2. Yoshida ltr. of Apr. 19, 1949, to MacArthur, JWC; Suzuki G., "Japan's Experience," 6.

3. Farley, Aspects , 215, 226, fn. 17; Takemae, GHQ , 201; Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 351.

4. C. Johnson, Conspiracy , 79-81. The government's criteria for discharging workers were uncooperativeness, unfitness as a public service employee, inferiority in technical knowledge and physical condition, short period of service, and poor performance (Farley, Aspects , 52-53, 228-230).

5. C. Johnson, Conspiracy , 46-107, summarizes the three incidents.

6. YM , 177; Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Aug. 6, 1949, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida. In 1951 Yoshida told Dulles that the government had determined that a Korean had assassinated Shimoyama but had been unable to catch him ( FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1008); little evidence has been produced to support Yoshida's assertion.

7. The popular book was by Matsumoto, Nihon no kuroi kiri , 7-96.

8. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 352-353.

9. Dynaword, "A Brief History," 9.

10. Sullivan memo to Rusk, Apr. 27, 1950, DOS files, NRAW, RG 59, Box 5655.

11. SCAP, "Selected Data," 11; Fearey, The Occupation , 206; F 2626/44/ 23, FO 69819, Gascoigne ltr. to London, Jan. 29, 1948.

12. YM , 233-235; Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, June 8, 1950, MMA, RG 5, VIP file—Yoshida; Yoshida statement of July 15, 1949, MMA, RG 5.

13. Swearingen, The Soviet Union , 64.

14. Gunther, The Riddle , 162; Yoshida statement, June 4, 1950, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida.

15. MacArthur ltrs. to Yoshida, June 6, 7, and 26, 1950, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida.

16. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1221-1222.

17. MacArthur ltr. of June 6, 1950, MMA, RG 5, VIP file—Yoshida.

18. Takemae, GHQ , 201-202; Takemae, Senryo sengoshi , 186-201; MacArthur ltr. of July 18, 1950, MMA, RG 5, VIP file—Yoshida; C. Johnson, Conspiracy , 79. Yoshida's ltr. of August 9, 1949 (JWC), listed many steps he thought necessary for "national reconstruction," including "elimination of communist influence from government service and educational institutions." The Red Purge was conducted without legal procedure or other recourse. Those purged did receive all compensation and pension payments due them, and improving economic conditions helped many of them find new employment. In 1949-1950 about 12,480 persons were discharged in the Red Purge, and about 600,000 were discharged under administrative retrenchment, according to Shi-nobu ( Sengo Nihon seijishi , vol. 4, 1184) and Takemae ( Sengo rodo kaikaku , 351).

19. YM , 241.

20. Enclosure to CLM desp. no. 183 to Ottawa, March 18, 1949, file no. 104 C, 50061, v. 4.

21. YM , 211-231; Garon, The State and Labor , 243.

22. Schonberger, Aftermath of War , 128-133; Takemae, "Sohyo."

23. Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 306-307.

24. Garon, The State and Labor , 242-248; Shirai, "A Supplement," 369-384; Japan Times Weekly (Overseas ed.), Dec. 9, 1989, 4.

25. Nishi, Unconditional Democracy , 258-261.

26. YM , 174, 175; Japan Times Weekly (Overseas ed.), May 27, 1989, 6.

27. RLED, Apr. 25, 1948; YM , 177.

28. DS staff study, ''Status and Treatment of Koreans in Japan," Aug. 15, 1949, MMA, RG 84, Box 2291; SD , Aug. 8, 1949.

29. Yoshida undated ltr. to MacArthur, MMA RG 5, Box 3, Folder 2; Sebald memo to MacArthur, Sept. 9, 1949, MMA, RG 5, Box 3, Folder 2; FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1007-1008.

30. Robert Ricketts, who has carefully studied the status of Koreans in Japan, has provided the author with useful information and documents.

