Chapter Five
From the Kerkyraian Revolt to the Peace of Nikias (3.70-5.24)
We saw in the last chapter that as soon as Perikles disappeared from the History , the issue of Athens' financial strength for fighting the war and controlling the empire became clouded. This impression was fostered by Thucydides' development of the theme of the expense of war and arche and from his highlighting, partly through the treatment of financial resources, the decline in quality and
With the exception of his derailed treatment of financial matters relevant to the origins of the Kerkyraian stasis (3.70), financial resources do not figure prominently in the History for the years 427-424. During these years, the war was fought primarily on land, as operations were conducted in Sicily and northwestern Greece, in the Megarid in summer 424 (4.66-77) and in Boiotia (4.78, 89-101). The lack of attention to financial resources accords well with the relative insignificance of money in warfare on land compared to that at sea.
Some naval activity, however, did occur during these years. Signifi-
cantly, the Athenians did not respond to the relative relaxation of naval conflict by restricting expense to the bare necessities of naval defense. During the two years from summer 427 to summer 425, the Athenians sent out naval expeditions, some of which went well beyond the offensive naval strategy outlined by Perikles and were by no means necessary for the war with Sparta. They dispatched twenty ships to Sicily at the end of summer 427 in response to a request for help from the Leontinians; according to Thucydides, however, their real intent was to try to interrupt grain shipments to the Peloponnese from the west and to assess the possibility of conquering Sicily (3.86.4).[1] Then, in the following summer, while the twenty ships were still in Sicily, the Athenians sent out sixty ships and two thousand hoplites under Nikias' command to the island of Melos. Thucydides provides the reason for the expedition: "The Athenians wanted to bring the Melians over to their side, since they were islanders and wished neither to submit to the Athenians nor to enter into alliance with them" (3.91.2). The expedition failed in its aim, and Nikias subsequently brought the fleet over to Oropos and made raids in the area around Tanagra before returning home (3.91.3-6). In addition to these sixty ships, the Athenians sent out another thirty ships around the Peloponnese (3.91.1), as part of their usual strategy.
The decisions to undertake the naval expeditions both to Sicily and against Melos beyond those encompassed in Athenian military strategy have direct relevance for our understanding of Athens' financial condition at this time, so soon after the Mytilenaian expedition and not long after the siege of Poteidaia. The ad hoc financing that accompanied the operation against Mytilene was likely, as I suggested in the last chapter, a sign of concern about the future in the anxious climate following the end of the revolt of Poteidaia and amidst the ghastly effects of the plague. It does not attest to a general and extensive depletion of Athens' resources. The vitality of Athens' periousia chrematon is revealed by the polis's readiness to extend naval operations beyond the minimum, despite the expense involved.[2] Also relevant in this connection is the increasing archaeological evidence for public building throughout the 420s (and
[1] Gr. Kagan, Archidamian War, 183, who, after Busolt, argues that the Athenian aim in Sicily was to forestall the possibility that Syracuse and others would provide ships and money to the Spartans and finds this conclusion "inescapable from [Thucydides'] own narrative" (n. 136); on the contrary, the fact that he did not point this out suggests that it was not a significant consideration at all. That the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 427 went beyond the scope of Periklean strategy is denied by Kagan but supported by Holladay, Historia 27 (1978):390-427.
[2] Cf. Ampolo, PP 42 (1987):5-11, who dates IG I 291, contributions from Sicilian allies to Athens usually dated to the expedition of 415, to that of 427/6. If correct, there are significant sums—individual contributions in excess of fifty talents—to be added to Athenian funds.
beyond).[3] The natural inference to be drawn from the naval operations and building record of this period is that Athens' financial resources were not seriously diminished.
Allusion to expense occurs at the beginning of Thucydides' narrative of the Pylos episode. When Demosthenes revealed his plan to fortify Pylos to the generals Sophokles and Eurymedon, they responded sarcastically. "They said;' comments Thucydides, "that there were many deserted headlands in the Peloponnese if, by occupying them, he wanted the city to incur expense" (dapanan ) (4.3.3).[4] The word dapanao elsewhere in Thucydides simply means "spend" rather than "exhaust," and that is how I would interpret it here.[5] Nevertheless, the image of waste is put before the reader as a reminder of the expense of every operation. Following their victory at Pylos, the Athenians continued to have successes, in the Korinthia along the coast and at Methana with a fleet of eighty ships (4.42-45), also in summer 425/4. Thucydides then recounts events in Kerkyra with the arrival of Eurymedon and Sophokles (4.46-48), ending with the virtual annihilation of the anti-Athenian faction in the city.
At this time, Thucydides notes, Aristeides, one of the generals of the "money-collecting" ships sent out by Athens to the allies, captured in Eion on the Strymon River, Artaphernes, a Persian who was making his way to Sparta. He was taken to Athens, where (after, Thucydides bothers to point out, his messages had been translated from the Assyrian!), it was discovered that the Spartans had sent a number of embassies to Persia, the purpose of none of these missions clear, with each apparently asking something different from the one before (4.50.1-2).
Thucydides' conscientiousness in reporting such details as these, which may seem fairly unimportant per se, contributes to the cumulative picture of Athenian and Spartan strategy and policy concerning financial resources. In this case, we learn of another "money-collecting" expedition in an incidental context, which suggests that such expeditions were not unusual; furthermore, we learn that this one was in the Thraceward region, unlike the two mentioned previously (six ships to Karia and Lykia in 430/29 [2.69.2]; twelve to various places, including Karia in 428/7 [3.19.1]). Moreover, the capture of Artaphernes was important:
[3] See Miles, Hesp . 58 (1989):221-35, for a good concise discussion of evidence and bibliography; Boersma, Building Policy , 82-96; Mikalson, GRBM 10 (1984):217-25.
[5] Gomme, HCT 3, ad loc., maintains that "exhaust" is a late meaning. But cf. LSJ; Gäller, ad loc.; Arnold, ad loc.
through it the Athenians learned of the many embassies sent by Sparta to the Persian king and the confused nature of their communication. Peloponnesian envoys had attempted, so Thucydides informs us, to request chremata for the war from the King in 429 (2.67.1); it is reasonable to include a request for money among the garbled messages of the Spartans here, given their inevitably heightened awareness of the need for money especially for naval operations.[6] Yet naval strategy still seems to have been a low priority for the Spartans, and they were still uncertain about its underpinnings as well as its execution. The confusion over the purposes of the embassies to Persia, in addition to, for example, Alkidas' failure to effect the revolt of Ionia and procure considerable money, attests to the Spartans' continued inability to understand the requirements of naval war.[7]
The Ransoming of Rhoiteion (4.52.2)
During the winter of 425/4, the Athenians forced the Chians to dismantle their walls (4.51). Thucydides' narrative of the next summer begins with the activities of the exiled Mytilenaians and other Lesbians who, along with hired local and Peloponnesian support, captured the city of Rhoiteion and then took the unusual step of handing it back unharmed in return for a ransom of two thousand Phokaian staters.[8] This episode is intriguing and unusual, and that, along with the fact that the ransom itself was substantial, surely accounts for Thucydides' specification both of the precise amount and the type of coinage used in the deal. Although not directly concerned with Athens' finances, it has necessarily become relevant indirectly through the association of the ransom money with Rhoiteion's tribute; moreover, the account provides a useful instance of the correlation and relative value of Thucydides and epigraphical evidence.
Scholars commenting on this passage have confined themselves to providing the equivalence of two thousand Phokaian staters in Athenian coinage, that is, eight Attic talents.[9] But the act of ransoming a captured
[6] Though this awareness was apparently still rather vague; cf. Thucydides' comment (4.55.3-4) on the Spartan reaction to the loss of Kythera and the discussion below.
[7] This point holds even if the Spartan embassies to Persia did not explicitly request money (they dearly did not bring up anything explicitly!), for then the question is "why not?" If they went so far as not only recognizing their need for assistance beyond what the Peloponnesian League could supply but even acting on it by sending envoys to Persia and yet did not include a request for financial assistance, then they still grossly misunderstood the requirements of the new warfare.
