1. Aristotle, Poetics , trans. Ingram Bywater, ch. 9: 1451a-b. For convenience of reference, I have used The Basic Works of Aristotle , ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941); also, for other of Aristotle's treatises.

2. See Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), Polemical Introduction and First Essay.

3. See Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

4. See Aristotle, Physics , bk. 4, chs. 10-11.

5. Aristotle, Physics, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, bk. IV: 220a; in McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle .

6. See Irwin C. Lieb, Past, Present, and Future (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992); also, Joseph Margolis, The Flux of History and the Flux of Science (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1993).

7. Aristotle, Physics , bk. 4: 221a.

8. Aristotle's passing remark about "the sea battle tomorrow" raises a question of logic more than a question about the nature of the future of human history. See Aristotle, On Interpretation, ch. 9, particularly 19a30-35, where it is clear that, as far as the future is concerned, Aristotle has in mind the openended nature of what is "potential." See, also, G. E. M. Anscombe, "Aristotle and the Sea Battle," Mind 65 (1956); also, Donald Williams, "The Sea Fight Tomorrow," in Structure, Method and Meaning, ed. Paul Henle et al. (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1951). The matter is usually regarded as concerned with the need for a three-valued logic.

9. See, for instance, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce , 8 vols., ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1963), 6.13, 6.101.

10. See Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983); and Bas C. van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).

11. See Ilya Prigogine, "Irreversibility and Space-Time Structure," in Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time , ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986).

12. See J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London: Rout-ledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), ch. 3.

13. See Aristotle, Physics, bk. 2; Metaphysics , bk. 9. It needs to be said that the model of science drawn from the Physics and the Posterior Analytics does not fit in an altogether satisfactory way the empirical features of Aristotle's biological tracts, although the discrepancies are open to considerable quarrel. For a sense of the contemporary treatment of the question, see Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox, eds., Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

14. Aristotle, Metaphysics , trans. W. D. Ross, bk. 9, ch. 8: 1049b; in McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle.

15. For example, it is the view of Arthur C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and, though not entirely consistently, of Adolf Grünbaum, The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984), introduction.

16. Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , vol. 3, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 23-27; see, also, Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. James S. Churchill, ed. Martin Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), introduction.

17. See, for instance, the intriguing exchange between Kurt Gödel and Albert Einstein, in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist , 3d ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1970), 555-562 and 687-688; also, Paul Horwich, Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).

18. See Kurt Gödel, "A Remark about the Relationship between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy," in Schilpp, Albert Einstein.

19. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Philosopher and Sociology," Signs , trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964); also, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man," trans. John Wild, The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenom-enological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics , ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964).

20. See Edmund Husserl, "The Origin of Geometry," appended in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology , trans. David Cart (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); and Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr., ed. David B. Allison (Stony Brook: Nicholas Hay, 1978), particularly SS. I must add that there has been something of a campaign to discredit Derrida's competence and accuracy as a philosophical critic, especially with regard to his account of Husserl's work. For a sample of the persistent charges, see J. Claude Evans, Strategies of Deconstruction: Derrida and the Myth of the Voice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). I confess I was inclined to give some credence to those charges. But, having now examined some of them with care, I must say they are unconvincing. I discuss a number of them in "Deferring to Derrida's Difference," publication pending. The matter bears in an important way on the issue under discussion.

21. For an overview of the topic of reference, see Joseph Margolis, Texts without Referents: Reconciling Science and Narrative (Oxford: Basil Black-well, 1989), ch. 7.

22. See, for instance, the different lines of argument in Bas C. van Fraas-sen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980); and Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Regarding theoretical entities, see Hilary Putnam, "The John Locke Lectures" (1976), Lecture 2 (regarding "the principle of charity"), in Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). Putnam has altered his views on reference considerably since the appearance of this book.

23. See, for instance, Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie . I am not, therefore, endorsing the rather different "positivisms" Cartwright and van Fraassen espouse.

24. Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight, 2d ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 17.

25. Fred Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall : An Essay on Interpretation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 12. The quoted phrase is from a remark of E. L. Doctorow's, in Bruce Weber, "The Myth Maker," The New York Times Magazine, 20 October 1985, 78.

26. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 161.

27. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 161.

28. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 12. Doctorow's remark is cited from Michiko Kakutani, "Mailer Talking," New York Times Book Review , 5 June 1982, 28-29.

29. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 1.

30. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 49-50. See, also, Alas-dair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2d ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), particularly pp. 113-120 and ch. 18; Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche, Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 191-199; but also p. 210; and Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), especially "The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality" and "Flawed Crystals: James's The Golden Bowl and Literature as Moral Philosophy." It is a foregone conclusion, of course, that neither MacIntyre nor Nehamas nor Nussbaum would subscribe to the suggestion being made here.

31. Cited from Nicola Chiaromonte, The Paradox of History: Stendhal, Tolstoy, Pasternak, and Others (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), xxi, in Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall, 13.

32. Cited, from Hayden White, review of Chiaromonte's The Paradox of History, New York Times Book Review , 22 September 1985, 7, in Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall, 13.

33. White, Tropics of Discourse , 22.

34. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 9; italics added.

35. See W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), ch. 2. Quine, it must be said, talks as if "there is no fact of the matter" where meanings are concerned; but, on his own view of the analytic/synthetic distinction, he cannot then show in a principled way how there could be "a fact of the matter" where the structure of reality is concerned. He nowhere addresses the distinction, and, on the argument (his own) that the analytic/synthetic distinction is a "dogma," he cannot. See Vt. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1953).

