Intraphilosophic Factors in Heidegger's Nazi Turning
Fundamental Ontology, Nazism, and Political Philosophy
The account of external factors in the background has identified factors that impinge on, form the background of, and are reflected in Heidegger's fundamental ontology. There can be no doubt that Heidegger's personal and philosophical position reflect the decline of the Weimar Republic and the intensely conservative tendencies of the period. Both of these factors impelled many other German intellectuals of this period, including numerous German philosophers, toward National Socialism. Yet Heidegger was neither an ordinary German nor even an ordinary German philosopher. Since he differed from all other Germans, including all other German philosophers, in the possession of a philosophical position of unusual importance, we must inquire whether there are still other factors, factors internal to Heidegger's thought, that led him in the direction of Nazism.
As a first step, it is helpful to recall the traditional philosophical view of the relation between philosophy and politics. We owe to Plato the idea that philosophy is a necessary condition for the good life. Philosophy, on this view, differs from other disciplines such as shoemaking or chemistry, in that while the other disciplines contribute to a good life and are useful to that end, philosophy is not only useful but moreover indispensable, for philosophers and only philosophers possess unique insight into reality. To put the point more strongly, the good life may well be possible without shoemakers or chemists; but, according to the traditional view, it is not possible without philosophers. It is, then, different if a businessman or a philosopher turns to Nazism. One cannot demand that a businessman possess knowledge that leads beyond the business world. But a philosopher can be held responsible for his political actions since philosophy is intended to afford insight into the political realm.
It is difficult to square the claim for the specific insight of philosophy into reality, including politics, with the actions of philosophers. The actions of philosophers in times of crisis provide no comfort to those who hold that knowing and doing are intimately related. If Nazism is evil, then it is troubling that German philosophers lined up to become members of the NSDAP. Either philosophy was insufficient to discern
the truth in such political circumstances, for instance through a misidentification of Nazism as the good, or knowledge of the truth was insufficient to influence actions as German philosophers flocked to enlist in this cause. Despite philosophical claims for the political utility of their discipline, philosophers have at best an indifferent political record. There is no reason to believe that philosophy as such is either politically indispensable or the source of political insight. Philosophers have certainly not been the model citizens that their superior insight would suggest, although the link between their thought and their actions is often rather tenuous. For instance, Frege's well-known, vicious anti-Semitism seems unrelated to his fundamental contributions to modern logic.[58] On the contrary, the relation between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics is by no means merely contingent, or limited to the impact of external factors, since it follows as well from factors internal to his thought.
The link between Heidegger's thought and his politics is a form of the wider problem of the relation between theory and practice. It is no accident that Heidegger turned to politics, since his philosophy is intrinsically political. Now the claim that fundamental ontology is not only a theory of Being but also political is obviously controversial. The way to understand the relation of Being and Time to Heidegger's politics has sharply divided students of his thought. Aubenque has argued that Heidegger's turn to National Socialism is not a political act since it cannot be deduced from his philosophy.[59] Janicaud, following Aubenque, does not deny that fundamental ontology is implicated in Heidegger's politics but insists on the necessarily apolitical status of his thought.[60] On the contrary, Wolin has described Heidegger's political philosophy in detail.[61]
If fundamental ontology is basically political, then there is an intrinsic connection between ontology, as Heidegger understands it, and politics. Since Heidegger never tired of praising the virtues of ancient Greek thought, not surprisingly it provides obvious antecedents of the political dimension of Heidegger's position. Plato's Republic describes an ideal state based on the self-realization of the individual through what he or she does best.[62] Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics treats of the good for its own sake, that for the sake of which all actions are taken, which belongs to the science of politics. According to Aristotle, the end of politics is the good for man.[63]
Being and Time is an intensely political book in an Aristotelian sense of the term "politics." It is a book concerned with the good in itself, understood as the concern with fundamental ontology. Heidegger rejects the Aristotelian view of human being, although he accepts the general Aristotelian understanding of practical philosophy.[64] According to Heidegger, concern with the problem of Being is indispensable for the good for human being. For both Aristotle the author of the Ni-
comachean Ethics and Heidegger the author of Being and Time , the aim is not merely a theoretical treatise but a work with practical intent. Just as ethics belongs to politics, so Aristotle's account of human affairs points beyond itself to the state that completes it.[65] Similarly, fundamental ontology demands a response to the question of the meaning of Being which cannot leave human being indifferent. Being and Time , which does not offer a series of political injunctions, is not political in the sense of, say, Machiavelli's The Prince or Hobbes's Leviathan , or even Kant's "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch." But it is political in another, more basic sense, concerning the realization of human being in the human context. It is, then, no accident that the entire discussion of "Being" in this work culminates in an analysis of historicality (Geschichtlichkeit ), Heidegger's term for the authentic conception of history, since fundamental ontology and political life are intimately related.[66] Even some thirty years later, after his period as rector, the turning in his thought, and the loss of the Second World War, Heidegger held the same view of the political consequences of the concern with Being. He ends his lectures on the law of sufficient reason with the statement:
Does the specified criterion, that man is a rational animal, exhaust the essence of man? Is it the last word concerning Being, that Being means ground? Does not the essence of man, does not his belonging to Being, does not the essence of Being itself remain still and ever more urgently worthy of thought? . . . That is the question. That is the world question [Weltfrage] of thought. Its answer will decide what becomes of the earth and of the existence of man on this earth.[67]
The turn to politics in general, including real and ideal forms of Nazism, is obviously rooted in Heidegger's philosophical thought. It is not necessary, nor is it my intention, to demonstrate that fundamental ontology necessarily led to National Socialism as its only possibility. This kind of argument, which is sometimes made in political theory, say to explain the relation between Marx, or Marxism, and Stalinism, is difficult at best.[68] My point is rather that fundamental ontology necessarily leads beyond itself to political practice, and that National Socialism represents one of the types of politics acceptable to Heidegger's philosophical perspective. To put the same point differently, I hold that the link between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics is not necessary, but I also hold that it is not contingent.
It is a matter of record that Heidegger, the philosopher of Being, did turn to Nazi politics. This political turning is not contingent since it was inscribed in the essence of his theory, which called for, even demanded, political practice. The fact that his political turn took the form of Nazism
is neither contingent nor necessary, but hardly surprising. It was not necessary in any strict sense and could not therefore be "deduced" since he could possibly have accepted another form of politics. But what in practice took the form of a turning to Nazism was also not contingent, a mere accident as it were, an unfortunate incident, even essentially meaningless as Heidegger later claimed, since the political practice called for by his philosophy in fact suggested either National Socialism or something like it. It is not surprising that Heidegger's philosophy in practice led him toward a Nazi form of political practice. For his position reflected in philosophical dress the same political and social influences of his time which themselves led to Nazism. In short, Heidegger's Nazi turning represents a rather obvious historical confluence, something that comes about at a particular historical moment, a coming together as it were between the external influences on his thought, which also led to Nazism, and his own turning in that direction because of his thought.
Fundamental Ontology and Politics
This general account of factors influencing Heidegger's turn to politics is insufficient without specific textual analysis. As an aid in grasping the specific connection between Heidegger's philosophy and Nazism, we can differentiate three aspects of his thought: his initial philosophical position as described in Being and Time , its evolution in the period between Being and Time and the Nazi turning, and the political application of his philosophical thought in the rectoral address.
Now it is difficult to describe a philosophical position adequately. In virtue of its original character, no simple description is adequate to the complex nature of Heidegger's thought. It is also not possible to attempt anything like a full description of Heidegger's position.[69] Fortunately, that is not necessary for our purposes here. Since the present discussion is concerned with the relation of Heidegger's thought to Nazism, we can restrict our account of fundamental ontology merely to those concepts which form the background of his turn to practical politics, including the question of Being, or Seinsfrage ; Dasein, the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity; and historicity.
Fundamental ontology is intended as a new theory of ontology which takes up the unanswered question of the meaning of Being through a demonstration of "the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being."[70] Heidegger's investigation is based on the ontological difference between Being in general and beings, or entities. The question of the meaning of Being concerns the Being of beings, or entities. "Dasein" is Heidegger's name for human being.[71] According to Heidegger, as a being human being, or Dasein,
differs from other entities, either animate or inanimate, since its understanding of Being is characteristic of it.[72]
In rapid succession, Heidegger sketches the outlines of a view of Dasein. Dasein's way of "Being-ontological" is not tantamount to possessing an ontology, since it is "pre-ontological," that is, a "way that one has an understanding of Being."[73] Dasein always comports itself in terms of its existence, defined as "a possibility of itself; to be itself or not itself."[74] There is, accordingly, a close, in fact a reciprocal, link between Dasein and the Seinsfrage . Since existence is the defining trait of Dasein, the analysis of Dasein requires that existence be considered initially. But since Dasein's existence concerns its Being, an analysis of Dasein requires a prior analysis of the question of the meaning of Being.[75] Hence, an understanding of human being rests on a conceptually prior grasp of Being. On the contrary, the Seinsfrage requires as its condition the analysis of human being. Since Dasein belongs essentially to a world, it possesses an equally primordial understanding of "world" as well as of the entities within it.[76] It follows that the way to respond to the question of the meaning of Being is through an analysis of Dasein: "Therefore, fundamental ontology , from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein. "[77]
So far we have uncovered the reciprocal relationship, the hermeneutical circle so to speak, in the connection between Dasein and Being. Heidegger's thought here and in succeeding works is resolutely centered on Being, not on human being. He does not intend to provide a philosophical anthropology, much less a complete ontology, of Dasein.[78] In fact, Heidegger's interest in human being is confined solely and wholly to its role in providing access to Being. That this is so is shown in two ways in Heidegger's thought. On the one hand, it is visible in the fact that, following the so-called turning in his thought, he later gives up the idea that we can accede to Being through Dasein in his turn away from human being. In the later phase of his thought, he resolutely attempts to think Being without human being. On the other hand, philosophically speaking, his political turn is not motivated, as might be thought, by a basic concern with human being, since this is never Heidegger's fundamental philosophical interest. From a philosophical perspective, it is rather motivated by the underlying concern with Being, which itself leads to politics.
