3
Organization and Motivation

It would seem self-evident that unified direction of insurgencies and effective mobilization of their support require that there be organizations devoted to those purposes. In actual practice, some insurgencies, particularly, wars of resistance, have been fought with a paucity of organization matching their poverty of material means, which leaders accustomed to the requirements of conventional armies might find incomprehensible. Others, notably ones led by Marxist-Leninists, have been characterized by organizational effort that can only be called prodigious.

That there can be such a range of possibilities between the little and the highly organized is owing to the circumstance that the factors of organization and cause, in substantial measure though never completely, are interchangeable variables. Less organizational effort is needed on behalf of causes many people share in common, to which they readily react, and about which they feel deeply; more effort, perhaps involving a substantial measure of compulsion, may be required to produce the desired response if the cause is divisive or arouses limited spontaneous enthusiasm. The cause that may be expected to evoke the strongest and most uniform response, especially in the present age of nationalisms, is that of independence from external domination. The response of a populace to those engaged in armed uprisings against their own government is likely to be ambivalent, especially to the extent that their evident aims are revolutionary rather than merely reformist.

The organizational means whereby rebellions and wars of resistance are directed and supported are commonly called their infrastructures, though the term may be deceptive, suggesting an articulation that is likely to be lacking. The concentration usual in conventional armies facilitates the exercise over them of centralized command and their support over well-defined lines of communication; the dispersion characterizing guerrillas and the populace upon which they depend requires decentralization of command over forces and of control over their sources of support. This decentralization is feasible only within the context of a considerable measure of self-discipline on the part of guerrillas, and voluntarism in the case of their supporters. The essential element to the unified direction of decentralized operations is commitment to a common cause on the part of both leadership and followers. More often than not the cause has a component of nationalism, which tends to ensure that these movements will be unresponsive to efforts to bring them under foreign control.

Guerrilla bases, which may be defined as areas from which guerrillas draw their support, are generally not defensible against determined attack. Access to foreign territory as sanctuary and as source of support, however useful, cannot serve as a complete substitute for internal support. Indeed, forces that depend entirely on foreign support should be classified as raiders rather than guerrillas and, depending on the degree of complicity on the part of countries that give them sanctuary and support, as agents of external aggression. Although a third party may gain political capital by assisting one of two sides, such capital is likely to prove highly perishable. Finally, the organizational aspects of wars of the third kind may have an importance transcending that of the wars themselves, for structures created to lead and support them may be the subsequent peacetime governments in embryo.

Decentralization

The general headquarters or other authority to which guerrilla or other irregular forces may be subordinate can set forth the objectives it wants them to attain and lay down the operational and other policies it wants them to follow. But commanders in

the field are necessarily allowed a substantial degree of operational autonomy: no general headquarters could make detailed decisions for numerous small units scattered about it knows not where, in circumstances of which it may be unaware, on behalf of commanders who may have to act as fast as they can think. That being so, one can understand why American visitors to Yenan during World War II found that Zhu De, the communist commander in chief, had no map room, possessed only a general idea as to the disposition of his forces, and—like other top leaders in Yenan—seemed to have plenty to time to talk with foreign visitors. One can also believe the truth of the assertion of one of his commanders in the field that he did not send telegraphic requests to Yenan because they were never answered.^[1] The decentralization of command over communist forces implied a similar decentralization of control over their support organization, and the field commanders had to look to it for support rather than to headquarters at Yenan.

The hit-and-run war of the guerrilla cannot be conducted by men who are serving unwillingly and whose discipline depends predominantly on fear of their commanding officers, for such men cannot be depended on to regroup after flight in order to fight another day. The fact that irregular forces must be able to melt away and subsequently to regroup implies a measure of voluntarism arising from commitment to their cause. Seth Warner depended on the self-imposed discipline of his New England militiamen, surrounded by British troops during Burgoyne's invasion from Canada, when he issued the order: "Scatter and meet me in Manchester." They did, and subsequently were on hand to help defeat Burgoyne's Hessians at the Battle of Bennington.^[2] And what is true of guerrillas' commitment to a cause must also be true of those who give them support, for guerrillas, when in a tight spot, can seek safety in flight, whereas their supporters, tied to their homes and herds, cannot follow suit.

