1. George E Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: 1961), 223.

2. Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs: A History of the Relations between the Soviet Union and the Rest of the World (London: 1930); Theodore H. von Laue, "Soviet Diplomacy: G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930," in The Diplomats, 1919-1939 , ed. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, N.J.: 1953; reprint, New York, 1963); Kennan, Russia and the West; Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (New York: 1968).

3. Teddy J. Uldricks, "Russia and Europe: Diplomacy, Revolution, and Economic Development in the 1920s," International History Review 1 (1979): 55-83; also his Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917-1930 (London and Beverly Hills, Calif.: 1979).

4. Two of the earliest works were the third volume of E. H. Carr's Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926 (New York: 1964) and Harvey L. Dyck's Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926-1933: A Study in Diplomatic Instability (London: 1966). The method was perfected in two works of Richard K. Debo, Revolution and Survival: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1917-18 (Toronto: 1979) and Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918-1921 (Montreal and Kingston: 1992). Both works are based on a combination of archival and printed sources from the governments of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, as well as on published Russian sources.

5. The publication of Moshe Lewin's La paysannerie et le pouvoir soviétique (Paris: 1966) marked the beginning of this development. The literature that followed is too vast to discuss here. For a compilation of research on NEP society and culture made in 1986, at the beginning of perestroika , see Sheila Fitzpatrick, Alexander Rabinowich, and Richard Stites (eds.), Russia in the Era of NEP: Explorations in Soviet Society and Culture (Bloomington, Ind.: 1991). A summary of research on the economy prior to the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 is presented in R. W. Davies (ed.), From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy: Continuity and Change in the Economy of the USSR (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1991).

6. This research is described in R. W. Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution (London: 1989), 27-46.

7. See, for example, R. W. Davies' observation in the introduction to From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy , pp. 25-26, that consideration of the international situation of the USSR has played little part in the debates among economic historians regarding the breakdown of NEP; and V. A. Shishkin's statement that ''The study and elucidation of the country's socioeconomic development in the 1920s are carried out without taking into consideration the country's interactions and relationships with the world economy": "The external factor in the country's socioeconomic development," in "The Soviet Union in the 1920s: A Roundtable," Soviet Studies in History 28 (1989): 48.

8. L. N. Nezhinskii, "Istoriia vneshnei politiki SSSR: poiski novykh podkhodov," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1990:4): 3.

9. Zinovii Sheinis, Maxim Litvinov (Moscow: 1990); original Russian edition, 1989.

10. A. A. Galkin, "Nekotorye voprosy istorii Kominterna," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1989:2): 83.

11. Shishkin, "External factor," 54.

12. Jon Jacobson, "Is There a New International History of the 1920s?" American Historical Review 88 (1983): 617-45. See also Donald Cameron Watt, "The New International History," International History Review 9 (1987): 518-52; Alexander de Conde, "On the Nature of International History," International History Review 10 (1988): 282-301; and Stephen Pelz, "On Systematic Explanation in International History" International History Review 12 (1990): 763-81.

1. Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations (Brighton, England: 1988), 27-28, 149-51; Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of International Relations (New York: 1987), 8-18; V. Kubálková and A. A. Cruickshank, Marxism and International Relations (Oxford and New York: 1985), 76-77.

2. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism : V. I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: 1960-70), 22:266 (hereafter cited as CW ).

3. Lynch, Soviet Study of International Relations , 13.

4. Marx quoted in Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform (New York: 1975), 20.

5. Lenin quoted in Debo, Revolution and Survival , 408. Together, this work and Debo's Survival and Consolidation provide a full narrative of Soviet foreign policy from the October Revolution to the settlements of March 1921.

6. Piotr S. Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1969), brought the diplomacy of the Soviet-Polish war into critical scholarship. Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20 (New York: 1972), chronicles the military events. In "The Genesis of the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20," European Studies Review 5 (1975): 47-67, and "The Missing Revolutionary War: The Polish Campaigns and the Retreat from Revolution in Soviet Russia, 1919-21," Soviet Studies 27 (1975): 178-95, Davies draws out the interpretative implications of his research, one of them being that the war was a Bolshevik revolutionary offensive by military means, something that Lenin strongly favored. Thomas C. Fiddick, in Russia's Retreat from Poland, 1920: From Permanent Revolution to Peaceful Coexistence (London: 1990), looks into the diversity of policies preferred and activities undertaken by the major Bolshevik actors in 1920. He does so with remarkable depth and clarity and denies that revolutionary war was Lenin's policy. Debo, in Survival and Consolidation , 408-412, agrees that Soviet policy in Poland was not a revolutionary crusade. Rather, as the Red Army drove back the Polish forces from the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks rethought their entire foreign policy. Lenin included, they abandoned the cautious and realistic diplomacy they had pursued since Brest-Litvosk. Instead, Debo speculates, they were attracted to the possibility of dividing up Polish territory with Germany and forcing Britain and France into an international conference to revise the peace settlement in Eastern Europe. James M. McCann, "Beyond the Bug: Soviet Historiography of the Soviet-Policy War of 1920,'' Soviet Studies 36 (1984): 475-93, analyzes Soviet scholarship prior to glasnost and also comments on Euro-American historiography. Vladlen Sirorkin, "The Riga Peace Treaty," International Affairs (Moscow) (1989:9): 128-43, extols Lenin's realism and his 1921 turnabout leading to the adoption of the Riga Treaty, NEE and "the high road" to world revolution, as opposed to Trotsky's notion of "direct revolution." A. Ya. Manusevkch, "Trudnyi put' k Rizhskomu mirnomu dogovoru 1921 g.," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1991:1): 19-43, reads like unreconstructed "old political thinking" despite the date of publication.

7. Fiddick, Russia's Retreat from Poland , 26-27.

8. Teddy J. Uldricks, "Russia and Europe: Diplomacy, Revolution, and Economic Development in the 1920s," International History Review 1 (1979): 55-83.

9. Major programmatic statements by Lenin on which the following analysis is based include: speech delivered to the Moscow Gubernia Conference of the RCP(B), 21 November 1920, Lenin, CW , 31: 408-415; report on concessions delivered to the RCP(B) group at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, 21 December 1920, Lenin, CW , 31: 463-86; report on the political work of the CC of the RCP(B) to the Tenth Party Congress, 8 March 1921, Lenin, CW , 32:179-83; report of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars to the Ninth Congress of Soviets, 23 December 1921, Lenin, CW , 33: 143-61.

10. Branko Lazitch and Milorad Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern (Stanford, Calif.: 1972), 532-45.

11. Report to the Tenth Party Congress, 8 March 1921, Lenin, CW , 32: 180.

12. Trotsky quoted in E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 (New York: 1950-53), 3: 383.

13. Piero Melograni, Lenin and the Myth of World Revolution: Ideology and Reasons of State, 1917-1920 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 1989).

14. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern , 523, 546.

15. For the argument of M. M. Gorinov and S. V. Tasakunov that the New Economic Policy was forced on the party leadership by local Bolshevik chiefs, who, in confronting the realities of war-torn Russia and demands for food supplies from the cities, began working out tentative compromises with the peasantry as early as the autumn of 1918, see "Leninskaia kontseptsiia NEPa: stanovlenie i razvitie," Voprosy istorii (1990:4): 20-21.

16. Speech to the Plenary Session of the Moscow Soviet, 20 November 1922, Lenin, CW , 33: 441.

17. R. W. Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution , 119.

18. Samuel Farber, Before Stalinism: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Democracy (Oxford: 1990), 195-99.

19. Lenin quoted in N. V. Zagladin, Istoriia uspekhov i neudach sovetskoi diplomatii: politologicheskii aspekt (Moscow: 1990), 22-23.

20. Franklyn Griffiths, "Origins of Peaceful Coexistence: A Historical Note," Survey , no. 50 (January 1964): 195-201; Stephan Horak, "Lenin on Coexistence: A Chapter in Soviet Foreign Policy," Studies on the Soviet Union 3 (1964): 20-30; V. Kubálková and A. A. Cruickshank, "The Soviet Concept of Peaceful Coexistence: Some Theoretical and Semantic Problems," Australian Journal of Politics and History 24 (1978): 184-98; Warren Lerner, "The Historical Origins of the Soviet Doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence," Law and Contemporary Society 29 (1964): 865-70. Griffiths, 195-96, distinguishes carefully between "peaceful cohabitation'' ( mirnoe sozhitelstvo ) and "peaceful coexistence" ( mirnoe sosushchestvovanie ) as terms used by the party/state leadership from 1917 to 1921; the former, he states, "suggests more active participation," but the latter "is more stable, less transitory." Light, Soviet Theory of International Relations , 42, does not regard the distinction as significant. The practice I have adopted here is to use "peaceful coexistence" and to rely on the political context to make clear its various connotations. The official historiography of the CPSU did not credit Trotsky with first usage of the term, or with any other achievements as the first narkom for foreign affairs. The initial breakdown of this interpretation can be observed in A. V. Pantsov, "Brestskii mir," Voprosy istorii (1990:2): 60-79, which criticized the pre- glasnost line and used materials authored by Trotsky; the latter had been taboo up to that time.

21. Lenin and Chicherin quoted in Zagladin, Istoriia uspekhov i neudach , 50-51, and Griffiths, "Origins of Peaceful Coexistence," 197-98. For the negotiations with Estonia, see Debo, Survival and Consolidation , 124-46.

22. Fiddick, Russia's Retreat from Poland , 36-37, 41.

23. Ibid., 274.

24. V. G. Sirotkin, "Ot grazhdanskoi voiny k grazhdanskomu miru," in Inogo ne dano , ed. Iu. N. Afanaseva (Moscow: 1988), 371.

25. Report on Concessions at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, 21 December 1920, Lenin, CW , 31: 463-86; quotations on 471 and 480; report to the Tenth Party Congress, 8 March 1921, Lenin, CW , 32: 182-83.

26. Research into the articulation of NEP is discussed in V. P. Dmitrenko, "Certain Aspects of the New Economic Policy in Soviet Historical Scholarship of the 1960s," Soviet Studies in History 11 (1972-73): 224-25.

27. Quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution , 3: 289.

28. Zinovii Sheinis, Maxim Litvinov , 153.

29. Anthony J. Heywood, "Trade or Isolation? Soviet Imports of Railway Equipment, 1920-1922," in Contact or Isolation? Soviet-Western Relations in the Interwar Period , ed. John Hiden and Aleksander Loit (Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia) 8 (Stockholm: 1991), 137-60; Christine A. White, "'Riches have Wings,' The Use of Russian Gold in Soviet Foreign Trade, 1918-1922," ibid., 117-36.

30. Roger Pethybridge, One Step Backwards, Two Steps Forward: Soviet Society and Politics in the New Economic Policy (Oxford and New York: 1990), 94.

31. Charles M. Edmondson, "The Politics of Hunger: The Soviet Response to Famine, 1921," Soviet Studies 29 (1977): 506-518.

32. Lenin quoted in Edmondson, "Politics of Hunger," 516.

33. "Report by the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for the Ninth Congress of Soviets, December 1921," International Affairs (Moscow) (1990:2): 138, 144.

34. Benjamin M. Weissman, Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia, 1921-1923 (Stanford, Calif.: 1974).

35. "Report by the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for the Ninth Congress of Soviets, December 1921," 146.

36. Report by Lenin to the RCP(B) Group at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, 22 December 1920, Lenin, CW , 31: 493.

37. Pethybridge, One Step , 232-33.

38. John Quigley, The Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly: Institutions and Laws (Columbus, Ohio: 1974), 3-36.

39. V. L. Genis, "Upriamyi narkom s Ilinki," in Otkryvaia novye stranitsy. Mezhdunarodnye voprosy: sobytiia i liudi , ed. A. A. Iskenderov (Moscow: 1989), 233.

40. Timothy Edward O'Connor, The Engineer of Revolution: L. B. Krasin and the Bolsheviks, 1870-1926 (Boulder, Colo.: 1992), 166-220.

41. Report by Lenin to the RCP(B) Group at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, 21 December 1920, Lenin, CW , 31: 463-86, quotations on 485-86.

42. Widely quoted; see Light, Soviet Theory of International Relations , 28.

43. V. G. Sirotkin, Vekhi otechestvennoi istorii (Moscow: 1991), 175. In true perestroika fashion, the work gives high marks to the pragmatists of early Soviet politics—Lenin, Krasin, Chicherin, the NKID in general, and, later, Radek and Trotsky—contrasting them with the doctrinaire Zinoviev, Stalin, and Dzerzhinskii. The author is a historian at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry. During the glasnost era, he was the one who proposed that the secret protocols to the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact be sought out in the archives and published immediately.

44. "Resolution of the All Russian Central Executive Committee on the Report of the Work of the Russian Delegation at Genoa and the Treaty with Germany signed at Rapallo," 18 May 1922, printed in Henri Barbusse, ed., The Soviet Union and Peace: The Most Important of the Documents Issued by the Government of the USSR Concerning Peace and Disarmament from 1917 to 1929 (New York: [1929?]), 196.

45. On this point, see Kubálková and Cruickshank, Marxism and International Relations, 77 , and "Soviet Concept," 185.

46. Barbusse, The Soviet Union and Peace .

47. Nikita Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress , 14 February 1956 (Moscow: 1956), 38-46, and "On Peaceful Co-existence," Foreign Affairs 38 (1959): 1-18. On the sometimes subtle adaptations of "peaceful coexistence" during the Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev eras, see V. Kubálková and A. A. Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations (London and Boston: 1980), 148-54, 165-67; and Light, Soviet Theory of International Relations , 31-68.

48. This line was sustained with increasingly ponderous repetition after 1968. See, for instance, K. P. Ivanov, Leninism and Foreign Policy of the USSR (Moscow: ca. 1971); and Mikhail I. Trush, Soviet Foreign Policy: Early Years (Moscow: ca. 1970). Numerous articles on the topic appeared in International Affairs (Moscow), the last of them being published in June 1987: Nikolai Yermoshkin, "Peaceful Coexistence: A Universal Norm of International Relations," International Affairs (Moscow) (1987:6): 71-78. See also Vilnis Sipols, Soviet Peace Policy, 1917-1939 (Moscow: 1988).

49. A. E. Bovin, Mirnoe sosushchestovnie: istoriia, teoriia, politika (Moscow: 1988); A. O. Chubarian, Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie: teoriia i praktika (Moscow: 1976).

50. "Lenin's Legacy," International Affairs (Moscow) (1990:5): 71-74.

51. Zagladin, Istoriia uspekhov i neudach sovetskoi diplomatii , 11.

52. Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics; the Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social Change (Cambridge, Mass.: 1959).

53. See, especially, Debo, Revolution and Survival and Survival and Consolidation; and Fiddick, Russia's Retreat from Poland .

54. The function of ideology in Soviet politics and foreign policy has received extensive coverage in European and American scholarship, much of it during the late 1960s. Opinion has varied widely. See the works discussed in Stephen White, "Ideology and Soviet Politics," in Ideology and Soviet Politics , ed. Stephen White and Alex Pravda (New York: 1988), 1-20, and in "Communist Ideology, Belief Systems, and Soviet Foreign Policy," in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy , ed. Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. (2d ed.; New York: 1980), 91-97. Also Jonathan Harris, Ideology and International Politics: An Introduction to Soviet Analysis (Pittsburgh: 1970).

55. Graeme Gill, The Origins of the Stalinist Political System (Cambridge: 1990), 172-98; and "Ideology and System-Building: The Experience under Lenin and Stalin," in Ideology and Soviet Politics , 59-82.

56. For ideology and Soviet international relations doctrine, see Teddy J. Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917-1930 (London and Beverly Hills, Calif.: 1979), 143-55.

57. For the inevitability of war and the dilemma of peaceful coexistence, see Frederic S. Burin, "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War," American Political Science Review 57 (1963): 334-54; and Light, Soviet Theory of International Relations , 209-215.

1. James W. Hulse, The Forming of the Communist International (Stanford, Calif.: 1964); Jules Humbert-Droz, L'origine de l'internationale com-muniste: de Zimmerwald à Moscou (Neuchâtel: 1968).

2. E. H. Carr's history of the Soviet Union is an encyclopedia of knowledge about the Communist International and about Bolshevik relations with the other national Communist parties. No other single work compares with it for comprehensiveness and detail: see The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (New York: 1950-53), vol. 3, chaps. 23, 25, 30, and 31; Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926 (New York: 1958-64), vol. 3, chaps. 27-28, 30-31, 35, 43, and 46; and, with Robert W. Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929 (New York: 1969-78), vol. 3, chaps. 66-72 and 76-81. The most nuanced and coherent study is Fernando Claudin's The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform (New York: 1975). The history of the Comintern was fully deployed by the followers of Trotsky in their struggle with Stalin and his supporters. The major Trotskyist work is Pierre Frank, Histoire de l'Internationale communiste, 1919-1943 (Paris: 1979). Trotsky's own account is to be found in The First Five Years of the Communist International (New York: 1945-53); and in Die Internationale Revolution und die Kommunistische Internationale (Berlin: 1929) and l'Internationale communiste après Lénine (Paris: 1930), which were published together as The Third International after Lenin (London: 1974).

3. The initial phase of the Comintern's development (1919-1928) has been the subject of several outstanding monographs, for example, the works of Hulse and Humbert-Droz, noted above; Lazitch and Drach-kovitch, Lenin and the Comintern (Stanford, Calif.: 1972); and Kermit McKenzie, Comintern and World Revolution, 1928-1943: The Shaping of Doctrine (London and New York: 1964).

4. Discussion of these contradictions has been a prominent feature of the scholarship of Euro-American critics of the Communist International. See, for example, Claudin, Communist Movement , 126. Soviet writers, including official historians of the Comintern, recognized them during perestroika . I. M. Krivoguz, in "Sud'ba i nasledie Kominterna," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1990:6): 9, expressed the view that the tragedy of the Comintern was to be found in the continual incongruence of its ideology and political strategies with historical reality, despite frequent attempts to adjust the former to the latter. F. I. Firsov, "Komintern: mekhanizm funktsionirovania," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1991:2): 37, stated that the "centralizing line'' of the Comintern did much harm at a time when there was "a decline in revolutionary activities in the capitalist countries, when the tasks of daily work were moving to the first priority, and when specific national conditions were consequently becoming more important."

5. " Left-Wing" Communism — An Infantile Disorder , April-May 1920: Lenin, CW , 31: 17-117.

6. "Theses on the Conditions of Admission to the Communist International," Alan Adler, ed., Theses, Resolutions, and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International (London and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 1980), 92-97; hereafter referred to as First Four Congresses . For their authorship, see John Riddell, ed., Workers of the World and Oppressed Peoples Unite! Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress, 1920 (New York: 1991), 1011-12; hereafter cited as Second Congress . Richard Lowenthal, in "The Rise and Decline of International Communism," Problems of Communism 12 (1963): 19-29, analyzes the conditions perceptively. Milorad Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch, "The Third International," in The Revolutionary Internationals, 1864-1943 , ed. Milorad M. Drachkovitch (Stanford, Calif.: 1966), 159-202, is uncompromisingly critical of the Bolshevik stamp Lenin and Zinoviev imprinted on the international movement.