[9] E.g., Gomme, HCT 3, ad loc., who notes that this was "the sum at which Roiteion was assessed in 425," a comment based on ATL 2:82; 3:88; but note the important qualification that he adds: "strictly, we should say 'probably assessed'."
city is of considerable interest as well. There is no suggestion that the exiles intended to retain control of the polis, as they did, for example, in Antandros (4.52.3), nor to harm its inhabitants. Indeed, the point of capturing Rhoiteion may simply have been to raise money. The exiles, with grand designs in mind, had already hired soldiers: using Antandros as a base, they would liberate the Aktaian cities under Athenian control and construct ships with which to make raids on Lesbos and subdue the Aiolian towns on the coastal mainland (4.52.3). Thucydides, indeed, provides remarkably detailed information about the exiles' plans, of which the hiring of soldiers and the capture and subsequent ransoming of Rhoiteion are all important preparatory elements. Such elaborate naval plans, as the reader knows well by this point, require the extensive outlay of cash; significantly, Thucydides brings the issue of money explicitly into his account.
The plan, however, failed (4.75). Why is it related in such detail? The answer may be that the Lesbian exiles and their army were intending to put into effect exactly what Alkidas had been urged, but declined, to do;[10] the comparison is, I suggest, intended and pointed.[11] Also, the exiles from Lesbos waited three years before they attempted to regain control of the area and do harm to the Athenians. The delay may have been caused, in large part, by insufficient financial resources to implement the plan.
The practice of extorting money, not only at Rhoiteion but elsewhere during the war, suggests further the presence of considerable wealth in ready cash circulating, deposited in temples, or hoarded that would make such piratical attempts seem worthwhile.[12] The circumstances of the collection of the money at Rhoiteion, however, are generally connected with the annual tribute payment of that polis. Let us examine the evidence.
The editors of ATL specifically tied the ransom to the tribute reassessment of 425, for which we have the decree, IG I3 71, and they write:
In the early summer of 424 B.C. the Mytilenaian exiles on the mainland raided Rhoiteion and made their escape with 2000 Phokaian staters.... Reckoned at 24 drachmai to the stater this sum amounts to 8 talents, which is precisely the assessment [my italics] of Rhoiteion in A9 [the 425 reassessment
[10] Cf. Adcock, Mélanges Glotz 1:1-6.
[12] The finest example of the possibilities is the spectacular "decadrachm hoard"; see the articles by Fried, Kagan, and Spier in Carradice, Coinage , 1-42.
decree]. It looks very much as if the Mytilenaians timed their raid perfectly, and made off with Rhoiteion's tribute just when it had been gathered together for transportation to Athens.[13]
In fact, neither the connection between the ransom and reassessment of 425 nor the amount of the assessment is certain. The issue has importance not so much for our knowledge of the precise amount of tribute that one polis in the empire paid as for its broader application and significance in its methodological context of epigraphic restoration and reconstruction.
According to the editors of ATL, IG I3 71, the 425 reassessment decree, shows that Rhoiteion was assessed eight talents in 425;[14] but they arrive at that figure through restoration. On the stele on which the decree and catalog of cities are inscribed, only a partial amount is extant in the preserved fragment: [ .. ]TT. Several totals are possible from these remains: four talents ([TT]TT); eight, as in ATL ([
Moreover, not only is Rhoiteion restored but so are all of the cities on the new "Aktaian panel" made subject to Athens by the terms of the settlement of Mytilene, which had previously controlled these polismata (Thuc. 3.50.3). Fortunately, enough of the rubric AKTAIAI P OL ES survives to assure at least the certainty of the panel on the stone. But the fact remains that the debut of the Aktaian dries on any inscription whatsoever is here in IG I3 71, in which no city's name is preserved; for nine entries, traces of the first letter in the name are visible.[15] Merritt and West restored the full panel by comparison with IG I3 77, the assessment decree of 422/1, in which much of the Aktaian panel is preserved; it is this later decree which dictated the order in which Rhoiteion appears in IG I3 71, immediately below Antandros, although the order of IG I3 77 was not retained for many of the other cities listed in IG I3 71. In view of such inconsistency, common in both quota lists and assessment decrees, the fact that Antandros and Rhoiteion head the list in IG I3 77 does not assure that the same order was observed in IG I3 71.
There is more. To the left of Rhoiteion in IG I3 77, no figure is preserved; to the left of Antandros above it, however, [ .. ]TT appears.[16]
[13] ATL 3:88.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Cf. the facsimile drawing in Plate II, in Meritt and West, Assessment of 425.
[16] Only the left portion of the crossbar of the T survives, but is enough to insure the restoration.
Rather than supposing that Antandros should have been restored in Rhoiteion's place in IG I3 71, which would have made the figure [ .. ]TT consistent, the editors of ATL decided that the mason inscribing this section made a mistake and erroneously inscribed Rhoiteion's tribute beside Antandros, and they restore [ .. ]TT as [TT]TT. The certainty, therefore, that (1) Rhoiteion was assessed eight talents, (2) the order of cities is correct, (3) the confused mason in 421 erred, and (4) Thucydides provides confirmation, is entirely unjustified.
There is a further important issue. Although Rhoiteion appears on one assessment list, that of the year 422/1 (IG I3 77), and should reasonably be restored on IG I3 71 (though not necessarily where it has been), there is no record that the polis ever actually paid tribute; one need only note the difference between assessment and collection, especially in connection with the 425 reassessment decree, in which even places such as Melos were registered as having been assessed. Nevertheless, let us suppose that the city did pay it. In what currency would it have done so? If one accepts the dating of the Coinage Decree (ML 45) to the mid-fifth century, as the editors of ATL did, then the citizens of Rhoiteion should have paid not in Phokaian staters but in Athenian silver coinage. This is not the place to enter the controversy over the date for this decree;[17] but if Thuc. 4.52.3 is to be connected with Rhoiteion's tribute, then its implications for the Coinage Decree need to be addressed: either it must have been passed after 425, or the decree was ineffective.
There is, then, no assurance that [ .. ]TT was Rhoiteion's assessment in 425. If it was, there is no certainty that it should be restored [
It is fortunate when one can reconcile or find agreement between Thucydides and epigraphical evidence. But the case of Rhoiteion and the assessment decrees is one, I suggest, of false agreement. Rather, we should ask whether Thucydides' reference to the two thousand Phokaian starers conflicts with our knowledge that Rhoiteion was assessed an (unknown) amount, which could have been eight talents or a number of other possibilities in 425. The answer is that although the two pieces of evidence do not conflict, they also have little to do with each other; they
[17] Cf. the discussion in ML 45; Meiggs, AE , 167-73; Lewis, "The Athenian Coinage Decree"; Mattingly, "The Athenian Coinage Decree and the Assertion of Empire."
are mutually irrelevant and supply only a specious connection. Thucydides 4.52.3 tells us nothing about tribute payment or assessment and thus bears no relation to the quota lists or assessment decrees.
Regardless of Rhoiteion's tribute assessment, the indications that Thucydides has provided thus far about the diverse means of exploiting the empire financially, for example in Ionia, allow the inference that Athens may well have obtained money from the Aktaian cities in ways other than or in addition to tribute. We know that, for example, "money-collecting" ships were operating in the area, and indeed, it was the generals of these ships who, in the same summer of 424, foiled the exiles' plans at Antandros (4.75-76.1). Thucydides' account of the ransoming of Rhoiteion offers another indication of the monetary wealth of but one polis in the area.[18]
The Capture of Kythera
Thucydides leaves the Mytilenaian exiles with their plan untested and the result unknown. He turns to the Athenian operation against Kythera, off the southern coast of the Peloponnese, also in summer 424, involving sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, and some other forces under the command of Nikias (4.53). The island was taken with moderate ease, as the Kytheraians initially resisted but then came to terms with Nikias and the other generals; Thucydides reports the outcome as "quite advantageous" both for the present and future.[19] But the historian does not provide the actual details of these "quite advantageous terms" until 4.57.4, when, in another context, he refers to the prisoners the Athenians brought back to Athens, consisting of Aiginetans and some Kytheraians. We then learn that some Kytheraians who had been brought to Athens for their safety were to be resettled "on the islands," while the rest could remain on their own land and pay tribute amounting to four talents (4.57.4).
