The Fall of Amphipolis
After Akanthos' revolt, the polls of Stagiros followed suit (4.88.2). Then, in the winter of 424, Brasidas marched against the Athenian colony of Amphipolis. Thucydides' account of its fall and his role in the events as one of the two generals responsible for the area has been thoroughly unsatisfying to virtually all modern scholars. Although some have come
[50] Brasidas knows that the Spartans do not need more manpower.
[51] He was, Thucydides notes, "not a bad speaker for a Lakedaimonian" (4.84.2).
to the historian's defense,[52] more have viewed his account as an apologia, written from the perspective of someone conscious of his guilt who aimed at self-exculpation but who offers little in the way of real explanation.[53] Indeed, even Gomme believed that Thucydides was conscious not only of his failure but also of his partial responsibility and that "responsible commanders should not allow themselves to be surprised by the enemy."[54] Many candidates emerge as potential winners in the competition for the most scathing appraisal; but perhaps J. R. Ellis put it most bluntly, accusing the historian of writing a "loaded and misleading version whose inadequacies are very simply explained in terms of a wish on his part to represent his own delinquency in a more favourable light."[55]
Virtually all scholars agree that Thucydides fails to provide an adequate explanation for his inability to anticipate Brasidas' arrival at Amphipolis.[56] On the contrary, as we shall see, the historian does address the situation squarely in the very passage that has received much attention but whose purpose in the narrative has not been fully appreciated; Thucydides' portrayal of his role in the loss of Amphipolis turns out to have much to do with his conception of the relationship between wealth and power. Let us survey the account.
In 4.102, Thucydides begins his description of Brasidas' march against Amphipolis. He underscores the importance of the region by noting all the attempts to found the colony,[57] impressing on the reader the extent to which the Athenians coveted the area. They had made numerous attempts to colonize Amphipolis, finally succeeding in 437; now, Brasidas arrived in the area in the wake of his success in the district. As
[52] E.g, Delbrück, Strategie , 177-78; Meyer, Forschungen , 343; Geschichte , 120, n. 1; Grundy, Thucydides , 30.
[53] E.g., Busolt, GG 3:1154-55, n. 4; Adcock, in CAH 5:244-45; Westlake, Essays , 123-37; Kagan, Archidamian War , 300-302; Roberts, Accountability , 117-18, 128-32. See also Bauman's recent discussion, Political Trials , 57-60.
[54] Gomme, HGT 3, on 4.108.7; Gomme, Greek Attitude , 162; see also Finley, Thucydides , 200.
[55] Ellis, Antichthon 12 (1978):28-29.
[56] For Roberts, Accountability , 130, the "staggering omission" is of any explanation why Thucydides was on Thasos at all. As she notes, Thucydides' location was known to Eukles, and there is no reason to assume there was something amiss with his being there. The issue is not why Thucydides was on Thasos but why he could not get to Amphipolis in time to save it. Interestingly, Thucydides lays no blame on Eukles, who, after all, was on the spot and therefore should have been the one against whom anger was directed; this suggests Thucydides' conscious attempt at detachment from whatever personal judgments he may have had.
[57] This is, in my view, his purpose in mentioning all of the attempts to colonize the place, rather than simply demonstrating his interest in chronology, as some scholars have argued, e.g., Ridley, Hermes 109 (1981):37.
the Spartan general moved toward Amphipolis, Eukles, the Athenian commander on the spot, sent for Thucydides, the other general in the Thraceward region, currently on Thasos, whose intention was "to reach Amphipolis before it yielded at all, but, failing that, to secure Eion" in advance of the Spartans (4.104.5). Upon learning that Thucydides was coming to lend assistance to Amphipolis, Brasidas' reaction was fear and haste, since he was aware that Thucydides
held the contract for the gold mines in that part of Thrace and because of that had great power among the leading men there on the mainland; accordingly, Brasidas sped to gain possession of the polis before Thucydides, if possible, fearing that should Thucydides arrive first, the majority of the Amphipolitans, expecting that he would bring allies from the sea and from Thrace to save them, would no longer come over to his side. (4.105.1)[58]
In this well-known passage, Thucydides supplies a rare piece of biographical information; indeed, the very fact that the historian, loath to bring himself overtly into the narrative, has done so alerts the reader immediately to its importance. Although scholars have remarked on Thucydides' allusion to his own
Brasidas' reaction to the news of Thucydides' approach differed significantly from what it would have been if anyone else had been coming to give assistance, for he knew that Thucydides had great influence among the leaders in the region. Thucydides' personal dunamis in that area resulted from his
[59] As Bauman notes, AClass 11 (1968): 170-78, Brasidas viewed Thucydides' arrival as crucial.
