Eight—
Beyond Continuous Revolution

This study has been based on the premise that continuing revolution after the seizure of sovereignty has three functional requisites. The first is charismatic leadership, consisting of an inspiring leader and an inspired staff, successfully performing a revolutionary mission. The second is effective mass mobilization, which presumes access between elite and masses and some judicious combination of material and normative incentives. The third is a structure of opposition against which the forces of revolution may reflexively define themselves through "struggle." These three functional requisites have historically been combined, with varying selective emphases, into two distinct approaches to revolution. The "storming" approach, with its characteristic emphasis on simultaneous, egalitarian, and spontaneous elements, has been relatively infrequently applied, but it retains a strong hold on the revolutionary imagination and is often evoked in propaganda. The "engineering" approach, which emphasizes the sequential, elitist, and well-organized aspects of the revolutionary experience, has figured prominently in the practical socialization of cadres in the post-Liberation era.

During roughly the first decade after Liberation, the engineering approach had its heyday. Revolutionary ideology and the charismatic leadership of Mao Zedong formed a complementary union with the administrative staff of the Chinese Communist Party and the incipient government, belying the assumption that there is an inherent contradiction between charismatic leadership and bureaucratic organization. Making ample use of purges and swift promotions to motivate cadres and informally linking cadres with activists during implementation all helped to maintain the revolutionary dynamic of the organization; although admittedly there were occasional clashes between the more impatient and driving leader and those colleagues more attentive to organizational maintenance and enhancement needs, these were resolved according to the norms regulating intra-Party conflict.^[1] The masses were mobilized by

[1] See Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China .

a combination of material and normative incentives so closely calibrated that the latter acquired legitimacy per se, with the result that for several years afterward the masses would respond to normative incentives alone. The structure of opposition consisted of empirical representatives of the former ruling classes who could still be said to pose a credible threat of restoring the old order if not vigorously repressed, though they had lost political power. Thus the contrast between old and new, pre- and postrevolutionary, counterrevolutionary and revolutionary, could still be credibly dramatized within a bipolar rhetoric of inner/outer, permitted/ forbidden, and so forth, and evocation of this symbolic cleavage gave a semblance of moral order to a swiftly changing political reality.

Before the first decade had elapsed, the socialist transformation of the means of production and the restructuring of primary group relationships marked successful achievement of the first phase of continuing revolution. The period from 1957 to 1966 was a period of transition, consisting of a number of false starts interspersed with inconclusive floundering for a new theoretical direction. The first attempt to turn the revolution against vestiges of traditional Chinese political culture in the Hundred Flowers movement collapsed swiftly as the burgeoning movement revealed contradictions in the actors' notions of which aspects of the cultural and political superstructure most needed to be transformed, and the leadership recoiled from this flirtation with liberalism to a more repressive stance vis-à-vis society. Material incentives were not employed, hence only "intellectuals," who proved to have been inadequately resocialized, responded. The attempt the following year to shift the revolution from redistributive and transformative tasks to economic development was both badly conceived and meteorologically unlucky, and the Great Leap Forward took a big step backward, permanently discrediting the direct transposition of storm tactics to economic objectives. The Socialist Education movement of the early 1960s coincided with recovery but foundered on the incongruence between revolutionary ideological rhetoric and "revisionist" economic policies.

By the mid-1960s the functional requisites of revolution had so changed in character as to facilitate a transition from the engineering to the storming approach for the first time since the late 1920s and early 1930s. The charismatic leader and his personal staff had become detached from the administrative apparatus, as the latter became increasingly absorbed in the satisfaction of organizational interests and mistrustful of mobilizational techniques and the former became preoccupied with finding a new theoretical direction for the revolution. Therefore, when the Cultural Revolution erupted, it did so with minimal organizational guidance from the central or local leadership (many of whom became its targets), thereby achieving unprecedented spontaneity. Although there

was thus no systematic linkage of normative and material incentives, the masses participated avidly and in great numbers in order to take advantage of this unwonted freedom to raise new issues and vent long-repressed grievances. By daring to air such sensitive issues publicly, the supreme leader momentarily recovered his claim to charismatic boldness and vision. The opposition structure took the form of personalized condensation symbols (viz., Peng Zhen, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping) who were polemically associated with a theory of socialist degeneration that conflated residual ("capitalist") and emergent (socialist) contradictions. The thinking on which the Cultural Revolution was based was so loose and question-begging that the great movement it precipitated soon threatened to devour itself, however, requiring the intervention of a deus ex machina (namely, the PLA "aid-the-left" troops and Mao Zedong Thought worker-peasant-soldier propaganda teams) to terminate it.

The period from the suppression of spontaneous mobilization and the rustication of Red Guards in 1968–69 until the fall of the leading cultural radicals in September 1976 might be characterized as one of revised storming. The storming approach in its 1966–68 form could not be sustained without tearing the country apart, and so an attempt was made to institutionalize its iconoclastic animus. But, partly because of irresolvable contradictions between the two approaches, partly because these contradictions coincided with factional rivalries at a time of succession crisis, this attempt at fusion fell apart. The radicals were frustrated by the inherent contradictions between the dynamics of storming and their own stake in the new order, whereas the moderates were stymied by the superficial similarity between engineering and "revisionism."

In the post-Mao period, a brief and abortive attempt to revive the engineering approach under Hua Guofeng gave way under Deng Xiaoping to an unprecedentedly explicit attempt to adapt to a postrevolutionary era. Although the final form that this adaptation will take is still at issue at this writing, the transformation of the erstwhile functional requisites for continuing revolution has been so profound that the likelihood of reconstituting them seems remote. These changes will be examined as they have affected charismatic leadership, mass mobilization, and the structure of opposition respectively.

The Routinization of Charisma

In the course of post-Liberation CPC history, Mao initially exercised the personal charisma that had accrued to him as a result of his successful leadership of the revolution on behalf of the corporate interests of the Party-state apparatus. But then in the wake of the split occasioned by essential completion of socialization of the means of production, he began to exercise charismatic leadership in defiance of all organizational

mechanisms erected to contain it, in time appropriating ideological innovation on behalf of a highly personal revolutionary vision. His performance record hence declined measurably from that which he had been able to claim as spokesman for the Party-state apparatus as a whole, at first simply because of the inefficacy of the policies he espoused, which were vigorously implemented with catastrophic results, later (in the early 1960s) because of poor execution as well, as the bureaucracy lost faith in his initiatives and passively resisted them. Yet Mao still had faith in his own vision and, with the help of Lin Biao and a successful propaganda campaign that reasserted the infallibility of his "line" and blamed misfortunes on ideologically defined scapegoats, he was able to retain mass support. Then in the early Cultural Revolution Mao reclaimed genuine charisma by boldly assailing the structures of authority in the emergent socialist regime, bidding promise of salvation to the many who had resented the constraints of these "frames." His vision once again seemed to fail him in the late Cultural Revolution period, however; unable to synthesize the conflicting requirements of economic production and continuing revolution, or to balance the mutually antagonistic factions that competed for his blessing in the anticipated succession crisis, he equivocated, shifting lines as he shifted alliances, ultimately failing either to preserve or to transmit charisma.

Apparently unaware of the tenuous condition of charisma and the inauspicious circumstances confronting its prospective revival, Hua Guofeng attempted to "inherit" Mao's charismatic mantle by publicly embracing his Thought. Yet the ultimately prevailing tendency in the successor leadership was not only to abandon such efforts but to adopt institutional safeguards against charismatic effervescence. Three aspects of this tendency may be distinguished: a repudiation of the personality cult, evacuation of revolutionary mission, and diffusion of leadership responsibility.

Repudiation of the Personality Cult

A useful preliminary to any attempt to inherit charisma as an instrument of personal hegemony is an enhancement of the prestige of one's predecessor—such had been Stalin's ploy in launching a movement to honor the dead Lenin—and Hua Guofeng followed suit. It was particularly in Hua's interest to refurbish the cult, for his own emergence as Mao's successor could be justified by the infallibility premise and by little else. Hua's previous career had demonstrated him to be a competent implementer of radical policies at the provincial level and a political maneuverer capable of surviving in a chaotic political milieu without accumulating enemies. He had not distinguished himself as a policy innovator, however, and his arrest of the Gang of Four offered the first hint of political imagination or even inordinate ambition. His strategy for

legitimating his seizure of power seems to have been to arrogate to himself the superficial trappings of the cult, while reaffirming the infallibility premise with regard to the now-disembodied Thought of Mao Zedong, hoping thereby to establish an equation of himself with the late Chairman. Hua's first official act upon taking the helm was thus to appoint himself chairman of the committee to edit volume five of Mao's Selected Works and the committee to plan construction of a mausoleum to house Mao's crystal sarcophagus (like Stalin, Hua mummified his predecessor contrary to the latter's express wish). Pictures self-consciously associating Mao with Hua promptly appeared in public places, and Hua began to emulate Mao by adopting his hair style, bestowing exemplars of his calligraphy to various journal mastheads, visiting prominent sites in Mao's career itinerary (such as Jinggangshan), and otherwise appropriating his persona.

With respect to Mao's Thought, Hua ignored the dilemmas and theoretical dead ends into which it had gravitated during its terminal phase and reaffirmed its infallibility as of that time in which it could claim its greatest popular consensus: the 1950s. Within a year and a half after Mao's death no less than eight hitherto-unpublished Mao texts had made their appearance in People's Daily ; except during the Cultural Revolution itself, no previous period in PRC history had witnessed the publication of so many new texts.^[2] In the first stages of the campaign to criticize the Gang of Four, the latter were accused of being "apparently left, but actually right," and placed in the Maoist framework of "two-line struggle" in direct line of descent from their old nemesis, Liu Shaoqi.^[3] At the apparent instigation of Wang Dongxing,^[4] Hua sponsored a joint editorial containing the famous "two whatevers": "Whatever policies

[2] Helmut Martin, Cult and Canon ; see also Krishna Prakash Gupta, "Mao after Mao: A Marxist Debate in China," in V. P. Dutt, ed., China : The Post-Mao View (New Delhi: Allied Pub., 1981), pp. 162–81.

[3] The continuing antirevisionist animus is also apparent in the editing of volume 5 of Mao's Selected Works . See Lu Shi, "'Mao xuan' wu juan yingdang chong shen chong bian" [The fifth volume of 'Mao's Selected Works' should be reexamined and reedited], ZM , no. 24 (October 1979): 16–17.

[4] In a self-examination presented at the preparatory meeting of the Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh CC (December 10, 1979), Wang said: "I proposed the 'two-whatever' theme when I was concurrently placed in charge of the Red Flag journal. This proposal came to my mind shortly after the downfall of the Gang of Four. . . . I believed that the overliberalization of the discussion on practice as the sole criterion for truth may lead to trouble. This belief was corroborated by incidents that erupted in various localities since the beginning of January this year as a result of the overemphasis on the emancipation of people's minds. Eventually, the bourgeois democracy and anarchist trend of thought flooded our country. As soon as the CC noted this, it proclaimed the four basic principles as 'an emergency measure' to stop this trend." Text of Wang Dongxing's Self-examination Paper Read at the Preparatory Meeting for the 4th Plenary Session of the 11th CCP CC," Dong Xi Fang , no. 12 (December 10, 1979): 10–12.

Chairman Mao had decided, we shall resolutely defend; whatever instructions he issued, we shall steadfastly obey."^[5]

Hua's position unfortunately placed him at cross-purposes with Deng Xiaoping, for in the same "infallible" decision in which he appointed Hua to the heir-apparent positions of premier and first vice-chairman, Mao had also evicted Deng from all his Party and government posts. Deng therefore had an interest in negating the infallibility premise on which Hua was attempting to build his own legitimacy. Having just purged Mao's most enthusiastic supporters, and lacking any political base of his own, Hua was however thrown into the arms of the moderate senior Party-state cadres, most of whom had stronger bonds to Deng than to Hua. Aware of the threat that Deng posed to his position, Hua fell back on assertions of Mao's infallibility; for example, his "two whatevers" statement, issued on the anniversary of Hua's appointment as acting premier, seems to have come in response to strong pressure for Deng's rehabilitation in the public expressions of bereavement surrounding the first anniversary of Zhou Enlai's death. Deng adopted the tactic of expressing contrition and exaggerated deference in order to ingratiate himself with Hua, but he also took issue with the "two whatevers," before he had even been rehabilitated.^[6] He seems to have permitted his criticisms to leak through the rumor network, for by April a group of military supporters in Guangzhou had drafted a manifesto evoking them.^[7]

In response to this combination of blandishment and pressure, Hua finally agreed to rehabilitate Deng to all former positions, a decision formalized at the Third Plenum of the Tenth CC in July 1977. In his maiden speech to the CC, Deng questioned the common practice of quoting Mao out of context: "We must not distortedly take one sentence and use it as a slogan," he said. "Mao Zedong Thought must be taken as a whole and cannot be unilaterally applied. Chairman Mao's style is very

[5] "Study Well the Documents and Grasp the Key Link," RR , February 7, 1977.

[6] See Deng Xiaoping, "The 'Two Whatever' Policy Does Not Accord with Marxism" (May 24, 1977), in Beijing Review (hereinafter BR ), no. 33 (August 15, 1983): 14–15.

[7] "We have the Party Statutes and the Constitution before us; there are precise regulations as to how the Chairman of the Party, who will also be the commander-in-chief of our army and chief of state, is to be nominated. . . . The fact that comrade Hua Guofeng assumed the chairmanship of the MAC without calling the NPC into session, indeed without even calling a plenary session of the CC, can only be described as an emergency solution forced upon him by the circumstances, and also as a consequence of the struggle against the anti-Party clique, the Gang of Four. . . . We need not emphasize the point that Hua Guofeng assumed Chairmanship of the CC based on Mao's written remark, 'with you in charge, I am at ease.' These words, be they glittering as gold, cannot represent anything but the personal opinion of Chairman Mao; they can by no means be rated as the expression of the will of the Party, army or people." "Proposal of the Canton PLA Party Committee and the Guang-dong Provincial Party Committee Concerning Certain Topical Questions," trans. in Der Spiegel (Hamburg), April 18, 1977, pp. 161–64.

lively and popular and sometimes he liked to say something humorous."^[8] Deng's influence was perceptible in a series of articles that appeared at the time of the first anniversary of Mao's death, stressing the same theme, and in a gradual change in the public handling of Mao's writings and statements. Nie Rongzhen, for example, wrote an important article arguing that Mao Zedong Thought should be studied only in terms of its spirit, and not through isolated quotations that disregarded their spatial and temporal context.^[9]

By December 1977 it had become apparent that tighter constraints were being placed on the publication of Mao texts. By April 1978, the press had ceased printing all Mao quotations in boldface type, and at about the same time People's Daily desisted from carrying a daily quotation in a special nameplate at the top of the page.^[10] There were fewer quotations, and Mao's name was not inevitably invoked in support of particular policies. Only three major writings by Mao were released in 1978; one was his 1962 speech to seven thousand cadres, in which he discussed the importance of democratic centralism and offered his own self-criticism (hitherto unpublished) for errors committed during the Great Leap; the second (a 1958 piece entitled "Uninterrupted Revolution") actually stressed economic reconstruction through technological revolution (Mao's two letters to his sons, published at about this time, also stressed the need for science and technology); and the third, Mao's 1941 talk to a women's group, upheld the primacy of actual practice and investigation in justifying a theoretical viewpoint. On the second anniversary of Mao's death, only three poems were released; by the fourth anniversary, Mao was totally ignored in Beijing.^[11]

But Deng's most explicit and theoretically ambitious challenge to the doctrine of charismatic infallibility took the form of a seemingly academic debate concerning the epistemological issue of the correct "criterion of truth" (zhenli de biaozhun ).^[12] The origins of this debate can be traced all the way back to Deng's brief concluding speech at the Eleventh Party Congress in September 1977, in which he emphasized the need to "revive . . . the practice of seeking truth from facts."^[13] This theme was reflected in the article "Practice Is the Sole Criterion of Truth," which first

[8] Ming Bao , August 16, 1977, p. 1; and August 17, 1977, p. 1.

[9] Nie Rongzhen in RR , September 5, 1977; see also GM , August 29, 1977, as trans. in Survey of the People's Republic of China Press (hereinafter SPRCP ), no. 6431 (September 27, 1977): 77–80.

[10] AFP Hong Kong, January 10, 1978.

[11] NCNA, June 30, 1978; NCNA, December 25, 1978; NCNA, December 12, 1978; RR , January 16, 1979; NCNA, September 8, 1978; NCNA, September 7, 1978; all cited in Gupta, "Mao after Mao."

[12] See CNA , no. 1134 (September 22, 1978).

[13] Deng Xiaoping, "Concluding Speech," in The Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), pp. 192–93.

appeared in Guangming Daily on May 11, 1978, and was reprinted shortly thereafter in People's Daily . Although most such articles were composed by the Theory Study Group at the Central Party School in Beijing under the patronage of Hu Yaobang (deputy director of the school under Hua), it was (ten months) later revealed that the "special commentator" who wrote this seminal article was one Hu Fuming, director of the philosophy department at Nanjing University and deputy secretary of the department's general Party branch, who voluntarily submitted it to Guangming Daily . The newspaper in turn referred it to Hu Yaobang, who edited it in consultation with the author and published it.

The central issue dealt with in this article was whether dogma might be revised. The answer, the author declared, was that it could: Marxism recognized no "forbidden zones," and those that had been erected by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four (or Hua Guofeng?) were anti-Marxist. Hu Fuming later explained that the article had become necessary because after Mao's death many of his colleagues were constantly on tenterhooks about possible violation of one Mao quotation or another at a time when no authoritative arbiter remained available to resolve such uncertainties, leaving them unable to decide the correctness of any policy strictly on the merits of the issue. Truth cannot become its own yardstick, he argued, but must constantly be validated anew in the course of practice. The implications of this line of thinking, if taken to its logical conclusion, was that "practice" exists independently of any revolutionary theory, that "facts" are value-free, and that Mao's Thought was valid only with reference to the historical milieu that had produced it.^[14]

Opposition quickly materialized, led by Wang Dongxing, Zhang Pinghua (director of the Propaganda Department), Wu Lengxi (former People's Daily editor), and Xiong Fu and Hu Sheng (Red Flag editor and assistant general editor, respectively).^[15] But opposition never became

[14] See Oskar Weggel, "Ideologie im nachmaoistischen China: Versuch einer Systematisierung," CA , January 1983, pp. 19–40.

