6
The Gang of Four: Ideologues

Lin Biao's fall reduced the contending political groups to radical ideologues and bureaucrats, the latter headed by Zhou Enlai. Mao tried to bring the two warring groups together, relying on the ideologues to maintain a revolutionary momentum, while counting on the bureaucrats to preserve order and run the economy. However, the two groups were bound to clash on many issues created by the Lin Biao incident. The innocent victims of Lin's conspiracy had to be rehabilitated. But thorny issues were who the innocent victims were, how many of those purged should be rehabilitated, and who should fill the power vacuum created by the purge of Lin's followers and the military's return to barracks. Understandably, Zhou's group wanted to reinstate disgraced cadres in order to correct Lin Biao's mistakes and to remedy the "absolute shortage of experienced cadres," whereas the Gang of Four wanted to promote CR rebels in order to establish their power base within the party-state apparatus.

Power Base

The official news media often referred to the CR radicals as "the Gang of Four's factional system" (xitong ), which "had its own platform, line, policy, theory, and supporting members." The two contradictory terms "faction" and "system" accurately capture the complexities of the CR radical group. The behavior of the four radical leaders—Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen—displayed all the characteristics of a faction. Thanks to close personal ties with Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan became members of the Cultural Revolution Small Group in the initial stage of the CR and then were promoted to the Politburo with her. Wang Hongwen, a leader of the radical workers organization in Shanghai, probably owed his rise to

Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, who must have recommended him to Mao. United by friendship, the four radicals thought as one on every issue, and each of them developed complex factional networks involving subleaders and their followers. They frequently gathered followers into "study groups" or "writing groups," which acted as confidential networks for their factional activities.^[1]

But the Gang of Four was more than a faction because it had developed a well-defined ideology and political program. It regarded itself as representing "Chairman Mao's proletarian headquarters" at the central level and the "new, rising political forces" at the mass level. Often the Gang of Four managed to make official its radical ideology, program, and policy so that they were implemented at the organizational level. It mobilized disadvantaged and discontented social groups against the existing political authority. The recruitment of such well-known followers as Zhang Tiesheng and Wen Hongsheng was based not on narrowly defined personal ties but on what they had done and stood for during the CR. Only after recruitment did followers become close to the Gang of Four. The well-known followers represented a certain type of person rather than unique individuals. The Gang of Four's power base both reflected and shaped its cadre policy.

Selecting the Tenth Central Committee

Immediately after the Lin Biao incident, Zhou Enlai, who was delegated by Mao to manage the daily work of the center, took a moderate domestic and international course for China.^[2] In dealing with the chaotic domestic scene, he demonstrated his political acumen, deftly compromising with the radicals in order to restore a semblance of political stability.

Thanks to Zhou's willingness to compromise with the Gang of Four, the two sides apparently reached an agreement on how to convene the Tenth Party Congress at an extended Central Commit-

[1] Daily Report , 29 June 1977, p. E2; Hong Qi , no. 11, 1977; no. 5, 1979.

[2] In the rural area, Zhou initiated a moderate policy of paying attention to the needs of collectives and individuals, and in the foreign policy arena, he diffused military pressure from the Soviet Union by inviting President Nixon to Beijing.

tee meeting held in May 1973. Qualifications for delegates to the congress included "good political performance during the CR," a criterion that the radicals may have insisted on. As for old cadres who had "made serious mistakes, if they underwent self-criticism, they should be allowed to be delegates." However, a veteran cadre with a "questionable history" was not to be elected. The delegation would be selected by "negotiation" and "voting." A quota probably demanded by the radicals was set up for each occupational category: 30 percent for workers, 25 percent for lower-middle and poor peasants, 19 percent for "revolutionary" cadres, and 5 percent for "revolutionary" inellectuals. The Jiang Qing group also managed to set up an age quota for the delegation: 80 percent of the worker and peasant delegation had to be between eighteen and fifty-five; the same age group had to constitute about 60 percent of the military delegates, cadres, and revolutionary intellectuals.^[3]

Preparations for the congress proceeded secretly; delegates from each province met in its capital under the pretense of "study classes."^[4] These meetings selected an election committee of 104 members with Wang Hongwen as chairman.^[5]

The election committee used the Ninth CC members as the basis for selecting new CC members, first removing Lin Biao's followers (a total of forty-seven people) and then filling the vacancies with those selected by the election committee from the pool of nominees recommended by provinces and municipalities. Heated debate between the two groups ensued. The Zhou Enlai group managed to place some rehabilitated cadres (such as Deng Xiaoping, Wu Lanfu, Wang Jiaxiang, Tan Zhenlin, and Li Jingquan, all of whom were Eighth CC members, but had failed to enter the Ninth CC).^[6] The Gang of Four, by contrast, argued vehemently on behalf of the CR rebels, even nominating nonparty member CR rebels on the grounds that they "had joined the party ideologically, although they have not yet joined the party organizationally." A substantial

[3] Zhongguo Zhongyang Dangshi Yanjiushi, ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang Lice Daibiao Dahui (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1983), 107.

[4] Ibid., 111.

[5] In addition, Wang Hongwen was in charge of revising the party constitution, and he assumed the chairmanship of the preparatory committee for electing the Tenth CC. Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Ye Jianying, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Li Desheng were vice chairmen. Ibid.

[6] Ibid., 112.

number of the young CR rebels entered the Central Committee. For example, Zhang Chunqiao pushed hard for Zhu Gejia, a Shanghai student who had been sent to Xinjiang, in spite of objections from Zhou's group. The final meeting, which was attended by all delegates and lasted only four days (from 24 to 28 August), approved the final list of Tenth CC members.^[7]

Officially labeled "a congress of unity, a congress of victory, and a congress full of vigor," the Tenth Party Congress produced a well-balanced outcome in terms of the membership of the Central Committee; 30 percent were from the PLA, 33 percent were cadres, and 37 percent were representatives from the masses.^[8] This balance was achieved by removing 40 percent of the PLA's Ninth CC members from office and adding twenty-five PLA candidates (six were liberated PLA leaders), forty-three cadres, and forty-eight leaders of the masses. This kind of balance would have been impossible without a conscious effort to maintain equilibrium. Theoretical justification for such equal representation came from the principle of the three-in-one formula—which was first introduced in 1967 as a means to form the revolutionary committees with representatives from the cadres, the military, and the mass organizations—on which the Jiang Qing group probably insisted in order to increase mass representation.

The radicals had reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the Tenth Party Congress. Mass representation made spectacular gains in the Tenth CC, mainly at the expense of PLA leaders; it increased from a mere 25 percent in the Ninth CC to 37 percent in the Tenth CC. By contrast, the PLA's proportion decreased from 43 percent in the Ninth CC to 30 percent, whereas cadre representation increased slightly from 31 percent to 33 percent. In terms of numbers of representatives, cadres were behind the masses. Yet if we take into account the difference between full members and alternate members by giving double weight to each full member, we see that cadres had more power than delegates from the masses.

[7] For the heated debates at the meeting, see ibid., 117–18.

