Scoping the Study

Latin Americanists and students of economic thought may wonder: What wider good is served by a social history of ideas, about such a historically conditioned concept as "development," and of ideas generated by such a historical oddity as Peruvian guano? This historian, reared in old-fashioned (materialist) economics, is not one to argue that ideas per se dictated the possibilities and limits of economic development in nineteenth-century Latin America—notwithstanding the famous dictum of Keynes. Especially as no Peruvian politician rose forth as slave to these defunct local economists.

Then why is this book different from all other books? First, it aims to address a general gap in the history of Western economic thought: nineteenth-century notions of development and their transmission and transformation in Europe's first postcolonial societies of Latin America. Well over a generation ago, the genesis of modern economic growth theory initially inspired discussions of formal antecedents. Classical Smithian and Ricardian Political Economy (and their forerunners) harbored dynamic elements of growth—concerns soon replaced by the allocative, efficiency, and marginalist Economics of the late nineteenth

century. Development resurfaced as a formal field only with postwar preoccupations with macroeconomic management and the modern discovery of Third World underdevelopment, or so our story goes.^[21] In this telling, the intervening century gets submerged, along with the dissemination of economic ideas, however improvised or practical, to the rest of the world. Indeed, current studies of transmission processes appear narrowly confined to relations between economists and policymakers rather than addressing relations across geographic, political, and cultural space. Economic historians stand alone in plotting the formidable transformations worked by North Atlantic paradigms on the entire globe since 1800.^[22]

Second—to indulge in grander generalizations—the history of economic thought suffers from an enduring divide between the economic and historical professions. Economists remain notoriously wary of intellectual "trespassing." Since the passing of archaic Continental historical economics and the consolidation of modern economics as a positivist quantitative science, the history of economic ideas—unlike the new cliometric economic history—has lost its direct relevance to mainstream theory.^[23] To some, economic thought portends the most dismal of

[21] E.g., Bert F. Hoselitz, ed., Theories of Economic Growth (New York, 1960), esp. essays by Litiche, McKinley, and Hoselitz; John Fei and Gustav Ranis, "Economic Development in Historical Perspective," American Economic Review 59, no. 2 (1969): 386-400; Albert O. Hirschman, "The Rise and Decline of Development Economics," in Hirschman, Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond (Cambridge, 1981), 1-24. For political angles, H. W. Arndt, The Rise and Fall of Economic Growth: A Study in Contemporary Thought (Melbourne, 1978), esp. ch. 2; J. C. Alcalde, The Idea of Third-World Development: Emerging Perspectives in the United States and Britain, 1900-1950 (Lanham, 1987)—an aptly Peruvian view of the north.

[22] Joseph J. Spengler, "Notes on the International Transmission of Economic Ideas," History of Political Economy 2 (1970): 133-51; A. W. Coats and David Colander, eds., The Spread of Economic Ideas (Cambridge, 1989), esp. editors' introduction lamenting primitive state of field, even among distinguished economists represented. Also Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), one of the last offshoots of the historical-institutional school. Noneconomists, however, are widening approaches to the transculturation of ideas; see, e.g., vanguard literary analysis in Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London, 1992).

Sociological "world-systems" analysis rekindles some interest: see Wallerstein's series "Developmental theory Before 1945," Review 13-14 (1990-1991), esp. Jean-Yves Grenier, "La notion de croissance dans la pensée économique française au 18° siècle (1715-1789)," vol. 13 (1990): 499-550; Bipan Chandra, "Colonial India: British Versus Indian Views of Development," vol. 14 (1991): 81-167; and Dieter Senghaas, "Friedrich List and the Basic Problems of Modern Development," vol. 14 (1991): 451-67.

[23] Hirschman, Trespassing ; Donald Winch, "The Emergence of Economics as a Science, 1750-1870," in C. Cipolla, ed., Fontana Economic History of Europe (Glasgow, 1973) 3:507-60; Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory (1929; rpt. New Brunswick, 1990). Hirschman, Gerschenkron, and Hoselitz were the remarkable refugee cohort, eclectic offspring of German historicism, who basically founded modern development; but cf. Gershenkron's influential address "History of Economic Doctrines and Economic History," American Economic Review 59, no. 2 (1969): 1-17, which formalizes split of economic history and economic thought.