[15] Wu Shengzhi's "Zhonggong dui Mao Zedong sixiang pingjia de xin fazhan" [New developments in the evaluation of Mao Zedong thought], DX , no. 1 (October 1978), lists the other important articles in the discussion of the criterion of truth through the fall of 1978. The opponents of "practice as the sole criterion" held Mao's Thought to be, if not the sole criterion, certainly a relatively definitive one. They controlled HQ , and the Party journal conspicuously avoided endorsing this epistemological line (until the summer of 1979; see the self-criticism published at that time, "Conscientiously Make Up the Missed Lessons in the Discussions of the Criterion of Truth," HQ , no. 7 [July 1979]). On National Day (October 1, 1978), for the first time since 1967 there was no joint editorial, signaling the gravity of the split. See Chen Chi, "'Hongqi ' zazhi qiguai de chenmo" [The strange silence of Red Flag ], ZM , no. 13 (November 1978): 16–17. In September, Wang Dongxing and Zhang Pinghua went so far as to impound the first issue of Zhongguo Qingnian [China youth] since the Cultural Revolution for its selection of the participants in the Tiananmen demonstrations as model activists against the Gang of Four (both Hua and Deng happened to be out of the country at the time). See Qi Xin article in QN , no. 106 (November 1978): 6–13.

theoretically articulate (this had been ingeniously precluded by the use of Mao's own words to underpin this delimitation of their theoretical significance), whereas Deng Xiaoping publicly announced his approval in a speech to a PLA work conference on June 2 (published a week later).^[16] Deng's cue elicited a series of echoing affirmations from his supporters throughout the summer and fall. At the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Deng Liqun and Zhou Yang (a vice-chairman and an adviser, respectively) gave speeches of endorsement. The first secretaries of the various provincial Party committees and the MR commanders each contributed an article on the importance of practice as a criterion of truth. Many organizations and provinces held a large educational conference for cadres, using Hu's article and Deng's speech as study documents. The journals Philosophical Studies and Economic Studies convened conferences on the topic. Beginning in October, ancillary themes were introduced, such as the critique of the "theory of genius"—the notion that thought can transcend historical circumstances and apply to all times and places.^[17] In terms redolent of Marx's attack on religious authority, reformers began to characterize the belief in infallible leadership as a "superstition" or "fetish" devoid of "scientific" basis. For example, one article drew implicit parallels between the European Inquisition and thought control in China during the period of the Gang of Four.^[18] In repudiating the "Gang's" notion (actually Mao's) that "the political line decides everything," or that there were certain transitional periods when "spirit, not the material foundation, is the primary condition," reformers tended to derogate the role of political leadership to that of the competent management of socio-economic interests.^[19] One article even lampooned the "foolish old man who moved mountains" for his "imbecilic" lack of realism, pointing out that the happy ending to the tale requires a leap into "superstition" (i.e., two angels come and bear the mountain away).^[20]

The Third Plenum, held in Beijing in December 1978 after a long and apparently contentious central work conference (November 10–December 13), heralded a breakthrough in the critique of the cult in at least three respects. First, the CC "highly appraised" the discussion

[16] Editorial, RR , June 10, 1978, p. 2.

[17] The major article on this theme is by Special Commentator, "The Struggle of the Theory of Genius and the Theory of Practice," RR , October 30, 1978, p. 2.

[18] Yan Jiaqi, "Religion, Rationality, and Practice: Visiting Three 'Law Courts' on the Question of Truth in Different Eras," GM , September 14, 1978, pp. 3–4.

[19] See Hong Yuanpeng, "Hypotheses on the Inner Springs of Productive Forces," Sixiang Zhanxian [Ideological front] (Kunming), no. 5 (October 20, 1978): 1–16; see also Brantly Womack, "Chinese Political Economy: Reversing the Polarity," Pacific Affairs 54, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 57–82.

[20] Liu Maoying (commentator), "A New Explanation of the Story of Yu Gong Who Removed the Mountains," Wenhui Bao , August 15, 1980.

on the criterion of truth and affirmed such guiding principles as the emancipation of the mind and seeking truth from facts. Second, Mao's infallibility was denied, both in the abstract (by criticizing the "two whatevers") and by implication, overruling his verdicts in various specific cases: the Tiananmen Incident was deemed "revolutionary" rather than "counterrevolutionary," and some five hundred thousand victims of the 1957 Anti-Rightist movement were rehabilitated, as were such highlevel purge victims as Peng Dehuai and Peng Zhen. Third, Hua Guofeng publicly forswore the cult he himself had attempted to appropriate, advocating that all members of the leadership henceforth be addressed as "comrade" rather than by title, and that no opinion expressed by Party leaders should be called an "instruction" (zhishi ).^[21]

Throughout 1979 and 1980, as the frequency of public references to Mao or his Thought underwent a steady secular decline,^[22] elite critiques of his leadership escalated with seeming inexorability. Whereas the Third Plenum had merely deferred discussion of Mao's responsibility for the Cultural Revolution, in the spring of 1979 Wang Ruoshui gave a devastating internal speech, "The Important Lesson of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Is the Need to Oppose Individual Superstition" (geren mixin ), which attributed that movement (now evaluated in purely negative terms) to Mao's ideological imbalance and to the overweening personal power he had arrogated.^[23] In Ye Jianying's public address on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic in October 1979 (reportedly drafted by Hu Yaobang after months of mutual consultation and approved by the Fourth Plenum prior to delivery), Mao's errors—now referred to as "faults" rather than "shortcomings and mistakes"—were referred to on six points: (1) broadening the scope of the attack against the rightists in 1957; (2) encouraging the "Communist wind" during the Three Red Banners (1958–60); (3) leading the intra-Party struggle against Peng Dehuai in 1959; (4) launching the Cultural Revolution; (5) artificially creating or widening the scope of class struggle; and (6) indulging the personality cult.^[24] At the Fifth

[21] See Wang Jienan, "Why We May Call the Third Plenum a Great Turning Point of Farreaching Significance in the Whole History of Our Party since the Establishment of the People's Republic of China," Wenhui Bao (Shanghai), July 17, 1981, p. 3.

[22] See L. Dittmer, "Charismatic Leadership and the Crisis of Succession: Changing Conceptions of Legitimacy in the PRC," unpub. paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies, Los Angeles, Calif., February 1979.

[23] Wang Ruoshui, "The Greatest Lesson of the Cultural Revolution Is That the Personality Cult Should Be Opposed," Mingbao Yuekan , no. 2 (February 1, 1980): 2–15.

[24] Ye Jianying, at Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh CC, Speech at the Meeting in Celebration of the 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1979), pp. 5, 16–17, 19, 20–21, et passim . After Hu drafted the report, the draft was sent to leading strata in various localities, to various ministers, secretaries ofprovincial committees, and secretaries of Party committees of institutes of higher learning, a total of more than a thousand persons, who made suggestions (the entire drafting process took three months). Then Deng and Ye revised it, whereupon it was taken to the Fourth Plenum for discussion and passed. Amid many favorable comments about Mao and some fairly low-key criticisms (e.g., "we had become imprudent"), the speech introduces the notion that Mao Zedong Thought is a collective rather than an individual product.

Plenum of the Eleventh CC (February 1980), Mao's old nemesis Liu Shaoqi was posthumously rehabilitated, and although the "mistakes" of this erstwhile "top Party person in authority taking the capitalist road" were not unreservedly absolved, this reversal of verdicts inevitably reflected adversely on Mao's judgment (Mao's own "faults" had meanwhile come to be referred to as "serious mistakes" [yanzhong de cuowu ]).^[25] Finally, the Gang of Four and six surviving participants in the Lin Biao conspiracy were placed on public trial in the fall of 1980, and although some care was taken (in deference to Hua Guofeng) to limit the process to the defendants (who had committed "crimes," as distinct from "political errors"), Jiang Qing herself sought refuge in an Eichmann defense, referring to herself as the Chairman's running dog.^[26] These object lessons destroyed Mao's symbolic utility for those seeking to salvage some ideological flotsam from his radical platform, as well as fatally undermining the legitimacy of Hua Guofeng's "feudal" succession. The latter formally retired from his chairmanship at the Sixth Plenum.^[27]

In the spring of 1981 the regime attempted to call a halt to the process of de-Maoization and formulate a final verdict on the Chairman's histor-

[25] Although Liu was honored at a memorial service two months later as "the first to advance the concept of Mao Zedong Thought," the impression of a theoretical "contradiction" between Mao and Liu was not easily allayed. Among the top leaders involved, such a contradiction was explicitly acknowledged. The memorial ceremony reportedly had to be postponed for two weeks because of the objections of Liu's widow, Wang Guangmei, to a line in the eulogy referring to her late husband as Mao's "close comrade-in-arms." The phrase was deleted. NYT , May 18, 1980, p. 13; see also Dittmer, "Death and Transfiguration: Liu Shaoqi's Rehabilitation and Contemporary Chinese Politics," Journal of Asian Studies 40, no. 3 (May 1981): 455–80.

[26] Perceptive reportage on the "great trial" may be found in Luo Bing, "Da shenxun taiqian muhou" [On the stage and behind the scenes of the great trial], ZM , no. 38 (December 1980): 7–11; Luo Bing, "Beijing da shenxun zhongzhong" [About Beijing's great trial], ZM , no. 37 (November 1980): 8–10; Liu Ying, "Tingqian muhou de Jiang Qing" [Jiang Qing at court and behind the scenes], ZM , no. 40 (February 1981): 18–21; Li Mingfa, "Zhonggong gaoceng dui panjue Jiang Qing de zhengyi" [The dispute among high-ranking Chinese Communist officials concerning the sentence of Jiang Qing], ZM , no. 40 (February 1981): 22–24; QI Xing, "Shirenbang' da shen de youguan wenti" [Issues concerning the trial of the 'Gang of 10'"], Qishi Niandai , December 1980, pp. 8–14; Ding Wang, "Beijing 'da shen pan' de falü genju boruo" [The legal basis of the Beijing 'Great Trial' is weak], Dangdai , no. 3 (November 15, 1980): 28–30.

[27] See Luo Bing, "Hua Guofeng cizhi muhou" [Behind the scenes of Hua Guofeng's resignation], ZM , no. 39 (January 1980): 7–10; and Luo, "Shei yao qudai Hua Guofeng diwei" [Who will replace Hua Guofeng?], ZM , no. 39 (January 1981): 12–13.

ical contribution, thereby establishing an ideological consensus upon which to consolidate its legitimacy. The main components of this consensus consisted of a selective restoration of Mao's reputation and a more flexible interpretation of his Thought. The result has been a balanced and multidimensional portrait unique in the annals of Chinese political hagiology.

The article by Huang Kecheng (who had been purged along with Peng Dehuai in 1959), "About Mao and Mao's Thought," published by Liberation Army Daily on April 10, 1981, to coincide with a major resurgence of military leftism (including the criticism of Bai Hua, to be examined later), set the basic themes for this more "balanced" interpretation. Huang did not deny Mao's errors ("in his later years, Chairman Mao had some shortcomings and made some mistakes, even some serious mistakes. . . . When I had the chance of being with him in 1958, I felt that he had overtaxed his brain."), but he did attempt to compensate for this by celebrating his virtues, placing errors in a secondary position.^[28] Huang's article, reportedly written at the instigation of Deng Xiaoping, prompted a small freshet of similar memorials, usually from former military figures such as Xiao Hua, Wei Guoqing, or He Changgong (deputy commander of the PLA Academy), whose usual pattern was to devote nine-tenths of the essay to a recollection of some particular episode that revealed Mao's heroic or endearing qualities and then insert a few sentences adverting to errors in his "later years."^[29]

The Sixth Plenum endorsed the reevaluation inaugurated by the PLA in its Resolution on CPC History (1949 –81 ). This epoch-making document, reportedly drafted by Deng Liqun (Liu Shaoqi's former secretary, now chairman of the CC Propaganda Department) on the basis of a year's

[28] Translated in FBIS , April 10, 1981, pp. K5–14. Also see Jiang Xinli, "Cong Huang Kecheng zhuanwen kan Zhonggong pi-Mao yundong" [Looking at the criticize Mao movement from the perspective of Huang Kecheng's speech], Feiqing Yuebao 23, no. 11 (May 1982).

[29] Thus Yang Dezhi, in a July 1981 HQ article: "After the decade of disorder in the country, some comrades have a misunderstanding that Comrade Mao Zedong made mistakes in the 10-year 'Great Cultural Revolution.' However, if we judge his activities as a whole, he made indelible contributions. . . . Our Party and the people of all nationalities in the country would have had to grope in the dark much longer had it not been for comrade Mao Zedong and the Party CC he led more than once to rescue the Chinese revolution from grave danger and chart the firm, correct political course for the Party and the army. . . . Of course, our advocacy of upholding Mao Zedong Thought is by no means an attempt to restore the erroneous leftist ideology which prevailed prior to he Third Plenum." HQ , July 1981, translated in FBIS , July 7, 1981, pp. K9–K10. Other contributions to this wave of more favorable reevaluations include Song Renqiong (member of the Secretariat and director of the CC Organization Department), in a RR article, June 30, 1981, trans. in FBIS , July 16, 1981, p. K8; Xu Xiangqian (MAC vice-chairman), HQ , October 1979, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Far East , no. 6249 (October 19, 1979), p. BII/4.

discussion and widespread consultation before submission to the CC, attempted to stake off limits to further erosion of Mao's reputation^[30] and to define the "living soul of Mao Zedong Thought" from the "correct" perspective of the post-Mao leadership. The "key link" was no longer class struggle, which was subordinated in importance to the contradiction between "advanced" and "backward" sectors of the economy. Mao's Thought could "boil down" to three basic points: "to seek truth from facts, the mass line, and [national] independence."^[31]

Mao's personal role in the formulation of his Thought is relegated to far more modest proportions. Mao's contribution, the resolution makes clear, has only historical reference; his more sweeping generalizations conceivably have contemporary relevance but may only be construed with the exegetical assistance of the Party. Mao's Thought is not a set of fixed principles but a "scientific system"; that is to say, its content is open to periodic reinterpretation in the light of subsequent "scientific" (i.e., authoritatively validated) experience. It is by no means a "work of genius" by a single heroic leader, as had successively been alleged by Lin Biao and by the Gang of Four (as in their allegorical apotheosis of Qin Shihuang), but rather the by-product of the "collective struggle of the Party and the people," to which "many outstanding leaders of our Party" also made contributions, including such erstwhile renegades as Liu Shaoqi. Mao Zedong himself is thus conceptually distinguishable from his Thought and indeed sometimes violated his own correct line.

Thus the leadership's handling of the infallibility premise seems to have gone through three phases in the post-Mao period. The first phase was marked by an attempt to maintain the popular belief in Mao's flawless decision-making capability and in the privileged epistemological status of his Thought, in order to justify his succession arrangements and in hopes that this infallibility might in time be imputed to the next Chairman. This attempt failed, for several reasons. First, it failed to take into account that popular belief in Mao's infallibility had already eroded over the previous decade. Second, it revised the content of Mao's Thought in a more moderate (and less distinctive) direction even while claiming unadulterated commitment to it. And finally, the new defender of the faith lacked the political base and skills to maintain his position when challenged by a stronger adversary—the presumption of infallibility proved to be based upon power rather than vice versa.

[30] See the analysis in Feiqing Yuebao 24, no. 1 (July 1981): 1; see also Zhang Zhenbang, "Analysis of the 6th Plenum of the 11th CC," in ibid., pp. 9–14; and David S. G. Goodman, "The 6th Plenum of the 11th CC of the CCP: Look Back in Anger?" CQ , no. 87 (September 1981): 518–28.

[31] Resolution , p. 67 et passim ; see also Editorial department, "The General Content and Far-reaching Significance of the 'Resolution,'" Banyue Tan [Semimonthly talks], no. 13 (July 10, 1981): 3–9, 26.

The second phase witnessed displacement of the infallibility premise by pragmatism of a relatively pure form, as rationalized in the defense of practice as the sole criterion of truth. This motto legitimated an outburst of political and intellectual experimentation, which soon trespassed the threshold of official tolerance, unleashing an ideological backlash to be examined later.

During the third and so far final phase, the leadership has sought to reclaim and institutionalize at least a prima facie assumption of infallibility, vested however in formal offices rather than in their incumbents. The ongoing critique of Mao Zedong's policy errors has been arrested in order to preserve popular faith in the political order he after all did much to create. Although Deng Xiaoping has clearly emerged as first among equals in the successor regime,^[32] he seems to have adhered to the discipline of collective leadership (as evinced, for example, in his policy zigzags, which conform to a shifting Politburo majority), and there are no signs of any attempt to resuscitate the cult of personality.

Evacuation of Mission

The tendency for the concept to lose its content and become equivocal, vague, "vacuous" is referred to as "evacuation of mission." The tendency in the post-Mao period has been for the mission or "line" to shift its function from that of indicating a broad but relatively clear policy direction ex ante to that of providing an ex post legitimating umbrella for high-priority system requirements. The successor leadership emphatically still has a mission, consisting of the achievement of economic modernization, but this mission is no longer "salvationary" by our criteria: it is not unique (not even distinctive), and it is not utopian. Modernization is not really an ideologically derived objective, as was socialization of the means of production or creation of a revolutionary culture and New Man, but rather a goal shared by various classes in any less-developed country: non-Party elites are also likely to desire the prestige of major power status (for which modernization is sine qua non ), for example; non-Party masses to desire the material improvements of mass consumerism. If the mission is widely shared, so too are the resources and skills necessary for its achievement. This sharing permits the leadership to shift from the invidious mobilization of a "class" constituency to the inclusion of all interested social groups in a common project. But it also means the Party risks losing its claim to a monopoly of insight into the scientifically "correct" means of achieving a mission so widely shared and eclectically de-

[32] As Hu Yaobang put it, "over the past years four comrades have been of major usefulness: Jianying, Xiaoping, Xiannian, and Chen Yun—especially Comrade Xiaoping. This is no secret. Even foreigners know that Comrade Xiaoping is the primary decision-maker in China's Party today." "Comrade Hu Yaobang's Speech to the Closing Session of the Plenum" (July 29, 1981), as trans. in IS , December 1981, p. 75.

fined. What is thus threatened is not only the claim to charismatic infallibility of an individual hero-leader, but the "leading role" of the Party itself, whose ideological competence is no longer uniquely relevant.

Hua Guofeng's statement of mission was essentially Maoist, designed to coincide with his attempt to assume sponsorship of the personality cult; at the same time, he could not afford to alienate the senior cadres who provided his base of support. The result was something of a mélange—inchoate "evacuation." Thus he reaffirmed the Maoist motto of "continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" but tended to downplay "class struggle" in favor of achieving "great unity under heaven."^[33] He adopted the Four Modernizations, the final fruits of the engineering approach to continuing revolution, with minimal or no revision of the documents Zhou and Deng and their supporters had drafted in 1976 (Deng's "three poisonous weeds" were rehabilitated even before Deng himself was, in June 1977), but then implemented them in a storming fashion reminiscent of the Great Leap Forward. In his report to the Eleventh Party Congress, Hua averred that the Cultural Revolution reflected Mao's correct analysis of the danger of capitalist restoration in the Party via revisionism, but expressed regret that the movement had been led astray by the machinations of Lin Biao, Chen Boda, and the Gang of Four. Declaring the Cultural Revolution to have been victoriously concluded, he however reserved the option of repeating it, and reasserted the themes Mao had used to justify the purge of Deng: that "class struggle is the key link," and "stability and unity do not mean writing off class struggle."^[34] Such comments can have only aroused the anxieties of veteran cadres about the prospects of coexistence with Cultural Revolution beneficiaries in the post-Mao era.