[8] In the Tenth CC, some of the old cadres—Deng Xiaoping, Wang Jiaxiang, Wu Lanfu, Li Jingquan, Li Baohua, Liao Chengzhi, Yang Yong, Chen Chiwei, and Wang Zhen—entered the Tenth CC. But such Gang of Four followers (who were known to have "horns on the head, and scars on the body") as Wang Xiuzhen, Xu Jingxian, Ma Tienshui, Yu Huiping, Jin Zumin, Zhou Hongbao, Chu Chiayao, Dang Zhishan, Xia Fangen, and Xie Zhengyi were also added. Ibid.

Followers in the Tenth Central Committee

Since we know who among the Ninth CC members was purged with the Gang of Four, tables 21–26 attempt to delineate their power base among the three groups. In table 21 we see that under half of the Tenth CC members (41 percent) were removed from their seats when the Gang of Four fell. The scope of this purge indicates that the gang's influence was much more powerful than Lin Biao's: almost twice as many people were purged in Lin Biao's group as purged in the Gang of Four's. Of the 41 percent of the Tenth CC members who failed to make it into the Eleventh CC, 55 percent were mass representatives (54 percent of all the mass representatives at the Tenth CC), 26 percent were PLA representatives (37 percent of all the PLA representatives), and 19 percent

were cadres (17 percent of all the cadres). Needless to say, the Gang of Four controlled the majority of the mass representatives at the Tenth CC.

Table 22 shows a similar distribution of the Gang of Four's influence nationwide: their supporters were heavily drawn from the mass organizations; the 59 percent purge rate among the mass representatives is likely to be lower than the actual figure, because many of the mass leaders who had originally made it into the Eleventh Party Congress were later dropped. The radicals' influence among the PLA was surprisingly high; about 45 percent of PLA members in the sample were identified as having been purged with the Gang of Four. The radicals' weakest point was among party leaders: only 11 percent of them disappeared with the Gang of Four. Twenty-five percent of the government leaders were also purged with the Gang. The 71 percent purge rate of those who held multiple positions clearly indicates that the main power base of the Gang of Four was the former rebels whom they had promoted to leadership positions after Lin Biao's fall.

Table 23 examines the correlation between the number of promotions after 1971 and the probability of being purged with the Gang of Four. Undoubtedly, their followers were those whom the radicals worked hard to place in leadership positions—the beneficiaries

of the gang's cadre line. By contrast, table 24 clearly demonstrates the unpopularity of the radicals among the senior cadres; only six members of the Eighth CC were identified as members of the Gang of Four group.

Table 25 shows that the Gang of Four's ties with any particular field army were very weak because none of the radical members had any particular field army ties—except for Xie Fuzhi. Most of the military leaders who were purged with the Gang of Four were junior officers whom the gang patronized, promoting them to leadership positions on the basis of their "revolutionary spirit." This point is made particularly clear in table 26, which shows that 38 percent of the fourth to eight generation of military leaders were purged with the Gang of Four, although they constituted only 14 percent of all military leaders who reached a high enough level to be included in the sample.

In short, the Jiang Qing group did well at the Tenth Party Congress, partly thanks to Mao's support and Zhou Enlai's willingness to compromise for the sake of unity. They succeeded in making Wang Hongwen vice chairman of the party, probably as a representative of the masses and the younger members. However, a closer look reveals the weakness of the Gang of Four's position. First, they could not command a majority in the Politburo: the radicals controlled five votes (including Kang Sheng), whereas the beneficiaries, headed by Hua, had eight, the survivors had seven, and the rehabilitated had only one. In terms of simple arithmetic, the Gang of Four obviously needed the cooperation of Hua Guofeng's group to carry any majority vote in the Politburo.

More seriously, the ideologues' power base at the provincial level was very tenuous. None of the mass representatives of the Tenth CC

carried the title of first or second secretary to a provincial party committee. Moreover, twenty-eight of the mass leaders at the Tenth CC did not even sit on the standing committee of their provincial party committees. Many of them were instead chairmen or vice chairmen of provincial trade unions, which controlled the newly organized militia. Despite the two years of mass mobilization that disrupted, the entire ruling structure, the CR radicals failed to find entry into party committees once they were reactivated. For this reason, radicals wanted to "open the party committees and make revolution," while "relying on the leftists, not on the party."^[9] In their inability to control the party committees, they frequently set up new party committees—"officials of movement," "underground fighting groups," or "artillery brigades"—to replace the existing leadership of the party organ.^[10] Unlike the Lin Biao group, which tried to seize power from within, the Gang of Four used mass mobilization to seize party committees' power from the outside. They publicly declared, "We must support the revolt of large numbers of the masses in factories against the factory leadership and certain leaders of the third ministry. [We] should seize the power that must be seized."^[11]

Cadre Policy

Ideology

The Gang of Four developed an elaborate ideology, which, while eloquently articulating some of Mao's basic concerns (e.g., the bureaucratization of the party), also directly served its political interests. A good example is Zhang Chunqiao's 1975 article, "On Exercising All-Around Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie," which addressed a central theoretical question: how can one explain the existence of class struggle in a society where the means of production are collectivized and in a Communist Party that theoretically represents the working class? Zhang's answer politicized the concept of "class," making explicit points already discernible in Mao's writing. According to Zhang, not just the distribution of the means

[9] Hong Qi , no. 5, 1979.

[10] Daily Report , 29 June 1977, E2.

[11] Dagong Bao (Hong Kong), 27 January 1977.

of ownership but also economic reward and political power can serve as the basis for forming a class. By arguing that the inequality stemming from differential wages as well as from differential power distribution can also be a basis for class formation, Zhang logically justified in Marxist terms the existence of class struggle in socialist China and in the Communist Party. Any party leader advocating a policy that aggravated the differential distribution of power and wealth could be considered a capitalist roader. In this regard Zhang's view resembles Djilas's devastating criticism of the Communist elite as the "new class," a view articulated by such ultraleftist organizations as the May 16 group and Sheng Wu Lien.^[12]

To the concept of a politicized "class," Zhang Chunqiao added the notion of a "new stage": each new stage of revolution even within a socialist country requires new leadership and new enemies. Whatever the validity of his argument may be, its political significance is clear: he provided a theoretical justification for attacking veteran party leaders and social groups that had benefited from the Chinese revolution—in the name of continuing the revolution.

In order to reach the point where some party leaders could be made into targets of a new revolution, Zhang proposed a distinction between ideology and organization, which the Leninists believed to be inseparable.

There are undeniably some comrades among us who have joined the Communist Party organizationally but not ideologically. In their world outlook they have not yet overstepped the bounds of small production and of the bourgeoisie. They approve of the dictatorship of the proletariat at a certain stage and within a certain sphere and are pleased with some victories of the proletariat because they gain from them. Once they have secured their spoils, they feel it is time to settle down and feather their cozy nests. As for exercising an all-around dictatorship over the bourgeoisie and as for going farther than the first step on the 10,000-mile [li ] march, sorry, let others do the job: here is my stop—I must get off the bus.^[13]

[12] Zhang Chunqiao, On Exercising All-Around Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975); Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York; Praeger, 1957).