7. This stage of development began in 1921 when the Third Congress elaborated on the "Twenty-one Conditions" in a lengthy "monster resolution," a set of theses entitled "Organizational Structure of the Communist Parties, the Methods and Content of their Work": See First Four Congresses , 234-61; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution , 3: 390. The second stage began in 1924-25 when the Fifth Congress, followed by the Fifth ECCI Plenum, decided in favor of the "Bolshevization'' of the national parties. The transformation culminated in 1928 when the Sixth Congress adopted an organizational statute, long in preparation, which codified and extended the changes of the previous years: See Jane Degras, ed., The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents (London and New York: 1956-65), 2: 464-71; hereafter cited as Communist International ; and McKenzie, Comintern and World Revolution , 31-35, 55-56.

8. As early as January 1921, Clara Zetkin, a member of the German delegation to the Second Congress, complained to Lenin regarding the authoritarian demeanor of the ECCI: "Sometimes they are overtly rude and interventionist while genuine knowledge of the situation is absent." Quoted in Firsov, "Komintern: mekhanizm funktsionirovania," 35.

9. For a list of early interventions, see Souvarine to French Communist Party, 28 September 1921, in Siegfried Bahne et al., eds., Archives de Jules Humbert-Droz (Dortrecht: 1970-81), vol. 1, no. 37. Also Branko Lazitch, "Two Instruments of Control by the Comintern: The Emissaries of the ECCI and the Party Representatives in Moscow," in The Comintern: Historical Highlights, Essays, Recollections, Documents , ed. Milorad M. Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch (New York: 1966), 45-65.

10. Carr, Foundations , 3: 128-29.

11. Geoff Eley, in "Reviewing the Socialist Tradition," presented at the symposium "The Crisis of Socialism in Eastern and Western Europe" held in Chapel Hill, N.C., in April 1990, pointed to the complexity of revolutionary possibilities in the years 1917-1923 in an effort to reconstruct the historical significance of the October Revolution in the wake of the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe.

12. Carr, Bolshevik Revolution , 3: 446.

13. Claudin, Communist Movement , 76-77.

14. A somewhat different sequence of stages is presented in Franz Borkenau's perceptive and caustic criticism of Comintern strategies of revolution—the CI as the instrument of revolution, as the tool of factional struggles within the RCP(B), and as the instrument of Russian foreign relations: See World Communism: A History of the Communist International (Ann Arbor, Mich.: 1962), 419.

15. Carr, Bolshevik Revolution , 3: 201.

16. Jules Humbert-Droz, De Lénine à Staline. Dix ans au service de l'internationale communiste, 1921-1931 (Neuchâtel: 1971), and, even more, the memoirs of Aino Kuusinen, Before and after Stalin: A Personal Account of Soviet Russia from the 1920s to the 1960s (London: 1974), are informative on matters of Comintern organizational apparatus and personnel. So too is Carr, Socialism in One Country , 3: 898-913. Branko Lazitch's Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern (rev. ed., Stanford, Calif.: 1986) contains over 700 biographies of Comintern figures. Vilem Kahan, "The Communist International, 1919-43: The Personnel of Its Highest Bodies," International Review of Social History 21 (1976): 151-85, verifies the names of Comintern participants. (CI records often did not list first names or pseudonyms).

17. Some of the initial activities and responsibilities of the Presidium are outlined in a letter from Boris Souvarine to the French Communist Party, 28 September 1921, in Archives de Jules Humbert-Droz , vol. 1, no. 37.

18. Geoff Eley, "Some Unfinished Thoughts on the Comintern," presented at the symposium "Fifty Years of the Popular Front," University of Michigan, November 1985.

19. Carr, Bolshevik Revolution , 3: 200-204.

20. Kuusinen to Humbert-Droz, 5 February 1923, Archives de Jules Humbert-Droz , vol. 1, no. 143.

21. The reprinting of those Comintern documents that were public when they originally appeared—theses, resolutions, manifestos, published statements, and open letters to national Communist parties—has been undertaken more widely in Europe and America than in the USSR. The Communist International , ed. Degras, is the fullest general collection of Comintern documents in English, or any language. There are more exhaustive collections of materials for specific congresses, such as John Rid-dell, ed., The German Revolution and the Debate on Soviet Power: Documents, 1918-1919. Preparing the Founding Congress (New York: 1986) and Founding the Communist International: Proceedings and Documents of the First Congress, March 1919 (New York: 1987), and of the Second Congress ; and Adler, ed., First Four Congresses . Vilem Kahan, in Bibliography of the Communist International (1919-1979) (Leiden and New York: 1990), lists more than 3,000 publications issued by the CI, including stenographic records and minutes, theses, resolutions, and manifestos of the world congresses and of plenary sessions of the ECCI. Included also are secondary publications concerning these meetings published between 1919 and 1979. The ECCI published two periodicals, Kommunisticheskii Internatsional , representing official views on current matters, and International Press Correspondence , which publicized news items of interest to the national Communist parties.

22. Some internal documents remained in national Communist party archives and in private collections, the most important being the Archives de Jules Humbert-Droz . Humbert-Droz was a founder of the Swiss Communist Party who attended the second and all subsequent congresses of the Comintern. As director of the Comintern's Latin Secretariat during the years 1921-1930, he carried out multiple confidential missions for the Comintern in France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The documents he retained are informative regarding the work of those parties, but they tell less about the particulars of policy formulation at the center. In this regard, his memoirs, De Lénine à Staline , are more interesting and valuable. From 1926 to 1928 he was a member of the ECCI Presidium and Political Secretarat. He aligned himself with the moderate opposition to Stalin, became a confidant of Bukharin's, and—after engaging in public self-criticism and supporting the Stalinist position—lived to tell about it: De Lénine à Staline , 284-86.

23. In his speech on the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution (November 1987), Mikhail Gorbachev stated that the "true history" of the CI had yet to be written: "We have to restore the truth about it. Despite all the fallacies and draw-backs in its actions, and however bitter could be the recalling of some of the pages of its history, the Comintern is part of the great past of our movement." See M. S. Gorbachev, Oktiabr i perestroika: revoliutsiia prodolzhaetsia (Moscow: 1987), 55.

Subsequently, the CPSU Central Committee adopted new procedures for the utilization of the Comintern archives, the purpose of which was to "help uproot Stalinism completely and restore and develop further Lenin's concept of the Communist movement." See Fridrikh J. Firsov, "What the Comintern Archives Will Reveal," World Marxist Review 32, 1 (1989): 52-57. A round-table discussion was held at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in June 1988 to undertake the reevaluation of the theoretical and political work of the Comintern and of Stalin's role in it. Much of the opinion expressed at this meeting displayed considerable professional-political discomfort regarding the task. Stalin was to be criticized fully. Zinoviev, Trotsky, and Bukharin were said to have played a somewhat positive role in the affairs of the ECCI; however, their mistakes, especially those of Trotsky, were not to be minimized. It was necessary, one contributor stated, "to keep the proper balance,'' and "Bukharin, of course, cannot be idealized." The project was to be undertaken by professional academics who knew the archives and who would produce a scientifically balanced judgment. If left to others, the rewriting of the history of the Comintern would become a witch-hunt. The Western social democratic interpretation, which condemned the Comintern completely, was to be opposed. It was, after all, the survival of social democracy as the dominant political force among the working classes of Western Europe that had "doomed Communists to the dogmatic-sectarian positions" characteristic of Stalinism: See "Nekotorye voprosy istorii Kominterna," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1989:2); quotations, 76-79.

With a few notable exceptions, which I discuss elsewhere in this work, the initial reevaluations of Comintern history published during perestroika did not reflect extensive "new political thinking" and are both historiographically and politically cautious. For instance, in B. N. Ponomarev, "Stranitsy deiatel'nosti Kominterna," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1989:2): 118-30, the famous academic historian, principal editor of some two hundred works, and a member of Brezhnev's Politburo, "share[d] his reminiscences" of the Comintern in which he had worked on the staff of the ECCI under Georgii Dimitrov in the years 1937-1943. He criticized Stalin but praised the Comintern for its "glorious past," calling it the "great school" for all Communists (119-20). In Krivoguz, "Sudba i nasledie Kominterna," 3-20, one of the official historians of the Comintern issued what was called "a newly improved, balanced view.'' He identified Bukharin as "a complex personality," who, though not without faults, was nevertheless a great Communist. He chronicled Stalin's mistakes, but praised the Comintern as the place where the masses of the world were organized for the struggle for democracy and social justice and against Fascism. I. N. Undasynov and Z. P. Iakhimovich, Kommunisticheskii Internatsional: dostizheniia, proschety, uroki (Moscow: 1990), relied on monographic literature published in the USSR in the 1960s and 1970s and was intended as a "popular short review" for a perestroika -era audience. It attempted to rescue the reputation of the Comintern by blaming Stalin, by characterizing Zinoviev, Trotsky, and Bukharin as dangerous confusionists, and by attributing the salvation of the international Communist movement to the genius of Lenin and those who faithfully followed his teaching.

24. Claudin, Communist Movement , 65-67.

25. First Four Congresses , 184-203, 274-99, 383-88.

26. Karl Radek, Der Kampf der Kommunistischen Internationale gegen Versailles und gegen die Offensive des Kapitals (Hamburg: 1923).

27. Carr, Bolshevik Revolution , 3: 449-50; Socialism in One Country , 3: 283-93, 490-95; Foundations , 3: 144-45; McKenzie, Comintern and World Revolution , 51-52.

28. "To the Fourth Congress of the Communist International," 4 November 1922, Lenin, CW , 33: 430-32.

29. Bukharin quoted in Sirotkin, "Ot grazhdanskoi voiny k grazhdanskomu miru," 380.

30. Carr, Bolshevik Revolution , 3: 443.

31. Moshe Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle (New York: 1968), first indicated the historical importance of these writings. V. I. Startsev, "Political Leaders of the Soviet State in 1922 and Early 1923," Soviet Studies in History 28 (1989-90): 5-40, chronicles the vicissitudes of Lenin's physical condition and demonstrates their impact on the struggle for succession among the RCP(B) leadership. For Lenin's reconceptualization of the postwar international situation, see Claudin, Communist Movement , 66-71.

32. "Better Fewer, but Better," 2 March 1923, Lenin, CW , 33: 487-502.

33. The concept of "achieving genuine communism" that emerged from Lenin's final writings is that of a long transition period, an entire historical epoch of a decade or two or more, during which the prerequisites for genuine Communism would develop. Lenin called these "civilization," by which he meant industrial technology and a culturally advanced and civic-minded population. See Lenin, "Better Fewer, but Better," CW , 33: 500-501; Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle , 108, 114; Stephen E Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938 (New York: 1975), 134-38; and Robert C. Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality (New York: 1973), 368-72.

34. "Better Fewer, but Better," Lenin, CW , 33: 500-502.

35. Report by Lenin to the Tenth Party Conference, 28 March 1921, CW , 32: 437.

36. L. N. Nezhinskii, "Vneshniaia politika sovetskogo gosudarstva v 1917-1921 godakh: kurs na 'mirovuiu revoliutsiu' ili na mirnoe sosushchestvovanie?" Istoriia SSSR (1991:6): 3-27.

37. For the incompetencies and failures of the CI, see Alexander Dallin, "The Soviet Union as a Revolutionary Power," in Perestroika: The Historical Perspective , ed. Catherine Merridale and Chris Ward (London and New York: 1991), 220-21, 224.

38. Theses and Resolutions of the Third Congress, 29 June-17 July 1921, Communist International 1: 255-56.

39. Speech by Lenin to the Fourth All-Russian Congress of Garment Workers, 6 February 1921, Lenin, CW , 32: 113-14; report by Lenin to the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 23 December 1921, Lenin, CW , 33: 145.

40. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern , 529-30.

41. Helmut Gruber, International Communism in the Era of Lenin: A Documentary History (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1967), 316.

42. Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921-1923 (Princeton, N.J.: 1963), 109-110.

43. Theses and Resolutions of the Third Congress, 29 June-17 July 1921, Communist International , 1: 230, 238, 242-43.

44. The premises on which "united fronts" were to be based were discussed at the Third Comintern Congress in June-July 1921. The strategy was adopted by the ECCI in December 1921. The "Theses on the United Front" were published by the Fourth Comintern Congress in November-December 1922. See First Four Congresses , 400-409.

45. For Radek's reports, see Dietrich Möller, Karl Radek in Deutschland: Revolutionär, Intrigant, Diplomat (Cologne: 1976), nos. 23, 28-29; also Warren Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist (Stanford, Calif.: 1970), 112-17.

46. For the theory and strategy of the "united front," see Claudin, Communist Movement , 145-53; Wolfgang Eichwede, Revolution und Internationale Politik: Zur kommunistischen Interpretation der kapitalistischen Welt, 1921-1925 (Cologne: 1971), 7-19; Frank, Histoire de l'Internationale Communiste , 223-29. F. I. Firsov, "K voprosu o taktike edinogo fronta v 1921-1924 gg," Voprosy Istorii KPSS (1987:10): 113-27, is based on materials in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. It was actually written in 1964, near the end of the Khrushchev thaw, by one of the leading official party specialists on Comintern history. The tone and approach are those of the confining Brezhnev conservative orthodoxy emerging at that time, rather than those of glasnost , which was emerging when it was finally printed.

47. Lenin quoted in Carr, Foundations , 3: 157.

48. Zinoviev quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution , 3: 420.

49. Theses and Resolutions of the Third Congress, 29 June-17 July, 1921, Communist International 1: 256.

50. Zinoviev and Stalin first associated social democracy with Fascism in January 1924 during the reaction against Socialist-Communist "united fronts from above" that took place in the wake of the abortive Communist revolution in Germany the previous November. Stalin stated at this time that "there had occurred a major shift of the petty bourgeois social-democratic forces to the side of counterrevolution, into the fascist camp." From this he concluded that the best tactic for the Comintern to adopt was "not a coalition with social democracy but lethal battle against it, as the pillar of fascisized power." See Firsov in ''Nekotorye voprosy istorii Kominterna," 89. At the Fifth Comintern Congress in June-July, the leadership of the Russian party led a chorus of denunciation that would last for years. Zinoviev: "The Fascists are the right hand and the Social Democrats are the left hand of the bourgeoisie." Stalin: "Social Democracy is objectively the moderate wing of Fascism. " See Claudin, Communist Movement , 152-53. The exact term social-fascism was first used in April 1929, in an editorial in Kommunisticheskii Internatsional , according to Firsov, "Nekotorye voprosy istorii Kominterna," 89.

51. Sirotkin, "Ot grazhdanskoi voiny k grazhdanskomu miru," 384; Lenin quoted in Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern , 534.

52. Chicherin quoted in S. Iu. Vygodskii, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, 1924-1929 (Moscow: 1963), 292. A well-documented monograph, Vygodskii's work reflected the Khrushchev thaw (1956-64) and the revitalization of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence at this time. It superseded the faithful Stalinist work on this period, A. A. Troianovskii, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, 1924-1926 (Moscow: 1945). And it is a bolder and livelier work than the diplomatic history done by party scholars during the Brezhnev-Suslov period that followed, for example, A. A. Gromyko and B. N. Ponomarev (eds.), Istoriia vneshnei politiki SSSR 1917-1980 (Moscow: 1980-81); English translation, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1980 (Moscow: 1981). Initial discussions concerning a replacement for this work, one that would be informed by the values of glasnost , took place in 1988. See "Kompleksnaia programma 'Istoriia vneshnei politiki SSSR i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii,'" Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1988:2): 63-81.

1. V. I. Lenin, The National Liberation Movement in the East (3d rev. ed.; Moscow: 1969). Stalin's writings on "the national and colonial question" actually predate those of Lenin: Demetrio Boersner, The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question 1917-1928 (Westport, Conn.: 1981), 32-58; hereafter cited as National and Colonial Question .

2. "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-determination: Theses," April 1916, Lenin, CW , 22: 150-52.

3. This point is stressed by R. A. Ulyanovskii in the preface to Ulyanovskii, ed. The Comintern and the East: The Struggle for the Leninist Strategy and Tactics in National Liberation Movements (Moscow: 1979), 6-9.

4. A. B. Reznikov, The Comintern and the East: Strategy and Tactics in the National Liberation Movement (Moscow: 1984), 50-51.

5. Boersner, National and Colonial Question , 38-39, 45.

6. Bukharin's statement to the Eighth Party Congress, March 1919: Boersner, National and Colonial Question , 62.

7. Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World (Chicago: 1979), 51-57.

8. "Theses on the National and Colonial Question" (original draft version), Lenin, CW , 31: 144-51.

9. A complete record of the deliberations of the Second Comintern Congress, including relevant reports, theses, and the stenographic record of the proceedings, has been published in Second Congress . In the 1970s, Soviet scholars reexamined the debate on "the national and colonial question" at the Second Congress on the basis of archival research: see A. B. Reznikov, Comintern and the East , 51-87.

10. Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton, N.J.: 1966), 12-24, offers a penetrating analysis of the issues debated at the Second Congress.

11. Minutes of the meeting of the Commission on the National and Colonial Questions, 25 July 1920, Second Congress , 865-66; also Roy's revised supplementary theses and report, 26 July 1920, Second Congress , 218-24.

12. For Roy's original draft supplementary theses, see Gangadhar M. Adhikari, ed., Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India (New Delhi: 1971), 1: 173-88.

13. Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, Comintern, India, and the Colonial Question, 1920-37 (Calcutta: 1980), 14-51, examines the Lenin-Roy debate from a close reading of the major and minor texts.

14. Stenographic record of debate, 28 July 1920, Second Congress , 227.

15. On this and other views on revolution in Asia expressed by Lenin at the congress, see his "Report on the National and Colonial Questions," Second Congress , 211-22.

16. Reznikov, Comintern and the East , 74-75.

17. Datta Gupta, Comintern, India, and the Colonial Question , 21-70, emphasizes the persistence with which Roy held to and developed the views he first expressed in embryonic form at the Second Comintern Congress.

18. Quoted in Stephen White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1920-1924 (London: 1979), 120.

19. Lenin's revised theses, adopted 28 July 1920, Second Congress , 283-90; Lenin's report on National and Colonial Questions," 26 July 1920, Second Congress , 213.

20. Second Congress , 846-55.

21. Trotsky quoted in Boersner, National and Colonial Question , 66.

22. Light, Soviet Theory of International Relations , 81-90.

23. See, for example, Donald M. Lowe, The Function of "China" in Marx, Lenin, and Mao (Berkeley, Calif.: 1966), 54-81. The exception is Stanley W. Page, whose thesis is that sometime in the summer or fall of 1919 "Lenin arrived at a concept regarding the course of world revolution differing radically from that which he had previously held." He became an ''Easterner" who believed that the revolution in Europe could not succeed unless and until it was preceded by revolution in Asia: "Lenin, Prophet of World Revolution from the East," Russian Review 11 (1952): 67-75; Lenin and World Revolution (New York: 1959), 143, 152; The Geopolitics of Leninism (Boulder, Colo. and New York: 1982), 167-68, 187-88.

24. A. B. Reznikov, "Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International in the National and Colonial Question," in R. A. Ulyanovskii, ed., Comintern and the East , 154-55; and Reznikov, Comintern and the East , 87.

25. "Report on the Tactics of the RCP" to the Third Congress of the Communist International, 5 July 1921, Lenin, CW , 32: 478-79, 481-82.

26. "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation,'" 30-31 December 1922, Lenin, CW , 36: 605-611.

27. Quoted in Ronald G. Suny, "Don't Paint Nationalism Red. National Revolution and Socialist Internationalism: The Comintern and the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East," paper delivered to the American Historical Association, December 1989, p. 29.