The outlines of Hua's syncretic strategy were first announced at the Eleventh Congress and presented in more elaborate form at the Fifth NPC in February 1978, after a series of professional conferences similar to those held in 1975. Hua's mission was characterized by excessively ambitious production targets and an uncoordinated effort to achieve striking results in many different directions at once: 60 million tons of steel, production of 400 million tons of grain, 85 percent mechanization of all farmwork, 10 new oil fields, 120 large-scale industrial projects to be completed by 1985. "In these eight years [viz., 1978–85], state revenues will be equivalent to the total for the past 28 years," Hua announced.^[35]

[33] Hua Guofeng, "Continue the Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to the End," PR , no. 19 (May 6, 1977): 15–27.

[34] Hua Guofeng, "Political Report to the Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China" (August 26, 1977), PR , September 2, 1977, pp. 16–23.

[35] Hua Guofeng, "Unite and Strive to Build a Modern Powerful Socialist Country: Report to the Fifth National People's Congress" (February 26, 1978), PR , no. 10 (March 10, 1978): 39.

Dispensing with extensive mass mobilization because of its manifest drawbacks, Hua's long-term plan seemed to rely upon foreign investment as a functional substitute for cheap labor, and it rapidly incurred a balance-of-payments deficit, an ill-prepared round of plant construction, inflation, and other problems. The fact that Hua's program failed so resoundingly that it had to be substantially revised within a year of its unveiling and publicly repudiated within two^[36] crippled any further thought of harnessing economic production to continuing revolution.

Deng's rise was unique in that it promised not to "grasp" a "line," whether new or refurbished, but an end to untested "lines," announced a priori and implemented with "one slice of the knife" (yi dao qie ). In place of a clear-cut positive program he offered a critique of the contradictions and inadequacies of Hua's line and a commitment more effectively to harness the innovative and managerial capacities of China's bureaucratic-intellectual elite to the broad goal of modernization. Thus in April 1979 the Four Modernizations project was placed in abeyance for a three-year period of "readjustment," during which the administration would rely upon short-term planning and improvisation. The ambitious goals of the "great plan" of 1978–85 and 1985–2000, in the course of which China was to "join the ranks of the foremost economic powers of the world," have since been cut back from a per capita GNP of U.S. $2,000 in 1978, to $1,000 in 1980, to the still-ambitious objective (proclaimed by Hu Yaobang in September 1982) of quadrupling the GNP and achieving a per capita GNP of $800 by the year 2000.

Deng Xiaoping has, since his accession to power, consistently advocated a more open, "vacuous" notion of mission. While declining to disavow the concept of "line" altogether, Deng has sharply curtailed its usage, suggesting, for example, that the concept of "line struggle" has little applicability.^[37] At the same time, observing in 1978–79 that the absence of line gave rein to uncontrollable experimentation, Deng also moved quickly to delimit the range of freedom, as we shall see. In place of line, the leadership seems to be moving toward a notion of a "struggle on

[36] By Hua himself, at the Third Session of the Fifth NPC (September 1980), where he conceded that the Ten-Year Plan he had sponsored was unrevisable and would have to be scrapped.

[37] See Liu Mouyin, "Why Are We Going to Avoid Mentioning 'Struggle between the Two Lines' and Also Shun the Term 'Line' Hereafter?" Zhejiang Ribao (Hangzhou), August 12, 1981, p. 4. Also see Jin Wen, "The Struggle within the Party and the Unity of the Whole Party," HQ , March 6, 1979, trans. in FBIS , no. 79070 (April 10, 1979). According to Jin, inner-Party struggle should not be equated with two-line struggles (although there may be some relationship), and two-line struggle should not be regarded as class struggle (though it may to some extent reflect it). As a nonantagonistic contradiction, the method of "unity-criticism-unity" is appropriate. See also, however, Liang Xuechu, "CCP Power Struggles as Seen from the 'Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,'" Qishi Niandai (hereinafter QN ), no. 8 (August 1983): 60–63.

two fronts," in which both "left" and "right" deviations are clearly delineated but the precise outlines of correct policy hover vaguely somewhere in the "middle of the road."^[38] Though the concept of line thus seems to have retained its negative function of proscribing deviation, it has lost its positive function of prescribing the general direction of movement. As one recent commentator observes, "one cannot speak at the present time of any durable national consensus or common outlook on development among the overall Party and state leadership."^[39]

Diffusion of Leadership Responsibility

This term approximates what the Chinese call "collective leadership," a political counterpart of the diffusion of economic responsibility (via such vehicles as the "responsibility systems" in agriculture and industry). Diffusion of responsibility in this broader sense has been among the pervasive tendencies of the past two decades, antedating the death of Mao to some extent in the form of decentralization and the "cellularization" of self-sufficient local units, but accelerating even more rapidly since then. Nor has this diffusion of responsibility been entirely welcome, contributing among other things to a loss of financial control over investment. Thus far, it does seem to have been irrevocable.^[40]

The political import of this trend has been a transition from the concentration of formal power and diffusion of informal power in the immediate post-Mao period to a diffusion of formal power and concentration of informal power in the period since 1980. During the Hua Guofeng interregnum, the positions of chairman of the Party, chairman of the CC Military Affairs Commission (MAC), and premiership of the State Council were all in the hands of one man—Hua Guofeng—for the first time in the history of the People's Republic. This concentration of formal power coincided however with a diffusion of informal power, as, due to his brief tenure in office and lack of base (zhengzhi jichu ), credentials (zige ), or seniority, Hua was obliged to seek the support of those who informally outranked him (e.g., Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian)—at the price of an obfuscation of mission and rehabilitation of those with whom he had a clear conflict of interest (Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang). Following the

[38] See Xin Cheng, "Grasp Firmly the Central Line," HQ , no. 11 (June 1, 1982): 34–36.

[39] Ruediger Machetzki, "The People's Republic of China: The Condition of Its Economy and the Limits of Reform," Vierteljahresberichte (Bonn:^[*] Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung) 92 (June 1983): 123–35.

[40] See Barry Naughton, "The Decline of Central Control over Investment in Post-Mao China," unpub. paper, December 20, 1983; also Christine Wong, "Material Allocation and Decentralization: Impact of the Local Sector on Industrial Reform," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, eds., The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 253–78.

triumph of Deng at the Third Plenum, the growing discrepancy between formal and informal power forced Hua into the role of a figurehead who announced policies made by a collective leadership.^[41] Even this role was eventually to be denied him, as this hapless and unlikely relict of the age of individual heroism was progressively divested of his premiership (at the Third Session of the Fifth NPC, in September 1980), his chairmanship of the Party and the MAC (Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh CC, June 1981), and finally of his Party vice-chairmanship (Twelfth Party Congress, September 1–11, 1982).

Deng Xiaoping's reforms were designed to preclude the possibility of any future recurrence of the cult of personality by institutionalizing the principle of collegiality and by diffusing power throughout the governmental structure. The first stage in this effort consisted of reestablishment of the Central Party Secretariat at the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh CC (February 1980) under the leadership of Hu Yaobang. Deng Xiaoping unveiled the general outlines of a more comprehensive reform in his August speech to an expanded Politburo meeting, extended and elaborated two months later in the still more ambitious proposals of Liao Gailong, a Party historian and member of the CC Policy Research Section. This platform has since become known as the "Gengshen reform" (1980 is "Gengshen" in the traditional Chinese sixty-year cycle, an obvious reference to the "100-Day Reform" of 1898). With specific regard to the redefinition of leadership entailed (other aspects of these reforms will be examined later), the Gengshen reforms envisaged a functional division of authority (the separation of Party and state and an independent judiciary in particular, but also including autonomous economic/financial, cultural, educational, and scientific and technological organizations), a system of "checks and balances" (zhiheng ) among different leadership organs, even the abolition of the Politburo as the central decision-making forum (to be replaced by a Central Executive Committee, staffed by representatives of these larger bodies).^[42]

In the course of discussion and ratification, the Gengshen reforms seem to have encountered strong resistance, for they were watered down considerably. Still, their intent is discernible in the Party and State Constitutions approved by the Twelfth Party Congress (September 1982) and the Fifth Session of the Fifth NPC (December 1982), respectively. Whereas a Central Advisory Commission was introduced to fill out the troika of CC, Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee (already introduced at the Third Plenum), and CAC, for example, it was not

[41] See for example his report to the Third Session of the Fifth NPC, which closely echoes Deng Xiaoping's speech on reform to an enlarged Politburo meeting in mid-August. Hua Guofeng, "Report on the Work of the Government," BR , no. 38 (September 22, 1980): 21.

[42] Xu Xing, "Conservative System Reforms," ZM , no. 73 (November 1983): 54–57.

vested with meaningful political functions,^[43] and the idea of a check-and-balance relationship among the three organs yielded to the notion of "consultation and assistance" that has historically governed the relationship between CC and CPPCC (that is to say, the CC is to retain primacy). The Politburo also survived, but the "chairmanship system" (i.e., the positions of Party chairman and ranked vice-chairmen) was eliminated, to prevent the chairman from accumulating too much power. This change leaves the Party general secretary as de facto chair of the CC and its Politburo and Standing Committee, though formally he chairs only the Secretariat, having the right to "convene" (zhaoji ), but not "preside over" (zhuchi ) these other organs. In terms of informal power, Hu is at this point not even first among equals in the collective leadership of the Politburo or its Standing Committee. For the first time since the founding of the PRC, leadership of the Party has been separated from chairmanship of the MAC, in effect dividing executive control over Party, state, and army among three leaders—and coincidentally obscuring the succession picture, by making it unclear which position it is most relevant to inherit. As at the center, the leadership has stressed that the system of collective leadership should be fully implemented at all levels throughout the Party structure. Within the Party committees, decisions must be made by majority vote and not unilaterally by the first secretary. If a first secretary departs from the system of collective leadership, all members of the Party committee (and not the secretary alone) must bear responsibility.^[44]

In view of the cultural propensity to defer to strong leadership and the long and rather discouraging history of constitutional engineering in modern China, the efficacy of this diffusion of leadership responsibility is uncertain. As noted at the outset, its purpose has been ambiguous, serving at once to inhibit the concentration of power in a general sense and to undermine the position of Hua Guofeng in particular. The articulation of a complex system of organs and offices both superannuated Hua's functionaries and provided new sets of offices for Deng and his lieutenants to fill with their protégés, with the paradoxical effect that the formal diffusion of power coincided with an informal concentration of power, as Deng's factional rivals were slowly squeezed out of the emergent formal network. Whether this reorganization actually results in an elaborate façade for the reconcentration of leadership under a single head

[43] It is not equipped to prepare resolutions, and is not staffed on any principle of functional specialization, but rather on power-political considerations. Deng once even suggested that the CAC was a transitional institution, to be abolished within ten to fifteen years. Wenjian Huibian , p. 171; as quoted in Tang Tsou, "Reflections on the Formation and Foundation of the Communist Party-State in China," unpub. paper, University of Chicago, 1983.

[44] Tsou, "Reflections."

thus remains to be seen. The operating assumption of the reformers seems to have been that "structure is fate"—that although the current leadership may still be more hierarchically ordered at an informal level than appears on the surface, ultimately the constitutionally diffused distribution of functional authority will enable a balance of power to emerge. Informal relationships, it is assumed, will eventually come to complement rather than undermine formal structure, as they are usually found to do in studies of Western bureaucratic behavior. The real test of the efficacy of these reforms must await a clear-cut divergence between factional ambitions and the constitutional distribution of power.

From Mobilization to Participation

In rethinking the role of the masses in Chinese politics, the post-Mao leadership found itself faced with three questions: what priority should mass political involvement have, how should it be organized, and toward which objectives should it be directed? The dominant tendencies since 1976 have been in the direction of declining priority for mass participation in general, a shift from concerted mobilizational efforts toward more routinized arrangements, relying by default on voluntarism. There has been a parallel shift from economic or cultural transformation of a maximally inclusive constituency to the indirect representation of publics in political activities functional to their specific interests. Mass involvement in politics has gone through three distinguishable phases: the Campaign to Criticize the Gang of Four in 1976–79, the Democracy Wall movement in 1978–81, and the implementation of liberalized electoral procedures in 1980–82.

The Campaign to Criticize the Gang of Four

The anti-Gang campaign was initiated shortly after Hua's accession to the chairmanship and lasted until it was declared "essentially completed" at the Third Plenum in December 1978.^[45] Hua Guofeng assigned fairly low priority to the campaign, both because criticism of the Gang raised the delicate question of their relationship to Hua's patron, Mao, and because Hua stood in an opportune position to inherit the orphaned radical constituency. "All slanders and charges levelled at anyone by the 'Gang of Four' should be repudiated and cancelled," as he put it in September 1977. "On the other hand, our comrades, and especially those who have been screened, must take a correct [i.e., basically positive]

[45] The only analysis of the campaign I have found is an unpublished paper by Constance Squires Meany, "Political Conflict in China: 'Reversal of Verdicts' and the Campaign to Suppress the 'Gang of Four's Bourgeois Factional Setup,' 1977–1978," Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 1980.

attitude toward the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, toward the masses and toward themselves."^[46] Upon being restored to his previous positions in July 1977, Deng reportedly requested and was granted leadership of the campaign, giving it higher priority—and a more vindictive thrust.

As a result of the decoupling of mobilization from organizational coordination in the last years of the Cultural Revolution decade (see chapter 7 above), mobilization had grown increasingly spontaneous and disruptive. Deng's organization of the movement was thus rather tight, hearkening back to pre-Cultural Revolution techniques: "work teams" were dispatched from higher levels to lead the struggle in local units, an ad hoc campaign committee was established, and mass criticism of human "targets" was arranged by cadres with punishment for the recalcitrant. The objectives of mobilization were to motivate neither economic production nor economic/cultural transformation, but (1) to restore order, and (2) to settle factional scores.

The campaign literature suggested that mass mobilization as practiced during the ten years of upheaval had become a pretext for widespread corruption, looting, vandalism, and other forms of criminal activity. As a major article on the movement put it in the spring of 1978:

[The] industry, communications and other fronts have launched step by step and on a large scale a movement to deal blows at both the sabotage activities of class enemies and at the frenzied assaults of capitalist forces, and have combined this movement with the great struggle to expose and criticize the "Gang of Four." . . . The Gang of Four's scheme to usurp Party and state power had a close bearing on the sabotage activities of class enemies and capitalist forces. A large number of persons of the bourgeois factional setups were "two-faced tigers." They were at once the background elements of bourgeois factional setups and the bad elements engaged in corruption, theft and speculation.^[47]

Deng's movement, by conflating this dragnet against "smash-and-grabbers" with the criticism of the Four, magnified the crimes of the latter even as it permitted the acts of the former to be punished under ideological sanction. Such a condensation of evils gave impetus to the crackdown: Thus newspapers teemed with reports of executions during the first eighteen months of the campaign.^[48]

[46] Hua, "Political Report to the Eleventh Congress," p. 56.

[47] "It Is Necessary to Unfold the 'Two Blows' Movement on a Large Scale," RR , April 7, 1978, p. 1; as trans. in FBIS , April 20, 1978, p. E6; as quoted in Meany, "Political Conflict."

[48] Nigel Wade reported that executions in Kunming (Yunnan) and Beijing in the first nine months of 1977 alone ran into the thousands. Sunday Telegraph , London, October 30, 1977, p. 1; see also Georges Biannic, AFP, Hong Kong, October 29, 1977, as trans. in FBIS , October 29, 1977, pp. E15–E16.

It also permitted Deng to utilize the campaign for factional gains. Both the purge of upwardly mobile cultural radicals and the rehabilitation of their erstwhile victims served Deng's political interests, and he pressed the campaign in order to legitimate such personnel shifts in the teeth of Hua's evident discomfiture. While vulnerable to Deng's mobilization of the anti-Cultural Revolution right, Hua's political position precluded any defensive countermobilization: he could hardly appeal to the right while claiming the aegis of Mao's Thought, and yet his arrest of the Four had placed radical support beyond his grasp. Beyond intimidating such residual "Maoists" and facilitating the wholesale rehabilitation of veteran cadres, however, Deng did not press for a sweeping purge of radicals from the middle and lower bureaucracy at this time, for prospective targets were so numerous that such a purge would surely have split the Party.^[49]

Democracy Wall

The so-called Democracy Wall movement arose in China's leading urban centers in the fall of 1978 as a direct outgrowth of the attempt by victims of the Tiananmen Incident to gain official rehabilitation. The success of that attempt immediately triggered a mushrooming of analogous appeals by victims of various other radical policies. Although participants were thus defined by opposition to the Cultural Revolution and articulated liberal rather than radical values, their participatory mode was "leftist in form": it consisted of a spontaneously assembled ideological constituency with informal links to a sympathetic elite patron, expressing itself through big-character posters, unofficial tabloids, and mass demonstrations.

There is little question that Deng Xiaoping was the foremost "backstage backer" of the Democracy activists' self-emancipatory activities through the fall of 1978. He expressed himself clearly in this regard in interviews with a number of foreign visitors, allowing his comments to be

[49] This is an inference based on the lack of evidence of any extensive purge. Thus when the Party rectification campaign was launched at the Second Plenum of the Twelfth CC in October 1983, the chief targets were still defined as the "three types of person" (san zhong ren ): those "who rose to prominence by following the counterrevolutionary cliques of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing in 'rebellion,' those who are seriously factionalist in their ideas, and those who indulged in beating, smashing and looting"—each of whom had a clear line of descent from the Cultural Revolution. Statistics indicated that of the 40 million members in the Party at this time (including ca. 9 million cadres), about 18 million had been recruited before the Cultural Revolution, while 4 million had been recruited in the post-Mao period, leaving 18 million who had been admitted during the Cultural Revolution decade. "The Decision of the CC of the Communist Party of China on Party Consolidation" (adopted by the Second Plenary Session of the Twelfth Party CC, October 11, 1983), BR 26:42 (October 17, 1983): 11. Clearly, Cultural Revolution recruits at the middle and lower bureaucratic echelons had not yet suffered serious attrition, despite the elimination of their patrons at the higher levels.

leaked to the masses. "We have no right to deny this or to criticize the masses for making use of democracy," he said on one such occasion. "If the masses feel some anger, let them express it."^[50] In view of Deng's status as one of the leading victims of the Cultural Revolution his patronage seems somewhat surprising, inviting suspicions of Machiavellianism. In fact this liaison of strange bedfellows seems to have been based on an opportunistic coincidence of tactical objectives—both sides wanted a reversal of the Tiananmen verdict—rather than on any considered convergence upon a long-term strategy for mass participation. Upon achievement of this tactical objective,^[51] the confluence of interests quickly dissolved.

