4—
The Aristocratic Ethos and the Preservation of Status

The gods and the soldiers could shield a general from blame, but that protection would not have been enough to ensure his survival in the public arena. Strictly speaking, the problem was not one of escaping accountability for a defeat but one of protecting a political career from its domestic repercussions. Although the one was germane to the other, it was not inevitable that a victus would go on to win high office simply because he had somehow been judged not culpable for a disaster on the battlefield (although of course had the contrary been the case, it would certainly have meant personal ruin). Defeat could engender an irrational animus that an opponent might focus against him in subsequent rivalry. If victi as a group were to enjoy no better or worse a rate of success than that of their undefeated peers, then in order to strip lost battles of all consequence in future struggles for office, something had to keep the mere fact of having presided over a defeat from becoming a source of opprobrium. Avoiding recrimination was not enough, in and of itself, to bring that about.

A key step, therefore, lay in the ability to limit aristocratic competition in such cases solely to moral issues. The causes of the defeat itself were never in doubt and so could not become a source of controversy. Certainty on that point left a general's own conduct at the center of public attention. What counted above all else in the eyes of the Romans was not generalship in a technical sense but leadership in a moral one—how well or poorly a man's actions had reflected those qualities expected of a commander in defeat. The ideals and values comprising what may be termed the Roman aristocratic ethos laid down clear-cut standards that a war leader facing adversity was expected to meet and against which his conduct could therefore be judged. His performance on this score, not the

outcome of his battle, became the critical factor determining the public response.

This emphasis on personal deportment is most evident in the few cases where a victus failed to measure up to what the ethos demanded, and rivals capitalized on the anger he had thereby aroused to mount a prosecution against him. The complaints that lay at the center of these proceedings are overwhelmingly moral in character. They are little concerned with the broad questions of how the defeat had come about and who or what was responsible. They center instead on the far more narrow issues of the general's own behavior in the crisis and whether the required standards had been met. Contracting the focus in this way severely restricted the scope for aristocratic competition. Only if a victus had fallen short did a political issue exist and with it the opportunity for inimici to exploit it in court. Moral, not military, failure is the common thread connecting this small number of prosecutions, which strongly suggests that meeting expected standards was what allowed the majority of defeated generals to escape trial altogether. Given the high degree of competitiveness within aristocratic culture, there is no reason to think that opponents would have failed to raise these same sorts of charges against the vast bulk of victi except in the absence of a similar perception of personal disgrace.

As in the courts, so in the comitia. The existence of such generally accepted criteria of conduct furnished victi with a way of presenting themselves as successes despite their failures, and the availability of that recourse was of fundamental importance in limiting the political consequences. The fact that even in defeat their virtus could win respect or even high praise drove a wedge in the mind of the public between a lost battle and what it said about a general. Defeat implied nothing about his abilities or, more important, his character, thus limiting its potential for harm back in the competitive arena at Rome. As long as the expectations of the public had been met, no grounds for criticism existed and hence no issue for critics to exploit in subsequent rivalry. Victi would continue to enjoy electoral triumphs because the bases of their political strength—such things as their ancestry, connections, personal popularity, achievements, and especially a reputation for courage and moral worthiness—remained intact. Furthermore, and of equal importance, the power to obtain this protection reposed

principally in the hands of the victi themselves, not among the soldiers or with the fortunes of war. Although commanders had little ability to shape the broad course of events once the fighting started, they did have the capacity to control their own actions. By making plain what was expected of them, the aristocratic ethos thus gave to generals in the midst of a crisis the ability to determine its impact on their future careers. They therefore possessed the means to guard the one thing that really mattered—their standing among their peers in the race for status and prestige.

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The aristocratic ethos at Rome was both multifaceted and complex but emphasized two qualities pertaining directly to a general's conduct in defeat. T. Quinctius Flamininus summed them up this way in 197 as he lectured the Aetolians on proper deportment in war: "Gentlemen ought to be stern and hot-blooded in combat, noble and high-minded if worsted, but moderate, mild, and benevolent when they conquer."^[1] These last elements were certainly uppermost in the proconsul's mind, for his victory at Cynoscephalae had put him in a position to dictate terms for a settlement in Greece; however, the first and especially the second parts of his formulation clearly reflect an awareness that there was a proper stance for a Roman aristocrat in defeat.^[2] Perhaps the most impressive monument to this ideal is the remarkable transformation of C. Flaminius' final hours in the historical tradition. Working from sources both contemporary and highly critical of the consul, Polybius paints him as distressed and largely inert while the fighting swirled around him and the tribunes and centurions took what steps they could to meet the emergency at Lake Trasimene. But in Livy's telling more than a century later the portrait is dramatically different: the consul is conspicuous in the thick of the fray, struggling courageously and lending his aid wherever the fighting is

[2] On Flamininus' position following Cynoscephalae, see Eckstein, SenateandGeneral, 285-297. On the Romans' alleged moderation in victory, see the references collected by Gruen, HellenisticWorld, 346 n. 156; Gelzer, Hermes 68 (1933): 165-66 (=KS 3.90-91).

hottest until at last he is cut down in single combat.^[3] The change is not likely to have been the result of writers in the interval becoming generally more sympathetic to Flaminius. He emerges elsewhere in Livy's narrative as the same thoroughgoing demagogue and opponent of the nobility that Polybius encountered in the accounts he consulted. Rather, the amelioration occurred because the annalists were compelled to recognize that Flaminius was a Roman aristocrat notwithstanding his origins.^[4] Whatever else they may have thought about him, the historians knew how their audiences expected a man of his rank to die, and so they obliged by remolding the accounts of his conduct they received to reflect the required standards.^[5] His rehabilitation occurred precisely in terms of his stance in the face of disaster. Gone is the overwhelmed and helpless sufferer, replaced by a warrior unbowed in the crisis and stubbornly resisting to the end. The idealization clearly manifests in concrete terms precisely the qualities Flamininus commended to the Aetolians.

Thus a general was expected to display courage and self-control when things were falling apart all around him—a willingness to fight hard, take risks, and, if necessary, meet death fighting bravely. M. Caelius Rufus politely assumed in one letter to Cicero during his stint as governor of Cilicia that that not-very-bellicose imperator might find himself in the thick of it were he forced to do battle against the strong Parthian contingent invading Syria.^[6] The remark is more than mere empty flattery of a vain man's martial delusions. Generals died in battle frequently enough during the last two and a half centuries of the Republic to indicate that crisis often led commanders to put themselves in harm's way, and those

[3] Poly. 3.84.6; Livy 22.6.2-4; Plut. Fab. 3.3; cf. Jannsen, Mnemosyne 59 (1926): 189-94. On Flaminius' career generally and its representation in the sources,. see Gelzer, Hermes (1933): 152-53 (=KS 3.76-77).

