Winds of Change

One of the developments toward the end of the eighteenth century that altered the balance of forces in the Mountain was the increasing commercialization of its economy and its consequent dependence on the outside world. Above all, the rising demand for the Mountain's raw silk in inland towns, as well as in Egypt and France, engendered a steady increase in the amount of land planted in the mulberry trees used in sericulture. Vine-

yards and olive groves enjoyed a similar expansion, all at the expense of land devoted to cereal crops.^[31] By the early nineteenth century, only 35–40 percent of the grain consumed in the Mountain was locally produced; the rest was imported from inland Syria and Egypt.^[32] Despite the high cost of transportation for imported food, the net proceeds from the sale of raw silk and other cash crops were apparently sufficient to encourage the mountaineers to make the shift.

Another development that stimulated commercial transactions was the growing importance of maritime trade along the Syrian coast. Akka (Acre) was the main beneficiary of this boom. Zahir al-'Umar, the powerful magnate of Palestine from 1746 to 1775, was the first to develop Akka into a major port at the expense of Saida. As Zahir became engaged in a protracted struggle with the potentates of Saida, the Shihabi amirs of the Mountain took advantage of the situation to bring Beirut into the fold of the amirate, in 1748, and siphon off some of Damascus's trade with Egypt and Europe. Zahir responded by laying siege to Beirut in 1773, but he was defeated and eventually killed.^[33]

Cezzar Ahmed (Jazzar Ahmad), an adventurer-soldier who had excelled in the battles against Zahir, was appointed governor of the Saida province in return for his services. Using Akka as his seat and power base, he quickly brought not only Beirut but also Tripoli under his direct rule. He then set himself up as the monopolistic overseer of all coastal trade, much to the discomfiture of the merchants and potentates of inland Syria. Yet his cautious relations with Istanbul, and the glory he earned by successfully defending Akka against Bonaparte's powerful army in 1799, made Cezzar irreplaceable. Until his death in 1804, he remained the most powerful magnate in the area.^[34]

His policies did not reverse the trend of commercialization in the Mountain, but he was able to extract much of the proceeds. By playing the rival factions of the amirate against one another, he collected much higher sums from the mountaineers than their normal tax burden. While this indicates the vulnerability of the amirate to the manipulations of a powerful and ruthless governor, it also attests to the growing capacity of the Mountain's economy to generate cash.^[35] Indeed, when the moderate Süleyman Pasha replaced Cezzar as governor of Saida-Akka, from 1804 to 1818, the Mountain enjoyed a visible prosperity, spectacularly represented by the splendid mansion its increasingly powerful amir, Bashir Shihab II, built for himself in Bait ul-Din.^[36]

Bashir had occupied the amirate, with intermissions, since 1788, with the indispensable support of his namesake Sheikh Bashir Junblat.^[37] The cooperation between the two Bashirs reflected the changing balance of

forces in the Mountain. Sheikh Bashir, the undisputed chief of the Junblats, was by all accounts the most powerful and the richest person in the Mountain. A considerable portion of his wealth came from the silk produced on the muqâta'as run by the Junblats. The family also held muqâta'as in the grain-growing Biqa' valley, and thus had access to a ready supply of food. Cezzar's requests for cash put Sheikh Bashir in a key position as a maker of amirs. He was the only muqâta'aji who could provide an amir with ready cash, credit, and sufficient manpower to collect the additional taxes levied on the mountaineers. Sheikh Bashir used his weight to support Amir Bashir against other Shihabs. The two Bashirs then cooperated to extend the lands under their control at the expense of other muqâta'ajis . Thus, first the Abu Nakads and then the 'Imads, who had been the backbone of the Yazbaki alliance against the Junblats, were reduced to insignificance. Occasionally the opponents of the two Bashirs managed to make Cezzar appoint other Shihabs to the amirate, but their inability to meet the pasha's requests returned Amir Bashir to power.

Cezzar's manipulations clearly played an important role in this seesaw struggle. Yet, equally clearly, the struggle acquired a dynamic of its own that was embedded in the realities of the Mountain. Amir Bashir was using his contacts with governors and Sheikh Bashir's support to build a power base for himself. In fact, it was in 1807, during Süleyman Pasha's governorship, that Bashir Shihab launched a fierce attack against his cousins, blinded them in order to end their claims to the amirate, confiscated their properties as well as muqâta'as , and killed a number of others whom he considered a threat to his authority. By 1818–19 the territories under the amir's control, which included Dair al-Qamar and muqâta'as in the Biqa', had brought him sufficient affluence and power to lead him to consider Sheikh Bashir's undoing.^[38] A new development briefly postponed the impending showdown between the two partners.

In 1820, the Maronite peasants of the northern enclaves refused to pay the additional taxes that a new governor in Akka, Abdullah Pasha (1818–1832), imposed on the amirate. Their Shiite neighbors joined the action, but the Druze and the Maronite peasants of the south stayed away. Sheikh Bashir Junblat, together with a few merchants from the south and probably also the amir himself, had paid part of the surtax out of their own pockets to relieve the southern peasants of the burden. Since there were no such affluent personages in the north, the surtax was levied on the producers, thereby provoking their reaction. Indeed, the recalcitrant peasants demanded not only an end to surtaxes but also the equitable distribution of the overall tax burden, claiming that the Druze enjoyed a privi-

leged position in the system. Political issues engendered by regional and class differences had begun to take on a sectarian coloring.