28. Appeal to the Muslims of Russia and the East, 3 December 1917: Basil Dmytryshyn and Frederick Cox, The Soviet Union and the Middle East: A Documentary Record of Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, 1917-1985 (Princeton, N.J.: 1987), 3-6; hereafter cited as Soviet Documents on the Middle East .

29. Suny, "Don't Paint Nationalism Red," 1-2.

30. Debo, Survival and Consolidation , 176-80; Lenin quoted, 177.

31. A. N. Kheifets, Sovetskaia Rossiia i sopredelnye strany Vostoka, 1918-1920 (Moscow: 1964), 135, 159-60.

32. Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation (Bloomington, Ind. and Stanford, Calif.: 1988), 207-219.

33. Seymour Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1968), 273-95; Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia (London: 1988), 148-66. Dov. B. Yaroshevski, "The Central Government and Peripheral Opposition in Khiva, 1910-24," in The USSR and the Muslim World: Issues in Domestic and Foreign Policy , ed. Yaacov Roi (London: 1984), utilizes Russian/Soviet archival sources.

34. Sultan Galiev quoted in Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism , 54-55.

35. Appeal to the peoples of the Middle East, September 1920: Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 7-15.

36. Stephen White, "Communism and the East: The Baku Congress, 1920, " Slavic Review 33 (1974): 491-514; hereafter "Baku Congress"; Suny, "Don't Paint Nationalism Red," 20-29.

37. White, "Baku Congress," 506-510.

38. Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism , 57.

39. Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921 (Princeton, N.J.: 1961-72), 3: 350-54.

40. For renunciation of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, 27 January 1918, see Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 244-46; for renunciation of all tsarist claims on Persia and the appeal for friendly relations, 26 June 1919, ibid., 246-49. Also Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927: A Study of Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan (Geneva: 1966), 160-67.

41. Trotsky to Lenin and Chicherin, 20 April 1920: Lev Trotskii, The Trotsky Papers, 1917-1922 , ed. Jan M. Meijer (The Hague: 1964-71), vol. 2, no. 522, p. 147; hereafter Trotsky Papers .

42. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations , 3: 262-67; Debo, Survival and Consolidation , 184-87.

43. M. I. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi Iran i Afganistan 1917-1933 (London: 1985). The author is a Soviet émigré historian.

44. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 65-66; Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism , 79-80, 218-19; Sepeher Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley, Calif.: 1966), 13-45.

45. Kuchik Khan quoted in Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia , 175. During the World War, Kuchik Khan had been armed and funded by the Germans and the Turks; he had purchased weapons from the troops of the defeated and retreating tsarist army in 1917; he had made previous contact with the Adalet and Hummet , the Bolshevik-leaning Azeri, and Persian communist organizations in Baku.

46. Trotsky quoted in Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia , 176.

47. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 69.

48. Trotsky to Chicherin, 4 June 1920: Trotsky Papers , vol. 2, nos. 556, 209.

49. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 68-69.

50. The Tehran government protested angrily. The NKID's reply was astutely employed by Chicherin to expose the complicity of Stalin and his group: Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 69-72.

51. Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism , 80.

52. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 68-69.

53. Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia , 177-81.

54. Stephen White, "Soviet Russia and the Asian Revolution, 1917-1924," Review of International Studies 10 (1984): 223-25.

55. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 75-81, 92-93; Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia , 182-88. For the treaty negotiations, see Debo, Survival and Consolidation , 368-71.

56. Treaty between Russian Socialist Republic and Persia, 26 February 1921: Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 262-63.

57. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 72.

58. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 95; Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia , 178-81; Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism , 80; Martin Sicker, The Bear and the Lion: Soviet Imperialism and Iran (New York: 1988), 45.

59. White, "Baku Congress," 512-13.

60. On Soviet-Afghan relations, see Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , and "First Steps in Soviet Diplomacy towards Afghanistan, 1917-21," in The USSR and the Muslim World , ed. Yaacov Roi, 215-25; Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History (Berkeley, Calif.: 1967) and Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century: Relations with the USSR, Germany, and Britain (Tucson, Ariz.: 1974); and Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia . The Soviet work is L. B. Teplinskii, Sovetsko-Afganskie otnosheniia, 1919-1987 (Moscow: 1988).

61. Curzon quoted in White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution , 91.

62. Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923 , 115.

63. Mark Jacobsen, "The Modernization of the Indian Army, 1925-1939," doctoral dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 1979, 119-33.

64. Volodarskii, "First Steps," 217.

65. Red forces isolated in Tashkent actually transmitted the texts by radio before the letters reached their destinations: Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 161-62.

66. Note on the establishment of diplomatic relations, 27 May 1919: Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 87-88.

67. First Soviet technological assistance to Afghanistan, 29 May 1920: Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 89.

68. Volodarskii, "First Steps," 218.

69. After having been one of the blank spots in Soviet history for decades, the life and career of Raskolnikov became the object of considerable attention during glasnost . See, for instance, V. K. Arkhipenko, "Fedor Raskolnikov" in Otkryvaia novye stranitsy: Mezhdunarodnye voprosy: sobytiia i liudi , ed. A. A. Iskenderov (Moscow: 1989), 309; also Branko Lazitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern (Stanford, Calif.: 1973), 331-32, 337.

70. Lenin quoted in Volodarskii, "First Steps," 218.

71. Treaty between Russian Socialist Federative Republic and Afghanistan, 28 February 1921: Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 90-94.

72. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 168.

73. Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia , 228-29.

74. Milan Hauner, What Is Asia to Us? Russia's Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today (Boston: 1990), 90.

75. Glenda Fraser, "Basmachi I," Central Asian Survey 6, 1 (1987): 1-73, and "Basmachi II," Central Asian Survey 6, 2 (1987): 7-42, utilizes British Foreign Office records of reports by special agents and informants on the scene to reconstruct the events of the basmachi rebellion in considerable detail. See also Alexandre A. Bennigsen et al., The Soviet Union and Muslim Guerrilla Wars, 1920-1981: Lessons for Afghanistan (Santa Monica, Calif.: 1981).

76. Enver quoted in Fraser, "Basmachi I," 58-59, and "Basmachi II," 37-38.

77. Quoted in Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 178.

78. Ibid., 180.

79. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 180-81.

80. Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1916 (Stanford, Calif.: 1969), 239-61.

81. Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia , 222, 238-39; Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 182.

82. Compare Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan , 237-38.

83. Peter Hopkirk, Setting the East Ablaze: Lenin's Dream of an Empire in Asia (London: 1984).

84. For the Comintern, M. N. Roy, and India, see Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkeley, Calif.: 1959), 21-81; Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Policy toward India: Ideology and Strategy (Cambridge, Mass.: 1974), 13-18; John Patrick Haithcox, Communism and Nationalism in India: M. N. Roy and Comintern Policy, 1920-1939 (Princeton, N.J.: 1971), 11-43; and M. N. Roy, M. N. Roy's Memoirs (Bombay and New York: 1964).

86. Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan , 235-36.

87. Donaldson, Soviet Policy toward India , 6-7.

88. Instructions to the Soviet Representative in Afghanistan, 3 June 1921: Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 95-98.

89. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 173-74.

90. Quoted in Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations , 3: 342.

91. For Afghan negotiations with Britain and Russia, see Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923 , 136-66.

92. Quoted in Tilak Raj Sareen, Russian Revolution and India: A Study of Soviet Policy towards the Indian National Movement, 1922-29 (New Delhi: 1978), 34-43; also Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India , 67-68, and Haithcox, Communism and Nationalism in India , 34-36.

93. White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution , 129.

1. Note from Chicherin to the Allied Powers, 18 October 1921, Soviet Documents , 1: 270-72. Chicherin's proposals were ratified by the Ninth Soviet Congress on 1 January 1922. In his report to the congress, he emphasized that the Russian government was not accepting the principle of war debt repayment but was, rather, offering an initial concession as a way of opening negotiations toward a comprehensive settlement with the Entente powers and the United States: Annual Report by the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for the Ninth Congress of Soviets (1920-1921), International Affairs (Moscow) (1990:2): 146. The Soviet government formally accepted the Allied invitation to a conference at Genoa on January 8: Note from Chicherin to the Supreme Allied Council, Soviet Documents , 1: 287-88.

2. Carole Fink, The Genoa Conference: European Diplomacy, 1921-1922 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: 1984), and Stephen White, The Origins of Détente: The Genoa Conference and Soviet-Western Relations, 1921-1922 (Cambridge and New York: 1985) both offer full narratives of the Genoa Conference and its antecedents based on admirable research. White focuses on relations between Russia and Europe, whereas Fink adopts an international/multinational approach. Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in 1922 , ed. Carole Fink, Axel Frohn, and Jurgen Heideking (Cambridge: 1991) incorporates the findings of an international group of scholars. Evgeny M. Chossudovsky's "Genoa Revisited: Russia and Coexistence," Foreign Affairs 50 (1972): 554-77, is an argument for détente written by a Soviet diplomat and senior member of the United Nations Secretariat.

3. Timothy Edward O'Connor, Diplomacy and Revolution: G. V. Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930 (Ames, Iowa: 1988), 80; hereafter cited as Chicherin .

4. The projects of German industry and Walter Rathenau's Russian policy are discussed in depth with precision and insight in Robert Himmer, "Rathenau, Russia, and Rapallo," Central European History 9 (1976): 146-83; Rathenau quoted, 171. See also Ernst Laubach, Die Politik der Kabinette Wirth 1921/22 (Lubeck: 1968), and Hélène Seppain, Contrasting US and German Attitudes to Soviet Trade, 1917-91: Politics by Economic Means (London: 1992), 32-54.

5. On the international consortium project, see Himmer, "Rathenau, Russia, and Rapallo," 154-58; White, Origins of Détente , 38-51, 71-72; and Fink, Genoa Conference , 101-105.

6. Lloyd George's Grand Design is revealed fully in Carole Fink, "European Politics and Security at the Genoa Conference of 1922," in German Nationalism and the European Response, 1890-1945 , ed. Carole Fink, Isabel V. Hull, and MacGregor Knox (Norman, Okla.: 1985), 136-37, 149, 151, and in Genoa Conference 191-97. Marc Trachtenberg has written that the readiness with which Lloyd George gave up on his Grand Design suggests that it may have been completely fatuous: See his review of Fink, Genoa Conference , in Journal of Modern History 58 (1986): 712. For the making of Britain's Genoa policy, see Andrew J. Williams, "The Genoa Conference of 1922: Lloyd George and the Politics of Recognition," in Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction , 29-47.

7. Widely discussed; see, in particular, Neil Harding, Lenin's Political Thought (New York: 1978), 2: 243-49.

8. Report by Lenin to the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 21 December 1920, in Lenin, CW , 31: 475; Report by Lenin to the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 23 December 1921, CW , 33: 146.

9. Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change (rev. ed.; New York: 1971), 213.

10. Zinovii S. Sheinis, "Polpred B. E. Stein," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1991:1): 101, 107.

11. Chicherin to Lenin, 24 October 1921, first published in Izvestiia Tsk KPSS (1990:4): 189-90.

12. Zinovii S. Sheinis, Maxim Litvinov (Moscow: 1990), 151-60.

13. Lenin quoted in Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929 , 3: 120.

14. For the Soviet negotiating stance, see report by Chicherin to the Central Executive Committee, 27 January 1922, Soviet Documents , 1: 291, and Chicherin's opening statement at Genoa, 10 April 1923, Soviet Documents , 1: 298-301. For Soviet strategy and preparations for Genoa, see Fink, Genoa Conference , 96-97; White, Origins of Détente , 107-109; O'Connor, Chicherin , 82-85; quotations from Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Lenin on Disarmament," Slavic Review 23 (1964): 512-13.

15. For Lenin's recommendation of Keynes, see Ia. G. Temkin, "Marksisty i patsifisty (Iz opyta vzaimootnoshenii)," Voprosy Istorii KPSS (1987:8): 67.

16. Stephen A. Schuker, "American Policy toward Debts and Reconstruction at Genoa, 1922," in Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction , 95-122.

17. Himmer, "Rathenau, Russia, and Rapallo," 161-64, 169-70; White, Origins of Détente , 76-77, 151, 153; Chicherin quoted, 76.

18. Pravda , 15 October 1921, 11 November 1921, 3 January 1922; Die Rote Fahne , 3 December 1921: reprinted in Möller, Karl Radek in Deutschland , nos. 24-27; also Marie-Luise Goldbach, Karl Radek und die deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen, 1918-1923 (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: 1973), 9-19, 109-116.

19. Anne Hogenhuis-Selverstoff, "French Plans for the Reconstruction of Russia: A History and Evaluation," in Fink, Frohn, and Heideking (eds.) Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction , 131-47.

20. For opposition to the Genoa project in Washington, Paris, and London, see Fink, Genoa Conference , 47-49, 82-87, 94, 97-100, 133-42; White, Origins of Détente , 68-70, 75-76, 83-94, 127-28.

21. For the major proposals and exchanges made during the Genoa Conference, see Allied Proposal to the Soviets, 15 April 1922, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 , ser. 1, v. 19, no. 74 (appendix); and Chicherin's letter, 20 April 1922, no. 81 (appendix); hereafter cited as DBFP .

22. The Cannes resolutions, 6 January 1922: DBFP , ser. 1, v. 19, no. 6. The London Experts Report, 28 March 1922: DBFP , ser. 1, v. 19, no. 56 (appendix).

23. Soviet memorandum, 20 April 1922, quoted in White, Origins of Détente , 172.

24. For divisions within the Soviet delegation, see White, Origins of Détente , 39, 106, 112-13, 169-73, 180-81.

25. For Soviet counterproposals, 24 April 1922, see Soviet Documents , 1: 301-303; DBFP , ser. 1, v. 19, no. 91 (annex). For Chicherin's continued efforts to sustain negotiations, Soviet Documents , 1: 306-18.

26. Speech by Lenin to Congress of Metalworkers, 6 March 1922, in Lenin, CW , 33: 220-23.

27. Startsev, "Political Leaders of the Soviet State in 1922 and Early 1923," 7-9, 11.

28. Trush, Soviet Foreign Policy , 195-97; Lenin quoted in White, Origins of Détente , 181 (emphasis in original).

29. Fink, Genoa Conference , 303.

30. White, Origins of Détente , 210-12.

31. For antagonisms within the Entente, see Fink, Genoa Conference , 123; White, Origins of Détente , 28, 206.

32. White, Origins of Détente , 88, 95-96.

33. Ibid., 43, 92-93.

34. Lenin quoted in Sheinis, Litvinov , 158.

35. Press interview given by Chicherin, Observer , 20 August 1922, in Soviet Documents , 1: 328-29.

36. For the draft of the telegram submitted by Lenin to the Politburo on 9 May and sent to Genoa, see Trush, Soviet Foreign Policy , 196.

37. Sheinis, Litvinov , 175.

38. Resolution of the Central Executive Committee, 17 May 1922: Soviet Documents , 1: 318-20. In the writings of party historians during the 1960s, the Rapallo relationship became an example of the benefits the Federal Republic of Germany could gain from closer relations with the USSR: See George Ginsburgs, "The Theme of Rapallo in Post-War Soviet-West German Relations," Soviet Union/Union Soviétique 13 (1986): 357-66. Documents on the origins of the relationship were compiled from the archives of both the USSR and the German Democratic Republic: German Democratic Republic. Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR. Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen von den Verhandlungen in Brest-Litowsk bis zum Abschluss des Rapallovertrages; Dokumentensammlung (Berlin: 1967-71).

39. For a to-the-point discussion of "the Rapallo legend" and of the significance of the treaty for German foreign relations, see Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic (London and Boston: 1988), 172-74; also the highly nuanced discussion of the sources of German Rapallo policy in John Hiden, Germany and Europe 1919-1939 (2d ed.; London and New York: 1993), 111-17. On German diplomacy, see the works discussed in Kolb, especially Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Rapallo—Strategy in Preventative Diplomacy: New Sources and New Interpretations," in Volker R. Berghahn and Martin Kitchen, eds., Germany in the Age of Total War (London: 1981), 123-46, and Peter Krüger, "A Rainy Day, April 1922: The Rapallo Treaty and the Cloudy Perspective for German Foreign Policy," in Fink, Frohn, and Heideking, Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction , 49-64.

40. Startsev, "Political Leaders," 11-30.

41. Hugh D. Phillips, Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov (Boulder, Colo.: 1992), 71-85.

42. Phillips, Between the Revolution and the West , 73; compare Jiri Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938 (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1984), 31-33.

43. Sheinis, Litvinov , 182-83.

44. Ibid., 183-84.

45. Hodgson to Gregory, 29 September 1921, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 20, no. 427.

46. During the Khrushchev thaw Chicherin's reputation was rescued by Andrei Gromyko from the oblivion to which it had been consigned during the Stalin era. His articles and speeches from the 1920s were published as Georgii Chicherin, Stati i rechi po voprosam mezhdunarodnoi politiki (Moscow: 1961), and two biographies were commissioned—S. V. Zamitskii and A. N. Sergeev, Chicherin (Moscow: 1966), and I. Gorokhov, L. Zamiatin, and I. Zemskov, G. V. Chicherin—Diplomat leninskoi shkoly (Moscow: 1966). Nevertheless, Timothy O'Connor's Chicherin is unsurpassed; and Evgeny M. Chossudovsky, "Lenin and Chicherin: The Beginnings of Soviet Foreign Policy and Diplomacy," Millennium 3 (1974): 1-16, remains a valuable contribution.

47. Gorokhov, Zamiatin, and Zemskov, Chicherin , 23.

48. Mikoian quoted in Sheinis, Litvinov , 152.

1. Curzon quoted in Stephen White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution (London: 1979), 85-86.

2. Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations (Princeton, N.J.: 1961-73), 3: 397-453, is effectively supplemented by Debo, Survival and Consolidation , 248-71, 314-19, and 328-37, particularly with regard to the formulation of Soviet policy, and by Timothy O'Connor, The Engineer of Revolution: L. B. Krasin and the Bolsheviks, 1870-1926 (Boulder, Colo.: 1992), regarding relations between Krasin, who negotiated the treaty, and Lenin, Chicherin, Litvinov, and Kamenev.

3. Quoted in White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution , 91.

4. Curzon quoted in White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution , 86-87. For face-to-face negotiations between the British and Soviet delegations, 31 May-7 June, 29 June, and 21 December, see DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 8, chaps. 3, 6, and 15. Notes were exchanged on 30 June and 7 July 1920; additional notes were dispatched from Curzon to Chicherin on 1 and 9 October; and there was a final exchange of notes on 4 and 25 February 1921. The texts of these notes, which were made public at the time, are not reprinted in Documents on British Foreign Policy , for which see DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 12, 679-82. Narrative in Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations , 3: 399-401, 427-30, 443-44.

5. Text reprinted in Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations , 3: 474-78.

6. Also reprinted in Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations , 3: 479-82.

7. Debo, Survival and Consolidation , 317.

8. Quoted in White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution , 104.

9. Note to Soviet Government, 7 September 1921, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 20, no. 414.

10. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations , 3: 265-314.

11. Christopher M. Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (New York: 1986), 262, 273; and Christopher M. Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: 1990), 76-79.

12. "Memorandum by Earl Curzon on the Krasin Negotiations," ca. 14 February 1921, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 12, no. 835; Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations , 3: 445-46.

13. Hopkirk, Setting the East Ablaze , chaps. 1-6.

14. Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service , 277, 280.

15. "Reply from Litvinov to Curzon's Note Alleging Soviet Violations of the Anglo-Russian Treaty," Soviet Documents , 1: 257-62.