[4] He was, of course, a novushomo, but by 217 he had been consul once already and censor as well, and these achievements put him solidly within the political elite of the city.

[5] And who is to say that the image the historians created abuses the truth? Flaminius had at least once before evinced a discomforting readiness to insist that his peers adhere in their private financial dealings to the strictures appropriate to men of their station, in his sponsorship of the lexClaudia (Poly. 21.63.3-4). It is, moreover, suggestive of mendacity in Polybius' sources that the haplessness he ascribes to him and the initiative of the tribunes in the crisis echo the allegations made by the same author in connection with Flaminius' battle against the Insubri during his first consulate (Poly. 2.33.6-9).

[6] Cic. Fam. 87 (8.10).1.

who survived took pains to advertise the fact.^[7] Caesar chose to present himself on more than one occasion striding up into the front lines to check his wavering men.^[8] Sulla apparently had likewise recorded his declaration at one point that he would stay and fight on alone if his troops fled to shame them into standing their ground.^[9] The image had an immediate resonance for contemporaries until the very end of the Republic because the palpable courage it represented mattered in the race for prestige and status.^[10]

We have more than one instance of a general entering the fray to help turn the tide of battle by leading an attack or endeavoring to shore up a critical point.^[11] Inasmuch as he brought his personal bodyguard with him, a commander's presence in the line of battle

[7] Any assessment of frequency must necessarily be tentative, owing to the incompleteness of the sources, but the following is a chronological list of commanders killed in battle between 300 and 49 B.C. (sources may be found in MRR under the appropriate year unless otherwise noted; cf. also Harris, Warand Imperialism,40 ): P. Decius Mus, cos. 295; L. Caecilius Metellus Denter, pr. 283 (on the date, however, see Morgan, CQ 66 [19721: 304-25); P. Decius Mus, cos. 279; Q. Fabius Maximus Gurges, cos. 265; C. Atilius Regulus, cos. 225; C. Flaminius, cos. 217; C. Centenius, propr. 217; L. Aemilius Paullus, cos. 216; L. Postumius Albinus, pr. 216, cos.-elect, 215; Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, procos. 212; M. Centenius Paenula, special command, 212 (Livy 25.19.9-17); P. Cornelius Scipio, procos. 211; Cn. Cornelius Scipio, procos. 211; Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, procos. 210; M. Claudius Marcellus, cos. 208; T. Quinctius Crispinus, cos. 208; C. Atinius, propr. 186; Q. Petilius, cos. 176; P. luventius Thalna, propr.(?) 148; C. Vetilius, pr. 147; P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, procos. 130; Sex. Pompeius, pr. 119; L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, pr. 112; L. Cassius Longinus, cos. 107; M. Aurelius Scaurus, leg. 105; L. Postumius, pr. 90; P. Rutilius Lupus, cos. 90; Q. Servilius Caepio, procos. 90; T. Didius, leg. 90; L. Porcius Cato, cos. 89; L. Thorius Balbus, leg. 79; M. Domitius Calvinus, procos. 79; L. Cossinius, pr. 73; L. Aurunculeius Cotta, leg. 54; C. Scribonius Curio, propr. 49.

[8] E.g. BGall. 2.25; BCiv. 3.69. Cf. Veil. Pat. 2.5.3-4; Suet. Iul. 62; Plut. Cat 's. 56.2; Frontin. Str. 2.8.13.

[9] On the events of 86 at Orchomenos, see Plut. Sull. 21.2; App. Mith. 49; Frontin. Stra. 2.8.12. The story probably originated in his own memoirs. Note also the same gesture during his march on Rome in 88: App. BCiv. 1.58, probably from the same source. Cf. M. Atilius Regulus in 294 (Livy 10.36.6-15, cf. Frontin. Str. 2.8.11; Frontin. Str. 4.1.29, probably from Fabius Pictor: Livy 10.37.13) and M. Aemilius Lepidus, tr. mil. in 190 at Magnesia (Livy 37.43.1-4).

[10] Cf. the young P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica's self-advertisement of his exploits in 168, in Plut. Aem. 15.3-16.2, and the youthful Ser. Sulpicius Galba's of his in 43, in Cic. Fam. 378 (10.30). One would expect such personal testimonials to have been a common practice among men of that age in view of Polybius' remark about the importance of a reputation for courage to an ambitious aristocrat (Poly. 31.29.1, cf. Diod. 31.27.8), although it is clear that age and prior achievement were no impediment to similar self-aggrandizement (Plut. Cat.Mai. 14.2-4).

[11] In addition to the cases mentioned above, note also C. Calpurnius Piso (Livy 39.31.7); Sulla (Plut. Sull. 29.5); Pompey (Plut. Sert. 21.2; App. BCiv. 1.58); and Sallust's portrait of Catiline's last stand (Cat. 60.4). Cf. Harris, WarandImperialism, 39; Campbell, Emperor andtheRomanArmy, 59-60.

perhaps made no small contribution to the physical task of winning a victory.^[12] Far more important, however, was the emotional charge his presence brought to the soldiers. Generals in battle most frequently appear just behind the front lines, encouraging their men, allowing themselves to be seen sharing their dangers, and thus spurring them on to greater efforts.^[13] That was where Scipio Africanus was during the assault on New Carthage in 209.^[14] Even as late as the second battle of Philippi both Octavian and Brutus were racing about along the battle line, "exciting the men by their ardour, exhorting the toilers to toil on, and relieving those who were exhausted."^[15] In the eyes of peers and citizens who believed that victory or defeat was fundamentally a result of the soldiers' determination to stand their ground and prevail or die, the most important thing a general could do was bolster their spirits and enhance their resolve in the contest. A general's visibility and personal deportment therefore had a direct, material relevance to the legionaries' own performance.^[16]

This influence was particularly felt in a crisis, when by setting an example of bravery for his men, a general could shame them

[12] On the bodyguard, see Poly. 6.31.3, cf. Walbank, Comm., 1.714, 2.647; Harris, WarandImperialism, 39.

[13] On the crucial role in all armies of leadership by example and the need for generals to be perceived as sharing risks, see Keegan, MaskofCommand, 329-38.

[14] Poly, 10.13.1; Livy 26.44.7-8, and esp. Walbank's comment, Comm., 2.214.