Donald N. McClosky, The Rhetoric of Economics (Madison, Wis., 1985), is sole serious "postmodern" critique I know of, from this a vigorously Chicago economic historian. Apart from Marxist scholars, bastion of economic thought is group around History of Political Economy, a journal whose acronym (HOPE ) speaks to their professional marginality.

sciences, given its implied historical relativism of theory. From the economists' perspective, ideas remain a curiosity field, one hermetically sealed from the social and temporal bearings of most working historians.

Historians, for the most part, stand equally guilty of neglect. The materially oriented practitioners of the last generation—the new social history—routinely dismissed economic thought as "ideology." We comfortably inferred its rationalities from convergence with "interest" and its aims from the most tangible of social and class outcomes. Only popular economic mentalities deserved and won greater historical subtlety, diversity, and respect. And isolated from these trends, traditional varieties of intellectual history withered in their vineyard of rarefied philosophical and political themes.^[24]

The recent "turn" of the historical left to cultural and rhetorical analyses holds a rich future for intellectual studies. Yet of all the diverse discourses under deconstruction, economic ideas still seem the least represented or welcome.^[25] Born of ancient aversions to scientistic "bourgeois" economics, this neglect also epitomizes today's easy stampede away from any topics smacking of the materialist and structuralist modes.

Before we turn too fast and trip back into old idealisms, a case must be

[24] For relevant examples, Noel W. Thompson, The People's Science: The Popular Political Economy of Exploitation and Crisis, 1816-1834 (Cambridge, 1984); Maxine Berg, The Machinery Question and the Making of Political Economy, 1815-1848 (Cambridge, 1980); and in the new mode, Garth Stedman Jones, Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832-1982 (Cambridge, 1983). As "ideology," see Louis Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology (Chicago, 1977), or Albert O. Hirschman, "The Concept of Interest: From Euphemism to Tautology," in Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society (New York, 1986), 35-55.

[25] See, e.g., Dominick LaCapra and Stephen L. Kaplan, eds., Modern European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives (Ithaca, 1982); Lynn Hunt, ed., The New Cultural History (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989); Roger Chartier, Cultural History (Ithaca, 1988)—all notable for absence of economic ideas. Some efforts surface in recent Geertzian wanderings of William Reddy or Pierre Bourdieu's strained transfer of Marxist economic categories to "cultural production."

made for a reintegrative social history of economic ideas. Economic thought makes fertile ground—for bridging our fading determinisms, the indispensable achievements of social history, and the rising culturalist historical mood. Economic thought evokes texts and intertextualities, to be sure, but by nature never strays (too far) from their material and political groundings, contexts, and dilemmas.^[26] It crisscrosses classes and cultures and in this case goes well beyond European canons and cores. It actively trespasses on the economists' abandoned realm, without provoking a shooting spree. The history of economic ideas can no longer be orphaned; for at its best, it reconciles our increasingly estranged families of history.

Third, this book may also be a different sort for Latin Americanists. Nowhere is the chasm deeper between mental and structural approaches; nowhere is the study of economic thought both so promising and neglected. In the postwar era, with accelerated import-substituting industrialization and the coeval rise of the Latin American CEPAList school of structuralist economics, historians turned to the evolution of regional economic thought. This, too, was a brief detour, in search of national routes of development or the overwhelming force of North Atlantic thinking.^[27] By the 1960s such concerns had been smothered under the avalanche of Annalesque, neo-Marxist, and dependency studies, both here and there, which swept ideas into antiquarian corners. This massive production of economic and social histories, if exceedingly productive, proved exceedingly broad as well. Little room was left in history for conserving intellectual and political creativity and choice, particularly among maligned historical ruling elites. Since then intellectual culture has been left to our historically mindful but economically

[26] For definitions and critiques of social history of ideas, see Robert Darton, "In Search of the Enlightment: Recent Attempts to Create a Social History of Ideas," Journal of Modern History 43 (1971): 113-32; Dominick LaCapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts," in LaCapra and Kaplan, Modern Intellectual History, 47-85; or Roger Chartier, "Intellectual History or Sociocultural History? The French Trajectories," 13-46. Notable applications to economic ideas (with great political range) include Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age (New York, 1985), esp. ch. 1 discussion, and Joan W. Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York, 1988), pt. 3.