Deng Xiaoping seems to have expected the mass movement to recede following his victory at the Third Plenum, granting time to consolidate his gains. The masses, on the other hand, seizing upon these verdict reversals as a quasi-judicial precedent, hastened to crowd through the window of opportunity before it closed. The result was a chain migration of petitioners from the countryside to the capital cities (Beijing, Ji'nan, Hefei), where they staged sit-ins in government offices, blocked street traffic, damaged public property, and congested the railroads. Aggrieved dissidents like Fu Yuehua led bands of demobilized soldiers, rusticated urban youth, poor peasants, and other disprivileged marginal groups in urban protest marches, raising the specter of a Solidarity-like alliance between intellectuals and proletariat. Big-character posters proliferated in urban centers, most consisting of individual petitions for redress of grievances irresolvable at the unit level.

Whereas the masses were primarily concerned with the application of the new verdicts to their individual cases, the movement quickly spawned intellectual dissidents who sought to elaborate and generalize these principles, to push the movement's logic as far as it would go. As in the Cultural Revolution, big-character posters led to the proliferation of

[50] From an interview with Ryosaku Sasaki, chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party, as quoted in NYT , November 26, 1978. "Wall posters are guaranteed by the Constitution," Deng pointed out, also noting that "my talk to you today is based on a decision of the CC." "Foreigners make a fuss about the posters. But we have no intention of suppressing them or denying the right of the masses to express their views by pasting up wall posters." In another interview, with American columnist Robert Novak, later relayed to crowds at Tiananmen by John Fraser, he said the posters were a "good thing," though some statements were not correct. See Fraser, The Chinese: Portrait of a People (New York: Summit Books, 1980).

[51] On November 16, 1978, the Beijing Municipal Party Committee reversed verdicts on the Tiananmen Incident; on November 21–22 RR published a comprehensive rationalization, "The Truth about the Tiananmen Incident." See Jian Yan, "Tiananmen shijian de an fandingle!" [Reversal of the case of the Tiananmen Incident], DX , no. 1 (October 1978): 30–33.

unofficial "people's publications" (minkan ), expanding their authors' range (to include the international wire-service public and beam back to a domestic audience over the Voice of America, thanks to foreign correspondents) and facilitating more intensive analysis of issues. Intellectual liberation remained the movement's central leitmotif, now ramifying into other functional realms. Science was idealized as an antidote to the masses' susceptibility to charismatic leadership, in a conception that emphasized an inductive, trial-and-error methodology congenial to emerging notions of a free market of ideas.^[52] In economics, a case was made not only for expanded free markets, but for the dissolution of agricultural communes and state enterprises, based on the argument that "whole people's ownership" did not involve the assumption of popular control so much as "étatization"; collectives accordingly offered greater ambit for the realization of socialism.^[53] The legal system was scrutinized, some attention being given for the first time to the delicate question of why laws were made and then not enforced.^[54] Even the prison system received some attention for the first time.^[55] There were radical critiques of socialist bureaucracy.^[56] There was a widespread "blooming" of poetry, short stories, and other literary "flowers," including the most inventive experiments and theoretical formulations since the early 1960s. There was at this juncture a tacit alliance between democracy activists and elite members of the "practice faction,"^[57] and many of the ideas at the cutting edge of Deng's reform program may be traced to the democracy movement.

Yet, notwithstanding their affinity for many aspects of Western pluralism, the democracy activists still exhibited a "breakthrough" style of

[52] See Hu Ping, "On Freedom of Speech," as reprinted under the title, "Selections from the Political Views of China's New Generation of Politicians," QN , no. 3 (March 1, 1981): 68–82; no. 4 (April 1981): 57–75, and no. 6 (June 1981): 67–76.

[53] Commentator, "On Collective Ownership and Its Future," Siwu Luntan [April fifth forum], no. 12 (September 9, 1979): 1–8; trans. in JPRS , no. 74909 (January 11, 1980): 22–35.

[54] Qiu Mu, "Why Laws Are Made but Difficult to Enforce," Tansuo [Exploration], September 9, 1979, pp. 9–14.

[55] Liu Qing, "Prison Memoirs," ed. Stanley Rosen and James D. Seymour, Chinese Sociology and Anthropology 15, nos. 1–2 (Fall-Winter 1982/3), 181 pp.

[56] E.g., Lu Min, "Gradually Abolish the Bureaucratic System and Establish the Democratic System Modeled after the Paris Commune," Beijing zhi Chun [Beijing spring], no. 1 (January 9, 1979): 17–21; and no. 2 (January 27, 1979): 43–45. See also Lu Min, "Do Away with the Power of Administrative Leadership of Basic Level Party Organization in Factories, Mines, and Other Enterprises," ibid., no. 2 (1979), pp. 17–21.

[57] Thus the people's publication Beijing Spring was able to publish one issue in the regular press, and in the middle of 1979 the Beijing People's Press even prepared a reprint of important articles from various unofficial publications. Three members of the CYL Central Committee even participated in editing Beijing Spring . Opletal, Die Informationspolitik der Volksrepublik China , p. 185.

mobilization that polemically exaggerated the defects of the target as well as the relief its destruction would bring, generating a powerful, consuming momentum bound to frighten former targets of mass criticism—especially as the focus shifted from past iniquities to their structural residues in the present. Cadres also found the activists' tendency to generalize an abstract principle to every functional realm—another aftereffect of the Cultural Revolution polemical style—quite unnerving. As the most outspoken advocate of "taking the lid off," Deng bore the brunt of inner-Party recriminations.^[58] Unlike Mao, however, he responded to criticism by reversing course, depriving his adversaries of this issue while continuing to pursue reform in less problematic areas.^[59] In his public statements on the question he backed away from his previous stand that democracy was prerequisite to modernization toward an assertion that modernization was prerequisite to democracy—a position redolent of Sun Yat-sen's "tutelage."^[60] Democracy activists were no longer the Cultural Revolution's victims but its reincarnation. Between October and November 1979 the two most prominent activists in the capital, Wei Jingsheng and Fu Yuehua, were tried and convicted, and (after transcripts of Wei's "public" trial had been posted and circulated there), Xidan Wall was closed. Annoyed by dissidents' tendency to appeal to "constitutional rights," the authorities proceeded to rewrite the Constitution: the "four big freedoms" were rescinded at the Third Session of the Fifth NPC, and henceforth movement activists were invariably referred to as "illegal organizations" and "illegal publications."^[61] Early in 1981 the CC transmitted a series of documents, beginning with CD no. 2 and

[58] Yielding reluctantly on substance, Deng complained (in a speech made March 16, 1979) about the timing of the criticisms. "I never concealed my opinions. But in the past ten years a bad habit has developed in the Party. . . . It is that, at the start, no one opposes a resolution. But as soon as something goes wrong, no matter how small, they either drop a stone on someone who has fallen into a well or stick a knife in your back, eager to find a scapegoat."NYT , May 26, 1979, quoting Nationalist intelligence sources.

[59] At a March 1979 expanded Politburo meeting he introduced his own counterpart of the "two whatevers" to define the limits of dissent, the "four fundamental principles" (si xiang jiben yuanze ): Uphold the socialist road, uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat, uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (thus sometimes dubbed the "four upholds"). "Summary of Deng Xiaoping's March 1979 Speech at a Discussion of Theoretical Issues," Guang Jiao Jing (Hong Kong), no. 85 (November 16, 1979): 4–10.

[60] "We can never achieve the Four Modernizations without a political situation of stability and unity, because people cannot embark on modernization without peace of mind. Therefore, we are opposed to those people and things which create disturbances. Take, for example, the method of allowing the existence of the 'Xidan Wall.'" Quoted in Bai Renqiong, "Some Movements in the Political Situation of the PRC," DX , no. 16 (January 16, 1980): 4–6.

[61] E.g., see the commentator article in Jiefang Ribao (Shanghai), January 10, 1981.

culminating in CD no. 9, which instructed all departments concerned to interdict "two illegal" activities.^[62] Throughout the spring of 1981, the police made one arrest after another, dealing a final crushing blow to this singular amalgam of revolutionary tactics and democratic objectives.^[63]

Electoral Reform

Whether in order to co-opt the democracy issue or as a token of the sincerity of his professions of support for greater popular input, Deng proffered expanded opportunities for participation through formal electoral mechanisms even as he proceeded to eliminate intra-Party opposition and crush the democracy movement. "The Electoral Law of the PRC for the NPC and Local People's Congresses at All Levels" was one of seven major laws passed on July 1, 1979, by the Second Session of the Fifth NPC, to take effect on January 1, 1980. It departed from the previous (1953) electoral law in at least three respects: a policy of more candidates than positions (cha e xuanju zhi ) was adopted, delegates to county people's congresses were subject to direct election (previously only local officials up to the commune had been directly elected), and the nominating process was opened for the first time to (non-Party) mass participation, allowing any organization or individual with three seconds to submit candidates for the initial list (though they would not necessarily be placed on the final list).^[64]

The first test of the new law came during the nationwide county-level elections that were conducted on a staggered timetable through the summer and fall of 1980, and it soon became apparent that despite the liberalization of procedure, any attempt to use the electoral process to manifest dissent or even to aggregate popular demands was fraught with risk. In most of the nation's nearly three thousand counties elections

[62] Central Document no. 9 reportedly included provision for arrest of activists, exposure of those supplying or otherwise supporting them, and eviction of cadres involved from the Party. Ge Zhili, "People's Publications under 'Central Document no. 9,'" ZM , no. 5 (May 1. 1981): 50, 90; also Liang Mingjun, "The Chinese Communist CC's Documents no. 4, 7, and 9," Dangdai [Contemporary monthly] (Hong Kong), no. 8 (April 15, 1981): 43.

[63] Xu Wenli and Yang Jing, members of Siwu Luntan , were arrested by public security personnel in their Beijing homes. Also arrested at his home was Sun Feng, editor of Hailang Hua [Sea waves], a private publication in Qingdao, Shandong. Wang Xizhe, chief writer of the Li Yizhe trio, was arrested in his factory on April 10. Fu Shenqi of Shanghai and He Qiu, editor of People's Road in Guangzhou, were arrested in Beijing. Zhong Yueqiu, responsible person of People's Voice (Shaoguan), was arrested in that city. See Miao Xiao, "The Current Situation of the Beijing People's Publications," ZM , no. 28 (February 1980): 44–45

[64] See Li Zaizao and Chen Jinluo, "The Fundamental Spirit of Electoral Law and the Significance of Direct Elections of People's Assemblies at the County Level," Faxue Yanjiu , no. 2 (1980): 12–15; and Zhang Qingfu, "China's Electoral System," Faxue Yanjiu , no. 6 (1980): 42–46.

proceeded smoothly, the vast majority of the nation's 540 million voters apparently voting in accord with the wishes of the leadership.^[65] A number of well-publicized incidents revealed, however, both that local constituencies were sometimes prepared to use the new game rules to articulate local interests in defiance of Party guidance, and that local authorities were apt to bend the rules if necessary to ensure continued dominance.

The position of the center toward these developments was ambivalent; sometimes it denounced illegal attempts by local authorities to revise unfavorable electoral outcomes, but in other cases it reproved the sponsors of unofficial candidates for allowing campaigns to degenerate into anarchy.^[66] In the Haidian electoral district containing Beijing University, for example, 8,000 students nominated no fewer than 29 candidates for the two vacant seats to the district people's assembly; candidate support committees were organized, surveys were conducted, wall newspapers appeared, and a veritable election campaign was staged, replete with unrealistic campaign promises. In an electoral district containing 6,084 voters, public discussion meetings allegedly involving 20,000 people were convened in the halls, canteens, and classrooms.^[67] One of the successful candidates, a Beijing University graduate student (in philosophy) named Hu Ping, was met by CC charges of having precipitated a "Cultural Revolution–style movement" when he tried to assume his seat in the Haidian People's Assembly. As of the spring of 1982, he was still living in a dormitory on campus "waiting for placement." In Changsha, students at Hunan Teachers' College succeeded in nominating one Liang Heng as a non-Party candidate only after staging a hunger strike, "rioting," and sending a protest delegation to Beijing. Liang's campaign was

[65] Brantly Womack, "The 1980 County-level Elections in China: Experiment in Democratic Modernization," AS 22, no. 3 (March 1982): 261–78. See also Womack, "Modernization and Democratic Reform in China," Journal of Asian Studies 43, 3 (May 1984): 417–41; and Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1985).

[66] Press reports indicated that it would be wrong for leading cadres to blame the voters for electing the wrong representatives or arbitrarily to invalidate the electoral results, but if proper preparations were made doing so should not be necessary. If incumbents do not get placed on the candidate list they should do public self-criticism and ingratiate themselves with their constituency. Zhang Zeng, "Adopt a Correct View toward Failing to Get Elected," Nanfang Ribao , December 17, 1980, p. 3; Liu Xin, "Analysis of 'An Old Honest Fellow!'" ibid., December 20, 1980; Gen Niu, "In a Production Team Election, All Party Member Candidates Are Defeated," Dong Xi Fang [East and West] (Hong Kong), no. 24 (December 10, 1980): 18–20.

[67] Su Rong, "The Strange Record of Beijing's Cold Spring," ZM , no. 5 (May 1, 1981): 10–12; "Selections from the Political Views of China's New Generation of Politicians," QN , no. 3 (March 1, 1981): 68–82; Gong Bo, "Summary of the Student Election Campaign at Beijing University" (in "Letters from Readers" column), ZM , no. 42 (April 1, 1981): 87–90; Wei Ming, "Zhongguo xin yi dai de zhengzhijia" [China's new generation of politicians], QN , no. 2 (February 1981): 15–20.

ultimately unsuccessful, and Tao Sen, the central figure in the student protest, was subsequently arrested.^[68]

In a speech on December 25, 1980, Deng Xiaoping complained bitterly about those who exploited the elections to make speeches attacking the Party leadership and the socialist system.^[69] In early 1981 the official press began to fulminate against "ultra-democracy" and "dissidence," eventually leading to a general Party drive against "bourgeois liberalization." In a report published in September 1981 summarizing the electoral experience over the previous year and a half, Cheng Zihua, minister of civil administration and chairman of the National County Election Office, complained that a "tiny minority of people" had spread anarchy, conducted secret "linkups," expressed "outrageous and inflammatory views," and otherwise contravened the four basic principles. Cheng put forth a series of proposals for tightening up the Election Law that would transfer final power to determine lists of formal candidates to a new body not specified in the 1979 law, an "Electoral District Leadership Group." Such changes would presumably have the effect of precluding genuinely independent candidates from participating in the electoral process.^[70] Moreover, the right to promulgate campaign propaganda was taken from the candidate and reposited in the election committee. The fact that a second round of national elections for representatives to county assemblies was held in April–May 1984 with minimal publicity tends to confirm apprehensions that the process has been eviscerated.

In sum, the mobilizational approach to mass involvement suffered a surprisingly swift and unsung demise, but transition to a participatory style still hangs in abeyance. In previous chapters we have contended that mobilization functioned most satisfactorily when the masses were motivated by an optimum mix of normative leadership and material incentives, though it could also be provisionally sustained by a plausible deferment of the latter. This mix was obtained only during the first decade of CPC rule. Completion of socialization of the means of production deprived the leadership of its cheapest source of material incentives, and the attempt to replenish these through hypergrowth failed. Mobiliza-

[68] Robin Munro, "The Chinese Democracy Movement, 1978–1982," unpub. paper, 1983.

[69] On the case of Liang Heng, see Zong Lei, "Hunan xuesheng zheng minzhu fan guanliao de xingdong" [Hunan student movement for democracy against bureaucratism], QN , December 12, 1980, pp. 19–20.

The CC also dispatched a directive forbidding newspapers and journals from publishing Hu Ping's writings. Because it published Hu's article on freedom of the press, Qingnian Wengao [Youth draft articles], published internally by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, came under criticism. Su Rong, "The Strange Record," pp. 10–12; "Selections from Political Views," pp. 68–82.

[70] Munro, "Chinese Democracy Movement," pp. 18–19.

tion revived in the Cultural Revolution by dint of fresh normative/political appeals, but when these extravagant promises could not be kept the rhetoric lost credence; in any case, the leadership found it to be dangerous and unpredictable to mobilize the masses with so little control over their movement. Mobilizational efficacy declined steadily during the late Cultural Revolution, as elites sought in various ways to control and direct the movement to their own ends, without offering to replenish the fund of material incentives or providing a credible, fresh, or broadly appealing normative vision. In the post–Cultural Revolution period, additional material incentives became available through the reallocation of funds from investment to consumption, but these incentives were linked to production rather than mobilization, as modernization usurped priority. The democracy activists offered a compelling normative vision, which was, however, deemed intolerably threatening by bureaucratic elites. Only mobilization against negative targets remained viable, and it proved impossible to ensure that the demands and grievances thereby evoked would be delivered to the authoritatively stipulated address (scapegoat) without damaging spillover (of which more later).

The transition to a participatory mode has heretofore been inhibited by two deeply ingrained propensities. On the one hand, bureaucratic elites seem no less paralyzed by "fear" than when Mao lambasted this "mental encumbrance" in days of yore, tending to panic at the first sign of disagreement. Democracy Wall aroused anxiety, so it was replaced by elections, which could be more easily controlled; but cadres also felt uneasy at the tendency for electoral campaigns to get out of hand. From the elite perspective it remains difficult to open any forum to mass participation (and thereby engender the support and feedback still deemed necessary) without running unacceptable risks of losing control, and there is a consequent tendency to "Procrusteanize" participation. On the other hand, the masses continue to exhibit a "breakthrough" mentality, giving rise to two tendencies: a flagrantly hyperbolic rhetoric, which sharpens rather than conciliates differences; and the propensity to treat every concession as an opening for additional demands, so that the slightest "spark" of political entitlement can easily start a "prairie fire" of rising and eventually unfulfillable expectations. It is still too early to tell whether some form of meaningful mass participation will survive the Scylla of mass anarchy and the Charybdis of an empty formalism.

The Conquest of Structure

The two opposition structures against which the continuing revolution had been mobilized consisted of the residual and the emergent structures.

The former consisted of class contradictions, which had survived socialization of the means of production on which they were based. The latter consisted of emergent contradictions, deriving from the structural features of socialist society. The lesson of ten years of Cultural Revolution was ambiguous: from the fact that the uprising had occurred, one could infer that no rigid or impermeable structures should be constructed, for these had, after all, contributed to its explosive cathartic force. Those most committed to political reform touted this inference. From the fact that it had failed, on the other hand, one could draw the inference that frames should be respected and preserved, or at least never simply smashed—an interpretation to which the more conservative forces were partial. Despite a tendency to vacillate between uncritical restoration of pre-Cultural Revolution structures and terminal iconoclasm, the overall direction of movement seems to have been toward a synthesis: structure is an essential facet of social life, but it must be sufficiently flexible and permeable to permit innovation, communication, change.

The dominant current during the Hua Guofeng interregnum was one of indiscriminate restoration of all structures, probably due as much to the public mood at the time as to Hua's theoretical eclecticism. Thus Hua endorsed the residual conceptualization of class and class struggle (however tepidly), and also moved to rebuild the state apparatus and otherwise reaffirm emergent structures.

Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, renounced residual structures outright, thereby lifting that historical burden from his bureaucratic-intellectual constituency, while adopting a meliorist stance toward emergent structures. The revolution had succeeded, he implied, in destroying the original counterrevolutionary opposition, but it was unsuited for the rectification of emergent contradictions. Emergent structures should be qualifiedly affirmed rather than smashed, their objectionable features rectified gradually through proper channels.

