Clientelism and Neo-Traditionalism

A factor ignored by the various democratization theories (including the rational-choice-based transitions theories) is the intertwining of state and society in personal networks. Inattention to ways in which state and society are closely yet informally connected is precisely

[31] Brus (1983), pp. 127-128.

[32] Other writers have focused on still other intervening variables. Chirot (1992) argues that, while the economic reforms in the 1980s in Eastern Europe led to the rise of new urban and professional classes and set the context for change, the decisive stimulus for action was the popular recognition—unrelated to the economic processes—of the moral illegitimacy of the regimes. A broader argument about the role of attitudes is suggested by works on political culture in China: anti-democratic Confucian political culture may hinder democratization even in the context of marketization. See Pye (1967). Others, however, argue that the political culture does not prevent democratization. See, e.g., McCormick and Kelly (1994); Nathan and Shi (1993).

[33] In the judgment of Chinese intellectuals, Ma (1994, p. 192) argues, the growth of civil society "presupposes the active involvement of the state."

the problem addressed by clientelism and the related model of neo-traditionalism. It is useful to highlight two dimensions of clientelism. The first is clientelism based on formal organizational structures versus informal linkages between actors. The second is vertical clientelism, with ties up and down the hierarchy, versus horizontal, with rhizomic ties within society and among relative equals in status and power (such as between classmates or fellow villagers). This study is primarily concerned with vertical clientelism in both its formal and informal dimensions.^[34]

Jean Oi states the basic premise of informal, vertical clientelism: "In developing countries, where the formal channels for meaningful participation and interest articulation are weak, individuals regularly pursue their interests through the use of informal networks built upon personal ties."^[35] Informal, reciprocal ties, based on personal relations (guanxi ), are a crucial link between state and society. Because political behavior concerns primarily the distribution of economic resources, especially at local levels, clientelist behavior appears when those with neither authority nor autonomy from local officials, and hence with few alternative sources for resources, develop strategies based on personal ties to influence the state's distribution decisions.^[36] Clientelism is a strategy on the part of those subordinate to the (central or, especially, local) state to use a subculture of instrumental personal ties to influence what on the surface appears to be a rigid authority system.

Andrew Walder's "communist neo-traditionalism" model of authority relations for state-owned enterprises expands on the informal aspect of vertical clientelism by including an additional, formal and official aspect. Rather than seeing clientelism as an informal structure in systems with weak states, Walder argues that "Party-clientelism" was established in China in the 1950s by a strong Party-state as a way to control society (especially workers).^[37] In the neo-traditional model, managers in the

[34] Although not a primary focus of this book, horizontal ties are considered insofar as they create class cohesiveness (i.e., formal ties) within the new business elite. The importance of these four dimensions of clientelism in post-revolutionary China has been documented in Gold (1985); Hwang (1987); Nathan (1973); Oi (1985); Walder (1986); Whyte and Parish (1984); and Yang (1986, 1989, 1989a). On clientelism more generally, see Schmidt et al. (1977). The clientelism discussed in this book occurs among citizens and at the lower level of politics. Though not incompatible, it must be distinguished from patron-client ties and factionalism at the very elite levels of politics. The debate about elite factionalism has been rekindled in The China Journal (1995).

[35] Oi (1985), P. 238. Similar arguments about vertical ties are made by Shue (1988).

[36] In rural areas, clientelist practices surround the distribution of grain rations, relief funds and goods, loans, and private plots. See Oi (1985), pp. 241-243.

[37] Walder (1986), pp. 24-25, 170-175, 180-181. Walder's view that clientelism can be a formal strategy of a strong state is a revision of the standard definition of clientelism, which is typically applied to historically weak states such as Italy. Although Oi's and Walder's models have been set forth separately, they overlap in assumptions and conclusions. On the link between the two models, see also Pearson (1992), pp. 61, 76.

enterprise, who are either Party members themselves or are responsible to them, wield broad personal discretion over employees. Like rural team leaders, factory leaders have controlled key decisions, such as promotions, job mobility, and the distribution of material benefits (e.g., food coupons and housing), that in China have been allocated by the enterprise rather than the market or the central state. This authority over distribution has created an "organized dependence" that has forced Chinese employees to rely upon personal relationships with cadre-managers and, through them, with the Party-state.^[38] Thus, clientelism in urban China grew out of the specific pattern of authority set up explicitly by the Leninist state.

The concepts of clientelism and neo-traditionalism as set forth by Oi and Walder have provided tremendous insight into Chinese communist politics through the early reform era. But China has changed dramatically since these approaches were found applicable to a non-market system in which a Leninist state has denied significant autonomy to societal actors. The post-Mao reforms raise the question of whether vertical clientelism, in either its formal or informal aspect, remains relevant. An implication of neo-traditionalism is that, when the authority of the Party breaks down at the factory level, so too will formal Party clientelism. As the reforms have brought societal actors increased autonomy from the Party-state, neo-traditionalism would lead us to expect that relations of dependence too have weakened.^[39] In theory, moreover, the expansion of market relations should obviate the need for both horizontal and vertical personal relations, as impersonal market signals substitute for informal, localized personal ties.

Although the relatively extensive autonomy of China's new business elite can be expected to undermine many of the formal aspects of neo-traditionalism, there is reason to believe that informal clientelism remains a viable and important strategy in post-Mao China. We can expect informal relations in the political realm to continue as long as formal channels for business-government relations remain poorly institutionalized; if policy interests on the part of a new and relatively

[38] Walder (1986), pp. 8-27. Party leaders and managers in the factory also cultivate the loyalty of "activists" among workers upon whom they can rely. See also Walder (1983). "Organized dependence" is described further in ch. 3.

[39] Walder (1991, 1991a, p. 339) agrees that authority relations of organized dependence and the behaviors associated with it have evolved with the post-Mao reforms.

autonomous economic elite grow, yet are not given effective voice in existing political institutions, then personal ties as a means of interaction with officials can be expected to remain attractive.

An equally important reason to expect the continuing salience of clientelism is economic, namely, the absence of full marketization. Partial marketization fosters informal clientelism in two ways. First, the state is still important in such a system; economic authority has been partly transferred to the market, but local officials have kept some types of authority and gained many more. Although the distribution of economic resources is no longer as rigidly defined as previously, local officials still retain tremendous authority, which has created incentives for them to maximize personal ties to the non-state sector and to be sure personal ties remain useful for economic actors who need to gain resources still controlled by local officials.^[40] A second result of partial marketization is that the market relations are poorly defined and surrounded by uncertainty. This uncertainty can be expected to lead societal actors to try to attach themselves to more defined authority (officials)—if not formally then through informal means. Even as market relations deepen, the fact that personal networks are a key currency of business-government relations elsewhere in East Asia raises the possibility that the reliance on personal ties in China is unlikely to be reduced to the comparatively low level of the U.S.^[41]