1. Kennan, Memoirs , 395.

1. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly , 173, 214; FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 152-155; Bor-ton, "The Allied Occupation," 421; FRUS, 1947 , vol. 6, 473-474, 491-492, 509-511. Burma and Pakistan became members of the FEC in November 1949, raising its membership to thirteen ( FRUS, 1949 , vol. 6, 900-901).

2. Draft peace treaty, Aug. 5, 1947, State Department file 740.0011 (PW Peace) 8-647, NRAW; draft peace treaty, Jan. 8, 1948, State Department FE file (peace treaty), NRAW; FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 656-660; Dunn, Peace-Making , 70.

3. FRUS, 1947 , vol. 6, 454-456, 512-515.

4. Nishimura, "Kowa joyaku," 217; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 248 - 250; Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 32-34, 43; KJ , vol. 3, 25-26, 35. Ashida also gave the memo to several other foreign representatives, including Macmahon Ball, the Australian representative on the Allied Council. See also World Report , Dec. 11, 1947; Yomiuri shimbun , Dec. 11, 1947, 1, based on Associated Press despatch from Washington of Dec. 5, 1947; POLAD airgram A-130, Dec. 9, 1947, NRAW, State Dept file 500, Jap treaty; Nishi-mura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 45-47, lists the thirty-six documents prepared by the Foreign Office.

5. In 1949 a German "basic law" or constitution came into effect in the three western zones, and an occupation statute was agreed upon by the three Western Allies and the German government to govern their relations (Gimbel, The American Occupation , 253-257). C. J. Friedrich of Harvard University played a key role in advising German leaders regarding the drafting of the German constitution (Wolfe [ed.], Americans as Proconsuls , 110).

6. Acheson, Present at the Creation , 338.

7. FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 877-878; draft peace treaty, Oct. 13, 1949, DOS file 740.0011 (PW peace) 10-1449, NRAW; Dunn, Peace-Making , 83-86.

8. Butterworth ltr. to Sebald, Nov. 4, 1949, NRAW, dipl. file 320.1, RG 84, Box 2292; Dunn, Peace-Making , 85-86.

9. Dunn, Peace-Making , 648-649; Sebald desp. to DOS, "Secretary of the Army's Off-the-Record Press Conference," Feb. 15, 1949, NRAW, DOS file, RG 59, 740.00119 Japan, 2-1549; F 14488/1015/ 23 , FO 371/76210, Tokyo to London, report of MacArthur interview with G. Ward Price of Daily Mail , Mar. 2, 1949.

10. See YM , 246-248; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 369; Tamamoto, "Unwanted Peace."

11. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1166-1167.

12. Miyazawa, Tokyo-Washinton , 56-59. See Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 358-362; Nishimura, "Kowa joyaku," 227-229.

13. Miyazawa, Tokyo-Washinton , 40-41

14. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 362.

15. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1195-1196; Miyazawa, Tokyo-Washinton , 58-59.

16. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1198, fn. 5.

17. RLED, July 28 and Sept. 18, 1947; YM , 265; KJ , vol. 3, 23-26, 108-114; Nishimura, "Sanfuranshisuko heiwa," 37-38; Kojima, Nihon senryo , vol. 3, 28. The "Ashida memo" was also given subsequently to the Australian foreign minister, H. V. Evatt, and on September 13, 1947, to General Eichel-berger.

18. Miyazawa, Tokyo-Washinton , 64-67.

19. Acheson, Present at the Creation , 556.

20. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1175-1176, 1178.

21. Acheson, Present at the Creation , 432.

22. Pruessen, John Foster Dulles , 443-448; Beal, John Foster Dulles, 1888-1959 , 116.

23. Oral History interview with Babcock, Mar. 5, 1965, 2, John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library. See FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 890-894.

24. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1207-1212; Hoopes, The Devil , 113.

25. Dunn, Peace-Making , 98-102.

26. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1209.

27. SD , June 6, 1950; FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1231.

28. MacArthur memos on the Japanese peace treaty and Formosa, MMA, RG 5, Box 1, Folder 5; FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1213-1221.

29. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1215.

30. Ibid., 1218; see also 1205-1207.

31. FJ 19111/13, FO 371/83814, Tokyo desp. 53, Feb. 18, 1950; Hosoya, "The Road to San Francisco."

32. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1227-1228.

33. Ibid., 1229-1230.

34. Ibid., 1231-1232.

35. SD , June 22, 1950.

36. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1230-1237. In a meeting with the British ambassador, Dulles confided that he was aiming for a peace conference in June 1951 (FT 1021, FO 371/8383, Tokyo desp. to London, June 26, 1950).

37. Asahi shimbun , Aug. 12, 1979, 3; Kern letter to Dulles, Aug. 19, 1950, John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library. A Japanese who was at Dulles's meeting with Kern, Matsudaira, and others on June 22, 1950, thought the "Matsudaira letter" was a fake (int. with Watanabe Takeshi).

38. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1232.

1. U.S. Senate, Military Situation , 2020; DOSB , vol. 23, July 3, 1950, 12-13; DOSB , vol. 22, January 23, 1950, 116; Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War , examines how the war started.

2. Schnabel, Policy and Direction , 63-65.

3. Stephan, "Soviet Policy," 87; Halliday and Cumings, Korea , 71-74; Talbot (trans. and ed.), Khrushchev Remembers , 367-368, recounts how Kim Il Sung persuaded Stalin to support a North Korean attack on the South, which Kim was confident would quickly succeed and produce a revolt in the South against the government of Syngman Rhee; nothing appears in the Khrushchev account about the possibility of a U.S. peace treaty with Japan.

4. Gallicchio, The Cold War , 95-101, 116-119; Morison, Victory , vol. 14, 354-355. Morison said that the "best prophet was Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA, commanding the China Theater ... [who] urgently demanded priority for occupation of Manchuria and the Chinese seaports, in order to prevent the Chinese Reds from taking over." Dean Acheson also believed that the U.S. Marines should have been kept there ( Present at the Creation , 140).

5. Blair, MacArthur , 284-289; James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 3, 387-418. Both describe MacArthur's shifting views before June 1950 on the defense of Korea.

6. Allison, Ambassador , 129-131.

7. Allison reported that the evening after the attack MacArthur appeared to be surprised when Dulles phoned him to say the South Korean Army was in full retreat. Actually, MacArthur had been receiving reports since a few hours after the attack and had ordered ammunition to be sent to Korea (James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 3, 420).

8. Allison, Ambassador , 137. According to one account, Dulles advised President Truman a few days later that MacArthur should be "hauled back to the United States" (Diary of Eben A. Ayres, entry of July 1, 1950, 106-107, HSTL). But no other evidence supports this statement, which would seem to have been out of character for Dulles, a conservative Republican who had established good relations with MacArthur. (See FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, 972-976, for Dulles's reaction to the relief of MacArthur in 1951.)

9. Bernstein, "The Week We Went to War"; DOSB , vol. 23, July 10, 1950, 23-57, 49-50; Pruessen, John Foster Dulles , 414-418.

10. Wake Island conference, MMA, RG 5, Box 1B. MacArthur went to Formosa on July 31, 1950, for two days to discuss with Chiang Kai-shek "military coordination" between Nationalist Chinese and U.S. forces. MacArthur considered that as theater commander he had general authorization to do this (Sebald, With MacArthur , 122-125).

11. MacArthur initially felt that Japanese treaty planning had been "entirely eclipsed by events in Korea," but he soon got back in stride on treaty issues (SD, July 7, 1950).

12. Sebald, With MacArthur , 119.

13. In the first days of the war, Marquat confidentially asked Suzuki Gengo, an official of the Japanese Finance Ministry, if Japan could duplicate and print a large amount of Bank of Korea banknotes. When told it would take a month, Marquat said U.S. forces could not wait that long. Suzuki asked if U.S. forces were going to Korea. Marquat said, not entirely in jest, that Suzuki would be shot if anything about this leaked out. Suzuki got quick delivery of nearly ¥25 billion worth of Koreans banknotes (int. with Suzuki).

