Political Strategy
Although Lin Biao is known as a brilliant military strategist, he rose to power primarily because he actively encouraged the cult of Mao. He introduced Mao's approach of "politics in command" to the PLA and succeeded, to a certain extent, in restoring that body's sagging morale after the purge of Peng Dehuai. During the CR, he pushed Mao's personality cult to new heights. "Every sentence in Chairman Mao's work is a truth. One single sentence of his surpasses 10,000 of ours. . . . We must carry out not only those instructions we understand, but also those we fail to understand for the moment, and in the course of carrying them out, we must try to understand them."[22]
Lin Biao's thought pattern, aptly labeled a "barracks communism" by Lowell Dittmer, shows the traits of a military man, particularly in his penchant for reducing complex and ambiguous matters to simple propositions.[23] During the CR, he divided the leading cadres into two categories: those who paid attention to important matters and those who were preoccupied with minor matters. Although we do not know whether he undertook any serious study of Marxism-Leninism or any other theoretical literature, he left several boxes of cards containing excerpts from various Marxist writings, organized under such headings as "relations between superior and subordinates," "cadre policy," "seeking truth," and "dialectics."[24]
Although Lin Biao rose to be Mao's official successor during the CR, as vice chairman of the CCP, his real power was precarious because his influence was overshadowed by Mao, who was too powerful and unpredictable to be trusted. Lin knew about Mao's habit of using confidants and then dropping them.[25] Although he was fourteen years younger than Mao, his poor health made it doubtful that he would outlive him.[26] As defense minister he was legally subordinate to Premier Zhou Enlai, his for-
[22] New China News Agency (Beijing), 23 January 1968.
[23] Lowell Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949–1981 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).
[24] Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue , no. 4, 1983, 336.
[25] Ying-mao Kau, Lin Biao Affair .
[26] Hu Hua, "Marching on a Tortuous Road and Socialist New Victory During New Line" (unpublished paper), 1987, 24.
mer teacher at Whampao Military Academy. In the propaganda field he had no reliable partners except for the Gang of Four, over whom he did not have any formal authority.
With his power base limited to military officers, largely from the Fourth Field Army and those from the second and third generations, Lin attempted, first, to strengthen the political authority of the military, second, to obtain formal authority over the bureaucracy as chairman of the state, and, third, to mobilize his factional followers for a coup attempt.
Using The Military
Although Mao had to rely on the military to restore any semblance of order after two years of chaotic mass mobilization, the elite groups' interests in the military's deep involvement in politics diverged. For Mao, who invented the phrase "the party controls the gun," military involvement was a temporary measure to control the mass movement. The Gang of Four saw that their interests lay in weakening the military's political influence while increasing that of the rebels in the newly established power organs at the local level. Zhou Enlai shared Mao's view, regarding use of the military as an expedient measure to prevent civil war.
Given Lin Biao's heavy reliance on the military for his support, it is clear that he benefited from the institution's increasing political influence during the crisis of the CR, although he did not totally control it. For example, as vice chairman in charge of the daily operations of the Military Affairs Commission, he could legitimately interfere with the operations of the military control commissions that were imposed even on some central government ministries.
The rising tension along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 helped the military to maintain its active involvement in politics. After the armed clash in Chenbao island, Lin Biao expanded the military's control over industry at the expense of the State Council under Zhou Enlai.[27] Using the need to prepare for war as an ex-
[27] On the border clash, see Thomas Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute," American Political Science Review , vol. 66, December 1972, 1175–1202. For Lin Biao's exploitation of the incident, see Jingji Jihua Yanjiu , 20 November 1983.
cuse, he extended the military's authority over many industries at the expense of the State Council.[28] He also gave the military jurisdiction over small industries that could produce small weapons, and he planned to set up an "independent and complete national defense industry" under his control. Furthermore, Lin Biao reportedly intervened in the work of the economic planning agency by ordering it to replace "balance" as the main guiding principle of economic planning with "the battle perspective." Subsequently, the military share of the national budget increased by 34 percent in 1969, by 15 percent in 1970, and by 17 percent in 1971. In these years, defense industry and science received more than 11 percent of the total reinvestment of the state (in 1968 it had received only 9 percent). The state bureaucracy under Zhou Enlai was losing its jurisdiction over a large portion of industry.
