Appendix II
Fighting in the Aigaleos-Parnes Gap in 1826-27

Standing more or less intact for almost two and a half millennia, the Dema wall has inevitably impressed itself as strongly as any major natural feature on the minds of those who have lived near it, especially upon the herdsmen who have driven their flocks through its gates and sally ports time and time again through the ages. It is therefore no surprise that, when war has come to the Aigaleos-Parnes gap and when those herdsmen have been involved in the fighting, the Dema wall should again emerge as a strategic feature. Such fighting occurred during the Greek War of Independence, and events of the years 1826-27 certainly drew attention to the Dema wall. A review of these events is pertinent here not only as a postscript to the history of this monument but, more important, as a way of explaining the peculiar northern extension of the Dema wall, a feature that has mistakenly been regarded as part of its original construction and that has consequently misled scholars seeking to explain its original purpose (see further in chapter 2).

Following the fall of Mesolongi to the Turks in the spring of 1826, Turkish forces under Reshid Pasha advanced through Boiotia against Greek forces at Athens and there began a siege that lasted from the summer of 1826 until the capitulation of the Greeks on the Acropolis in the spring of 1827. This eventual outcome resulted not from the successes of the besieger in its assaults against the besieged but from the failures of the Greek forces outside Athens in their attempts to drive off the Turks. The decisive battles of this campaign were fought around the plain of Athens. (This summary of events is based on the published accounts of Gordon 1832, 330-402; Finlay 1877, 401-33; Makriyannis 1947, 300-302; and Howe 1828, 394-97, who were eyewitnesses to many of the events around Athens and Peiraieus in 1826-27; reference has also been made to Dakin 1973, 184-217.)

Using Salamis as a staging point, the Greek forces launched various attacks on the Turks, either overland by way of Eleusis or by direct landings on the coasts of Peiraieus and Phaleron. The first of these attacks was intended to dislodge Reshid before the siege of the Acropolis could be closely pressed. On August 17, 1826, 3,500 regular and irregular troops under Colonel Fabvier and Georgios Karaïskakis advanced from Eleusis through the Daphni pass and took up a position at Khaidari on the west edge of the plain of Athens. Here Reshid met them with a strong force, and the two sides assailed each other's positions in turn. On the night of August 19, a Greek attack was turned back sharply, setting off a general panic and a rout of Greek forces. This setback dissuaded the Greeks from attempting direct attacks on Reshid until stronger forces could be mustered.

The next substantial movement against the Turks therefore involved a more subtle stratagem designed to disrupt Turkish supply lines while reinforcing the garrison of the Acropolis. On October 21, two forces set out from Eleusis, one under Fabvier moving northwest to cross Kithai-ron and attack the Turkish stronghold at Thebes, and one under Ka-raïskakis moving eastward again toward Khaidari. Karaïskakis' movement was a feint, intended to divert the Turks from attacking Fabvier's column and also to mask the movement of a third force of 450 men, which landed at Phaleron on the night of October 23 and succeeded in crossing Turkish lines to enter the Acropolis. Fabvier was less fortunate, for the irregulars he had assigned to guard his way back through Ki-thairon left their posts, and he was forced to retreat before his attack on Thebes could develop.

The successful reinforcement of the Acropolis on this and other occasions bought time for the Greeks, but decisive action was still needed if the fortress was not to fall, sooner or later. Over the winter of 1826-27, Karaïskakis was active throughout central Greece, from Boiotia to Aitolia, against Turkish posts and supply lines. His successes, and the unchallenged strength of Greek naval forces, led some to favor a vigorous and concerted land and naval campaign against Reshid's lines of supply as the most effective way to lift the siege of Athens; for Reshid's army depended on supplies conveyed from Thessaly in the north, both overland via Thebes and by sea via Negropont/Chalkis and Oropos. If these lines were ever interrupted for any length of time, his army would be compelled to withdraw. Others favored the renewal of frontal assaults against the Turks around Athens as the quickest way of raising the siege, and since those in highest authority were of this mind, plans were made accordingly.

The favored plan called for the landing of a force on the heights of Peiraieus overlooking the bay of Phaleron, where a strong position could be fortified to distract and divide the Turks and from which a drive to

Map 6.
Battlegrounds in the siege of Athens, 1826-27

the Acropolis could in due course be launched. To insure the safety of the initial landing, a diversionary force was to set out first from Eleusis, to march on Menidi north of Athens via the Aigaleos-Parnes gap. The landing at Peiraieus, on February 5, 1827, came off successfully, and the diversion had the desired effect of preventing the Turks from concentrating an immediate counterattack against the landing. The diversion-ary force itself, however, met with disaster in a battle on February 8 at Kamatero, on the northeasternmost foot of Mount Aigaleos.