In Being and Time Heidegger has not yet arrived at the idea that Being can be thought without human being. Here, he insists strongly that Dasein is the clue to Being. Since at this stage of his thought the way to Being necessarily runs through human being, fundamental ontology cannot wholly free itself from "philosophical anthropology," which it needs to address. For that reason, Heidegger inquires into the essential
structures of Dasein, which he describes in a preliminary way.[79] Among these essential structures, none is more fundamental than Dasein's understanding of itself in terms of its existence.
According to Heidegger, existence, or the way in which Dasein always understands itself, concerns the possibility to be or not be to itself. He develops this idea in his analysis of the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity. This facet of his view provides a rigorous philosophical statement of the concern with alienation expressed in the traditional German concern with traditional Volksideologie . It further offers an alternative to the Marxist conception of alienation.[80] Heidegger's main predecessor in his understanding of authenticity is Kierkegaard.[81]
"Authenticity" can mean "what is really intended."[82] As applied to human being, authenticity concerns a conception of self-realization through a choice of oneself. Heidegger identifies two basic characteristics of Dasein: "the priority of existentia over essentia and the fact that Dasein is in each case mine."[83] Unlike entities, or mere things, Dasein is intrinsically directed toward the future. It is essentially characterized by the fact that its" 'essence' lies in its 'to be' [Zu-sein]."[84] The Being of Dasein which is in question is in every case its own. On this basis, Heidegger infers that for Dasein the Being that is at issue is its ownmost possibility, namely its possibility either to be or not to be what it essentially is. In an important passage, he asserts that whether Dasein will be or not be its possibility is a matter of choice.
And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can , in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic—that is, something of its own—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself.[85]
Authenticity and inauthenticity are correlative concepts. Both are grounded in the notion of mineness. Heidegger is at pains to stress that the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity does not concern the degree of Being. It follows, although he does not say so explicitly, that the difference concerns the type of Being, in other words the way that Dasein is itself. Since in principle Dasein always in a sense understands its own possibility, the way in which one is oneself is a matter of choice.[86] Although surrounded with numerous precautions to distinguish the analytic of Dasein from other endeavors, Heidegger's analysis of Dasein is similar to other theories of human self-realization.[87] For Heidegger, human being cannot be understood as a rational animal on the ancient Greek model or in terms of Christian theology; it must be
grasped through its own existence, or innermost possibility, which it necessarily understands and either chooses or fails to choose.
Now for Heidegger, a precondition of the thought of Being in an authentic manner is a break with the established tradition of metaphysical thought. For to follow the tradition on the well-known path of ontology is to accept precisely the view that must be "destroyed" in order to recover the original, correct alternative later covered up. Authentic thought of Being, like authenticity in all its forms, requires a withdrawal from the ordinary, in fact from the public in all its forms, where one mainly follows others, into the private sphere where one follows only oneself. On the conceptual level, this requires that one in effect think for oneself as opposed to remaining on paths already marked out.[88] Hence, if for no other reason, Heidegger's conception of the problem of Being in this work demands that he bring about human authenticity as a condition of the working out of the problem itself.[89]
Authenticity is obviously a key conception in Being and Time . There is a clear difference between an idea of authenticity, such as Heidegger's conception, and its practical realization. Special interest attaches to the transition from an understanding of the nature of an authentic person, namely the abstract, or philosophical, theory of authenticity, to actually being authentic in a concrete manner. Heidegger articulates his claim for the transition from a theoretical understanding of human being or Dasein as possibly authentic to authenticity in practice through a number of concepts, above all the notion of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit ).