14. FJ 10111/50, FO 371/83816, Gascoigne desp. 224 to London, July 13, 1950; Yoshida statement, Aug. 3, 1950, MMA, RG 10, Box 11. Yoshida reportedly called the war "a Gift of the Gods" (Shinobu, Sengo Nihon seijishi , vol. 4, 1151). MacArthur is said to have called it "Mars' last gift to an old warrior" (Rovere and Schlesinger, The General , 104). Neither Yoshida nor MacArthur was a particularly strong believer in divinity.

15. FJ 10111/53, FO 371/83816, Gascoigne desp. 249 to London, August 2, 1950; FJ 1025/2, FO 371/83842, Tokyo tel. 1661 to London, December 13, 1950.

16. POLAD tel. 40 to DOS, July 6, 1950, MMA, RG 9, Box 83.

17. Ltr. of July 8, 1950, MMA, RG 5, VIP file—Yoshida.

18. Ibid.

19. FRUS, 1948 , vol. 6, 859; FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 671-673, 725; Yoshida-MacArthur exchange of letters, Aug. 6 and Aug. 8, 1949, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida.

20. FJ 10111/50, FO 371/83816, UKLM desp. 224 to London, July 13, 1950.

21. Rizzo memos for record, "Conference Regarding SCAP Police Letter of July 8, 1950," and July 13, 1950, Japanese FO file, reel A0048-0102.

22. Ibid.

23. Message C 57814, CINCFE to DA, July 14, 1950, MMA, RG 5, Box 1.

24. GHQ FEC staff study, July 10, 1950, MMA, RG 6, Box 100.

25. YM , 182-195; KJ , vol. 2, 165-171; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 377.

26. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 381; Dower, "The Eye of the Beholder," 16.

27. Okazaki memo to Marquat, Sept. 20, 1950, NRAS, RG 331, Box 2187; Dodge memo to Marquat, "National Police Reserve," Nov. 30, 1950, NRAS, ESS file.

28. Kowalski, Nihon saigunbi , 24-36. This book has been published only in Japanese. An English version is available in the NDLT.

29. Murphy, Diplomat , 347-348; Drifte, "Japan's Involvement," 128-130.

30. NSC 68, FRUS, 1950 , vol. 1, 291; Gaddis, Strategies .

31. Baerwald, The Purge , 59.

32. Sakeda, "Kowa to kokunai seiji," 108.

33. NSC 68, FRUS, 1950 , vol. 1, 292.

1. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1243-1244. Dulles was suggesting to the State Department at the same time, in a "think piece," that Japanese might be recruited to take part individually in an international force to serve in Korea (ibid., 1246-1248). Nothing came of this idea; it was not too different from the Chinese idea of a volunteer force, which the PRC sent into Korea in November.

2. Ibid., 1255, 1264-1265.

3. Ibid., 1288-1296. One senior State Department official described the provisions of NSC 60/1 as "brutally frank" (ibid., 1304).

4. Ibid., 1196-1297. "Trusteeship" meant that the United States did not acquire sovereign rights. The emperor had reportedly suggested earlier that Japan agree to a fifty-year lease of Okinawa to the United States (POLAD desp. 1293, Sept. 22, 1947, DOS file 801, NRAW); Iriye Sukemasa, "Nikki," Asahi shimbun , February 23, 1989, 4; Toyoshita, "Tenno-Makkasa,'' part 2, 110-114.

5. Fearey, "Summary of the Negotiations," 281. This concise summary of the peace treaty negotiations by an insider does not deal with security treaty.

6. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 1332-1336, 1308.

7. Ibid., 1356-1358.

8. Ibid., 1359-1360, 1363-1367.

9. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 788-789. Dean Acheson told a press conference on February 8, 1950, that a "theme" of the U.S. response to the Soviet threat was "the transformation of our two former enemies into allies and their attachment by firm bonds of security and economic interest to the free nations in Europe and Asia" ( Present at the Creation , 378).