From Thucydides' account, we are to understand that both the imposition of four talents of tribute and the decision to allow the majority of the Kytheraians to remain on their land were considered "quite advantageous." The Athenians clearly had little to fear from the Spartans at this point, and the terms imposed on Kythera may reflect this. The Spartans' mood, as Thucydides describes it, was indeed pathetic: they were afraid (
[18] Relevant here is Thucydides' reference in the Pentekontaetia to the wealth brought in from Magnesia, amounting to fifty talents a year (1.138.5), a figure which, even if optimistic or exaggerated, still suggests a considerable amount.
teria. Moreover, success in the war required swift action, and it was difficult to anticipate attacks; they were forced to act against their usual practice by sending cavalry and peltasts against Athens. Thucydides continues:
And now, in their waging of war generally, they reached the highest peak of hesitation ever, having to deal with what was beyond the scope of their existing kind of preparation, namely, a naval contest, and that against the Athenians, people for whom not attempting an attack was always viewed as a failure to gain an achievement. (4.55.1-2)
In his analysis of the pathetic state of Spartan morale, Thucydides highlights both practical and conceptual difficulties faced by the Spartans in dealing with naval warfare. The virtual absence of Spartan dunamis on the sea and their failure even by 424, some seven years into the war, to confront the exigencies of naval war, are epitomized by their near paralysis as the island of Kythera, not distant but hard by the Lakonian coastline, was expeditiously conquered by the Athenians and given the humiliation of tributary status. Thucydides underscores the nature of and continuing disparity between Athens and Sparta by including a characterization of the Athenians to remind the reader of their unique
The importance of the loss of Kythera to the Spartans has been noticed,[20] but we should not fad to appreciate the significance of making the island tributary from Athens' standpoint: imposing tribute on a Lakedaimonian city was an unprecedented event in the history of the war as well as significant proof of Athens' power. Thucydides notes at the beginning of the war that Athens had allies who were tributary (1.19; 2.9). Now, a city which was not an ally was being forced to pay tribute. That Kythera was a Lakedaimonian city is extraordinary testimony both to Athens' strength and Sparta's weakness at this time. The settlement of Kythera suggests that revenue was far more important to the Athenians than
The "Money-Collecting" Ships
In 4.75, Thucydides returns to the developments concerning the Lesbian exiles in summer 425/4. Their plan of fortifying Antandros was foiled by an Athenian and allied force, which retook Antandros. Thucydides' description of the nature of the Athenian contingent is of con-
[20] E.g., Kagan, Archidamian War , 263; Holladay, Historia 27 (1978):405.
siderable interest to us, since he defines the leaders as "the generals of the Athenian money-collecting ships, Demodokos and Aristeides, who were around the Hellespont (the third general, Lamachos, had sailed with ten ships into the Pontos)" (4.75.1). Thus appears a further reference to the "money-collecting" ships,
Nevertheless, here, as in the other examples mentioned previously, it is typical of both Thucydides' conscientiousness as a historian and his interest in the finances of the empire that he specifies the nature of the expedition occupying these ships when they waylaid the Lesbian exiles on Antandros; that he notes the presence of ten more in the Pontos with Lamachos; and that, after describing Demodokos' and Aristeides' successful campaign at Antandros, he returns to Lamachos, who was at first mentioned almost incidentally. Although that general lost all of his ships (Thucydides does not explain how or why), he and his men traveled on foot through Thrace, finally to reach Kalchedon at the mouth of the Pontos (4.75.2).
This expedition, like that of Demodokos and Aristeides, has been connected to the tribute reassessment of 425. Some scholars treat it as fact: "The Athenians also anticipated collection of tribute in the Euxine area, for in the summer of 424 Lamachos, in command of
the activities of tribute collection extended in this year later than usual, but we know also that the assessment was particularly severe and that the new levy was not proposed until the fourth prytany. Adjudication of claims was not completed until after the month of Poseideon and at the earliest the ships could not have left Athens before Gamelion. The fact that they were still occupied in the early summer is in part explained by this late departure from Athens.[22]
The view presented in ATL is generally accepted. It is certainly possible, but how secure is it? It rests on the assumption that the "money-collecting" ships in 4.75.1 were sent out to collect tribute as a result of the reassessment of 425. Moreover, though the editors do not state ex-
[21] ATL 3:89.
[22] Meritt, AFD , 20.
plicitly that they believe the amount assessed was actually collected, their discussion implies that the decree was implemented and effective. I shall discuss the decree of 425 in detail shortly; we need now to examine whether any of Thucydides' references to the
The dates on which the historian mentions such ships—430 (2.69), 428 (3.19), 425 (4.50 and 4.75)—have been used to support the case for tribute reassessments in those years. What is the other evidence, and how firm is it? It will be dearest if we consider each year individually, beginning with the general remark that, of the tribute quota lists following the year 431, none can be dated with complete certainty; therefore, fluctuations in the quota cannot be pinned definitely on a particular year.
(1) Summer 430 (2.69): no assessment decree survives. Fluctuations in the quota lists suggest that there may have been an assessment in 431 or 430; the evidence does not allow preference of one year over another. (2) Summer 428 (3.19): no assessment decree survives. Although the dates of all the lists in the years following 431 are problematic, quota list 27 (IG I3 283) is dated by the editors of ATL (and followed by most scholars) to 428/7, but this is uncertain.[23] The list is believed to reflect a new assessment, but if so, it may belong either in 428/7 or 427/6; there is no basis for preferring one over the other. (3) Winter and summer 425 (4.50, 75): IG I3 71, the reassessment decree of 425.
We see, therefore, firm evidence of a reassessment in only one of the years in which Thucydides mentions the
[23] ATL 3:70. The editors assert that this is the only year to which list 27 can be assigned; their reason is that the Aktaian panel does not appear on it, and therefore it must predate Athens' suppression of the Mytilenaian revolt, as a consequence of which the Aktaian cities were added to the empire. Yet one should bear in mind that the Aktaian panel does not appear on any tribute quota list, not even after the cities were assessed in 425; this considerably diminishes the certainty of their argument.
[24] For example, the evidence to support the idea that the tribute reassessment of 425 was implemented and effective is the money-collecting expedition of 425 in Thucydides, 4.75.1. The only information that would constitute evidence that the assessment of tribute was effective would have to come from the tribute quota lists; it is one of the great frustrations of the period that these are all missing for the crucial years 425-421.
ides' "money-collecting" ships may be "mere coincidence."[25] We have decreased the "coincidences" considerably, down to one, that in 425.
There is, then, an inherent weakness in the alleged connection between Thucydides' ships and tribute reassessment. That Thucydides does not specify that the ships were on tribute-collecting missions is not necessarily a strong argument against it. In other cases where he dearly refers to tribute, he does not always use the explicit phoros but often simply writes chremata .[26]
Yet why should we prefer to think that these
All the same, Thucydides' references to
Clearly, the temptation is strong to associate the "money-collecting" ships in Thucydides with tribute collection, and perhaps scholars are inclined to yield to it partly out of a desire to defend Thucydides against the charge that he omits important financial information; by pointing to 2.69, 3.19, and 4.50, they can exonerate the historian. Yet if we want to understand as fully as possible the role and treatment of finances in the historian's work, we must dismiss all our presumptions about what he
[25] Meiggs, AE , 254.