16. Draft reply to the Soviet government, 27 October 1921, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 20, no. 347. As a result of this incident the organizational structure of British intelligence was changed, and the procedures for interpreting intelligence were reformed: Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service , 280-85; White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution , 104-109.

17. Moscow Treaty between the Russian Socialist Republic and Persia, 26 February 1921, Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 262; treaty between the Russian Socialist Federative Republic and Afghanistan, 28 February 1921, Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 90.

18. Instructions to the Soviet Representative in Afghanistan, 3 June 1921, Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 97.

19. Stephen White, "Soviet Russia and the Asian Revolution, 1917-1924," Review of International Studies 10 (1984): 220-21; "Baku Congress," 504.

20. Lenin and Kamenev voted in favor of Chicherin's request; Molotov abstained; Zinoviev was absent: "From the Party Archives," Izvestiia TsK KPSS 1990, no. 4, p. 181.

21. Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service , 291-92.

22. Mikhail I. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi Iran i Afganistan, 1917-1933 (London: 1985), 87.

23. John D. Gregory quoted in White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution , 157-58. Gregory's memoirs, On the Edge of Diplomacy: Rambles and Reflections, 1902-1928 (London: 1929), are not revealing on matters of policy formulation.

24. Curzon to Hodgson, 2 May 1921, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 25, no. 53.

25. Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service , 292-93.

26. Hodgson to Curzon, 10 May 1923, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 25, no. 60.

27. Hodgson to Curzon, 13 May 1923, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 25, no. 68.

28. Hodgson to Curzon, 13 May 1923, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 25, no. 67.

29. For Curzon's meeting with Krasin, 17 May 1923, see DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 25, no. 72; O'Connor, Engineer of Revolution , 275-76.

30. Gregory to Krasin, 29 May 1923, DBFP , ser. 1 vol. 25, no. 80.

31. Krasin to Curzon, 9 June 1921, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 25, no. 94. Chicherin made one exception. He refused to withdraw Raskolnikov and Shumiatskii—even when offered ingenious face-saving measures by the Foreign Office. He regarded this demand as an unacceptable infringement on the fight of the Soviet government to control the conduct of its foreign relations. Shumiatskii remained at his post in Tehran. Raskolnikov, against whom the most serious charges contained in the ultimatum were made, was not recalled officially, but he was transferred to another post: Memorandum from Curzon to Krasin, 13 June 1923, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 25, no. 100.

32. White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution , 168.

33. Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service , 296, citing intercepts by British intelligence.

34. Trotsky to Chicherin, 4 June 1920, Trotsky Papers , vol. 2, no. 556, p. 209.

35. Chicherin quoted in Fiddick, Russia's Retreat from Poland , 51.

36. For Lenin's mediation of the disagreement between Krasin and Chicherin, see Debo, Survival and Consolidation , 315-19, 328-33; Chicherin quoted on 329.

37. Chicherin quoted in Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations , 3: 427, citing an intercept by British intelligence.

38. Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism , 75-77.

39. Ibid., chap. 4.

40. Bennigsen, Soviet Strategy and Islam (New York: 1989), 8-22.

41. This is the central conclusion of Stephen White's research on the topic; see especially his ''Soviet Russia and the Asian Revolution."

42. The treaties are reproduced in Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 90-94, 260-71, and 473-80.

43. White, "Soviet Russia and the Asian Revolution"; Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution , 134-38.

44. Tareq Y. Ismael and Rifa 'at El-Sa'id, The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-1988 (Syracuse, N.Y.: 1990), 12-31; Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954 (Princeton, N.J.: 1987), 140-54.

45. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations , 3: 377-85.

46. Ibid., 3: 388.

47. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 102-106.

48. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, N.J.: 1982), 118-48; Werner Zurrer, Persien zwischen England und Russland 1918-1925: Grossmachteinflusse und nationaler Wiederaufstieg am Beispiel des Iran (Bern: 1978), 368-99.

49. Kemal quoted in Alexander N. Kheifets, Sovetskaia Rossiia i sopredelnye strany Vostoka v gody grazhdanskio voiny, 1918-1920 (Moscow: 1964), 135. This work and the author's Sovetskaia diplomatiia i narody Vostoka, 1921-1927 (Moscow: 1968) were researched during the Khrushchev thaw and based on the party's archives in Moscow, Baku, Tashkent, Irkutsk, and elsewhere, on the NKID archives, the military archives, and the Central State Archive of the October Revolution—as well as on contemporary published sources and the memoirs of Soviet diplomats. Both works carefully trace the development of Soviet foreign policy toward the Asian districts of the former Tsarist Empire and the neighboring countries of Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Mongolia, and China.

50. Kheifets, Sovetskaia Rossiia i sopredel'nye strany Vostoka , 139.

51. Ibid., 168.

52. Ibid., 164-66.

53. White, "Soviet Russia and the Asian Revolution," 227-29.

54. Datta Gupta, Comintern, India, and the Colonial Question , 45-70; Reznikov, Comintern and the East , 93-103, 242-43.

55. This analysis follows Boersner, National and Colonial Question , chap. 5, who uses the words Eastern and Western to refer to nationalist revolutions and proletarian revolutions, respectively.

56. Boersner, National and Colonial Question , 141-42.

57. Izvestiia quoted in R. A. Mirovitskaia, Sovetskii Soiuz v strategii Gomindana (20-30-e gody) (Moscow: 1990), 214-15.

58. On the origins of Soviet-Chinese diplomatic relations, see Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924 (New York: 1953), 131-235.

59. V. V. Sokolov, "Polpred v Kitae Lev Karakhan," in Otkryvaia novye stranitsy. Mezhdunarodnye voprosy: sobytiia i liudi , ed. A. A. Iskenderov (Moscow: 1989), 208. The author is director of the Archives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although he gives no references, his work obviously draws on archival transcripts from the 1920s.

60. Lee Feigon, Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party (Princeton, N.J.: 1983), 137-65.

61. Arif Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism (New York: 1989), 149-51, 191-95, 201-8.

62. Feigon, Chen Duxiu , 170-71.

63. C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1989), 27-28, 50; hereafter cited as Soviet Advisers .

64. "ECCI Resolution on the Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang," 12 January 1923, and "ECCI Instructions to the Third Congress of the Chinese Communist Party," May 1923: The Communist International 2: 5-6, 25-26.

65. Hans J. van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade: The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927 (Berkeley, Calif.: 1991), 123-26, 130, 134-36; V. I. Glunin, "The Comintern and the Rise of the Communist Movement in China, 1920-1927," in R. A. Ulyanovskii, ed., The Comintern and the East (Moscow: 1979), 280-344.

66. Mirovitskaia, Sovetskii Soiuz v strategii Gomindana , 22-23. This work by a veteran scholar and member of the Institute of the Far East demonstrates the full impact of "the new political thinking" of the Gorbachev-Shevardnaze era on the academic study of Sino-Soviet relations. The author utilizes both Chinese Nationalist and Communist historiography, deals evenhandedly with both movements, and renders balanced judgments. One axiom of the study is that the GMD was of revolutionary value, just as was the CPC, the former being referred to as "a party of the new type" (21)-a term normally reserved in Soviet historiography for Communist parties with strict "revolutionary discipline" and "democratic centralism.'' A second axiom is that "national interests" can be distinguished from "class relations," that they are worthy of investigation, and that it may be progressive to pursue the former as well as to conduct the latter (3-20).

67. Chicherin to Sun Yat-sen, 21 August 1921, quoted in Mirovitskaia, Sovetskii Soiuz v strategii Gomindana , 23.

68. Mirovitskaia, Sovetskii Soiuz v strategii Gomindana , 45, 47.

69. Wilbur and How, Soviet Advisers , 60-62.

70. Taiwanese historiography emphasizes Sun Yat-sen's drive to create a political party and organs of state power independently of the inspiration of the Russian Revolution and the urgings of Soviet advisers: See Mirovitskaia, Sovetskii Soiuz v strategii Gomindana , 31.

71. In Soviet Advisers , Wilbur and How have reconstructed the history of the Soviet aid mission in south China from primary documents—chiefly, but not exclusively, those seized by the Beijing police during the raid on the Soviet embassy compound in April 1927. The discussion of Soviet activities in China that I present here depends on their account and on the eighty-one documents printed in their work. The memoirs of numerous Soviet advisers were published in the 1960s and 1970s as part of the Soviet anti-Maoist campaign of that time. Some have been translated into English, including those of A. V. Blagodatov, A. I. Cherepanov, S. A. Dalin, M. I. Kasanin, V. M. Primakov, and Vera Vladimirovna Vishnyakova-Akimoval. Some of these, as well as the memoirs of other advisers, appear in Y. V. Chudodeyev, ed., Soviet Volunteers in China, 1925-1945; Articles and Reminiscences (Moscow: 1980).

72. For a brief period during 1926, two other officers substituted for Bliukher—first Nikolai Kuibyshev, formerly commandant and commissar of Kronshtadt (1922-23) and assistant commander of the Turkistan Front (1925-26), who was the brother of Valerain Kuibyshev, and then V. A. Stepanov. In China, Kuibyshev was code-named "Kisanka" (literally, "Pussycat").

73. Mirovitskaia, Sovetskii Soiuz v strategii Gomindana , 39.

74. Lydia Holubnychy, Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-1925 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: 1979) utilizes published Comintern documents and the works of Soviet historians with access to archival sources in the USSR; Dan N. Jacobs, Borodin: Stalin's Man in China (Cambridge, Mass.: 1981) is also based on published Comintern documents as well as on contemporaneous accounts, both Euro-American and Soviet.

75. Mirovitskaia, Sovetskii Soiuz v strategii Gomindana , 50, citing unpublished reports by Borodin and the published memoirs of A. I. Cherepanov.

76. Y. V. Chudodeyev, "Soviet Volunteers in the Chinese Revolution and War of Liberation," in Soviet Volunteers in China, 9.

77. Mirovitskaia, Sovetskii Soiuz v strategii Gomindana , 28-29, citing data in the possession of historians at the Institute for the History of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in Urga.

78. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia , 37-43, analyzes the relative importance of Europe and the various regions of Asia in Comintern grand strategy.

79. Nine articles were published in 1923; eighteen in 1924; ninety-five in 1925: See Heng-yü Kuo, Die Komintern und die Chinesische Revolution: Die Einheitsfront zwischen der KP Chinas und der Kuomintang 1924-1927 (Paderborn, Germany: 1979), 296-300.

80. Compare Boersner, National and Colonial Question , 180-81, who maintains that by the time of the Fifth Congress the strategic concept of the Comintern had undergone a complete reorientation from one aimed at the proletarians of Europe to one directed at the democratic nationalists of Asia.

1. In the historical scholarship on early Soviet foreign relations, works on relations between Russia and Germany predominate. Germany was important both to the revolutionary expectations of the Bolsheviks and to their efforts to break out of diplomatic and commercial isolation. But Germany did not have the singular importance one might assume from the large number of works devoted to Soviet-German relations listed in Robert H. Johnston, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1918-1945: A Guide to Research and Research Materials (Wilmington, Del.: 1991), 155-60. The accessibility of archival sources from Germany before similar sources became available in England, France, and Russia permitted an extensive investigation of Soviet-German relations. A significant portion of the work of E. H. Carr for this period is devoted to Soviet-German relations, for example, The Interregnum, 1923-1924 (New York: 1954), chaps. 5, 7, 9, and Socialism in One Country , 3: 46-62. Martin Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik: Stresemanns Russlandpolitik in der Locarno Ära (Bremen: 1971), 29-42, achieved a breakthrough toward a fuller understanding of both Soviet and German policy. Gunter Rosenfeld's Sowjetrussland und Deutschland, 1917-1922 and Sowjetunion und Deutschland, 1922-1933 (Cologne: 1984) are based on archival sources in the former Soviet Union and the former German Democratic Republic and on printed sources published in German, Russian, and English. Although the work utilizes "bourgeois" as well as "socialist" scholarship, it sustains a pervasive Marxist-Leninist interpretation. The Soviet work in the field is A. A. Akhtamzian, Rapallskaia politika: sovetsko-germskie diplomatichoskie otnosheniia v 1922-1932 gg (Moscow: 1974). The author's glasnost-era publications based on unpublished archival materials are significant contributions to scholarship: "Sovetsko-Germanskie ekonomicheskie otnosheniia v 1922-1932 gg,'' Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1988:4): 42-56, and "Voennoe sotrudnichestvo SSSR i Germanii v 1920-1933 gg," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1990:5): 3-24.

2. Kurt Rosenbaum, Community of Fate: German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1922-1928 (Syracuse, N.Y.: 1965) demonstrates the personal relationship between Brockdorff and Chicherin. So too does Timothy Edward O'Connor, Diplomacy and Revolution: G. V. Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930 (Ames, Iowa: 1988), 95-96 (hereafter cited as Chicherin ).

3. Brockdorff-Rantzau quoted in Valeri A. Shishkin, "The USSR and Western Countries in the Mid-1920s. An Experience of Political and Economic Relations in Connection with de jure Recognition," in Contact or Isolation? ed. John Hiden and Aleksander Loit (Stockholm: 1991), 110.

4. The torture of Krestinskii was established juridically in 1957 during "the Khrushchev thaw," but it was revealed publicly in the USSR only during glasnost : See N. V. Popov, "Byl i ostaius' kommunistom," in Otkryvaia novye stranitsy , ed. Akhmed A. Iskenderov (Moscow: 1989), 244-51.

5. Helmut Grieser, "Die Rapallo-Politik in sowjetischer Sicht: Zur Beurteilung der deutschen Aussenpolitik 1922-1932 in der zeitgenöss-ischen sowjetischen Presse," in Historisch-politische Streiflichter: Geschichtliche Beiträge zur Gegenwart , ed. Kurt Jürgensen and Reimer Hansen (Neumünster: 1971), 159-68; and Die Sowjetpresse über Deutschland in Europa 1922-1932. Revision von Versailles und Rapallo-Politik in sowjetischer Sicht (Stuttgart: 1970). Also, Klaus Hildebrand, Das Deutsche Reich und die Sowjetunion im internationalen System, 1918-1932. Legitimität oder Revolution? (Wiesbaden: 1977), 9-15.

6. On the Ruhr occupation, see the works of Denise Artaud, Jacques Bariety, Walter McDougall, Charles Maier, Hermann Rupieper, Stephen Schuker, and Marc Trachtenberg discussed in Jon Jacobson, "Strategies of French Foreign Policy after World War I," Journal of Modern History 55 (1983): 82-83, 89. Contemporary Soviet reactions are explained in Eichwede, Revolution und Internationale Politik , 154-75.

7. For the Central Executive Committee's condemnation of the Ruhr occupation, 13 January 1923, see Soviet Documents , 1: 368-70. For the Soviet warning to Poland, see Izvestiia , 21 January 1923, in Xenia Eudin and Harold H. Fischer, eds., Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford, Calif.: 1957), no. 55. For the possibility of renewed intervention, see press interview by Chicherin in Manchester Guardian , 24 December 1923, Soviet Documents , 1: 422. For the report on the Soviet diplomatic offensive, see speech by Kamenev to the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR, SRW , no. 78. See Wolfgang Ruge, Die Stellungsnahme der Sowjetunion gegen die Besetzung des Ruhrgebiets: zur Geschichte der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen von Januar bis September 1923 (Berlin: 1962), 32-59, for the fullest scholarly discussion.

8. For the "German October," see Angress, Stillborn Revolution , chaps. 11-13, especially 394-405 (decision and preparation), 319, 365-69 (hesitations of Radek and Brandler), and 417-20 (military provisions).

9. This was the objective of the "Schlageter line" strategy devised by Radek and presented to the Third ECCI Plenum on 12 June 1923: See Möller, Karl Radek in Deutschland , no. 31. Discussion in Angress, Stillborn Revolution , 327-50; Eichwede, Revolution und Internationale Politik , 38-52; and Warren Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist (Stanford, Calif.: 1970), 119-23.

10. Angress, Stillborn Revolution , 378, 398.

11. Kuusinen, Before and after Stalin , 63.

12. Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology , 159-60, and "Russia and Europe," 64-66.

13. The apology was made for a raid by the Berlin police on the Soviet Trade Delegation in May 1924—"the Bozenhardt incident": See Rosenbaum, Community of Fate , 87-112; O'Connor, Engineer of Revolution , 281-86.

14. For British recognition, see Resolution of the Second Congress of Soviets, 2 February 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 422-23; for the note from Rakovskii to MacDonald, 8 February 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 426-27; for interview by Litvinov in Pravda , 14 February 1924, Soviet Documents , 427-29; and Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Precarious Truce: Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1924-27 (Cambridge and New York: 1977), 7-13.

15. Shishkin, "The USSR and Western Countries," 109.

16. For the de jure recognitions of 1924, see Carr, Interregnum , 243-53.

17. Francis Conte, Un révolutionnaire-diplomate: Christian Rakovski. L'Union soviétique et l'Europe, 1922-1941 (Paris and New York: 1978), credits Rakovskii's "personal skill" with winning for the USSR the maximum concessions possible in the negotiations with both Britain and France. The English translation of Conte's work— Christian Rakovski (1873-1941): A Political Biography (Boulder, Colo. and New York: 1989)—"does not do justice to the competent analysis of the original French version," as Michael Carley has stated in a review published in International History Review 12 (1990): 604. Gus Fagan, ed., Christian Rakovsky: Selected Writings on Opposition in the USSR 1923-30 (London: 1980), 35-45, briefly sketches Rakovskii's career as a diplomat as well as his role in Bolshevik intraparty politics. Rakovskii was the number-two man in the Trotsky opposition, and he spoke for Trotsky at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927. For sixty years thereafter his name was expunged from the record of Soviet foreign relations. This situation began to change in May 1988 at a discussion of Soviet history of the 1920s held under the auspices of the leading Soviet historical journal, Voprosy istorii . There V. A. Shishkin, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, stated that the reinclusion of Rakovskii in the history of Soviet diplomacy would be one of the most significant steps that could be taken toward ending the prolonged depersonalization ( obezlichivanie ) of the history of Soviet foreign policy. A move in this direction was taken by Dimiter Stanischev, in "Khristian Rakovsky: His Life and Work," International Affairs (Moscow) (1989:1): 90-95. Written by the secretary of the CC of the Bulgarian Communist Party, this work is a glasnost -era tribute to "an honest and selfless man, a well-educated Marxist devoted to the cause of the revolution, an associate of Lenin in the bitter struggle to found, consolidate, and develop the Soviet state." See also N. A. Paniev, "Bolgarskii revoliutsioner i sovetskii polpred," in Otkryvaia novye stranitsy , ed. A. A. Iskenderov (Moscow: 1989), 278-80.

18. For Chicherin's telegram to Paris welcoming recognition by France, 28 October 1924, see Soviet Documents , 1: 473-75. The archives of the French Foreign Ministry have yet to be used extensively for the study of Franco-Soviet relations during the 1920s, but see Michael Jabara Carley, "From Revolution to Dissolution: The Quai d'Orsay, the Banque Russo-Asiatique, and the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1917-1926," International History Review 12 (1990): 721-61. Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Les relations franco-soviétiques, 1917-1924 (Paris: 1981) argues that French policy was inspired by considerations of grand diplomatic strategy—the fear of a German-Russian alliance and an unwillingness not to follow the British lead—rather then by economic interests. Similarly, Kalervo Hovi, "The French Alliance Policy 1917-1927: A Change of Mentality," in Contact or Isolation? ed. Hiden and Loit, 93-99, contends that anti-Bolshevik ideology was not an important consideration in French foreign policy after the autumn of 1920, policymakers being overcome by a concern for security against Germany.