Heidegger's argument depends on his basic understanding of human being. He summarizes his view of human being through the enumeration of four basic traits.[90] Disclosedness (Erschlossenheit ), which belongs to the Being of human being, primarily concerns care (Sorge ), that is, being in a context at all, and being with whatever is in the context, in Heidegger's language Being-in-the-world and Being alongside entities within-the-world. "Thrownness" is Heidegger's way of indicating that we are dealing with people in concrete situations, not ideal or idealized concepts that function as the subjective pole in a theory of knowledge. "Projection," which also belongs to the Being of human being, is defined as "disclosive Being towards its potentiality for Being."[91] This is Heidegger's designation for the capacity, ingredient in his basic conception of a person, to be aware of one's own capacities, capacities which every individual possesses. "Falling" is the term chosen to indicate that for the most part individuals are not authentic but inauthentic since, although aware of their own possibilities, they fail to choose them.
An awareness of one's capacities, which Heidegger insists we all possess, is merely a precondition to their manifestation. One has to be
aware of possibilities in order to bring them about, but the awareness itself is not the same as their manifestation. If a capacity, such as writing music, can only be realized because the person who possesses it is also aware of the fact, then this awareness is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for its realization. If Bach is unaware that he has the ability to write cantatas, he is exceedingly unlikely to do so. Heidegger addresses the problem of the transition to authenticity, given the imputation of a conception of self-awareness, in a notion of resoluteness.
Resoluteness is the key transitional notion, the way in which Heidegger means to mediate between authenticity as a theoretical concept, an ideal for human being as it were, and its practical realization. According to Heidegger, to be resolute is already to be authentic.[92] There is a faint echo here of Kant's idea of pure practical reason. For Kant, to determine oneself to act according to a principle applicable to every possible rational being is already in a sense to be moral; so for Heidegger, merely to be resolute is already to be authentic. The difference, on which Heidegger insists, is that unlike Kant's view of the subject as necessarily separate from the world, for Heidegger a person is already and necessarily in the concrete context. Resoluteness occurs in the life of a particular person, in a particular situation, at a particular time.
As elsewhere in Heidegger's theory, there are authentic and inauthentic forms of resoluteness. To be resolute is to anticipate a possibility, something a person can choose to be, rather like picking out a lifestyle. Now some possibilities are, in Heidegger's view, inessential because not specifically rooted in the essence of the person as such. Although they affect the person's Being, they do not do so in a way that belongs to that person as distinguished from others. Like Plato, Heidegger seems to hold that there are identifiable characteristics which individuals possess and that they ought to realize these characteristics in their actions, to concentrate on what is specific to them. Resoluteness is authentic, then, when it picks out what is uniquely characteristic of that person-in Heidegger's sibylline language, one's "ownmost authentic possibility."[93] Heidegger's conception seems to contain something like a sense of resistance against other temptations or possibilities, almost like Ulysses resisting the blandishments of the sirens.
The conception of resoluteness invoked in order to account for the practical realization of authenticity is at least as abstract as the abstract concept it is intended to mediate. To point out that a person grasps his or her specific potentials is not the same as showing how this is in practice carried out. We don't have any criteria that allow us to identify what is intrinsic to the individual. Unless one holds that an individual who is resolute about being authentic cannot go wrong, or unless resoluteness is itself the authenticity one seeks, then more needs to be said to rule out
possible incorrect choices of oneself. Heidegger moves closer to the practical level in his account of historicality, or the authentic conception of history.[94]
Heidegger's convoluted discussion of historicality carries special importance within the book for at least two reasons. First, it is plausible to hold that the work as a whole culminates in this passage, in the account of the transition from a manifold account of forms of human authenticity and inauthenticity to the concretely authentic person or group.[95] Second, Heidegger understands time as the indispensable horizon of Being and Dasein as existence. At this point in the analysis existence and time, human being, and Being come together in a supposedly authentic conception of history.