[27] Meiggs, AE , 254.
should have included. One such presumption is the insistence on a connection between the
My conclusions about the relationship between Thucydides'
The Reassessment of Tribute in 425
"The strangest of all omissions in Thucydides is that of the increase in the tribute in 425 B.C ."[30] Gomme's famous pronouncement has been echoed by virtually all scholars everywhere, both those primarily con-
[30] Gomme, HCT 3:500.
cerned with the epigraphic issues and those examining Thucydides from a historiographical standpoint.[31] Countless numbers of students of the historian have read M. I. Finley's similar judgment in the introduction to Warner's Penguin translation (p. 25):
There are astonishing gaps and silences, whole chunks of history that are left out altogether.... Thucydides certainly knew that in 425 B.C . the Athenians, running short of funds, made a radical re-assessment of the tribute from the empire, more than trebling the total demanded; and it is impossible to believe that he thought the action less significant than thousands of minor details he rescued from oblivion. Yet there is not even a hint of the decree in the book.
Not only is it regarded as the "strangest" of all omissions but also one of the most serious, for which there is no adequate excuse or explanation. Gomme notes that later ancient writers mention an increase in the tribute in the years after the war began, though he finds it "equally remarkable" that Aristophanes omits reference to it both in the Knights and the Wasps .
Let us first consider the evidence for the increase in assessment and then turn our attention to Thucydides. The decree recording the measure of 425, IG I3 71, was published fully by Meritt and West.[32] Our knowledge of its contents comes from the large number of fragments associated by Meritt and West, and extensive and impressive restoration based chiefly on parallels with the tribute quota lists and other assessment decrees. The section judged so damaging to Thucydides is that supplying the grand total of the reassessment, of which only part survives. The first figure is missing; it could be either
As Meiggs notes, however, "how spectacular an increase this represents depends on the figures for 430 and 428, and for the latter we have very little evidence indeed,"[34] as I have noted above as well. Moreover, it is not clear that the lower total is ruled out absolutely by the surviving district totals, because such a judgment is based on the premise that all
[31] For discussion and references to modern scholarship, see Meritt, "Kleon's Assessment," 89-93; IG I 71; ML 69; Meiggs, AE , 324-39; ATL 3:70-89; for general discussion of both the inscription and Thucydides and further bibliography, see Gomme, HCT 3:500-505; Woodhead, Mnem . 13 (1960):289-317; de Romilly, TAI , 92; Kagan, Archidamian War , 249-51.
[32] Meritt and West, Athenian Assessment ; see also ATL 3:70-89.
[33] Athenian Assessment , 64-90.
[34] Meiggs, AE , 325.
increases were proportionately the same (and all restorations correct), and there is no certainty about this. How firm are the grounds for supposing that the tribute was increased dramatically even in 425? Plutarch (Arist . 24.3) is of little help; he does not mention the 425 assessment in particular, though he does comment that the demagogues raised the total gradually (
Thus, firm evidence that the decree attested to a trebling of the tribute in 425 appears to be lacking. We do not know the level of previous assessments with any degree of certainty; thus, the total estimated in the decree of 425 may have been reached more incrementally and less dramatically than previously thought. We cannot even insist absolutely on the higher total, but let us grant that it is more probable, although it will not affect the present argument.
So much for the assessment. What about the effects of the decree? The editors of ATL argue that it was, by and large, implemented effectively. They suggest that the Athenians probably collected about one thousand talents annually in the years following 425.[36] Yet no quota lists for the years immediately after the assessment have been found; there are a few, extremely fragmentary, lists after the Peace of Nikias, but these are of no help in determining whether the total or near the total of the assessment was actually collected. Positive evidence is believed to come from the Wasps , lines 656-60, in which Bdelykleon gives a recitation of Athens' revenues:
[37]
West took this passage quite literally, as did the editors of ATL .[38] Indeed, it was on the basis of this passage that the estimate of the annual total of
[35] Ibid.
[36] ATL 3:345. Gomme regarded it as effective as well, HCT 3:500.
[37] "Then listen my own little pet Papa, and smooth your brow from its frowns again. / And not with pebbles precisely ranged, but roughly thus on your fingers count I The tribute paid by the subject states, and just consider its whole amount; / And then, in addition to this, compute the many taxes and one-per-cents, / The fees and the fines, and the silver mines, the markets and harbours and sales and rents. / If you take the total result of the lot, 'twill reach two thousand talents or near" (trans., B. B. Rogers).
[38] West, TAPA 61 (1930):223-28; ATL 3:344-45.
tribute following 425 was made. Objections to this approach are obvious. Aristophanes is, after all, a comic poet, not a historian; yet this passage is treated in exactly the same way as if it had come from Thucydides or Xenophon, and as if Aristophanes composed with account books beside him. Or, "[a]s though Aristophanes ... was thus nicely calculating, and remembering to reckon not the assessment, but what actually reached the Athenian treasury"[39] Aristophanes here, as elsewhere, is exaggerating as much or as little as he thought would achieve the desired effect. In this case, Bdelykleon is trying to convince Philokleon in no uncertain terms how little of the state's income goes to jury pay and, by comparison, how much goes to Kleon and others. To make Kleon appear as venal as possible (which seems to be the goal), he surely will exaggerate the disparity in money. Second, even if two thousand talents were near the mark of the state's yearly income, it includes much besides phoros .
We are left, then, with less than satisfactory evidence about the real effect of the assessment. In short, we have an impressive document with insufficient information to judge either its significance or its effect. On the negative side, we have Thucydides' silence (as well as Aristophanes'). Can the results of our investigation into Thucydides' treatment of financial resources help us answer the question of why the historian makes no reference to the inscription? I have argued that the decree of 425 may not be so dramatic a document in its purpose and effect as scholars assume it to be. But for the sake of argument, let us suppose that it did prescribe an increase in the tribute to 1,460 talents and that the total was two or three times as great as previous assessments. Would we expect Thucydides to have mentioned it?
The historian informed us about the assessment of 478. Does this indicate an interest in assessments per se? Thucydides mentions the assessment of 478 because it was the first (
[39] Gomme, HCT 3:504.
[40] In recording the terms of the Peace of Nikias, he mentions the tribute "in Aristeides' time" (5.18.5).
instances of significant decisions. We should not be any more surprised by the lack of reference to this assessment than to any other: that he does not mention it means that he did not judge it to be significant. This leads us back to the question of the decree's effect.
As we have seen, there is no positive evidence of the extent to which the assessment was realized. If it was ineffective in stimulating payments considerably above the levels collected during the previous years of the war, then we would not expect Thucydides to mention it; as we have seen, he was not concerned with assessments per se. In the area of finances, Thucydides was manifestly interested in results, in the actuality of chremata , not its potential (except in 1.96, where he mentions the 478 assessment because it was the first). Thus, he focuses on the tangible financial resources of Athens in the war, the revenue from tribute, the actual financial benefits that the city derived from the empire, and, in addition, particular expenditures. We can detect these interests in passages such as 2.13.3-5; 2.70.2; 3.17.3-4; 3.19.1. This attention expands to "cash transactions" of a significant nature, for example, 1.27.1; 4.26.5; 4.52.2; 4.65.1. By contrast, mere attempts, if unrealized, to do something of a financial nature (such as voting to raise tribute) are unimportant because they do not contribute concretely to naval dunamis and paraskeue .
Let us now suppose that the assessment of 425 was a great success and that the editors of ATL were correct in their hypothesis that Athens received about one thousand talents a year in tribute, the highest amount ever. Would we then expect Thucydides to have mentioned this result of the reassessment if not the reassessment itself? The answer is surely yes. Thucydides reveals a keen and consistent interest in significant quantities of money, and he often specifies such amounts.[41] More than that, however, the historian is as interested in "greatest" instances as he is in first instances.[42] Of particular relevance here is Thucydides' reference to Odrysian tribute at its height in the reign of Seuthes.[43] Similarly, he notes that Athens' resources were at their height (
[41] E.g., the first assessment (1.96.2); the tribute of Magnesia (1.138.5); Athenian resources on the eve of war (2.13.3-5); the siege of Poteidaia (2.70.2); the first eisphora (3.19.1); the ransoms of Kerkyraian prisoners (3.70.1), and Rhoiteion (4.52.2), to give just a few examples.