19. Stuart R. Schram, "Christian Rakovskij et le premier rapprochement franco-soviétique," Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique 1 (1960): 214-17; hereafter cited as "Rapprochement franco-soviétique."

20. Schram, "Rapprochement franco-soviétique," 230.

21. Report by Stalin at the Central Committee Courses for Secretaries of Uezd Party Committees, 17 June 1924, in Josef Stalin, Works (Moscow: 1952), 6: 248.

22. For the Anglo-Soviet Conference, 14 April-12 August 1924, see DBFP , ser. 1, v. 25, ch. 3. For the speech by Rakovskii, 14 April 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 441-47; for press interviews by Rakovskii, 26 April and 1 June 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 449-52; for the draft text of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, 8 August 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 453-59, and DBFP , ser. 1, v. 25, no. 293. Also, Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 13-32; Conte, Rakovski , 120-32; David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London: 1977), 361-63; and Shishkin, "The USSR and Western Countries," 106-107.

23. This is the standard interpretation. Compare the counterargument in Andrew J. Williams, Labour and Russia: The Attitude of the Labour Party to the USSR, 1924-34 (Manchester and New York: 1989), 13-16, which states that MacDonald did attach great importance to the meetings; he truly was busy with other duties, and Ponsonby was the best-suited person with whom to entrust the work of the conference.

24. Speech by Chicherin to the special plenary session of the Moscow Soviet, 20 August 1924, SRW , no. 94; report by Chicherin to the Central Executive Committee, 18 October 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 466.

25. For the Dawes Plan, see Jon Jacobson, "The Reparation Settlement of 1924," in Konsequenzen der Inflation , ed. Gerald D. Feldman et al. (Berlin: 1989), 79-108.

26. Jürgen Spenz, Die diplomatische Vorgeschichte des Beitritts Deutsch-lands zum Völkerbund, 1924-1926. Ein Beitrag zur Aussenpolitik der Weimarer Republik (Göttingen, Berlin, Frankfurt, Zürich: 1966), 33-34; Christoph M. Kimmich, Germany and the League of Nations (Chicago: 1976), 54-61.

27. Report by Chicherin to the Central Executive Committee, 18 October 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 463.

28. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald , 364-78. Allegedly under pressure from the left wing of the Labour Party, MacDonald persuaded the attorney general to drop the charges lodged under the Incitement to Mutiny Act against J. R. Campbell, the temporary editor of the official organ of the British Communist Party (CPGB), the Worker's Weekly . Campbell had allowed publication of an article calling on soldiers in the British army to let it be known that they would not turn their guns on their fellow workers in case of either a foreign war or a class war at home.

29. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald , 381-89.

30. Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service , 298-313, suggests that the published letter was a composite of leaks from a genuine original authored by Zinoviev, and that its publication was an effort by Tory diehards within the intelligence community to bring down the Labour government, which it considered soft on Communism and a threat to the intelligence service itself.

31. The case for forgery is put forth most fully in Lewis Chester, Stephen Fay, and Hugo Young, The Zinoviev Letter (Philadelphia: 1968), with significant emendations by Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Other "Zinoviev Letters": New Light on the Mismanagement of the Affair , Slavic and Soviet Series, no. 3, Russian and East European Research Center of Tel-Aviv University, 1976. According to this explanation, the letter was manufactured by a group of White Russian émigrés in Berlin and fed to the Foreign Office through the efforts of some members of the Central Office of the Conservative Party and of the Special Intelligence Service. No one in the Foreign Office regarded it as having any special significance except for Eyre Crowe, who took an extraordinary interest in the document. Being critical of the Russia policy of the Labour government and knowing that the Daily Mail was about to publish the letter, Crowe released it to the press before its authenticity could be confirmed or denied by the Soviet government and without clear authorization from MacDonald, who was slow to recognize the impact it would have on the electoral campaign. A thorough criticism of the forgery thesis, and an attempted exoneration of Crowe, is to be found in Sybil Crowe, "The Zinoviev Letter: A Reappraisal," Journal of Contemporary History 10 (1975): 407-432.

32. Note from Rakovskii to MacDonald, 25 October 1925, Soviet Documents , 1: 471-73; NKID reply to British note, 27 October 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 473; note from Rakovskii to Chamberlain, 28 November 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 477-80; interview by Chicherin, Pravda , 22 March 1928, Soviet Documents , 2: 296-99.

33. Notes from Chamberlain to Rakovskii, 21 November 1924, DBFP , ser. 1, v. 25, nos. 266, 267. For the official position of the British government on the "Zinoviev letter," see Foreign Office memorandum, 11 November 1924, DBFP , ser. 1, v. 25, no. 264.

34. For the Chamberlain-Herriot meeting, see memorandum by Chamberlain, 5 December 1924, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 26, no. 608. For other contemporaneous Anglo-French conversations, see Clemens A. Wurm, Die französische Sicherheitspolitik in der Phase der Umorientierung 1924-1926 (Frankfurt a.M., Bern, and Las Vegas: 1979), 218.

35. Kuusinen, Before and after Stalin , 51.

36. Report by Chicherin to the Central Executive Committee, 18 October 1924, Soviet Documents , 1: 461, 465-67.

37. Jon Jacobson, "Is There a New International History of the 1920s?" American Historical Review 88 (1983): 643-45.

38. Indeed, because Chamberlain was careful to keep London's relations with Moscow formally correct, the NKID was unable to find direct evidence that the British government had undertaken a policy hostile to the Soviet Union or was leading the rest of Europe toward one: See report by Chicherin to the Third Soviet Congress, 14 May 1925, Soviet Documents , 2: 38-43.

39. Stephen E Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (New York: 1975), 147-48, 162, 186-88; Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary , 377-94. Tucker maintains (399) that it was Stalin who insisted that international proletarian revolution be retained as a second stage of development in the formulation of "socialism in one country." Cohen attributes this idea to Bukharin (187).

40. The role played by the debate over the doctrines of "socialism in one country," "permanent revolution," and "revolutionary internationalism" in the Lenin succession is discussed in Richard Day, Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation (Cambridge: 1973), 3-16, 98-101, and in Anthony D'Agostino, Soviet Succession Struggles: Kremlinology and the Russian Question from Lenin to Gorbachev (Boston: 1988), 75-105. Both works correct the notion that Bolshevik intraparty politics of 1925 to 1927 are to be understood as a confrontation between Stalin and ''socialism in one country," on the one hand, and Trotsky and "permanent revolution" on the other. Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-1929 (London and New York: 1959), 157-63, 201-70, discusses Trotsky's absence from the debate during the important period from January 1925 to April 1926. For Trotsky's writings and politics during these years, see Pierre Broue, Trotsky (Paris: 1988), 441-73.

41. For the implications of the doctrine of "socialism in one country" for international relations theory, see V. Kubálková and A. A. Cruickshank, Marxism and International Relations (Oxford and New York: 1985), 85-86; quotation, 82; Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of International Relations (New York: 1987), 18-19.

42. Report by Stalin to the Moscow Party Organization on the results of the Fourteenth Party Conference, 9 May 1925, in Stalin, Works , 7: 95.

43. Richard B. Day, The Crisis and the Crash: Soviet Studies of the West (1917-1939) (London: 1981), 77-81; and Leon Trotsky , 130.

44. "The International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist Parties," Pravda , 22 March 1925, Stalin, Works , 7: 51-57; Report to the Moscow Party Organization, 9 May 1925, Stalin, Works , 7: 90-134; Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Party Congress, 18 December 1925, Stalin, Works , 7: 267-403; Resolutions, Decisions, and Directives of the Fourteenth Party Congress, December 1925, in Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: The Early Soviet Period: 1917-1929 , ed. Richard Gregor (Toronto and Buffalo: 1974), 2: 258-60, hereafter cited as Resolutions and Decisions .

45. Stalin, Works, 7: 51, 92-95, 302-304. For Marx, Lenin, and Bukharin on the theory of "capitalist stabilization" and its implications for the doctrine of "socialism in one country" see Day, The Crisis and the Crash , 73-77.

46. Stalin, Works , 7: 51-52.

47. Ibid., 272-73.

48. Ibid., 98.

49. Ibid., 99-100.

50. Ibid., 52.

51. Ibid., 276.

52. Ibid., 53-55, 290-94.

53. Ibid., 98-99, 273-74, 278-79. The Soviet/Comintern economist Eugen Varga also maintained that the Dawes Plan would not stabilize the international economy: See Day, The Crisis and the Crash , 70-72. His argument was the conventional one. France and Britain could not accept German exports at the level required for Germany to create the surplus necessary to make reparations payments.

54. "Concerning the International Situation," Bolshevik , 20 September 1924, Stalin, Works , 6: 289-99, 303.

55. Stalin, Works, 7 : 279-83.

56. Anna di Biagio, "Bukharin's International Alternative," in The Ideas of Nikolai Bukharin , ed. A. Kemp-Welch (Oxford: 1992), 116-20.

57. Report by Stalin to the Moscow Party Organization, 27 January 1925, Stalin, Works, 7: 25-29.

58. Resolutions of the Fourteenth Party Congress, Resolutions and Decisions , 258-60.

59. Speech by Stalin to the Central Committee Plenum, 19 January 1925, Stalin, Works, 7: 9-14; "The Prospects of the Communist Party of Germany and the Question of Bolshevization," Pravda , 3 February 1925, in Stalin, Works, 7: 34-41; Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Party Congress, 18 December 1925, Stalin, Works, 7: 279-83, 287; Robert C. Tucker, "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy," Slavic Review 36 (1977): 563-64, 565-66. Stalin's analysis and his prescription were supported by M. V. Frunze, who replaced Trotsky as commissar for military and naval affairs in January 1925. Frunze warned that ''the danger of war ... has not diminished ... as a result of our economic consolidation, it has increased." "Nothing but the development of our military power will prevent our enemies from attacking us": Speech by Frunze to the Moscow Garrison, Pravda , 16 February 1925, SRW , no. 104.

60. Stalin, Works, 7: 12-13, 34.

61. Resolutions of the Third Soviet Congress, 16 May 1925, Soviet Documents , 2: 45; Resolutions of the Fourteenth Party Congress, Resolutions and Decisions , 258.

62. Cohen, Bukharin , 179, 246-47; Day, Leon Trotsky , 101-104, 118-21.

63. Resolutions of the Fourteenth Party Congress, Resolutions and Decisions , 258; Stalin quoted in Day, Leon Trotsky , 120. Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary , 377, contends that "Stalin made no particular contribution to the industrialization debate in its earlier phases. He echoed the Bukharinist position." Cohen, Bukharin , 215, states that "while Stalin sometimes eulogized industrialism ... and the virtues of Soviet economic autarky more than did Bukharin, he did not seem to harbor a separate industrial or agrarian program."

64. Stalin, Works , 7: 279; Day, The Crisis and the Crash , 71-72; also the statement by Ia. Rudzutak quoted from the Stenographic Report of the Fourteenth Party Congress in S. Iu. Vygodskii, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, 1924-1929 gg (Moscow: 1963), 85: "The Dawes plan is aimed at converting Russia into an agrarian appendage, even Germany's, ... at squeezing pennies [out of the Russian working people] to pay German reparations to the USA. That is not our way, comrades!"

65. Stalin quoted in Day, Leon Trotsky , 121.

66. For the discussion of Trotsky's strategy of economic development and economic foreign policy, see Day, Leon Trotsky , 126-78, and "Leon Trotsky on the Dialectics of Democratic Control," in The Soviet Economy on the Brink of Reform: Essays in Honor of Alec Nove , ed. Peter Wiles (Boston: 1988), 17-24.

67. Hodgson (Moscow) to Chamberlain, 25 August 1925, DBFP , ser. 1, vol. 25, no. 326.

68. Day, Leon Trotsky , 131, 169.

69. On Preobrazhenskii see M. M. Gorinov and S. V. Tsakunov, "The Life and Works of Evgenii Alekssevich Prebrazhenskii," Slavic Review 50 (1991): 286-96, and Alexander Erlich, The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924-1928 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1960), 31-60.

70. Richard Day demonstrates convincingly that although Preobrazhenskii and Trotsky both favored rapid industrialization, Trotsky wanted to fund it with foreign capital rather than by expropriating the accumulations of the peasantry. Moreover, unlike Preobrazhenskii, Trotsky favored balanced industrial growth rather than giving priority to heavy industry: Leon Trotsky , 146-47. Compare Erlich, Soviet Industrialization Debate , in which the Preobrazhenskii road and the Bukharin road are viewed as the two primary alternative industrialization paths.

1. Raymond J. Swinder, Soviet Military Reform in the Twentieth Century: Three Case Studies (Westport, Conn.: 1992), 23-73; John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941 (New York: 1962), 164-213. For the composition of the committee, see Grigori Alimurzayev, "A Shield or a Sword? History of Soviet Military Doctrine," International Affairs (Moscow) (1989:5): 102.

2. Jacob W. Kipp, "Soviet Military Doctrine and the Origins of Operational Art, 1917-1936" in Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991 , ed. Willard C. Frank, Jr., and Phillip S. Gillette (Westport, Conn.: 1992), 85-131.

3. Stuart R. Schram, "Christian Rakovskij et le premier rapprochement franco-soviétique," Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique 1 (1960): 208-210; hereafter cited as "Rapprochement franco-soviétique."

4. For Stresemann, Locarno, and the strategies and objectives of German revisionism, see Jon Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929 (Princeton, N.J.: 1972); Peter Krüger, Die Aussenpolitik der Republik von Weimar (Darmstadt: 1985); Klaus Megerle, Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1925: Ansatz zu aktivem Revisionismus (Bern: 1974); and Wolfgang Michalka and Marshall M. Lee, Gustav Stresemann (Darmstadt: 1982).

5. Jürgen Spenz, Die diplomatische Vorgeschichte des Beitritts Deutsch-lands zum Völkerbund, 1924-1926 , 41-43; hereafter cited as Beitritts Deutschlands ; Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 78-79.

6. On the December initiative and its sequel, see note by Brockdorff-Rantzau on a conversation with Victor Kopp, 4 December 1924; letter from Brockdorff-Rantzau to Stresemann, 29 December 1924; Brockdorff's note on a conversation with Chicherin, 25/26 December 1924; and his note on additional conversations with Chicherin, 9 March 1925, in Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 214-16, 219-23, 225-27, 228. This study is the central work on Soviet-German relations during the Locarno era. In it are reproduced the texts of the major documents from the German Foreign Ministry. These not only form the basis for analysis of German policy but offer insight into Soviet policy as well. For discussion of the alliance offer, see pp. 15-77. Earlier work on the subject also remains valuable, e.g., Hans W. Gatzke, "Von Rapallo nach Berlin: Stresemann und die deutsche Russlandpolitik," Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte , 4 (1956): 1-19; Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski, "The Russian Overture to Germany of December 1924," Journal of Modern History 30 (1958): 99-117, and also his "Stresemann and Poland before Locarno," Journal of Central European Affairs 18 (1958): 25-47; and ''Stresemann and Poland after Locarno," Journal of Central European Affairs 18 (1958): 292-317; Schram, "Rapprochement franco-soviétique"; Spenz, Beitritts Deutschlands , 48-50—all based on the records of the German Foreign Ministry.

7. Carr, Socialism in One Country , 3: 257.

8. Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "Das Problem der Ost oder Westorientierung in der Locarno-Politik Stresemanns," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 6 (1966): 133-62, and "Die Geschichte der Weimarer Republik als Problem der Wissenschaft," Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 3 (1955): 1-19; Herbert Helbig, Die Träger der Rapallo-Politik (Göttin-gen: 1958); Theodor Schieder, "Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Rapallo-Vertrags," Historische Zeitschrift 204 (1967): 545-609.

9. Note by Brockdorff-Rantzau on a conversation with Rykov, 24 February 1925, Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 223-25.

10. On the "forcing back Poland" question, see Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 63-70, 76-77, 133-38; and Carr, Socialism in One Country , 3: 254-57, 275-76. Stresemann subsequently repudiated Brockdorff-Rantzau's statement in a conversation with Chicherin: Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 133-35.

11. Spenz, Beitritts Deutschlands , 46-47.

12. For the initial German response to the Soviet alliance offer—Malt-zan to Brockdorff-Rantzau, 13 December 1924; Schubert to Brockdorff-Rantzau, 29 December 1924—see Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 216-19; discussed in Walsdorff, 78-107, and in Carr, Socialism in One Country , 3: 260-62.

13. Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 109.

14. For the Western European security pact negotiations from the German initiative to the conclusion of the Locarno agreements, see Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy , chap. 1.

15. Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 117.

16. For German-Soviet negotiations from Stresemann's Rhineland pact proposal in January 1925 to the commercial treaty in October, see Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 71-132.

17. Francis Conte, Un révolutionnaire-diplomate: Christian Rakovski , 163; hereafter cited as Rakovski .

18. Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 74-75, 108-109, 122, 135.

19. For Soviet overtures to Poland and the reaction of Warsaw and Berlin, see Carr, Socialism in One Country , 3: 274-75, 432-33, 436, 444-47; Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 103-104, 110-13, 132-33, 174-75, 179-80, 195.

20. Report by Chicherin to the Fourteenth Party Congress, December 1925, Kentavr , October-December 1991, 121.

21. Report by Chicherin to the Third Soviet Congress, 14 May 1925, Soviet Documents , 2: 37.

22. Schram, "Rapprochement franco-soviétique," 234, 236-37.

23. Chicherin's press interview while in Warsaw, 28 September 1925, Izvestiia , 4 October, in Soviet Documents , 2: 55-56.

24. Schram, "Rapprochement franco-soviétique," 222-23.

25. Conte, Rakovski , 140.

26. Brockdorff-Rantzau to Stresemann, 29 December 1924: Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 68. On the French card, which Chicherin played more than once, and the reaction at the Wilhelmstrasse, see Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 63-64, 70-73, 132; and Spenz, Beitritts Deutschlands , 46.

27. Kalervo Hovi, "The French Alliance Policy 1917-1927," 93-99.

28. Schram, "Rapprochement franco-soviétique," 225, 226.

29. Ibid., 585.

30. Chicherin's statement to the press, 15 December 1925, Izvestiia and Le Temps , 17 December, in Soviet Documents , 2: 66-67. He reportedly told the French ambassador to Berlin, Pierre de Margerie, in early October that he preferred an agreement with France to one with Germany and that he wished to come to Paris to meet with Briand: Memo by Chamberlain on a conversation with Briand, 13 October 1925, DBFP , ser. 1, v. 25, no. 332.

31. Rakovskii quoted in Carr, Socialism in One Country , 3: 423.

32. Brockdorff-Rantzau to Berlin, 3 April 1926, Akten zur deutschen Auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945 , ser. B, v. 2, pt. 1, no. 105; hereafter cited as ADAP ; Schubert to Moscow, 8 April 1926, ADAP , ser. B, v. 2, pt. 1, no. 115. Philippe Berthelot, secretary-general at the Quai d'Orsay, told Leopold von Hoesch, the German ambassador in Paris, that Chicherin, Rakovskii, and Herbette were "crazy about the idea" of a "continental bloc": Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 175.

33. For the Franco-Russian Conference, February-July 1926, see Rakovskii's speech at the opening of Franco-Soviet negotiations, 25 February 1926, Izvestiia , 27 February, Soviet Documents , 2: 92-95; Litvinov's report to the Central Executive Committee, 24 April 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 109. The most complete account is Schram, "Rapprochement franco-soviétique," 587-623, the sources for which include de Monzie's personal papers and a long report written by de Monzie for Briand, which the author discovered in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry.