Lin Biao reportedly issued Order no. 1 on 18 October 1969 "behind the [back of] Chairman Mao." Under the pretext of "strengthening war preparation to prevent the enemy's sudden attack," this order put the entire military on alert, set up command structures, and appointed officers to command posts.[29] After Order no. 1, Lin's followers dispersed old senior leaders to different parts of China.[30] The objective was to remove them from the decision-making process at the center and to prevent them from forming a coalition against Lin. It was easy to keep close surveillance over them through the reliable local military units, and Lin took the precaution of forbidding these older leaders from communicating with one another.[31] Only on 19 October did Lin Biao report to Mao (by telephone recording), "following the practice of first beheading and then reporting," therefore forcing Mao to acquiesce in his decision. Upon hearing the report, Mao's first comment was that the order should be burned.[32]
Not surprisingly, after Lin Biao's death all his decisions made in the name of war preparations were reversed. All industry was returned to the control of the State Council. In contrast to Lin's
[28] Jingji Jihua Yanjiu , 23 November 1983.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu , vol. 3.
[31] Ibid.
[32] The implication of Mao's comment was that the order should be regarded as if it had not been issued. Ibid.
strategy of preparing for war, which inevitably increased the power of the military, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai opted for the goal of overcoming China's diplomatic isolation by improving Sino-American relations. In addition, Mao attempted to limit the power of the military: he later reduced its involvement in local politics by sending soldiers back to their barracks and transferring political authority to provincial party committees. "At the moment [our military] promotes politics [wen ], but does not promote military affairs [wu ], and it has already become a cultured army [wenhua jundui ]."[33] By February 1971, the center decided to transfer the authority to investigate May 16 elements to the national committee headed by Wu De, thus depriving the local military of the chance to use this investigation to increase their political influence.[34]
Issues of State Chairmanship
Lin and his followers tried to overcome his weakness in the civilian bureaucracy by making him the formal head of the state, as chairman of the PRC, the position that was abolished with Liu Shaoqi's purge.[35] The Gang of Four apparently wanted to exploit the issue in order to weaken Zhou Enlai's position.[36] Viewing the revision of the state constitution as "an opportunity for the redistribution of power," the Gang of Four argued that the new constitution should include an article stating that "on the basis of the Central Committee of the CCP's nomination, the premier and members of the State Council will be appointed and dismissed." According to this draft, the chairman of the CCP would concurrently be "a head of the proletarian dictatorship," whereas the premier would also be a "first minister" in charge of management offices under the chairman.[37]
Mao, probably happy with the three groups conflicting and cooperating under his authority, expressed several times his objection to restoring the state chairmanship. Zhou Enlai was
[33] Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue , no. 4, 1983, 301.
[34] Ibid., 298.
[35] For Lin's maneuver at Lushan, see Zheng Derung and Zhu Yang, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang Lishi Jiangyi (Jilin: Jilin Renmin Chubanshe, 1982), 181–93.
[36] Chen Hefu, ed., Zhongguo Faxian Leibian (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1980), 353.
[37] Ibid.
more than happy with Mao's opposition. But Lin Biao pushed the issue. He made an unauthorized move by stating "Chairman Mao is a genius," and the "chairmanship of the state should be established" in his opening speech at the second plenum of the Ninth Party Congress held in August 1970 in Lushan. Lin's followers endorsed his speech, demanding that it be distributed and studied.[38]
Mao counterattacked. Declaring "it is unprecedented for a few persons to attempt to confuse 200 Central Committee members," he personally convened a Politburo meeting, which decided to stop discussion of Lin Biao's speech, to cancel the central-north China group's report prepared by Chen Boda, and to order Chen to submit to self-criticism. A few days later, Mao wrote "My Opinion," which repudiated Lin's and Chen's theories of genius. In addition, probably alarmed at Lin's move, Mao took several additional measures to weaken Lin's position. He ordered the PLA to rectify its work style (zuofeng ) by initiating the campaign "against arrogance and complacency" and by placing Zhou Enlai in charge of the campaign. Mao also dispatched Ye Jianying to work in the management section of the Military Affairs Commission in order to let "some air in" and reorganized the Beijing military region by transferring the Thirty-eighth Field Army, which was suspected of being loyal to Lin Biao, out of Beijing—the strategy Mao himself described as "digging out Lin's wall."