Wars of Resistance

Guerrilla resistance to the armed forces of a foreign country is likely to begin in a context of political and military disorganiza-

tion arising in the wake of the destruction of the regular army of the invaded country, and perhaps of its government as well. In such circumstances the means of providing well-organized direction and support to the resistance will at least temporarily be lacking. However, as should be readily appreciated by all, but is not, few causes can evoke more widespread and deeply felt response than resistance to a foreign invader or alien oppressor. Accordingly, spontaneity of response by the populace, with many people taking up arms and others readily giving them support, can largely make up for deficient organization and make a stubborn resistance possible. Insofar as the need for organization is concerned, wars of resistance thus stand at the lower end of the scale.

That was true, for example, of the Spanish resistance to Napoleon during the 1807–14 Peninsular War. Charles IV and his son Ferdinand became captives of Napoleon and were forced to leave Spain in 1808. By the end of that year the regular armies of Spain had virtually ceased to exist. The following year the first guerrilla bands appeared. They were nominally under the supervision of a central revolutionary junta and of juntas formed for the various provinces, which did help the guerrillas in small ways, monetary for the most part, and called on the people to give the guerrillas food, other supplies, and information. However, the juntas were chased from town to town by the French, squabbled among themselves, and were too disorganized to act as an alternative government.^[3]

Indeed, the guerrillas were a law unto themselves, and the people did not wait to be told to support them. Guerrilla warfare, in which every man might feel he was his own commander, suited the individualism of the Spanish temperament, find though there necessarily were leaders, they were not a caste apart. Indeed, according to J. F. A. Lemière de Corvey, one of the principal officers of Napoleon's army, the outstanding leaders were "a miller, doctor, shepherd, curate, some monks, a few deserters, but not a single man of mark before that time."^[4] All the inhabitants served as spies to their fellow citizens, he declared, and thus the guerrillas could join together to be at least twice the enemy's number. Thus, in the course of the Peninsular War, between one hundred fifty and two hundred guer-

rilla bands, without fighting a single pitched battle, took the lives of half a million French soldiers.^[5] "These guerrillas," a military commentator of that period wrote, "carried their basis in themselves, as it were, and every operation against them terminated in the disappearance of its object."^[6]

The final liberation of Spain from the French armies owed something also to regular forces operating in the Iberian Peninsula under the Duke of Wellington, and it came only after defeats that Napoleon suffered elsewhere, notably at the hands of Russian irregulars and Russian winter. But Spain had been a bleeding ulcer, and Napoleon evidently traced to it the defeats he suffered elsewhere. At any rate, after Waterloo, in exile on St. Helena, he declared: "It was that miserable Spanish affair that killed me."^[7]

In more recent times, the guerrilla phase of the so-called Philippine Insurrection similarly began in a context of great disorganization, for the 50,000-man Filipino army had been defeated and disbanded and the officials of the Malolos government were isolated in the mountains of northern Luzon, where they had taken refuge. In such circumstances, support for continued resistance to U.S. forces depended on local Filipino leaders and the populace at large. The pervasiveness of that support surprised American leaders, who perhaps had not paid attention to cables sent to the State Department by the American consul at Manila shortly before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. The Spanish authorities in the Philippines had been trying in vain, he reported, to suppress an independence movement like the one in Cuba.^[8]

The Filipinos themselves were in hardly a good position to create an organized basis for the support of a guerrilla resistance, but the invading Americans, in appointing local officials, inadvertently did it for them. Describing Filipino support for that resistance some months after it had begun, General Adna Romanza Chafee reported: "Throughout these islands, wherever a presidente of a pueblo or cabeza of a barrio was appointed or elected under American authority, he, with few exceptions, either acted in the same capacity for the insurgents or maintained silence with respect to his neighbor who served in like

capacity in the same jurisdiction." Discussing the behavior of such officials, General Arthur MacArthur wrote:

In all matters touching the peace of the town, the regulation of markets, the primitive work possible on roads, streets and bridges, and the institution of schools, their open activity was commendable; at the same time they were exacting and collecting contributions and supplies and recruiting men for the Filipino forces, and sending all available military information to the Filipino leaders. Wherever throughout the archipelago there is a group of the insurgent army, it is a fact beyond dispute, that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance thereof ... not only so in the sense of furnishing supplies for the so-called flying columns of the guerrillas, but as affording secure places of refuge. Indeed, it is now the most important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband when closely pressed and seek safety in the nearest barrio; a maneuver quickly accomplished by reason of the assistance of the people and the ease with which the Filipino soldier is transformed into the appearance of a peaceful native.^[9]

The conclusions concerning popular support for wars of resistance that may be drawn from conflicts such as the Peninsular War and the Philippine Insurrection have a relevance extending beyond outright wars of conquest. Foreign intervention in such conflicts as that under way in Vietnam in the early 1960s and in Afghanistan beginning in 1979 can give to rebellions and civil wars the additional aspect of wars of resistance against alien invaders—as the respective difficulties encountered by the United States and the Soviet Union have so amply shown.

Insurgency: Rebellions and Revolutions

The body politic, which ever tends to reject the implant of a foreign authority, whatever its pretensions, is relatively tolerant of domestic misrule. A chief of state is seen first of all in his representational capacity, which means that his people tend to identify with him and to overlook his shortcomings. If these are gross, they nevertheless will say that he is good, but has bad

officials. Accordingly, rebels and revolutionaries, who must draw their support from the same populace as the government must contend with the ambivalence of popular feeling about opposing a regime that may be bad but is nonetheless their own.

In consequence, an insurgency may be expected to require more effort in the organizational fields of propaganda, recruitment, and material support than a war of resistance. In general, the organizational requirements of a rebellion aimed at gaining a redress of grievances may be expected to be less than those of a revolution directed at achieving a change of government. Most demanding of all—as is reflected in the stress on organization by Marxist-Leninist parties—are revolutions aimed at not only overthrowing a government but at overturning a social order as well. In wars of the third kind, such revolutions may be expected to possess not only military command arrangements and provision of popular support for the revolutionary forces, but also an additional element composed of political and administrative workers, led by party cadres, engaged not only in activities aimed at extending and supporting the revolution but also at providing the basis for the new government to follow.

As already indicated in the context of wars of resistance, organizational arrangements for the support of forces engaged on behalf of a cause that enjoys great popular support may be simple and informal, but yet effective. That may also be true of support arrangements for rebellions aimed at achieving reforms, such as those sought during the 1910–20 Mexican Revolution by the peasants of Morelos and adjoining states. Their cause was that of protecting the communal lands of the villages against continuing encroachment by the haciendas and of recovering lands already taken from them through force and fraud, and their rebellion was conducted against those who were, at any particular time, in charge of the government in Mexico City.^[10] The villages, under elected councils of elders, produced bands of armed men, which coalesced under local or regional leaders, with Emiliano Zapata emerging by common consent as their commander in chief.^[11] Even after his forces had grown into an army, the villages owed it only the duties of

providing its garrisons with farm plots to cultivate, serving as guides and messengers when needed, bringing the troops food and supplies when they were engaged in combat, helping the wounded, and burying the dead.^[12]

The Hukbalahap uprising in the Philippines was a case in which an organization adequate for the purpose of conducting a rebellion directed at achieving reforms proved inadequate for carrying the uprising onward toward the goal of revolution. The Hukbalahap was a World War II anti-Japanese guerrilla force with organizational roots in peasant unions that had been built up a few years earlier for the purpose of supporting the rights of tenant farmers. The peasantry, particularly in central Luzon, had been suffering from the ravages of progress, as represented by a shift from diversified agriculture to a cash crop economy. In the process, what had been a cooperative undertaking with shared costs, in which there had been a patriarchal relationship between landlords and tenants, was becoming a more impersonal affair in which the sharecropper lost both the dietary advantages of diversified agriculture and some of his former rights, but none of his former obligations.^[13]