10. Rockefeller was instrumental in creating the Japan Society in New York and the International House in Tokyo, both of which became influential in promoting cultural interchange.

11. Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 65, 81-86; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshi-da , vol. 3; 389-397; Nishimura, "Kowa joyaku," 230-231.

12. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 397; Hosoya, "Japan's Response," 20.

13. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 812.

14. Ibid., 818-820.

15. Ibid., 821-822, 836.

16. Ibid., 827-828.

17. Ibid., 828-830; KJ , vol. 2, 160-162; Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 87-88.

18. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 832; YM , 277. Yoshida's principal expert was Nishimura Kumao.

19. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 800, 818.

20. Ibid., 832-834; Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 88-89.

21. Kosaka, Saisho Yoshida , 58-59; Asahi shimbun , Feb. 14, 1964, 8; FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 832.

22. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 789; Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 94, note.

23. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 833-838, 839; Nishimura, "Sanfuranshisu-ko kowa," 30-31; Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 90.

24. Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 90-91; FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 833-834, 839; SD, Jan. 31, 1951.

25. Nishimura, "Kowa joyaku," 237; Nishimura, "Sanfuranshisuko kowa," 31. This appraisal of Yoshida's ability to speak and understand English is based on interviews with several who knew Yoshida well, such as Sebald and Matsui Akira, and on several personal conversations.

26. Nishimura, "Kowa joyaku," 239-241; Hosoya, "Japan's Response," 23.

27. Nishimura, "Kowa joyaku," 238-239.

28. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 843-849.

29. Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 82, 89-90; Nishimura, "Sanfuranshisuko kowa," 30; Hosoya, "Japan's Response," 23.

30. Hosoya, "Japan's Response," 24.

31. Tokyo shimbun , May 13, 1977, 3, gives an account of the contents of the Japanese rearmament plan (Hosoya, "Japan's Response," 25). Nishimura later confirmed the accuracy of this report ("Sanfuranshisuko kowa," 33). Inoki stated he had seen the document given Allison on Feb. 3 and confirmed the general accuracy of the press report (int. with Inoki). The document is evidently in the State Department historical files but was not made public, probably because the Japanese government so requested.

32. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 849, editorial note. Johnson's report of Feb. 8, 1951, to Secretary of Defense Marshall on the Yoshida-Dulles talks makes no reference to the Yoshida rearmament plan (MMA, RG 5, Box 68).

     Yoshida had told his advisers on Jan. 1, 1950, evidently in a pessimistic mood, that Japan might have to agree in the forthcoming negotiations to a 200,000-man army (Watanabe A., "Kowa mondai," 47). Perhaps he decided to try out a figure of 50,000 to get agreement in the February negotiations. Dower perceptively commented that "the issue, in Yoshida's view, was no longer rearmament per se but the pace and appearance of rearmament" ( Empire , 400). The appearance was more significant for him than the pace, as Americans were to find out in dealing with him for the next several years. Speculating that Yoshida may have cooked up the plan for a 50,000-man army as an "instantaneous idea,'' Hosoya noted that "improvisation was a characteristic of his diplomatic style" (Hosoya, "Japan's Response," 25).

33. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 849-855, 860-861; Hosoya, "Japan's Response," 26; Nishimura, "Sanfuranshisuko kowa," 32-33.

34. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 866-869; Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 94-95.

35. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 856-857, 863.

36. DOSB , vol. 24, Feb. 12, 1951, 252-255.

37. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 405; Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 94; H. Alexander Smith Oral History, Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library; FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1326-1328.

38. FRUS, 1950 , vol. 6, 26-27, 45, 81-83, 121-123, 214-219, 223-227; FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 143-144, 825-827, 830-832, 842-843.

39. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 825-827, 830-832, 842-843.

40. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 866-867.

41. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 874-880.