36. A good specimen of this sort of view, rather modestly formulated within the terms of reference of analytic—particularly pragmatist—philoso-phy, is afforded by Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987), Lectures 2 and 3. But it is important to say also that Putnam's account generates its own quite serious difficulties. The point is that the notion of an internal realism (which, effectively, captures what is least quarrelsome about "il n'y a pas de hors-texte"—philosophically rather than deconstructively—is coherent enough, without endorsing any particular version of realism.

37. See Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce , 5.503; 8.330.

38. See Hacking, Representing and Intervening , particularly ch. 16.

39. See, for instance, Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews , trans. Donald E Bouchard and Sherry Simon, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cot-nell University Press, 1977).

40. For a compendious account of the matter, see Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980). Genette, it may be said, is more influenced by the Slavic structuralists than the Francophone structuralists, which inclines him to take a good-humored attitude to the question of conceptual closure.

41. See, for instance, Fernand Braudel, On History , trans. Sarah Matthews (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

42. See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics , trans. Roy Harris, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechchaye, with Albert Riedlinger (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986).

43. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (New York: Basic Books, 1963), chs. 2, 15.

44. Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987),

45. I have italicized the phrase "found otherwise only." 45. See White, The Content of the Form , 45-46.

46. White, The Content of the Form , 44; see p. 43.

47. White, The Content of the Form, 47. See Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951).

48. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 142.

49. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 143.

50. Foucauk, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 153-154, 156.

51. For an impression of how easily serious historians drift into the confusion, see Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History , trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), introduction.

52. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 154.

53. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3. The citation is from White, Tropics of Discourse, 98; italics added by Ricoeur.

54. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 153. The citation is from White, Tropics of Discourse, 106; the italics are White's.

55. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. 3: 155.

56. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 152. The material cited is from Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 30; the italics in the cited material are White's, the italics that appear in Ricoeur's own text ("prior") have been added.

57. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 152.

58. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 153.

59. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 150, 154; italics added.

60. Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies otc the Creation of Meaning in Language , trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, SJ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 309-313.

61. The critical passage is this: "The central argument is that, with respect of the relation to reality, metaphor is to poetic language what the model is to scientific language. Now in scientific language, the model is essentially a heuristic instrument that seeks, by means of fiction, to break down an inadequate interpretation and to lay the way for a new, more adequate interpretation. In the language of Mary Hesse, another author close to [Max] Black, the model is an instrument of redescription. I will retain this expression for the duration of my analysis"; in Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 240.

Here, Ricoeur treats metaphor in only two ways: first, against the inadequacies of a nominalist theory of metaphor (against Nelson Goodman); and second, as a creative source for going beyond the horizonal limitations of our scientific vocabulary at any particular moment in time (with Max Black and Mary Hesse). (Later in The Rule of Metaphor, he tries to combine Black's vision with Heidegger's!) But there are two verbal slippages here (not verbal slips: deliberate slippages). First, Ricoeur replaces "redescription" (Black's and Hesse's term) by "interpretation" or by "new, more adequate interpretation," and then recovers the first usage—which misleadingly intrudes a specifically hermeneutic or poetic consideration that is then withdrawn—for, can we say that we "interpret" absent noumena? Of course not. Second, Ricoeur invents a formal analogy or ratio between poetry and science—metaphor:poetry::model: science—whereas Black and Hesse are concerned, as far as reference to reality is involved, to insist on the continuity and intended logically unified function of poetry and science. So, at the very least, Ricoeur's use of these materials is both idiosyncratic and arbitrary in an evidentiary sense. Also, of course, metaphors of Black's and Hesse's sort eventually settle into a benign catachresis, which casts considerable doubt on Ricoeur's use of the notion of a model—constructed, intervening, "prefiguring," suited better for explanation.

Ricoeur goes on to consider the bearing of "metaphorical truth on the definition of reality," The Rule of Metaphor, 256. The question is the topic of Ricoeur's final chapter, study 9. But, there, Ricoeur is concerned primarily with demonstrating that the "aporetic" interpretation of Aristotle's Meta physics in the light of the Categories (acceding thus far to the destructive critique of Pierre Aubenque and Jules Vuillemin) is recovered not by way of a deductive system of categorical distinctions grounded in Aristotle's original essentialism but (more or less following Heidegger) by way of an irreducible analogia entis. Ultimately, Ricoeur recovers his thesis by announcing the "universal metaphoricity of philosophical discourse" (p. 286), which must also mean, in a sense quite opposed to Black's, the "metaphoricity" of science as well. (This is Ricoeur's reading of Heidegger's pronouncement: "The metaphorical exists only within the metaphysical" [cf. p. 311].) But the whole exercise makes sense only in terms of the paradox of noumenal being that we "recover" through and only through the mode of "being-as"—that is, metaphorized being. There is no other instrument (here) that Ricoeur offers for the interpretation of the historical past.

62. See Frye, Anatomy of Criticism , Polemical Introduction and First Essay.

63. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 1.

64. Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall , 35; cf. also ch. 3.

65. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. 3: 155.

66. See Aristotle, Physics , 191a25-34; Metaphysics, 994a1-28.

67. For a fuller account of the "incarnate" and the relation between the cultural and physical, see Margolis, Texts without Referents, ch. 6.