[42] The most obvious example of a "greatest" is the war itself, the megiste kinesis , 1.1.2; cf. Macleod, "Thucydides and Tragedy," for an interesting discussion of the tragic function of some superlatives in the History .
[43] This comment is especially striking because Thucydides is writing about Sitalkes, not Seuthes, his successor (2.97.3).
ides would have remarked on this fact.[44] The evidence that tribute reached its highest point would not have been included simply as a detail for the purpose of thoroughness, but rather because it would have been central to the historian's argument about Athens' dunamis .
The conclusions to which we are heading should be dear by now. The fact that Thucydides does not mention that tribute reached its height in 425 strongly suggests that the decree had no especially significant effect, and this absence should also be considered alongside the negative testimony we examined in the beginning of this discussion (that is, without previous assessments and with only fragmentary tribute records, we cannot tell whether the assessment in 425 was in any way dramatic or unusual). Is it surprising that the decree may not have achieved its intended result? It should not be. Assessment and collection were two separate and distinct activities; furthermore, no one supposes that Athens ever received the total of its assessments. This decree is no exception. The possibility of a greater disparity between assessment and collection in 425 than at other times should not be unduly worrisome; nor should we feel compelled to adjust the estimates of collection to correspond more closely to the assessment totals.
Finally, does the probability that the reassessment decree was largely ineffective conflict with Thucydides' testimony about Athens' financial resources in the war? If the argument developed here is correct—that the efficacy of tribute as a stable source of imperial revenue was declining, in contrast to its central role in accumulating a reserve necessary for the development of Athens' naval arche during the Pentekontaetia—then the 425 reassessment decree has intriguing implications. The decree illuminates this very difficulty,[45] though the reasons behind it are less easy to determine. Was imperial revenue more forthcoming and reliable when demanded in another form and name than tribute? Or should we leave the idea of "willingness" completely out of the picture and suppose that Athens was better able to enforce regular payment of other types of imperial revenue than of tribute? Did the Athenians learn a lesson from the siege of Poteidaia that tributary states would revolt and the cost of suppression would be too high in the long run during a war? These are all possibilities; in any case, the decree makes clear that the Athenians had been unable properly and regularly to enforce full payment and collection but that they were now toughening their stance.[46]
[44] But cf. Gomme, HCT 3:501; Proctor, Experience , 19, 209, both of whom suggest that Thucydides would have remedied the omission if he had had time.
[45] As does other epigraphical evidence, to be discussed in chapter 6.
[46] Support comes from the section (lines 34-38) ordering for the future regular four-year assessments under heavy penalty to the prytaneis for failure to do so, which suggests that previous assessments had not been regularly undertaken.
The decree of 425, however, imposing heavy-handed and rigid restrictions on both Athenians and allies, was not the right answer.
On the other hand, to accept the possibility that the decree of 425 was not effective in reality is not to deny its significance in a psychological and symbolic respect. Purely from a physical standpoint, the document was meant to impress, inscribed on a marble stele looming some twenty feet high. It presented a powerful symbol of Athens' extraordinary confidence in the aftermath (whatever the precise timing of the decree) of Sphakteria and the capture of Kythera, and other successes, which helped to reaffirm the sense of Athens' dunamis after the plague, Poteidaia, and Mytilene. Likewise, the expedition to Sicily confirmed the changed atmosphere of the city. The stele recording the new assessment testified to Athens' recovery, and the Athenians would doubtless have expected the allies to be suitably affected. The monument would have demonstrated and reaffirmed to the allies their subject status to the imperial ruler.[47]
Brasidas' Northern Campaigns
The Athenians' optimism and apparent invincibility, now confirmed by their spectacular victories, refusal to make peace with the Spartans, and decisions to strengthen their hold on the allies, had a palpable effect on the Spartans and Athenian allies alike. In the very summer in which Athens' fortunes improved so dramatically, the Spartan general Brasidas set off northward to Thrace, and Thucydides describes his journey through Thessaly in north-central Greece. He indicates how widespread the view was that Athens had the upper hand in the war: not only did the Spartans feel dismayed at the present superiority of Athens following Pylos, but the inhabitants of the Athenian-held cities in the Thraceward area, especially those in the Chalkidike, did as well, fearing that Athens would attack them next (4.79.2). A Spartan army had been requested both by the allies and by Perdikkas, the Macedonian king, who was himself at odds with the Athenians.
Thucydides' discussion of the circumstances under which Brasidas went north raises some important considerations: the unrest in the Thraceward area, brought out well by the historian, and the significance of this area to Athenian interests bring home the clumsy handling of the alliance with Sitalkes, which would affect relations between Athens and Seuthes, his successor to the throne. It is not difficult to recall the massive resources at the disposal of the Odrysian king, which were near their height at this time. Now the allies were restive, Perdikkas was maneuver-
[47] Cf., e.g., 4.87.3, where Brasidas equates tribute with slavery.
ing, and, with the exception of the Thessalians to the south, there was no strong pro-Athenian support in the area. The loss of Sitalkes as a firm ally, then, comes to mind as we read Thucydides' narrative of the Thracian towns in revolt and Perdikkas' activities. At this point, Sitalkes is still alive; and, although he has not figured in the narrative since the end of book 2, Thucydides judges it important to inform us of his death in 4.101.5. Why? Most likely, his intention is to underscore implicitly, as he had done earlier, Athens' loss of a powerful friend with enormous resources in the very region now threatened by Brasidas.
Thucydides makes a point of noting that the Spartan army was sent out largely at Brasidas' own request (4.81.1). If true, this is a telling detail, for it suggests that Spartan leadership as a whole had still not grasped the necessity of developing a strategy that would effectively strike at the source of Athens' power, its financial resources from the empire, by aiding or fomenting revolts of poleis that provided revenue to the Athenians. We have already noted that the problem was twofold: the Spartans had faded to obtain the necessary funds themselves to build a fleet adequate to meet the Athenians on their own terms; moreover, they seem to have been unable to understand that this war could not be won in the traditional way.[48]
Thus, even though Brasidas was to have enormous success in the north in depriving Athens of allies that contributed sizable revenue, the strategy and the victory were exceptional, reflecting not official Spartan policy but rather the shrewdness of an individual, Brasidas. Thucydides shows a great deal of interest in Brasidas' expedition. He describes the general's character and the high regard in which he was held by the Greeks in the area; indeed, Thucydides believed that Brasidas was chiefly responsible for a pro-Spartan attitude among Athens' allies after the Sicilian expedition. In characteristic fashion, he notes that Brasidas was the first to be sent out in this way (4.81.3), an implicit reminder of the Spartans' laggardness.
As a result of Brasidas' appearance in the north, the Athenians de-dared war on Perdikkas and guarded the area more closely (4.82.1), which suggests that the Athenians took Brasidas' expedition seriously and responded promptly. After Brasidas negotiated with Arrabaios, son of Bromeros, king of the Lynkestians (4.83), he marched against Akanthos with the Chalkidians and spoke before the assembly (4.84-87). The general's speech is remarkable for the number of times he refers to the "liberation" of Greece within such a brief space.[49] He speaks of the con-
[48] Cf. the insight given by Thucydides into the Spartans' thinking at the end of the Archidamian War, 5.14.3.