[16] Note the reaction of Caesar's troops to the news that their imperator was in danger: BGall. 2.26. Cf. the remarks of Keegan (FaceofBattle, 179, 188-90) on what made the British regiments at Waterloo stand firm under hours of intense bombardment: he finds the example of courage and honor set by their officers to have been a crucial factor, although of course the way honor and courage were to be demonstrated by an aristocrat in the era of gunpowder was quite different from the conventions of Rome in the middle and late Republic.

into greater efforts. That was clearly what Sulla and Caesar hoped to do by their dramatic interventions in the fray as the tide was turning against them. But perhaps the best evidence comes from a case where there can be no suspicion that events were touched up in later memoirs by the principal himself. In 176 the forces of Q. Petilius Spurinus were thrown back during an assault on a body of Ligurians dug in on a hill and began to waver toward flight. Petilius rode out in front of the standards to rally his men, where he was killed by an enemy spear. Petilius had deliberately exposed himself to danger, in effect daring his men to leave him to face the enemy alone—the ultimate disgrace. As it was, even though his troops recovered their resolve and went on to overcome the enemy, the senate held them culpable for the death of their consul and docked them a year's service and pay.^[17] Certainly there were limits to how far a general was expected to go with such efforts. Deliberate suicide was not necessarily called for. As Livy has Cn. Fulvius Flaccus ask rhetorically during his trial by way of exculpating his conduct at Herdonia, was he expected to throw his life away for no reason when his men were fleeing the field in defeat? Clearly the answer ought to have been no.^[18] But the most damning accusation against Flaccus was not that he had fled but that he had been the first to do so. He had done nothing whatsoever to stem the tide of battle. By contrast, when the forces of A. Manlius Vulso were chased from their camp in a surprise attack and fled in panic, Vulso himself ran too, but only after having tried in vain to stop them by every form of command and entreaty. Although the rout provoked panic at Rome and bitter complaints against Vulso himself, he never faced trial.^[19] He had done everything he could to recall the soldiers to their duty and promote resistance.

As a consequence of this demand for unwavering determination

[17] Livy 41.18.11-13; Val. Max. 2.7.15; Frontin. Str. 4.1.46. Petilius himself could not have burnished the account, and the family was thereafter of so little importance that the tale is hardly likely to have suffered from excessive enhancement in subsequent funeral elogia and on other such occasions, as was perhaps true with the greater gentes (Cic. Brut. 62; Livy 27.27.13; and, generally, RE 12.1 col. 992-94).

[18] Livy 26.3.2-3; see further below.

[19] Livy 41.2.8, cf. 41.1.1-2.13. On panic and complaints, see Livy 41.5.1-2; 6.1-3; 7.4-10; cf. 10.3. Note, however, that Vulso recaptured his camp and with his colleague won a subsequent victory (Livy 3.1-4.8; 10.1-4).

in a defeat, few victi are recorded as having allowed themselves to be captured alive in combat.^[20] Sallust, always alive to the posture true virtus required, put it this way when he wrote Catiline's speech to his followers as they prepared to make their final stand against their pursuers: "But if fortune envies your virtus, take care not to die unavenged, and do not be captured and slaughtered like beasts, but rather, fighting like men, leave the enemy a bloody and mournful victory."^[21] The sentiment derives in good measure from a rhetorical topos, of course; it was a cliche by that time.^[22] But it became one at Rome, as elsewhere, precisely because the posture it signified represented the standard aristocrats were expected to meet. Catiline himself lived up to those high words; he perished far out in front of his own lines, surrounded by enemy dead.^[23] The Romans had a highly effective means of making vivid the equation between surrender and degradation in the ritual slaughter they inflicted on the enemy war leaders they had taken prisoner as part of their own victory celebrations.^[24] Nothing could make plainer for Roman generals the possible consequences of preferring capture to death when they lost.^[25] The attitude was a venerable one among the Roman upper class. L. Postumius Albinus died resisting capture with all his might in 216.^[26] When L. Hostilius Mancinus realized his troop of cavalry would not be able to outrun the Numidian horsemen who had surprised them, he rallied his men for a sui-

[20] Scipio Asina (appendix 1.1, no. 26), an apparent exception, was in fact trapped with very few men by the enemy and either compelled to surrender or taken prisoner during a parlay; on Regulus, see below, n. 25; on Aurelius Scaurus, see below, n. 30.

[21] Sail. Cat. 58.21: quodsivirtutivostraefortunainviderit,caveteinulti animamamittatis,neucaptipotiussicutipecoratrucidemini,quam virorummorepugnantescruentam atqueluctuosamvictoriamhostibus relinquatis.

[22] Xen. An. 3.2.2f.; Poly. 3.63.9; cf. Vretska, De CatilinaeConiuratione, 671-72.

[23] Sail. Cat. 61.4-6. Cf. the death of Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, procos. 210 (Livy 27.1.12).

[24] See Dar.-Sag. 5:489.

[25] Note too the tales concerning the fate of the proconsul M. Atilius Regulus, whom the Carthaginians took prisoner in 255 and then tortured to death after he refused to do their bidding. For sources, see MRR 1.209-10; for discussion, see RE 2 cols. 2088-92, and De Sanctis, Storia, 3.1 : 154-56, who reject the traditional accounts; contra, however, see Frank, CPh 21 (1926): 311-14. It matters less that the story is probably untrue than that it was told and repeated. The Romans found it satisfying, for it confirmed not only what they believed to be true of the Carthaginian character, but what tradition taught them about their options in defeat.

[26] Livy 23.24.11.

cidal charge against the enemy.^[27] P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus' end was much celebrated: in the confusion following the defeat of his army by Aristonicus, he was caught by a Thracian mercenary. To avoid falling into enemy hands, he stabbed his captor in the eye with his riding crop and so enraged the man that he killed Crassus reflexively.^[28] To die resisting desperately was thus not only to avoid the shame of capture but possibly even to achieve a certain measure of gloria as well.^[29]

Yet even eluding capture did not necessarily mean avoiding disgrace; survival itself could be unacceptable under certain conditions. An overwhelming defeat appears to have raised the expectation that the man in command simply would not return alive. According to one version of events, M. Aurelius Scaurus could have escaped the slaughter of his legions in 105, but he preferred death: his sense of honor would not allow him to survive unharmed when he had lost his army.^[30] Caesar likewise could present his propraetor, C. Scribonius Curio, as proclaiming that he would never return to Caesar after having lost the forces entrusted to him and then rushing forth to seek death in the melee.^[31] The same deliberate resolve to perish with his men rather than return without them also features prominently in Livy's highly wrought portrait of L. Aemilius Paullus at Cannae. The consul had given his all in

[27] Livy 22.15.9-10. Cf. M. Centenius Paenula in 210 (Livy 25.19.8-17). The son of this Mancinus became praetor in 180 and consul in 170, the first of that family to achieve eminence. One wonders what role, if any, his father's heroism in death contributed to his son's elevation.