34. Schram, "Rapprochement franco-soviétique," 588.

35. Daladier quoted in Conte, Rakovski , 186.

36. Alan Cassels, "Repairing the Entente Cordiale and the New Diplomacy," Historical Journal 23 (1980): 133-53; Stephen A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Chapel Hill, N.C.: 1976), 237-45, 256-63; Jacobson, "Is There a New International History of the 1920s?" 41-42.

37. Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: 1980), 82.

38. John Robert Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919-1926 (London: 1989), 154-55.

39. Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy , 21-22.

40. Christopher M. Andrew, "British Intelligence and the Breach with Russia in 1927," Historical Journal 25 (1982): 957-59.

41. Memorandum by Chamberlain, 10 June 1925, DBFP , ser. 1, v. 25, no. 317. For the fullest exposition of the Foreign Office's policy of "masterly inactivity" with regard to the USSR, see memorandum by Gregory, 1 November 1925, DBFP , ser. 1A, v. 1, no. 46. Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 53-67, 71-85, 258-61, offers a fascinating look into Soviet as well as British policy; quotations from pp. 71, 136. See also Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service , 315-81; Harriette Flory, "The Arcos Raid and the Rupture of Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1927," Journal of Contemporary History 12 (1977): 707-723; and Roger Schinness, "The Conservative Party and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1925-7," European Studies Review 7 (1977): 393-407.

42. Chicherin interview in Izvestiia , 23 December 1925, Soviet Documents , 2: 77.

43. Chamberlain to Hodgson (Moscow), 1 April 1925, DBFP , ser. 1, v. 25, no. 308; Chamberlain to Peters (Moscow), 5 November 1925, DBFP , ser. 1A, v. 1, no. 65; Chamberlain to G. Clerk (Prague), 13 April 1926, DBFP , ser. 1A, v. 1, no. 418.

44. Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 84. "The Soviet government has offered and continues to offer the hand of peace to England, but it is left in the air": Chicherin interview in Izvestiia , 8 December 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 145.

45. On the foreign policy of the diehards and Chamberlain's response, see Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 62-67; 175-79, 181-82; 213, 219, 228-29; Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy , 123; note from Litvinov to London, 26 February 1927, Soviet Documents , 161. There is still no definitive study of the General Strike. The work done in the 1970s does not seem to have exhausted the possibilities of the archives, e.g., Christopher Farman, The General Strike: May 1926 (London: 1972); Patrick Renshaw, The General Strike (London: 1975). Fortunately, Soviet involvement has been carefully studied: See, for instance, Daniel E Calhoun, The United Front!: The TUC and the Russians, 1923-1928 (Cambridge and New York: 1976), 233-54; Gabriel Gorodetsky, "The Soviet Union and Britain's General Strike of May 1926," Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique 17 (1976): 292-300, and Precarious Truce , 145-59. For the explanation of the NKID, 27 June 1926, see Soviet Documents , 2: 120-23. There is no recent archive-based study of Joynson-Hicks.

46. Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 84-85, 144-45, 181, 261.

47. Conte, Rakovski , 193.

48. Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy , 130-34.

49. On the "united front" policies of the Comintern, see Calhoun, United Front! ; Goredetsky, "The Soviet Union and Britain's General Strike," and Precarious Truce , 86-133, 204-205, 263-64.

50. Stalin quoted in Daniel E Calhoun, "Trade Union Internationalism in the 1920s: Personalities, Purposes, Premises," in Contact or Isolation? 258.

51. Leon Trotsky, Leon Trotsky on Britain (New York: 1973), Part I.

52. Carr, Socialism in One Country , 3: 494.

53. Trotsky, On Britain , Part III.

54. Statements by Stalin quoted in Claudin, Communist Movement , 153 and n. 51; Goredetsky, "The Soviet Union and Britain's General Strike," 305; SRW , no. 118.

55. For example, Karl Radek in Izvestiia , 22 October 1925, SRW , no. 106.

56. Report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Party Congress, 23 December 1925, Resolutions and Decisions , 258.

57. For Chicherin's pre-Locarno negotiations with Stresemann, see Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 133-38; for Stresemann's Ostpolitik at Locarno, Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 139-56.

58. Report by Chicherin to Fourteenth Party Congress, December 1925: Kentavr , October-December 1991, 117-19, 121, 124. Also press interviews by Chicherin, 15 and 21 December 1925, in Soviet Documents , 2: 67, 78. For his earlier statements, see report by Chicherin to the Central Executive Committee, 4 March 1925, Soviet Documents , 2: 17; speech by Chicherin to Third Soviet Congress, 14 May 1925, Soviet Documents , 2: 42.

59. Report by Chicherin to Fourteenth Party Congress, December 1925, Kentavr , October-December 1991, 117.

1. Report by Chicherin to Fourteenth Party Congress, December 1925, Kentavr , October-December 1991, 122-23.

2. Ibid.

3. Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 17 December 1925, Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 525-28; Pagman Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression between the USSR and Afghanistan, 31 August 1926, Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 101-6; Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality between Persia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1 October 1927, Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 288-92.

4. Editorial in Izvestiia , 29 September 1926, SRW , no. 113; report by Chicherin to Fourteenth Party Congress, December 1925, Kentavr , October-December 1991, 119; report by Litvinov to Central Executive Committee, 24 April 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 107.

5. Statement by Rakovskii, n.d., SRW , no. 107; statement by Chicherin in Izvestiia , 8 December 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 146; statement by Litvinov in Pravda , 24 December 1925, Soviet Documents , 2: 79-80.

6. This is the interpretation of Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia , 78-79, 212, 214.

7. Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia , 139-40.

8. Chicherin to Agent and Consul-General of the USSR in Hejaz, Comrade Khakimov, n.d.: "Chicherin and the Foundations of Soviet-Arab Relations," Vestnik , November 1990, 66-67; hereafter cited as "Soviet-Arab Relations." This article reproduces previously unpublished documents from the USSR Foreign Policy Archives.

9. "Soviet-Arab Relations," 66-67.

10. Aleksandr N. Kheifetz, Sovetskaia diplomatiia i narody Vostoka, 1921-1927 (Moscow: 1968), 313-14.

11. Igor P. Senchenko, Persidskii zaliv: vzgliad skvoz stoletie: Ot "novogo kursa" Peterburga do politiki novogo myshleniia (Moscow: 1991), 95.

12. Chicherin to Yurenev, 3 April 1924, "Soviet-Arab Relations," 65-66.

13. Senchenko, Persidskii zaliv , 98.

14. Chicherin to the Politburo and Central Committee of the CPSU, 13 February 1926, "Soviet-Arab Relations," 68.

15. Chicherin to Khakimov, 31 October 1926, "Soviet-Arab Relations," 69-70.

16. Kheifetz, Sovetskaia diplomatiia , 315-16.

17. Senchenko, Persidskii zaliv , 98.

18. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi Iran i Afganistan , 115.

19. Georgii S. Agabekov, OGPU, the Russian Secret Terror (New York: 1931), 97.

20. Sicker, The Bear and the Lion , 48.

21. Volodarskii, Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi , 120-23.

22. Official Soviet Summary of Relations with Persia for the Year 1927, Soviet Documents on the Middle East , 214-317.

23. Soviet policy leading to the Treaty of Berlin in April 1926 is revealed in Chicherin's conversation with Stresemann and Schubert in Berlin in December 1925 and in his conversations with Brockdorff-Rantzau in Moscow in March 1926: See ADAP , ser. B, vol. 2, pt. 1, nos. 12, 15, 54, 75, 79, 84. For the text of the Treaty of Berlin, see ADAP , ser. B, vol. 2, pt. 1, no. 168. On Soviet-German negotiations, October 1925-April 1926, see Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 157-89; Spenz, Beitritts Deutsch-lands , 109-21; and Rosenfeld, Sowjetunion und Deutschland , 166-81.

24. For Germany's Polish policy after Locarno, see Harald yon Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 1918-1933 (Baltimore: 1971), 120-30, 226-94; Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 171-74.

25. Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 139-41; Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy , 81-82.

26. Piotr S. Wandycz, The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances 1926-36: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from Locarno to the Remilitarization of the Rhineland (Princeton, N.J.: 1988), 40-42.

27. Litvinov's report to Central Executive Committee, 24 April 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 106-108. For evaluations of the significance of the Treaty of Berlin for Soviet foreign relations, see Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 187-89; Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 242-43 (Radek quoted).

28. John Hiden, Germany and Europe, 1919-1939 (London and New York: 1993), 121-22.

29. For the texts of the German proposals, see Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 228-29, 232-39.

30. Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 169. Litvinov himself announced before the Central Executive Committee Moscow's willingness to renew negotiations with London without delay and to conduct them to a favorable conclusion in a businesslike manner: Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 144-45.

31. The possibility of a Soviet-Polish rapprochement may have been a factor that the German Foreign Ministry was required to integrate into its policy calculations, but the Wilhelmstrasse did not feel particularly pressed by Chicherin's efforts with Warsaw. The German ambassador to Poland, Ulrich Rauscher, calmly and repeatedly predicted that a real rapprochement between Poland and the USSR could never take place. And the Soviet experts at the Wilhelmstrasse—both Erich Wallroth and Herbert von Dirk-sen—became indignant and intransigent rather than compliant in response to NKID overtures to Warsaw: See Wallroth to Moscow, 6 March 1926, ADAP , ser. B, vol. 2, pt. 1, no. 76; Dirksen to Moscow, ADAP , ser. B, vol. 2, pt. 1, no. 78.

32. Brockdorff-Rantzau to Berlin, 4 March 1926, ADAP , ser. B, vol. 2, pt. 1, no. 75. For the nonaggression pact proposal, see Izvestiia , 28 August 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 130; Harvey L. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926-1933: A Study in Diplomatic Instability (London: 1966), 33-38.

33. Memorandum by Stresemann, 25 March 1926, ADAP , set. B, vol. 2, pt. 1, no. 91; memorandum by Schubert, ADAP , ser. B, vol. 2, pt. 1, no. 96.

34. Statement by Litvinov, Izvestiia , 13 October 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 140-41; message from Litvinov to Stresemann, 16 April 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 181-82.

35. Litvinov's report to Central Executive Committee, 24 April 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 111-12.

36. NKID statement on Soviet proposal, Izvestiia , 28 August 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 130.

37. Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 194-96.

38. On the Baltic bloc and European diplomacy, see John Hiden, "On the Edge of Diplomacy? Britain, the Baltic and East-West Relations between the Wars," in Contact or Isolation? 311-19; Merja-Liisa Hinkkanen, "Bridges and Barriers, Pawns and Actors. The Baltic States in East-West Relations in the 1920s," in ibid., 431-42; Patrick Salmon, "Perceptions and Misperceptions: Great Britain and the Soviet Union in Scandinavia and the Baltic Region 1918-1939," ibid., 415-29.

39. Richard W. Rigby, The May 30 Movement: Events and Themes (Canberra: 1980).

40. Gregorii Zinoviev, "The Epoch of Wars and Revolutions," Inprecor 55 (1925): 745-47, quoted in Haithcox, Communism and Nationalism in India , 58.

41. The major Soviet documentary source is M. L. Titarenko, ed., Kommunisticheskii Internatsional i kitaiskaia revoliutsiia. Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow: 1986), which includes individual Comintern documents published in the USSR since the 1960s. Kuo Heng-yü, Die Komintern und die Chinesische Revolution examines printed Comintern documentation. Reznikov, Comintern and the East , 209, discusses the "Hands Off China" campaign.

42. Both Karakhan and Borodin played important roles in the project to provide the Chinese Revolution with professionally trained cadres. Radek was director of the KUTV; Pavel Mif assisted him. See Sokolov, "Polpred v Kitae Lev Karakhan," 208; Mirovitskaia, Sovetskii Soiuz v strategii Gomin'dana , 80; Jacobs, Borodin , 144.

43. "Prospects for Further Work in the South, or the Grand Plan of Kuomintang Military Activity for 1926," in Wilbur and How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China , Document 7, 508-16; also 158-60; hereafter cited as Soviet Advisers .

44. "Report of Soviet adviser 'L. Grey' in Canton on Kuomintang military aviation," in Wilbur and How, Soviet Advisers , Document 35, 640-43; also 233-34.

45. Wilbur and How, Soviet Advisers , 216-17, 428; compare Erickson, Soviet High Command , 232-33.

46. "Problems of Our Policy with Respect to China and Japan, 25 March 1926," in Leon Trotsky, Leon Trotsky on China , ed. Les Evans and Russell Block (New York: 1976), 102-10.

47. Mirovitskaia, Sovetskii Soiuz v strategii Gomindana , 34-35, 204.

48. Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China , 47-49; Wilbur and How, Soviet Advisers , 252-73.

49. See the discussion of Trotsky's China policy at this time in Anthony D'Agostino, Soviet Succession Struggles: Kremlinology and the Russian Question from Lenin to Gorbachev (Boston: 1988), 98-100. From research in party archives, A. I. Kartunova, "Kitaiskaia revolutsiia: diskussii v Kominterne," Voprosy istorii KPSS (1989:6): 59, reports that "unfounded attacks by Trotsky and Zinoviev" at this time "obstructed discussion in the Comintern."

50. Wilbur and How, Soviet Advisers , 272.

51. Stepanov's "Report on the March Twentieth Incident," ca. 2 April 1926, and his "Report to a Meeting of the Soviet Group at Canton," ca. 10 April 1926, in Wilbur and How, Soviet Advisers , Documents 50 and 51. V. A. Stepanov led the Soviet mission in south China from 24 March to early May 1926.

52. The Opposition's critique was sustained by both Trotskyist and non-Marxist scholarship. During the Cold War, American scholars labeled Soviet participation in the Nationalist Revolution in China "Stalin's Far Eastern Program," "Stalin's Chinese Adventure," or "Stalin's Failure in China." Meanwhile, pre-1987 official party scholarship in the USSR condemned the politics of Trotsky and Zinoviev and affirmed the course of policy taken by "the Comintern" without crediting Stalin and/or Bukharin with it: See Reznikov, Comintern and the East , 214-29; Glunin, "Comintern and the Rise of the Communist Movement in China.'' During perestroika it was admitted that Trotsky's role in Soviet history had been underrepresented and dealt with in an overtly biased manner: See, for instance, N. A. Vasentskii, "L. D. Trotskii: politicheskii portret," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1989:3), 142. And one of the principal official specialists on the history of the Communist International, K. K. Shirinia, attempted to come to a balanced view of Trotsky's Comintern policy in "Trotskii i Komintern," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1991:1). However, there were few important new revelations, and many older concepts were preserved, including complete lists of the mistakes attributed to Trotsky in pre-1987 Soviet scholarship.

53. Analyzed in McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia , 57-59.

54. Drachkovitch and Lazitch, "The Third International," 182-83.

55. Glunin, "Comintern and the Rise of the Communist Movement in China," 335-36.

56. Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution in China , 55-63, and Wilbur and How, Soviet Advisers , chap. 6.

57. Lengthy extracts from the "Resolution on the Chinese Situation," 16 December 1926, are printed in Communist International , 2: 336-48.

58. Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927 (New York: 1966), 95-101.

59. Reznikov, Comintern and the East , 218-19.

60. Hans J. van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade: The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927 (Berkeley, Calif.: 1991), 214-15.

61. 30 November 1926, "The Prospects of the Revolution in China," speech to Chinese Commission of the Seventh ECCI Plenum, Stalin, Works , 8: 373-91.

62. Kartunova, "Kitaiskaia revolutsiia," 58-72, demonstrates some of the effects of the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze-era "new political thinking" on the study of Soviet-Chinese relations. The author praises Chinese Communist Party historians for their attention to Comintern issues and urges scholarly cooperation with them. At the same time, she expresses some remarkably conservative opinions: "Any attempts to ascribe the fault for the defeat of the revolution of 1925-1927 to the Comintern should be dismissed, whoever tries to do it'' (70).

63. For instance, Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists (Stanford, Calif.: 1963), 90; Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China , 103.

64. Interview by Chicherin, Izvestiia , 6 April 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 102-103; report by Litvinov to Central Executive Committee, 24 April 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 104. For the crisis over German membership in the League Council, see David Carlton, "Great Britain and the League Council Crisis," Historical Journal 11 (1968): 354-64; and Christoph M. Kimmich, Germany and the League of Nations (Chicago: 1976), 78-89.

65. Conte, Rakovski , 166.

66. See Chicherin's discussion in Izvestiia , 8 December 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 147.

67. On Soviet League policy, see press interview by Chicherin, Izvestiia , 23 December 1925, Soviet Documents , 2: 77-78; press interview by Chicherin, 27 February 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 96-97; Chicherin's notes to Geneva, 16 January and 7 April 1926, in Barbusse, Soviet Union and Peace , 128-33; statement by Litvinov to the press, 22 November 1927, ibid., 134-37. Carr, Socialism in One Country , 3:450-62 provides the fullest account in any language. G. I. Morozov, "Liga natsii: vzgliad cherez polveka," Voprosy istorii (1992:2-3): 162-67, revises orthodox Soviet historiography, suggesting that the effectiveness of the League of Nations might have been increased had the USSR taken a more favorable attitude toward it during the 1920s.

68. Georgi Dragunov, "Vorovski's Assassination: New Facts," International Affairs (Moscow) (1989:5): 116-27.

69. V. L. Genis, "Upriamyi narkom s Il'inki," in Otkryvaia novye stranitsy Mezhdunarodnye voprosy: sobytiia i liudi , ed. A. A. Iskenderov (Moscow: 1989), 234.

70. Kathryn Davies, The Soviets at Geneva: The USSR and the League of Nations, 1919-1933 (Westport, Conn.: 1977), 208.

71. Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 180, 184-88, 217, 266.

72. William G. Ratliff, Faithful to the Fatherland: Julius Curtius and Weimar Foreign Policy (New York: 1990), 41-42.

73. On the Thoiry conference, see Jacques Bariety, "Finances et relations internationales: à propos du 'plan du Thoiry'; septembre 1926," Relations internationales 21 (1980): 51-70; Jon Jacobson and John T. Walker, "The Impulse for a Franco-German Entente: The Origins of the Thoiry Conference, 1926," Journal of Contemporary History 10 (1975): 157-81; Heinz-Otto Sieburg, "Les Entretiens de Thoiry, 1926," Revue d'Allemagne 4 (1972): 520-46.

74. Hiden, Germany and Europe , 123-24.

75. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia , 46-63.

76. Michael Reiman, The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the "Second Revolution" (Bloomington, Ind.: 1987), vii-viii, 9.

77. "Fully approving of this peace policy, the Congress charges the Soviet government to continue in the future steadily to pursue this policy and to aim at the establishment and reinforcement of friendly relations with foreign states. The Congress notes with satisfaction that these aspirations of the USSR have found a response in certain states, and the development of economic ties with them, which is the best evidence of the correctness of this policy": Resolution of the Fourth Congress of Soviets, 19 April 1927, in Barbusse, Soviet Union and Peace , 134.

78. Press statement by Chicherin, 6 December 1926, Izvestiia , 8 December 1926, Soviet Documents , 2: 147.

79. Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed. Trotsky: 1921-1929 (London and New York: 1959), 262-310; Medvedev, Let History Judge , 159-69.

80. Anna di Biagio, "Bukharin's International Alternative," in The Ideas of Nikolai Bukharin , ed. A. Kemp-Welch (Oxford and New York: 1992), 123.

81. Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy , 3: 123-24.

82. Chicherin quoted in Zagladin, Istoriia uspekhov i neudach Sovetskoi diplomatii , 82.

1. For the Soviet economy in 1926/27, see Robert W. Davies, The Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929-1930 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1989), 37-42; hereafter cited as Turmoil ; S. G. Wheatcroft, R. W. Davies, and J. M. Cooper, "Soviet Industrialization Reconsidered: Some Preliminary Conclusions about Economic Development between 1926 and 1941," Economic History Review , 2d. ser., 39 (1986): 264-72.

2. On the industrialization drive, see Davies, Turmoil 46-50; Wheatcroft, "Soviet Industrialization Reconsidered," 268-69; Carr, Socialism in One Country , 1: 352-53, and Foundations , 1: 287-88.

3. G. A. Bordiugov and V. A. Kozlov, "The Turning Point of 1929 and the Bukharin Alternative," Soviet Studies in History 28 (Spring 1990): 9.

4. Carr, Socialism in One Country , 1: 445-54, and Foundations , 1: 705-718; resolution quoted, 710; Davies, Turmoil , 32-37.

5. The analysis here follows M. R. Dohan, "Foreign Trade" in From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy: Continuity and Change in the Economy of the USSR , ed. R. W. Davies (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1991), 212-33.

6. Michael R. Dohan, "Foreign Trade and Soviet Investment Strategy for Planned Industrialization, 1928-1938," in Soviet Investment for Planned Industrialization, 1929-1937: Policy and Practice , ed. R. W. Davies (Berkeley, Calif.: 1984), 114.

7. Dohan, "Foreign Trade" (1991), 229; Davies, Turmoil 33-34; Day, Leon Trotsky , 114-15, 151-52.

8. "Opyt proshlykh ekonomicheskikh reform," Voprosy ekonomiki (1988:2): 63-64.

9. V. A. Shishkin, "The external factor in the country's socioeconomic development," in "The Soviet Union in the 1920s: A Roundtable," Soviet Studies in History 28 (1989), 52.

10. Day, Leon Trotsky , 153-59; Carr, Foundations , 1: 851-54.

11. Day, Leon Trotsky , 167-68.

12. Cohen, Bukharin , 247; Uldricks, "Russia and Europe," 69; Rykov quoted in Carr, Foundations , 1: 712.

13. On politika dogovorennost and Stalin's views on foreign investment and the government foreign trade monopoly, see memorandum from Stalin to the Politburo, 27 December 1927, in Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 128-33; also 9. Reiman's work makes use of highly secret Soviet documents that were sent to Herbert von Dirksen of the German Foreign Ministry in 1927-28 and that the author discovered in the Political Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. They include correspondence among Politburo members, party directives, Central Committee and government protocols, and letters from NKID officials in Moscow to Soviet representatives in Berlin. The work offers a view into Soviet decision making at the highest level.

14. Erickson, Soviet High Command , 301-303.

15. Anthony C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development (Stanford, Calif.: 1968), 258-66.

16. A. A. Akhtamzian, "Voennoe sotrudnichestvo SSSR i Germanii," 3-24. This work, authored by the leading Soviet specialist on relations with Germany during the 1920s, is based on extensive archival research sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR during the tenure of Shevardnadze. Some of the documents dating from the years 1926-1929 have been published in English translation: "Soviet-German Military Cooperation, 1920-1933," International Affairs (Moscow) (1990:7): 95-113; hereafter, "Military Cooperation." These publications represent the first documentation of Soviet-German military cooperation from the Foreign Policy Archives of the USSR (FPA-USSR). Official confirmation of these contacts were first made in the October 1989 issue of Vestnik MID SSSR , which printed a letter written by Chicherin dated 17 June 1927. The fullest discussion of the 1926-and-after phase of military collaboration is based on the records of the German Foreign Ministry: Erickson, Soviet High Command , 247-82. The pioneering work was done from French sources by Georges Castellan, Le réarmement clandestin du Reich, 1930-1935, vue par le 2e Bureau de l'État-Major Français (Paris: 1954), and from German sources by Hans W. Gatzke, "Russo-German Military Collaboration during the Weimar Republic," American Historical Review 63 (1958): 565-97.

17. Letter from Krestinskii to Unszlicht, 1 February 1926, Akhtamzian, "Military Cooperation," 97-100; Akhtamzian, "Voennoe sotrudnichestvo," 11.

18. Akhtamzian, "Military Cooperation," 100.

19. Walsdorff, Westorientierung und Ostpolitik , 170-71.

20. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia , 19-27, 76-77; Dirksen quoted, 76.

21. Akhtamzian, "Voennoe sotrudnichestvo," 12.

22. Memorandum by Unszlicht on negotiations with the Reichswehr, ca. April 1926, Akhtamzian, "Military Cooperation," 100-102; unsigned memorandum, January 1927, Akhtamzian, "Military Cooperation," 103-105.

23. Erickson, Soviet High Command , 225-57.

24. Unsigned memorandum, January 1927, Akhtamzian, "Military Cooperation," 104.

25. Krestinskii to Litvinov, 18 January 1927, Akhtamzian, "Military Cooperation," 105; quotation from Akhtamzian, "Voennoe sotrudnichestvo," 14-15.

26. Unsigned memorandum, January 1927, Akhtamzian, "Military Cooperation," 104.

27. Ibid., 103.

28. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia , 96-98, 188-90.

29. Letter from Trotsky to Central Committee, 27 June 1927, in Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed , 339.

30. Erickson, Soviet High Command , 288-90.

31. On the war scare crisis of 1927 and its antecedents, see Alfred G. Meyer, "The War Scare of 1927," Soviet Union/Union Soviétique , 5 (1978): 1-25, which regards the war scare as spurious, inspired by Bukharin and used by Stalin in the battle against Trotsky and Zinoviev. John P. Sontag, "The Soviet War Scare of 1926-27," Russian Review 34 (1975): 66-77, rightly interprets the war scare as "the result of confusion and uncertainty as well as of cool, sober calculation." Sheila Fitzpatrick, "The Foreign Threat during the First Five Year Plan," Soviet Union/Union Soviétique, 5 (1978): 26-35, finds in the scare the beginnings of mass mobilization. Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 11-18, examines the interactions of the Soviet leadership. Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 182-83, 211-40, defines the diplomatic context and emphasizes the crucial role played by the break in relations with London in setting off the crisis. During perestroika , leading Soviet scholars rejected the idea that there was any real basis for the war scare in the international relations of the time. ''It seems to me that an analysis of the events gives no ground for such a conclusion": Valeri A. Shishkin, "External factor," 54. L. N. Nezhinskii, "Byla li voennaia ugroza SSSR v kontse 20-kh—nachale 30-kh godov?" Istoriia SSSR (1990:6): 14-30, concludes from an examination of the international situation in the years 1927-1933 that the menace of a major war against the Soviet Union did not exist.

32. Wandycz, Twilight of French Eastern Alliances , 47-50.

33. Speech by Stalin to Fifteenth Party Conference, 1 November 1926, Izvestiia , 5 November 1926, SRW , no. 116; speech by Stalin to workers of the Stalin Railway Workshops, October Railway, 1 March 1927, Works , 9: 173; speech by Bukharin to Fifteenth Moscow Party Conference, Izvestiia , 13 January 1927, SRW , no. 119; report by Rykov to Fourth Soviet Congress, 18 April 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 182, 192. Stalin's statement of 1 March that war would not occur in the spring or autumn was contradicted by Bukharin's speech of 13 January in which he stated that there was no guarantee that war would not break out within that time frame. Meyer, "War Scare," 2-6, regards Bukharin as the primary instigator of the war scare.

34. Litvinov reportedly agreed with the British representative in Moscow that the war scare was "stupid": Hodgson (Moscow) to Chamberlain, 11 February 1927, DBFP , sen 1a, vol. 3, no. 11.

35. Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution in China , 77-117.

36. On the Northern Expedition and international relations, see Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution , 68-77; Wilbur and How, Soviet Advisers , 367-71.

37. Edmund S. K. Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain's South China Policy, 1924-1931 (Hong Kong and New York: 1991).

38. C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China 1918-1927: Papers Seized in the 1927 Peking Raid (New York: 1956), 8-9.

39. Van de Ven, Friend to Comrade , 193, citing the statistical research of Zaho Bu.

40. Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution , 108.

41. Schram, "Rapprochement franco-soviétique," 605-606.

42. NKID account of the ARCOS raid and the rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations, 7 June 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 221-27; formal Soviet protest against the raid, 12 May 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 202-204; supplementary note by Litvinov, 17 May 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 204-208; note from Chamberlain to Rosengloz severing relations, 26 May 1927, DBFP , ser. 1a, vol. 3, no. 215; statement by Litvinov, 26 May 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 209-212. For historical accounts, see Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 221-31; Andrew, "British Intelligence and the Breach with Russia," 957-64; Flory, "Arcos Raid"; and Schinness, "Conservative Party," 401-403.

43. Paul W. Blackstock, The Secret Road to World War Two: Soviet versus Western Intelligence 1921-1939 (Chicago: 1969), 136-61.

44. The assassin, the son of a Russian monarchist émigré, was a journalist for the Vilnius newspaper Bielorusskoe slovo . He claimed to be avenging the execution of the Russian imperial family in which, he believed, Voikov had taken part. Privately Chicherin stated that the assassination "had no political significance" and was a "purely personal act": Wandycz, Twilight of French Eastern Alliances , 95. Nezhinskii, "Byla li voennaia ugroza," 17, affirms that Koverda was acting alone and not as part of a reactionary plot. For the initial protest by Litvinov, 7 June 1927, see Soviet Documents , 2: 220-21; subsequent note, 11 June 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 228-31. On the assassination and the diplomacy of the war scare, see Josef Korbel, Poland between East and West: Soviet and German Diplomacy toward Poland, 1919-1933 (Princeton, N.J.: 1963), 217-20.

45. Notes from Litvinov to the Polish Minister in Moscow, 7 and 11 June 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 220-21, 228-31. On activities and reports of the GPU, see Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 15, 16, 17; and on troop concentrations, Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia , 97-98.

46. "The Threat of War," 28 July 1927, Stalin, Works , 9: 328-37.

47. Memorandum by Soviet government on the rupture in Anglo-Soviet relations, 7 June 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 221-27; note from Litvinov to Polish Minister in Moscow, 11 June 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 228-31.

48. Sheinis, Litvinov , 194.

49. Schram, "Rapprochement franco-soviétique," 607-610.

50. Note from Phipps (Paris) to Chamberlain, 13 June 1927, DBFP , ser. 1a, vol. 3, no. 231.

51. Memorandum by Stresemann, 7 June 1927, ADAP , ser. B, vol. 5, no. 209.

52. Memorandum by Stresemann, 15 June 1927, ADAP , ser. B, vol. 5, no. 236; Chamberlain (Geneva) to Tyrell, 16 June 1927, DBFP , ser. 1a, vol. 3, no. 240. On the international politics of the war scare, see Harvey L. Dyck, "German-Soviet Relations and the Anglo-Soviet Break, 1927," Slavic Review 25 (1966): 67-83, and Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia , 87-94; Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 234-38; quotation, 236; Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy , 131-34.

53. For the debate within the leadership over the future direction of Soviet foreign policy, see Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 15-18.

54. Stalin, "The Threat of War," Pravda , 28 July 1927, Works , 9: 334; speech by Stalin to the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, 23 October 1927, Stalin, Works , 10: 205-206.

55. Meyer's work states that Moscow's willingness to appease France showed that the Bolshevik elite, with the possible exception of Bukharin, did not take the threat of war seriously but rather used it for the purposes of a factional political struggle: Meyer, "War Scare," 2, 10-11, 13. Sontag argues that the Soviet willingness to appease France shows how seriously they took the idea that Britain was lining up allies for an attack on the USSR: Sontag, "Soviet War Scare," 72-74.

56. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia , 122.

57. Schram, "Rapprochement franco-soviétique," 611-15; Conte, Rakovski , 193-96.

58. Soviet proposal, 21 September 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 250-54; statements by Litvinov to the press, 16 September 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 248-54; and 22 September 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 255.

59. Statement of the Thirteen, 8 August 1927: Lev Trotskii, The Challenge of the Left Opposition (1926-1927) (New York: 1980), 291-95.

60. On the recall of Rakovskii, see press statement by Rakovskii, 4 September 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 247-48; Chicherin's note to Paris, 4 October 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 270; TASS statement in Izvestiia , 5 October 1927, Soviet Documents , 2: 270-71; Conte, Rakovski , 196-204; Schram, "Rapprochement franco-soviétique," 615-23.

61. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia , 94-96, 121-23.

62. Brockdorff-Rantzau to Stresemann, 27 August 1927, ADAP , ser. B, vol. 6, no. 146.

63. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia , 96-97.

64. Memorandum by Brockdorff-Rantzau, 24 July 1927, ADAP , ser. B, vol. 6, no. 60; Stresemann to Moscow, 12 August 1927, ADAP , ser. B, vol. 6, no. 108.

65. Krestinskii to Stalin, 28 December 1928, in Akhtamzian, "Military Cooperation," 107-108; Erickson, Soviet High Command , 258-61.

66. On China, the war scare, and the revival and suppression of the Opposition, see Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 19-36; Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed , 316-79; Pierre Broué, Trotsky (Paris: 1988), 506-546; and Medvedev, Let History Judge , 169-75.

67. Lerner, Karl Radek , 141-43.

68. "Declaration of the Eighty-Four," May 1927: Trotsky, Challenge of the Left Opposition (1926-1927) , 224-39.

69. The minutes of the proceedings of the Eighth ECCI Plenum were not published—the first such suppression—and they have yet to be published in any language. The resolutions adopted were printed in Inprecor (9 and 12 June 1927), and an extract appears in Degras, ed., Communist International , 2: 382-90. Stalin's address of 24 May 1927, "The Revolution in China and the Tasks of the Comintern," appeared in Bolshevik on 31 May (1927:10) and is printed in Stalin, Works , 9: 288-318. Trotsky's speeches, along with his initial attack, "The Chinese Revolution and the Theses of Comrade Stalin" (7 May), appeared in Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution (New York: 1966), as did Zinoviev's "Theses on the Chinese Revolution." Other statements by Trotsky are collected in Trotsky, Leon Trotsky on China .

70. See, for example, the text of Rakovskii's speech to the Fifteenth Party Congress in Fagan, Rakovsky , 115-20.

71. Fagan, Rakovsky , 44.

72. "Recognition of the Tsarist Debts," 12 October 1927: Trotsky, Challenge of the Left Opposition (1926-1927) , 433-36.

73. Fagan, Rakovsky , 44.

74. Shirinia, "Trotskii i Komintern," credits Trotsky with perspicacity. "Always suspicious of the national bourgeoisie in the Guomindang, Trotsky was able to notice earlier than anyone else their turn to the right" (10). The work allows that Trotsky "may have been correct on some questions," but insists that the excessively sarcastic tone of Trotsky's interventions in the ECCI alienated many party members (12). On balance, Shirinia sustains the judgment of pre -glasnost Soviet scholarship, that Trotsky's position on the China question was marked by "simplification'' and "left-dogmatism" (10). Trotsky himself later maintained that he had opposed the CPC's "bloc within" strategy since 1923. This claim, however, is not sustained by research in the Trotsky archives at Harvard, from which Brandt concludes that Trotsky paid little attention to the Chinese situation and knew little about it until March 1927: Brandt, Staling Failure , 155-58. Trotsky was apparently a party to the Politburo vote in May 1926 favoring the continuation of the "bloc within" strategy while Soviet advisers planned and supplied the Northern Expedition.

75. Carr, Socialism in One Country 3: 491.

76. "'Defeatism' and Clemenceau," 11 July 1927, and "The Clemenceau Thesis and the Party Regime," 24 September 1927, in Trotsky, Challenge of the Left Opposition (1926-1927) , 252-53, 395-404.

77. Stalin's statement was published in Pravda on 28 July 1927 as "Notes on Contemporary Issues: The Threat of War," Works , 9: 328, 336-37. It was incorporated into the resolutions of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission as "the menace of counter-revolutionary war against the USSR is the most acute problem of the current period"; quoted in L. N. Nezhinskii, "Byla li voennaia ugroza v kontse 20-kh— nachale 30-kh godov?" Istoriia SSSR (1990:6): 14. Trotsky's reply is published as "Speech to the Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC," 6 August 1927, in Trotsky, Challenge of the Left Opposition , 270-90.

78. "The Platform of the Opposition: The Party Crisis and How to Overcome It," September 1927, in Trotsky, Challenge of the Left Opposition , 301-394.

79. Victor Serge and Natalia Sedova Trotsky, The Life and Death of Leon Trotsky (London: 1975), 148.

80. Speech by Stalin to the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, 23 October 1927, Stalin, Works , 10: 206.

81. Memorandum by Menzhinskii, 10 November 1927, in Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 124-26.

82. "Resolution on the expulsion of Comrades Zinoviev and Trotsky from the Central Committee," 23 October 1927, Resolutions , 306; "Resolution on the anti-party statements of the leaders of the Opposition," 14 November 1927, Resolutions , 306-308.

83. For the text of Rakovskii's speech, see Fagan, Rakovsky , 115-20.

84. Graeme Gill, The Origins of the Stalinist Political System (Cambridge and New York: 1990), 187.

85. Note from Stalin to the Central Committee, n.d., Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 126-28.

1. All in all, foreign lending (bank, corporate, and government-guaranteed) came to a roughly calculated one billion rubles for the years 1923/24-1926/27. As the USSR's foreign trade turnover equalled 4.8 billion rubles for the same period, approximately one-fifth of Soviet foreign trade was financed by loans from abroad: See Shishkin, "External factor," 50.

2. Dohan, "Foreign Trade" (1991), 231-32.

3. Davies, Turmoil , 34-45, 51-60, 67-70, 75-80; Dohan, "Foreign Trade and Soviet Investment Strategy," 114-15.

4. Chicherin cited reports from the Soviet ambassadors in London, Paris, and Berlin. Elements of his report are incorporated in Stalin's memorandum to the Politburo, 27 December 1927, in Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 128-33. For foreign-policy decision making in October 1927, see pp. 38-40.

5. Statement by Litvinov to the press in Berlin, 22 November 1927, Barbusse, Soviet Union and Peace , 134-37; Declaration by the Soviet Delegation to the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, 30 November 1927, ibid., 137-43.

6. Speech by Stalin to joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, 23 October 1927, Stalin, Works , 10:204-206.

7. Griffiths, "Origins of Peaceful Coexistence," 195.

8. Memorandum from Stalin to Politburo, 27 December 1927, Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 128-33.

9. Carr, Foundations , 1: 708; Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 139-40.

10. On Soviet agriculture during the 1920s and the causes of the grain procurement crisis, see Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization (Evanston, Ill.: 1968); James Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy (New York: 1991); Davies, Socialist Offensive , 4-51.

11. For an extended analysis of the various factors involved in the procurement crisis, see Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy , 104-22; also Bordiugov and Kozlov, "Turning Point," 15, and Zagladin, Istoriia uspekhov i neudach sovetskoi diplomatii , 88.

12. Bukharin quoted in Carr, Foundations , 1: 315.

13. Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 36-47; Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy , 121-33.

14. Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy , 137-48.

15. Speech by Kuibyshev at joint meeting of Politburo, Sovnarkom, and Central Committee Presidium, January 1928, Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 135-38. On foreign-policy decision making in January-February 1928, see 46-50.

