3.3.4—
The Subject As Interpretation

We can now make explicit the result of this discussion for the issue at hand, the issue of the "subject" of perspectivism. We have seen that the subjects of perspectivism are not simply biological species; for, according to Nietzsche, there is no such thing as, for example, "the human perspective," because the human subject is itself composed of a multiplicity of perspectives formed at the micro-level of affects. We have also seen that the subject of perspectivism cannot be the individual human knower presupposed as atomic and given; for Nietzsche maintains that the human subject is a multiplicity that is constantly being achieved, accomplished, produced, constructed . Moreover, the subject does not have these various perspectives and interpretations; rather, they are what the subject is . According to Nietzsche, the subject is nothing over and above the various physical/spiritual affective perspectives and interpretations—the complexes of belief, desire, action, perception, and thought—that compose it and the relationships between these perspectives and interpretations.

This is not mysterious provided that we take seriously Nietzsche's conception of the subject as a political organization. Every such organization is a more or less temporary union of various individuals and groups that often have different experiences, views, and desires but agree (or are made to agree) about some central ideas, practices, and goals that supervene and serve to unify the membership. The force of the organization resides in the collective power of its members, in their ability to struggle in a particular direction and yet be flexible and responsive to changing circumstances by drawing upon the capacities of individual members or subgroups. There is no organization without these members and no membership without the existence of the organization as a whole.

Nietzsche argues that the subject is just like this.^[65] It is nothing over

[65] Along the lines of Quine's "web of belief," Rorty ("Inquiry as Recontextualization," 93) has described the subject in a similar fashion: as a self-reweaving web of beliefs and desires separate from which there is no subject or "self." Though a Nietzschean orientation is only implicit in their work, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have developed in detail this political model of subjectivity in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985).

and above the sum and arrangement of the affective perspectives and interpretations that compose it. These are not, and need not be, homogeneous. Indeed, Nietzsche argues that the more heterogeneous they are—provided that they maintain some coherence—the richer and more flexible the whole will be. (This is a basic theme of Nietzsche's later work. See GS 295–97, 344, 373, 375; BGE 212; GM III:12; TI "Morality" 3, 6; WP 259, 410, 600, 655, 881, 933, 1051.) This union, however, is "mortal"; it is a changeable entity. Different circumstances often force the acquisition of new perspectives and/or the loss of old ones, thus altering the overall structure. And if these changes are significant enough, or if particular factions cease to remain subordinate to the whole, that whole is threatened or falls apart. Nietzsche writes:

No subject "atoms." The sphere of the subject constantly growing or decreasing, the center of the system constantly shifting; in cases where it cannot organize the appropriate mass, it breaks into two parts. On the other hand, it can transform a weaker subject into its functionary without destroying it, and to a certain degree form a new unity with it. No "substance," rather something that in itself strives after greater strength, and that wants to "preserve" itself only indirectly (it wants to surpass itself—). (WP 488; cf. GS 290 and WP 715)

We thus discover not only that the human subject is a fabricated entity but that its fabrication takes the same form as that of an interpretation. Recall that, in his highly generalized account of interpretation (GM II:11), Nietzsche writes:

whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it;^[66] all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adjustment through which any previous "meaning" and "purpose" are necessarily obscured or obliterated.

If "all events in the organic world" are submitted to this process, it is not surprising that this description also applies to the formation of subjectivity. Indeed, we find that Nietzsche not only views the subject as a

[66] I take it that "some power superior to it" does not refer to a subject outside the field of interpretation that controls that field from without. Rather, it refers to an affect, perspective, or interpretation—within the general field of interpretative struggle—that is able to dominate and subordinate the previous interpretation by assimilating the old terms into its new system (see, e.g., WP 492). For more on this conception of interpretation, see §5.3.1, below.

multiplicity of micro-interpretations and -perspectives; he also views the subject itself as a macro-interpretation. The point is simply that, for Nietzsche, interpretation goes all the way down and all the way up. Rather than positing the subject as something outside the realm of interpretation, something that stands behind and fabricates interpretations, Nietzsche maintains that the subject itself is fabricated by and as an interpretation. Thus, the famous passage that claims that there are no facts but only interpretations, concludes:

"Everything is subjective," you say; but even this is interpretation [Auslegung ]. The "subject" is nothing given [nichts Gegebenes ], but something added, fabricated, and stuck behind [etwas Hinzu-Erdichtetes, Dahinter-Gestecktes ].—Finally, is it necessary to posit an interpreter [Interpreten ] behind the interpretation [Interpretationen ]? Even this is fiction, hypothesis. (WP 481)^[67]