[28] Val. Max. 3.2.12; Flor. 1.35.4-5, cf. Livy Per.59; Asc. 25 C; Veil. 2.4.1.

[29] Cf. Cic. Sest. 48: innumerabilesaliipartim adipiscendaelaudis,partimvitandae turpitudiniscausamorteminvariisbellisaequissmisanimisoppetissent; see also Earl, MoralandPolitical Traditions, 32; cf. idem, Sallust, 23. Note too the image of heroic self-sacrifice to bring about victory represented by the devotio of P. Decius Mus, cos. 340, and his son, P. Decius Mus, cos. 295: for sources, see MRR 1:134, 177. On the ceremony itself, see Latte, Römische Religionsgeschichte, 125-26; 203-4.

[30] Gran. Licin. 33.1-5 C. Livy recorded a different version of Scaurus' end focusing on a different manifestation of courage and heroism (Per. 67; Oros. 5.16.21 cf. Valerius Antias, frg. 63 P). The important point here, however, is not to decide which account contains the truth of the matter but to take note of how contemporary and later writers idealized Scaurus' posture in defeat and so contributed to the ongoing process of defining aristocratic models of conduct; cf. Griffin, JRS 67 (1977): 17-26, on the phenomenon of life imitating art imitating life in the late Republic On the ideal of an unbowed attitude in defeat, the central feature of Scaurus' portrayal in the Livian tradition, see below, n. 78. Note also P. Valerius Falto (Zonar. 8.18) and M. Centenius Paenula (Livy 25.19.16).

[31] Caes. BCiv. 2.42.

the battle, fighting fiercely throughout, and finally, when all was lost, he replied to those who would have him flee, "Let me die amid this slaughter of my soldiers."^[32] That statement unmistakably evinced the nobility and courage demanded at such a moment.^[33] The criticism leveled against Varro for having survived the debacle certainly grew out of the pointed contrast his detractors could draw between his colleague's death fighting furiously in the thick of the battle and his own failure to measure up to the same ideal.^[34] The greater the extent of the disaster, it seems, the more extreme the gesture that was required to prove one's virtus. In a calamity like Cannae, only death could signal the greatness of spirit that decorum exacted, even if one had to do the job oneself.^[35]

In some ways, therefore, dying in the midst of calamity could seem attractive to a defeated general. He might achieve a measure of glory to enhance his memory and increase the honor of his family, whereas the very fact that he had come back alive could become a potential source of danger if questions were raised about how he had managed to survive when so many others had died. Thus the senate's famous decree of thanks to Varro after Cannae was necessary to put an end to criticism of his conduct and rehabilitate him for further service in the war.^[36] Even Cicero was acutely aware

[32] Livy 22.49.11: Meinhacstrage militummeorumpatereexspirare.

[33] Note also the refusal of Cn. Octavius, cos. 87, to flee when Cinna and Marius captured Rome. Instead, according to Appian, he withdrew to the Janiculum with the remnants of his forces and, in the full regalia of his office, there awaited death (App. BCiv. 1.71); cf. Plut. Mar. 42.5, which places him on the rostra, probably incorrectly.

[34] On Paullus' death, see Poly. 3.116.1-4, 9; Livy 22.49.1-12, cf. 50.7; Vell. Pat. 1.9.3; Plut. Fab. 16.5-8; Plut. Aem. 2.2; App. Hann. 23-24; Frontin. Str. 4.5.5. Criticisms of Varro; see Poly. 3.116.13 (probably from Fabius Pictor: Walbank, Comm. 1:448); App. Hann. 25; Plut. Aem. 2.3; Oros. 5.5.8. On the portrait of Varro in the sources, see Will, Historia 32 (1983): 173-82.

[35] Cf. Cicero's picture of Crassus' end at Carrhae: nie videretvictoremvivusinimicum, eademsibimanuvitamexhausisse,quamortemsaepehostibus obtulisset (Sest. 48). This passage is a particularly revealing instance of idealizing a general's conduct in defeat in view of the far more sordid version of Crassus' demise in the narrative sources (Livy Per. 106; Plut. Crass. 31.1-6; Dio 40.27.1-3). But Cicero was speaking directly to the Roman public, and he knew the standard of conduct the citizenry expected from its leaders in such circumstances. On Cicero's personal motives in manipulating this ideal, see further below.

[36] Sources are in appendix 1.1, no. 85; see further below, pp. 139-40. Nevertheless, according to one tradition, Varro preserved an attitude of contrition and disgrace thereafter. He let his hair and beard grow long and refused to eat reclining (Frontin. Str. 4.5.6).

of the trouble accusations of self-serving flight in a desperate situation could spawn. To be sure, he never lost a battle of the sort we are concerned with here, but he did cast the options open to him in the final phase of his struggle with Clodius in 59-58 in terms of taking up arms and the likelihood of death or withdrawal into exile.^[37] He chose the latter course. Following his triumphant return he was at pains to justify his conduct two years earlier and in particular to answer critics who declared that he ought to have met death fighting.^[38] He insisted his decision had not come because he was afraid to die, but out of patriotism and concern for the state. No one could call him a coward.^[39] The relevance to the predicament of a victus is clear: survival under the wrong circumstances led to disgrace and hence political vulnerability. The prefect T. Turpilius Silanus had the singular misfortune to be the only man left alive when the inhabitants of Vaga massacred the town's Roman garrison during the Jugurthine War. How he got out unscathed Sallust was unable to explain, but, that author continued, "he appeared base and contemptible because he had valued his wretched life more highly in the crisis than his good name."^[40] Brought before Q. Metellus Numidicus to account for his escape, he could not do so satisfactorily, and the consul ordered him put to death.^[41] Both the general and the historian presumed Turpilius must have done something shameful to survive, and his failure to prove otherwise warranted the supreme penalty.^[42]

The threat that arose when a general fell short of expectations on this score is most strikingly revealed in the trial of Q. Servilius

[37] Cic. Sest. 39-40, 43-44; Dom. 63.