[49] He brings it up eight times in a speech comprising hardly more than two OCT pages: 4.85.1, 85.5, 85.6, 86.1, 86.4, 87.2, 87.4, 87.6.
sequences of the Akanthians' potential refusal to submit to Sparta, in which context he refers to the tribute which they pay to Athens. He makes some perceptive observations about the nature and source of Athenian power, arguing (somewhat sarcastically, it seems) that the Akanthians need to submit to Sparta; goodwill alone is of no benefit:
You Akanthians may be well-disposed toward us, but we will still be harmed by the money which you are paying (tois chremasi pheromenoi s) to Athens. I will have to attack for two reasons: first, if you refuse to join us, lest, by your goodwill (and not joining us) the Lakedaimonians will be harmed; second, so that the Greeks will not be prevented by you from throwing off their slavery. (4.87.3)
The sting is clear: you are our friends, but what kind of friends are these who would harm us? The issue at hand is unmistakable and explicit: it is the money that the allies pay to Athens that is the source of concern and must be removed, not the allies themselves. In other words, if the allies were not providing Athens with its money, then a well-disposed attitude toward Sparta, without actively joining it, would be satisfactory.[50] Furthermore, Brasidas' comment that paying money to Athens also keeps the other Greeks in slavery is striking for its apparent implication that an argument based on concern for others' lot would have force.
Brasidas has come to Thrace with a direct and specific goal: to stop the flow of chremata from the Thraceward region into Athens and thus to put an end to Athens' arche . The general's remarks attest to his clear understanding of the necessary measures for military success; he not only appreciates what is required to damage Athenian power but is ready to take the steps to implement the necessary strategy. Moreover, by connecting the payment of chremata with slavery (douleia ) and by advertising his intention to liberate poleis in the area, he uses his powerful and emotive rhetoric for maximum effect.[51] Indeed, his words persuade, though Thucydides pointedly notes the Akanthians' fear for their fruit (4.88) as a factor by no means negligible, and Akanthos revolts against Athens.
The Fall of Amphipolis
After Akanthos' revolt, the polls of Stagiros followed suit (4.88.2). Then, in the winter of 424, Brasidas marched against the Athenian colony of Amphipolis. Thucydides' account of its fall and his role in the events as one of the two generals responsible for the area has been thoroughly unsatisfying to virtually all modern scholars. Although some have come
[50] Brasidas knows that the Spartans do not need more manpower.
[51] He was, Thucydides notes, "not a bad speaker for a Lakedaimonian" (4.84.2).
to the historian's defense,[52] more have viewed his account as an apologia, written from the perspective of someone conscious of his guilt who aimed at self-exculpation but who offers little in the way of real explanation.[53] Indeed, even Gomme believed that Thucydides was conscious not only of his failure but also of his partial responsibility and that "responsible commanders should not allow themselves to be surprised by the enemy."[54] Many candidates emerge as potential winners in the competition for the most scathing appraisal; but perhaps J. R. Ellis put it most bluntly, accusing the historian of writing a "loaded and misleading version whose inadequacies are very simply explained in terms of a wish on his part to represent his own delinquency in a more favourable light."[55]
Virtually all scholars agree that Thucydides fails to provide an adequate explanation for his inability to anticipate Brasidas' arrival at Amphipolis.[56] On the contrary, as we shall see, the historian does address the situation squarely in the very passage that has received much attention but whose purpose in the narrative has not been fully appreciated; Thucydides' portrayal of his role in the loss of Amphipolis turns out to have much to do with his conception of the relationship between wealth and power. Let us survey the account.
In 4.102, Thucydides begins his description of Brasidas' march against Amphipolis. He underscores the importance of the region by noting all the attempts to found the colony,[57] impressing on the reader the extent to which the Athenians coveted the area. They had made numerous attempts to colonize Amphipolis, finally succeeding in 437; now, Brasidas arrived in the area in the wake of his success in the district. As
[52] E.g, Delbrück, Strategie , 177-78; Meyer, Forschungen , 343; Geschichte , 120, n. 1; Grundy, Thucydides , 30.
[53] E.g., Busolt, GG 3:1154-55, n. 4; Adcock, in CAH 5:244-45; Westlake, Essays , 123-37; Kagan, Archidamian War , 300-302; Roberts, Accountability , 117-18, 128-32. See also Bauman's recent discussion, Political Trials , 57-60.
[54] Gomme, HGT 3, on 4.108.7; Gomme, Greek Attitude , 162; see also Finley, Thucydides , 200.
[55] Ellis, Antichthon 12 (1978):28-29.
[56] For Roberts, Accountability , 130, the "staggering omission" is of any explanation why Thucydides was on Thasos at all. As she notes, Thucydides' location was known to Eukles, and there is no reason to assume there was something amiss with his being there. The issue is not why Thucydides was on Thasos but why he could not get to Amphipolis in time to save it. Interestingly, Thucydides lays no blame on Eukles, who, after all, was on the spot and therefore should have been the one against whom anger was directed; this suggests Thucydides' conscious attempt at detachment from whatever personal judgments he may have had.
[57] This is, in my view, his purpose in mentioning all of the attempts to colonize the place, rather than simply demonstrating his interest in chronology, as some scholars have argued, e.g., Ridley, Hermes 109 (1981):37.
the Spartan general moved toward Amphipolis, Eukles, the Athenian commander on the spot, sent for Thucydides, the other general in the Thraceward region, currently on Thasos, whose intention was "to reach Amphipolis before it yielded at all, but, failing that, to secure Eion" in advance of the Spartans (4.104.5). Upon learning that Thucydides was coming to lend assistance to Amphipolis, Brasidas' reaction was fear and haste, since he was aware that Thucydides
held the contract for the gold mines in that part of Thrace and because of that had great power among the leading men there on the mainland; accordingly, Brasidas sped to gain possession of the polis before Thucydides, if possible, fearing that should Thucydides arrive first, the majority of the Amphipolitans, expecting that he would bring allies from the sea and from Thrace to save them, would no longer come over to his side. (4.105.1)[58]
In this well-known passage, Thucydides supplies a rare piece of biographical information; indeed, the very fact that the historian, loath to bring himself overtly into the narrative, has done so alerts the reader immediately to its importance. Although scholars have remarked on Thucydides' allusion to his own
Brasidas' reaction to the news of Thucydides' approach differed significantly from what it would have been if anyone else had been coming to give assistance, for he knew that Thucydides had great influence among the leaders in the region. Thucydides' personal dunamis in that area resulted from his
[59] As Bauman notes, AClass 11 (1968): 170-78, Brasidas viewed Thucydides' arrival as crucial.
another way, whereas Brasidas would not have hastened so to anticipate any other Athenian general, he saw the need for special celerity in Thucydides' case. This explanation, with its focus on the historian's special influence in the endangered area, is in effect a response to those who apparently doubted that he did in fact hurry to Amphipolis as fast as possible, and who therefore considered him responsible for the loss of the city. Thucydides argues that the situation had special circumstances and provides the reasons in 4.105.1: given the fact that Brasidas knew that it was he, Thucydides, who was coming to help, it was impossible for Thucydides to have arrived in time to save the city.
Thucydides seldom provides autobiographical detail; indeed, its absence from the work suggests that he believed it inappropriate to his History . The very fact that he drew attention to his
Amphipolis fell into Spartan hands. Thucydides describes the reaction in Athens:
When they heard that Amphipolis had been taken, the Athenians plunged into great fear (
), especially because the polis was useful to them both in the supplying of timber for shipbuilding and in revenue of money (chrematon prosodo ), and because, although up to the Strymon the Lakedaimonians had an avenue to Athens' allies if the Thessalians led them, they [the Spartans] could not advance beyond it as they did not control the bridge, since there was a large lake above the town, and toward Eion, Athenian triremes were blocking them. They [the Athenians] also were afraid that their allies would revolt. (4.108.1)
We already knew of Amphipolis' importance to the Athenians in general terms. Now Thucydides comments specifically that the loss of the city caused great fear, especially because it supplied Athens with timber for shipbuilding and chrematon prosodos . What kind of revenue? Amphipolis itself was not tributary; therefore, Thucydides is alluding to another kind of imperial revenue.[61] We can safely draw two inferences. First, wealth from Amphipolis flowed into Athens regularly, since Thucydides refers to it as prosodos . Second, it was dearly substantial, since the
[60] If there is an element of apologia in Thucydides' account, it is probably to be found in his statement that he set out with the intention of reaching Amphipolis, or at least of holding Eion, that is, making Eion part of his original plan.