Eliminating the Residual Structure

First to be emancipated were overseas Chinese, many of whom were of bourgeois background or at least had kinship ties with capitalists, but also had access to overseas remittances, high educational attainment, and useful managerial/technical talents. In January 1978, the regime promised to cease all discrimination, return confiscated houses, and reopen the special shops for overseas Chinese to service their "special needs." The intellectuals were next in line for rehabilitation: Deng Xiaoping, in his March 1978 speech to the National Science Conference, was first to include this category, previously grouped among the petty bourgeoisie, within the proletariat: "Generally speaking the overwhelming majority

of them are part of the proletariat. The difference between them and the manual workers lies only in a different role in the division of labor."^[71] In early 1978 Deng also instructed the Party to stop using the label of "rightist," a political label equivalent to bad class categorization. In order to implement this instruction, the Organization, Propaganda, and United Front Departments of the CC and the Public Security and Civil Affairs Ministries jointly convened a meeting from June 16–22, 1978, in Shandong. After a heated debate between Deng's supporters and representatives of the "whatever" group, the meeting approved "Concrete Measures to Implement Thoroughly the Decision to Remove All Hats of the Rightists."

Responsibility for checking the correctness of the original label fell on the unit that had made the decision to apply it, regardless of whether the person in question was still in the unit. The Party committee in each unit typically organized one or several special investigation teams to look into the case, after which an internal Party meeting would be convened to write up the organizational conclusion and enter it into the person's dossier. This conclusion might include such statements as "no rightist remark was found," or "should not be considered a rightist." The conclusion would then be shown to the person, and if he or she agreed, forwarded to the next higher level for approval. Once approved, the unit would issue a certificate correcting or removing the rightist designation, sending one copy to units where the person's spouse or children worked as well (to relieve the latter of the onus of "connection" to a rightist). Then the person would be eligible for job reassignment and restoration of salary. Rehabilitated rightists were not automatically entitled to return to their previous positions—their new assignments were to be based on ability, physical condition, and unit needs—but the original salary scale was usually restored in any case. The process of removing the rightists' "hats" was successfully completed by November 1978.^[72]

Immediately following completion of the rehabilitation of rightists, the regime proceeded to remove the designations of "four-category elements" (i.e., landlord, rich peasant, counterrevolutionary, and bad element).^[73] Removal of these designations was not categorical, for "extremely small numbers of those who are stubbornly upholding the coun-

[71] Deng, "Speech to the National Conference on Science and Technology," PR 21, no. 12 (March 24, 1978): 11.

[72] See Hong Yung Lee, "Changing Patterns."

[73] RR announced in an editorial on January 29, 1979, that former landlords and rich peasants would have "citizen's rights" restored, and restoration of rights was formally confirmed by the CC on June 28. It was also announced that China's "national bourgeoisie" would get back the property, titles, and money that had been seized during the Cultural Revolution—with interest. NYT , January 29, 1979.

terrevolutionary standpoints and those who are not yet properly remolded" must continue to carry the labels. It is estimated that only 1 to 2 percent of former four-category elements failed to have their "hats" removed.^[74] Rehabilitation was formalized in the 1982 State Constitution, Article 33 of which guarantees equality of all Chinese citizens before the law. The label of "class enemy" is henceforth to be limited to five fairly restrictive categories.^[75] Once the government rescinded its sanctions against the old bad classes, social discrimination quickly evaporated. Class origins no longer count even in the arrangement of marriages; more important is the wealth and income potential of the prospective groom's family.^[76]

An equally important aspect of the emancipation of the residual structure has been the leadership's renunciation of its right to lead criticism campaigns against it. Thus at the Third Plenum, the CC announced that turbulent class struggle on a large scale had been "basically concluded." Although "class struggle will continue to exist, within certain limits, for a long time to come," it is no longer held to be the "principal" form of contradiction in socialist society.^[77] With certain qualifications, the mass movement has been disavowed.

The policy toward emergent contradictions has been two-tiered. With regard to political elites , the most notorious emergent structure, the "Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road," a concept implying the possibility of the political procreation of class, has been unequivocally repudiated. As Deng put it in March 1979: "We do not admit that

[74] Zhongguo Qingnian Bao , September 8, 1979. Another source estimated that only about fifty thousand people still carried the labels of landlords and rich peasants. BR , January 21, 1980, pp. 14–20; as quoted in Hong Yung Lee, "Changing Patterns."

[75] They are (1) counterrevolutionaries and enemy agents; (2) remnant elements of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques; (3) criminals who have gravely upset the socialist order; (4) new exploiters; and (5) old exploiters. They will be handled according to the law. JFJB commentator, "Scientifically Understand and Handle Class Struggle in China," BR , no. 49 (December 6, 1982): 18.

[76] Chan, Madsen, and Unger, Chen Village , p. 283. Within two years one production team (in rural Guangdong) had elected a former rich peasant to serve as team leader, while another team elected the son of the ex-guerrilla "bad element." Jonathan Unger, "The Class System in Rural China: A Case Study," in James L. Watson, Class and Social Stratification in Post-Revolutionary China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 121–42.

[77] Thus whereas the concept continues to be used to legitimate police suppression of criminality and the enforcement of political consensus, its relationship to economic stratification has grown increasingly obscure. There has even been a tendency to assert that class is now simply an economic category with no necessary political significance. See Wang Zhenping, "Is Class Merely an Economic Category?" RR , January 4, 1980, p. 5 (in which Wang concludes that it is); also Zhao De, "Should the Method of Class Analysis Continue to Be Upheld?" Xinhua Ribao (Nanjing), April 21, 1981, p. 3; China Record , no. 197 (June 17, 1981): 20–23.

there is a bourgeois class in the Party. We also do not admit that under a socialist system after the effective elimination of the exploiting class as well as the conditions making exploitation possible, a bourgeois class or any other exploiting class can be produced."^[78] The somewhat weaker concept of "line struggle" to refer to leadership disputes within the Party has not been disavowed in principle, but it has been generally avoided in practice, as noted above.

As for the masses , the approach has been more circumspect. The dominant effort in the post-1978 period has been to "build down" the existing sturcture, introducing various reforms to make it more flexible and permeable. A second and conceptually more ambitious approach has been to shift from the exclusive reliance on socio-political structures to the "rule of law"; this approach offers even greater potential for flexibility and permeability.

Building down Emergent Structure

Efforts to reform emergent structure may conveniently be grouped into three categories: (1) those seeking to relax constraints on horizontal mobility; (2) those making structure more permeable through the proliferation of communications; and (3) those facilitating greater vertical mobility via bureaucratic reorganization.

1. One of the major constraints on horizontal mobility has been the system of central labor allocation to jobs followed by lifetime employment in the unit to which one has been assigned. As already noted in chapter 3, this system tends to result in the ghettoization of everyone, fostering petty tyranny by local cadres over subordinates who have neither voice nor exit, and sometimes forcing protracted marital separation. It was already proving increasingly difficult for the authorities to enforce labor allocation in the post-Mao interregnum, as indicated for example by cases of university graduates refusing to accept their (usually rural) job placements—a previously unheard of phenomenon that authorities blamed on the influence of "Existentialism." A symptom of these difficulties was the unprecedented announcement in early 1979 that 20 million urban residents, just over 20 percent of the urban work force, were unemployed—a figure that would rise to 26 million by early 1981.^[79] This level of unemployment would be inconceivable in a planned labor

[78] See Jie Wen's article in HQ , no. 20, 1981, p. 27; see also Lin Boye and Shen Che, "Ping suowei fandui guanliao zhuyizhe jieji" [Criticizing the so-called overthrow of the bureaucratic class], HQ , no. 5, 1981, pp. 12–18; as quoted in Tsou, "Reflections."

[79] Nicholas R. Lardy, China's Economic Readjustment: Recovery or Paralysis (New York: China Council of the Asia Society, March 1980); see also Gorden White, "Urban Employment and Labor Allocation Policies," in G. White et al., eds., Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World (Sussex, England: Harvester Press, 1983), pp. 257–87.

allocation system without assuming massive noncompliance. Part of the problem is that the most ambitious instance of ideologically inspired labor allocation, the "up to the mountains and down to the countryside" (shangshan xiaxiang ) campaign, had been "basically concluded"^[80] by 1979 without adequate alternative facilities to absorb surplus urban labor. The more fundamental difficulty (to which rustication itself was originally thought to be the solution) is the tendency (hardly unique to China) for rural inhabitants to migrate to the cities faster than housing or jobs can be found to accommodate them. This problem has been so serious even under state labor allocation that Shanghai shut its doors to further in-migration in 1973, Beijing in 1982.

Two reforms have been proposed and, to some extent, implemented, which intend to facilitate greater "personnel mobility" (rencai liudong ). The first is the creation of a collective and private enterprise sector relatively independent from the state labor allocation system, in which there would be much greater individual autonomy in the allocation of employment. In November 1981 the Party-government authorities issued a joint directive urging unemployed Chinese to create their own jobs, either in collective enterprises or in the private sector. The directive also made clear that young people would no longer be guaranteed job tenure in a state enterprise, a practice nicknamed the "iron rice bowl." Hao Haifeng, chairman of the Individual Enterprises Department of the State Industrial and Commercial Administration, claimed at a news conference in March 1984 that the number of self-employed Chinese had risen from one hundred forty thousand in 1978 to more than 7.5 million in 1983.^[81] It was projected that of the 6 million who enter the urban labor force each year, perhaps a quarter will have to find jobs on their own, and most will be hired on a competitive basis rather than through state assignment. According to statistics, nearly four-fifths of the restaurants, retail stores, and service shops set up since 1978 have been privately owned; such businessmen are permitted to hire up to seven apprentices and helpers, not including family members. New labor contracts will also provide, for the first time, for dismissals and layoffs.^[82] In the countryside, even greater latitude has been granted for job-related mobility, including short-term migration.

The second attempt at reform would involve the "destatification" of the system of labor allocation, both for initial placement and subsequent mobility. Labor bureaus would hand over part of their functions to local

[80] According to an informant from the Economics Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in private conversation, Berkeley, Calif., 1981.

[81] Christopher Wren, NYT , September 15, 1984.

[82] Wren, September 15; also Michael Parks, in The Los Angeles Times , April 25, 1983, part 4, pp. 1–2.

non-state agencies; for instance, collectively owned "labor service companies," under the supervision of street committees, schools, or offices, might arrange placements in the collective and private sectors. The enterprises themselves would be permitted to advertise for new workers or even to hire labor away from other units, by offering higher wages; they should also have the right to fire, thereby curtailing overstaffing and raising productivity.^[83]

Whereas success in the area of employment creation has been impressive, innovations in the system of labor allocation have hitherto been less successful. To attempt to introduce greater flexibility into the labor allocation system at a time when high unemployment precipitated fear of dismissal and other insecurities among workers proved ill advised. Thus the state labor bureaus have heretofore continued to monopolize the allocation of labor to state enterprises, sometimes even forcing enterprises to accept labor quotas above their own estimated labor requirements in order to help alleviate unemployment. The proposed power of dismissal has remained a dead letter, with the exception of joint venture companies in the Special Economic Zones.

The foreseeable outlook is for a dual structure of lateral occupational mobility, in two senses: (1) within the state sector, a differential between entrenched, "fixed" workers on the one hand (entitled to all welfare benefits), and short-term contract workers on the other, the latter providing management with some flexibility in the disposition of labor; (2) another differential between the state sector on the one hand and the collective and private sectors on the other. In each case, the differential involves a trade-off between mobility and security, implying that progress toward a free labor market will be contingent upon continuing assurance of reasonably favorable prospects for venture entrepreneurialism and limited employment opportunities within the state sector (meaning low opportunity costs in terms of job security).

Whereas employment restrictions constitute the most egregious deterrent to lateral mobility, lesser barriers have also been subjected to piecemeal reform. Amid the general cultural liberalization there has been somewhat greater courtship mobility, including the opening of "marriage introduction institutes" in the larger cities (since 1980) to introduce eligible mates. Most ration coupons have been dispensed with, given the greater emphasis on light industry and increased availability of consumer goods, with even some discussion (so far inconclusive) of "canceling the rice coupon" (chuxiao liangpiao ); similarly, there has been a move to eliminate the congeries of identity cards most Chinese citizens must carry

[83] The rights of fired workers would be protected by involving enterprise workers' organizations, trade unions, and workers' congresses in the decision to fire. Formal approval would be required from higher organs as well. There might be special welfare provisions for a period of transitional unemployment organized by state labor agencies.

in favor of a single residence identity card.^[84] In addition, the expansion of the private sector has considerably facilitated commercial travel.

In the face of these pressures for mobility arising from a combination of cultural liberalization and economic commercialization, the local unit has gradually been losing its grip. In urban areas, industrial managers have lost power over matters extraneous to their professional competence, such as the right to "stop work for self-criticism" (tingzhi fanxing ; tantamount to the power of house arrest), the right to transfer, and the right to examine incoming or outgoing mail; to be sure, managers retain great power over matters within their spheres of competence, such as bonus allocation. Some units have introduced work councils or other representative bodies in an effort to harness unit authority to popular control.^[85] In the countryside, the team has been severely weakened by the devolution of power to the family in the "responsibility system"—and the family has been concomitantly strengthened, once again becoming the basic unit of production as well as consumption. The commune has given way to a three-way functional division of labor in which it must share jurisdiction with the commune, the commune Party committee, and the xiang (township) government. As such functional differentiation becomes more general, the neo-feudal power of local authorities may be expected to yield to overlapping spheres of competence and crosscutting membership obligations.

2. Even more far-reaching in its implications than the still limited expansion of the ambit of physical mobility has been the proliferation of communications that has occurred since 1976. This was in part a response to the sudden removal of constraints on repressed demand after ten years of media deprivation: Whereas in 1960, 1,300 official periodicals were published in China, in 1966 the number was cut to 648, and by 1973 the number had further dwindled to about 50. During this period, not only almost all foreign literature but also traditional Chinese literature and the modern Chinese classics of the 1920s and 1930s were barred from publication, distribution, and library circulation; about the only works widely available were political tracts, technical manuals, a few novels, and the collected works of Marx, Lenin, and Mao.^[86] In 1978 some 890 magazines were publicly available, selling a total of 76 million copies; in 1979 the number of titles rose to 1,200 (with a circulation of 118 million); and by 1982 it was possible to subscribe to no less than 2,100 reviews and magazines.^[87] The best-selling periodical is still the authoritative Party publication Red Flag , which distributes 9.7 million copies, but it is

[84] Julian Baum, in Christian Science Monitor , September 6, 1984.

[85] Whyte and Parish, Urban Life , p. 297.

[86] Siu and Stern, Mao's Harvest , pp. xlv–xlix.

[87] John Howkins, Mass Communication in China (New York: Longman, 1982), pp. 86–87; also CNA , no. 1223 (January 1, 1982).

closely rivaled by "specialty" publications such as Xiaoshuo Yuebao (Fiction monthly), Dazhong Dian Bao (Popular film), Kexue Huabao (Science illustrated), and Lianhuan Huabao (Cartoons), each of which published 2 to 3 million copies in 1978. Non-Party newspapers such as the Beijing Evening News and Guangzhou's Yangcheng Evening News , somewhat more open in their reporting, have resumed publication. Since 1979, there has been an explosive growth of self-published newspapers in rural areas: most of China's more than 400 provincial and county papers (which account for half the newspaper circulation nationwide) are published without state subvention, and their editorial policies reflect efforts to boost circulation.^[88] Even within the Party newspapers, the content is more varied than before, emphasizing information over propaganda and gradually minimizing "taboo areas." The most rapidly growing sector of the publishing industry has been literary magazines—there are 71 of them in Beijing, 38 in Shanghai, and 16 in Guangzhou, and many provinces have their own literary magazines.^[89]

The impact of this communications explosion has been felt in every media sector. From 1966 to 1977 barely half a dozen new feature films were approved for release, and almost no new directors or actors were trained; in 1977, 28 feature films were produced, increasing to 40 in 1978, 65 in 1979, more than 100 in 1980.^[90] The increase in the availability, variety, and aesthetic quality of films, with more cinemas open longer hours, has increased attendance from 50 million daily in 1977 to 70 million in 1980 (30 billion per year), giving China the world's largest moving picture audience.^[91] After 1977 radio jamming ceased, and it became legal to listen to foreign broadcasts; the BBC, Voice of America, Radio Japan, and other stations began to provide a regular diet of news about events inside and outside China. With new satellite reception stations, film clips from American television became a regular staple on China's evening news broadcasts, and television sets became more widely available.^[92] At the beginning of 1980 one in every 280 Chinese reportedly had a television set, compared with one in 16,400 people in 1970, with 38 television centers and 238 transmitting and relay stations.^[93] The fare includes, in addition to (traditional) Beijing opera and educational programs, the American series "Man from Atlantis," and the BBC series

[88] FEER , April 5, 1984, p. 44.

[89] Zhengming Ribao (Hong Kong), July 25, 1981; quoted in CNA , no. 1223.

[90] Moreover, about seventy foreign films were imported for exhibition and "study" in 1979, including "Death on the Nile"—which became the most popular film in China—"Cabaret," "The Sound of Music" (because it was "anti-fascist"), "Nightmare in Badham County," and "Convoy." Howkins, Mass Communication , pp. 67–68.

[91] Mathews and Mathews, One Billion , pp. 279–81.

[92] Whyte and Parish, Urban Life , p. 298.

[93] Xinhua, February 18, 1980; as cited in Howkins, Mass Communication , p. 31.

"David Copperfield" and "Anna Karenina." The publishing sector has also expanded, from 103 publishers in mid-1978 to 158 by the end of 1980. As it has expanded, publishing has become more decentralized: previously publishing tended to be concentrated in Beijing and Shanghai, but by 1980, half of the publishers were located in the rest of the country. In 1978 they published about 15,000 books (with an average run of about 200,000 per book, this amounted to 3 billion copies), increasing to 17,000 titles (and 4.2 billion copies) in 1979.

This quantitative increase in communication flows has helped to erode the "honeycomb" system of internal constraints in at least three respects. First, it has swamped internal communication channels by sheer volume, no doubt similarly overloading censorship and control mechanisms. Subscriptions to magazines and newspapers are managed through the post offices; for example, in January 1982, the Beijing post office was dispatching some 512 periodicals, with 35 million copies; in addition, it must handle over 200 periodicals coming in from elsewhere.^[94] Vast quantities of paper were used, straining the transport capabilities of the railways.^[95] Yet even such an increase has not satisfied consumer demand. Popular literary magazines are sold on the black market at prices above the original, and government publishers estimate that each book they print reaches ten to twenty readers—all the more remarkable when libraries are so few and crowded.^[96]

Second, consistent with general tendencies toward devolution of managerial and financial control to producing units and greater responsiveness to consumer demand, political authorities have to a considerable degree abdicated responsibility for the content of publications, making way for a tendency toward commercialization of the media. In 1979 it was decided that publishing houses would print runs based on estimated demand, arriving at such estimates by aggregating advance orders from local bookstores. Each bookshop is seen as a profit center and must fill a quota for sales, revenue, and expenditure (and pay taxes on its profits). This policy has resulted among other things in the publication of 1,750,000 copies of a three-volume translation of Gone with the Wind ; no fewer than 45 Agatha Christie novels were slated for publication in 1980,

[94] Beijing Ribao , August 3, 1981, p. 2; as quoted in CNA , no. 1223.