Heidegger provides additional information about his view of resoluteness in the context of his discussion of historicality (Geschichtlichkeit ). The idea of authenticity is initially futural in that the possibility to be realized obviously lies in the future as something that can still come about. Heidegger now renders this conception more concrete by insisting that the possibility to be realized in the future is part of the heritage and, hence, lies in the past. Clearly, a heritage is what is transmitted from the past to later generations. For Heidegger, who here anticipates Gadamer's notion of the tradition as itself valuable, what is "good" is a heritage, since goodness makes authenticity possible, and goodness is transmitted in resoluteness.[96] It follows, since authenticity is understood as the realization of the possibility that most intimately belongs to the individual person, that such possibilities are by their nature traditional in character. There is, then, a fiercely conservative strain in Heidegger's view of self-realization as the free choice of oneself, since to realize oneself, to resolutely seize the most intimate possibility available to one in choosing oneself, is finally to extend past tradition; for tradition itself is the vehicle of the "good." In a fundamental sense, the authenticity made possible by resoluteness is not innovative but repetitive in character; it is not the realization of what is new and unprecedented, but rather the repetition of a prior tradition which as such embodies "goodness." In a deep sense, for Heidegger to be authentic is to embrace or to repeat the past in one's own life through a reinstantiation of the tradition. Since Nazism claimed to embody the values of the authentic German, of the German Volk as German, there is, then, a profound parallel, providing for an easy transition without any compromise of basic philosophical principles, between Heidegger's conception of authenticity through resoluteness and National Socialism.
Heidegger expands on his conception of the transmission of the tradition as intrinsically good by introducing a series of distinctions concerning heritage and resoluteness. The two basic forms of tradition are fate
(Schicksal ), which concerns the individual, and destiny (Geschick ), which affects a group, such as a community or people.[97] Heidegger here notes, as he has done before, that authenticity can be either individual or on the level of the group. What, for lack of a better term, we can call "plural authenticity" can come about if the group authentically shares its heritage and realizes it.[98] When the group shares in an authentic manner that which represents its authentic heritage, then it obviously can be authentic in a plural sense. It is in this sense that he introduces the German idea of the people (Volk ), namely a community (Gemeinschaft ), as distinguished presumably from a society, which shares a common heritage, or destiny.[99]
Heidegger further mentions conceptions of the hero, the moment of vision, and loyalty. The conception of the hero (Held ) is evoked in relation to the authentic repetition of a possibility.[100] We can speculate that the hero is one willing to sacrifice or even die for this cause, that is, the destiny of the Volk . Here, Heidegger stresses the notion of struggle in which the hero acts as a model for others, who can follow in his footsteps as it were. It is this notion which he later applied, during his period as rector, in praise of Albert Leo Schlageter, a young man who was earlier hanged for terrorist acts against French and Belgian troops in the Rhineland and whom Heidegger eulogized as a hero.[101] Heidegger further links resoluteness with the moment of vision (Augenblick ).[102] Like the theological conception of kairos , there is a right time, a propitious instant when things come together, so to speak—a moment when an important action is possible, such as the transition to authenticity in practice through the grasp and reenactment of one's heritage on both the levels of the individual and the group. An important aspect of Heidegger's Nazi turning was his conviction that National Socialism offered the historical moment for the realization of the authenticity of the German Volk .
This account of the basic structure of Being and Time shows that Heidegger's conception of ontology commits him, as a condition of thinking through the problem of the meaning of "Being," to a political understanding of human being, that is, to an idea of the person as mainly inauthentic but as possibly authentic in a concrete fashion. The very concern with fundamental ontology requires a political turn since an authentic thought of Being can only arise on the basis of concrete authenticity. Heidegger's concern with the problem of the meaning of Being is not apolitical; nor is it indifferent to theory and practice in virtue of its concern with the Seinsfrage . Rather, the concern with "Being" is itself intrinsically political.
My argument to this point can be summarized as follows. Heidegger's turn to National Socialism, which cannot be denied, was motivated by factors intrinsic and extrinsic to his philosophical position. Extrinsic
factors include the general sense of despair in the waning days of the Weimar Republic, the concern with Volk ideology, the desire to recover self-respect in the wake of the disastrous defeat in the First World War, and so on. These influences, which were in the air, so to speak, at the time he was working out his fundamental ontology, constitute the wider contemporary context in which his philosophical theory emerged. These extrinsic factors are not merely part of the background but are in fact incorporated into Heidegger's thought in various ways—for instance, in his extensive reflection on the theme of authenticity. The intrinsic factors are those aspects of his philosophical theory which led him toward politics and which further made it possible for him to accept National Socialism. Heidegger's understanding of ontology commits him to a turn to politics, centered on the conception of human authenticity, which demands realization in a political context, as a condition of the authentic thought of Being. Heidegger's turn to Nazism was an obvious attempt to seize a supposedly propitious historical moment. The mere fact that Heidegger's attempt to seize the day was a decision for the darkest night of the human soul should not be invoked to explain his adherence to National Socialism as a mere error of judgment, as a simple mistake, as the kind of mistake anyone, so to speak, could make. The reason is obvious: unlike everyone, or his academic colleagues, or even other philosophers, Heidegger possessed an important philosophical theory, and it is this theory itself which led him from the ivory tower inhabited by German intellectuals toward the political arena.