Coup Attempt
After the Lushan conference Lin Biao realized not only that his plan for peaceful succession had failed but that he had also exposed his purpose so fully that he was in political trouble. He thus concluded, "Struggle by words will not do; only using weapons can work." Knowing Mao well enough to realize that he would probably move against him at the forthcoming third plenum of the Ninth Party Congress (planned for September 1971), Lin thought it
[38] According to the official interpretation, proclaiming Mao's genius was intended to achieve two objectives for the Lin Biao group. First, it would discredit Zhang Chunqiao, who failed to recognize Mao as a genius. By criticizing Zhang, Lin Biao could seize hegemony over ideology from the Jiang Qing faction. The second objective was to establish the triumvirate of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, with a parallel triumvirate of assistants—Engels, Stalin, and Lin Biao. Hu Hua, "Marching on a Tortuous Road."
would be better for him to move first. His son and his factional followers developed a secret contingent coup plan of the 571 program.[39]
Not sitting idly by, Mao was maneuvering to further isolate Lin Biao politically. From mid-August to 12 September 1971 Mao traveled around the south talking with leaders of the big military regions, provinces, and municipalities. In his talks, he made his displeasure with Lin Biao amply clear: "A certain person is impatient to be the state chairman; he wants to divide the party and seize power. . . . Making one's own wife the management office chief is not appropriate." With regard to his role in Lin Biao's rise, he said, "Of course, I have some responsibility."[40]
After being informed of Mao's move by means of two different sources, Lin Biao ordered the activation of the 571 program.[41] Lin Liguo's group busily discussed possible methods of assassinating Mao, ranging from using napalm and rockets to destroy Mao's train to sending assassins to murder him. Probably because he had been informed of "some abnormal action" on the part of Lin Biao's followers, Mao changed his travel schedule and immediately returned to Beijing.[42] When the Lin Liguo group discovered that Mao had left for Beijing, they changed their coup plan and decided to escape to Guangdong. In Canton, they planned to convene a meeting of cadres above the divisional level and then to use the radio broadcast system to declare the establishment of a separate regime. Reportedly, they planned to ask for help from the Soviet Union.[43]
"A comrade in the central management office" (probably Wang Dongxing) informed Zhou of Lin Biao's plan to escape to the Soviet Union.[44] Zhou ordered that no plane take off without the joint approval of Mao, Zhou, Huang, Wu, and Li Zuopeng, commander
[39] Lin Liguo called his secret group a "fleet" in admiration of the Japanese naval spirit as depicted in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! For the most detailed information on his coup plan, see Yan Jiaqi, Wenge Shinian Shi , 356; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin .
[40] Jiefangjun Bao , 25 November 1980.
[41] Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 112.
[42] Hu Hua reports that Zheng Shiqing, the head of Jiangxi province, informed Mao at Nanchang (at the end of August) of Lin Liguo's activities. Hu Hua, "Marching on a Tortuous Road."
[43] Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 142–49.
[44] Dangshi Yanjiu , no. 3, 1981, 59.
of the navy, who was responsible for airport security. Nonetheless, at midnight, Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and Lin Liguo decided to escape, probably because they had heard about Zhou's suspicions. Around 2 A.M. , when Lin's plane was getting close to the limits of Chinese air space, Wu Faxian asked Zhou whether or not to shoot the plane down. Zhou went to Mao for a decision. Mao said, "Heaven wants to rain, and a woman wants to marry. Let him go."[45] On the afternoon of 14 September, Zhou received a report from the Chinese embassy in Mongolia stating that the plane had crashed. We still do not know why.[46]
[45] Ibid.
[46] Some speculate that the plane was shot down; others guess that the plane ran out of fuel. Hangkong Zhishi , no. 9, 1981, 26–29.