[95] In 1981 the printing offices in Beijing used 7.5 million reams of paper, most of which (4.9 million reams) was however used for official publications. Some two thousand sacks of the periodical Dazhong Dian Bao are directed to the northwestern provinces, but the trains can haul only two hundred fifty sacks per day, and when other transport has priority, the masses must wait. CNA , no. 1223.

[96] A survey of university students in Canton found most of them spending at least five hours a week reading novels and short stories. Some claimed that they spent as much as twenty-three to thirty hours a week reading books that had little to do with their schoolwork. Mathews and Mathews, One Billion , p. 296.

following the 1979 cinematic success of "Death on the Nile." Similarly, the success of the American film "Futureworld" in 1980 excited an interest in publishing science fiction. In February 1979 the Ministry of Culture's Film Bureau likewise relinquished its right to review film scripts prior to filming, permitting studios to move directly to production on the basis of self-censorship. Troupes of actors and Beijing opera performers have been dispatched to the countryside with the exhortation to become economically self-supporting, resulting in the depoliticization of their repertoire (also in a deterioration in quality). Regional media seem most sensitive to commercial considerations; the central media establishment in Beijing, while attuned to political nuances, is also more willing to take a principled stand on given issues.

Third, emergence of a large-scale, commercially remunerative media network, and an enthusiastic public whose demand seems capable of consuming all that this network can produce, seems to have enhanced the autonomy and even the sense of self-importance of the literati whose creations it reproduces, and self-selected representatives of the literati have shown an increasing willingness to confront authorities who threaten to restrict the media for political reasons. To be sure, their assertiveness is attributable only partly to the growth of their media "base," and partly to their conviction that cultural liberalization is a legitimate construal of the administration's "double hundred" (let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend) and "emancipation of mind" policies.

Confrontation between dissident literati and authorities did not erupt abruptly, but emerged only gradually in the course of emancipation from past repression. The Hua Guofeng position toward intellectual liberation had after all been quite conservative, inheriting the censoriousness of cultural radicalism without sharing any of its populist proclivities; the literati for their part remained deeply traumatized, not venturing any statements that might be misconstrued. In a speech made as late as July 1978, Zhang Pinghua, erstwhile CC Propaganda Department director, continued to defend Jiang Qing's revolutionary model operas, for example, opposing even aesthetically superior productions if they reflected badly upon socialism. "We should persist in one principle, that is, report on the bright side of society and the mainstream of socialism," he said. "Defects and mistakes are only minor things that can be overcome."^[97]

The first significant departure from radical orthodoxy was signaled by publication of Liu Xinwu's short story "Class Counselor" (Banzhuren ), just after adjournment of the Eleventh Party Congress in September

[97] "Chang P'ing-hua's Speech to Cadres on the Cultural Front," trans. in IS 14, no. 12 (December 1978): 99–108.

1977. This introduced the so-called wound literature (named after a short story, "The Wounded," by Lu Xinhua), which exposed to sympathetic diagnosis the scars left by the Cultural Revolution, focusing primarily upon young people and intellectuals—thus harmonizing well with the concurrent campaign against the Gang of Four.^[98] By 1979, spurred by the rehabilitation of the authors of the Hundred Flowers period, the critique of the Cultural Revolution had graduated to criticism of the shadow side of contemporary political reality, introducing the novel possibilities of tragedy. In film scripts, reportage, or plays such as "In Society's Files," "People or Monsters?" and "What If I Really Were?" such issues as cadre privilege or corruption were bruited.^[99]

The Party and army cadres most frequently skewered in such satirical sallies resented this artistic license—one PLA representative (to the Fourth Session of the Fifth NPC) was heard to remark that the intellectuals were becoming "cocky" (literally, "sticking up their tails"—qiao weiba ).^[100] Yet there was no immediate crackdown, but rather a preliminary effort by authorities to signal that the bounds of tolerance were being trespassed. The first such signal took the form of quasi-official redefinition of the ambit of intellectual competence. Hu Qiaomu's July 1978 speech to the State Council contending that economics should be governed by "objective economic laws" was justly hailed as a landmark in claiming autonomy for the social sciences,^[101] but after further debate the conclusion was reached that whereas the natural sciences consisted of truths that were independent of class standpoint, in the humanities and social sciences truth remained subjective and therefore under the ultimate jurisdiction of the Party.^[102] In another academic discussion of the limits of freedom of speech, it was concluded that "thought activity" was not punishable by law, only "acts" were; the former did not, however, include the right to express thoughts freely if they were deemed harm-

[98] See Lu Xinhua et al., The Wounded: New Stories of the Cultural Revolution , 1977–78 , trans. Geremie Barme and Bennett Lee (Hong Kong: Joint Pub., 1979).

[99] Jiang Youbei, "Wen tequan tiaojian de Zhonggong wenyi" [Chinese Communist literature that challenges special privileges], ZM , no. 26 (December 1979): 27–29; Huai Bing, "Ping 'Zai shehui de dang'an li'" [Criticism of "In the files of society"], ZM , no. 28 (February 1980): 78–79; in Jin Fang, "Zhonggong huaju mianshang de fengfeng leilei" [Storm in Chinese drama], ZM , no. 28 (February 1980): 32–33, 66.

[100] Luo Bing, "Renda de muhou xinwen" [The inside story of the People's Congress], ZM , no. 51 (January 1982): 8–13.

[101] Hu Qiaomu, "Act According to Economic Laws, Accelerate the Four Modernizations" [Anzhao jingji guilü ban shi, jiakuai shixian sige xiandaihua], finally published in RR on October 6, 1978.

[102] See He Zuoxiu, Zhao Hongzhou, and Guo Hanying, "Criticize the 'Science and Technology Superstructure Theory,'" pp. 13–22; also "Implement the Policy of 'Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom and One Hundred Schools of Thought Contend,' Promote Academic Research," Nanfang Ribao (Guangzhou), January 13, 1979, p. 2.

ful.^[103] Only after such signals fell on deaf ears did the authorities resort to more familiar and severe tactics to discipline errant literati (to be reviewed later).

In sum, the proliferation of communications seems to have been highly successful in permeating the internal gridwork of lateral constraints, qualified only by two considerations. First, notwithstanding the breaching of many geographical barriers, the general distinction between "inner" and "outer" remains a formidable one, and the authorities have made clear their determination to shore up the neibu communication system against further erosion.^[104] This distinction reflects and tends to reinforce the persisting elite-mass cleavage in society. Second, although the regime's ideological justification of continuing political control over communication is logically vulnerable, the political strength of the literati and assembled intelligentsia, though growing, is still too weak to pose a serious challenge.

3. Vertical (hierarchical) structures have long been considered problematic in Chinese politics, although the nature of the problem has been defined differently from time to time. The early Cultural Revolution vision of an end to bureaucratic authority had by the late Cultural Revolution given way to an embrace of strict proletarian dictatorship, for example. The post-Mao critique of vertical structure, while more tolerant of hierarchy and more critical of autocracy, continues to embrace many elements of the radical polemic, such as its animus against cadre "privilege" and gerontocratic ossification. Having forsworn iconoclastic approaches to structural change, the post-Mao regime has, however, opted for nonconfrontational (indeed, elaborately consultative) change via constitutional engineering, proceeding "from the top down." Three aspects of these reforms are noteworthy: the co-optation of functional specialists into the state structure, the introduction of limited tenure and other devices designed to facilitate vertical mobility, and the institutionalization (and concomitant propensity for depoliticization) of elite monitoring devices.

[103] See Yu Yiding, "On Emancipating the Mind and Opposing Bourgeois Liberalization," HQ no. 23 (December 1, 1981): 23–28, which supports a restrictive interpretation. Taking a more liberal tack are Gu Bing, "The Theory of the Vitality of Faith," Jiefang Ribao , February 28, 1980, p. 4; and Wang Ruoshui, "It is Permissible to Criticize Mao Zedong Thought" (part of a speech given in Shanghai in August 1979 but never published in the PRC), ZM , no. 31 (May 1, 1980): 27–29.

[104] Albeit not without controversy. Noteworthy are several articles in which neibu book publishing and the difficult access to libraries have been criticized. See Yu Zhen, "Jiefang 'neibu shu'" [Liberate internal books], Dushu [Reading] (Beijing), no. 1 (1979); also Feng Yumin, "'Tushuguan' bixu si men da kai" [The libraries must be opened on all sides], Dushu , no. 2 (1979). But the issue appears dead at this writing.

Co-optation of functional experts entails restoration of the power and status of the state bureaucracy, which remains the principal institutional channel through which these experts have input. During the Cultural Revolution era, although Zhou Enlai managed to keep the State Council intact and finally to convene the Fourth National People's Congress, the governmental structure below the central level was merged into the Revolutionary Committees, where they were subordinated to de facto military hegemony much of the time. This measure was theoretically justified in terms of the "withering away" of the State and its replacement by proletarian dictatorship as represented by the direct leadership of the Communist Party. In retrospect, however, the reformers deem it premature to have reduced the role of the governmental apparatus in the context of economic underdevelopment. As modernization assumed top priority in the post-Mao ambience, the State's functional significance grew. Thus the National People's Congress met annually in 1978 and 1979, for example, and its Standing Committee convened as many as eight sessions during the intervening period; several state commissions became engaged in working out various proposals. The State Council busied itself with numerous new projects, including calling national conferences in almost every important functional field for the formulating of guidelines relevant to the Four Modernizations.^[105]

Despite the persistence of problematic elite-mass relations, the regime has granted increasing autonomy to vertically defined sectors, be they functional sectors or parallel bureaucracies.^[106] The CPPCC has been revived at both central and local levels, and the Bourgeois Democratic Parties claim to have exhibited a certain popular appeal in attracting new members, though recruitment remains necessarily low-key.^[107] The mass organizations have all been revived: The All-China Federation of Trade Unions held its Ninth Congress in Beijing October 11–21, 1978, after a hiatus of twenty-one years; the Tenth Congress of the China Youth League was held October 16–28, 1979, for the first time since 1964; the Fourth National Women's Congress was held in September 1978; and in October–November 1979, the Fourth Congress of Writers and Artists

[105] Manoranjan Mohanty, "Party, State and Modernization in Post-Mao China," in V. P. Dutt, ed., China : The Post-Mao View (New Delhi: Allied Pub., 1981), pp. 45–67.

[106] Hong Yung Lee, "Changing Patterns."

[107] Many have joined the Bourgeois Democratic Parties, including young people. Tuanjiebao , the newspaper of the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT, has been allowed to publish in Beijing, and has a circulation of more than fifty thousand per day. See He Wenxing, "Beijing, kexi, keyou" [Happiness and worry about Beijing], ZM , no. 49 (November 1981): 13–15; Xiao Ying, "Bei hang jian wen suo ji" [Miscellaneous information from my trip north], ZM , no. 28 (February 1980): 29–30.

met for the first time in nineteen years.^[108] The People's Procuratorate was retrieved from Cultural Revolution oblivion at the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, and at the Second Session Peng Zhen's Legal Commission introduced the first codification of law in the history of the People's Republic.

Other reforms designed to facilitate vertical mobility have also been inaugurated. The Central Advisory Committee in the Party and the position of State Councillor in the government were introduced in order to facilitate the phased retirement of senior cadres from leadership positions; although it has not been entirely successful in this endeavor at the central level, the institutions are in place there and will be set up at the provincial and local levels as well, where they may be somewhat more efficacious.^[109] There has also been a concerted effort since 1982 to encourage the accelerated promotion of outstanding younger officials, visible for example in the new membership of the Party Secretariat elected by the Twelfth Congress. Many of the governors or vice-governors at the provincial level are now young functional specialists: the mayor of Shanghai, for example, is a prestigious industrial specialist within the Party: Yao Jun, as of April 1983 (non-Party) vice-mayor of Tianjin, was once associate general engineer and vice-manager of the municipal chemical industry corporation; a former vice-director of the bureau of provincial mechanical industry with a Master's degree in mechanical engineering from the United States is now vice-governor in charge of mechanical industry in Zhejiang.^[110] On the government side, a further step designed to stimulate the circulation of elites and forestall fossilization has been the introduction of fixed terms of office for most leadership positions: the premier, the president, the Standing Committee chairman, and other top governmental officials (excepting only the chairman of the

[108] In addition, from October 11 to 23, 1979, China's eight democratic parties, and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (a group of "national bourgeoisie" analogous to a chamber of commerce) simultaneously held their respective national congresses in Beijing, meeting for the first time in some twenty years. Zhen Ming, "An Appraisal of the Destiny of Mainland China's Democratic Parties," DX , no. 14 (November 16, 1979): 7–8.

[109] Mu Fu, "Communist China Moves to Cut Its Deadwood," Qishi Niandai , no. 4 (1982): 20–23. Between December 1982 and May 1983, nearly a third of the Party provincial first secretaries and all but three of the provincial governors were replaced. Altogether nearly two-thirds of the country's top fourteen hundred provincial officials either resigned or "retired to the second line" as advisers. Christopher Clarke, "The Shakeup Moves Down," China Business Review , September–October 1983.

[110] Ming Bao , March 30, 1983; RR , August 20, 1983; RR , January 4, 13, 1984. Between late 1982 and mid-1983, the average age of provincial governors and vice-governors dropped by nearly eight years, and the percentage in those posts with college education increased by 26.6 percent. The percentage of cadres at the prefectural, county, municipal, and town levels with college education rose by 14 percent. Christopher Clarke, "China's Third Generation," China Business Review , March–April 1984, pp. 36–38.

Central Military Commission) are to be limited to two five-year terms. Although the Party Constitution incorporated neither limited tenure nor restrictions on the number of positions concurrently occupied by one leader at its Twelfth Congress, these two principles were affirmed as guiding principles for future reforms.

To control elite corruption, a number of devices have been introduced in place of direct mass monitoring. Since elimination of the "four big" in 1981, there has been an emphasis on institutional mediation (letters to the editor, legal channels)—far less disruptive to the offending agency, but also more risky to the protester (who must relinquish anonymity). The chief weapon against elite privilege and corruption is organizational, consisting of a combination of external control hierarchies (primarily the Central Discipline Inspection Committee and its subordinate organs), along with such internal disciplinary techniques as criticism and self-criticism. A good example of the mode of implementation of such techniques is provided by the Party rectification campaign launched at the Second Plenum of the Twelfth Party Congress (October 11–12, 1983): its launching was preceded by more than a year's preparation, including pilot implementation in selected units, and the Party has proceeded from the top down and from the center outward, on a staggered schedule, with relatively little publicity. It is impossible to measure the efficacy of such monitoring agencies and techniques relative to the iconoclastic populism they have replaced, but the limited evidence so far available suggests a mixed verdict.^[111]

The Rule of Law

Perhaps the most conceptually ambitious reform of structure involves the introduction of the "rule of law," inasmuch as this would potentially impose a structure of rules on social behavior of such abstract universalizability that many of the existing institutional constraints on lateral mobility might eventually be dispensed with or at least placed on a more voluntary basis. The regime has at this writing done little more than make a beginning, however, and it is not clear whether Party leaders understand the full implications of the steps they have taken. This beginning consists of the introduction of seven basic laws at the Second Session of the Fifth NPC (June 1979) as the first stage in what promises to be a more general codification of law, plus the attempt through constitutional revision to place political organization and legislative procedure on a more secure legal footing.

Legal codification has proceeded at a deliberate pace, led by work in international law designed to provide a favorable climate for foreign

[111] See Lawrence R. Sullivan, "The Role of the Control Organs in the Chinese Communist Party, 1977–83," AS 24, no. 6 (June 1984): 597–618.

investment and trade. So long as the "Open Door Policy" remains in effect, it may be expected to stimulate continued progress within the realm of international law and perhaps to have some spillover effects, as the analogous precedents of Japan and Taiwan suggest.

Constitutional guarantees of democratic legislative procedure and certain civil rights of citizenship are not unique to the post-Mao era but are nonetheless important, going further than such formulations have in the past and for the first time making some reasonably realistic provision for enforcement. None of the previous Constitutions set forth such clear and definite provisions on the question of limiting the Party's activities to the sphere allowed by the Constitution and the laws, for example.^[112] Unprecedented sanctity has been attributed to law, some reform advocates even viewing law as the legal expression of "scientific laws." The enactment and enforcement of law have been touted to replace the mass movements as a means of implementing policies.^[113] As Marxists, the reformers rationalize the current salience of legality in terms of an inexorable developmental process:

The socialist system has already solidified into a firm rule, and the former classes of landlords, rich peasants and capitalists do not exist anymore. The target of our dictatorship has shrunk, while the circle of "people" has widened, and as a consequence the most important thing in the strengthening of the socialist legal system, in a certain sense, is the adjustment of the various kinds of social relations that have arisen among the people.^[114]

In 1954, the previous high-water mark of socialist legality, the PRC adopted only the constitutional terminology and forms from the West, rejecting in principle the spirit of the Western "rule of law" or Rechtsstaat . And whenever the constitution proved inconvenient, the Party did not hesitate to abandon it, invoking ideology to justify its acts. The 1982 Constitution, in contrast, introduces certain constitutional guarantees. Whereas all previous Constitutions had been drafted by the Party CC and presented to the NPC for ratification, in 1982 the Constitution was prepared by an NPC drafting committee. For the first time, an organ has been specified for the enforcement of the Constitution and the laws; namely, the Standing Committee of the NPC, which has been provided with a permanent staff and several specialized committees, and meets

[112] Staff commentator, "The Party Must Operate within the Scope of the Constitution and the Law," Minzhu yu Fazhi (Shanghai), no. 9 (September 25, 1982): 2–3. The 1982 Party Constitution stipulates that the "Party shall act within the limits of the [state] Constitution and the laws"; it also stipulates that Party members must obey the laws of the state. The provision that "the Communist Party of China is the leading core of the people of the whole country," found in both previous versions, has been deleted.

[113] According to Tang Tsou, in "Reflections," pp. 142–43.