[13] Zhang, On Exercising All-Around Dictatorship , 18.

Once ideology and organization were separated, it became possible to argue that those who had led the CCP to the establishment of the People's Republic of China were plausible objects of this new revolution. Zhang allegedly declared, "The current targets of revolution are the democrats who used to eat bran in the old society, were wounded in the war resisting Japanese aggression, shouldered guns in the war of liberation, and crossed the river [the Yalu River] in the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea."^[14] Those who joined the revolution after 1949 were not exempt. "The poor and middle peasants reaped the benefits of land reform. They do not demand a socialist revolution and do not have a revolutionary character any more, whereas the landlords and rich peasants who have been suppressed for almost twenty years are opposed to the capitalist roaders, and their rebel spirit is the strongest."^[15] To the CR radicals, the party's leaders had too much interest in retaining the status quo. "When the war ended, they made profits and rose to the positions of influence; because of their vested interest in the new status quo, they can no longer advance."^[16] In the realms of ideology and policy, "they practice revisionism; in dealing with foreign countries, they practice capitulationism."^[17] These people should be the major targets of the revolution, not "traitors or secret agents, and not types engaged in corruption and degeneration."^[18]

Zhang Chunqiao analyzed workers in a similar fashion. He divided them into four age groups. The first group consisted of "veteran workers" who had started work before the liberation, usually as foremen or technical workers receiving high wages. Their political consciousness, according to Zhang, was not sufficient because "their position has changed and their livelihood has changed." The second group worked initially as "apprentices" both before and after liberation. Although "they had good feelings toward the party and are now the 'backbone' of the factories, they

[14] Hong Qi , no. 8, 1977, 60.

[15] Renmin Ribao , 4 June 1977.

[16] "Document of the Central Committee (Zhongfa ), No. 37, 1977," Issues and Studies , 14(7) (July 1978):81–102.

[17] Renmin Ribao , 4 June 1977.

[18] Ibid.

are influenced too much by 'Soviet revisionism,' and therefore they are too much concerned with material incentives."^[19]

The third group of workers entered factories around 1958 as

contract and temporary workers who suffered under the revisionist line. They rose to the revolution in 1966. Their understanding of line struggle is high, and they have excellent morale and good feelings toward the CR. The problem is that their understanding of the party is rather poor, and their attitude to labor is not quite satisfactory. They don't know what they can and cannot do. Some people have selfish motives in fomenting rebellion. They always go backward after seizing power. In a certain sense they are the new lumpenproletariat. Zeng Guofan used this kind of person to suppress the Taiping Rebellion, and Chiang Kai-shek used to rely on them. These are part of the foundation of our party.

The fourth group covers "new worker," those who became workers after participating in the CR as Red Guards. "They are enthusiastic, simple, eager to learn, with quick reflexes and very few experiences of struggle; they are childish and need tempering."^[20]

Recruitment

While attacking the veteran cadres, the Jiang Qing group endeavored to promote "the new rising forces" (i.e., the CR rebels) who had proven to be "highly sensitive to the two-line struggle, strong in their class view, willing to defend Mao's revolutionary line, and courageous in their opposition to revisionism."^[21]

More specific criteria advocated by the CR radicals included "daring to struggle against the bourgeois reactionary line," "being willing to go against the tide," having a "clear standpoint," being "familiar with leadership" or "being supported by the masses," and "cherishing deep feelings." All these phrases refer to rebels willing to take on the existing leadership. A Yunnan rebel summarized Zhang Chunqiao's elaborate argument in the following way: "The major contradiction at the socialist stage is between capitalist roaders and rebels. 'Rebels' are advanced elements and the basic

[19] Beijing Informer , 16 June 1977.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Hong Qi , no. 2, 1977, 7–12.

force for the revolution; they are 'the essence of humankind.' . . . [One] should take rebel ideology as the guiding principle, and democracy should be given to only rebel factions."^[22]

Since the term "rebel" was too controversial and too vague to be an official criterion and since most of the rebels were young, the Gang of Four advocated the promotion of "young" people, insisting that "the group around twenty-five years old should have one-third of all leadership positions; those forty-five or older are not fit for such positions."^[23] Simple-minded rebels made slogans such as "the older, the more revisionist; the older, the more inclined to the right; the older, the more counterrevolutionary."^[24] At the radicals' insistence, the meaning of the three-in-one formula was altered so that it referred to the young, the middle-aged, and the old, not to the PLA, the revolutionary cadres, and the mass representatives. Having one-third of every leadership group consist of young people became an official policy.

The radicals were accused of having used "two surprise attacks." One recruited unqualified persons to the party, and the second promoted them to high office by skipping several grades—the practice that Deng Xiaoping satirically labeled "helicopter promotion." For example, a Shanghai rebel who had graduated only from middle school was sent to a northeastern province where he became deputy director of the provincial propaganda department. Another Shanghai rusticated youth was ordered into the party by the Gang of Four and was eventually elected to the Tenth CC.^[25] Some people who were not yet party members became party secretaries.^[26]

The radicals apparently used several illegal methods to promote their followers to positions of power. First, when the radicals controlled a unit's organizational department, they used it arbitrarily to replace lower-level leaders with their own followers. Second, they relied on their factional communications channels to scout for

[22] The simpler-minded radicals used "high grade and high wage" to determine who were the powerholders. Renmin Ribao , 4 June 1977.

[23] Among the leaders of the revolutionary committee of Linxian county in Henan about 40 percent were "young people." Renmin Ribao , 5 June 1974. Also for promotion of "young people," see Renmin Ribao , 19 October 1973; 25 October 1973.

[24] Renmin Ribao , 6 October 1977.

[25] Ibid., 26 April 1978.

[26] Hong Qi , no. 2, 1977, 7–12.

potential candidates. For the central government leadership, "they prepared a list of a dozen persons to be appointed to the posts of minister, vice minister, and department and bureau director under the ministries. Some Shanghai cadres were so appointed." Third, "when the former rebels were not allowed to join the party, they complained to Jiang Qing, who specifically instructed the party committees involved to admit them on the grounds that they had 'rebelled and have revolutionary enthusiasm. . . . If you are not willing to introduce them, I will do so. . . . You should rely on that kind of people.'"^[27]

Another widely used illegal method of effecting promotions was the study session. More than 65 percent of the graduates of the Anhui provincial study session attended by workers and peasants were appointed to leadership posts above the county (xian ) level. Similarly, the Anhui provincial party school was a key instrument for recruiting factional members and placing them in leadership positions. When a particular rebel was rejected by party branches at his workplace, the Gang of Four's followers often used their authority to take the case to another unit or to set up a new, temporary branch, which admitted the person. This way of joining the party was known as "entering the party after flying over the sea."^[28] Thus, the Gang of Four "violated party rules and regulations, randomly destroyed the party's cadre management principle, and disregarded materials in the dossier, frequently changing the conclusions that had been reached organizationally and adding forged materials." Through such means, a railway party committee recruited 106 persons in eight days. The CR rebels openly declared, "the party charter is only for consultation"; "rebelling is the only qualification for joining the party, and the best application to it."^[29]

