VI—
Consolidation of the New United Front

When the December Incident was over, it appeared that the Kuomintang would acquiesce in the new united front by conceding all the areas to the CCP from which it had retreated. But that was not to be the case. It changed its tactics. Anti-Communist pressure was increased. The Kuomintang could no longer maintain the fiction that military friction was "local" without playing into the CCP's hand. The pending negotiations were carried on against the backdrop of another international crisis in 1940. The CCP pursued the goal of taking north Kiangsu to build up the north–south corridor. Finally, the tension erupted in the New Fourth Army Incident in which the Kuomintang's central forces openly took part in the destruction of the Communist forces. When that was over without undermining the Kuomintang's resistance, the united front was consolidated on Mao's terms. During the same period, the division in the CCP leadership over united front policy was intensified. On the one hand, Mao put together a political theory of the war of national liberation in defense of his view of the united front. On the other hand, the CCP launched the Battle of One Hundred Regiments to stave off Chungking's surrender.

"On New Democracy"

"On New Democracy" has been widely regarded as a manifesto of the moderate intentions of the Chinese Communists. In terms of intra-Party politics at the time, the contrary was true. The essay was unacceptable to the Party leadership as a whole because of its radicalism. It had appeared not as a Party document but rather as the personal

Map 10
The Central China Bases, circa 1944

opinion of Mao in a journal.^[1] In spite of its theoretical pretensions, it was an intensely political statement, written in the context of a very complicated struggle involving two sets of triangular relationships. One was the CCP–Kuomintang–Japan triangle; the other was the CCP–Kuomintang–Soviet Union triangle. Without an awareness of political stress generated by these triangles, Mao's intentions in writing "On New Democracy" would be lost to our sight.

Since Mao's vision of the revolution and corresponding strategies as delineated in the Wayaopao Resolution had been set aside, little that he said or wrote about the revolution's goals seemed to be fully his own. At the Sixth Plenum, for instance, he conceded the Kuomintang's initiative in the war and promised to cooperate with it after the war. In mid–1939, however, he returned to the task of defending the rural revolutionary line by raising the most basic issues. His challenge to the urban revolutionary line became more and more strident until it culminated in the concept of New Democracy.^[2]

In "On New Democracy," Mao discussed extensively the various stages of the revolution in China. He began with the familiar two-stage theory of revolution—democratic and socialist. His innovation was to further subdivide the bourgeois–democratic stage into two. According to him, the Opium War of 1840 had ushered in the stage of bourgeois–democracy in China.^[3] China began to be transformed from a "feudal" country to a "semi-feudal," "semi-colonial" country. The Taiping Rebellion, the Sino–French War, the first Sino–Japanese War, and the Reformist movement of 1898 continued the trend until the bourgeois–democratic stage found its full expression in the Revolution of 1911.^[4] But the task of the revolution, i.e., to change a "semi-colonial," "semi-feudal" society into an independent democratic society, was not completed.

A change, however, occurred in China's bourgeois–democratic revolution after the outbreak of the first imperialist world war in 1914 and the founding of a socialist state . . . as a result of the Russian October Revolution. . . .

Since these events, the Chinese bourgeois–democratic revolution has changed, it has come within the new category of the bourgeois–democratic revolutions , and, as far as the alignment of revolutionary forces is concerned, forms part of the proletarian–socialist world revolution .^[5]

[1] It appeared in Chinese Culture . See Selected Works , II, 339, 382. It was met with disapproval. See The Case of Peng Teh-huai , p. 212.

[2] His essays, "The May 4th Movement," "Introducing the Communist ," and "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party"—all written in 1939—were direct precursors.

[3] Selected Works , II, 342.

[4] Ibid. , p. 343.

[5] Ibid. , Emphasis added.

Ex post facto, Mao designated the Chinese revolution since the May Fourth Movement and the founding of the Chinese Communist movement as post-bourgeois–democratic, though still pre-socialist.

In fact, New Democracy was Mao's declaration of war against the Kuomintang and the Republic of China. Sooner or later there had to be a war to decide the question, "Whither China?" Mao was therefore explicit about the state system to be erected under New Democracy. After 1917,

It is no longer a revolution of the old type led by the bourgeoisie with the aim of establishing a capitalist society and a state under bourgeois dictatorship. It belongs to the new type of revolution led by the proletariat with the aim, in the first stage, of establishing a new–democratic society and a state under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes .^[6]

The "dual" character of the Chinese bourgeoisie would induce the progressive elements to join the New Democracy.^[7] The "joint dictatorship" thus resembled the concept of "united front from below and above."

Having sufficiently radicalized the Chinese revolution, Mao nevertheless withheld himself. He insisted that the New Democracy "will need quite a long time and cannot be accomplished overnight. We are not utopians . . . . "^[8] While unmistakably subordinating the Chinese revolution to Soviet leadership in connection with the war against Japan, he hedged against identifying it with socialism proper. This was because of his conviction, I infer, that the New Democracy was "democracy of the Chinese type, a new and special type."^[9] Obviously having Wang Ming in mind, he said, "the universal truth of Marxism must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form . . . . "^[10] This nationalistic injunction stemmed from the basic proposition that

the Chinese revolution is essentially a peasant revolution and that the resistance to Japan now going on is essentially peasant resistance. Essentially, the politics of New Democracy means giving the peasants their rights. . . . mass culture means raising the cultural level of the peasants.^[11]

New Democracy was radical yet uniquely indigenous because it was a peasant democracy. In this sense, the concept was a restatement of the theories of "Asiatic society" and of the "hinterland." These two theories had been advanced by Besso Lominadze, Heinz Neumann, and Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai in the debate at the Sixth Comintern Congress, which

[6] Ibid. , p. 344.

[7] Ibid. , pp. 348–349.

[8] Ibid. , p. 358.

[9] Ibid. , p. 342.

[10] Ibid. , p. 381.

[11] Ibid. , p. 366.

directed the CCP's Sixth Congress in Moscow. "This faction," according to Richard Thornton, "favored a vigorous policy of immediate action to overthrow the Nationalists" following the 1927 coup.^[12] They devised a theory closely resembling the theory of continuous or permanent revolution which would bypass the bourgeois–democratic stage. By stressing that China was characterized by Asiatic mode of production rather than by feudalism, they maintained that the bourgeoisie was only weakly developed in China. Hence, the Chinese revolution "could not inaugurate a capitalist stage, and . . . a policy of immediate armed uprisings would succeed in pushing the revolution directly into its socialist phase."^[13] Without strong bourgeoisie, they also argued, the anti-imperialist struggle of the workers and peasants would take on an international and proletarian character. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai brought up the theory of the "hinterland" or of the "world rural districts."^[14] According to this theory, not only the bourgeoisie but the proletariat as well were weak in China. By this means, he argued for an immediate transition to radical agrarian revolution and the formation of peasant soviets. Stalin, who was aligned with Bukharian at the time, expressly rejected these radical proposals.^[15]

Behind this theoretical orientation of Mao loomed his own political predicament. His revolution was a struggle against the Kuomintang's bourgeois–democracy with Soviet assistance; yet it also pointed ultimately to the independence of the Chinese Communist movement from Soviet hegemony. To the apparent horror of his critics, he averred, "We are now living in a time when the 'principle of going up into the hills' applies . . . . "^[16] He was saying in effect that, with or without the Kuomintang, he would lead a guerrilla war among the peasants. He could not reveal his animus toward Stalin with such candor; he had to resort to a parable. On the sixtieth birthday of Stalin (December, 1939), Mao wrote a message:

Living in a period of the bitterest sufferings in our history, we Chinese people most urgently need help from others. . . .

But who are our friends?

There are so-called friends, self-styled friends of the Chinese people, whom even some Chinese unthinkingly accept as friends. But such friends can only be classed with Li Lin-fu the prime minister in the Tang Dynasty who was notorious as a man with "honey on his lips and murder in his heart."^[17]

A post-war edition of Selected Works , published under Mao's personal supervision, added a footnote explaining Li Lin-fu's character:

[12] Thornton, Comintern , p. 4.

[13] Ibid. , p. 16.

[14] Ibid. , p. 20.

[15] Ibid. , p. 23.

[16] Selected Works , II, 366.

[17] Ibid. , p. 335.

Although feigning friendship, he plotted ruin of all those who surpassed him . . . or found favour in the emperor's eyes.^[18]

One must conclude that New Democracy pointed for the CCP a third path between Republican China and Soviet Russia.

The Latest Development

Just as Wang Ming's slogan, "defense of Wuhan," came at an inopportune time in late 1938, so Mao's New Democracy was premature in early 1940. Mao's opponents clashed with him until they overruled him, in mid-year, on some major issues. They differed with his judgment, stated in the January 28 directive on the general situation, that since the Kuomintang was committed to the policy of unification cum resistance, armed friction with it was only of limited and local significance.^[19]

Two of the issues that had divided the Party since 1939 were outstanding. One was the last major effort by Japan to woo Chiang Kai-shek into a negotiated settlement of the war. The other was the Kuomintang's efforts to regain lost ground in north China, and its alarm over the latest Communist expansion into north Kiangsu and north Anhwei. A third issue was added in the spring of 1940, as the Japanese forces, which had been on the defensive since late 1938, once again turned to the offensive and struck toward the interior.

Nineteen forty was the most agonizing year for Tokyo in the whole China war. Impelled by the imminent threat of a world-wide conflagration, Japan tried to withdraw its strategic combat units from China to regain flexibility in troop deployment. Yet there was always the hope that one more push with the Chungking operation might end the war. Through November, 1940, therefore, Japan proceeded indecisively along three tracks: protracted occupation with Wang Ching-wei's regime; direct contact for peace with Chungking; and strategic sallies toward Chungking. Japan was disappointed by the apparent inability of the Wang Ching-wei faction to draw support for itself. There was still considerable pressure in Tokyo against committing itself to Wang Ching-wei, a step regarded as irrevocable by many. In January, 1940, another moderate cabinet was formed in Tokyo under Admiral Yonai, and he too sent a personal message to Chiang Kai-shek urging peaceful settlement.^[20]

In early December, 1939, Lieutenant Colonel Suzuki Takuji, a

[18] Ibid. , p. 336.

[19] Ibid. , pp. 386–387.

[20] Pacification War , No. 1, p. 255.

Japanese Army attache in Hong Kong, had gotten in touch with a man who claimed to be Sung Tzu-liang through the introduction of a Hong Kong University professor. Sung Tzu-liang was the younger brother of T. V. Soong and Madame Chiang Kai-shek. Peace exploration through this channel was code-named Kiri kosaku^[*] (Kiri Operation), and the Japanese high command showed a great deal of interest in it. Both sides agreed to a preliminary conference in Hong Kong in early March, which held up the inauguration of Wang Ching-wei's government.^[21] In this meeting, March 7–10, the Chungking side was represented by Chang Yu-san, the secretary of the Supreme National Defense Council, and Lieutenant General Ch'en Ch'ao-lin, the vice chief of staff of the Chungking Headquarters, in addition to Sung Tzu-liang. The Japanese side was represented by Colonel Imai Takeo (of the China Expeditionary Forces), Colonel Usui Shigeki (of the Army General Staff), and Lieutenant Colonel Suzuki. A memorandum of preliminary agreement was drawn up.^[22]

According to Colonel Imai, "Just before the signing [of the memorandum], the Chungking delegation received an instruction and began to show disapproval."^[23] A Chinese negotiator related an allegory. Manchuria, according to him, was an unfaithful wife who left her husband for Japan. For Japan to demand Chinese recognition of Manchukuo was tantamount to asking for a formal approval of illicit relationship. Why cannot Japan, he asked, let time solve the problem by contenting itself with actual control of Manchuria? In addition to the question of Manchukuo, the Chinese side objected to regarding the Wang Ching-wei question as an international issue; and it demanded immediate and total withdrawal of the Japanese forces upon return of peace.^[24] The Japanese delegation was bound by the strong opinion in the Army, which demanded Chinese recognition of Manchukuo and which objected to total withdrawal of the Japanese forces from China. The negotiation deadlocked, and both sides agreed to return home for further deliberation pending a second meeting.

While the Hong Kong discussion was in progress, the Japanese side compared Sung Tzu-liang's photograph with the man who had presented himself as Sung, and discovered that they had been dealing with

[21] Taiheiyo^[*] senso^[*] e no michi , IV, 230; Chou Fou-hai jih-chi , p. 52.

[22] Taiheiyo senso e no michi , VI, 232.

[23] Imai, p. 233.