16. Note from Litvinov to Soviet representatives abroad, 9 February 1928, Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 138-42.

17. Davies, Turmoil , 62-65; Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy , 155, 179.

18. Note from Stalin to the Central Committee, 11 November 1927, Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 123-24; Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Party Congress, 3 December 1927, Stalin, Works , 10: 296.

19. Speech by Menzhinskii at joint meeting of the Politburo, Sovnarkom, and Central Committee Presidium, January 1928, Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 133-35.

20. Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 49.

21. Davies, Turmoil , 71-75.

22. This is the central concept of Reiman, Birth of Stalinism .

23. Moshe Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia (New York: 1985), 91-95, 114-20.

24. Davies, Socialist Offensive , 39-41; Robert W. Davies, and S. G. Wheatcroft, "Further Thoughts on the First Soviet Five Year Plan," Slavic Review 34 (1975): 798. Wheatcroft, Davies, and Cooper, "Soviet Industrialization Reconsidered," 264-94, presents some of the conclusions of the authors' research against a background of other scholarship. Bordiugov and Kozlov, "Turning Point," 11-15, examines the problems and tensions inherent in NEE how they increased in the 1925-1927 period, and how they were overlooked by the Bukharin-Stalin-Rykov leadership as they announced the industrialization drive in 1926. The result, the authors maintain, was that the program of accelerated industrialization within NEP was "hardly possible." The views of other perestroika -era Soviet writers are discussed in Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution (London: 1989), 28-33.

25. For the conflict among the leadership and the struggle over economic and foreign policy, see Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 67-71; Cohen, Bukharin , 276-86; Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary , 409-416; Davies, Turmoil , 60-62, 459-61; and Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy , 181-83.

26. Kendall E. Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1917-1941 (Princeton, N.J.: 1978), chap. 3; Hiroaki Kuromiya, Stalin's Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928-1932 (Cambridge: 1988), 12-17.

27. Note from Rykov to Menzhinskii, 12 March 1928, Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 145-47.

28. Note from Chicherin to Menzhinskii, 13 March 1928, Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 147-49.

29. Report by Stalin to Moscow Party Organization, 13 April 1928, Stalin, Works , 11: 57-58; Tucker, Stalin in Power , 76-80.

30. Akhtamzian, "Sovetsko-Germanskie ekonomicheskie otnosheniia," 53; Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia , 119-29.

31. According to statistics from Soviet sources, the volume of trade with Germany in 1924/25 was 149 million rubles; in 1925/26, 225.6 million rubles; in 1926-27, 264.3 million rubles; and in 1927/28, 364.7 million rubles. In terms of Germany's total foreign trade, these were negligible sums—l.4 percent of exports in 1924 and 3.3 percent in 1928; 1.4 percent of imports in 1924 and 2.7 percent in 1928: Akhtamzian, "Sovetsko-Germanskie ekonomicheskie otnosheniia," 48-49. This work by the leading Soviet expert on relations between Weimar Germany and the USSR is based in part on documents from the "Historical Diplomatic Archives," papers apparently taken from Germany during World War II and kept secret until the late 1980s. Published under the political influence of the Gorbachev-Reagan summit conference at Reykjavik, his work reflects partial "new political thinking." The author's final conclusion: ''Historic experience has shown that successful cooperation is possible between two different social systems, if good will prevails" (56).

32. Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy , 279-306.

33. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia , 144-46, 216.

34. Krestinskii to Litvinov, 18 January 1927, "Military Cooperation," 105.

35. Krestinskii to Stalin (with copies to Litvinov and Voroshilov), 28 December 1928, "Military Cooperation," 106-110; Akhtamzian, "Voennoe sotrudnichestvo SSSR i Germanii," 17, 22.

36. Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 60-61.

37. Shishkin, "The USSR and Western Countries," 113-14.

38. Kendall E. Bailes, "The American Connection: Ideology and the Transfer of American Technology to the Soviet Union, 1919-1941," Comparative Studies in Society and History 23 (1981): 426-33, 439; also Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1: 276-79, 296-99.

39. Robert Paul Browder, The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: 1953), 22-23.

40. On foreign-policy decision making in July-August 1928, see Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 48, 61, 75-77. For Soviet-American trade, 1925-1928, see Joan Hoff-Wilson, Ideology and Economics: U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union, 1918-1933 (Columbia, Mo.: 1974), 71-93; and Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1984), 160. V. L. Malkov, "SShA: Ot interventsii k priznaniiu Sovetskogo Soiuza (1917-1933gg)," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1984:1): 125-46, looked back on the opening of diplomatic relations between the United States and the USSR in 1933 as a time of friendlier relations and expressed the hope that they would be restored to that level.

41. Statement by Chicherin in Izvestiia , 5 August 1928, Soviet Documents , 2: 322-25; Tass statement in Izvestiia , 28 August, Soviet Documents , 2: 333-35; note from Litvinov to Paris, 31 August 1928, Soviet Documents , 2: 335-39.

42. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia , 111-12, 139-43.

43. Phillips, Between the Revolution and the West , 102-103.

44. Sheinis, Litvinov , 204. Elsewhere Sheinis states that Chicherin abandoned the leadership of Soviet diplomacy in November 1926, at the time he began his first extended period of treatment in Germany, and that in September 1928 he was literally sent abroad: Sheinis, "Polpred B. E. Stein," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1991:1): 108.

45. Sheinis, Litvinov , 193; Sheinis, "Stein," 108.

46. When the Social Democratic Party became the main party in the coalition governing Germany in 1928, Comintern attacks on the SPD, labeling its leadership "social-fascist," posed renewed problems for Chicherin's diplomacy. In June 1929, at a time when he was seriously ill and recovering at a health spa in Germany, Chicherin addressed a protest to Stalin. The "social-fascist" line of the Comintern was, he wrote, in what would be one of his last political initiatives, "ridiculous nonsense," "based on falsehoods and propaganda rattling": Quoted by Firsov in "Nekotorye voprosy istorii Kominterna,'' Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1989:2): 90.

47. Notes from Litvinov to Warsaw, 29 December 1928 and 11 January 1929, Barbusse, Soviet Union and Peace , Part IV; report by Rykov to Fifth Soviet Congress, 20 May 1929, Soviet Documents , 2: 372-74; Phillips, Between the Revolution and the West , 103-105; Wandycz, Twilight of French Eastern Alliances , 135-36.

48. Akhtamzian, "Sovetsko-Germanskie ekonomicheskie otnosheniia," 53-54.

49. Bailes, "American Connection," 433.

50. Bordiugov and Kozlov, "Turning Point," 16-17; Shishkin, "External factor," 53.

51. Bordiugov and Kozlov, "Turning Point," 22.

52. Ibid., 21-22.

53. Tucker, Stalin in Power , 71.

54. On Stalin versus the moderates, see Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 89-99; Medvedev, Let History Judge , 195-202; Cohen, Bukharin , 276-329.

55. Moshe Lewin, "The Disappearance of Planning in the Plan," Slavic Review 32 (1973): 279-80.

56. Catherine Merridale, "The Reluctant Opposition: The Right 'Deviation' in Moscow, 1928," Soviet Studies 41 (1989): 382-400.

57. Perrey, Hans-Jurgen, Der Russlandausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft. Die deutsche-sowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen der Zwischen-kriegszeit. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Ost-West-Handels (Munich: 1985).

58. Litvinov complained before the Central Executive Committee on 10 December 1928 of "the periodical repetition and dissemination of legends about our difficulties, about alleged crises, catastrophes, insurrections, and the approaching end of the Soviet system": Soviet Documents , 2: 355-56.

59. On report by Litvinov to Fifteenth Party Congress, see Barbusse, Soviet Union and Peace , 159; Phillips, Between the Revolution and the West , 94, 96, 97, 101.

60. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia , 143-51.

61. Erickson, Soviet High Command , 263-68.

62. See the analysis in Hiden, Germany and Europe , 124-25, and compare Jiri Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938 (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1984), 15-36.

63. Donald N. Lammers, "The Second Labour Government and the Restoration of Relations with Soviet Russia, 1929," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 37 (1964): 60-72; Williams, Labour and Russia , chaps. 6-7; Henderson quoted, 91.

64. Genis, "Upriamyi narkom s Ilinki," 235. When Sokolnikov returned to Moscow in September 1932, Stalin said to him (237): "I have heard, Grigori, that these gentlemen in England became so fond of you that they didn't want you to leave. Perhaps, it would have been better for you to have stayed with them?"

65. Costigliola, Awkward Dominion , 161-64; Hoff-Wilson, Ideology and Economics , 93-96; Nikolai V. Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakovlev, Russia and the United States (Chicago: 1979), 86-89.

66. Bailes, "American Connection," 434-35.

67. Shishkin, "The USSR and Western Countries," 112.

68. Bailes, "American Connection," 440; cf. Sutton, Western Technology , 346-49. On German technological assistance and the First Five-Year Plan, see Werner Beitel and Jürgen Nötzold, Deutsch-sowjetische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik (Baden-Baden: 1979).

69. Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 103.

70. Izvestiia , 7 December 1928, quoted in Sontag, "Soviet War Scare," 75.

71. For the analysis that follows, see Michael R. Dohan, "The Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky, 1927/28-1934," Slavic Review 35 (1976): 603-35; "Foreign Trade and Soviet Investment Strategy," 114-20; "Foreign Trade," 224-33.

72. Anders Johansson, "Swedish Concessionaires in Soviet Industry: Experiences of Foreign Participants in the Rise and Fall of NEP, 'the First Perestroika'" in Contact or Isolation? ed. Hiden and Loit, 189-207. Also, Alexander Kulikov, "Concessions of the 1920s," International Affairs (Moscow) (1989:4):76-83.

1. Lewin, Making of the Soviet System , 104-105. At the same time, the work is not uncritical of the economic strategies offered by the moderates in 1928-29.

2. Stephen E Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917 (New York: 1985), 86.

3. For the critical examination of Stalinist industrialization, see Holland Hunter, "The Over-ambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan," Slavic Review 32 (1973): 237-57, with comments by Robert Campbell, Stephen E Cohen, Moshe Lewin, and a reply by Hunter, 258-91; quotation from review by Hunter in the Journal of Economic History 49 (1989): 221.

4. On the achievements, difficulties, and costs of the First Five-Year Plan, see Kuromiya, Stalin's Industrial Revolution , 287-96, 302-310. In the transformation of historical awareness that accompanied the Gorbachev revolution, "a new radical consensus" emerged in the summer of 1988. Although that consensus recognized the industrial achievements of the 1930s, it rejected the collectivization of agriculture and the administrative planning that had replaced the mixed market economy of NEE The abandonment of Leninist principles in the political system was criticized, and the whole Stalinist period was regarded as "a substantial departure from the road to socialism." Gorbachev himself, in the report he gave on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1987, denounced Stalinist repression, condemned what he called the "administrative-command system of party-state management of the country" initiated in the 1930s, and criticized its negative consequences for the democratization of Soviet society: See R. W. Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution , 135-36, 195.

5. Bukharin's development strategy, his criticism of what became Stalinist industrialization, and his appeal to Lenin's political testament are examined in Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution , especially 312-22. The idea of a Bukharin road to socialism as an alternative to Stalinism is developed in Cohen's introduction to the 1980 edition of this work. See also the reviews of Cohen's work by Lewin in the Journal of Modem History 47 (1975): 373-83, and by Loren Graham in the Russian Review 33 (1974): 324-26.

6. Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution , 1-2, 32-38, 146-47.

7. On the "Bukharin alternative" and its impact on perestroika , see Peter Kneen, "The Background to Perestroika : 'Political Undercurrents' Reconsidered in the Light of Recent Events," in Stalinism: Its Nature and Aftermath: Essays in Honour of Moshe Lewin , ed. Nick Lambert and Gábor T. Rittersporn (Armonk, N.Y.: 1992), 243-59; "The Bukharin Alternative," Soviet Studies in History 28 (Spring 1990), edited with introduction by Lynne Viola. Sirorkin, "Or grazhdanskoi voiny k grazhdanskomu miru," offers an appreciation of NEP as a program of socialization well thought out by Lenin and further developed by Bukharin in opposition to Trotsky.

8. G. M. Adibekov, "Tri krutykh povorota. (O vzaimosviazi vnutrennei i vneshnei politiki KPSS)," Voprosy Istorii KPSS (1990:3): 30-43.

9. A. G. Latyshev, "Bukharin—izvestnyi i neivestnyi," in Otkryvaia novye stranitsy , 328. Also L. K. Shkarenkov, "Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin," Voprosy istorii (1988:7): 59-78; and N. V. Pavlov and M. L. Fedorov, "Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin," Voprosy istorii KPSS (1988:10): 73-87; both are printed in translation in Soviet Studies in History 28 (Spring 1990): 40-97.

10. M. M. Gorinov and S. V. Tasakunov, "Leninskaia kontseptsiia NEPa: stanovlenie i razvitie," Voprosy istorii (1990:4): 20-39. Also Lars T. Lib, "Political Testament of Lenin and Bukharin and the Meaning of NEP," Slavic Review 50 (1991): 241-52.

11. Bordiugov and Kozlov, "Turning Point," 33-34.

12. G. I. Khanin, "Why and When did NEP Die? An Economist's Reflections," Soviet Review 31 (1990): 47-59; original Russian publication, "Pochemu i kogda pogib NEP? Razmyshleniia ekonomista," Ekonomika i organizatsiia poromyslennogo proizvodstva (1989:10): 66-83.

13. Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy , 99-104, 208-209; quotation from 209.

14. Dohan, "Foreign Trade," 232-33.

15. Khanin, "Why and When did NEP Die?" 59-62, argues that, so essential were economic foreign relations to the long-term development of the economy that there was no possibility of solving Russia's economic problems within the framework of NEP once the decisions had been made in 1922 not to recognize fully the debts of previous regimes, not to relax the foreign trade monopoly, and not to alter the system of one-party dictatorship.

16. Gill, Origins of the Stalinist Political System , 18.

17. Tucker, "Stalinism as Revolution from Above," 89-94; quotation, 92.

18. D'Agostino, Soviet Succession Struggles ; Day, Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation .

19. Gorinov and Tasakunov, "Leninskaia kontseptsiia NEPa."

20. Stephane Courtois, "Le système communiste international et la lutte pour la paix 1917-1939," Relations internationales 53 (1988): 7-10.

21. Tucker, Stalin in Power , 223-37.

22. Phillips, Between the Revolution and the West , 47-99.

23. di Biagio, "Bukharin's International Alternative," 123.

24. The major investigations into Bukharin's writings give little attention to the issue of foreign investment: Cohen, Bukharin ; Lewin, Political Undercurrents . Discussions of the issue at the highest political levels, as opposed to the level of theoretical/ideological disputation, show little evidence of his influence: Reiman, Birth of Stalinism .

25. Michael Haynes, Nikolai Bukharin and the Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (London: 1985), chap. 6.

26. Bordiugov and Kozlov, "Turning Point," 23.

27. Meyer, "War Scare," 2-6.

28. Central Committee message quoted in Nezhinskii, "Byla li voennaia ugroza," 21; Voroshilov in Izvestiia , 11 June 1927, and Tomskii in Izvestiia , 12 June 1927, are quoted in Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 238.

29. Gregor, Resolutions and Decisions , 312-13.

30. Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Party Congress, 3 December 1927, Stalin, Works , 10: 291-95. The congress resolution stated that "reactionary elements of the international bourgeoisie have started to prepare the ground for an armed assault on the USSR, after entangling it in a whole cluster of provocation (assaults on the USSR diplomatic representatives, murder of Soviet diplomats)": Resolutions , 313.

31. Manfred von Boetticher, Industrialisierungspolitik und Vertiedigungskonzeption der UdSSR 1926-1930: Herausbildung des Stalinismus und "aüssere Bedrohung" (Dusseldorf: 1979); Fitzpatrick, "Foreign Threat." Nezhinskii, "Byla li voennaia ugroza," 14-30, a work published during perestroika by a prominent Soviet scholar, constitutes a full refutation of the notion that "the foreign threat" proclaimed by Stalin had any real basis in international relations.

32. Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 238-39.

33. Statement by Kalinin in Pravda , 12 October 1927, quoted in Gorodetsky, Precarious Truce , 240.

34. Stalin's statement (November 1928) quoted in Reiman, Birth of Stalinism , 85-86.

35. Resolutions of Fifteenth Party Congress, December 1927, quoted in Davies, Soviet Economy in Turmoil , 442.

36. Davies, Soviet Economy in Turmoil , 441-45, 461-62; Carr, Foundations , 1: 872.

37. Report by Stalin to Moscow Party Organization, 13 April 1928, Stalin, Works , 11: 58. For Stalin's exploitation of the Shakhty case, see Bailes, Technology and Society , 84-89.

38. Fitzpatrick, "Foreign Threat," passim; also her The Russian Revolution, 1917-1932 (Oxford: 1982), 110-13; Kuromiya, Stalin's Industrial Revolution , especially 310-18.

39. For Report by Bukharin on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist Parties, 18-19 July 1928, see Xenia J. Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, eds., Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-1934: Documents and Materials (University Park, Pa.: 1967), 1: 106-120; hereafter, SFP, 1928-1934 ; Carr, Foundations , 3: 193-222.

40. Carr, Foundations , 3:223-34.

41. Nicholas N. Kozlov and Eric D. Weitz, "Reflections on the Origins of the 'Third Period': Bukharin, the Comintern, and the Political Economy of Western Germany," Journal of Contemporary History 24 (1989): 387-401, demonstrates that Bukharin believed that capitalism was in crisis despite its relative stabilization, just as did Varga, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Stalin. In fact, it was Bukharin who coined the term "third period" at the Seventh ECCI Plenum in November-December 1926. Where he differed from the others, who depicted capitalism as "decadent," "rotten," and "moribund,'' was in contending that capitalism's crisis developed from its progressive stabilization and continued advances in technology and organization rather than from its general decline. Stalin and Bukharin had a common hostility toward social democracy and a belief that the "third period" was one of wars and revolutions. However, as Day has demonstrated, Stalin defined the current epoch as one of "general crisis" and the period as one of wars and revolutions, meaning that war might occur in the immediate future. Bukharin, on the other hand, contended that the epoch was one of wars and revolutions, while the period was one of capitalist stabilization and reconstruction, meaning that there could be years of international peace: See Day, Crisis and Crash , 111.

42. "Measures of Struggle against the Danger of Imperialist War and the Tasks of the Communists," Sixth Comintern Congress, July-September 1928: SFP, 1928-1934 , 1: 128.

43. Izvestiia , 23 May 1929, quoted in SFP, 1928-1934 , 1: 4-5.

44. Report by Rykov to the Fifth Congress of Soviets, 20 May 1929, Soviet Documents , 2: 374.

45. See, for example, Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence , 183.

46. For example, Jonathan Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930-33: The Impact of the Depression (London and New York: 1983), 18-20.

47. Robert C. Tucker, "Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy," 563-75; his Stalin in Power , 44-65, quotations on 45; and his "Stalinism as Revolution from Above," 77-108.

48. Speech by Stalin at Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, 27 January 1925, Works , 7: 13-14.

49. Stalin quoted in Meyer, "War Scare," 3.

50. "To stretch out the breathing space for as long as possible . . . is the foundation and the most essential formula of the foreign policy of the USSR": "Leninist Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy," Izvestiia , 22 January 1929, SFP, 1928-1934 , 1: 160-61.

51. Antonio Carlo, "Structural Causes of the Soviet Coexistence Policy," in Jahn, ed. Soviet Foreign Policy , 65.