[61] I agree with Gomme, ad loc., that the phrase does not refer to tribute that Athens was able to collect from the surrounding area by virtue of its control of Amphipolis.
loss of revenue and timber is cited as the chief reason for the Athenians' "great fear" at the loss of the colony.[62] Revenue may have accrued from sacred precincts,[63] but the bulk likely derived from the gold and silver mines for which the area of Mount Pangaion was famous, possessing the "richest mineral deposits" of the entire Thraco-Macedonian region.[64] Without Thucydides' explicit testimony, however, we would not have had firm evidence that Athens successfully exploited the abundant wealth of the region on a regular basis over and above receiving tribute from poleis in that area.[65]
In 4.108.2, Thucydides tells us that Athens now feared a wave of revolts in the area as a result of the fall of Amphipolis, prompted by Brasidas' apparent moderation and generous employment of the catchword and rallying cry
[62] In ATL 3:339, n. 58, an estimate of seventy to seventy-five talents annually is given, though without specific explanation.
[64] Hammond in Macedonia 2:69; also 70-73; Hammond, Macedonia 1:13; J. H. Healy, Mining and Metallurgy in the Greek and Roman World (London, 1978), 46. J. Ramin, La technique minière et métallurgique des Anciens (Brussels, 1977), conveniently lists the ancient sources attesting to the richness of the mines in the Mount Pangaion area, Appendices I, III.
[65] Cf. also Thucydides' remark about the mines which fell under Athenian control following the suppression of the revolt of Thasos, 1.101.3.
Armistice Between Athens and Sparta
After the fall of Amphipolis, Brasidas marched against the cities on the promontory of Akte, most of which came over to him (4.109), and from there against Torone, which was betrayed to him from within (110-14). Next, he attacked the Athenian fortifications at Lekythos and succeeded in taking it, although most of the Athenians escaped (115-16).
Then, in spring 423, the Athenians and Spartans agreed on an armistice for one year. Thucydides describes the reasons for, as well as the terms of, the agreement (4.117-18). Both sides seemed to regard the armistice as a hopeful prelude to a general and lasting peace treaty (4.117). The Athenians were, as Thucydides presents them, motivated by the desire to halt further Spartan successes in the north; the Spartans knew this and believed that they were therefore in a favorable position for negotiating the release of the Spartan prisoners taken from Sphakteria. Implicit in the Athenians' desire to forestall further revolts in the area and to increase their level of preparedness in order to deal most effectively with Brasidas was the need to guard against future losses of imperial revenue; but Thucydides is silent on any present concern for the condition of Athens' reserves which might have affected their decision in 423.
One of the points in the agreement made by Sparta and its allies, and approved by the Athenians, treated the sacred moneys of Pythian Apollo at Delphi:
Concerning the chremata of the god, we shall take care to determine who has done wrong, in the case of both sides, adhering to our ancestral laws correctly and justly, and any others who wish may do so, according to their ancestral laws. (4.118.3)
It is unclear to what extent this clause refers to a specific instance of borrowing from the sacred treasures of Apollo. Parke and Wormell considered it "too unsafe to argue that the Peloponnesians actually made use of the sacred treasures," but they suggest the possibility that such a use might have occurred in 426, to hire Arkadian mercenaries for an attack on Naupaktos (3.101.1; cf. 109.2).[68]
They do, however, regard the relevant clause in the armistice agreement as a specific reference to offenses (alleged or otherwise) in the "management of the sacred treasury."[69] It is further unclear whether the clause refers directly to the discussion preceding the war about the use
[68] Parke and Wormell, Delphic Oracle 1:101-92.
[69] Ibid., 196.
of sacred money by the Peloponnesians.[70] Regardless of actual guilt or innocence, it would have been easy for the Athenians to make such a charge, in that the whole issue of the use of sacred treasures from Olympia and Delphi seems to have originated on the Peloponnesian side; it would therefore have been more in Athenian than in Spartan interests to have the matter investigated.
There is no subsequent mention of this charge in the terms of the Peace of Nikias. Is it because the Athenians were satisfied that action had been taken against the wrongdoers (as Steup believed) or because, after further Athenian losses in Thrace and also after the death of Kleon, the Athenians "quietly dropped" the matter (as Gomme suggested)?[71] Certainty is, of course, impossible. But it is likely either that the Athenians were satisfied that the problem had been cleared up and would not arise again (insofar as the clause looks both backward and forward) or that it was not among the issues of greatest concern in the ensuing peace treaty, to which we will now turn.
The Peace of Nikias
Between the armistice and the Peace of Nikias occurred the revolts of Skione and Mende and the battle of Amphipolis.[72] After the battle, Thu-
[70] Cf. Gomme, HCT 3, ad loc., who discusses the various hypotheses proposed by previous scholars on this point.
[71] Steup, ad loc.; Gomme, HCT 3, ad loc.
cydides tells us, both Athens and Sparta began to negotiate for peace (5.14.1). The Athenians had lost the confidence with which they had carried on the war after Pylos, and they also feared revolts from their allies; the Spartans, for their part, had a number of compelling reasons for making peace, among which was the realization that the war had turned out to be utterly different from what they had imagined—they had thought that they would be able to destroy the dunamis of Athens in a few years simply by laying waste its land. The Spartan surrender at Sphakteria was an unprecedented blow; their territory was being invaded by the Athenians, and there were other reasons as well (5.14.2-4). Both sides, then, judged peace to be in their self-interest. Thucydides notes, however, that the Spartans had the most to gain by it, "because of their desire to recover the men who had been captured on Sphakteria, among whom were Spartiates" (5.15.1).
This analysis of the considerations in the belligerents' minds fully accords with what we have seen emerge thus far in the History . The underlying thread developed by Thucydides, that the Spartans faced a fundamental problem of expectation and understanding as much as of necessary resources, is reinforced here. It is not the temporal miscalculation that is at issue but rather the assumption that this war, like earlier wars, would be decided along traditional lines of preparation and strategy. Despite Archidamos' arguments and the actual course of the war, the Spartans did not seem fully aware of the realities and implications of fighting a naval power. That this is not simply Thucydides' unsubstantiated opinion is borne out by the narrative of events, in which decisions, actions, and results demonstrate its accuracy.
Also significant is Thucydides' comment that the Spartans had the most to gain from peace, chiefly the retrieval of the soldiers captured on Sphakteria; that is, Sparta's loss of these men was a more significant factor than Athens' loss of its own resources. This line of thinking suggests that Athens' financial resources were not a major factor in their deliberations about the advantages of the treaty. At the same time, however, the northern campaigns of Brasidas had taken a heavy toll on the Athenians; just as the Spartans may well have begun to appreciate the preconditions and consequences of naval war, the Athenians too, having received the first real blow to their lifeline at the hands of the Spartans (as opposed to revolts emanating from the allies themselves), had reason for concern. Indeed, in a sense, it is not entirely perverse to state that the war really began, not ended, in 422, as both sides perhaps only now realized the potential destruction and magnitude of this kind of war.
Thucydides presents the decision for peace largely in personal terms: the impetus came from individuals whose motives stemmed from individual honor and achievement. It is dear from his narrative that what brought the two sides to consider peace seriously were the personal mo-
tives of Nikias and Pleistoanax, not the exhaustion of their respective resources (although Thucydides implies that the Spartans' ability to wage effective land war was affected significantly by the capture of their military elite). This point is crucial: for although individual self-interest need not exclude serious military factors, and we expect such focus on personal motives from an ancient author, it is nonetheless noteworthy that significant depletion of the essential requirement for making war is not brought up as one of the compelling factors for peace.