After the interregnum of the Japanese occupation, the peasant unions were reestablished and renewed their activities on behalf of the peasantry. The postwar Philippine government, however, responded to their efforts with repression: seven congressmen who were favorable to their cause, elected in the spring of 1946, were denied their seats, and that summer, in an atmosphere of rising tension, a leader of the largest peasant union was abducted by men in military police uniform and killed. The Hukbalahap had been disbanded after liberation, but a number of the leaders of the peasant unions had been Huks, and they responded to armed repression by again taking up arms themselves and reconstituting their wartime organization. In trying to suppress them, the government's forces were guilty of excessive and indiscriminate use of force against the residents of rural barrios, and in consequence the Hukbalahap gained additional recruits.^[14]

Luis Taruc, vice president of the largest peasant union and the Hukbalahap supreme commander, was a member of the

Philippine Communist Party (PKP), as were a number of other Huk leaders, but they were men of a certain independence, who were not particularly amenable to Party control.^[15] Indeed, in 1946 and 1947 the PKP was engaged in united front politics and opposed to the Huk rebellion. However, in 1948 and 1949, influenced by the fact that the insurgency was gaining force and by the victories of the Chinese Communists on the adjacent Asian mainland, the leadership of the PKP reassessed its position and decided to take command of the rebellion.^[16] The name Hukbalahap, an acronym derived from a Tagalog term meaning People's Anti-Japanese Army, was changed to Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB), for People's Liberation Army, and José Lava, general secretary of the PKP, became its supreme commander. Taruc was demoted to the chairmanship of one of nine regional committees established in various parts of the country to coordinate the military and support aspects of the rebellion.^[17] Subordinate to these were field commands of from one to seven hundred men, ranging in number from seven field commands under Taruc's regional committee for central Luzon to as few as one in distant parts of the archipelago to which PKP leaders had gone on expansion missions. On the support side, the PKP created a pyramidal structure of barrio, section, and district committees, the cadres of which took responsibility for collecting supplies for Huks in the field and for carrying on political work.

On the 29 March 1950 anniversary of the founding of the wartime Hukbalahap, the HMB conducted the raids referred to in the Introduction—simultaneous attacks in all four provinces of central Luzon—and on the 29 August anniversary of the outbreak of the 1896 revolution against Spain, it again raided a number of urban centers, among them a provincial capital not far from Manila, where the Huks looted the municipal treasury.^[18]

Up to this point it was the Philippine Constabulary, an arm of the Interior Ministry, that had the responsibility for suppressing the rebellion. Its relations with the people were not helped by the fact that many of the constabulary's men had been in it during World War II, when it had served the occupying Japanese army. And since its reestablishment in the imme-

diate postwar period, as already noted, it had become widely hated in the countryside for its abuse of the rural populace.^[19]

It was in the immediate wake of the 29 August 1950 raids that President Elpidio Quirino appointed Ramon Magsaysay to the post of secretary of national defense. General Mariano Castañeda was superseded as commander of the constabulary, which was placed under the Department of National Defense, and the main responsibility for counterinsurgency operations was assumed by the army.

Magsaysay offered the Huks the choice between all-out force, which soon was being applied with more effectiveness and greater discrimination, or all-out friendship, which meant that those willing to come in from the field were given amnesty and could return to civilian life, in some cases with government resettlement assistance.^[20] He got the army deeply involved in civil affairs, and he reached into other parts of the government and out to community organizations for help. Recognizing that the Huk rebellion had roots in the plight of tenant farmers of central Luzon, Magsaysay had young lawyers in the army's Judge Advocate General's Corps represent peasants with grievances in suits against their landlords.^[21] Aware of the government's reputation for being responsive only to the well-to-do, he announced that anyone with a grievance against an official, military or civilian, could send him a telegram, for which the equivalent of five cents would be charged, and that an investigation of the grievance would be initiated within twenty-four hours.^[22]

