Preface to the Paper-Bound Book

Some three years have elapsed since I last revised the text of this book. Considering the pace of change in Africa, this is a considerable period. However, if this book has erred in its predictions, it has been in the direction of expecting a faster pace of change in Southern Africa than has in fact taken place. In every fundamental respect, South Africa has not appreciably changed since this book first appeared. Hence, I have resisted the temptation to "update" it, except for the bibliography.

Chapter Ten is perhaps the only one which has been partially invalidated by recent events. The resilience of Portugal and of the white supremacist regime in Rhodesia has given the South African government time to develop a more effective repressive apparatus. South Africa still retains its cordon sanitaire of white controlled territories to the North; and the economic dependence of Lesotho and Botswana on South Africa is reducing the political independence of these former British High Commission Territories to an empty legalism. They are in Jack Halpern's phrase "South Africa's hostages." International pressures against South Africa have continued to mount but they have remained largely ineffective so far. Both the United States and Britain have cautiously inched away from South Africa while still reluctant to take direct action beyond an arms embargo rendered meaningless by the

willingness of other NATO powers to sell the Republic modern weapons. The International Court's failure to pass judgment on South Africa's jurisdiction over South West Africa, while in no sense a vindication of South Africa, gave the Nationalist Government another tactical advantage.

Internally, the apartheid policies of the government did not change during the last years of Verwoerd's regime. The choice of Balthazar J. Vorster as Verwoerd's successor was consistent with the steady evolution of the Nationalist Party toward the right. Just as Verwoerd was further to the right than Strydom, Strydom than Malan, and Malan than Hertzog, so Vorster as an extremist among reactionaries was a logical choice to succeed the assassinated Verwoerd. The implementation of apartheid policies has, however, undergone rapid change in that the trend toward streamlining, rationalization and efficiency in the means of repression which was evident from 1961 continued. Military expenditures have climbed even higher; the secret police have become better trained; the public display of armed violence has been replaced by preventive arrests and invisible repression in the prisons and labor camps. All political groups left of the United Party have been increasingly suppressed and harassed. The United Party is still useful as a harmless pseudo-opposition which allows the government to parade as a parliamentary democracy.

The liberation of South Africa remains contingent on two main external factors. First, the territories north of the Limpopo must come under majority rule. Second, there must be effective outside support for the South African underground and an escalation of sanctions.