[27] E.g., Celso Furtado, Economic Development of Latin America: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution (Cambridge, 1970); Luis Ospina Vásquez's classic La industria y protección en Colombia 1810-1930 (Medellín, 1955); Luis Roque Gondra et al., eds., El pensamiento económico latinoamericano (Mexico, 1945). North American interest was also short-lived, as in Robert S. Smith, "The Wealth of Nations in Spain and Hispanic America, 1780-1930," Journal of Political Economy 55 (1957): 104-26; Robert M. Will, "The Introduction of Classical Economics into Chile," Hispanic American Historical Review (HAHR ) 44 (1964): 1-21.

illiterate literary and anthropological specialists.^[28] Now, for varied reasons, these boundaries are shifting.

Implicitly, however, ideational arguments always pervaded the region's structuralist historiography, particularly in the dominant dependency synthesis of the formative national era. Economic ideals implicitly served to construct Latin America's "neocolonial" century to 1930. Erratic postcolonial experiments in political and social liberalism, it is now argued, brought few lasting or genuine consequences. But imported economic ideals—the "unifying myth of liberalism"—were another story. The region's nineteenth-century "liberal pause" augured terribly tangible economic legacies: the creation of dependent export and financial structures, capitalist modernization from abroad and above, delayed industrialism—the whole gamut of social and regional disparities bequeathed by the 1850-1930 age of "outward-oriented" growth. Indeed, feverish imitation of Anglo-Saxon free-trade and laissez-faire ideologies made Latin America the purest outpost of liberal orthodoxy in the nineteenth-century world, in this its first true encounter with capitalist modernization.^[29] As seen in the sociological interpretation of Peru, determining economic ideas essentialized the neocolonial order.

Few scholars openly confess that conviction: the nineteenth century as economic "culture conflict." One who has done so deems the encoun-

[28] See Charles A. Hale, "The Reconstruction of Nineteenth-Century Politics in Spanish America: A Case for the History of Ideas," Latin American Research Review (LARR ) 8 (1973): 53-73, for cogent critique of trend. Yet Hale's own work—the best among intellectual histories—itself reveals a trend against economic ideas: Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821-1853 (New Haven, 1968) fully integrates economic ideas, which virtually vanish from científico thinking by The Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico (Princeton, 1989). For rootless idiosyncrasy in recent intellectual history, try Richard M. Morse, New World Soundings: Culture and Ideology in the Americas (Baltimore, 1989); a postmodern sign of shifts is Ricardo Salvatorre's "Markets, Social Discipline, and Popular Protest: Latin America from Charles III to the IMF" (paper presented to the SSHA, 1991).

[29] This general reading comes from Stanley J. Stein and Barbara Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective (New York, 1970); Richard Graham, Independence in Latin America: A Comparative Approach (New York, 1972); Claudio Véliz, The Centralist Tradition in Latin America (Princeton, 1980), chs. 6-7, and ch. 8, "Outward Looking Nationalism and the Liberal Pause"; Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin American America (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1979): Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America (New York, 1984), ch. 1; David Bushnell and Neill Macaulay, The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1988), with its more skeptical ch. 13, "The Liberal Legacy and the Quest for Development." Broadly, these views parallel traditional intellectual histories with their shift from romanticism and positivism to more nationalist twentieth-century "isms": e.g., Leopoldo Zea, The Latin American Mind (Norman, 1963).

ter as having been as powerful in cause and effect as Latin America's primordial sixteenth-century kind. "Enamoured" with ill-fitting European notions of "modernization," tiny urban elites purposefully pursued free-trade individualism as a weapon for full social hegemony over fading rural oligarchies and their recalcitrant, Americanized "folk." The legacy of this postcolonial culture clash was modern Latin America's baneful "poverty of progress."^[30] Triumphal elites, if anything, had shown marked "fears" of genuine national "development."