[24] Boyle, p. 291; Taiheiyo senso e no michi , IV, 231. Bunker notes that Chungking was in effect willing to settle for the same terms as those originally worked out by Wang Ching-wei so long as the Wang question could be regarded as a domestic issue of China. That is, upon the restoration of peace, China was willing to enter into a secret agreement to make Manchukuo a joint protectorate of China and Japan, p. 222.

an imposter. They decided that as long as the bogus Sung Tzu-liang was in touch with the Chungking authorities, the question of his identity should not be brought up lest the contact be lost.^[25] But in the meantime Japan could not hold off the Wang Ching-wei faction any longer. On March 30, the "orthodox Kuomin government" returned to Nanking with Wang Ching-wei as the vice-president—a gesture of deference to President Lin Sen in Chungking.^[26]

The Chungking side requested a second meeting, which took place between June 4 and 6.^[27] It also ended without an agreement, but it was decided to arrange a meeting of Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei, and General Itagaki Seishiro, the chief of staff of the China Expeditionary Forces. The planning for the meeting proceeded on the Japanese side with the approval of the second Konoe cabinet, which came into being in July. It is against the background of this and other peace discussions that we must view the Kuomintang–CCP negotiation in 1940.

When Wang Ching-wei's lieutenants defected back to Chungking in January, 1940, it seemed as though the tension in the united front might subside. But that was not to be the case. In early January, General Ch'en Ch'eng made a speech in Shaokuan accusing the Communist forces of "roaming without striking"^[28] —a stinging pun, since "roam and strike" means to fight guerrilla war in Chinese. Immediately, Chu Te and P'eng Te-huai wired a protest to Ch'en Ch'eng. They demanded that he come into the areas behind the Japanese line and see for himself that his allegations were not true.^[29] Also in Jaunary, according to Chiang Kai-shek, General Ho Ying-ch'in called in Yeh Chien-ying and ordered him again to stop the CCP's unauthorized expansion.^[30] This meeting was in private—outwardly conforming to the pattern of negotiation established in 1939. The content of Ho's instructions to Yeh is not known; but it seems in retrospect that this was the beginning of negotiations of a very different character.

On March 1, just before the opening of the Fifth Session of the National Political Council, the commander of the T'ienshui Headquarters, Ch'eng Ch'ien, distributed a pamphlet to the right wing members of the Council entitled Summary of facts about illegal activities and sabotage of the war of resistance by the Chinese Communists . The pamphlet pointed out that the Communist bases constituted a state within a state, bent on subverting the resistance. According to Hatano, Chiang Kai-shek was distraught and ordered the pamphlet

[25] Imai, p. 234.

[26] Taiheiyo^[*] senso^[*] e no michi , IV, 232.

[27] Ibid. , p. 235.

[28] Toa^[*] , July 1, 1940, p. 11.

[29] Hsiang-ch'ih chieh-tuan  . . . , p. 79.

[30] Soviet Russia in China , p. 93.

withdrawn.^[31] But the whole affair could very well have been staged with Chiang's knowledge. In April, the Political Department of the 18th Group Army retaliated by issuing a pamphlet of its own entitled From where does friction come? It adhered to the thesis that friction was local.^[32]

The Eighth Route Army proceeded to eliminate the remainder of the Kuomintang's regional forces in Hopei and southeastern Shansi in early 1940. In February, the local forces under Shih Yu-san and Ting Shu-pen, a Kuomintang special district commissioner, were withdrawing from the western part of the Chi-Lu-Yü District. Thereupon, the CCP esablished the Chi-Lu-Yü District Office.^[33] Its power was still confined to the western part of Small Chi-Lu-Yü. With Small Chi-Lu-Yü in hand, it was now possible for the CCP to set up a political structure which comprised Hopei Province and southeastern Shansi. The Unified Administrative Office for the Southern Hopei District, the T'aihang District, and the T'aiyüeh District came into existence in April. Thus a foundation was laid for the latter-day Chin-Chi-Lu-Yü Border Region.^[34] The forces of Chang Yin-wu and Chu Huai-p'ing were also liquidated early in the year.^[35] In March, Governor Lu Chung-lin of Hopei fled into southeastern Shansi, presumably to seek protection under Wei Li-huang's central forces.^[36]

In early 1940, a new phase in the Kuomintang–CCP relationship was emerging. As the Kuomintang's local and regional forces were eliminated one by one, the buffer that separated the two sides was removed; they began to confront each other. On the Kuomintang's side, more prominent leaders began to make public their opposition to communism. The center of conflict was escalating. In March, Wei Li-huang, who commanded the First War Zone and who was also keeping his eye on Yen Hsi-shan's command in Shansi, gathered ten divisions of his forces in the Lingch'uan–Kaop'ing area and threatened to attack the Eighth Route Army in the Chin-Chi-Yü base.^[37]

At this point, one could detect in the CCP's pronouncements and actions signs of a split in its leadership. On the one hand was the voice

[31] Joho^[*] , No. 31, December 1, 1940, p. 24.

[32] Mo-ts'a ts'ung ho erh lai (The Political Department, 18th Group Army, 1940).

[33] Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 50; Selected Works , II, 418.

[34] Growth of one revolutionary base , pp. 29, 48, 50.

[35] SW , III, 254. In 1942 P'eng Te-huai stated that the Communist side went a bit too far in dealing with Chu Huai-p'ing, in Kuan-yü hua-pei ken-chü-ti kung-tso ti pao-kao , p. 360.

[36] Yen Chün, ed., Chung-Kung wen-t'i chung-yao wen-hsien [Important documents on Chinese Communist problems] (Ta-kung ch'u-pan-she, 1941) (BI), p. 26. Also driven out were Sun Liang-ch'eng and Kao Shu-hsün. Ibid.

[37] Pacification War , No. 1, p. 258.

of those who showed acute concern over the unabating tension with the Kuomintang—the voice which was moreover translated into temporizing acts. On February 1, the Central Committee passed The Decision concerning the Current Situation and the Party's Task . It amounted to a partial reversal of the January 28 directive, written by Mao. The Decision stated,

The characteristics of the current domestic situation are that, in the stage of strategic stalemate between the enemy and ourselves, the inclinations of the big bourgeoisie to capitulate and the inclinations of the proletariat, petty bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie to remain in resistance have developed into a struggle, more obvious and serious day by day. Because the power of the anti-Japanese progressive forces in the country to overcome capitulation and retrogression is still inadequate , the danger of capitulation and retrogression still remains serious. It is still the main danger in the current situation. . . .^[38]

Oddly enough, however, the Decision added that emergencies that could be expected were "partial and local in character."^[39]

The threatening maneuver of Wei Li-huang's central forces against the Chin-Chi-Yü base resulted in a large concession by the Eighth Route Army, which withdrew, of its own accord, from Lingch'uan, Linhsien, Ch'angchih, Hukuan, Chinch'eng, Yangch'eng, Kaop'ing in southern Shansi, and all of northern Honan. In May, Chu Te formalized the concession in a local boundary accord with the Kuomintang army.^[40]

The Communists' withdrawal from southern Shansi was followed in April by a conference of the Northern Bureau in Lich'eng, northeast of Ch'angchih.^[41] It was reported that "for a very brief period following the 'December Incident' some comrades even felt that the united front has already been split and proposed the Left deviation slogan of 'dictatorship of the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie.'" "The mistake of 'Left' deviation barbarism" committed in southern Hopei and southeastern Shansi was corrected at this conference.^[42] Excessive radicalism was evidently connected with the pace of land revolution, disarming and reorganizing of local armed groups. The conference decided to soft-pedal the program of rent and interest reduction and "mass mobilization" in general, as that term is specifically understood in the CCP's parlance. P'eng Te-huai and Liu Po-ch'eng apparently attended and influenced the conference. They were to con-

[38] Mao Tse-tung-chi , VII, 209. Emphasis added.

[39] Ibid. , p. 210.

[40] Pacification War , No. 1, p. 258; Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 44.

[41] Ibid. , p. 47.

[42] Ibid. , p. 48.

duct self-criticisms later for the alleged failure to "mobilize the masses" in southeastern Shansi.^[43]

In contrast to the temporizing inclinations of some CCP leaders, Mao continued to defend his strategic rationale and proceeded to implement it with daring and dispatch. The Lungtung Incident of December apparently failed to intimidate the CCP's resolve to control all of the twenty-three hsien in Shen-Kan-Ning. On March 6, Mao announced that the border region government was being extended to Suite and Lungtung.^[44] Five days later, he gave a report entitled "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front" to a meeting of senior cadres in Yenan. I have already presented my analysis of it in the concluding section of the preceding chapter. The purpose of the report was to assure his critics that the Kuomintang would not surrender if the CCP followed his tactics of piecemeal expansion. The message was Mao's reply to the February 1 Decision of the Central Committee. But this was not all. Mao gave an enormous boost to the CCP's expansion into the Huai River valley in north Kiangsu—areas to the north of the Yangtze River.

The leadership organ for this expansion had been completed when Liu Shao-ch'i arrived in the newly established Central Plains Bureau in September, 1939. It seems that he had some difficulty in securing Hsiang Ying's cooperation. This prompted Mao to write a directive to Hsiang Ying in early 1940. Though I do not have access to this directive, it seems to have been similar to another written by Mao in May:

The Central Committee has pointed out this policy of expansion to you time and again. To expand means to reach out into all enemy-occupied areas and not to be bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions but to go beyond the limits allowed by the Kuomintang, not to expect official appointments from them or depend on the higher-ups for financial support but instead to expand the armed forces freely and independently, set up base areas unhesitatingly, independently arouse the masses in those areas to action and build up united front organs of political power. . . . The Central Committee previously instructed you to enlarge the anti-Japanese armed forces to 100,000 men. . . . Opportunities have been missed before, and if this year they are missed again, things will become still more difficult.^[45]

The Sixth Plenum's decision to redeploy most of the units of the New Fourth Army on the north bank of the Yangtze had been delayed

[43] For P'eng Te-huai's self-criticism, see below, p. 276. Liu Po-ch'eng "Kuan-yü T'aihang chün-ch'ü chien-she yü tso-chan wen-t'i" [Concerning the problems of building the T'aihang Military District and combat operation], Tang ti sheng-huo , No. 31, February, 1941, pp. 8–25. This was written after the Battle of One Hundred Regiments.

[44] Selected Works , II, 418.

[45] Selected Works , II, 431–432.

by nearly one year. Mao's impatience stemmed from two considerations. His scant regard for the Kuomintang notwithstanding, Mao was not deliberately provoking a civil war. On the contrary, his position was that in the face of mounting pressure from the Kuomintang, the New Fourth Army should disengage from exposed areas and get in behind the Japanese lines. If, in addition, the Kuomintang was in danger of capitulation to Japan, that was all the more reason for making haste in building up solid contiguous bases from north to central China. Only by having such bases could the CCP hope to survive the Kuomintang's suppression campaign until some favorable turn in the international situation. Still, Mao was pushing his luck to the limit in early 1940. There was no more of that willingness to carry on the revolution under cover:

It is wrong to make the opposite appraisal or adopt the opposite tactics in the belief that the more our forces expand, the more the die-hards will tend towards capitulation, that the whole country is on the verge of a split and Kuomintang–Communist co-operation is no longer possible.^[46]

In September, 1939, Liu Shao-ch'i had proposed to the Party Center that the New Fourth Army be divided into the North Yangtze Command and the South Yangtze Command; and that the former be subordinated directly to the Central Plains Bureau. He had also requested dispatch of a main force unit of the Eighth Route Army into north Kiangsu to dislodge the forces under the Kiangsu Governor Han Tech'in. The Party Center had agreed.^[47] From this time on, Hsiang Ying seems to have exercised actual command over only those forces south of the Yangtze. What the relationship was between the Party Center and Hsiang Ying in 1940 remains a mystery. Contrary to the later accusations against him, the May directive cited above demanded that he move into Chekiang Province.

In January, an advance unit of the Eighth Route Army from Shantung moved south and linked up with the New Fourth Army in north Kiangsu. The Fourth Detachment of the New Fourth Army, whose insubordination had troubled Liu Shao-ch'i, had been split into two after the execution of its Commander Kao Ching-t'ing. It was reorganized into the Fourth and the Fifth Detachments.^[48] To insure their loyalty and subordination to the Central Plains Bureau, the Fourth Detachment was merged with the Eighth Route Army unit that came down from the north, though the unit designation remained unchanged. The Fifth Detachment absorbed the reliable cadres from the Third

[46] Ibid. , p. 434.

[47] Teng Tzu-hui, "Hsin-ssu-chün ti fa-chan . . . ," p. 394.

[48] Teng Tzu-hui, "Hsin-ssu-chün ti fa-chan . . . ," p. 380.