On February 3, the force from Eleusis, something under 3,500 men commanded by Colonel Dionisios Bourbakis, Vasos Mavrovouniotis, and Panayotis Notaras, advanced to the village of Menidi where they attacked a Turkish unit on guard in the area. The Turks took refuge in a fortified church, and before Turkish cavalry could arrive, the Greeks withdrew into Mount Parnes toward the village of Khasia. Here the commanders became divided in their opinions about how to proceed. Bour-bakis, a regular army officer, was keen to advance toward Athens and challenge the Turks in the plain. Mavrovouniotis and Notaras, experienced leaders of Greek irregulars, favored remaining in the mountains and harassing Turkish supply lines. Bourbakis persuaded his colleagues to advance at least to the nearer slopes of Aigaleos, perhaps arguing that their diversionary threat against Athens must be made to appear more credible.

On February 6, the Greeks advanced across the gap between Parnes and Aigaleos and took up positions along the crest and slopes of Aiga-leos above the village of Kamatero. Here Bourbakis, eager for the battle that his colleagues sought to avoid, drew his own men out into the plain a little distance, where they threw up fieldworks to prepare for the anticipated attack. Bourbakis had indeed attracted the attention of Reshid, who began an attack on February 8 with a force of 2,000 foot and 600 cavalry supported by artillery. While Bourbakis' men were held in place by the Turkish artillery, the Turkish foot rushed against the Greeks who remained on Aigaleos. These, with their commanders, had no desire to be drawn into a general engagement, and they took flight, leaving Bourbakis unsupported. Reshid's cavalry finished the job with a charge that broke Bourbakis' position, and in the ensuing rout some 400 Greeks, including Bourbakis, were killed or captured. The Greek force was so completely dispersed that the Turks even succeeded in taking Eleusis. They withdrew from Eleusis after destroying the fieldworks of the Greek camp and filling the wells with rubble.

The remaining campaign against Reshid was distinguished only by the return of Karaïskakis a month after the battle of Kamatero and by the eventual ill-fated attack mounted by Greek forces from the coast two months later. On March 14, Karaïskakis advanced from Eleusis along

the coast and entrenched himself at Keratsini near Peiraieus. This development marked the expansion of the desultory war of positions in which the Greeks and Turks around Peiraieus had been engaged. Receiving further reinforcements toward the end of April, the commanders of the Greek forces were encouraged to attempt a drive on Athens. Poorly coordinated and executed (ill conceived from the very first, according to some), this attack badly misfired and resulted in another more serious rout for Greek forces on May 6. By May 27, the troops who still held the positions at Peiraieus withdrew, and messages sent to the Acropolis advised the Greeks there to negotiate a capitulation. This was done, and the Acropolis was turned over to the forces of Reshid Pasha on June 5.

The movements of February 3-8, culminating in the battle of Ka-matero, are the only events of this campaign that are known to have taken place in the Aigaleos-Parnes gap. There is no hint in any of our sources that the Dema wall was in any way involved in this sequence of events, nor is there any real reason to suppose that it might have been. Other fieldworks in the area, however, most likely were involved. The Kamatero wall in particular, a long and slight rubble fieldwork on the side of Aigaleos above Kamatero facing Athens (see map 6), must surely be one of the tambouria of the men of Mavrovouniotis and Notaras. (The Kamatero wall is noted on the Karten von Attika sheet vi, Pyrgos, 1883, and is described by Milchhoefer 1883, 44, and McCredie 1966, 71-72; it closely resembles the construction of the northern sector of the Dema wall.) A series of small circular rubble enclosures along Aigaleos to the south of Kamatero, on the brow of the ridge facing Athens, is likely to have been a line of outlying tambouria , the watchposts of the Greek forces noted by Howe when he wrote in his journal that "the fires of the Greeks under Vashos [Mavrovouniotis] and Bourbakis upon the sides of the mountains" were conspicuous from Peiraieus on the nights of February 6 and 7 (Richards 1906, 205; these remains are noted by Milch-hoefer 1883, 44, and DEMA , 175; see also the descriptions by Smith and Lowry 1954, 39-40, and Munn 1979b, 21-22; it is likely that a rubble wall adjacent to the Aigaleos tower is also a work of this episode).

If the Dema had no role in the events of February 3-8, the concentration of action around the plain of Athens over the whole course of the campaign of 1826-27, and especially the fact that Eleusis and Athens were the bases of opposing forces, with those at Eleusis seeking to attack and harass those around Athens, makes it most unlikely that the Dema wall would have been completely ignored. The Dema provided an excellent defensive position for the Turkish forces around Athens and Peiraieus, guarding against an attack to their rear. Furthermore, it served to fortify a vulnerable point along a supply route of considerable

importance to the Turks, the route from Thebes across the Skourta plain, through Khasia and Menidi to Athens. This route certainly was used, for we are told that soon after his embarrassing defeat at Khaidari, Karaïskakis repaired his reputation by raiding Skourta and carrying away 10,000 head of cattle which had been assembled there for the supply of the Turks at Athens (Gordon 1832, 339).