[38] Cic. Sest.45:Unumenim [var. in other eds.] mihirestabatillud,quod forsitannonnemovirfortis etacrisanimimagniquedixerit: "Restitisses,repugnasses,mortem pugnansoppetisses. "

[39] Cic. Sest. 47-49, cf. 36; Dom. 63-64, 95.

[40] Sail. Iug. 67.3: quiailliintanto maloturpisvitaintegrafama potiorfuit,inprobisintestabilisque videtur.

[41] Sail.Iug. 69.4, cf. Plut. Mar. 8.1-2; App. Num. 3.

[42] Whatever pressure the legate Marius applied to secure Turpilius' execution could only be brought to bear because of the strong conviction among those in Metellus' concilium that survival in such circumstances equaled dishonorable conduct, stemming from a consensus on this point among aristocrats generally (Plut. Mar. 8.2). On the politics involved, see Badian, ForeignClientelae, 196-97; Gruen, RomanPolitics, 152-54; on doubts about Marius' involvement, see Passerini, Ath., n.s. 12 (1934): 24-25.

Caepio, one of the ill-fated commanders at Arausio in 105. We know very little about the proceedings themselves beyond the fact that they were a violent affair and that some years later, in 94, his accuser, C. Norbanus, himself faced charges of maiestas in connection with the events.^[43] M. Antonius defended Norbanus successfully on that occasion in a famous speech, of which Cicero preserves a summary. After upholding the right of the Roman people to undertake a seditio, Antonius focused his whole speech on a denunciation of Caepio's flight and a lament for the destruction of his army, rekindling among his listeners their grief at the loss of friends and relatives.^[44] It is not certain that these were the principal themes in Norbanus' case against Caepio nine years before, but on balance the likelihood seems strong. If Antonius believed the flight of Caepio and the destruction of the army would be effective in moving the jurors to side with Norbanus, then it is a fair surmise that they were among the main issues that Norbanus himself had raised against Caepio since by his appeal to them Antonius intended to reawaken old animosities. There is no reason to assume that what aroused the jurors' hostility in 94 would not have done the same among the voters in 103.^[45] But even if the accusation does not represent the burden of Norbanus' case against Caepio, its political impact is nonetheless demonstrated clearly in the outcome of the trial in 94: Norbanus was acquitted.^[46] Whatever crimes he

[43] On the seditioNorbani, see Cic. DeOr. 2.197; MRR 1:564; appendix 1.1, no. 81.

[44] Cic. DeOr. 2.199, esp.: Tumomnem orationemtraduxi[Antoniuis]et convertiinincrepandamCaepionis fugam,indeploranduminteritum exercitus:siceteorumdolorem,quilugebantsuos,oratione refricabam,;cf. 2.124, 200, 203.

[45] Caepio had of course altered the composition of the juries of the criminal courts during his consulship to replace equites with senators (sources are in MARR 1:533, cf. 3:194). Antonius expected the memory of that measure would increase hostility among the equestrian jurors in 94 (Orat. 2.199-200). But although anger on this score surely fueled the antipathies of his audience, it hardly constituted their prime source, as the tenor of Antonius' speech demonstrates.

[46] Gruen, Historia 15 (1966): 45-46 (cf. RomanPolitics, 195-96), views this verdict, along with several others in cases around the same time, as a demonstration of the equestrian jurors' disinterest in involving themselves in the partisan rivalries he sees being played out in the trial. Disinterested in factional politics the jurors may have been, but certainly this indifference was not the main, or even an important, reason for their verdict. Such a view places the event in far too limited a perspective. Everything we know about this case, especially from Cicero's report of Antonius' speech, indicates that it, like the one brought against Q. Servilius Caepio, the son of the consul of 106 at about the same time, asked the equestrians to pass judgment on the violent events of a decade before. Their verdicts put an unmistakable seal of approval on the punishment Norbanus inflicted on Caepio senior for his actions in connection with the Arausio disaster as well as for his son's resistance to Saturninus' demagoguery notwithstanding the violence of which each had been guilty. Both had been justified; neither diminished the majesty of Rome. Elaborate speculation about the factional alignments revealed by these cases has obscured their real meaning in the larger context of Roman politics. See also Badian, Studies, 34-70, on the trials of Caepio and Norbanus and further prosopographical musings.

had committed in the course of prosecuting Caepio were largely outweighed in the jurors' eyes by the enormity of Caepio's own conduct in connection with the defeat. It stands to reason, therefore, that if Caepio's flight and the destruction of the army were central to Antonius' case on Norbanus' behalf, something about them was open to criticism. The material presented here strongly suggests that simply surviving a catastrophe of this magnitude without a clear demonstration of personal bravery in the fight was tantamount to a proof of cowardice and sufficient to call down the wrath of the public.^[47]

Thus certainly in Norbanus' trial and probably in Caepio's the standards of conduct imposed by the aristocratic ethos were vital in determining the political implications of the defeat. The attack against Caepio did not come about simply because of factional intrigue or the hysteria generated by the disaster, important as those

[47] The depth of hostility against Caepio is also evident in the fact that he was not allowed to withdraw into exile after the verdict against him but was hauled off to prison to await execution. He was only saved by the intervention of a friendly tribune (Val. Max. 4.7.3, cf. 6.9.13); on the custom of allowing exile, see Poly. 6.14.9; on imprisonment preliminary to execution, see Mommsen, Röm.Strafr., 960-62. Caepio's imprisonment may only have been owing to the fact of his having been fined as a result of the trial and held in prison to guarantee its payment (Lengel, Hermes 66 [1931]: 303), but this would have been highly unusual and seems therefore far from probable. It is sometimes also believed that Cn. Mallius, who also suffered a defeat by the Cimbri in conjunction with Caepio's, stood trial as well (Gruen, RomanPolitics, 165). No source so states, however, and Cic. Dc. (r. 2.125 need not refer to a speech in his defense, only to a lament for Mallius' fate in another context. The sources tell us only that he was obeandemcausamquamet CaepioL.Saturninirogationee civitateplebiscitoeiectus (Gran. Lic. 33.24 C), and this statement might plausibly be taken to mean that he elected to withdraw from Rome rather than face a trial in which violence similar to that which marred Caepio's would render his defense otiose, and that afterward a bill confirmed this self-imposed sentence of exile (Lengle Hermes 66 [1931]: 312-13; contra Gabba, Ath., n.s. 29 (1951): 22 n. 4, is not convincing). Furthermore, Mallius too may have survived the debacle by running away, exposing him to public wrath equally with Caepio.

factors may have been.^[48] Political inimicitia and public anguish were constants following serious losses. Rather, Caepio opened himself to his enemies' attempt to direct public anger against him by seeming to prefer to save his life by flight while his men were being cut to pieces. It is striking that, as Cicero preserves his speech, there is little indication that Antonius taxed Caepio principally with actually causing the disaster, although he would not have lacked grounds for such a charge: Caepio had refused to join forces with the consul Mallius when the latter urged this course; he was determined instead that credit for the victory should belong to himself alone. An attempt at reconciliation left the two men more hostile than before. When the Cimbri sought terms of peace, Caepio's response convinced them that they had no alternative but war.^[49] If Antonius touched on these transgressions, he apparently made so little of them that Cicero thought them not worth mentioning.^[50]

Nor was it the case that nothing more than the severe shock and outrage in the aftermath of a disaster of such magnitude had made

[48] On factional alignments, see above, n. 46; on inimicitiae, see Epstein, PersonalEnmity, 16.