[114] Zhang Youyu, "Revolution and the Legal System—Written in Commemoration of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Founding of the CCP," Minzhu yu Fazhi , no. 7 (July 25, 1981): 5–9.

more frequently than in the past. When the Standing Committee is in session it may put forward bills of inquiry to the State Council, the Supreme People's Court, or the Supreme People's Procuratorate, which are in turn under obligation to answer. The NPC itself has the power to amend the Constitution (for example, two amendments were drafted to the 1978 Constitution at the Second and Third Sessions of the Fifth NPC), to make and amend basic laws, and to formulate edicts (i.e., resolutions apart from the law); amendments require a two-thirds majority vote, laws a simple majority. Delegates are immune from arrest and trial without permission of the NPC or its Standing Committee; they cannot be prosecuted for speeches or votes at any session of the NPC.^[115]

However, notwithstanding the precedent-shattering declaration that the Party will abide within legal limits, there are no external restraints on the Party, making this provision entirely dependent upon the self-restrictive capacity of the Party's leadership and the value it places on the constitutional rules of the game. The Constitution has neither legal guarantees for its implementation nor legal procedures to enable the people to invoke it on behalf of their constitutional rights and freedoms. It is also important to bear in mind that although the "rule of law" has been invoked by its legal proponents in the scholarly (and even the popular) press,^[116] the leadership at this point endorses only the "Chinese socialist rule of law," reserving the option to differentiate that concept from "bourgeois" legality should that become politically expedient.^[117]

However tenuous its foundation, so long as the emphasis on socialist legality persists, this implies a concomitant revitalization of legislative activity. This revitalization is already visible in the increasing focus on democratic parliamentary procedure, including elections by secret ballot and the right of assembly delegates to pose questions to responsible authorities. In the Party, secret ballots for Party committees at each level and for delegates for higher levels have been introduced; in these ballots a certain range of discretion has been permitted for competition (no recommended ratio is stipulated, only that there should be more candidates than positions).^[118] At the Twelfth CPC Congress in September 1982, for

[115] Wang Shuwen and Zhou Yanrui, "New Developments of the People's Congress System," Faxue Yanjiu (Beijing), no. 3 (1982): 9–14; Chen Yunsheng, "Immunity of Representatives in the Draft Constitution," Faxue (Shanghai), no. 7 (July 1982): 16.

[116] See for example Xu Chongde, "Ten Proposals for Revising the Constitution," Minzhu yu Fazhi , no. 3 (March 20, 1981): 7–10.

[117] Lu Yonghong, "Is the Age of Deng Xiaoping the Chinese Communist Party's Constitutional Age?" Mingbao Yuekan , vol. 18, no. 6 (June 1983): 19–25.

[118] For example, during the election of the Secretariat at the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh CC, Geng Biao and Chen Muhua were originally on the list of nominees. But during the discussion period questions were raised, and in the end they were not elected; instead Song Renqiong and Yang Dezhi were elected. Luo Bing, "Inside Information on the Election of the Secretariat," ZM , no. 30 (April 1980): 3–8.

example, a preliminary election was held on September 8 to draw up a name list of candidates for Central Committee membership; following this preliminary election, the Presidium of the Party Congress drew up a formal list, after which a final election was held in which those receiving the most votes on the list were elected (vacancies appearing subsequently in the CC would be filled by alternates in order of the number of votes by which they were elected, so vote totals apparently played some role in establishing a pecking order).^[119] People's congresses were empowered to elect, by a similar procedure, the county head, county standing committee, and other leading county officials as well as delegates to the higher-level people's congress. Delegates to the congresses may raise questions about government programs, pass resolutions, and make "delegates' motions" (proposals for government action that require a second of three delegates, are passed on to the relevant government authorities, and require an official response.)^[120] Delegate participation in the National People's Congress was particularly salient at the Third Session of the Fifth Congress, where delegates held serious debate and grilled officials about various controversial issues, even casting a few negative votes.^[121] Subsequent developments suggest that this trend will continue, albeit with zigs and zags.^[122]

As in any case in which elites introduce more democratic measures from the top down (e.g., Meiji Japan, Wilhelminian Germany), legislative reform is inherently ambiguous. Elites would like power distributed more broadly in order to protect themselves from charismatic autocracy,

[119] Hu Sisheng and Chen Min, "Elections—Eye-catching Moment," RR , September 11, 1982, p. 4; Gan Wei, "Many Special Features in List of Alternate CC Members," Da Gong Bao (Hong Kong), September 15, 1982, p. 2.

[120] The Fifth session of the CPPCC (held immediately following the First session of the Fifth NPC in February 1978) was also said to be more open than previous sessions. It included communication among groups as well as within them, more oral discussion and less written material, and some sharp criticisms. Ren Gu, "San wen zhengxie weiyuan" [Three questions to a member of the CPPCC], ZM , no. 6 (April 1978): 17–20.

[121] Delegates asked for an explanation of the "Bohai No. 2" incident, and demanded an investigation into the criminal responsibility of Song Zhenming, former minister of the petroleum industry, and Chen Yonggui, former vice-premier. Tang Ke, minister of the metallurgical industry, was questioned about problems of investment and industrial pollution at the Baoshan Iron and Steel Works; Zhou Huamin, vice minister of foreign trade, was questioned about waste of foreign exchange in building the Beijing Foreign Trade Center. Yao Yilin's report came under fire for placing too much emphasis on industry and too little on agriculture, or too much on heavy industry and too little on light. The Hong Kong–Macao delegate criticized the foreign exchange certificates. Delegates also aired their views on bureaucratization, the system of economic management, the "four freedoms," and on problems in education and the publishing industry. Commentator, "Preliminary Observations on the 3rd Plenary Session of the 5th NPC," Dong Xi Fang , no. 21 (September 10, 1980): 12–13.

[122] Cf. Xi Xing, "Issues Raised by the 4th Session of the 5th NPC," ZM , no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 18–20.

and yet they are reluctant to divest themselves of power or to run any risk that their own interests might be jeopardized. Withal, the prospect of intramural democracy (within the NPC, the CC, the Party branch or the work unit) seems more likely now than the prospect that the elite will open itself to meaningful mass input on issues of national importance.

Revolution Discontinued?

In the "Resolution on CPC History" adopted by the Sixth Plenum, the Party has come closer to announcing an official termination of the Chinese revolution than ever before. Although the resolution states that "the triumph of the Chinese revolution is the most important political event since World War II and has exerted a profound and far-reaching impact on the international situation and the development of the people's struggle throughout the world,"^[123] that revolution is conceived in chronologically discrete terms. None of the identifiably Maoist attempts to prolong or revive the revolution in the post-Liberation era, from the acceleration of agricultural cooperativization in 1955 to the campaign to criticize Deng in 1976, receive favorable notice. The theory of continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, said to have provided the theoretical rationale for the Cultural Revolution, is repudiated for being "obviously inconsistent with the system of Mao Zedong Thought." Thus, one concurrent article notes that although Marx said explicitly (in The Class Struggle in France , 1848–1850 ) that "this kind of socialism is to declare an uninterrupted revolution," he and Engels later modified their position: "we can now say that uninterrupted revolution is only a tactic under special historical circumstances."^[124] Another article carefully distinguishes between revolution and reform, salvaging the latter from the Marxist terminological trashpile as the preferred mode of political change for postrevolutionary systems:

Before the overthrow of the exploiting system, they [viz., reformism and revolution] were absolutely incompatible; revolution precluded reformism. However, after the overthrow of the exploiting system, the relations between them are completely different. Not only are they tolerant of each other, but the means of reform must be used to complete the new revolutionary tasks. . . . To promote a political revolution whereby one class overthrows another after the proletariat has seized political power will inevitably create nationwide chaos.^[125]

[123] Resolution , p. 10.

[124] Guang Chuizhan, "Marx and the Idea of Uninterrupted Revolution," Shangyao Shizhuan Xuebao , no. 1, 1981, as quoted in Xinhua Yuebao , August 1981.

[125] Xue Hanwei and Pan Guohua, "On Revolutionary Reformism," Xuexi yu Tansuo [Study and exploration] (Harbin), no. 6 (1981): 4–9; this article is approvingly cited in Liu Hefu, "On Revolutionary Reformism," GM , January 12, 1982, p. 3.

All the same, in the concluding section of the resolution, the need to "carry on revolutionary struggles with determination" is resoundingly reaffirmed:

Socialism aims not just at eliminating all systems of exploitation and all exploiting classes but also at greatly expanding the productive forces, improving and developing the socialist relations of production and the superstructure and, on this basis, gradually eliminating all class differences and all major social distinctions and inequalities which are chiefly due to the inadequate development of the productive forces until communism is finally realized. This is a great revolution, unprecedented in human history.^[126]

To be sure, the type of revolution to be "carried on" is implicitly redefined: "this revolution is carried out not through fierce class confrontation and conflict, but through the strength of the socialist system itself, under leadership, step by step and in an orderly way." The revolution has entered a "period of peaceful development" that will "not only take a very long historical period to accomplish but also demand many generations of unswerving and disciplined hard work and heroic sacrifice."^[127] It is consistent with this redefinition that many historical transformations previously denigrated as "reformist" are now conceived to have revolutionary aspects (e.g., the Xinhai Revolution of 1911).^[128] As Zhao Ziyang puts it in his report on the work of the government, neatly conflating the two apparent alternatives, "This reform is a revolution, but of course it is not a fundamental change in the social system and must

[126] Resolution , p. 84.

[127] Ibid., pp. 84–85. It is worth noting that "revolution" as now conceived more closely resembles that revolution described by Marx in the Communist Manifesto :

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. . . . The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. . . . The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls. . . . (Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party , in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader [New York: W. W. Norton, 1978 ed.], pp. 475–77.)

The theoretical implication of a "bourgeois democratic revolution" under the auspices of a firmly entrenched Communist Party leadership would be a return to a New Democratic regime (wherein bourgeois democratic and socialist revolutions could be "telescoped"). Although it is now often conceded that the departure from this earlier "stage" was forced and premature, there is at this point still a theoretical aversion against turning back the historical clock.

[128] See also He Fangchuan, "Reform Movements in the Upper Levels of Eastern Countries in the Middle of the 19th Century," Lishi Yanjiu , no. 4 (August 15, 1981): 88–101; and Ma Hongliang, "The 1898 Reform Movement," RR , September 15, 1981, p. 5.

not rock or depart from the socialist system. Rather it represents self-improvement and self-perfection on the basis of socialism itself."^[129]

The ambiguity of this somewhat forced synthesis^[130] left it open to further revision, and in retrospect the Sixth Plenum might be viewed not only as the high-water mark in the repudiation of the concept of continuing revolution but as the beginning of a regrouping of the forces most reluctant to relinquish it. No sooner had the leadership of the "Maoist" factional network been decapitated, it seems, than its ideological initiatives began to find official favor.^[131] Contrariwise, the boldest advocates of reform fell upon political hard times, particularly after the Twelfth Congress.^[132] The fact that Deng's faction prospered organizationally rather than suffering in the course of this shift suggests that Deng agreed with it or at least wished to give its advocates their lead.

Why the turn to the left, after eliminating the leading leftists? Partly, perhaps, in order to co-opt their political base. After all, unless the propaganda organs were to be altogether disbanded, they had to be given something to do; "practice as the sole criterion" rendered them superfluous, and morale was apparently sagging.^[133] Among the population

[129] Tang Wensheng and Jia Chenfeng, "Reform is Self-perfection of the Socialist System," HQ , no. 13 (July 1, 1983): 32–36.

[130] Outside observers have sometimes welcomed the reconstrual of revolution in terms of modernization (see for example Donald Zagoria, "China's Quiet Revolution," Foreign Affairs [Spring 1984]: 880). But in the context of China's revolutionary experience, before and after Liberation, any such analogy appears superficial and unconvincing. The changes now under way fundamentally repudiate charismatic leadership, mass mobilization, a "breakthrough" mentality—all the earmarks of revolution as it has been practiced for the last thirty years. Although the political structure is not unaffected, it is no longer the mainspring or focus of change.

[131] Since the fall of the "small gang of four," the residual "whatever faction" has reportedly taken great interest in "political and ideological work," in the name of "resisting the erosion of bourgeois ideology." Their initiatives in this area have included a major attempt to reorient art and literature toward the praise of socialist virtue. Bi Dingtang, "Beijing Coup and Beijing Reform," Dong Xi Fang , no. 19 (July 10, 1980): 72–76.

[132] Though not purged, many of the most prominent reformers were demoted, including Feng Wenbin, Hu Jiwei, Wang Ruoshui, and Liao Gailong. In the elections to the Twelfth Congress, neither Hu Jiwei (former RR editor-in-chief, "kicked upstairs" to the post of director in May 1982) nor Deputy Editor-in-Chief Wang Ruoshui were listed among CC members, though the new editor-in-chief, Qin Chuan, became a full member. Feng Wenbin, already replaced by Hu Qili as director of the CC General Office, was relegated to the CAC. Liao Gailong was transferred from the CC's Policy Research Office to the Party History Research Center; his name was not to be found on any of the committees at the Twelfth Congress. HQ editor-in-chief Xiong Fu also failed to be elected to the CC, although his deputy (Wang Renzhi) became an alternate member. Qi Xin, "Personnel Changes of the CCP Twelfth Congress," QN , no. 10 (October 1982): 16–19.

[133] This morale problem was apparent in efforts to clad ideological work in the more prestigious raiments of "science" (previously, the transfer of status had been in the opposite direction!); see for example Zhang Weiping, "Why Is Ideological and Political Work aScience?" Xin Shiqi [New era] (Beijing), no. 11 (November 1981): 2–4; also Chao Yang, "Is Publicizing Communist Ideology Contradictory to the Principle of Social Existence Determining Social Consciousness?" HQ , no. 4 (February 16, 1983): 48 Still, the press noted that "many cadres do not care for the study of theory," considering this "useless," because "theories are changing all the time." Fujian Ribao , June 19, 1982.

at large, de-Maoization seemed to have given rise to a "crisis of faith," in which doubt was fairly openly expressed about the legitimacy of the Communist Party and Marxist-Leninist ideology.^[134] The leadership associated this ideological secularization with a juvenile crime wave, black marketeering, corruption, and other problems stemming from a more materialist worldview, betimes deeming all to be manifestations of renascent "class struggle."^[135] It was both morally distasteful and economically infeasible to displace ideological crusades with pragmatic materialism at one fell swoop, the leadership seems to have concluded,^[136] so an induced mass consensus upon certain ideological verities was still useful—even as reform continued. This revival entailed the suppression of "erroneous" notions as well as an educational effort designed to generate a popular consensus around "correct" tenets. Toward this end, the leadership has returned to a number of time-tested techniques, including the institutions of "study" and "criticism and self-criticism," which had apparently been permitted to lapse in many places.^[137]

[134] Two secret polls taken among students at Fudan University in Shanghai in 1979 and September 1980 by the Federation of Students and then briefly posted on the university's bulletin boards suggest that this crisis of faith is fairly widespread. Asked what they thought of current leaders' ability to achieve the Four Modernizations, 78 percent took a "wait and see" attitude; when asked whether people like the Gang of Four might return to power within the next ten years, only 5.4 percent responded with a firm "no," while half thought it was "possible" and 39 percent considered it "difficult to avoid." With regard to what the students believed in, only a third said "Communism," nearly a quarter said "fate," and 25 percent said "nothing at all." Time 116, no. 19 (November 10, 1980): 57.

[135] There is also a tendency to attribute such degenerative tendencies to Western influence—and indeed there is some evidence to support such a thesis, at least in some areas. See Deng Ziben, "Guangzhou qing shaonian wenti" [Problems of youth in Guangzhou], Guang Jiao Jing , no. 98 (November 16, 1980): 8–12, which documents the change of value patterns in Guangzhou through statistics, implying that these may be traced to Western influence emanating from Hong Kong. See also Lin Nan, "Zhongguo de zhengzhi daigou" [The political generation gap in China], ZM , no. 32 (June 1980): 36–39; and Luo Bing, "Wu zhong quan hui he qiangren zhengzhi" [The Fifth Plenum and strongman politics], ZM , no. 29 (March 1980): 5–9.

[136] "We cannot subscribe to the view that once the economy improves the ideology of people in various sectors will automatically become better," warns Hu Yaobang. "On the contrary, there is actually this kind of condition even in countries with very flourishing economies. The people (naturally not all the people) lack ideals and convictions and suffer from a spiritual void." Quoted from Hu's speech at a forum on ideological problems convened by the CC Propaganda Department on August 8, 1981, in HQ , no. 23, pp. 2–22.

[137] "Owing to the damage caused by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, the Party's tradition of attaching importance to theoretical study was suspended for a fairly long time," concedesHQ , "The problem in which some cadres look down on and even detest and reject theoretical studies has not been completely solved." Zhao Shouyi, "The Key to Building the Two Civilizations," HQ , no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 13–14; see also Li Biyan, "Put an End to the Practice of Allowing Theoretical Study to Take Its Natural Course," HQ , no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 18.

But the restoration of institutions of routine political resocialization alone was apparently deemed inadequate. Conceding that the CC renounced political campaigns at its Third Plenum and had subsequently reaffirmed this decision "many times," one writer justified its tacit reversal in terms of "the need for everyone to concentrate more on opposing a certain tendency, or solving a certain problem":

Not carrying out political campaigns naturally does not mean that no campaigns whatever should be carried out. To resolve certain problems, the adoption of the form of the mass movement is necessary. For example, in promoting sanitation, we must persevere and make it a habit. However, mobilizing everyone to do a crash job sometimes creates enthusiasm which often leads to better results. . . . There remain certain problems which, like all the relatively widespread unhealthy tendencies, will be difficult to resolve if we do not build strong public opinion pressure and have a definite momentum.^[138]

Thus the period from the spring of 1981 to the fall of 1983 witnessed the mobilization of three consecutive "noncampaigns," one positive, two negative: the criticism of "bourgeois liberalization," the promotion of "socialist spiritual civilization," and the drive to clear up "spiritual pollution."

The first ideological initiative was launched preemptively by the PLA just prior to the Sixth Plenum, by publishing (apparently unilaterally) a series of articles criticizing a screenplay (never actually produced) entitled "Unrequited Love" (Kulian ), by a military writer named Bai Hua. The campaign won CC endorsement at the Sixth Plenum in June, and criticisms were then somewhat grudgingly taken up by People's Daily and the other pace-making media.^[139] The campaign continued through

[138] Shen Baoxiang, "Do Not Exaggerate the Concept of 'Political Campaign,'" Jiefang Ribao , November 12, 1981, p. 4. This argument was however controversial, particularly among intellectuals. At a forum held at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences under the auspices of Guangming Ribao , Li Shu, editor of Lishi Yanjiu , opined; "Just as we have announced that we will no longer launch political movements in the future, I think we should explicitly proclaim that we will not launch academic criticism movements again." He complained that "articles that are in conflict with current policies are not permitted to be published." NCNA Beijing, September 15, 1979, reported in GM on the same date; translated in JPRS no. 74296 (October 3, 1979): 1–8.