The 1949 Philippine elections had been accompanied by much force and fraud, a circumstance that had added fuel to the rebellion. As the 1951 elections approached, the Philippine Veterans Legion and a variety of other civic organizations launched a National Movement for Free Elections. On behalf of the government, Magsaysay announced that the army would guard the polls in order to ensure the freedom of the elections and the safety of civilian election watchers. In fulfillment of this pledge, high school and college ROTC members throughout the archipelago were temporarily blanketed into the army and assigned to duty at the polls. In consequence, the 1951 elections were relatively honest and peaceful, and when the votes were counted,

the opposition Nacionalista Party was found to have won the mayoral election in Manila and control of the Senate.^[23] As Taruc later said, the effect on the peasants was to "open again elections as alternative to rebellion."^[24]

It was in 1951 that the rebellion reached its apogee and began to decline, and for this decline the difference between the respective aims of the Philippine Communist Party and of the peasantry was in no small part responsible. The Party wanted to overthrow the government; the peasants wanted the government to stop its repression. The Party set forth a program calling for far-reaching economic change, whereas the peasant rebels wanted reform of the tenancy system rather than its abolition. The Party proposed to carry the revolution through to the end, but among the peasantry there was widespread weariness of strife. In 1952 the divergence between these two sets of aims and attitudes led to a split in the Party that reached as high as its Political Bureau. That year Taruc and other leaders close to the peasants argued for stopping the fighting and entering into negotiations with the government, and the leaders of some Huk squadrons did so. Some years earlier Taruc had declared: "The Hukbalahap can only hold out as long as it is supported by the masses. No more, no less." In 1953 he said that it no longer had their support, and in 1954 he did what many other Huks had been doing—quit. Thereafter the Huks were reduced to a dwindling number of small bands that no longer posed a peace-and-order problem.^[25]

In a base in China's south-central Jiangxi province, built beginning in 1927 under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communists set up a pervasive array of mass organizations, based upon occupation, age, and sex, intended to make possible a complete mobilization of the populace. They began with only a few thousand troops, who happened to have communist commanders, salvaged from the breakup of the Kuomintang-communist alliance against that period's Chinese warlords, and gave them the tasks, besides fighting, of doing propaganda and organizational work among the people. By creating local village guard units and, at the next higher level, guerrilla bands, they established a three-tier military system in which the main forces could call on the part-time fighters in

time of need and could draw on them for recruits. As the communist army grew, the Communist Party apparatus within it was expanded and elaborated. In addition, a governmental structure was set up, first at the local and county levels, then culminating in a purported Provisional Central Government.^[26] It was intended that the Party should govern through that structure; however, as Mao Zedong admitted, "for the sake of convenience the Party handles many things directly and brushes aside the governmental bodies."^[27]

The region in which the Chinese Communists had established their base was a rural one, and there they adopted a policy of land confiscation and redistribution. The implementation of this was accomplished not through bureaucratic means, but by the peasants themselves and to the accompaniment of class struggle, whereby the participants were intended to become irrevocably committed to the communist cause. This involved the holding of "trials" at which landlords were the accused, their tenants and hired laborers the accusers, and the rest of the local people the jury—trials that resulted in the liquidating of the landlords and in making their lands, houses, agricultural implements, and other property available for redistribution. These trials were conducted in an atmosphere of deliberately whipped-up emotion and—because people must hate those whom they wrong—atrocities were sometimes committed not only against landlords but against their families. During the initial years the lands of rich peasants also were confiscated, with compensation taking the form of redistributed land of inferior quality, and this created worry among middle peasants lest they be placed in the rich peasant category. Even those who held only a little land, because they had cared for it and become attached to it, would not be consoled for its loss into the common pool by the hope of a larger and more fertile plot, and all who benefited faced the uncertain prospect of what might happen to them should the area be reconquered by the Kuomintang.^[28]