The influence of the increasingly better organized, better educated, and self-confident Maronite clergy on the emergence of this trend is unmistakable. A group of young clerics who provided guidance to the peasants in 1820 believed the Church should play an active role in defense of the interests of the Maronite community.^[39] As the two Bashirs dominated the amirate at a cost felt more heavily in the predominantly Maronite north than in the Druze-dominated south, the Church began to move into the political arena as an advocate of popular grievances. Amir Bashir would eventually ally himself with this new force, but in 1820–22 he showed no sympathy for the clerics' involvement in politics. He had the leading cleric involved, Bishop Yusuf Istafan, poisoned. He also repressed the resistance by force and collected the taxes levied on the peasants, with due support from Sheikh Bashir and the sheikh's Druze retainers.

No sooner had the amir reasserted his authority than developments external to the Mountain confronted him with new challenges and revealed the deepening breach between him and Sheikh Bashir. Since Cezzar's days, the potentates of the coastal lands had held Damascus and other inland towns largely under their sway by monopolizing the coastal trade. In 1822 the governors of Damascus and Aleppo joined forces to break this monopoly, and laid siege to Akka. So far, both Bashirs has cooperated with the coastal party perforce, as clients of the potentates of Akka and also because the cooperation served their interests well. At this juncture, however, the two Bashirs parted. The sheikh negotiated an agreement with the governor of Damascus to keep the Mountain out of the conflict. The amir remained loyal to Abdullah, the governor of Akka, and left for Egypt. A new amir, invested in his position by the governor of Damascus, took charge of the Mountain under Sheikh Bashir's wings.

Briefly, the sheikh appeared to have outwitted the amir, but the latter proved to be politically the shrewder of the two, for yet another rising force in the region tipped the balance in favor of Abdullah Pasha. Mehmed Ali (Muhammad 'Ali), the governor of Egypt, persuaded Istanbul to order the lifting of the siege against Akka. Amir Bashir returned to the Mountain triumphantly. The sheikh tried in vain to make peace with him. An all-out confrontation between the supporters of the amir and those of the sheikh became unavoidable. In 1825, the two sides joined battle at Mukhtara. The artillery and gunners that Abdullah Pasha had put at the amir's disposal decided the outcome. The leading Junblats and some of their supporters were forced to leave the Mountain for Hauran. Sheikh Bashir him-

self was eventually captured and was killed in the dungeons of Akka. Bashir Shihab confiscated Sheikh Bashir's property and redistributed the muqâta'as among his own supporters, keeping the lion's share for himself and his sons.^[40]

With the sheikh out of the way, Amir Bashir became the focal point of the Mountain's politics, more tangibly so than any of his predecessors except Fakhr al-Din. But Fakhr al-Din had really been the governor of the coast, and as such in the same category with Cezzar Ahmed Pasha, Süleyman Pasha, and Abdullah Pasha, whereas Amir Bashir was simply the ruler of the Mountain.^[41] He had always been a client of the governors of the coast and dependent on them to rule the Mountain, and he continued to be so to the end of his career. Amir Bashir was able to capitalize on the changes taking place in and around the Mountain, however, to become a stronger ruler than his predecessors. The economy could now generate more cash to sustain a somewhat greater degree of centralization. Indeed, the guards, scribes, and other retainers in the amir's employ increased as he extended the territories under his control. His mansion became more like a government palace. Here he convened meetings, settled disputes, and attended to administrative business. He was also able to appoint and dismiss the muqâta'ajis virtually at will. Although the incumbent muqâta'ajis continued to enjoy territorial autonomy and the notable families retained a privileged social status, their authority became visibly marginalized vis-à-vis not only the amir but also the Maronite Church.

With a new patriarch, Ilias Hubaish (1823–1845), at the helm, the Church had reconciled its differences with Bashir Shihab just before the critical Mukhtara battle.^[42] The amir, who practiced Sunni Islam in public and Christianity in private, allowed a Maronite priest to take charge of his spiritual life. In return, the patriarch used all the weight of the church to successfully rally the Maronite muqâta'ajis and sheikhs behind the amir, in the name of communal solidarity and interests. So far, all major political confrontations in the Mountain had been cross-sectarian. In Mukhtara, as well, there were Druze and Shiite chieftains fighting on both sides, but the Maronites concentrated their support on one side alone. This was a novel development. Sectarian sensitivities, already evoked during the peasant resistance of 1820–21, found vivid expression in Mukhtara.

After Mukhtara, the cooperation between the Church and the amir continued, enabling the Church to expand its organization, land possessions, and influence. As the Maronite peasants turned to the Church in increasing numbers for protection against oppressive taxation, the Church became the main mouthpiece of and principal power-broker within the

Maronite community. The amir relied on the Church to keep the northern districts under control. Furthermore, the Church's support provided the amir's rule with a moral legitimacy at a time when the leading lineages, which had hitherto been the main pillars of the Shihabi amirate, were fast becoming alienated from it, given the marginalization of their authority. Since most of the leading notables were Druze, and Amir Bashir's new source of political support self-consciously Maronite, the unfolding social cleavages in the Mountain began more than ever to loom as a sectarian issue. Perhaps the amir could have worked out a new social reconciliation that would have based the amirate on firmer ground, in accordance with the changing circumstances, assuming that he had the state-building qualities attributed to him by some of his modern admirers. But Mehmed Ali's invasion of Syria in 1831, and the consequent concentration of international attention on the Mountain, complicated its problems and rendered their resolution a challenge beyond the means of any amir.