42. Ibid., 866-869.

43. YM , 250-251; Curtis, "The Dulles-Yoshida Negotiations," 50-52; Takeuchi (ed.), Yoshida naikaku , 380-385.

44. DOSB , vol. 24, Feb. 26, 1951, 351; Hatoyama, Hatoyama Ichiro , 85-92; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 280; Auer, The Postwar Rearmament , 76; FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 873-874.

45. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 880-883; Fearey, "Summary of the Negotiations," 284.

46. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 885-887, 169-179; Fearey, "Summary of Negotiations," 284.

47. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 944-950.

48. DOSB , vol. 24, May 28, 1951, 852-858. See DOSB , vol. 24, July 23, 1951, 138-143.

49. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 900-903, 931.

1. James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 3, 600; MacArthur, Reminiscences , 395.

2. Sebald, With MacArthur , 227-228. Sebald was accorded the personal rank of ambassador on October 11, 1950, after strong endorsement by MacArthur and in spite of considerable State Department reluctance to so honor a relative newcomer to the diplomatic service.

3. Ibid., 228-230; FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 968-969.

4. SD , Apr. 11, 1951; MacArthur, Reminiscences , 285, 395.

5. U. Johnson, The Right Hand , 117.

6. Sebald, With MacArthur , 230.

7. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 972-973.

8. Ibid., 973-975, 975-976.

9. Sebald, With MacArthur , 234; Hara, "Makkasa Kainin," vol. 5, 219-227; Miyazawa letter to Reid, Apr. 19, 1951, Kolko Papers, Box 3, Dodge file, London School of Economics Library.

10. Acheson, Present at the Creation , 526-528; U. Johnson, The Right Hand , 106-109.

11. Ridgway, Soldier , 223.

12. Sebald, With MacArthur , 236.

13. Ibid., 237, 240; memo from Rizzo to Fox, Apr. 20, 1951, NRAS, GS file.

14. Ridgway, Soldier , 224.

15. Fearey, "Summary of the Negotiations," 285; Nishimura, Sanfuranshi-suko heiwa , 112-114; FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 986, 1003.

16. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 985-989; Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 114-121.

17. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1006-1009, 1011. Nishimura later commented somewhat bitterly that the Americans took the position that they had not come to negotiate a peace treaty, since Japan had surrendered unconditionally, but only to consult ("Sanfuranshisuko no omoide," 75). Both sides considered the negotiation of the security treaty as one between equals.

18. FJ 1202/10/025677, FO 371/92655, Clutton desp. 142 to London, Apr. 30, 1951.

19. U.S. Senate, Military Situation , 312.

20. YM , 49; F 328/23, FO 371/69858, Jan. 2, 1948, report of meeting on Dec, 19, 1947, of U.K. parliamentary delegation with MacArthur.

1. YM , 46; GS memo to chief of staff, "Letter from Prime Minister to General MacArthur," Apr. 19, 1951, NRAS, GS file, RG 331, Box 2187. Yoshida asserted in his memoirs that he did not actually have the opportunity to give the letter to MacArthur before the general's recall but did discuss the subject with him ( YM , 252).

2. Unsigned ltr. from Yoshida to MacArthur, Apr. 9, 1951, NRAS, GS file, RG 331, Box 2187. Yoshida later told a trusted official that MacArthur did not agree with all the things he had been instructed to do during the occupation (Watanabe T., Watanabe Takeshi nikki , 666). Yoshida's daughter thought that her father wrote the letter because he wanted to rescue the general from some of the "excesses" committed during the occupation (int. with Aso Kazuko).

3. GS memo to chief of staff, Apr. 23, 1951, NRAS, GS file, RG 331, Box 2187. Sodei described at length Yoshida's "last attempt to mutilate MacArthur's reforms" ( Senryo , 215-218) and observed that MacArthur made no concession other than to "fade away."

4. Sebald ltr. to Johnson, Aug. 3, 1951, DOS file 794.00/8-351, NRAW; Johnson ltr. to Sebald, June 16, 1951, DOS file 794.00/8-351, NRAW.