In reporting to the Party Center in Shanghai late in 1928, Mao Zedong had written: "Wherever the Red Army goes, the masses are cold and aloof, and only after our propaganda do they slowly move into action."^[29] The Communists' expansion into adjacent areas, though it undoubtedly benefited from enor-

mous efforts in the fields of organization and propaganda, took place under the chilling shadow cast by their socially divisive practices of class struggle. In any case, unable to defend their base against superior Kuomintang armies, the Communists were in 1934 forced to undertake the terrible retreat known as the Long March. In northwestern China, reduced to a tenth of those who had set out, the remnants found refuge in a small guerrilla base that other Communists had created. After taking it over, they established their headquarters in the small town of Yenan and, thanks to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, were able to exchange the divisive policies of their period in Jiangxi for the unifying cause of national resistance.

Subsequent to the founding in 1949 of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong in effect admitted that the Chinese Communists might not have been able to win the civil war had they not postponed their land revolution in favor of the anti-Japanese united front. To a Japanese visitor who expressed regret over Japan's past aggression against China, Mao declared that there was no need for apologies. Rather, Mao said, the Chinese Communists should thank the Japanese, for it was their invasion that had enabled the Chinese Communists to lay the basis for their postwar rise to power.^[30]

The anti-Japanese united front represented a truce of sorts between the two Chinese sides, and with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War on 7 July 1937 the government designated the communist forces the Eighth Route Army. Thereafter each fought the Japanese in its own way: the government forces attempted to maintain a conventional defense, the Communists a fluid "war of millet and rifles." Elements of the Eighth Route Army, together with their political workers, moved eastward from the Yenan area and began establishing base areas between and around the transport lines and urban centers of North China on which Japanese logistics depended. In their efforts to mobilize the largely apolitical peasantry, the political cadres of the Eighth Route Army were enormously assisted by the people's experience of mopping-up operations by the Japanese army. (Indeed, in his classic Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, Chalmers Johnson declares that as a general rule the

Communists were able to establish guerrilla bases only in areas that had had direct experience with the Japanese army.)^[31]

Because it was economically backward and impoverished, and because the government maintained a blockade against it, the communist territory centered at Yenan could hardly serve as a logistic base for the Eighth Route Army's struggle against the Japanese. Indeed, all that it sent eastward were cadres, recruited from among Chinese who had been attracted to Yenan by the opportunities it afforded for service against the Japanese and who had undergone brief periods of training at Yenan's Resistance University. These cadres joined the political workers of the Eighth Route Army in setting up an array of mass associations based upon occupation, sex, and age—the most numerous being those of peasants, women, and youths, but also including associations of businessmen, teachers, and other middle-class elements. This was much like the activities of the Communists in Jiangxi. but carried on in the far different context of unifying all patriotic elements against the invading Japanese. These mass organizations provided the Communists with a means of aggregating the populace and involving the people in support of the Eighth Route Army: from the membership of the mass associations, they formed supplemental units composed of people who turned from their regular occupations when the need arose to serve as guides, transport workers, stretcher bearers, and nurses. They also drew from these mass associations the recruits for the two lower levels of the three-part military structure—the village militia and the regional guerrillas—on which the main forces could draw for replacements and for expansion. Indeed, by the end of World War II, the Communists' various base areas were supporting main force units totaling between 500,000 and 900,000 men—depending upon whose estimates are accepted—and a far larger number of part-time fighters.^[32]

In nineteen base areas, most of them in North China, the Communists set up village and county governments, and in several of them they established regional administrations resembling the provincial governments functioning elsewhere in China. They collected taxes, ran postal systems, controlled a variety of productive enterprises, operated banks and trading

companies, published newspapers, and ran hospitals. Some of the base areas, no longer dependent on Yenan for a flow of trained political workers, contained their own cadre schools. The representatives sent to regional assemblies were chosen through elections held at local levels, giving the people a sense of participation, and the services of cooperative officials of the Kuomintang regime were welcomed.^[33] But the mass organizations and government were kept under the control of the Party, which had grown as the war progressed.^[34] By its end the Communists had created what Edgar Snow called "the largest guerrilla organization in the world."^[35] In addition, they were leading governments ruling approximately 100,000,000 people and that anticipated the establishment in 1949 of the People's Republic of China.^[36]

Political Control of Revolutionary Forces

Revolutions have their own dynamics, making it peculiarly difficult to conduct them under the control of a unified leadership. The most readily fractured is the relationship between the political heads of a revolutionary movement and its military leaders. Within such a movement, leadership struggles are likely to be settled by purge, and such purges are likely to gain a momentum that gives them lives of their own.