Since most radicals, at least at the beginning of the CR, came from undesirable class backgrounds, the people they recruited were vulnerable to charges of being "political riffraff, reactionary, literary radicals, the scum of society, and dregs and monsters carrying a counterrevolutionary black banner." Since many of them had been politically backward before the CR and were imprisoned

[27] Renmin Ribao , 14 March 1977.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

by the military because of their challenge to the PLA in 1967, they were also condemned: "Those who stank in the past now smell fragrant because they are out of prison."^[30] Since they were activists in the CR, they were also accused: "Their 'heroes going against the trend' were criminals—corrupt thieves, speculators, degenerates, and violators of state laws. Their comrades included those who participated in beatings, lootings, and destruction—the hooligans who disrupted the social order." What the Gang of Four called those with the strongest revolutionary enthusiasm were those who sent secret intelligence to them, filed complaints with them, and wrote pledges of loyalty to them. What they called "new rising forces were those who did not go to work every day, who were unproductive, undisciplined parasites."^[31]

We have no way of knowing how many former rebels were made cadres and then promoted. However, the scattered official figures available seem to indicate that personnel changes in some basic units were sweeping. For instance, the seventh machine-building ministry changed almost 80 percent of the leadership in Beijing factories under its jurisdiction in 1976.^[32] At Wuhan Steel Mill, seven of eleven secretaries were ousted, and the remaining four ran away, reducing production by 45 percent in 1976.^[33] New cadres accounted for 39 percent of the Wushun municipality revolutionary committee.^[34] Radicals in one district allegedly appointed ninety-five new members to county-level standing committees. In Zhengding county 126 young cadres were promoted to deputy secretaries of twenty-five communes.^[35] In one county of Qinghai province, almost 380 cadres were subjected to struggle meetings, more than half of all commune-level cadres were purged, and 201 out of all 321 production-brigade-level cadres were replaced by rebels. Shunde county, in Guangdong province, reported that 25 percent of brigade party committee members were young cadres.^[36] More than two-thirds of all cadres in twenty-three brigades of a Jiangxu province commune were young people (the

[30] Ibid., 4 June 1977.

[31] Ibid., 17 May 1977; ibid., 4 June 1977.

[32] "Document of the Central Committee (Zhongfa ), No. 37, 1977," 139.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Renmin Ribao , 9 June 1973.

[35] Ibid., 10 July 1974.

[36] Ibid., 21 March 1973.

average age was thirty; they had proven themselves during the CR). Another source reported that new cadres amounted to 61 percent of 176 production team cadres.^[37]

During this period, many workers were promoted to cadre positions. At one factory in Henan county, twenty-five workers out of a total of 1,000 were promoted to cadre status.^[38] The Beijing Transformer Factory reported that 30 percent of its cadres and 70 percent of its leading cadres were newly promoted.^[39] The Fuzhou railway bureau reported that one-third of its leadership was composed of newly promoted young people.^[40] In brief, many basic-level units carried out official policy by staffing approximately one-third of their revolutionary committees with the young, but not all of the young people were adherents of the Gang of Four. Who was promoted depended largely on the old cadres' choices.

In 1969, when party rebuilding started, official policy was "to eliminate wastrels, renegades, spies, counterrevolutionaries, and stubborn capitalist roaders." A commune in Henan province reported that it had expelled 3.4 percent of its party members; 1.8 percent more were subjected to various disciplinary measures. Although we do not know what percentage of new recruits entered the party with the aid of the Gang of Four's network, the increase in party membership during the period was very rapid. One Chinese source claimed that "a substantial portion of the 6 million recruited in 1969–73 is suspected to have been composed of rebels."^[41] In the ten years of the CR, the total number of party members doubled to 32 million. This means that on the average, 1.6 million new members were recruited each year.

A majority of the new recruits were under the age of thirty.^[42] At the Gang of Four's insistence, women were actively recruited. Beijing reports that "the overwhelming majority of new recruits were under thirty-five years of age, and women constituted 25 percent of the total."^[43] As a result, the proportion of women among new

[37] Ibid., 14 September 1973.

[38] Ibid., 19 February 1974.

[39] Ibid., 22 October 1973.

[40] Ibid., 27 August 1973.

[41] Dangshi Yanjiu , no. 2, 1985, 57–64.

[42] Beijing Review , 1 July 1973; New China News Analysis (Shanghai), 30 June 1973; New China News Agency (Shenyang), 2 July 1976.

[43] "Comrade Wang Hongwen's Report at the Central Study Class," Issues and Studies 11(2) (February 1975):94–105.

party members increased from about 10 percent in 1966 to 27 percent in 1973.^[44] Another group that the regime actively recruited during this period were ethnic minorities.^[45] Youths who had been sent to rural areas provided a large pool of young people from which new members were recruited.^[46] Most new recruits had good class backgrounds. For instance, 45,000 of the 60,000 new members admitted by the Beijing party committee between 1966 and 1973 were "workers, former poor and lower-middle peasants or children of such families"; just under 3,000 were "revolutionary intellectuals working in the fields of culture, health, science and education."^[47]

Rehabilitation

The fall of Lin Biao, one of the main architects of the CR, put decision-makers in Beijing in a quandary: they had to rehabilitate Lin's victims, but they could not reverse official decisions made during the CR, decisions that usually originated from Lin Biao and were endorsed by Mao. It proved extremely difficult to distinguish Lin's decisions from those made by others during the CR. Many purged cadres demanded rehabilitation on the grounds that they had been his innocent victims.^[48] According to the Gang of Four's charge, Deng Xiaoping, with tears in his eyes, declared in one of his self-criticism sessions that he was "the arch enemy of Lin Biao" and consequently Lin had wanted to "put him in a death situation."^[49] Moreover, the Zhou Enlai and the Jiang Qing groups disagreed about who should be rehabilitated.

According to a Taiwanese source, Wang Dongxing, vice chairman of the CCP at this time, sent a list of ten types of cadres to be liberated and ten types not to be liberated to a specially convened work conference. He ended his instructions by remarking, "This is party 'policy.' If there are any errors, I request comrades to point

[44] Joan Mahoney, "Problems in China's Party Rebuilding," Current Scene 15(3) (March 1977); Robert Martin, Party Recruitment in China: Pattern and Prospect (New York: Columbia University, Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute); Renmin Ribao , 27 June 1973.

[45] Renmin Ribao , 6 October 1973.

[46] NCNA (Beijing), January 21, 1975; Beijing Review , no. 22, May 31, 1974, 20.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Daily Report , 7 November 1978.

[49] Xuexi Yu Pipan , no. 5, 1976, 18–20.

them out. I personally assume responsibility."^[50] This blunt statment implies how sensitive the issue was.

