Affirmative Action

Scholars will debate for some time the question of whether Justice Thomas ran from his prior views on several controversial issues (e.g., abortion and natural law) during his confirmation hearings. There is, however, one issue from which Justice Thomas clearly did not run: affirmative action. He remained an outspoken opponent of affirmative action thoughout the confirmation hearings.

Justice Thomas's opposition to affirmative action is, like that of his intellectual guru, the conservative African American Thomas Sowell, primarily based on the argument that affirmative action does not help poor African Americans, only middle-class African Americans. Other African American intellectuals, including Shelby Steele and Stephen Carter, have also made this argument. For example, Carter states: "All the efforts at seeking to justify racial preferences as justice or compensation mask the simple truth that among those training for business and professional careers, the benefits of affirmative action fall to those least in need of them."^[2] The media was quick to pick up this attack on affirmative action, primarily because its source—affirmative action beneficiaries—was so astonishing.

While those who would attack affirmative action on grounds of its limited reach appear to focus only on the second step of the American race problem (resolving it), their argument may in fact be based on an unrealistic assumption in the first step (understanding it), namely that, properly understood, the American race prob-

lem is defined solely or mostly in terms of the life experiences of poor African Americans. But, as this book tries to establish, the American race problem and the American class problem are not coextensive. Unlike the class problem, the race problem is not simply an economic problem. Rather, it is a problem of racial subordination that operates within definable class boundaries—what I call in the book intra-class racial disparity . Thus, the existence of the American race problem is neither proven nor disproven by comparing the socioeconomic burdens or advantages of one segment of African American society with that of another (for instance, middle-class African Americans and underclass African Americans) or, for that matter, by comparing the socioeconomic burdens or advantages of one segment of African American society with that of another segment of white society. Its existence can only be established by examining the socioeconomic burdens or advantages of African Americans and whites belonging to the same class (for example, working-class African Americans and working-class whites). Viewed in this manner, it can be seen that the American race problem is multifarious, that the problems of middle-class African Americans, which are quite specific to their class (Chapter 2), do in fact count as part of the American race problem.

If it is true that each class within African American society faces a unique set of racial problems, then it follows that these problems require different responses. What works for the African American poverty class may not work for the African American middle class. Accordingly, I maintain in Chapters 5 and 6 that solutions designed to deal with the problems of the latter (including affirmative action) will not make sense if applied to the problems of the former. This is because although both classes of African Americans face racial problems—i.e., the African American middle class is worse off in many respects than the white middle class (Chapter 2) and the African American poverty class is disadvantaged relative to its white counterpart (Chapter 4)—the problems of the African American middle class are responsive to a civil rights solution whereas the problems of the African American poverty class are more amenable to an economic solution. Hence, I offer a civil rights program for the African American middle class and an employment opportunities program for the African American poverty class.

My civil rights reforms include a strong program of affirmative action, primarily for three reasons. First, affirmative action works: it promotes racial inclusion, the ultimate goal of formal equal opportunity, our fundamental civil rights policy since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education (Chapter 1). Throughout the book, I discuss several private and governmental studies, including a labor department report the Reagan administration attempted to suppress, plus Supreme Court opinions in which the point is repeated that affirmative action is the most effective means of bringing qualified African Americans into mainstream society. Affirmative action works because it counteracts the inertia of discriminatory traditions in American institutions. If there is one thing about which both conservative and liberal African Americans agree, it is that racial discrimination remains a serious problem in American society. Second, an affirmative action candidate who has managed to achieve traditional qualifications that are roughly equal to those of white candidates despite severe social or psychological obstacles that were simply not a part of the white candidates' life experiences (Chapters 2 and 3) may in fact be the most qualified candidate in the pool.

The third argument is more complex than the first two: affirmative action is a moral imperative because it makes our society more open than it otherwise would be. Plato believed that the question of a moderately just society (an absolutely just society may not be possible) could not be approached in terms of the individual on an independent basis, but rather must be looked at first in terms of the design of society. A moderately just society is one in which individuals are given a fair chance (real equal opportunity) to succeed. Accordingly, a moderately just society is one in which an African American (or other minority or woman) has a fair chance to succeed and then to attain further success. Because, as my first argument establishes, affirmative action assures such success, affirmative action, at least for the time being, is an essential ingredient for a moderately just society.

In short, this book offers a twofold message to the few vocal African American beneficiaries of affirmative action who are concerned about the failure of affirmative action to reach the African American poverty class. First, affirmative action is not a panacea for a problem as complex and as multifaceted as the American race

problem. Second, affirmative action's social utility cannot be gainsaid. At a minimum, its presence reminds us that merit and achievement cannot be measured in a cookie-cutter fashion in a society that is not only culturally diverse but also morally guided. Given the unqualified success of so many affirmative action beneficiaries since the inception of the concept a generation ago (including Justice Clarence Thomas), we must endeavor to isolate those pre-professional qualities in African Americans—principally personal drive and academic strength in the face of racial burdens—that can help us make morally correct and institutionally sound choices.

None of this discussion should be taken as a concession to the idea that poor African Americans do not benefit from affirmative action. Poor African Americans do in fact benefit from affirmative action: they benefit from the role models affirmative action creates. This is no small bone; for it is the absence of good role models that contributes to the American race problem (Chapter 4), and it is the presence of good role models that can help resolve the American race problem (Chapter 5).