5. Ridgway, Soldier , 225; Ridgway memo of conversation with Yoshida, Jan. 1, 1952, Ridgway file, Army War College Library, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

6. Ridgway, Soldier , 226-228.

7. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1022-1023; YM , 46-47; Dower, Empire , 559, fn. 105.

8. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1045-1049, 1138-1141, 1328-1329; Baerwald, The Purge , 79.

9. YM , 147-166; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 274-276, 279-281; Montgomery, Forced to Be Free , 48.

10. Ridgway, Soldier , 226; KJ , vol. 2, 180; Dower, Empire , 432. Yoshida told his staff he would not consider any specific plans and budgets for force increases of more than 50,000 a year (CAS memo to CofS, Feb. 23, 1952, with memo for record by Kowalski, file GS [B] 04394, NDLT; FRUS, 1952-1954 , vol. 14, no. 2, 1232). It was characteristic of Yoshida that he did not shrink from entering into vague understandings that required action in the future. By playing the artful dodger, he could get past the immediate hurdle.

11. Dower, Empire , 386; Weinstein, "Defense Policy," 167; Rusk-Okazaki memo, Feb. 11, 1952, NRAW, DOS file, 794.5/2-1152; Welfield, An Empire , 70.

12. NSC 125/2, Feb. 21, 1952, FRUS, 1952 , vol. 14, no. 2, 1300-1308.

13. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 888-895, 898-900, 1001-1002, 1208-1215, 1330-1331.

14. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1021-1022.

15. Ibid., 1024-1037, 1119-1133; Fearey, "Summary of the Negotiations," 287-289. Several issues, mostly technical, were still unsettled: fisheries, shipping, Japanese assets in Thailand, compensation for Allied wartime property losses, and reparations.

16. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1171-1174; Fearey, "Summary of the Negotiations," 289.

17. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1274; Sebald, With MacArthur , 136-149; Reischauer, The United States and Japan , 242-243.

18. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1251, 1255-1256; Andrew Gordon, "Reparations for Southeast Asia," Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan , vol. 6, 302.

19. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1153-1155.

20. Nishimura, "Sanfuranshisuko kowa," 34; Takemae, GHQ , 202-204; FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 857-858, 1227. The Japanese believed the security treaty should conform closely with the international obligations set out in the U.N. Charter and that the United States was imposing obligations in excess of charter requirements (Nishimura, "Ampo joyaku kaitei," 27).

21. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 860, 863. This provision was eliminated from the revised security treaty signed in 1960.

22. Sebald, With MacArthur , 280; Kosaka, Saisho Yoshida , 55-59, 69-71.

23. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1207-1208.

24. Ibid., 873-874, 1235, 1242, 1248-1249, 1274; Sebald, With MacArthur , 271-272.

25. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1275-1277.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 1229-1230, 1299-1300.

28. Sebald, With MacArthur , 269; Fearey, "Summary of the Negotiations," 294-295.

29. Truman speech, DOSB , vol. 25, Sept. 17, 1951, 447-450; see U.S. Congress, Selected Speeches — Douglas MacArthur , 33-38, in which he reviewed the achievements of the occupation.

30. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1315-1318.

31. Multilateral Japan Peace Treaty, signed Sept. 8, 1951, TIAS , vol. 3, part 3 (1952), 3169-3325; Dunn, Peace-Making , 183-184. Dulles told the Soviets that the United States would support Soviet claims to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin if the USSR became a party to the Japanese peace treaty ( FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1,886).

32. Sebald, With MacArthur , 278-280; Nishimura, "Sanfuranshisuko kowa," 36.

33. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1343-1344; Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 272-278; Acheson, Present at the Creation , 547; Takemae, Senryo sengoshi , 17.

34. Nishimura, "Sanfuranshisuko kowa," 36; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 418.

35. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1339; James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 3, 352; Dulles message to MacArthur, Sept. 6, 1951, MMA, RG 21.

36. Acheson, Present at the Creation , 544, 551; United States-Japan Security Treaty, signed Sept. 8, 1951, TIAS , vol. 3, part 3 (1952), 3329-3341.