Official policy granted rehabilitation to all cadres who had been purged because of their opposition to Lin Biao's line and to his rise within the party. All those who had been purged for errors in "supporting the left" during the CR were exonerated. As noted, many cadres had supported conservative mass organizations during the CR, and for that reason they were rejected by the radicals. Now all cadres who were active in the CR for either conservative or radical organizations became eligible for rehabilitation. Another category included those who were dismissed from office for their lack of "enough revolutionary drive," one of the criteria advanced by Lin Biao for evaluating cadres.^[51]

Official policy also declared that "renegades, enemy spies, and alien classes" should not be rehabilitated even if they had opposed Lin Biao in the past. It also made a distinction between decisions made with Mao's approval and decisions made by Lin Biao alone. Decisions not to be reversed included those made "in accordance with conclusions drawn by our organization after Lin Biao and Chen Boda had reported to the central authority for intructions and obtained approval." Another point reads:

During the great proletarian CR the central authority, acting on Mao's instruction or his approval, made certain resolutions pursuant to the comments submitted by the central departments and provinces. Except for some individual cases which were not properly handled because Lin and Chen had furnished wrong information or issued false orders and directives in Mao's name, which are now being further studied, the overwhelming majority of cases were correctly handled. This should be affirmed and no reversal of the verdict on any of these cases should be allowed.^[52]

Regardless of how these ambiguous and somewhat contradictory policy lines were actually applied to an individual cadre, many high-ranking cadres purged during the CR reappeared, not in a group, but one by one, after Lin Biao's fall. On 1 August 1972, the founding day of the army, such old cadres as Chen Yun, Wang

[50] Daily Report , 24 March 1975, E5.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

Zhen, and Zheng Daiyuan appeared. At every important occasion thereafter, Zhou Enlai brought some more old cadres forward. For instance, Chen Zaidao, the commander responsible for the open challenge to the central authorities by the Wuhan workers in 1967, made his first public reappearance on Army Day, in 1972.

The most surprising comeback was that of Deng Xiaoping, who made his first public appearance in March 1973 escorted by Wang Hairong, Mao's niece. According to a Chinese source, Deng wrote a letter to Mao exposing Lin Biao in August 1972. Commenting on the letter, Mao said,

He does not have historical problems. In the Soviet period he was rectified by leftist opportunist Wang Ming. . . . During the liberation war, he helped Liu Bocheng to make a great contribution [to the final victory]. Besides, after [the CCP] entered cities, he did some good things. For example, he led our delegation to Moscow, and he did not surrender to the pressure of the Soviet Union.^[53]

Later Deng Xiaoping acknowledged his indebtedness to Mao. "Before my second fall in the CR, Chairman Mao wanted to protect me, but did not succeed. The main reason was that Lin Biao and the Gang of Four hated me very much. Their hatred toward me was not as deep as toward Liu Shaoqi, but they did not want to be soft on me. They sent me to Jiangxi to labor. In 1973, Chairman Mao transferred me to Beijing."^[54] Deng acceded to the position of vice premier on 3 March 1973.

In addition, Mao personally rehabilitated many other high-level leaders. In November 1971, he exonerated those involved in the "February Adverse Current."^[55] On 6 January 1971 he personally attended the funeral of Chen Yi.^[56] Sensing that Mao was burying old grudges against some veteran cadres, Zhou Enlai had Renmin Ribao publish an editorial entitled "Punish for Future Use, and Cure the

[53] Mao acknowledged that Deng had made many contributions to the revolutionary struggle as early as 1972: "I have said it before and I want to say it once again." Zhongguo Gongchandang Lishi Jianyi (Jilin: Jilin Chubanshe, 1982), 2:2.

[54] Qixi Niandai , no. 10, 1980, 54.

[55] The term "February Adverse Current" refers to top leaders' opposition to Mao's radical policy of allowing Red Guards to seize power. Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1984), 3:859.

[56] Zhou Enlai instinctively realized the significance of Mao's attendance and told Chen Yi's relatives to transmit the news to other cadres. Zhang Tianyi, Zhonggong Dangshi (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 1985), 345.

Disease to Save the Patient," which boldly declared that "the old cadres steeled in long revolutionary struggles are the party's greatest treasure."^[57] After that, Zhou continued to liberate some cadres and intellectuals, while improving jail conditions and banning physical torture of disgraced cadres.

While the disgraced cadres reappeared one by one, the media renewed the discussion of cadre liberation at the lower level—a theme that had been absent from public news since 1969. This time public discussion went further than before in several ways. First, discussion now focused on the cadres' rich experience of political and functional work, a characteristic of cadres that would have been denounced as counterrevolutionary. By contrast, revolutionary zeal was no longer mentioned as a necessary trait of cadres. Numerous articles describe how experienced older cadres corrected wrong decisions (presumably initiated by inexperienced young cadres), thus avoiding waste.^[58] The phrase "bourgeois reactionary line" was dropped from official use, and the nature of the mistakes made during the CR—the central theme in 1969 discussions—was ignored. When the issue came up, it was only used to argue that cadres who had made mistakes once would be less likely to do so in the future.^[59]

Second, primary emphasis was now given to the "bold and proper use of cadres' work ability" rather than to simple liberation. Clearly the new campaign was aimed at reinstating most of the old cadres in their jobs or in equivalent positions. One provincial newspaper declared,

Those who have already been liberated and who are capable of normal work must quickly be given suitable work. For those who have not been properly assigned, the necessary adjustments must be made after proper investigation and study. Those who are incapacitated must be taken care of according to party policy and actual circumstances. As for those who have not been liberated, their cases must be handled without delay so that appropriate decisions can be reached.^[60]

[57] Renmin Ribao , 24 April 1972.

[58] Survey of China Minland Press (supplement), no. 302, 8 June 1972, 9–11.

[59] Daily Report , 25 April 1972, B2.

[60] Ibid., 3 March 1972, D3; 22 March 1972, E2.

Numerous sources reported that more than 90 percent of all old cadres had regained their positions of leadership in either party committees or revolutionary committees.^[61] For the sake of properly utilizing the cadres' manpower, transferring across functional lines was officially prohibited.^[62]

Third, the work of liberation was carried out by party committees, which by this time had regained their dominant position over other mass organizations including revolutionary committees. Lower-level party committees played a leading role; they set up special sections to handle cadre liberation, organized numerous work conferences to educate cadres on the "party's cadre policy," and on many occasions sent out special investigation teams to check that old cadres were appropriately employed at the basic level.^[63] They arranged for work for those who were unemployed and made readjustments for those who had not been assigned to jobs suitable to their experience.^[64] The official slogan at the time was, "if there is even one cadre who has not been treated in accordance with party policy, the party's cadre policy cannot be considered to have been thoroughly implemented."^[65] Some party committees even organized mobile reportage teams to publicize the good results of carrying out party cadre policy. Discussions of cadre liberation seldom mentioned mass participation.

It seems that virtually all cadres at and below the county level and in basic production units had been liberated by the end of 1972. Some county committees had arranged suitable work for the "few cadres who made serious mistakes and who are not fit to carry out leadership work any more in accordance with party policy." Even the treatment of those with historical problems was changed. Special investigation teams were organized to clear up their problems as speedily as possible, and those whose cases were not yet settled were given temporary assignments.^[66] Only "old and physically feeble cadres" failed to regain employment, and they were treated as retired cadres, not as purged ones. Due respect was given

[61] Ibid., 30 May 1972, C1.