[49] Valerius Antias frg. 63 P (= Oros. 5.16.2); Gran. Lic. 33.6-11 C.; Dio 27 frg. 91.1-3; cf. Livy Per. 67. These transgressions are commonly believed to have been the central issues in his trial (Gruen, RomanPolitics, 161-65; Epstein, PersonalEnmity, 16). However, Caepio was legally in the right in refusing cooperation: he could act as he thought best within his provincia and was in no sense Mallius' subordinate. Caepio may have met such charges with the plea that the fortunes of war had brought about the loss of his army, not his own actions (Rhet.Her. 1.24; cf. Cic. Brut. 135; Lengle, Hermes 66 [1931]: 307-8).

[50] Cf., however, Cic. DeOr. 2.164, which, if it actually comes from Antonius' defense of Norbanus, shows that at some point he argued that simaiestasamplitudoacdignitascivitatis,iseam minuitquiexercitumhostibus populiRomanitradidit,nonqui eumquiidfecisset,populi Romanipotestatitradidit. This statement may indicate that Antonius' speech included the accusation that Caepio's decisions in command had caused the destruction of his army, but it is more in keeping with the thrust of Cicero's summary of the speech at 2.199 to see it as a reference to the effect his flight had on his men, causing resistance to crumble among the rank and file when it became generally known that their commander had fled. Cf. the result of Cn. Fulvius Flaccus' flight and its role in the proceedings undertaken against him, discussed immediately below. Val. Max. 4.7.3 suggests that Caepio was imprisoned because it appeared that it was his fault his army was destroyed, but that may be nothing more than Valerius' own inference. Yet even if we assume that Caepio's decision to put the interests of the state behind the selfish pursuit of his personal feud against Mallius formed a principal theme in the case against him, his action involves much the same sort of moral turpitude as does his flight to save his own life instead of sacrificing it in a final, desperate attempt to turn the tide of battle. Cf. Cic. Fam. 395 (10.18).2, Plancus to Cicero, for an appraisal of the likely response of the public to such a choice on the part of a commander.

Caepio vulnerable. These factors contributed but were not crucial. M. Iunius Silanus underwent prosecution in the year following the debacle, when passions were, if anything, running higher, and he stood accused of being the cause of all the current misfortunes of the Republic. He was acquitted by a wide margin.^[51] It was not simply the loss of his army that set Caepio's case apart; the critical difference was his failure to display the self-sacrifice and personal valor expected of a man of his station. That failure transformed what might have been an unhappy, but politically benign, episode into a personal catastrophe.^[52] The centrality of this transgression is underscored by its power to shape the outcome of rivalry almost a decade later. Despite the strength of the case against Norbanus—the indisputable violence that had attended his prosecution of Caepio and his disregard for a tribunician veto of the proceedings—Antonius was able to use the proconsul's own moral failure to blunt the assault launched against his client.^[53]

Even when defeat was not grave enough to bring the fate of the Republic into doubt, conformity to the ethos defined the issues around which rivalry took shape in its wake. In 212 the army of the praetor Cn. Fulvius Flaccus dissolved at the onset of a Carthaginian attack, and in the following year its commander faced trial on account of the defeat.^[54] The complaints raised against him did not center on his management of the battle and its role in bringing about the defeat. That the soldiers themselves were responsible was never in doubt. In his defense, as Livy presents it, Flaccus both asserted the propriety of his own conduct and heaped blame

[51] Appendix 1.i, no. 44, see further above, pp. 47-48.

[52] The charge of cowardice in the face of defeat came at a time when the moral worthiness of the senatorial class to lead was generally being questioned: cf. the speech of Marius in 107 as given by Sallust, Iug. 85. Such allegations may have considerably increased the impact of the charges against Caepio.

[53] Cf. Cic. deOr. 2.197. Note also that when the son of M. Aemilius Scaurus, princepssenatus, fled the Germans' victorious charge while serving as a legate under the consul Catulus in 102, his father sent word that he would rather have seen his son dead in battle than charged with a disgraceful flight and ordered the young man never to come into his presence again. Shame drove the son to suicide (Val. Max. 5.8.4; Frontin. Str. 4.1.13; DeVir.Ill . 72.10). Scaurus himself may have had little choice; he had been present at Caepio's trial, apparently as one of his defenders, and seeming to condone Caepio's cowardice may have made it imperative for Scaurus to condemn the same behavior on the part of his son to protect his own position.

[54] Sources for the battle are in appendix 1.1, no. 35. De Sanctis and Brunt both reject this episode as a doublet of the defeat of Cn. Fulvius Centumalis, pr. 210, but incorrectly; see appendix 3.

on that of his men: he had done everything a good general should; they had run away from the enemy.^[55] The prosecutor concurred. He accepted the defendant's assertion that the soldiers had been unruly and contumacious but charged that they had become so by contagion from their commander's turpitude. Nor did he deny that the legionaries had fled, only that the impulse to do so arose from among themselves: their leader had been the first to run. He could only blame Flaccus for the defeat, in other words, by imputing it to flaws in his personal character and to the effect these had had on his men.^[56]

However, the complexion of the trial changed dramatically once the charge of cowardice could be substantiated. When witnesses came forward to testify that not only had Flaccus been the first to run, but his flight had indeed precipitated a general rout among his men, public indignation became acute.^[57] Popular outrage brought the defendant's life suddenly into jeopardy as the contio hearing the case began to shout for the death penalty. His accuser obliged by substituting a charge of perduellio for the fine originally proposed. Worse, the revelation damned Flaccus in the eyes of his peers. The other tribunes refused his pleas to block the new charges, and an appeal to the senate from his eminent brother Quintus, consul for the third time the year before and now in command of the siege at Capua, for permission to return to Rome to attend the trial was turned down flat. Revulsion at his cravenness had put this scion of one of the most eminent and powerful gentes of the era outside the pale, and he, seeing the handwriting on the wall, slunk off into exile.^[58]

The issues of culpability and moral failure are not easy to disentangle in this affair, even assuming that Livy reports accurately

[55] Livy 26.3.1-4. Livy's account of the battle repeatedly stresses the soldiers' indiscipline and refusal to heed their officers' commands (25.20.6, 21.1, 5-10). See further above, pp. 106-7.