Thus, we find no evidence that the state of Athens' financial resources necessitated peace; peace at this time was expedient, not essential. In response to scholars who have argued that the Athenian treasury was virtually empty by the end of the Archidamian War, Kagan notes:
If they are right it is truly amazing that Thucydides, who makes so much of the critical role of money in waging war and takes such pains to describe the precise condition of Athenian finances in 431, does not mention the lack of money as a motive for making peace ten years later.[73]
The absence of such a motive in Thucydides implies that Athens' finances were by no means dangerously low. We may briefly now turn to the peace treaty.
For our purposes, we need to examine only the clauses in the treaty relevant to financial resources. The first clause that concerns us is the following:
The Lakedaimonians and their allies shall return Amphipolis to the Athenians. But as many dries as the Lakedaimonians handed over to the Athenians, let them go wherever they wish, keeping their own possessions; and the cities shall be autonomous, paying the tribute of Aristeides. (5.18.2)
We want to keep at a minimum our entry into the tangle of complexities that the clause has raised pertaining to the cities handed over by the Spartans to the Athenians.[74] Put simply, debate over this section of the treaty concerns whether the "tribute of Aristeides" is to be applied only to the specific cities mentioned in the clause, namely, Argilos, Stagiros, Akanthos, Skolos, Olynthos, and Spartolos, or whether a general extension is implied. The larger question is whether the Peace of Nikias marks a general softening in Athens' stance toward its allies. Those who hold that view argue for a broader application of the clause concerned with the tribute of Aristeides.[75] Aside from the questions raised in chapter 2
[73] Kagan, Archidamian War , 336.
[74] See Gomme, HCT 3, ad loc.; ATL 3:346-58; Meiggs, AE , 340-43.
[75] Elaborated by West, AJA 29 (1925):135-51; ATL 3:347-53. They have argued, on the basis of the assessment of 421, IG I 77, that all tribute was reduced as near as possible to the Aristeidean level, not just that of the cities listed in 5.18.5. Yet, as Meiggs points out, AE , 340-42, the evidence of the assessment list is far from certain. There are, on the contrary, indications that the assessment was far closer to the 425 level and not reduced. Furthermore, its date could be either 422 or 421; thus, it might not reflect the Peace of Nikias at all.
about the "moderation" of the first assessment of tribute,[76] the idea that Athens reduced the tribute of all of its allies as a result of the peace is not supported by extant fragments of a quota list most likely dating to 418;[77] but it is also clear that one cannot draw unilateral inferences about the treatment of allies by looking at tribute, for some areas seem to have been decidedly better off than others (for example, the islands). It makes most sense, and is most defensible, to suppose that the tribute of Aristeides held only for the few poleis at issue.[78]
Indeed, assuming a general application first requires demonstrating that it would have been in Athens' interest to extend the terms to other poleis, even though not specified by the treaty. Athens was by no means a weak party to the peace; accordingly, the Athenians would have lowered everyone's tribute to its level at the outset of the League only if they considered it to be a useful concession. Yet reducing the allies' financial burden, which had come to be so closely associated with their "slavery," would not make them feel less subjugated, nor would it have been worthwhile for Athens from the practical standpoint of maintaining power.[79] In any case, it is exceedingly unlikely that Athens would go beyond what was required by the terms of the peace and voluntarily decide to reduce tribute generally.
In the treaty, as noted, Athens appears to have a strong position: the clause of 5.18.5 is a case in point, whereby the grant of autonomy (and neutrality, if desired) to the six poleis is counterbalanced by their obligation to pay tribute. The combination is reminiscent of the situation at the beginning of the Delian League as Thucydides describes it: certain allies were tributary; all were "at first" autonomous (1.97.1). This arrangement was acceptable initially; but as soon as a polis reneged on its obli-
[76] There may be a crucial distinction between 1.96.2, in which Thucydides discusses the first assessment of 460 talents, and 5.18.5. The former was an assessment alone; it is possible that, if it differed widely from what was actually paid in the early years of the League, the reference in 5.18.5—in which the cities are simply to pay the phoros in the time of Aristeides, not necessarily the photos of the original assessment—might be to a lower figure. But additional considerations may help to assess better the nature of Aristeides' assessment.
[77] IG I 287.
[78] So Bauslaugh, Neutrality , 137-40.
[79] The notion that its allies might be less likely to revolt if their tribute requirements were decreased is not immediately convincing; the argument could always be used that such reductions implied weakness on the Athenians' part and therefore would foster as many revolts as previously.
gations of money or ships, it lost its autonomy. Similarly, the six poleis specified in the treaty of 421 were to be autonomous and pay tribute, but force was allowed by the terms of the treaty if they refused.[80] The compatibility of tribute and autonomy thus has a precedent.[81] More interesting is the following stipulation. The treaty states that the cities which are to pay the photos they did in the time of Aristeides are not to be allies of the Athenians—unless they themselves choose to be.[82] Refusal to pay tribute seems to be the only basis on which the Athenians could justly attack them; not, that is, on the grounds of their neutrality.[83] This term seems to be novel,[84] and it strongly suggests that revenue was more important than allies to Athens; this must have been increasingly apparent as the purchase of manpower became more commonplace. The treatment of Kythera (4.57) is relevant here: it was rendered tributary but not brought into the League as a compulsory ally. Both cases suggest the possibility of an emerging pattern different from the standard formula of tributary, subject ally. In both cases, we can see one effect of the large-scale introduction of money into the military sphere on Athenian practice in relationships with weaker parties; indeed, these examples continue the trend begun when a system of exchange involving money for survival and protection was instituted by the Athenians. The difference between the situation described by Thucydides in 1.99 and that toward the end of the Archidamian War is that the Athenians came to judge the bond of alliance unnecessary.
The six Chalkidian poleis specified in the peace regarded the terms as disadvantageous; indeed, they refused to agree to the provisions (5.21.2). The offer of autonomia can hardly have offended; less clear is their reception of the option to ally with Athens.[85] Certainly, neutrality could put a polis in an uncomfortable and insecure position. Perhaps
[80] Whether this was true when the Delian League was established is less dear.
[84] Bauslaugh, Neutrality , 139.
[85] Cf. Bauslaugh, Neutrality , 139-40, who implies that neutrality would have been the issue of concern.
these cities had hoped for a Spartan alliance with full Spartan protections—if so, they would only have been disappointed. In any case, it is reasonable to suppose that the continued payment of tribute would have been objectionable, alliance or not. It is unfortunately impossible to determine whether the amount of tribute expected from these cities was a factor in their refusal to accept its terms.
Following the ratification of the peace by Athens and Sparta, but not by all of Sparta's allies, the two cities also concluded an alliance for fifty years, and with that Thucydides ends his account of the Archidamian, or "first," War.
Conclusions
At the end of chapter 4, which took us through the Mytilenaian settlement, I argued that Thucydides, while supplying firm evidence of the need for (additional) money, nevertheless seemed to be creating an impression of significant financial distress. This, I suggested, was more a result of the historian's argument concerning the inferiority of Athenian leadership after Perikles than evidence of a real financial crisis. Does Thucydides' analysis of the rest of the Archidamian War give further evidence of financial trouble, which would help us to assess whether Athens' financial resources at the beginning of the war were indeed great enough to sustain even a prolonged conflict of ten years?
In this chapter, we have investigated Thucydides' handling of the financial problems faced by Athens, some of the financial measures taken to meet the needs of war and to insure revenue, and the general role that the city's financial condition played in affecting the course of the war and political decisions made. We also scrutinized some of the key epigraphical evidence on imperial finances in conjunction with Thucydides to understand better not only the value of each kind of evidence but also the historical context. In general, the results fail to-support the orthodoxy on Athens' finances during the Archidamian War, that is, that the treasuries were virtually depleted by its end. They do, however, shed light on the history of the war as it affected and was affected by the financial resources of the Athenian polis. In the next chapter I shall address more broadly Athens' financial status in the Archidamian War, with special attention to the evidence of Thucydides.