[62] Ibid., 18 January 1973, D9.

[63] Ibid., 28 April 1972, C2; 3 May 1972; 30 November 1972.

[64] Ibid., 3 April 1972.

[65] Ibid., 4 April 1972, C5.

[66] Ibid., February 1972, D4.

to retired cadres. To make use of their experience, old cadres were allowed to take part in party committee meetings dealing with their specialties.^[67]

Political Strategy

Having come to power by purging party leaders during the mass mobilization stage and feeling insecure about their political future, the Gang of Four used whatever formal authority they had to strengthen their power position by recruiting and promoting former rebels to leadership positions within the bureaucracy. After consolidating their own domination in one organization or area, they tried to "colonize" others, often using the news media to interfere with the operation of other organizations—in violation of the jurisdiction and command structure of each field. At the same time they vigorously defended their own exclusive jurisdiction over the propaganda machine.^[68] When it was difficult to penetrate an institution, as was the case with the military, the Gang of Four tried to set up a parallel organization. Their establishment of a militia not under the control of regional PLA commanders, although obviously justified by Mao's military concept of a people's war, was basically intended to develop the Gang's own coercive forces. Having been able to control such mass organizations as labor unions, it endeavored to enhance the political influence of these organizations vis-à-vis the party committee.

In their efforts to consolidate their power positions and to obtain new positions of dominance, the Gang of Four used three different but related methods. First, they tried to promote their followers to key leadership positions of the bureacracy through renewed mass mobilization. When their method failed, they openly demanded their share of power in the government organization. In the last days they combined pressure from the top and bottom by enlisting Mao's support and mobilizing the social forces that benefited from the CR in order to get rid of Deng Xiaoping, a representative of the rehabilitated cadres.

[67] Ibid., 12 January 1973, C28–29, C31, F1.

[68] For instance, in September 1975, the State Council tried to publish a new journal called Ideological Frontline , and Mao approved the project. But because of opposition from the Gang of Four, no issues were published. Hong Qi , no. 8, 1978.

Renewed Mass Mobilization: The Campaign Against Confucius and Lin Biao

Wholesale rehabilitation renewed conflicts between former rebels and their former victims, now rehabilitated. Since the number of leadership positions had probably diminished because of administrative streamlining, old and new cadres now had to compete for the limited number of positions, the former basing their claims on their work ability and experience, the latter stressing their revolutionary zeal. Once reinstated, the old cadres reiterated their previous view that "there is no good man among the rebels." Moreover, they were inclined toward revenge. "To get even with those who struggled against us should be considered a lenient measure. What is wrong with venting one's spleen?"^[69] To them, the CR was "a dark night of ravaging floods and savage beasts," which had been absolutely unnecessary. What China needed after the Lin Biao incident was to "sweep the temple, invite the real gods, return old marshals to their posts, and send little soldiers back to their barracks." To the radicals, the old cadres were simply waiting for an appropriate moment to repudiate them.^[70]

Related to the question of rehabilitating old cadres and the promotion of CR rebels was how Lin Biao's policy should be defined and who should be criticized as his followers.^[71] Zhou Enlai and the old cadres regarded Lin as an ultraleftist who exploited the CR for political gain. Zhou's characterization made the Gang of Four and their followers vulnerable to the same charge, while justifying the rehabilitation of the victims of ultraleftist errors.^[72] The Gang of Four viewed Lin as an advocate of ultrarightism. Thus, criticism of Lin's mistakes could justify the campaign against the military, which had ruthlessly suppressed the Red Guards in 1968, and

[69] "Comrade Wang Hongwen's Report at the Central Study Class," 94–105.

[70] Wang Hongwen insisted that when the old cadres "were liberated and put back in power, they sought every opportunity to liquidate the masses." Ibid.

[71] The conflict between the old cadres and the CR rebels was particularly serious in Zhejiang, where Tan Qilong, a veteran cadre who was made first party secretary, replaced the CR radicals with rehabilitated cadres under the excuse of "carrying out leadership readjustment." Renmin Ribao , 20 March 1978. For Wang Hongwen's support of the Zhejiang rebels, see Beijing Review , 4 February 1977, 10.

[72] "Comrade Wang Hongwen's Report at the Central Study Class," 101.

other kinds of rightist tendencies, while not raising the issue of the excesses of the mass movement or the purges it engendered.^[73]

Endorsing the Gang of Four's view, Mao approved the campaign to criticize Confucius and Lin Biao, which enabled the Gang to kill two birds with one stone. By equating Lin with Confucius, who endeavored to "revive states that were extinguished, restore families whose lines of succession were broken, call back to office those who had retired into obscurity,"^[74] the Gang of Four was able to challenge Zhou Enlai, who was guilty of similar offenses. At the same time they put pressure on the military leaders who had suppressed the revolutionary movement in the preceding state, but who now looked upon Zhou as a counterbalance against the radicals.

Once the campaign started, the Gang of Four pushed for mass mobilization, focusing its attack on "going through the back door," which ultimately aimed at the nepotism of veteran party and military leaders. They had particularly harsh words for local military leaders now resisting the renewed mass campaign.^[75] "What is the use of building an army, if it departs from the class line, the line struggle, and the ideological revolution?"^[76] Wang Hongwen was more blunt:

Soldiers are told to obey orders unconditionally and absolutely. We must know that they are required to obey your orders conditionally, not unconditionally. They should obey whatever conforms to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thought and rebel against whatever does not. All members of the Communist Party execute the instructions of the higher level on the basis of self-consciousness. We should judge the correctness of an order in terms of its line. We only execute correctly following the correct line. They will not be implemented if they are not correct.^[77]

Apparently surprised at the radicals' reckless effort, Mao banned any discussion of "entering through the back door," but he en-

[73] For changes in labeling Lin's mistakes from ultrarightist to ultraleftist in the official criticism, see William A. Joseph, The Critique of Ultra-Leftism in China, 1958–1981 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984).

[74] Hong Qi , no. 2, 1978, 2.

[75] "Comrade Wang Hongwen's Report at the Central Study Class," 102.

[76] Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue Cankao Ziliao: Wenhua Dageming Shiqi (Beijing: Zhonggua Renmin Zhengzhi Xueyuan, 1983), vol. 4, no. 4, 278.

[77] "Comrade Wang Hongwen's Report at the Central Study Class," 99.

couraged the campaign. As the movement spread across the nation, there was no shortage of grievances. All the CR conflicts, plus the new grievances that the mass movement had raised and that had then been ruthlessly suppressed by the military, surfaced again. In addition, many decisions made by the military came under attack.