Detachment which had been transferred from the South Yangtze Command.^[49] By June, the only unit that remained on the south side of the Yangtze was the headquarters unit. The New Fourth Army's life was very precarious in north Kiangsu. But for the first time, base construction began in earnest. In March the Huaipei Su-Wan (North Huai Kiangsu–Anhwei) base was set up around Lake Hungtze.

It is interesting to speculate on why the Fourth, the Fifth, and the Sixth Detachments were west of the Tientsin–Pukow railway in 1939 and 1940. The area to the west of this railway included western Anhwei and eastern Honan, directly south of Hopei and Shansi Provinces. When the battle line was stabilized at the end of 1938, the Japanese forces took most of Shansi and both banks of the Yangtze up to Wuhan but left the area lying between them unoccupied. This area constituted a great loop of the Kuomintang's forward line inserted between north and central China. Northern Honan and southern Shansi was the First War Zone, the remainder of Honan and Anhwei belonged to the Fifth War Zone commanded by Kwangsi warlord Li Tsung-jen. In Communist documents, the area was referred to as the Yü-Wan-Su (Honan–Anhwei–Kiangsu) Border Region through 1939. The term disappeared after the local truce and boundary agreement between Chu Te and Wei Li-huang in May, 1940, by which the CCP abandoned northern Honan.^[50] The official map of the CCP for the resistance period does not include the area as anti-Japanese bases.^[51] But in 1939, and well into 1940, some leading cadres of the CCP expected the Japanese forces to advance westward from the Tientsin–Pukow railway to occupy the area. During the strategic dispute in 1938, Mao himself predicted that the Japanese forces would occupy the area east of the line connecting Lanchow, Wuhan, and Canton.^[52] P'eng Hsüehfen, an officer of the Eighth Route Army and admirer of P'eng Te-huai, was dispatched south from Shansi into northern Honan to build a base around K'aifeng in 1938.^[53] He disobeyed Liu Shao-ch'i's order to move eastward because of his belief that the Japanese forces would move farther westward. The main force of his unit did not move east until it was seriously mauled by the Kwangsi army in 1941.^[54]

This pointed up a problem which was likely to have been raised among the CCP leadership. The principle that the Communist forces should move in behind the Japanese lines to avoid unnecessary friction with the Kuomintang forces had better applicability in north

[49] Ibid. , pp. 381, 385.

[50] Growth of one revolutionary base , pp. 6–7.

[51] See map 2.

[52] Selected Works , II, 137.

[53] Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao , V, 161.

[54] Central China Bureau First Plenum , pp. 44–45, 95–100.

China than in central China. The Japanese Army had permanent designs in north China and sought to eliminate all opposition. In central China, with the exception of the Nanking–Shanghai–Hangchow delta, the mission of the Japanese forces was strategic deterrence of the Kuomintang's central forces. Most of the areas that lay behind the Japanese forces were combat zones rather than pacification zones. Moreover, north Kiangsu was the boundary of jurisdiction between the North China Area Army and the 13th Army, which was directly under the command of the China Expeditionary Forces. Pacification campaigns in north Kiangsu were sporadic, less intense, and not well coordinated. The first one did not come until September, 1940.^[55] Hence, the central forces of the Fifth War Zone were capable of backing up the regional forces under Han Te-ch'in and Li P'in-hsien, governors of Kiangsu and Anhwei respectively, without much fear of running into Japanese reaction in the areas east of the Tientsin–Pukow railway.^[56]

In addition, the fact that the CCP did not move into north Kiangsu until 1940 added to its difficulty. By then, the Kuomintang side was fully prepared to thwart unauthorized Communist expansion by military means. If north Kiangsu was to be taken, it was certain to be accompanied by outright military confrontation on an unprecedented scale. The tension began to rise in March as the Fourth, the Fifth, and the Sixth Detachments moved eastward against the western border of Kiangsu. Han Te-ch'in and Yü Hsüeh-chung of the Shantung–Kiangsu War Zone had a force numbering 60,000 to 70,000.^[57] In April, a division and a brigade of Han's force besieged the headquarters of a New Fourth Army's "division" and a training unit east of the Tientsin–Pukow railway for two weeks before being driven back by rescue forces.^[58] On the west side of the railway, the Kwangsi forces were pressing against the New Fourth Army units of Chang Yün-i, P'eng Hsüeh-fen, and Li Hsien-nien.^[59] Then in June, landlords of Hsüi, Laian, T'iench'ang, and Liuho—south of Lake Kaoyu—carried out an insurrection against the Communists,^[60] while Han Te-ch'in ordered fourteen regiments to attack the Communist forces in Kaots'un

[55] Teng Tzu-hui, "Hsin-ssu-chün ti fa-chan . . . , " p. 395.

[56] This was the reason why Liu Shao-chi asked for the dispatch of the Eighth Route Army's main force unit. Ibid. , p. 394.

[57] Johnson, Peasant Nationalism , p. 133.

[58] Ch'en I, Wan-nan shih-pien ti chen-hsiang [The truth about the Southern Anhwei Incident] (Report to Col. David D. Barrett, U.S. Army Observer Section, August, 1944) (Hoover), p. 9.

[59] Selected Works , II, 453.

[60] Teng Tzu-hui, "Hsin-ssu-chün ti fa-chan . . . ," p. 386.

on the border of Chiangtu and T'aihsien.^[61] At the same time, the South Yangtze Command moved across the river to escape the pressure from Ku Chu-t'ung's attack. Shortly thereafter, the remainder of the Eighth Route Army unit, three brigades of the Fifth Column, moved into north Kiangsu. In early fall, Han assembled the largest force totalling 25,000 men against 7,000 Communist troops at Huangch'iao in T'aihsing.^[62]

The deteriorating domestic and international circumstances in the summer were clearly at odds with the foolhardiness implied in Mao's "On New Democracy." The CCP was not in a position to force the Kuomintang to swallow the revolution cum resistance by mobilizing a "joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes" from below, nor was it as yet strong enough to forego the united front with the Kuomintang by "going up into the hills." It is my inference that the Internationalists and some generals rallied against Mao again. It must have appeared to them far wiser to forego an immediate territorial gain and avoid the seemingly inevitable military confrontation. Chang Went'ien indicated this view when he said in August,

the danger of the Left deviation manifests itself in the wavering of the anti-Japanese united front policy. There are some comrades in the Party who think that the united front is necessary only when the national situation is favorable but unnecessary when the national situation turns unfavorable. In certain areas some comrades have completely forgotten about united front work while carrying out the anti-friction struggle with the die-hards. Some even carry on the struggle so that the united front period will quickly pass away and the days of land revolution will quickly arrive. In this, moreover, they feel elated.^[63]

He conceded that struggle within the united front was unavoidable, but it was "only for the purpose of expanding and consolidating the united front, not for the sake of splitting or destroying it."^[64] It was one thing to fight in self-defense but something else to provoke a fight.

To be sure, one also finds Mao warning in March: "At the moment the 'Left' tendency . . . is the most serious danger."^[65] This directive ordered the establishment of the so-called Three-thirds system which marked the turn toward liberalization in the administration of the Communist bases, as will be shown later. But the Three-thirds system was applied only in areas where Communist political power was well

[61] Wan-nan-shih-pien ti chen-hsiang , p. 9.

[62] Ibid. , p. 10.

[63] Lo Fu, "K'ang-Jih min-tsu t'ung-i chan-hsien-chung ti tso-ch'ing wei-hsien" [Left deviation danger in the anti-Japanese national united front] (August 10, 1940), in Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 452–453.

[64] Ibid. , p. 453.

[65] Selected Works , II, 418.

consolidated and beyond any challenge. It had no application in areas which were militarily contested by the Kuomintang and the CCP—areas which were most likely to give rise to friction.

The residual influence of the Comintern, too, was brought to bear in support of closer cooperation with the Kuomintang. On February 22, according to Japanese sources, the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern met in Tschita again. With twenty-seven Asian members attending, the Bureau directed the CCP to oppose the peace movement and to step up its war efforts in coordination with Chungking's counter-offensive.^[66] The previous directive, reported by the Japanese source, made a similar demand on the Chinese Communists in January of 1939.^[67] A lively debate was no doubt under way among the Communist leaders concerning the desirability of a large-scale offensive against the Japanese. The debate was focused on the impact of the new Japanese offensive on the sagging will of the Kuomintang.

The limited offensive undertaken by the China Expeditionary Forces in 1940 was the direct result of the amazing aggressiveness exhibited by the Chinese forces in the winter offensive of December and January. It indicated that Japan's own protracted war—holding the line and exerting political pressure on Chungking—was producing no result. Contrary to earlier expectations, an equivalent of nine divisions had to be added to the China theater by the end of 1939 to make for a total force of thirty-five divisions.^[68] Clearly the existing policy was not a solution for defense against the Soviet Union nor for the China Incident. Again, the Operations Division of the Army General Staff put forth a proposal for a large-scale withdrawal from China in December, 1939. Field commanders advised an aggressive scheme to go for Chungking once more before the proposed reduction in force level. The Army supported the plan for a last offensive in the fall of 1940, followed by a reduction in early 1941.^[69] In April, the 11th Army, which had borne the brunt of the winter offensive, was ordered to launch the Ich'ang Operation in May and June. There were plans for the Hunan Operation aimed at taking Kweilin and an operation to take the Peiping–Hankow railway in Honan. In addition, a plan was discussed to augment the forces in Nanning with five additional divisions to advance on Kunming, in order to cut the route between Yünan and French Indochina.^[70] Ich'ang was taken on June 12. In order to assist

[66] "Soren no kyokuto^[*] sekika shirei" [Soviet directive on communizing the Far East], Shina , April, 1940, pp. 186–187.

[67] Joho^[*] , No. 9, January 1, 1940, pp. 97–105.

[68] Imperial Army General Staff , No. 1, p. 622.

[69] Ibid. , pp. 626–628.

[70] Taiheiyo^[*] senso^[*] e no michi , IV, 66.

the Kiri Operation which was under way, the 11th Army remained poised against Chungking.

The Shift in Local Balance of Power

Besides watching the ominous move of the Japanese strategic combat units up the Yangtze in the spring and summer of 1940 and gauging its impact on Chungking, the Chinese Communist leaders had another development on their minds. It concerned the balance of power between the Japanese and themselves.

When the North China Area Army launched the pacification program in early 1939, it paid little attention to the partisan affiliation of the enemy—Kuomintang or Communist. The Eighth Route Army was less numerous then and less of a threat than the non-Communist irregular forces. As the year wore on, the Chinese side enacted armed skirmishes in the Japanese presence while intelligence reports of crisis in the united front circulated. On many occasions, both the Kuomintang and the Communist forces sought to pit each other against the Japanese forces. The Japanese forces in turn learned to exploit the situation.

By the end of 1939, it was apparent to the North China Area Army that the Eighth Route Army posed by far the greatest threat in the long run, while other Chinese forces could be used for its own purpose. Usually a sizable victory in pacification involved Kuomintang units, and the vacuum thus created was filled by the Communist forces. The Japanese forces were indirectly aiding Communist expansion in areas which they could sweep but could not hold. The custom developed of leaving alone the Kuomintang units which were simply subsisting in the countryside without showing active hostility. The more irregular non-Communist units also began to seek Japanese protection against attack by the Communist forces. In the fall of 1939 the Area Army decided to place emphasis on finer discrimination among the enemies: the Eighth Route Army became the major target. This was formalized in a policy laid down in March, 1940. The new program stated, " . . . for the foreseeable future in areas where the Imperial Army's power cannot be extended, take initiative in tacitly recognizing the presence of irregular forces which do not resist the Imperial Army. If necessary they may be induced to occuy [an area] temporarily and be used for preventing the clandestine entry of the Communist forces."^[71]

[71] Pacification War , No. 1, p. 268.

Table 7 gives statistics of defection compiled by the North China Area Army between August, 1939, and November, 1940. The figures reported are incomplete. Units listed here as defectors are those which formally announced it; the table does not include those units whose attitude was uncertain or those which defected to smaller Japanese units in outlying areas. The value of the table is in what it shows about the long-term trend and the probable causes which lie behind it. There was an increase in over-all defection after December of 1939 and a sudden jump in March and April of 1940. Early defections could be related to the disintegration of the Kuomintang forces under Lu Chung-lin, Chang Yin-wu, and Chu Huai-P'ing in the spring of 1940. The Mongolian Garrison Army carried out a large-scale campaign between January and March, which might account for the large defection in March. But the important factor behind the large defection in March and April was the emergence of the Wang Ching-wei government in Nanking. When the Kuomintang's winter offensive was over and the real stalemate began, a general decline in morale and anti-Japanese sentiment was reported. Hard pressed between the Japanese and the Communist forces, the irregular local units found in Wang Ching-wei a means of achieving security without losing face.^[72] The next wave of defection in August might well have been related to the squeeze on the non-Communist forces, as the Eighth Route Army wheeled into position for the Battle of One Hundred Regiments offensive. The increase in November could be accounted for by the Japanese counter-offensive.