Such views can also reflect a poverty of research. Our isolated intellectual historians largely bypass economic thinking. Or attention focuses on the obvious Latin vitality of ideas born during the twentieth-century age of inward-directed industrialism—portrayed as the antithesis of the passive, anglicized century behind. In the meantime, studies of Latin American political, literary, nationalist, and popular traditions enjoy increasing sophistication, with all their historical ambiguities, cultural contestations, and multifarious and multinational social origins.^[31] Nineteenth-century thinkers could invent nations that barely existed and project constitutions without states; they spun national myths, composed poetic canons, and reified indigenous masses whom they knew nothing about. What did Latin Americans imagine about development? What did they imagine as national futures as they bought and brought themselves into global markets? The discourse could not have been a mindless, materialist, and monomaniacal carbon copy from abroad.^[32]

[30] E. Bradford Burns, The Poverty of Progress: Latin America in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980), passim. For timely critique, see Florencia Mallon, "Economic Liberalism: Where We Are and Where We Need to Go," in J. Love and N. Jacobsen, eds., Guiding the Invisible Hand: Economic Liberalism and the State in Latin American History (New York, 1988), 177-86—the state-of-the-art collection. For more class-grounded analysis of liberal ideology, see Emília Viotti da Costa, "Liberalism: Theory and Practice," in da Costa, The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories (Chicago, 1988), 53-72.

[31] Joseph L. Love, "Raul Prebisch and the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange," LARR 15 (1980): 45-72; Albert O. Hirschman, "Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin America," in Hirschman, ed., Latin American Issues: Essays and Comments (New York, 1961), 3-42; Tulio Halperín-Donghi, "'Dependency Theory' and Latin American Historiography," LARR 17 (1982): 115-30; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "The Originality of the Copy: The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Idea of Development," in Rothko Chapel Colloquium, Toward a New Strategy for Development (New York, 1979), 53-72 (very interesting on innovation during the transmission of ideas).

[32] An obvious influence here is the historical sociology of ideas proposed by Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983); for examples of strides in other realms, see Nicolas Shumway, The Invention of Argentina (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1991); D. A. Brading, The Origins of Mexican Nationalism (Cambridge, 1985); or Alberto Flores Galindo, Buscando un inca: Identidad y utopía en los Andes (Lima, 1987).

This orphaned status of Latin American economic ideas is reflected in the latest survey literature: in the Cambridge History of Latin American (ed. L. Bethell, vols. 3-4, 1983-85), Frank Safford's and Charles Hale's solid reviews of nineteenth-century social thought barely include economic ideas; yet William Glade's economic survey ignores ideas altogether.

Pursuing visions of development is not just an empirical inquiry, for conceptual dualities impede complex understandings. Periodization itself conceals one gigantic and stifling duality: between Latin America's era of "outward-directed" thinking (1830-1930) and the "inward-looking" developmentalist era after 1929. Other dichotomies include persisting Manichaean divides that pitted intellectual against social forces; national against foreign ideologies; nationalist against comprador strategies; external against internal markets; and elite against popular cultures and politics.^[33] Such divisions must soften in a rounded social history of ideas. But they are fast dissolving anyway—in Latin America's newest mixed bag of developmental and political possibilisms.

Finally, a few words are needed on the scope of this study and the peculiarities of the Peruvians. The "developmental" visions pursued here focus largely on trade policies, diversification, and technological, industrial, and infrastructural progress or on the roles of the state and popular groups in lasting economic growth. One can imagine very different sets of developmental concerns—demography, entrepreneurialism, capital accumulation, finance, foreign investment, human capital promotion, or agrarian surpluses—issues that infused debates in other national republics.^[34]

[33] For similar historiographic critique, see William B. Taylor, "Between Global Process and Local Knowledge: An Inquiry into Early Latin American Social History, 1500-1900," in O. Zunz, ed., Reliving the Past: The Worlds of Social History (Chapel Hill, 1985), 115-90. Despite positive impacts of sociological history, rounded approaches to ideas were arguably advancing before its hegemony; for a relevant overlooked example, see Frank Safford, The Ideal of the Practical: Colombia's Struggle to Form a Technical Elite (Austin, 1976).