To make matters more complicated, the radicals' intention to use the campaign to "cultivate new cadres" further intensified the conflict between the rehabilitated and the newly appointed cadres.^[78] After Wang Hongwen, the newly elected vice chairman of the CCP, called for training a million revolutionary successors and promoting them to posts of leadership at all levels, public discussion of cadre rehabilitation stopped. The news media began instead one-sidedly to stress the revolutionary qualities of young cadres and their contributions during the CR, while criticizing the old cadres' attitude toward the newly promoted young ones.^[79] "If we fail to see this fundamental fact [that the young cadres possess revolutionary zeal] and talk of nothing but qualifications, we will not be able to select a large number of outstanding young people for leading posts."^[80] Meanwhile, the radical leaders told their followers what was at stake. "Some powerholders are trying to reverse the achievements of the CR by reinstating all pre-CR leadership, irrespective of their political history or their attitude toward the CR. They made a serious error in personnel management."^[81]

By this time, public discussion had made it clear that cultivating new cadres meant placing them in powerful positions, not making them decorative aides to old cadres.^[82] Resistance to the promotion of young cadres ("young men are unstable, [and] men without mustaches are immature") came under increasingly severe criticism.^[83] For instance, Guangming Ribao bluntly declared: "Maturity in handling things should be judged on the basis of one's class, one's consciousness of line struggle, and one's general orientation, not on the basis of one's age."^[84] A thesis reminiscent

[78] Daily Report , 19 July 1972, B1–4.

[79] Ibid., 10 October 1973, D1; 16 November 1973, B1.

[80] Ibid., 22 March 1973.

[81] Guangming Ribao , 15 July 1977.

[82] Daily Report , 15 October 1973, F1.

[83] Ibid., 2 May 1973.

[84] Ibid.

of CR rhetoric, that of the two-line struggle, was reintroduced to bolster the radicals' position. One provincial radio broadcast declared, "which line [old] cadres should follow and what stand they should take concerning the training and promotion of new cadres are questions at the heart of the struggle between the two classes, the two lines, and the two ideologies."^[85] Criticisms became increasingly harsh. "Many leading cadres failed to uphold the basic line, [and] they imposed a bourgeois dictatorship on the masses."^[86]

Some party committees, largely dominated by the military and old cadres, took evasive measures by simply creating new positions for the younger cadres, thus swelling their ranks in spite of the official policy of administrative simplification.^[87] Others put up a strong fight.

Consequently, workers' unrest, strikes, and armed clashes between rival youth groups spread. Beijing was swamped by petitioners. The leading cadres resorted to a familiar method: some of them simply left their posts as they did at the initial stages of the CR. The economy suffered.

Determined to dislodge the veteran cadres at any cost, the Gang of Four declared that "to disrupt the production of one factory is to put a knot around the neck of the faction in authority," and that "the loss belongs to the state, the responsibility belongs to the faction in authority, and the power belongs to us."^[88] Mao was not, however, in a position to sacrifice the economy for the sake of evolution.^[89] Nor could he agree to the Gang of Four's view that "rebelling against the leadership is going against the tide." He reportedly declared that "the CR has been going on for eight years. It is time to settle down. The entire party and the army should unite."^[90] With Mao's change of mind, the campaign came to an end.

[85] Ibid., 11 June 1973, C1.

[86] Ibid., 21 June 1976, T4. Guangming Ribao , 16 March 1977; 9 May 1977.

[87] Daily Report , 14 March 1974, D5.

[88] Hong Qi , no. 12, 1976, 48; Dagong Bao (Hong Kong), 27 January 1977, 13 December 1976.

[89] "Document of the Central Committee (Zhongfa ), No. 21, 1974."

[90] Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue , no. 4, 1983, 369.

"Forming a Cabinet": Pressure from Above

Having failed to strengthen their power base at the basic level through mass mobilization, the radicals tried to gain a large share of government positions by using the politics of confrontation at the top level. When preparation for the forthcoming National People's Congress was undertaken, Jiang Qing first pressured Zhou Enlai to hand over some government power—probably including the post of chief of staff of the PLA—to the radicals, but she failed to obtain his concession. The radicals then took their case to Mao in the city of Changsha. Wang Hongwen complained to Mao that Deng, unhappy with the CR, did not support the "newborn things" and that Zhou Enlai, although seriously ill, was always busy meeting with the other old leaders. Mao allegedly advised Wang to see Zhou Enlai often and not to form a faction with Jiang Qing. "You should be careful about her."^[91]

While rejecting the radicals' bid to "form a cabinet," Mao suggested making Deng Xiaoping first vice premier, vice chairman of the party, and chief of staff of the PLA. Authorized by Mao, Zhou made the final decisions about personnel after "repeated consultation with other veteran cadres" in the hospital. He gave the ministry of culture and the ministry of physical education to the radicals, but refused the Gang of Four's demands for the ministry of education.^[92] The radicals came away with very few government positions. Although Zhang Chunqiao became vice premier, second to Deng Xiaoping, only four of the twelve vice premiers could be regarded as close associates of the Jiang Qing group.

According to a Taiwanese source, the true picture was different. Mao initially supported the Gang of Four's effort to form a cabinet and obtained Zhou's agreement in selecting cabinet members. But the old cadres in the Politburo strongly opposed the idea. Zhu De allegedly said, "If Premier Zhou does not assume premiership, the position should be rotated and should come to me."^[93] After work-

[91] Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiusuo, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Tebie Fating Shenpan Lin Biao, Jiang Qing Fingering Jituan Zhufan Jishi (Beijing: Falu Chubanshe, 1982), 92.

[92] Renmin Ribao , 17 January 1986.

[93] Zhonggong Yanjiu 11 (23) (March 1977).

ing out their differences in secret meetings, these Politburo members collectively confronted Zhou Enlai with the threat of splitting the party center. Mao had to retreat.

Once placed in charge of the government, Deng Xiaoping proceeded to straighten out the mess created by the CR. He prepared three documents dealing respectively with industry, science and technology, and the academy of sciences. These documents not only repudiated many policies adopted after the CR but also explicitly blamed the Gang of Four for the economic dislocation. For instance, declaring that in many units power was held by "unreformed petty intellectuals, brave elements, and bad people," one version of the "Twenty Articles on Accelerating Economic Development" demanded rectification of the basic leadership. Undoubtedly the group to be rectified were the young cadres who had been promoted by the Jiang Qing group.^[94] To the radicals, those whom Deng wanted to rectify were "the revolutionary intellectuals" and "those people carrying out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line."^[95]

Given the explicitness of the language used in the party program, whatever hopes Mao and Zhou Enlai might have entertained of uniting the rehabilitated cadres and the Jiang Qing group were completely shattered. Now the liberated cadres and the Jiang Qing group found themselves in a situation where one group had to go. In Chinese parlance, the three documents that the liberated cadres prepared were either fragrant flowers or poisonous ones; they could not be both.

The Campaign Against "Rightist Reversal Trends"

The frontal clash between the Gang of Four and the old cadres took place over the issue of educational policy. When Liu Bing, president of Qinghua University, complained that the CR educational policy lowered the quality of higher education, the Gang of Four mobilized the worker-peasant-soldier (gong nong bing ) students, who obviously owed their place in higher educational institutions to the CR's radical admissions policy. The educational debate even-

[94] Issues and Studies , 13(7) (July 1977):90–114.