[139] On July 17, 1981, Deng reportedly summoned a meeting in Zhongnanhai whose participants included Wang Renzhong, Zhou Yang, Hu Jiwei, Zeng Tao, and Zhu Muzhi, in which he attacked the Party leadership of literature and art for its "slackness" (huansanruanruo ), calling for criticism of Bai Hua, Ye Wenfu, et al. At a meeting of the CC Propaganda Department in early August, Hu Yaobang relayed this message to the Party leadership of the cultural sector. Immediately after this meeting, the Party issued CD no. 30, containing the speeches of Deng and Hu as well as other materials. Luo Bing, "Deng Xiaoping fadong da pipan neiqing" [The inside story of the mass criticism launched by Deng Xiaoping], ZM , no. 48 (October 1981): 7–17.

the summer, broadening into a critique of "bourgeois liberalization" (zichan jieji ziyouhua ), and the possibility of "peaceful evolution," raising the old specter of a "capitalist road."^[140]

The "socialist spiritual civilization" drive was intended to "foster socialist ethics and educate the young people to have ideals, pay attention to morality and discipline, be polite and work hard," according to Deng Xiaoping. "Everyone should be patriotic and have a sense of national dignity. All these are closely connected with our efforts to modernize the country."^[141] In language redolent of the Kuomintang's "New Life" movement of the 1930s, mass organizations were urged to pay attention to the "five stresses, four beauties, and three loves,"^[142] or the "four haves, three attentions, and two fear-nots." The concept of "socialist spiritual civilization," nowhere to be found in Marx, Engels, or Lenin, is based on the Maoist premise that the ideological superstructure is to some degree autonomous from the economic base, thereby justifying continuing Party leadership in moral and ideological socialization efforts—crime or immorality are not to be blamed on the material environment (even on class background), but on disobedience to the Party.^[143]

The flip side of "spiritual civilization" is "spiritual pollution," which came under attack following the Second Plenum of the Twelfth CC in mid-October 1983, with Deng's strong endorsement. In its initial phase this movement focused on the polluting influence of Western ideology, as manifested for example in the concepts of "alienation" and "humanism" (ironically both Marxist terms, deriving from Marx's earlier writings). But before long it gave rise to interference in economic reforms by resentful local cadres. Beginning in November 1983, agricultural and industrial issues were thus exempted, restricting the field of investigation

[140] See for example Li Jiansheng, "The Threat of 'Peaceful Evolution' Is Far from Being Eliminated," Dazhong Ribao (Jinan), April 1, 1982, p. 3.

[141] "Deng on China's Open Policy," BR , vol. 25, no. 10 (March 8, 1982), p. 9.

[142] The "five stresses" are on decorum, courtesy, hygiene, discipline, and morals; the "four beauties" are of mind, language, behavior, and environment; the "three loves" (appended in early 1983) are of the motherland, socialism, and the Party.

[143] See Zhang Qihua's two articles, "On Spiritual Civilization and Marxism," HQ , no. 10 (May 16, 1982): 39–43; and "Is There Class Character in Spiritual Civilization?" HQ , no. 23 (December 1, 1982): 38–39; also An Tung, "Why Is It Necessary to Carry Out Communist Ideological Education at the Socialist Stage?" HQ , no. 22 (November 16, 1982): 41–43; and Commentator, "Socialist Spiritual Civilization," BR , no. 45 (November 8, 1982): 13–17, 30.

to the ideological and literary fronts;^[144] under these constraints, the drive soon lost momentum.

Do such countercyclical developments signal a revival of "continuing revolution"—or even simply the arrest of reform (the two are not equivalent)? In answer to this question, a final review of the three functional requisites of continuing revolution is in order: charismatic leadership, mass mobilization, and an antistructural animus.

1. Charismatic leadership on the whole played a functional role in the achievement of the revolutionary objectives of the 1950s, declining significantly at the end of the first decade as a result of having accomplished the basic revolutionary agenda on the one hand and having overreached itself in going beyond it on the other. Having to a considerable degree personified itself in the charismatic leader as a way of enhancing its mass appeal, the regime had an interest in preserving Mao's charisma and increasingly resorted to artificial techniques to shore it up, in the process losing control of the source of its own legitimacy. All of this redounded disastrously during the Cultural Revolution, when the charismatic leader and the bureaucracy became pitted against one another. Despite charisma's triumphant revival in 1966–68, the economically austere and culturally bleak prospects of continuing the revolution adversely prejudiced the mass verdict even before Mao's demise. Charisma degenerated into despotism, as the emancipatory slogans of cultural revolution became transformed into a socially enforced form of totalitarianism. Even so, it took several years thereafter for the renunciation of charismatic ideology to be publicly worked through.

Chinese politics still responds to personal power bases that are more independent of the institutional structure in which they are embedded than in most political systems, and a regeneration of charismatic leadership under critical circumstances cannot be precluded.^[145] Yet the public commitment to collective leadership (led by Deng himself, who rose to power on a critique of the cult of personality) is firmer than ever before, and it has become rooted in institutional arrangements that seem to be functioning effectively. As a whole, Chinese bureaucrats must see considerable risk to their security interests in any reconcentration of power under monocratic leadership. Barring a crisis of comparable magnitude

[144] See Deng Liqun, in RR , December 10, 1983, p. 3; also Bo Yibo's statement in RR , January 6, 1984, p. 1.

[145] Although he has repudiated the "personality cult" and the concept of "continuing revolution," Deng has occasionally manifested monocratic propensities, as in his support of Democracy Wall activists in the fall of 1978 (for which he subsequently made a self-criticism), or his outspoken public refutation of an apparent NPC commitment not to post PLA troops in Hong Kong (in May 1984). NYT , May 26, 1984; FEER , 124:23 (June 7, 1984): 13–14.

to that which hit Weimar Germany in the 1920s, China's newly established institutional arrangements and commitment to orderly growth have foreclosed radical policy breakthroughs emanating unpredictably from the charismatic imagination of an heroic leader. More likely than authentic charisma, perhaps, is the advent of the "charismatic illusion" characteristic of systems (such as the United States or the Soviet Union) with well-institutionalized political structures. Here the popular yearning for charisma arises not from the disarray of institutions but from their firmly entrenched positions in defense of the status quo, in which the rhetoric of a magnetic personality appears to offer the only hope for dramatic change. Upon the leader's winning office this prospect however vanishes like a mirage, as the leader for pragmatic reasons shifts from an anti-establishment posture to a more compromising and cooperative role. (As should be clear from the foregoing chapters, the problems of over-institutionalization should still be considered remote ones for China.)

2. Mass mobilization was motivated by a combination of remunerative and normative incentives during the first post-Liberation decade, and principally by normative incentives thereafter. Experience since that time has demonstrated that normative incentives may be motivationally effective only if the regime allows significant latitude for mass initiative—which in turn reduces the steering capability of the elite, permitting the movement to factionalize uncontrollably. In the post-Mao era, after initially renouncing mobilizational approaches to the generation of mass support, the regime seems to have reconsidered. But having detached mass mobilization from the fragile economic sector that once supplied material incentives, and having sharply circumscribed the ambit for mass initiative (à la democracy movement), the regime seems to have approximately the same chances of really "moving" the masses as Mao had of persuading incumbent cadres to participate actively in the Cultural Revolution.

Though apparently a case of plus ça change , closer scrutiny reveals important differences in the "noncampaigns" launched after 1981.^[146] First, they are not as all-encompassing as previous such efforts, coinciding indeed with continuing reform efforts in the economic and political sectors (e.g., the 1982 constitutional reforms). Second, such human targets as Bai Hua and Ye Wenfu (another young military writer, who had written a poem, "General, You Cannot Do This," about a rehabilitated Cultural Revolution victim who converts an orphanage into his private villa) were publicly criticized but not "struggled" against, and were apparently able to continue to work and live normally; the campaign was

[146] See Tang Tsou, "Political Change and Reform: The Middle Course," in Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 219–59.

not permitted to spread beyond a few initial targets.^[147] Third, there was less pressure upon members of the intellectual community to conform with the public opinion wave being orchestrated from above; although no one dared publish a "countercriticism" disputing the attacks made on the leading liberals, it was apparently possible to remain silent, and many leading intellectuals in fact did so.^[148]

3. In its first decade, the regime succeeded in smashing the frames of the residual political and social structure. When it then turned its attentions to the aversive structures that had emerged in the course of constructing a modern socialist system, it became much more difficult to generate a politically decisive consensus, due to the vested interests that had arisen in defense of the new status quo. Mao eventally succeeded in generating sufficient support to smash emergent structures (in part by tapping cumulative popular resentment of earlier radical fiascoes, ironically enough), only to find that his vision of what lay beyond those structures was either incoherent or politically impractical. Though the repudiation of "continuing revolution" signifies above all a reconciliation to the existence of structures, popular attitudes toward them are likely to remain ambivalent and even perhaps somewhat volatile as long as structures inhibit the movement of people, commodities, or ideas. A satisfactory synthesis of structure and movement remains the task of structural reform.

Beyond Revolution

Postrevolutionary political development has always suffered from relative theoretical neglect, yielding pride of place to the more dramatic dynamics of revolution itself. This neglect hinders attempts to speculate

[147] Yan Yue, "Tou xiang tequan de zhadan—Ye Wenfu de shizuo yanjiang ji aipi jingguo" [A bomb dropped on the privileged class—Ye Wenfu's poems, speeches, and how he is being criticized], ZM , no. 52 (February 1982): 20–24; Gong Qigong, "Ye wenfu shou pi" [Ye Wenfu is criticized], ZM , no. 51 (January 1982): 30–32. Ye was criticized not for the poem cited above, but for a more recent poem, "Jiangjun, haohao xiyixi" [General, have a nice bath], which tells of how a general has a sapper company work on his house, building a bathtub that alone costs 10,000 yuan.

[148] Shanghai's Wenyi Bao , for example, received numerous letters in support of Bai Hua (Bai himself reportedly received more than a thousand letters from well-wishers), but there were so few writers willing to write critical articles that the journal was hard put to find enough articles for its special issue criticizing Bai Hua. Editorial, "Qing shao 'pipan' zhe" [Please stop the 'criticism'], ZM , no. 48 (October 1981): 1. Zhou Yang supported "the necessary freedom and democracy of literary and artistic workers" in his speeches on December 15–16, 1981, and he is rumored to have submitted his resignation (which was not accepted) rather than join in the criticism. Luo Bing, "Inside Story"; see also Ying Zi, "Fan 'Ziyouhua' fengshi ruole" [The "anti-bourgeois liberalization" wind abates], ZM , no. 49 (November 1981): 11–12.

on a firm comparative evidential basis about the future of Chinese politics. The concepts of "Thermidor" and the "routinization of charisma" have hitherto dominated thinking about the process of postrevolutionary adjustment, and in fact both of these notions concur in certain respects.^[149] The postrevolutionary political system will revert to a situation in which the leadership stabilizes, a new equilibrium is established among various classes and groups, mass participation declines in scope and intensity, political authority demands (and receives) respect and obedience, and millenarian expectations give way to mundane concerns. All of which is to say little more than that the political system returns to "normalcy," while ignoring the range of possibilities this term encompasses.

The following schematization of the prospects for future Chinese political development attempts to subdivide "postrevolutionary normalization" into two broad alternatives, and to endow each alternative with specific mass and elite constituencies, political objectives, material and ideal interests, and functional raisons d'être . At the outset of its postrevolutionary era, the Chinese system stands poised, once again, between "two roads": one leading toward institutionalized revisionism , the other toward the ritualization of charisma .

"Institutionalized revisionism" is a particular variant of state socialism that has emerged in a variety of contexts in response to the functional imperatives of modernization.^[150] The intellectual forebears of institutionalized revisionism include Bernstein, Bukharin, Khrushchev (with qualification—Khrushchev also had radical impulses), Liu Shaoqi, and Dubcek^[*] (before August 1968, of course). The social base of the revisionists is that of the intelligentsia and the "new middle class," or salariat (not all intellectuals are revisionists, but most revisionists happen to be intellectuals). The priority commitment to rapid economic development makes expertise a functional requisite, entailing universal education and the proliferation of meritocratic criteria for recruitment and promotion, eventually giving rise to a fairly large, strategically located coalition of professional groups of broadly similar collective consciousness. The intellectual background of revisionists predisposes them to adopt liberal and relatively cosmopolitan cultural and educational policies, to entrust the economy to academically trained economists, to favor the functional

[149] See Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1960); and Max Weber, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), vol. 2: 1111–58.

[150] Ludz coined the term to refer to those revisionists having a firm institutional base and political constituency, as opposed to such intellectual deviants as Schaff and Kolakowski in Poland, Kosik in Czechoslovakia, Havemann in East Germany, or Lukacs in Hungary. See Peter C. Ludz, The Changing Party Elite in East Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1972).

division of labor in most walks of life, and to prefer complex hierarchical or market-oriented institutions to a more direct, populist approach to the masses. The distinctive ideological innovation shared by revisionists is a de facto abandonment of the dialectic, entailing an attenuation of support for class struggle, for violent revolution as a necessary prerequisite for socialism, and for the dictatorship of the proletariat. In place of class struggle and normative incentives, revisionists prefer easily calculable material incentives to motivate the work force; in place of the proletarian dictatorship they opt for socialist legality and a (highly formalized) representative democracy; in place of violent revolution they prefer "peaceful coexistence" and economic competition under political détente as a way of gradually realigning the international power balance.^[151]

The attempt to "ritualize" charisma^[152] leads to a Marxist form of neo-traditionalism similar to that which has characterized Soviet politics since the purge of Khrushchev.^[153] Socialist neo-traditionalism consists of an attempt to revive revolutionary forms in the absence of any obviously revolutionary task to perform, enemy to destroy, "frame" to "smash." The violent revolutionary crusade thus becomes a legitimating ritual. Its most conspicuous departure from revolutionary "engineering" consists of a disenchantment with mass mobilization (thus it was Deng who mobilized the "masses" in 1978–79, not the "Maoists"). Hua Guofeng has been perhaps the most prominent spokesman of this course of development in the post-Mao era, and, although his own lack of a political base finally obliged him to succumb, there is evidence that this "line" still has considerable underlying support among veteran military and Party cadres. Still harkening to a charismatic conception of leadership in the admitted absence of appropriate tasks (or candidates) therefor, legitimation consists of memorialized heroism deriving from historical "contributions" (gonglao ). Thus charismatic legitimacy transmutes into seniority, as personified by Ye Jianying—yet time goes by, and this is a dying breed. With the closing of the gates of charismatic revelation, ideology petrifies into a sort of holy writ, the attitude toward which partakes of traditional feelings of filial piety. Neo-traditionalism harbors a certain affinity for cultural essentialism and xenophobia, though the

[151] See Dittmer, "Chinese Communist Revisionism in Comparative Perspective," Studies in Comparative Communism 13, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 3–41.

[152] Cf. Robert Middlekauff, "The Ritualization of the American Revolution," in Stanley Coben and Lorman Ratner, eds., The Development of an American Culture (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 31–44.

[153] Ken Jowitt has accounted for the resurgence of neo-traditionalism by the assumption that "A Leninist Party's charismatic features normally coincide with and unintentionally reinforce many cultural predispositions present in a traditional or status society." See Jowitt, "Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime," Soviet Studies 35, no. 3 (July 1983): 275–97; also see Weber, Economy , vol. 2: 1122.

recent disgrace of Maoism handicaps the quest for effective icons. For the nonce the neo-traditional grouping must be assumed still to have considerable power, based on well-articulated networks of personal connections and a "lingering fear" of breaking ideological taboos; they may perhaps also count on mass support from the military, the propaganda network, less successful enclaves among the peasantry, and unionized labor (depending on the economic conjuncture).

The inherent attractiveness of each of these "lines" to a given functionally specialized bureaucratic constituency, occupational sector, or "faction" may be expected to vary according to how well it "fits" the ideal interests of that group or quasi-group. But this "closeness of fit" can never be calculated with great precision, due to the incompleteness of the functional division of labor and the ideologically based refusal to concede the existence of diverging interests. Thus, empirically, the recruitment of adherents to these alternative tendencies will rely on a mixture of appeals to functional interests, ideological preferences, and informal personal connections. Considerable overlap and cross-cutting cleavage may be anticipated.

Though defined as programmatic alternatives of some internal ideological coherence, these alternative lines may each be considered functionally complementary to the system as a whole rather than mutually exclusive. The ritualization of charisma is sensitive to system needs for ideological legitimation, whereas institutionalized revisionism responds more flexibly to the shifting requirements of economic growth and productivity. This informal functional division of labor was not strictly adhered to in the initial post-Mao period (i.e., the "neo-traditionals" first seized control of the economic apparatus, whereas the "revisionists" made their play in the ideological arena), due to the allocation of power in the original postsuccession "deal," but there appears to be a tendency to gravitate to such an alignment in the wake of the resolution of that cleavage.^[154]

In the immediate post-Mao caesura the tendency was to assume that the diametrically opposite course to anything so widely loathed as the Cultural Revolution must be "correct," and to move toward an increasingly pure form of institutionalized revisionism. But time has shown that neither alternative is a panacea and has reinforced the sense of interdependence between the two "lines." The neo-traditional approach to economic development, an uneasy amalgam of the Great Leap Forward with massive import-led capital investment in technologically advanced

[154] See Xiao Cheng, "Some Signs of Intensification of the Restrictive Policy," ZM , no. 47 (September 1, 1981): 12–13, who points to an emergent coexistence between relaxation and continued experimentation in the economic realm (controlled by the pragmatists) with increasing restrictiveness in politics and culture.

heavy industry, came a cropper, appearing to bear out revisionist critiques of Maoist development strategy. The revisionist alternative, leading toward the ultimate destination of some form of market socialism, has achieved noteworthy successes in some sectors, particularly agriculture and light industry. It has in its turn, however, also precipitated unanticipated consequences (particularly bouts of unemployment and inflation) and bears partial responsibility for the problems of trade imbalance and deficit financing, and it still seems puzzled by the problems of industrialization and price reform. The revisionist "right" nevertheless retains the initiative for the time being, while the neo-traditional "left" retreats to a passive position to await targets of opportunity presented by revisionist setbacks. If the left is handicapped by its lack of a coherent alternative developmental strategy, the right has been discountenanced by the lacuna at the core of its eclectic, pragmatic approach to ideology, having been obliged to contain this void with the "four fundamental principles"—its own version of "whateverism."

The oscillatory pattern that has long characterized Chinese policy-making processes has thus not abruptly ceased, though the end of the revolution has modified its character. The left and right alternatives are no longer so far apart: united by their common commitment to modernization, they appear to differ only with regard to tactics and pace, and their differences are modulated by an agreement on the procedural rules of the game. Leadership disputes and elite factionalism continue to exist (ideological proximity does not altogether preclude political cleavage). However, the left no longer publicly accuses the right of attempting to restore capitalism, and the right no longer publicly accuses the left of threatening to overthrow all political authority and foment chaos. The last factional disputes to be resolved in purge and ideological recrimination stemmed from the cleavages of the Cultural Revolution; those ideological or policy differences between groups to have been detected since then (involving, say, the "petroleum faction," or the rivalry between "reformers" and "adjusters") have been resolved short of purge. There seems to be growing awareness that, notwithstanding the intellectual attractions of an internally congruent idea system, neither the left nor the right can at this time proffer realistically expedient alternatives fully compatible with the shifting and sometimes contradictory requirements of a modernizing socialist system. In the light of this recognition there is a tendency to grope for an ideologically incoherent but politically practical position somewhere between these two logical alternatives.^[155]

[155] See Tsou, "Political Change and Reform."