[34] For shifting range of developmental concerns, see Paul Streeten, "Development Ideas in Historical Perspective," in Toward a New Strategy for Development, 21-52; Hirschman, "Rise and Decline of Development"; or political analysis in John Sheahan, Patterns of Development in Latin America: Poverty, Repression, and Economic Strategy (Princeton, 1987).

A recent regional historical survey (biographical, with few nineteenth-century thinkers) is Oreste Popescu, Estudios en la historia del pensamiento económico latinoamericano (Bogotá, 1986). For earlier, delimited studies of Peruvian economic ideas, César Augusto Reinaga, Esbozo de una historia del pensamiento económico en el Perú (Cuzco, 1969); Emilio Romero, "Perú," in Roque Gondra, Pensamiento económico latinoamericano (1945), 275-324; Macera, "Historia económica como ciencia"; for survey of social thought, Fredrick B. Pike, The Modern History of Peru (New York, 1967).

There are many reasons for following these facets of development, which are not all that peculiar. First, the setting of the guano-age economy explains a lot. With the enormous commercial, public, and capital resources released by Peru's bird-dung bonanza, the primordial policy questions of the era were in fact how best to channel opportunities of trade into development. Historically, too, the Andean economy was export driven (by silver mining) and marked by a weighty state sector (as viceregal capital of Spanish South America). But second, major transitions had ensued between silver and guano. These shifts—the dramatic example and impact of the North Atlantic's liberal commercial and industrial "revolutions"—most impressed Peruvian observers and became immediately linked to visions and theories of secular progress. Westernized elites everywhere were similarly struck.^[35]

Third, such controversies over trade, diversity, and the state are precisely those isolated in recent dependency visions of the formative nineteenth century. The broad notion here is that free trade forfeited possibilities for diversified development that would have made Latin America part of the industrializing West by 1900. Latin America's historic error, as it were, was taking commercial observer status during the first industrial revolution. By the century's end specialization had transformed colonial backwardness into modern underdevelopment. As a counterfactual, or would-have-been argument, this needs informing with the developmental options genuinely felt at the time.^[36] Moreover, today's pyrotechnics around regional "neoliberal" policies put these very issues of diversity and statism on the front burner, though thus far without much history behind them.

Fourth, Peruvian elites were an especially urban-bound group. An overwhelming majority of the country's educated males lived and intellectualized in the capital port city of Lima, culturally and economically

[35] Besides Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano, and the general Latin American studies cited above, see Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Idelogies of Western Dominance (Ithaca, 1989), pt. 2, "The Age of Industrialization." See Phyllis Deane, The State and the Economic System: An Introduction to the History of Political Economy (Oxford, 1989), for most general argument putting the state at the center of economic thought; see Hunt, "Interpretive Essay," for incisive analysis of Peruvian policy questions.

[36] Explicit counterfactual approaches are Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano; Bill Albert, South America and the World Economy from Independence to 1930 (London, 1983); for state making, Maurice Zeitlin, The Civil Wars in Chile, or, the Bourgeois Revolutions That Never Were (Princeton, 1984); or advancing global economic studies, such as Jean Batou, ed., Between Development and Underdevelopment: The Precocious Attempts at Industrialization on the Periphery, 1800-1870 (Geneva, 1991).

worlds apart from the predominantly agrarian, peasant, and (60 percent) Indian country around them. In worldly, white Lima—whose population of sixty to one hundred and twenty thousand never passed 5 percent of Peru's total—resonated the country's ministries, press, schools, lobbies, and vibrant café-salon society.^[37] It proves difficult to pick up genuine provincial accents from the nineteenth century, the tones of thinkers who might have spoken of developmental dilemmas in, say, more agrarian or Andean terms. Yet we will encounter progressively expanding national visions in the nineteenth-century developmental imagination.

Finally, although midcentury Lima already boasted professors and formal courses in European "Political Economy," the country produced no economists of note. Peruvian thinkers emerge literally as wide-ranging pensadores, practical and political men, engaged in building up a new nation as much as raising economic growth. Rather than abstract designs, they imbibed the working examples of overseas statesmen and pundits, though the liberalism they absorbed initially enjoyed a quasiscientific and religious status. It was precisely their broader state-building concerns—with fiscality, national sovereignty and integration, true citizenries, and social control—that eventually gave their visions an eclectic and thus developmental compass.^[38] It also made them typical of nation-building elites across nineteenth-century America.