another way, whereas Brasidas would not have hastened so to anticipate any other Athenian general, he saw the need for special celerity in Thucydides' case. This explanation, with its focus on the historian's special influence in the endangered area, is in effect a response to those who apparently doubted that he did in fact hurry to Amphipolis as fast as possible, and who therefore considered him responsible for the loss of the city. Thucydides argues that the situation had special circumstances and provides the reasons in 4.105.1: given the fact that Brasidas knew that it was he, Thucydides, who was coming to help, it was impossible for Thucydides to have arrived in time to save the city.
Thucydides seldom provides autobiographical detail; indeed, its absence from the work suggests that he believed it inappropriate to his History . The very fact that he drew attention to his
Amphipolis fell into Spartan hands. Thucydides describes the reaction in Athens:
When they heard that Amphipolis had been taken, the Athenians plunged into great fear (
), especially because the polis was useful to them both in the supplying of timber for shipbuilding and in revenue of money (chrematon prosodo ), and because, although up to the Strymon the Lakedaimonians had an avenue to Athens' allies if the Thessalians led them, they [the Spartans] could not advance beyond it as they did not control the bridge, since there was a large lake above the town, and toward Eion, Athenian triremes were blocking them. They [the Athenians] also were afraid that their allies would revolt. (4.108.1)
We already knew of Amphipolis' importance to the Athenians in general terms. Now Thucydides comments specifically that the loss of the city caused great fear, especially because it supplied Athens with timber for shipbuilding and chrematon prosodos . What kind of revenue? Amphipolis itself was not tributary; therefore, Thucydides is alluding to another kind of imperial revenue.[61] We can safely draw two inferences. First, wealth from Amphipolis flowed into Athens regularly, since Thucydides refers to it as prosodos . Second, it was dearly substantial, since the
[60] If there is an element of apologia in Thucydides' account, it is probably to be found in his statement that he set out with the intention of reaching Amphipolis, or at least of holding Eion, that is, making Eion part of his original plan.
[61] I agree with Gomme, ad loc., that the phrase does not refer to tribute that Athens was able to collect from the surrounding area by virtue of its control of Amphipolis.
loss of revenue and timber is cited as the chief reason for the Athenians' "great fear" at the loss of the colony.[62] Revenue may have accrued from sacred precincts,[63] but the bulk likely derived from the gold and silver mines for which the area of Mount Pangaion was famous, possessing the "richest mineral deposits" of the entire Thraco-Macedonian region.[64] Without Thucydides' explicit testimony, however, we would not have had firm evidence that Athens successfully exploited the abundant wealth of the region on a regular basis over and above receiving tribute from poleis in that area.[65]
In 4.108.2, Thucydides tells us that Athens now feared a wave of revolts in the area as a result of the fall of Amphipolis, prompted by Brasidas' apparent moderation and generous employment of the catchword and rallying cry
[62] In ATL 3:339, n. 58, an estimate of seventy to seventy-five talents annually is given, though without specific explanation.
[64] Hammond in Macedonia 2:69; also 70-73; Hammond, Macedonia 1:13; J. H. Healy, Mining and Metallurgy in the Greek and Roman World (London, 1978), 46. J. Ramin, La technique minière et métallurgique des Anciens (Brussels, 1977), conveniently lists the ancient sources attesting to the richness of the mines in the Mount Pangaion area, Appendices I, III.
[65] Cf. also Thucydides' remark about the mines which fell under Athenian control following the suppression of the revolt of Thasos, 1.101.3.