Because they tend to be men who are committed, and because they become habituated to the exercise of independent judgment, the commanders of revolutionary forces are unlikely to prove unquestioningly obedient to orders that experience tells them are impracticable, or to be readily responsive to policies they deem seriously inconsistent with the cause for which they believe themselves to be fighting. Such differences of perspective are likely to become exaggerated when, as is often the case, the top command has its headquarters at a distance, perhaps in an urban center or in another country. That was so, to cite three illustrations, in the cases of the Hukbalahap rebellion, the early phase of the Chinese communist revolution, and the 1954–62 Algerian war of independence.

The Political Bureau of the Philippine Communist Party, its

directives disregarded by the Communist leaders of the Hukbalahap, had physically to leave its secret headquarters in downtown Manila and travel to the Huk headquarters in the Sierra Madre in order to relieve Luis Taruc of the supreme command and appoint josé Lava, the general secretary of the Party, to take his place.^[37] Mao Zedong, while building his Red Army base in Jiangxi Province, refused to follow military policies laid down by the Party Center in Shanghai because he considered them wrong, and when it ordered him to leave the Red Army and report to the Party Center, he did not obey.^[38] During the Algerian war for independence there was bitter strife between political and military leaders in Algeria and between the military leaders and the Algerian government-in-exile in Tunisia; indeed, it took some years after independence had been won for those leadership struggles to end.^[39]

The Chinese Red Army in Jiangxi contained a pyramidal Party structure and had over it a system of political commissars, arrangements providing an alternate chain of command, which in theory should have ensured subordination to the Party Center. They did not because Mao Zedong was the Red Army's top political commissar and because he dominated its internal Party organization. The Chinese Communist Party, like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had an intelligence and security apparatus intended, among other things, to enforce obedience to the Party Center. Its arm was not long enough, however, to reach into Jiangxi, and there Mao had a secret police apparatus of his own. When the leaders of one of the Red armies sided with the Party Center and against Mao Zedong on certain matters of military and agrarian policy, Mao employed that apparatus, to the accompaniment of vague charges of infiltration by a secret Kuomintang organization, to initiate a purge against them and their subordinates. When interrogations are conducted under torture the list of suspects tends to increase by geometric progression, and in this purge some 4,400 men were arrested and between 2,000 and 3,000 lost their lives.^[40] Such purges, it should be admitted, can also occur within non-communist revolutionary movements. In the Algerian war for independence, the commanders of three of the six wilayas, or zones, bitterly at odds with the Algerian govern-

ment-in-exile and also fearful of infiltration by French agents, conducted purges more long lasting than that which took place under Mao Zedong, which were no less deadly.^[41]

Mao Zedong's purge of supporters in Jiangxi of the Party Center helped to precipitate a shift of the Party's headquarters and top leadership from Shanghai to Jiangxi, a move that made it possible to curb his exercise of personal authority. In 1931 a Moscow-trained cadre named Deng Fa was brought there to establish a new political security apparatus, and in 1932 Zhou Enlai replaced Mao as top political commissar of the Red Forces. In 1934, as will be recounted in the chapter that follows, nationalist military pressure compelled the Communists to abandon Jiangxi and undertake the retreat known as the Long March. This damaged the moral authority of those who had been in charge during the immediately preceding period in which Mao had been in eclipse. In consequence, during a pause in the Long March, he succeeded in regaining the ascendancy over the Red Army that he had lost to Zhou Enlai, and the subsequent stages of that retreat found Mao enjoying the support of the political security apparatus as well.^[42] He never again lost it, and in later years, headed by his former bodyguard Wang Dongxing, it became a pervasive organization, which included a security guard force of at least division size.^[43]

External Aid and Foreign Control

It is frequently charged that this or that revolutionary struggle or war of resistance is under the control of an outside power. There is an element of paradox about charges of alien control where struggles against foreign domination are concerned. However, not all conflicts fall neatly into one category or another, and both revolutionary movements and wars of resistance are likely to be given outside help and encouragement. Such help and encouragement may be adduced in support of charges of foreign control, but such charges always deserve to be approached with skepticism.