At the time of the reporting, there was no defection from among the Chinese regular forces. The central forces seldom defected throughout the war. Defectors came from regional or local forces. Political reliability and quality of these troops were low. "Part of the defecting troops usually revolt and desert after several months," it was reported.^[73] Desertion from the Japanese side at this time was ascribed not to the policies of the Chinese side to win them back but to the lack of a maintenance fund on the Japanese side. After the spring of 1940, the major problem for the Japanese forces in handling defection was the sheer number of defectors. The North China Area Army was not prepared to accept them. "It is impossible to count the number of units which are simply left alone because of our army's inability to accommodate them," it was stated.^[74] All defecting units expected to continue their existence on Japanese pay. At the time of reporting in January 1941, some Chinese units were negotiating for better terms

[72] Ibid. , pp. 485–486.

[73] Ibid. , p. 485.

[74] Ibid. , p. 490.

and pay. Some were located in areas which were in the way of Japanese operations and had to be relocated. Some units which definitely wished to defect were restrained by the presence of another Chinese unit in their vicinity.^[75] The report stated that the majority of armed groups in the occupied areas other than the Communist forces were willing to defect.

The units which had been in touch with the Japanese forces since the spring of 1940 and could be regarded as potential defectors included: (1) Shih Yu-san's unit in south central Hopei, 70,000; (2) Sun T'ien-ying's unit in southeastern Shansi, 40,000; (3) Mou Ch'eng-liu's unit in southeastern Shantung, 20,000; and (4) Feng Shou-p'eng's unit in southwestern Shantung, 20,000. The total of Chinese troops which were in some sort of liaison with the Japanese forces in early 1940 was estimated to be in the neighborhood of 300,000.^[76] At the top of the whole group, and much more cautious in revealing their political intentions, were the two war zone commanders: Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi and Yü Hsüeh-chung of Shantung–Kiangsu War Zone. They had been, the report said, "giving us an eye of late although they are as yet at the stage of sending secret emissaries to probe our intentions."^[77]

It is worthwhile to study the profile of some of these units to better appreciate the war conditions in north China. Of the countless groups of bandit cum tsap'ai (irregular) forces that had dotted China's countryside during the war and that had vanished since, there is virtually no record, as both the Kuomintang and the Communists despised them. Liu Kuei-t'ang was an exception. He came from a background of "green forest" or banditry. It seemed that he went to Manchuria from his native place in Shantung as a coolie and joined Chang Tso-lin's army, which was indistinguishable at lower echelons from local bandits of Manchuria, usually skilled horsemen. Under Chang Tsung-ch'ang, one of Chang Tso-lin's generals, Liu was a leader of a sizable contingent by 1932, when Chang Tsung-ch'ang switched his loyalty to the Japanese side.

The Kuantung Army was having a difficult time eradicating the disruptions created by sundry groups of native popular forces, especially in Liaotung Peninsula and Jehol Province where these groups became extremely politicized because of proximity to north China. The Kuantung Army enlisted the native armed groups into the Kenkoku dainigun (National Construction Second Army), founded in 1932, as a regional force of its own. Its leadership and liaison with

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid. , pp. 489–490.

[77] Ibid. , p. 486.

the Kuantung Army was provided by a band of Japanese soldiers of fortune (ronin^[*] ). Date Junnosuke, sworn to brotherhood with Chang Tsung-ch'ang and calling himself Chang Tsung-yüan, commanded the Kenkoku dainigun .^[78] Not much is known of the activities in which this self-appointed friend of the Chinese people and his unit had engaged on both sides of the Great Wall in the turbulent days preceding the Lukouchiao Incident.

Apparently with the secret support of the Kuantung Army, Pai Chien-wu, Liu Kuei-t'ang, and Shih Yu-san had put together a ragtag force calling itself Tung-ya t'ung-meng tzu-chih-chün (East Asian League Autonomous Army) in 1935. In June, the Umezu-Ho Ying-ch'in Agreement was signed, and the Kuomintang forces that were to be forced out of Hopei were disgruntled. On July 27, Pai Chien-wu's group attempted a coup in Peiping.^[79] Their plan was to bribe the troops of Yü Hsüeh-chung and Wan Fu-lin to side with them in an anti-Chiang uprising. Date's forces, too, prepared to join the event but did not have the opportunity.^[80] The bribery attempt was discovered prematurely and obstructed. Thereupon, Pai Chien-wu with one hundred men robbed an armored train and headed toward Peiping, but was soon subdued by Shang Chen's (Kuomintang) forces.

The outbreak of the war removed the restraining hand of the Tientsin Garrison command, as it was incorporated into the North China Area Army. In January 1938, Terauchi Hisaichi, the new commander, asked Date to organize the Shantung tzu-chih lien-chün (Shantung Autonomous United Army) to help the Japanese forces occupy the province. Date and Liu Kuei-t'ang, who had been plotting to instigate a mutiny among Han Fu-ch'ü's forces for some time, proceeded to Tsinan. It is said, however, that officers of the Japanese Fifth Division which occupied Shantung resented the seeming popularity of Date's mixed contingent, and finally disbanded it in 1940.^[81] But Date's former comrades continued their gray existence on their own. Liu Kuei-t'ang carved out a small territory in southern Shantung and, according to Communist sources, served concurrently as the commander of the Tenth (puppet) Army and of the Kuomintang's New 36th Division.^[82] The Japanese 12th Army continued to use Liu for

[78] Watanabe Ryusaku^[*] , Bazoku: Nitchu^[*] senso^[*] shi no sokumen [Mounted bandits: a side history of the Sino–Japanese War] (Tokyo: Chuo^[*] koron-sha^[*] , 1964), pp. 81–82, 128–129.

[79] Taiheiyo^[*] senso e no michi , III, 144–145.

[80] Tuzuki Shichiro^[*] , Date Junnosuke no ayunda michi [The life of Date Junnosuke] (Tokyo: Taisei shinbunsha, 1964), pp. 182, 202.

[81] Bazoku , p. 174; Date Junnosuke , pp. 210, 215–216.

[82] Hsing-huo liao-yüan , VII, 274–275; Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao , VI, 215.

liaison with Yü Hsüeh-chung.^[83] Judging from the write-ups in Communist memoirs, Liu's activities presented serious problems for the Eighth Route Army in the Southern Shantung Military Sub-district. Being more native than the Communists, he monopolized intelligence and eluded capture. One night in 1943, a small Communist unit finally trapped him by a ruse and assassinated him.^[84] He seems to have been typical of what the Communist side called the "bad boss" (epa ).

Having no tradition of "people's war," the Japanese forces as a rule mistrusted these irregular native units. As the Communists often pointed out, these units had a good number of opium smokers and criminal elements. They frequently abused authority conferred on them by the Japanese forces. Half-hearted efforts were made to weed out the undesirable elements, and retrain and equip the rest; but for the most part they were allowed to retain their original organization. Large-scale defection was therefore not an unblemished blessing for the Japanese. But these irregular forces did help to overcome the critical shortage of manpower for the occupation forces.

Mention should also be made of local security forces recruited by the Japanese Army in cooperation with the Temporary Government in Peiping; this government was later renamed the North China Political Commission and enjoyed some autonomy under the Nanking government. The Hopei provincial governmet under Wu Tsan-chou controlled Peiping, Tientsin and 129 hsien towns. In March, 1940, the provincial office moved from Tientsin to Paoting. It had trained a 20,000-man police force and a 2,500-man security force. They were distributed in hsien towns and important hsiang . The Shansi provincial government under Su T'i-jen, who received the appointment because of his connection with Yen Hsi-shan, controlled Taiyuan and 92 hsien towns. The Shantung provincial government under T'ang Yang-tu, controlled all but four of its 105 hsien towns. The Honan provincial government under Chen Ching-chi had its office in K'aifeng and was expanding to the western bank of the New Yellow River. It had 42 hsien towns. In addition, a special district commissioner's office was established in Hsüchow and supervised 18 hsien in north Kiangsu and, from 1940 on, 10 hsien in north Anhwei.^[85] It was the goal of the North China Area Army to have 300 police or security troops in each hsien .^[86] At the rate of 200 men per hsien , a putative total police force in early 1940 in Shansi, Shantung, and Honan Provinces would be roughly 50,000. With the addition of Hopei's

[83] Pacification War , No. 1, p. 488.

[84] Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao , VI, 215–225.

[85] Pacification War , No. 1, p. 492.

[86] Ibid. , p. 485.

22,500, there were 72,500 men. If this figure is added to the strength of irregular armed groups interested in defection between the spring of 1940 and January of 1941, the total is roughly 370,000.

A most remarkable change was the defection of 300,000 men from the united front. Even if allowances are made for their dismal quality, this constituted a major shift in the balance of power in north China in favor of the Japanese forces. The North China Area Army commanded 245,000 men in early 1941.^[87] Japanese estimate of the Communist forces in north China in 1940 is 250,000 regulars and 150,000 guerrillas.^[88] According to P'eng Te-huai, the Communist regulars numbered 220,000 in mid–1940.^[89] Thus, even if the sizable Japanese troops tied down in containing the Kuomintang forces in southern Shansi, along the Lunghai railway and in Shantung, are discounted, the total anti-Communist forces roughly equaled the Communist forces.

Such native collaboration made it possible for the Japanese Army to carry out dispersion of its troops on the plain of Hopei Province. A Communist cadre of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region noted with alarm in mid–1940, "The enemy has adopted the policy of blockhouse method of the civil war period. They are spread like a galaxy. In central Hopei alone, there are about 500, separated by several to more than ten li ."^[90] Entrusting the more secure areas to the native allies, the Japanese forces cut deep into the Communist bases in the mountains also. The phrase "transportation war" cropped up frequently in the Eighth Route Army's journal.^[91] The Communist field command was watching with apprehension the construction of new roads, which doubled as blockade lines. In the T'aihang range, the Taiyuan–Shihchiachuang railway separated the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region from the Chin-Chi-Yü District. The latter was cut into four pieces by two new roads that crossed each other. The narrow-gauge Paichin railway, running north to south, was built along an old

[87] Ibid. , p. 439.

[88] The North China Area Army estimated the Communist strength to be 250,000 regulars and half a million self-defense forces. Ibid. , p. 447. In November, 1939, the Japanese estimate was 140,000 regulars, 110,000 regional forces, and half a million self-defense forces. Ibid. , appendix III. In January, 1941, the regular forces were estimated to be 290,000 in north China and 40,000 in central China. Ibid. , appendix V. I have reckoned the regional forces to be at least 150,000 for 1940.

[89] San-nien-lai ti k'ang-chan , p. 46.

[90] Shu T'ung, "Lun chien-ch'ih Chin-Ch'a-Chi k'ang-Jih ken-chü-ti jen-wu chi fang-chen" [Discussion of the duty and policy of firmly defending the Chin-Ch'a-Chi anti-Japanese base], Military Affairs Journal , September, 1940, p. 31.

[91] See Liu Po-ch'eng in Pa-lu-chün pai-t'uan ta-chan t'e-chi [Special issue on the Eighth Route Army's Battle of One Hundred Regiments] (The Political Department, the Eighth Route Army, 1941), pp. 14–15.

highway connecting Paikui and Ch'angchih. Thus, the T'aihang and the T'aiyüeh Districts were separated by 1940. The two districts were subdivided by a road, running east to west, between Linfen on the Tat'ung–P'uchow line and Hantan on the Peiping–Hankow line. The Taiyuan–Schihchiachuang line was extended east through south Hopei to reach the Tientsin–Pukow line at Techow. A new highway connected Hantan and Tsinan.^[92] Of these the transport network in Shansi Province became the prime target of attack in the Battle of One Hundred Regiments.

The Last Debate between Mao and Wang Ming

While the bloody contest was going on in the spring of 1940 over north Kiangsu, Kuomintang–CCP negotiations to settle the terms of the united front were continuing. In January, Ho Ying-ch'in called in Yeh Chien-ying and ordered the CCP to stop illegal expansion. Yeh in turn demanded that the Kuomintang authorize nine divisions for the Communist forces and enlarge the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region's boundary, according to Chiang Kai-shek.^[93] In June, the CCP formally presented the so-called "June Proposals."^[94] The first two of the three parts related to the CCP's standing demand on the Kuomintang for more "democracy."