[56] Livy 26.2.7-16. Losing one's army was never accounted a crime at Rome. The closest one gets to such a charge is in a comment by the second-century A.D. jurist Scaevola on the lexIuliaMaiestatis (Dig. 48.4.4) regarding leading an army intentionally into an ambush or some other form of betrayal. Such actions may have been explicitly included within the scope of Caesar's law, possibly on the model of Saturninus' legislation. I owe this reference to Michael Alexander, in a private communication.

[57] Livy 26.3.5: testibusdatis . . . iurati permultidicerentfugaepavorisque initiumapraetoreortum,ab eodesertosmilitescumhaud vanumtimoremduciscrederenttergadedisse. Cf. 2.12, 16.

[58] Livy 26.3.6-12.

the substance of what was said and done at the trial.^[59] But the point is surely that given the role of the gods and the importance of the soldiers themselves in determining the outcome of a battle, what mattered to the Romans was the personal conduct of a general as opposed to his management of the army as a whole. In a case such as that made against Flaccus, culpability could only really be expressed in moral terms because in a crisis it was as an exemplar rather than as a manager that a general made his greatest contribution.

Consequently, more is involved in the prosecutions of Caepio and Flaccus than merely two cowards who were caught and punished. Theirs are two of the few cases in which the political repercussions of a defeat were fatal to a general's career: their cravenness exposed them to the wrath of the citizens and their peers. That fact argues strongly that the right posture in defeat worked equally to shield the bulk of victi from public ire and partisan attack. On one level the protection such a stance offered resulted simply from the important contribution a general's display of courage could make to the outcome of a battle, as we have seen. But such displays are merely conventional in face-to-face combat. Under such circumstances war leaders are expected to exhibit great bravery and thereby inspire their men to fight harder, to be avatars of the qualities required of the group.^[60] On a deeper level the peculiarly Roman feature of this convention was its political ramifications. Its utility did not cease once the fighting had stopped but instead continued to exert a powerful influence in the competitive arena back at Rome. This potency arose not simply because it could there be said that a victus had done his utmost to turn the tide of battle and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, so that no grounds for complaint against his performance existed on that score. Rather, the key to the political significance of the convention lay in the fact that the courage he had displayed reconfirmed his aristocratic status.

Generals who deliberately put themselves in danger during the

[59] If not, it is still instructive concerning the lines along which Livy and his sources thought such an affair ought to have been played out.

[60] See in this regard Keegan's analysis of Alexander's generalship (MaskofCommand, 60-91) and the remark of Paul Fussell: "The whole trick for the officer is to seem what you would be, and the formula for dealing with fear is ultimately rhetorical and theatrical: regardless of your actual feelings, you must simulate a carriage which will affect your audience as fearless, in the hope that you will be imitated, or at least not be the occasion for spreading panic" (Wartime, 274).

heat of battle, who refused to surrender or even survive when all was lost, displayed a superior form of courage and self-discipline to that of their men, for theirs was the product of an individual decision, not something expected of them because they were part of a group. It was precisely this readiness to face extreme danger when no necessity compelled it that was acknowledged as the supreme manifestation of personal courage at Rome and that won decorations for valor, not the bravery of soldiers in the line of battle.^[61] And it was distinction in valor that represented one of the great avenues for winning fame and building a political career. During the middle Republic a reputation for courage was virtually an indispensable prerequisite for success in public life.^[62] When the dictator appointed in 216 to revise the role of the senate, M. Fabius Buteo, made his lectio, he selected first the former curule officeholders not yet enrolled, next ex-plebeian aediles, tribunes of the plebes, and quaestors, and finally those who had spoils taken from the enemy affixed to their walls or a civic crown.^[63] The expectation is clearly that men in the last-named category would under ordinary circumstances move into the other two as a matter of course. Fabius simply accelerated the normal sequence of political advancement to fill up the ranks of the senate depleted by the carnage of the opening years of the Hannibalic War. The normal pattern is reflected in the cursus of M. Claudius Marcellus, consul in 222 and thrice thereafter: victories in single combat brought him spoils; saving his brother's life won him a civic crown. The reputation that followed boosted him to a curule aedileship, after which a consulate might seem virtually certain.^[64]

By the late Republic the aristocratic ethos had evolved considerably, and a far wider range of behavior served to demonstrate

[61] Poly. 6.39.4. On monomachia during the Republic, see Oakley, CQ 35 (1985): 392-410.

[62] Poly. 31.29.1.

[63] Livy 23.23.5-6.

[64] Plut. Marc. 2.1-2. On the frequency with which curule aediles rose to the consulship, see Develin, Practice, 92-96; cf. PatternsinOffice-Holding, 23-24. Note too that among the ten highest goods attained by L. Caecilius Metellus, cos. 251 and 247, primariusbellator occupied the initial position; with optimusorator it served as entree and foundation for the rest: Q. Caecilius Metellus, ORF 2; on the identity of L. Metellus, see ORF 535 and the works cited there. Cato the Elder was certainly well aware of that fact; according to his biographer, although as a young man he devoted much time to pleading cases in court, his principal concern was to gain high repute as a warrior (Plut. Cat.Mai. 1.5-6; cf. Astin, CatotheCensor, 6-7).

elite status."^[65] Yet even down to the close of the first century personal bravery still counted for much, and one's prowess as a warrior continued to be considered a strong claim to membership in the ruling class of Rome.^[66] Cicero in Cilicia could proclaim a willingness to face any and all dangers in the line of duty.^[67] Perhaps this affirmation should be considered merely a matter of form, but the fact that he felt convention demanded it indicates that it still mattered to those he addressed that a general commanding the Republic's forces express himself in those terms. As late as 18 B.C. a man being purged from the senate by Augustus could bare his chest in the curia to display his scars and enumerate his campaigns by way of validating his claim to a place within its ranks.^[68]Virtus supplied a principal element within the ideological underpinnings of senatorial dominance, and one of its most basic manifestations was as personal courage.^[69] Consequently generals who displayed exceptional, deliberate bravery in the crisis of battle not only contributed materially to efforts to salvage a victory from the midst of impending defeat, but, more important, they placed themselves firmly within the moral tradition that defined the aristocracy and thereby protected themselves against prosecutions or other attacks intended to strip them of that status. They proved themselves worthy of the stature they already enjoyed—perhaps even enhanced it—and so neutralized the impact of their defeats on their chances for future political success. Defeat became politically dangerous only when, as in the cases of Caepio and Flaccus, it revealed that such pretensions to moral superiority were fraudulent.