[95] Hong Qi , no. 10, 1977, 77.

tually developed into a public campaign against "the rightist wind to reverse the correct verdicts," which, among other things, specifically condemned Deng's three documents as the concrete manifestation of the reversal effort. By December 1975, the campaign was widely reported in the official media, and by 1976, although his name was not yet explicitly mentioned, Deng Xiaoping came under attack as the leader of the "rightist reversal wind."^[96]

The death of Zhou Enlai on 8 January 1976 changed the distribution of power in the Politburo. Since Dong Biwu and Kang Sheng were dead, Zhu De and Liu Bocheng mortally ill, and Deng Xiaoping in deep political trouble, the veteran cadres' political power in the Politburo substantially diminished, whereas the beneficiaries of the CR (headed by Hua Guofeng and including Wang Dongxing, Wu De, and Chen Yonggui) emerged as the crucial bloc in the conflict between the Gang of Four and the older leaders. Mao chose Hua Guofeng over Zhang Chunqiao as acting premier, and his appointment was announced on 3 February.^[97]

Understandably, the Gang of Four was unhappy with Hua's appointment, for to them he was not only behind Zhang Chunqiao in seniority, but he was also incompetent, too close to the old veteran cadres, including the late Zhou Enlai, and deeply involved in preparing one of Deng's three documents, "On the Question of Science and Technological Work."^[98] The Gang of Four used the mass media they controlled to surreptitiously criticize Hua.

Although Deng's disgrace helped Hua become acting premier, Hua displayed an ambivalent attitude toward the anti-Deng campaign. He must have known about the Gang's frequent engagement in factional activities and their unpopularity in contrast to Deng's high prestige among old cadres. Mao advised him "not to be anxious and to take your time." Hua criticized Deng in such a manner so as not to upset normal bureaucratic operations: he advised provincial leaders to continue the anti-Deng campaign but cautioned that Deng's problem was "contradiction among the peo-

[96] Harry Harding, "China After Mao," Problems of Communism , 26 (March–April 1977):1–18.

[97] It is reported that Mao asked Ye Jianying to persuade Deng to submit another self-criticism and that Deng refused. Zhou Xun, ed., Deng Xiaoping (Hong Kong: Guangjiaojing Pub., 1979).

[98] Hong Qi , no. 10, 1977, 72–80.

ple" and that neither Deng nor those who had supported his 1975 modernization plans should be purged.^[99]

The Gang of Four, in contrast, took a strong anti-Deng line, frequently making unauthorized appearances and speeches to reinforce their position. Consequently, the campaign against Deng intensified in 1976, and posters publicly denouncing him appeared in Beijing by the end of February. In early March the Gang of Four used the name of Chi Heng to publish an article entitled "From Democrats to Capitalist Roaders," in Hong Qi magazine, defining the main target of the campaign as "a handful of capitalist roaders within the party who have refused to repent." The article explained, following Zhang Chunqiao's theory, how a large portion of party veterans had become "bourgeois democrats and capitalist roaders." Renmin Ribao also published Mao's undated statement, "You are making a socialist revolution, and yet you do not know where the bourgeoisie is. It is right in the Communist Party—those in power taking the capitalist road. The capitalist roaders are still on the capitalist road." Around this time Mao reportedly called Deng a bourgeois democrat who had never been a Marxist. "He said he would never reverse the verdicts," Mao observed. "His words cannot be trusted."^[100]

The Tiananmen Square incident of April 1976 was the turning point in the Gang of Four's attack. When the spontaneous commemoration of Zhou by a large crowd gathered in the square turned into an open protest against the radicals, the Gang of Four persuaded Mao that Deng was responsible. The center made two decisions on 7 April 1976: to remove Deng from all his offices and to appoint Hua as premier and first vice chairman of the CC. Although stripped of all official power, Deng continued to enjoy the veteran cadres' support.^[101]

After the Tiananmen incident, the Gang of Four expanded the scope of the original campaign with a view to replacing old cadres with young rebels. Deng Xiaoping was publicly condemned for having opposed the promotion of young cadres "because their

[99] Lowell Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949–1981 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).

[100] Xuexi Yu Pipan , October 1976.

[101] For Deng's activities during this crucial period, see South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 25 February 1977, 1.

positions are high, their experience is nil, and they do not know what to do."^[102] Deng's view that promotion should be made one grade at a time was criticized as a sinister attempt to "suppress the new cadres who emerged during the CR." Declaring that "a nation-wide network of the capitalist roaders had been formed," the radicals advocated the policy of dragging out "Deng's representatives in provinces" "layer by layer," and carrying out "large-scale surgery on the leadership."^[103] The rehabilitated cadres were obviously their major target. Jiang Qing demanded a public apology for the rebel groups from the old cadres. Zhang Chunqiao joined her: "Every official has made mistakes and every mistake will be opposed. As a result, there is now no single county party committee member who can be trusted, no single prefectural party committee member who can be trusted; among the provincial party committee members and those of the center, no one can be trusted except Chairman Mao."^[104]

During the height of the campaign against rightism, the radicals put pressure on provincial party leaders to promote former rebels to leading positions. Jiang Qing went to Tianjin and demanded that the municipal party committee adopt a quota system for young cadres. According to one source, Jie Xuemao, the first secretary, refused to carry out her wish. Yet Tianjin municipal radio reported that the municipal party committee actually made it a policy not to approve wholesale personnel appointments at lower levels unless they included the required percentage of young cadres.^[105] The Inner Mongolia party committee decided that every provincial, municipal, district, and county party committee would promote two or three young people to positions of leadership by the end of 1976. Some organs without enough qualified young people dispatched teams to look for them.^[106]

In some areas, many young cadres holding positions as deputies were promoted to positions as heads, while erstwhile heads became mere deputies and were forced to retire.^[107] In units where

[102] Hong Qi , no. 6, 1976, 30.

[103] Ibid., no. 2, 1977, 11; Renmin Ribao , 19 February 1975.

[104] China News Analysis , November 1976, 581.

[105] Renmin Ribao , 19 February 1975.

[106] Shijian (Inner Mongolia), January 1978, 28–37.

[107] Daily Report , 15 October 1973, F1.

young people were not promoted, rebels holding positions of deputy chiefs openly challenged their superiors, accusing them of obstructing the movement.^[108] Followers of the Gang of Four in Baoding district illegally fired three district party secretaries and appointed ninety-five young cadres above the county level.^[109]

When Mao died in September 1976, three situational groups shared the power of the Politburo: the radicals with four seats, the beneficiaries of the CR with seven seats, and the survivors of the CR with five seats. Despite the obvious fact that Hua Guofeng's beneficiaries constituted almost a majority, standing between the radicals and the survivors, the Gang of Four failed to form a coalition with them. Instead, they pushed them to collaborate with the old cadres.

[108] "Document of the Central Committee (Zhongfa ), No. 37, 1977 (Part III)," Issues and Studies , 14(9) (September 1978): 78–100.

[109] "Document of the Central Committee (Zhongfa ), No. 37, 1977," 142.