The most important was the third part dealing with the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, the 18th Group Army, and the New Fourth Army. The CCP demanded unambiguous boundary settlement in Shen-Kan-Ning. It asked that the twenty-three hsien be recognized as belonging to the border region and that the border region be made directly subordinate to the Administrative Yuan. Second, the CCP "request[ed] that the 18th Group Army be expanded to nine divisions in three armies and that the subordinate guerrilla forces receive the same accommodation as other guerrilla forces in the same war zone."^[95] Third, the New Fourth Army was to be expanded to seven detachments. Fourth, the CCP asked that "in order to establish responsibility for fighting and to avoid misunderstanding and clashes" a

[92] Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 32; Pacification War , No. 1, p. 405.

[93] Soviet Russia in China , p. 93.

[94] K'ang-chan lun-wen-chi [Collection of essays on the resistance] (no date, no publisher listed) (Hoover), pp. 5–7. This is a Communist source published probably shortly after the New Fourth Army Incident. It was written by the man who wrote Mo-ts'a ts'ung ho erh lai for the Eighth Route Army's Political Department. See preface, Ibid. , p. 1. I rely on it because it matches Kuomintang data where the latter are available.

[95] Ibid. , p. 6.

boundary be drawn distinguishing the areas of operation for the Communist forces and the "friendly forces." Whether this item was accompanied by a specific proposal for new boundaries cannot be ascertained. Last, a request was made for equal provision of arms, ammunition, clothing, rations, medical and communication materials.^[96]

The international situation in July, 1940, was very grave for China. The German blitz ended in France's surrender on June 17. Two days later the Indochina route to Chungking was closed. On July 12 Britain succumbed to Japan's pressure and notified Tokyo that it was closing the Burma Road for three months.^[97] Washington protested without results. German victory stimulated the Japanese Army, frustrated by the stalemate in China. The advocates of "southward advance" began to prevail, with the view that the China war could not be solved except within the framework of a new international alignment which would cut China completely off from American influence. In order to guard against the Tripartite Alliance, the Soviet Union began showing an interest in a nonaggression pact with Japan. Moscow might go further, as Chiang Kai-shek suspected then, and side with the Axis powers. The Kiri Operation was then in progress, as was the latest German attempt at mediation in Chunking designed to help Japan regain maneuverability. The Japanese strategic units were in Ich'ang and Nanning; they might move farther inland. Japanese occupation of French Indochina was also anticipated. It was reported that Chungking was watching with intense concern the final process of negotiation between Japan and Wang Ching-wei (from July 5, in Nanking) leading to the formal recognition of the Nanking government.^[98] A high Kuomintang official confided after the war that the situation was most critical then.^[99]

In a crisis atmosphere, the Seventh Plenum of the Kuomintang's CEC met between July 1 and 7. According to an unconfirmed Japanese intelligence report, the Plenum debated the search for a peaceful solution of the war.^[100] On July 2, the government offered a counter-proposal to the CCP. The so-called "First Counter-Proposal by the Kuomintang" included the following points: (1) "The party question" should be postponed until after the promulgation of the new constitution. (2) The Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region was to be renamed the

[96] Ibid. , pp. 6–7.

[97] Nihon gaiko^[*] nempyo^[*] , II, 137. China was probably notified of it in advance as a courtesy.

[98] Joho^[*] No. 24, August 15, 1940, pp. 93–94.

[99] Taiheiyo^[*] senso^[*] e no michi , IV, 67.

[100] Joho, No. 24, August 15, 1940, pp. 93–94; Toa^[*] , September 1, 1940, p. 40 ff.

Northern Shensi Administrative Area, and to be placed temporarily under the Executive Yuan but subject to the control of the Shensi provincial government. Fifteen hsien were to be recognized as part of the border region with some minor qualifications. The chairman of the Administrative Area and the hsien magistrates were to be nominated by the 18th Group Army and appointed by the Central Government. Issuance of separate currency was forbidden. In the Suite area, the government's Military Commission was to maintain an administrative office and a garrison.^[101]

(3) Chu Te was to be relieved of the post of vice commander of the Second War Zone in Shansi under Yen Hsi-shan, and appointed the vice commander of the Hopei–Chahar War Zone. The Kuomintang had two alternate proposals for the redeployment and boundary settlement for the 18th Group Army and the New Fourth Army. The first one would authorize the entire Communist forces to operate in the two provinces of Hopei and Chahar. This meant that the New Fourth Army would be included in the order of battle of the Hopei–Chahar War Zone. According to the second plan, the Kuomintang would authorize the transfer of the entire Communist forces into the Hopei–Chahar War Zone but in addition permit some of the 18th Group Army units to operate in northern Shansi. Such forces as were to operate in Shansi Province were to remain under the command of the Second War Zone. In either event, the boundary of the war zone was to be "temporary and not permanent in nature." The Communist forces were given one month to complete this redeployment and were forbidden to leave any "rear office," "liaison office," and the like in the former areas of occupation. The Communist forces were absolutely forbidden to move beyond the boundary of the new war zone; and within the war zone, they were forbidden to interfere with "local government and Party affairs." Within Hopei and Chahar Provinces the central government claimed the cities of Peiping and Tientsin as belonging to its direct administration. The central government was to appoint governors for the two provinces. The two incumbent governors—P'ang Ping-hsün, who succeeded Lu Chung-lin in Hopei, and Shih Yu-san in Chahar—were reconfirmed in their positions.^[102]

(4) The 18th Group Army was authorized to organize six divisions in three armies plus five regiments. The New Fourth Army was to be reorganized into two divisions. Upon collecting and incorporating all the guerrilla or irregular units into the designated areas by the deadline, the CCP was forbidden to organize any additional collateral

[101] K'ang-chan lun-wen-chi , pp. 7–9.

[102] Ibid. , pp. 9–11.

unit under whatever title. The government promised to put the authorized Communist units on the government's pay provided that they submitted to government inspections.^[103]

By offering the Communists a choice between two alternatives, the Kuomintang's July 2 "decision" took less than a final form. In either case, it was Chungking's intention to seal up the Communist forces in Hopei, Chahar, and northern Shansi—areas which were subjected to the most intense pacification by the Japanese forces. The Kuomintang was not willing to concede Shantung, Kiangsu and Anhwei Provinces. By forcing the New Fourth Army out of the Shanghai–Nanking–Hangchow delta, the Kuomintang was also unwittingly undermining the Internationalists as it did over the question of defense of Wuhan.

Between July 1 and 7, at the time of the third anniversary of the Lukouchiao Incident, the CCP passed two major decisions and issued a manifesto.^[*] They were permeated with the sense of grave and imminent crisis; together they amounted to a reaffirmation of the united front policy advocated by the Internationalists. The Central Committee's manifesto of July 7 (issued on July 4) stated that "at present China faces unprecedented danger of capitulation and unprecedented difficulties in resistance. We ought not to conceal these dangers and difficulties."^[104] It acknowledged that the pressure for peace exerted by Germany and Italy was replacing the danger of a "Far Eastern Munich," and it demanded that "the Kuomintang–Communist relationship must be adjusted, the danger of civil war must be eradicated, the anti-Japanese united front must be consolidated."^[105] To this end, it renewed once again the most far-reaching pledge of cooperation it had made: "We always carry out our own promises," it stated, "We never once deviated from our manifesto of September 22, 1937: to struggle for the complete realization of the Three People's Principles, to stop the land revolution, to liquidate the insurrectionary policy. . . . "^[106] In criticizing the anti-Communist measures without naming the Kuomintang, it warned against a "two-front policy" against an external enemy and domestic ally—a statement which could just as well apply to Mao's line. In an unsigned appeal in July, the Party conceded once again that "the rise and fall of the Chinese nation is the responsibility of the Kuomintang."^[107]

Once again one can detect inconsistency in the Party's documents

[103] Ibid. , pp. 11–12.

[*] The Central Committee's decision of July 1 is not available.

[104] Mao Tse-tung-chi , VII, 254.

[105] Ibid. , p. 255.

[106] Ibid.

[107] "T'uan-chi tao-ti" [Unity to the very end], Ibid. , p. 259. Unlike the Party's manifesto, this essay appears in the Peking edition of Selected Works , though the passage has been deleted.

of early July. An internal directive of July 7 stated, for instance, that "unprecedented danger of capitulation has fast arrived, but . . . the possibility for winning a favorable turn has also increased."^[108] It went on to say, "The big landlords and the big bourgeoisie . . . are unable to change completely for the better, but it is possible to prolong the period of cooperation and resistance."^[109] Such cooperation was justified on the ground that "at the moment the anti-Communist high tide is ebbing ."^[110] The July 7 manifesto, moreover, rejected the Kuomintang's July 2 counter-proposal with respect to the boundary question. It declared that the Communist forces would keep "the war zones, the enemy's rear, and the twenty-three hsien of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region."^[111] That is, the CCP was demanding for itself all of north Kiangsu and a permission to keep its troops in the Third War Zone south of the Yangtze. Thus, the CCP's stand at this point closely resembled its earlier stand at the Sixth Plenum, where it renewed verbal promises without any substance.

The movement of the Communist forces in and around north Kiangsu in July and August suggested that they were there to stay. By July, Ch'en I and Kuan Wen-wei had led the South Yangtze Command across the river. Kuan Wen-wei clashed with local units of Han Te-ch'in's forces in Kuots'un, near T'aihsien, between June 28 and July 7.^[112] This came to be called the first battle of Huangch'iao. In August, as the remainder of the Fifth Column arrived from Shantung, a decisive battle was threatening around Huangch'iao.^[113] In the meantime, the Communist forces increased pressure in southern Shantung. On August 11, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien's unit was attacking the Shantung provincial government in Luts'un and drove away the Kuomintang forces under Governor Shen Hung-lieh.^[114]

However, Chungking remained adamant about keeping the Communist forces out of north Kiangsu. According to Chiang Kai-shek,

On July 16, the Government, with a view to preventing more clashes in various parts of the country, worked out an arrangement with the Communists represented by Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-ying. This agreed arrangement was later handed to Chou En-lai, who took it to northern Shensi on July 24, for observance by Communist field commanders.^[115]

[108] Mao Tse-tung-chi , VII, 71.

[109] Ibid. , p. 72.

[110] Ibid. , p. 73. Emphasis added.

[111] Ibid. , p. 256.

[112] Wan-nan shih-pien ti chen-hsiang , p. 9.

[113] Ibid. , p. 10. Ch'en I states that his side exercised great restraint, which is entirely credible. He seems to have been ordered to hold the ground without provoking a fight if at all possible. See his telegram to Chungking, in Ibid. , p. 15.

[114] Chung-Kung wen-t'i chung-yao wen-hsien , p. 27.

[115] Soviet Russia in China , p. 93.

Actually there is no indication that the CCP agreed to the government's demand. It was issued unilaterally as "the Center's final decision" dated July 20.^[116] Compliance was demanded of the Communists within one month; thus, August 20 was the deadline.

For the Communist forces, the government conceded thirty-six hsien in northern Shantung north of the Yellow River, in addition to Hopei and Chahar Provinces.^[117] The Hopei–Chahar War Zone was to be abolished, and the area plus the thirty-six hsien in northern Shantung were to come under the command of the Second War Zone under Yen Hsi-shan. Chu Te and Wei Li-huang were to act as vice commanders under Yen Hsi-shan. Specifically, Yen Hsi-shan was to be directly responsible for the southwestern part of Shansi; Wei Li-huang for the southeastern part; and Chu Te controlling the rest, namely, northern Shansi, Hopei, Chahar, and the northern Shantung. The size of the authorized Communist forces remained the same as in the July 2 Kuomintang counter-proposal.^[118] The government conceded three more hsien to the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region to make a total of eighteen,^[119] the other provisions for the border region remaining the same.

What sanctions the central government invoked to enforce its decision is not known, but it apparently made clear to Chou En-lai that it was dead set against allowing the Communists in northern Kiangsu. In August, the CCP appeared to give in. The Communist leadership formulated a counter-proposal in which it offered to withdraw all of the Communist forces from central China. This so-called

[116] Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 219; K'ang-chan lun-wen-chi , p. 12.

[117] They were: Litsin, P'ut'ai, Pinhsien, Chanhua, Wuti, Loling, Huimin, Tep'ing, Shangho, Linghsien, Linyi, Chiyang, Tehsien, P'ingyüan, Yuch'eng, Ch'iho, Enhsien, Wuch'eng, Hsiatsin, Linch'ing, Kaot'ang Ch'ingp'ing, Pop'ing, Jenp'ing, Liaoch'eng, Ch'iuhsien, Kuant'ao, T'angyi, Kuanhsien, Hsinhsien, Chaoch'eng, Yangku, T'aochang, Fanhsien, Kuangch'eng, and P'uhsien. Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 221.