Rather than oddity, Peru in the guano age posed the developmental challenges of republican Latin America in the sharpest terms imaginable. The stark cultural dualism between urban plutocrats and rural folk, the startling disparities between national wealth and disparate levels of

[37] For demographic and ethnic trends, see Paul Gootenberg, "Population and Ethnicity in Early Republican Peru: Some Revisions," LARR 26 (1991): 109-57; for insight into intellectual culture, Gertrude M. Yeager, "Women and Intellectual Life in Nineteenth-Century Lima," InterAmerican Review of Bibliography 40 (1990): 361-93; I say "male" here, for women writers contributed enormously to literary life (and to indigenismo and educational reform) but rarely broached the gender-segregated realm of economics. Nils Jacobsen, "Free Trade, Regional Elites, and the Internal Market in Southern Peru, 1895-1932," in Love and Jacobsen, Guiding the Invisible Hand , 145-76, an example of regional analysis feasible for later periods; less helpful is the sole regional survey, Héctor Ballon Lozada, Las ideas sociopolíticas en Arequipa (Arequipa, 1986).

[38] Political limits (and transformation) of liberal "theory" is now standard fare in European historiography: e.g., Arthur J. Taylor, Laissez-Faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth-Century Britain (London, 1972); see Steven Topik, The Political Economy of the Brazilian State, 1889-1930 (Austin, 1987), for fine (but nonideological) study of reasons of state in export economies. For official liberalism, see Tantaleán, Política económico-financiera , and its unimaginative officialist policy documentation.

development, and the official enthusiasm for the new liberal exporter creeds—all epitomized the processes in play almost everywhere in the region. A country hardly known for the originality and diversity of its economic policies and ideas, Peru has long served as regional exemplar of growth without development, ill served by its myopic ruling cliques.^[39] For all these reasons, Peru merits the close but eminently comparable case study that follows. If Peruvian intellectuals had other visions in mind, the region as a whole likely enjoys a rich but submerged economic tradition.

This book shows that unofficial traditions of "developmentalist" thought infused both elite and popular Peruvian culture, surviving, even thriving, during the country's age of outward-directed growth. Even among highly Westernized dominant classes, active contestation of regnant European practice and theory was commonplace—drawing imaginatively on Peruvian economic experience, nationalist twists of formal theory, serious concerns over export dependence, reasons of state, and a popular-folkloric ethos of productive and distributive justice.

Chapter 2 briefly surveys the influential nationalist thought, aristocratic and artisan, prevalent in Peru before the triumph of free trade at the advent of the guano age. Chapter 3 explores initial guano-age conflicts about diversification—around Juan Norberto Casanova's native industrializing ideology—and how its failure by the 1850s colored liberal orthodoxy and dissenters over the next generation. Chapter 4 is the massive heart of the matter: a reexamination of the 1860s developmentalist schemes of Manuel Pardo and Luis Benjamín Cisneros, the organic intellectuals of guano. Attentive to mounting social costs of liberalism and looming nation-building tasks, their projects for railways, guano, and fiscal reform aspired to broaden domestic development, technology, sovereignty, and participation—the keys, in their minds, to reversing Peru's growing commercial imbalances. Such concerns found audible echoes in nationwide cries for modern communications and economies. Chapter 5, central in other ways, scrutinizes responses to the enveloping crisis of export exhaustion in the 1870s: the reactivation of artisan politics in the era and a new developmental synthesis in the middle-class industrialism of Copello and Petriconi. Chapter 6, a dé-

[39] For sterile images of the nineteenth century, see Macera, "Historia económica como ciencia"; for paradigmatic later analysis, Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru 1890-1977: Growth and Policy in an Open Economy (London, 1978).

nouement of the 1880s, turns to retrospectives on the national fiasco with export liberalism, as in the integrative industrial indigenismo of Peru's first economic historian, Luis Esteves. The conclusions seek to mend the gap between Peruvian ideas and experience and seek implications for study of Latin American social thought. Along the way many other thinkers are met, in what amounts to a genealogy of discontent with fictive prosperities. If little else, Peruvians fervidly imagined their thwarted development.