This sort of raid was probably just what Mavrovouniotis and Notaras had in mind when they argued with Bourbakis before their advance to Kamatero, and it is clear from our sources that such attacks against Turkish supply routes were contemplated more often than they were executed. Gordon, who was the commanding general of the Greeks at the time of the landing at Peiraieus, speaks of his preference for concentrating on disrupting the communications of Reshid's army (1832, 378, 383, 385, 399). Finlay, who was also present during this campaign, describes more explicitly a plan which was contemplated at the time:

The besiegers of Athens might also have been closely blockaded by a line of posts, extending from Megara to Eleutherae, Phyle, Deceleia, and Rhamnus. This plan was rejected, and a number of desultory operations were undertaken (Finlay 1877, 413).

If the Greeks were contemplating such moves and, in the cases of the raid on Skourta and the march to Kamatero, actually carrying out operations in strength in the vicinity of the Aigaleos-Parnes gap, the Turks must have been prepared to oppose them. The fact that there was a Turkish outpost at Menidi on February 3 shows that the Turks already recognized the importance of this route and the need to prevent a Greek force from operating in this area and cutting off the direct route to Thebes. The Greeks could have done this if they had established a strong camp in the vicinity of Khasia, within the foothills of Parnes where Turkish cavalry could not move and artillery could be transported only with great difficulty. Indeed, this seems to have been the intent of Mavrovouniotis and Notaras on February 3, and Makriyannis, who participated in the planning of this operation, states that Khasia was the original objective of this force (1947, 301,302).

The northern extension of the Dema wall is suited not so much to dosing the Aigaleos-Parnes gap, which the Wall already does, as to preventing a flanking movement around the wall to the north. This is precisely the direction of Khasia. The northern sector should be understood as a way to extend the line of the Dema up to the crest of the ridge that separates Khasia from the plain of Eleusis. The ridge itself completes the defenses of Khasia.

Would the Turks have undertaken such a project to defend an outlying village like Khasia? One might also ask, Would the Turks build

such a wall at al, a wall that is more appropriate to the tactics of Greek irregulars than of the Turkish army? The answer to both of these questions lies in the fact that the Turkish army was itself supported by substantial numbers of Greek, or in this case Albanian, irregulars, whose manner of fighting was precisely the same as that of the troops of Ka-raïskakis, Mavrovouniotis, and Notaras. Moreover, the Albanian villagers of Khasia and Menidi were active supporters of Reshid, as Finlay makes clear in his description of the advent of Turkish forces in June of 1826:

A great proportion of the Attic peasantry was driven to despair [by the rapacity of the Greek garrison commanders in Athens], and the moment Reshid's forces appeared in the Katadema, or hilly district between Parnes and the channel of Euboea, they were welcomed as deliverers. On advancing into the plain of Athens, they were openly joined by the warlike inhabitants of Menidhi and Khasia, who vigorously supported Reshid's government as long as he remained in Attica (Finlay 1877, 401).

The northern sector of the Dema wall, therefore, is most likely the work of these villagers, who, on their own initiative or under Turkish command, sought to strengthen their defenses against an attack like that of the forces of Mavrovouniotis, Notaras, and Bourbakis. The most probable time for its construction is after the battle of Kamatero, which marked the beginning of the campaign of 1827 for the Greeks, who had been relatively inactive since the beginning of the previous November, when Karaïskakis had left Eleusis for the interior. The Khasiotes and Menidiotes need not have seen a major threat developing to impel them to this work (although the return of Karaïskakis to Eleusis in March might well have provided them with the energy to undertake it), since it is quite possible that they had to be continuously on their guard against small raiding parties from the direction of Eleusis, who would prey on their flocks as if they were supplies for the enemy, which in fact they were.

One other fieldwork in this area deserves notice as a construction probably belonging to this campaign of the War of Independence. This is the long spur wall attached to the Thriasian Lager, an ancient fortified camp on a ridge some three kilometers southwest of the Dema wall (McCredie 1966, 66-71). As McGredie notes, the camp is best understood as the base of an army opposing a force at the Dema wall, and it seems to have been reused, with the addition of the spur wall, for this purpose in the age of firearms. Unlike the massive rubble enclosure wall of the camp itself, the spur wall, which runs from the camp on a summit down into the valley to the east, is a slight construction closely resembling both the

northern sector of the Dema wall and the Kamatero wall. This wall might mark a stage in the advance of the forces of Bourbakis, Mavro-vouniotis, and Notaras; it might have been built earlier and used as a place of ambush in a rout of the Turkish cavalry which took place somewhere in the plain of Eleusis in the course of the Turks' advance on Athens from the north (Gordon 1832, 331); or it might have been built at any time during the campaign as an outwork of a minor post established at the Lager to watch for possible movements of Turkish forces through the Aigaleos-Parnes gap, either against Eleusis or against the rear of the forces twice led by Karaïskakis through the Daphni pass to Khaidari.