[118] Ibid. , p. 220.

[119] The list of hsien named by the two sides for the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region are as follows:

[*] The CCP's June proposal: Yenan, Yench'ang, Yench'uan, Paoting, Anting, Ansai, Kanch'üan, Luhsien, Tingpien, Chingpien, Ch'unhua, Kouyi, Ninghsien, Chengning, Ch'ingyang, Hoshui, Huanhsien, Yench'ih, Suite, Michih, Wupao, Chiahsien, and Ch'ingchien. K'ang-chan yen-lun-chi , p. 6.

[*] The Kuomintang's July 2 counter-proposal: Suite, Michih, Wupao, Chiahsien, Ch'ingchien, Yenan, Yench'ang, Yench'uan, Paoan, Anting, Ansai, Kanch'üan, Luhsien, and parts of Tingpien and Chingpien. Ibid. , p. 7.

[*] The Kuomintang's July 20 decision: Suite, Michih, Wupao, Chiahsien, Ch'ingchien, Yenan, Yench'ang, Yench'uan, Paoan, Anting, Ansai, Kanch'üan, Luhsien, and parts of Tingpien and Chingpien in Shensi Province; Hoshui, Huanhsien, and part of Ch'inyang in Kansu Province. Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 220; K'ang-chan yen-lun-chi , pp. 12–13.

"August counter-proposal" by the CCP is available in a document published by the Communist side. The counter-proposal asked for authorization of nine divisions for the 18th Group Army and three divisions for the New Fourth Army (instead of seven detachments for the latter, as in the June Proposal). It demanded that the CCP be given the right to appoint governors of Hopei and Chahar Provinces. Finally, it asked that "the five provinces of north China be defined as the area of operation for the 18th Group Army and the New Fourth Army."^[120] According to this proposal, the CCP was abandoning central China bases in exchange for Hopei, Chahar, Shantung, Shansi, and Suiyüan Provinces.

At the time, rumors were abroad alleging that a mutually acceptable settlement had been reached between the Kuomintang and the CCP. But the Kuomintang has never acknowledged the existence of the "August counter-proposal." A prefatory remark accompanying the document states that the proposal was decided in the middle of August and presented to Chang Chung, the Kuomintang's liaison officer in Yenan, in early September to be transmitted to Chungking. However, it went on, the proposal was shelved on account of the military clash in north Kiangsu.^[121] The authenticity of this document cannot be verified. Nevertheless, it seems credible that the CCP should have been inclined to make such a concession in late August. It was entirely in keeping with the purpose of the other decisions, especially the one to launch the Battle of One Hundred Regiments. That offensive would have been meaningless unless the CCP had been willing to compromise with the Kuomintang over the north Kiangsu question.

Simultaneously in August, the CCP made several substantive decisions of major importance and began to live up fully to the pledge made on July 7. The question of how to cope with the landslide of defection among the irregular non-Communist forces was the central concern of the August 15 directive. It stated:

In accordance with the decision of July 7, it is necessary to broadly expand united front work. In friendly forces, enlargement of the work of making friendships is necessary to win over the two million members of these friendly forces to continued resistance to Japan. In the making of friendships, there have been absolutely no achievements. You must accept a severe reprimand

[120] Ibid. , pp. 18–21. See Chen-ching chung-wai ti "Wan-nan ts'an-pien" mien-mien kuan [Several perspectives on the world shaking "southern Anhwei massacre"] (Shih-chieh ch'u-pan-she, 1941), pp. 16–17, for another version of the CCP's August counter-proposal. According to this, the CCP demanded five northern provinces in addition to north Kiangsu.

[121] K'ang-chen yen-lun-chi , p. 18.

from the Party, and you must examine your work on the basis of this decision. . . .

Especially since the Kuomintang began carrying out its anti-Communist policy, many cadres—even including some leading cadres—have come to feel that the Kuomintang and the central armies are all die-hards, and that our line is one of opposition, struggle, and preparation for a split.^[122]

Several other directives followed in close succession, all demanding improvement of united front work at lower levels.^[123] Sweeping reforms in the administration of the Communist bases were initiated by the Northern Bureau on August 12, just prior to the Battle of One Hundred Regiments. The reforms reversed the civil-war-like sectarian radicalism which had affected the Party since the December Incident. I will review the new administrative programs in the next chapter.

The Battle of One Hundred Regiments

The August 20 deadline for transfer of the New Fourth Army units was chosen by the Communist leadership to commence the large-scale and the only offensive by the Communist forces in the war. The offensive took one month's preparation, according to a Communist source.^[124] Hence, the idea of an offensive to buttress the united front must have been on the agenda for the Central Committee at least since early July. The Political Department of the Eighth Route Army's Field Headquarters was also holding a political work conference in July.^[125] Regardless of the offensive, Communist units were in all likelihood placed in a high state of alert as the Kuomintang–CCP negotiation had reached the critical passage in early summer. The Japanese officers who negotiated in early June with Chungking's emissaries in the Kiri Operation came away with a distinct impression that the Kuomintang was anticipating a general insurrection by the Communists once an official, high-level peace talk was announced.^[126] If so, the CCP was in the difficult position of having to decide be-

[122] Chung-Kung chung-yang kuan-yü k'ai-chan t'ung-i chan-hsien kung-tso ti shih-chih [The CCP Central Committee's directive concerning expansion of united front work], in Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 470.

[123] See, for instance, the directive issued by the United Front Work Department on November 2, The Organization and Work of United Front Bureau , in Van Slyke, pp. 266–270.

[124] PLA during resistance , p. 109.

[125] Cheng-chih kung-tso lun-ts'ung , p. 32.

[126] Boyle, p. 292. Boyle quotes a Japanese officer's recollection of a Kuomintang negotiator that tension between Chungking and Yenan "would become evident in August."

tween a civil war or a general offensive against the Japanese to forestall a civil war.

The decision for the offensive was made by the Central Committee, according to Ch'en I speaking in 1944:

The Central Committee . . . perceived that if this flood of opopsition to the people and democracy was not halted, it might cause the war of resistance to end in defeat. Accordingly the Central Committee ordered the Eighth Route Army to carry out the Hundred Regiment Offensive in north China in order that the determined attack on the Japanese bandits might strengthen faith of the whole country in ultimate victory and stop the tide of capitulationism.^[127]

It is clear that the CCP feared the demoralizing impact on Chungking of Anglo–Japanese cooperation in closing the "southwestern international route." That left the Sinkiang route—dependent on the uncertain friendship of the Soviet Union—as the only link to the outside world. It was probably for this reason that the "defense of northwest" was mentioned by the leaders of the Eighth Route Army as one of the aims of the offensive.^[128] Since the Japanese forces never seriously threatened the northwest throughout the war, the CCP's concern for it at this time must be taken in a political sense.

The offensive was also designed to solve the tactical problems that concerned the Communist field commanders, as I have noted above. Both P'eng Te-huai and Chu Te stated at the time that undermining the confidence of puppet forces was one of their goals.^[129] The transport and blockade lines in Shansi were chosen as prime targets. Simultaneous attack on small Japanese outposts and the transport link between them was intended to make the dispersion of pacification forces difficult. If successful, moreover, such an attack would compel the Japanese forces to abandon the more exposed outposts and to seek security in larger enclaves, thus leaving the countryside once again to the Communist forces.

In the CCP's history, rewritten by the Maoists since, the Battle of One Hundred Regiments receives little or no mention.^[130] Further-

[127] Wan-nan shih-pien ti chen-hsiang , p. 4.

[128] See Chu Te's remark at a cadre conference in Yenan in August, cited in Pacification War , No. 1, p. 336. See also Tso Ch'üan, the chief of staff, in "Chien-ch'ih hua-pei k'ang-chan liang-nien-chung chih pa-lu-chün" [Firmly uphold the Eighth Route Army in two years of resistance in north China], Military Affairs Journal , November, 1939, pp. 19–33.

[129] Pa-lu-chün pai-t'uan ta-chan t'e-chi , p. 7.

[130] Chu Te's major report to the Seventh Congress barely mentions the campaign. Lun chieh-fang-ch'ü chan-ch'ang [On the battlefield of the liberated areas] (Tung-pei shu-tien, 1947). Ho Kan-chih ignores it altogether.

more, it was revealed during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that P'eng Te-huai "arbitrarily started the 'campaign of a hundred regiments' in support of Chiang Kai-shek and in aid of the Kuomintang" without Mao's knowledge.^[131] But the campaign was on such a large scale that it could not have been started by personal initiative of a vice commander of the Eighth Route Army, that is, without the authorization of the Party. The real meaning of Mao's denial of his part in it seems to be that he opposed it but was overruled.

The offensive was intended to create a diversion in the rear of the Japanese forces, and to bolster Chungking's morale, as Communist sources openly boasted contemporaneously. The North China Area Army suspected that the offensive was planned jointly during the Kuomintang–CCP negotiation in July.^[132] All signs, however, point the other way. It was very doubtful that the Communists would have entrusted the Kuomintang with vital intelligence concerning their surprise attack. The "coordination" was thus strategic and not tactical.

The paucity of clues makes reconstruction of Mao's motive for opposing the offensive entirely conjectural. On a tactical level, Mao's difference with his field commanders was an extension of the military dispute which was supposed to have been settled at the Sixth Plenum. So far as the Japanese forces were concerned, Mao seems to have felt, the offensive was more likely to provoke rather than intimidate them. On this occasion, however, a substantial number of officers in the field might have sided with P'eng Te-huai in demanding a square fight with the enemy. The professional soldiers had acquired a good deal of experience in dealing with the Japanese in the three years of war. They could have been tired of observing the rule of hit and run. In 1959, P'eng conducted a self-criticism of his role in the campaign and said,

[The Battle of One Hundred Regiments] exposed too early our own strength and attracted the main force of the Japanese Army from the frontal battlefield—to the advantage of the Kuomintang—and brought about serious difficulties to our anti-Japanese bases in the rear of the enemy. Obviously it was a case of nationalistic indignation blurring the class stand.^[133]

The effectiveness of the campaign in achieving its strategic objective—to keep the Kuomintang in the war—depended on mutual trust between Chungking and Yenan. Without it, the Eighth Route Army's

[131] Li Hsin-kung, "Settle Accounts With Peng Teh-huai for His Heinous Crimes . . . ," p. 13.

[132] Pacification War , No. 1, p. 384.

[133] The Case of Peng Teh-huai , p. 34.

military victory over the Japanese forces would not necessarily lessen Chungking's suspicion and anxiety. The most critical issue in inter-Party relations was the CCP's disposition of the north Kiangsu question. Unless the CCP was prepared to abandon north Kiangsu, the offensive would forfeit its strategic aim. If the Kuomintang–CCP relationship was bordering on civil war in the summer, the Communist forces could have been running the risk of exhausting themselves against the Japanese without any assurance that the Kuomintang forces would not pounce on them in turn. Mao's objection to the offensive might well have been related to his resolve to take north Kiangsu. He might have bracketed his stand with an assurance that Chungking would not surrender.

The CCP divided the campaign into three phases: the first phase, August 20 to September 10; the second, September 20 to the end of October; and the third phase, "resistance to Japanese mopping-up," October 6 to December 5.^[134] Preparations were started in the middle of July and took about one month. During this period, the Eighth Route Army carefully surveyed the terrain around Japanese garrisons in Shansi, collected intelligence, selected roads, stockpiled explosives and grain, printed anti-Japanese propaganda materials, and mobilized the peasants in the vicinity of selected targets.^[135] There were many small signs which collectively pointed to some large-scale operation, as recalled by the Japanese side afterward. To take only one instance, in Yangch'üan on the Chengting–Taiyuan railway a number of husky strangers were seen during a local fair on August 15 and 16. Half of the peddlers were new faces. Local Chinese police were ordered to investigate, but nothing came of it.^[136] Had the North China Area Army been properly mindful of Communist military strength, it could have read ominous portent in such reports.

Most of the regular units of the Eighth Route Army and the Shansi New Army took part. One main force unit, presumably the 115th Division, stayed out of the first phase of the campaign.^[137] The reason for this cannot be identified. It is possible that the division was tied down in southern Shantung in the operation to assist the New Fourth Army. Nieh Jung-chen led the units from the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Military District to attack the P'ingting–Shihchiachuang section of the Chengting–Taiyuan railway. This line separated Nieh Jung-chen's base from P'eng Te-huai's to the south; on it were the garrison of

[134] PLA during resistance , pp. 109, 114, 116.

[135] Pa-lu-chün pai-t'uan ta-chan t'e-chi , p. 56.

[136] Pacification War , No. 1, p. 341.