The problems of the PKP headquarters in Manila with the Huks under the leadership of Taruc, of the Party Center in

Shanghai with Mao Zedong in Jiangxi, and of the Algerian government-in-exile with the six zonal commands in Algeria itself all bear witness to the fact that irregular forces and their commanders are not easily controlled by their own organizational superiors. That being so, logic suggests that it would be still more difficult for a foreign power to exercise domination over them.

The most persistent attempt by one country to control the course of another country's revolution, at least in modern times, was undoubtedly Soviet Russia's long involvement in the affairs of China. In the 1920s the Soviet Union provided military aid in the forms of arms, ammunition, advisers, and instructors to the revolutionary Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek, but found that it could not control him even during the period in which he was dependent on it for essential support. As soon as he had gained access to Chinese financial resources adequate to his needs, he purged the Chinese Communists from the Kuomintang and sent his Russian advisers home. In the 30 July 1949 letter of transmittal of the China White Paper, published in the wake of the Communist takeover, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party were "subservient to a foreign power, Russia."^[44] It did appear so at the time, but after the Sino-Soviet split over a decade later, it became known that the reality had been different. At the end of World War II Stalin had advised the Chinese Communists to make their peace with Chiang Kai-shek.^[45] Stalin had evidently admired Chiang Kai-shek and distrusted the Chinese Communists, and they had justified his distrust by disregarding his advice—advice that, if followed, would undoubtedly have proved fatal to their cause.

It is also instructive to note that in the years beginning with 1949, China provided a sanctuary in which Vietnam's communist insurgents could be trained and refitted. China supplied the artillery that ensured French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, and between 1965 and 1968 some fifty thousand Chinese engineering and anti-aircraft troops were stationed in North Vietnam in support of Hanoi's war effort.^[46] In fact, if the Chinese Communists' account is to be accepted, they extended a total of $20 billion in aid to their Vietnamese comrades. Yet not long after those com-

rades had taken Saigon, they began to expel the residents of Cholon, the city's Chinese quarter, and other people of Chinese race, and in 1979 the two countries fought a border war.^[47]

All this suggests that attempts by outsiders to control a country's revolution are not likely to succeed, and that the gratitude earned by foreign aid—even aid crucial to the success of a revolution or a resistance movement—can be expected to prove transitory.

In pondering the foregoing discussion of the relationship between organization and motivation, one may see the imperative of decentralization that characterizes guerrilla warfare as the key link in a chain. This imperative leads, first of all, to the need for a self-imposed discipline that can only arise from commitment to the objectives of the struggle. Since nationalism motivates so many wars of the third kind, such committed revolutionaries—while they may appreciate outside help—are unlikely to allow their movements to fall under foreign control. The participants may differ over the best means of attaining their common objective. They may also see it from quite different perspectives. Inasmuch as they have staked their lives on it, moreover, their differences are likely to be passionately held. Accordingly, these movements, and particularly revolutionary ones, are by their nature prone to factionalism and leadership struggles, with the connection between headquarters and field commands a particularly sensitive nexus. Indeed, as illustrated by the Chinese case, the need for decentralization of operations leads to horizontal, loosely structured development of the support organizations on which field forces depend, in contradistinction to the verticality of organization that characterizes conventional forces and facilitates command. Finally, in considering the dual factors of organization and motivation, one sees that motivation is the more clearly indispensable requirement for conducting wars of the third kind, while organization may lay the foundations of a post-war structure through which the movement's organization men will govern.