37. KJ , vol. 3, 48-50; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 418; Kosaka, Saisho Yoshida , 4. A year later Yoshida told the American ambassador that the emperor had advised him to give up cigars; Yoshida said in reply he had no intention of doing so (Murphy desp., Sept. 13, 1952, NRAW, DOS file, RG 59, Box 4246).

38. Nishimura, "Sanfuranshisuko kowa," 37. (See Packard, Protest , 252-302.)

39. DOSB , vol. 25, Sept. 17, 1951, 465.

40. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1,250-251; NYT , Sept. 9, 1951, 1, 22, 25, 28.

41. Yomiuri , Aug. 13, 1979, 10.

42. Iriye, The Cold War , 93-97, 182-191.

43. Igarashi, "Peace Making," 11, no. 2 (Summer 1985), 323-356; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 218. See Williams, "Diet Interpellations on the Peace and Security Treaties," memos dated Oct. 19 and Oct. 28, 1951, JWC.

44. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1416-1418, 1347, editorial note; Nishimura, Sanfuranshisuko heiwa , 312-326; W. Cohen, "China," 40.

45. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1437-1439.

46. Ibid., 1443-1446. As early as May 1951 Yoshida had indicated that Japan would not make a treaty with the PRC but would make peace with the ROC ( FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1050). On December 13, 1951, Yoshida handed Dulles a short draft treaty Japan proposed to negotiate with the Nationalist government after the multilateral treaty came into force, but Dulles paid little attention to it (ibid., 1436-1437; SD , Dec. 13, 1951). Nevertheless, the impression remains strong in Japan and among foreign scholars that the United States pressured Yoshida into agreeing to make a treaty with the ROC (Masumi, Postwar Politics , 217-218). Dower pointed out that Yoshida may have been ambivalent about the China issue ( Empire , 404).

47. FRUS, 1951 , vol. 6, no. 1, 1446-1447, 1467-1470.

48. Ibid., 1465-1467. Yoshida remained worried about his letter. He wrote to Dulles on Dec. 27 urging that the United States and the United Kingdom reach agreement on China policy, with which Japan would go along for the sake of a common front of the free nations (ibid., 1471-1472; SD , Dec. 27, 1951).

49. FRUS, 1952 , vol. 14, no. 2, 1077-1080, memo of Jan. 10, 1952, Eden-Dulles meeting.

50. Acheson, Present at the Creation , 772; Schonberger, Aftermath of War , 275-276; SD , Jan. 15, 1952.

51. Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy , 181.

52. FRUS, 1952-1954 , vol. 14, no. 2, 1248; Usui, "Postwar Japan-China Relations," Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan , vol. 1,290.

53. FRUS, 1952-1954 , vol. 14, no. 2, 1251-1252, 1259-1262; Owada Hisashi, "Korea-Japan Treaty of 1965," and Soon Sung Cho, "Korea-Japan Treaty of 1965, Supplementary Agreements," Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan , vol. 4, 287-288.

54. Text of administrative agreement, TIAS , vol. 3, part 4 (1952), 3341-3419; FRUS, 1952-1954 , vol. 14, no. 2, 1197-1206.

55. DA tel. W 87569 to CINCFE, Aug. 1, 1950, MMA, RG 9, radiograms; CINCFE tel. 021209 to DA, Aug. 2, 1950, MMA, RG 9; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 278-279.

56. NYT , May 2, 1952, 1, 3; Asahi shimbun , May 2, 1952, 1; Shinobu, Sengo Nihon seijishi , vol. 4, 1432.

1. Asahi shimbun , Oct. 21, 1967, 15, and Oct. 23, 1967, 14; Horie, "Yoshida-san no senrei," 251-252.

2. Wray and Conroy (eds.), Japan Examined , 335-364.

3. NYT , Aug. 8, 1985, 1, 3. I am indebted to Carol Gluck for this reference.

4. YM , 60.