[137] Pa-lu-chün pai-t'uan ta-chan t'e-chi , pp. 59, 82.

Niangtzukuan and the Chinghsing coal mines. The line was the main target of the campaign. Liu Po-ch'eng and Teng Tzu-hui led the 129th Division against the line west of P'ingting. Ho Lung and Kuan Hsiangying led the 120th Division against the Tat'ung–P'uchow railway around Yangchü, primarily to stall the Japanese reaction force from reaching the Chengting–Taiyuan line.^[138]

The attack came at 8 P.M. on all fronts in north China. Shortly thereafter, the Japanese side monitored a Communist radio message reporting the campaign to Yen Hsi-shan's Second War Zone headquarters. Destruction of railway lines, bridges, highways, and telephone lines was carried out simultaneously, with the result that regrouping and reaction by the Japanese forces was obstructed. On the Shihchiachuang-Taiyuan railway the Fourth Independent Mixed Brigade, under Lieutenant General Katayama, defended some twenty outposts west of Niangtzukuan. The size of defending forces at each post ranged from a platoon to a battalion.^[139] They were attacked by fifteen regiments under Liu Po-ch'eng. The Eighth Independent Mixed Brigade, commanded by Major General Mizuhara, was defending the line east of P'ingting to Chengting, including the Chinghsing coal mines.^[140] It was attacked by fifteen regiments under Nieh Jung-chen from the north. In the first few hours, all the outposts were isolated from one another. From a map captured from the Communist forces, it was learned that the Communist forces outnumbered the Japanese by five to ten times.^[141] It soon dawned on the defenders that the Eighth Route Army forces meant to stay this time, attacking them in their fixed positions. Faced by an overwhelming force, most of the outposts soon lost initiative. All the smaller units could do was to stave off attacks in the bunkers and wait for relief forces to arrive.

The Japanese company posted at the citadel in Niangtzukuan was treated to a bone-chilling sight on the night of August 20: the dark surrounding valley was dotted with flickering torch lights carried by peasants guiding the Communist troops into position. At about 11 A.M. on August 22, a messenger bearing a white flag approached the garrison and handed over a letter urging the defenders to surrender. It took General Katayama's brigade headquarters three days to get a complete picture of the situation under its command, and it was fully one week before relief forces could be sent on foot to the outlying areas.^[142] By then, most of the smaller units had exhausted their ammunition and had been overrun. The Fourth Independent Mixed

[138] PLA during resistance , pp. 109–113.

[139] Pacification War , No. 1, p. 343.

[140] Ibid. , p. 350.

[141] Ibid. , p. 347.

[142] Ibid. , p. 349.

Brigade was again the major target of Communist assault during the second wave. The 385th and 386th Brigades, the elite units of the 129th Division, attacked it from September 24 on—again overrunning several posts.^[143]

According to an interim report written by the North China Area Army on October 15, the damage to the Shihchiachuang–Taiyuan railway was the heaviest. Forty-eight bridges with a total span of one kilometer were destroyed, while 3.5 kilometers of rail were either blown up or carried away. The Tat'ung–P'uchow line was destroyed in thirteen places and the Peiping–Hankow line in eighty-six places. Altogether 44 kilometers of rail, excluding bridge span, were lost. The Chengting–Taiyuan railway did not complete "emergency repairs" until September 20. The Peiping–Hankow and the Tat'ung–P'uchow lines were restored by August 25 and September 8, respectively. The mine at Chinghsing sustained heavy damage, though the Communist forces merely set fire to it rather than using explosives. Anshan steel mills in Manchuria depended on the high grade coal extracted from Chinghsing. The new mine was inoperative for six months.^[144] An official public release by the Eighth Route Army, published on December 10, estimated that five Japanese battalions were wiped out, including the two belonging to the Fourth Independent Mixed Brigade.^[145] According to the brigade's casualty report, it suffered some sixty and eighty killed during the first and second waves respectively.^[146] The wounded numbered several times those figures. These statistics do not include the casualties among the Japanese civilian employees of the railway and the Chinese security troops.

The initial attack sent a shock-wave through the North China Area Army. Organized Japanese reaction did not come until September. By October the initiative passed to the Japanese forces, and the campaign turned to the phase of Japanese mopping-up. On the whole the Communist forces, especially the regular units, fought well and with determination—though, as at P'inghsingkuan, there were many minor problems, according to a captured internal review.^[147] The impact of the campaign on the Japanese forces was more psychological than military. In fact, the total damage to the Japanese side might be

[143] Ibid. , p. 358.

[144] Ibid. , pp. 354–355.

[145] Pa-lu-chün pai-t'uan ta-chan t'e-chi , pp. 59–60.

[146] Pacification War , No. 1, pp. 353, 358. See also the casualty report filed by the brigade in War History Office, The Defense Board.

[147] "Tazan no ishi" [Learn from the experience of others] (combat report written by Yang Ch'eng-wu, the commander of the First Military Sub-district of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, and subsequently captured by the Japanese), Kaikosha^[*] kiji , August, 1941, pp. 93–109.

said to have been light in view of the number of troops and civilians mobilized on the Communist side. This was partly because of the inferiority of arms available to the Communist forces and the nature of the targets they attacked. The Eighth Route Army lacked adequate heavy weapons, good explosives, and supply of ammunition. It attacked with rifles the Japanese forces in well-fortified fixed positions. The Communist units seem to have overrun Japanese positions only after repeated charges exhausted the defenders' ammunition. Casualties on the Communist side were heavy. By November the North China Area Army noted that the Communist forces had exhausted their supplies and were avoiding contacts.^[148] In the Chin-Chi-Yü District, according to a Communist source, "the big battle also inflicted very extensive casualities on our army (7,000 were wounded or killed among the border region's forces alone), and the morale was not easily restored for a while . . . . "^[149] Total casualties were reported at 22,000.^[150]

Chungking's reaction to the campaign is not known. But if the CCP's strategic objective in launching the campaign was to thwart the peace talk, neither Chungking nor Tokyo was affected by it. In any event, on September 10—at the end of the first phase of the campaign—the CCP ordered its forces to use the opportunity for stepped-up expansion in central China, though it warned against unnecessary provocation of Kuomintang forces.^[151]

The New Fourth Army Incident

The pending negotiation between the Kuomintang and the CCP was not cancelled by the Battle of One Hundred Regiments; it was resumed in September. Precisely what happened between the two parties and within the CCP during late August and early September cannot be known at present. Hence, this account must be mostly conjectural. There seems little doubt that the author of the CCP's June proposal was Mao: he wanted to compel the Kuomintang to formally concede north Kiangsu to the CCP. In this he was opposed, I infer, by a coalition of the Internationalists and some generals; fearing

[148] Pacification War , No. 1, p. 385.

[149] Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 57.

[150] PLA during resistance , p. 117. P'eng Te-huai stated that 90,000 were lost from 1940 to 1941 partly because of the Japanese counter-offensive, in Amerasia Papers , p. 710.

[151] Chung-Kung chung-yang kuan-yü chün-shih hsing-tung shih-chih [The CCP Central Committee's directive concerning military movements], Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 190–191.

Chungking's surrender, they advocated the offensive campaign and authored the CCP's August proposal. As far as Mao's opponents were concerned, the offer to abandon central China was to be made in good faith. But Mao might have compromised the opposition's demands by turning them into a means for simply keeping the Chungking negotiation open. The CCP offered to withdraw from central China—a large concession—so as not to provoke the central government; but as a trade-off it asked for five northern provinces and authorization for a larger force level. It presumed to act as though the Kuomintang's "final decision" was negotiable. The CCP used such a delaying tactic between the Sian Incident and the Lukouchiao Incident to prevent the government from integrating the Red Army into its forces. The Battle of One Hundred Regiments—commenced on the date on which compliance with the government was due—had the effect of distracting Chunking until the international situation changed, thereby forcing it to abandon the order.

If the CCP was willing to discuss withdrawal from central China in late August and early September, it had reverted to its stand of July 7 by the middle of September. Some time prior to the eighteenth, according to my reckoning, Chou En-lai delivered another proposal. The available version of the three-point proposal seems to be a summary and is very cryptic.^[152] According to Chu Te's later revelation, Chou En-lai petitioned the central government that "it graciously grant its permission to all units on the south and north sides of the Yangtze to remain in their original areas for resistance . . . " until the war was over!^[153]

At the time T. V. Soong, soon to be the Foreign Minister, was in Washington as Chiang Kai-shek's emissary. His mission was to secure American loans and material assistance. The political implications of such aid at this juncture were fully appreciated by all concerned—not least of all by Tokyo.^[154] As will be shown below, the CCP, too, was aware of the loan negotiation in Washington. It is probable that the CCP's reversion to the hard line in mid-September was based on Chungking's jubilant reaction to the initial American approval for the loan.^[155]

[152] Ibid. , p. 223; K'ang-chan yen-lun-chi , p. 21.

[153] Ibid. , pp. 28–29. Chu Te's letter is dated November 9, 1940.

[154] U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940 , Vol. IV: The Far East (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 649.

[155] The earliest sign of approval for Export–Import Bank credit to China came on September 13. See Ibid. , p. 668. Another loan came in November. On Soong's negotiations, see Stilwell and the American Experience in China , pp. 214–215.

Toward the end of September, the CCP's outlook on both the domestic and international situations had undergone perceptible change. It was unmistakably encouraged by the reaction of the United States to the formation of the Tripartite Alliance. On September 28—the day after the alliance was announced—the Central Committee postulated three possibilities for the war. The first was American intervention in the war to bring it to a conclusion.^[156] The second was the possibility that "the national bourgeoisie and certain factions of the intermediate groups" might come to the fore in Chungking to "ease the high pressure policy . . . to the advantage of the Communist Party, the resistance against Japan, and the preservation of the Kuomintang." Sun Fo, Feng Yü-hsiang, Li Chi-shen, Yü Yu-jen, Ch'en Chia-keng, Ch'en Kuang-fu, Huang Yen-p'ei, Chang Nai-ch'i and others were named as "our relatively good allies."^[157] The CCP's hope in this case was to draw on the influence of these leaders to revive the pro-Soviet, pro-resistance spirit which had animated China during the first stage of the war. The third possibility was the fall of Chungking and the union of the die-hards with the Wang Ching-wei faction into a "Pétain regime."^[158] If the Kuomintang were to enter a negotiated settlement of the war, according to this view, it would become the common enemy of the CCP and the United States. This is one of the earliest intimations of the Communists' hope to use anticipated American intervention to displace the Kuomintang.

In early October, Ch'en I's unit had fought and won a decisive battle at Huangch'iao in north Kiangsu with Han Te-ch'in's troops commanded by Li Shou-wei. Following the previously established procedure, the New Fourth Army sent several telegrams of regret to Chungking explaining the action as self-defense against the provocation of traitors.^[159] Publicly assuming a low posture, the CCP was nevertheless taking a calculated risk. By November 1, it was issuing directives to its organizations to get ready for a sudden attack by the Kuomintang.^[160]

On October 19, Ho Ying-ch'in and Pai Ch'ung-hsi telegraphed Chu Te, P'eng Te-huai, and Yeh T'ing. It was a public message, the first

[156] Chung-Kung chung-yang kuan-yü shih-chü tsung-ch'ü-hsiang ti shih-chih [The CCP Central Committee's directive concerning the general trend of the situation], Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 78.

[157] Ibid.

[158] Ibid. , p. 79.

[159] Johnson, Peasant Nationalism , p. 135. See Chu Te's telegram to Chiang Kaishek in K'ang-chan yen-lun-chi , pp. 39–41.

[160] Chung-Kung chung-yang tui chi-yao kung-tso ti shih-chih [The CCP Central Committee's directive for secret work], Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 148–149. Destruction of documents was ordered.

one of its kind in the Kuomintang—CCP negotiations. It stated that " . . . since the deputy director [of the Military Commission] Chou [En-lai] went back, there has been as yet no clear indication to strictly observe the order. [On the contrary, you] also proposed the three-point measure to adjust the guerrilla districts and guerrilla forces and caused the Center a great deal of additional difficulty in the disposition [of the matter]."^[161] The message put the blame for the north Kiangsu incident on the Communist side and demanded once again that the Communist forces move across the Yellow River into north China. The government compromised with the CCP's dilatoriness by extending the deadline for transfer until the end of November. Having dealt with the CCP in an authoritative fashion by issuing an order on July 20, Chungking was not going to budge. But as long as its order was kept secret, the CCP would stall it. It was probably for this reason that Chungking made its new order public. In so doing, it put its authority and prestige at stake.

In Shen-Kan-Ning, the blockading was tightened in October. The so-called "second anti-Communist high tide" is traced back to this reinforcement.^[162] By then the international situation had visibly improved for China. Far from being intimidated into neutrality by the coalescence of Japan with Germany, the United States decided to oppose the fascist encirclement. In Asia, this took the form of putting its muscle behind the principle of Open Door for the first time, and of coming to the aid of Britain to obstruct Japan's move into Southeast Asia. Britain reversed itself and, on October 8, notified Tokyo that the Burma Road would be reopened on the eighteenth.^[163] The Kiri Operation had been discarded by the China Expeditionary Forces on September 28, when it was concluded that China was "not sincere in her desire for peace."^[164]

But Konoe (in his second cabinet) persisted in a search for a way out of the expanding conflict. Formal recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime was slated at the end of November, which was the deadline for peace talks. The new foreign minister Matsuoka Yosuke^[*] took charge. He asked Germany to increase its pressure on Chungking while seeking a new direct contact with it.^[165]

Ch'ien Yung-ming, the general manager of the Communications Bank and an important member of the so-called Kiangsu–Chekiang financial clique, acted as a go-between. On November 12, a messenger of unknown identity arrived in Hong Kong bearing a letter from

[161] Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 218.

[162] Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 45.

[163] Nihon gaiko^[*] nempyo^[*] , II, 141.

[164] Boyle, p. 293.

[165] Taiheiyo^[*] senso^[*] e no michi , IV, 238.

Chiang Kai-shek written by Chang Ch'ün. Chiang offered to enter into a peace negotiation on two major conditions. One was Japan's agreement to the principle of total withdrawal. The other was withholding of recognition from Wang Ching-wei's faction. A four-minister conference in Tokyo accepted the two conditions on November 22. A Japanese reply to that effect reached Hong Kong on November 24, but Chungking's messenger had already left. On the twenty-eighth, the Konoe cabinet decided that it would sign the Basic Treaty with Wang Ching-wei's regime on the thirtieth. On November 29, Chungking notified Tokyo that it was appointing Hsü Shih-ying, the former Chinese ambassador to Japan, as the chairman of the Chinese delegation to the peace negotiation. But this did not reverse Tokyo's final decision to go for a protracted war.^[166] On no other occasion during the war did Chungking and Tokyo come so close to agreeing to basic conditions for peace. But how serious the Kuomintang was in these peace discussions remains moot to this day.^[167]

On November 7—the day after Roosevelt was re-elected to his third term—the CCP's Central Committee ordered stepped-up propaganda efforts to create a public opinion opposed to "split" and "capitulation." It instructed:

Do not revile X [Chiang Kai-shek?], do not revile the Kuomintang, do not revile the central army and the Whampoa faction, do not revile the tsap'ai armies . . . do not revile Britain, the United States, and the pro-British pro-American faction. . . . All efforts must be concentrated on reviling the pro-Japanese faction, the plotters and the provocateurs.^[168]

The directive named Ho Ying-ch'in as the leader of the "pro-Japanese faction." It also ordered struggles to nullify the German mediation in Chungking.^[169]

On November 9, Chu Te, P'eng Te-huai, Yeh T'ing, and Hsiang Ying jointly sent a reply to the October 19 message of Ho Ying-ch'in and Pai Ch'ung-hsi. Its humble style was in contrast to its substance. The CCP stood by its September proposal: the New Fourth Army was to remain in north Kiangsu until Japan was defeated. Then Chu Te's letter went on:

[166] Ibid. , p. 243.

[167] Those who took part in the Kiri Operation speculated that Chungking was trying to split Japan and Wang Ching-wei.

[168] Chung-Kung chung-yang kuan-yü fan-tui t'ou-hsiang fen-lieh wan-chiu shih-chü wei-chi ti shih-chih [The CCP Central Committee's directive concerning opposition to capitulation and split and saving the dangerous situation], Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 224.

[169] Ibid. , pp. 223, 225.

As for the regular units south of the Yangtze, [Chu] Te and others are just now undertaking the painful task of persuading them to obey the order and to move for the good of the whole. We beg the Center to postpone the deadline so as to facilitate our efforts to make thorough explanations to them, and to avoid sudden preciptation of other incidents, which would in turn add to the infinite transgresssions of [Chu] Te and others.^[170]

This message was the basis for the CCP's later assertion that it had promised to move its troops in southern Anhwei northward.^[171]

In December, the Central Committee issued a directive concerning the political situation. It indicated the Party leadership's judgment that the crisis in Chungking had passed:

Following the signing of the Japan–Wang Ching-wei treaty, the United States' loan, Soviet assistance, and the development of our Party's anti-capitulation struggle, the capitulation crisis of this occasion has already come to a halt. Though there are possibilities that this sort of crisis may happen again in the future, nevertheless at the moment the situation is still for resistance.^[172]

By stalling the Kuomintang by means of negotiations and a costly offensive, the CCP had succeeded in weathering perhaps the worst crisis in the war. Whatever friction and military clash might occur from this point on would not affect the united front. The only question that remained, Yenan seemed to assume, was whether such a clash would be viewed by the public—domestic as well as international—as a repression of patriots by the government or a revolt by traitors. The directive therefore instructed the Party to sway the public opinion in favor of the CCP.^[173]

The taunting reply from Chu Te and others was more than the Kuomintang could tolerate. On December 8, Ho Ying-ch'in and Pai Ch'ung-hsi again dispatched a very lengthy telegraphic message to the Communist military leaders. Written in dignified literary style, it seethed wth indignation.^[174] This was quite understandable but pointless—unless the government was willing to enforce its orders. On the following day, Chiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all units of the Eighth Route Army south of the Yellow River move across to the north bank by December 30, and that all units of the New Fourth

[170] K'ang-chan yen-lun-chi , p. 29.

[171] See Mao Tse-tung in Selected Works , III, 146.

[172] Chung-Kung chung-yang kuan-yü shih-chü cheng-ts'e ti shih-chih [The CCP Central Committee's directive concerning the situation and policy], Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 227.

[173] Ibid. , pp. 227–228. The arguments to be used were that the Communists had already agreed to evacuate the south bank of Yangtze, that the troops in central China only wanted to defend their homes, etc.

[174] Chung-Kung wen-t'i chung-yao wen-hsien , pp. 15–24.

Army south of the Yangtze River move to the north side by December 31 and cross the Yellow River northward by January 31, 1941.^[175] Ho's letter as well as Chiang's order were meant to be an ultimatum, though this was the second time the deadline had been put off.

On January 4, what was said to be the headquarters unit of the New Fourth Army, with 9,000 men, was surrounded by the Kuomintang forces of the Third War Zone commanded by Ku Chu-t'ung, at Maolin near Chinghsien in southern Anhwei—south of the Yangtze. The bulk of the unit perished in ten days of bitter fighting. Yeh T'ing, the commander, was taken prisoner while Hsiang Ying, the vice commander, and Yüan Kuo-p'ing, the director of the political department, were reported to have been killed. On January 17, the Chungking government disbanded the New Fourth Army for breach of discipline. There were many mysterious aspects to the incident. Internally the CCP has placed the blame on Hsiang Ying's alleged defiance of the Party's order since the Sixth Plenum to move east and north into areas behind the Japanese line. As late as May, 1940, however, Mao was directing him personally to expand into Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces.^[176] At the time of this incident, Hsiang Ying's unit was moving southward.

Commenting publicly on the government's order of January 17 disbanding the New Fourth Army, Mao said, " . . . those who issued this counter-revolutionary order . . . must have determined upon a complete split and out-and-out capitulation."^[177] It is quite possible that the CCP, surprised by the sternness of Chungking's action after all the postponements, prepared for a civil war. In the end, however, the CCP's directive of December was vindicated: the New Fourth Army Incident remained basically "local" in character. In fact, it was an anti-climax. The incident took place on the south side of the Yangtze, from which the CCP had been withdrawing the bulk of its forces of its own accord since 1939. It promised to vacate the area in November, though it would not have kept the promise unless forced. A military clash might have taken on a more serious character had it been undertaken by the Kwangsi forces in north Kiangsu. Attacking the Communist forces on the south bank of Yangtze instead, the government's action had the effect of saving its face after having issued an order which it was unwilling to enforce.

Did the Kuomintang intend to attack the New Fourth Army in north Kiangsu and north Anhwei? Since late 1939, the Kwangsi forces

[175] Soviet Russia in China , p. 95.

[176] Selected Works , II, 431–432.

[177] Ibid. , p. 454. This was issued on January 22.

of the Fifth War Zone—having semi-central army status—had been amassed on the west side of the Tientsin–Pukow railway with obvious intentions of attacking the New Fourth Army in the area. Several skirmishes took place. According to a Japanese source, T'ang En-po was ordered to marshal the 31st Group Army, the Second Cavalry Army, and the Third Group Army to engage in Communist suppression in Honan and eastern Anhwei in late January. But this force happened to be obstructed by Japanese operations in the area and withdrew.^[178] It appears in the last analysis that the Kuomintang could not bring its superior central forces to bear on the Communist forces without first coming to terms with Japan.

On January 20 the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee published an order making appointments to the New Fourth Army, which had been "abolished" by the central government. Ch'en I and Chang Yün-i were appointed commander and vice commander respectively; Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Tzu-hui were political commissar and director of the political department; and Lai Ch'uan-chu was the chief of staff.^[179] Simultaneously, the CCP demanded that the government meet twelve demands, including punishment for Ho Ying-ch'in, Ku Chu-t'ung, and Shangkuan Yünhsiang as culprits for the incident.^[180] The fiction that the Communist forces were a part of the National Revolutionary Army was formally done away with, and Yenan began to claim the trappings of an independent state. On February 18, the Central Committee went ahead on its own initiative to reorganize the New Fourth Army—now under Mao's complete control—into seven divisions. The seven Communist delegates to the National Political Council vowed to boycott the Council until the government met its "Twelve Item Demands."^[181] By March, Mao felt that the "second anti-Communist high tide" was ending.^[182]

The new united front was consolidated. The CCP had had to test its strength slowly since the Sixth Plenum. The cornerstone of the new united front was the Kuomintang's resistance in a protracted war of stalemate. Within this basic framework the Kuomintang recognized the right of the CCP to carry out revolutionary expansion. With the taking of north Kiangsu, the CCP's basic requirement for its revolutionary goal was met. Only at this point did Mao's thesis in the

[178] Pacification War , No. 1, p. 390. Beside the Japanese, the Russians restrained Chungking, according to Ho Kan-chih: "The aid of the Soviet Union to China and her attitude constituted another factor that the die-hards had to ponder carefully," p. 368.

[179] Selected Works , II, 451.

[180] Ibid. , pp. 455–456.

[181] Mao Tse-tung-chi , VII, 284.

[182] Selected Works , II, 459.

Wayaopao Resolution—since abandoned—come to take on apparent validity. Whether the Kuomintang was actually compelled by the Communists to stay in the war did not matter. It had demonstrated by its deed that Communist preparation for the forthcoming civil war would be tolerated.^[*]

On May 8, Mao lectured his internal opponents in reviewing the New Fourth Army Incident, saying,

As long as the contradiction between China and Japan remains acute, even if the entire big landlord class and big bourgeoisie turn traitor and surrender, they can never bring about another 1927 situation. . . . The first anti-Communist onslaught was appraised as another May 21st Incident by some comrades, and the second onslaught as a repetition of the April 12th and the May 21st Incidents, but objective facts have proved these appraisals wrong. The mistake of these comrades lies in forgetting that the national contradiction is the primary one.^[183]

Mao professed to defend the united front against its detractors. This was the end of the Internationalists. The Rectification Campaign that followed ratified this fact.^[184]

[*] The Kuomintang lumps together the negotiations in 1939 and 1940 and calls it the first negotiation. There were five of them altogether during the war: March, 1942; May, 1944; November, 1944; and January, 1945. By the fifth round, the CCP demanded sixteen divisions in five armies and a coalition government. Soviet Russia in China , pp. 107–108, 115–117, 122–123. As the Communists grew in strength, the negotiations came to resemble diplomatic bargains between independent states.

[183] "Conclusions on the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught," Ibid. , p. 464. The April 12th and the May 21st Incidents refer to the Kuomintang's coup in 1927.

[184] In the November, 1940, issue of The Communist , Wang Ming published a lengthy article elaborating on "comrade Mao Tse-tung's" united front tactics. It is my guess that this was his self-criticism. I can only guess because the version I have seen was mutilated in several places. "Lun Ma-Lieh chu-i chüeh-ting ts'e-lüeh ti chi-ke chi-pen yüan-tse" [On several basic principles concerning tactics based on Marxism-Leninism], Kung-ch'an-tang-jen , No. 12.