[65] Note, e.g., the "five greatest goods" that a consensus of historians in the later second century B.C. believed P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus had attained: Sempronius Asellio frg. 8 P (= Gell. NA 1.13.10). But note also how he died: above, p. 122.

[66] Nicolet, WorldoftheCitizen, 136-37; on the role of personal valor in the elevation of equites to the ranks of the senate, see idem, "Armée et sociétè à Rome," 117-156.

[67] Cic. Fam. 104 (15.1).4.

[68] Dio 54.14.3; cf. the political authority that M. Servilius Pulex Geminus asserted such scars conferred on him when he addressed the populus in 167 (Livy 45.39.14-19; Plut. Aem. 31.2). Note also the coins of his descendants, C. and M. Servilius, moneyers in 127 and c. 100, which commemorate their ancestor's exploits in battle (Crawford, RomanRepublican Coinage, 289, 328-29).

[69] Harris, WarandImperialism, 20.

However, courage was demonstrated not only by a general's performance in the battle itself; equally important was his steadfastness afterward. Like his soldiers in the battle, a victus was still expected to stand his ground at all costs once it was over and the enemy had won. Polybius explained to his Greek readers the Romans' peculiar ancestral custom of appearing at their most stubborn and severe whenever they were beaten.^[70] At such times they never softened their bargaining position; rather, they were most to be feared at moments of real danger.^[71] Down to the end of the Republic it remained a point of honor even among defeated generals to refuse negotiations with an armed enemy.^[72] The nobility and high-mindedness that Flamininus held up to the Aetolians in 197 as the characteristics a gentleman ought to display in defeat thus acquired a specific and concrete manifestation once the fighting was over; hence victi were under considerable pressure to adopt a hard-line stance in negotiating with victorious opponents to demonstrate the necessary courage and resolve.^[73] This could lead to patent absurdities.

After beating the Romans under P. Licinius Crassus' leadership in 171, the Macedonian king Perseus sent envoys to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Crassus, however, with the backing of his consilium, elected to return as stern a reply as possible, commanding the king to surrender unconditionally and leave the fate of Macedon to the discretion of the senate. Diplomatically the Roman position was utter folly—the enemy found it difficult to be certain whether it was the height of arrogance or a bargaining ploy.^[74] To be sure, peace on the terms the king was offering may not have accurately reflected the Roman perception of the balance of power between the two sides. But the specific terms of Crassus' response arose less out of a calculated realpolitik than out of the imperatives conventional expectations about proper conduct in defeat had imposed on him. Exhibiting flexibility and an openness to compromise would have been viewed as a disgrace back at Rome. Rather, the moral stance demanded after a loss dictated that his

[70] Poly. 27.8.8; cf. Livy 42.62.11.

[71] Poly. 21.17.1 with Livy 37.45.12 and Walbank, Comm., 3:l09; Poly. 3.75.8.

[72] Caes. BGall.5.36.3; cf. Sall. Cat. 34.1.

[73] Poly. 18.37.7.

[74] Poly. 27.8.1-11; cf. Livy 42.62.1-15.

negotiating position be exactly the same as if he had won a resounding victory.^[75]

Fortunately for Crassus, his loss was not serious, and success soon followed.^[76] But for others in predicaments far worse, the need to preserve the required stance could lead them to make their situations truly desperate. Rebellious Gauls besieged the forces of Caesar's legate Q. Tullius Cicero in their cantonments over the winter of 54/3. After surrounding his camp, they offered to allow the Romans to depart unharmed, but the nature of Cicero's reply was a foregone conclusion: "It was not the custom of the Roman people to accept terms from an armed enemy. If they wished to lay down their arms, he would intercede for them if they wished to send envoys to Caesar; he trusted that, in view of his justice, they would obtain what they wanted."^[77] The Gauls must have been mightily confused at a demand for their surrender; they seemed to hold all the high cards: the Romans were facing the possibility of a long siege and uncertain prospects of rescue. Certainly Cicero may have suspected that the enemy's promise of safe conduct was a fraud; he may have hoped for Caesar's speedy succor. Yet even so, it is the form of his reply that is arresting. He could have opened talks in a play for time. He could have feigned acceptance and invented reasons for delay. But instead he chose to behave as if he had the Gauls exactly where he wanted them—at his mercy.

Cicero knew what honor required of a leader in a tough spot and acted accordingly. He also must have been aware that had he not, he would have faced the judgment of his peers and countrymen. Contemporaries would remember whether he had backed down from a posture of superiority and escaped by allowing the

[75] As it was, Crassus was reluctant to relocate his camp so as to place a stream between him and the enemy because he feared the disgrace of an apparent confession of fear (Livy 42.60.3-4). Sensitivity on such points of honor persisted to the end of the Republic; cf. Caelius' fears that a decision by Cicero to retreat in the face of an overwhelming Parthian force would damage his reputation, for the public tended not to appreciate the necessities facing a commander (Cic. Fam. 87 [8.0 1].l, quoted above, chap. 3, n. 4).

[76] Crassus was fined after his year in command, but for cruelty toward the allies, not his military failures (Zonar. 9.22; cf. Livy 43.4.5-8).

[77] Caes. BGall. 5.41: Ciceroadhaecunummodorespondit:nonesse consuetudinempopuliRomaniaccipere abhostearmatocondicionem:si abarmisdiscederevelint,se adiutoreutanturlegatosquead Caesaremmittant;sperareproeiusiustitia,quaepetierint, impetraturos.

enemy to dictate the terms of egress. A man of his station could not afford the stigma of having done anything unworthy in order to survive.^[78] So he stood firm and resorted to desperate expedients in order to extricate himself and his men.

Ultimately his patience was rewarded: Caesar came to the rescue and the imperator warmly praised his legate's energy and determination.^[79] Other of Caesar's officers faced choices fully as desperate as Cicero's that winter, but their resolve was less firm: they accepted the enemy offer to allow the Romans to march away in safety. The judgment Caesar places in the mouths of tribunes and centurions who urged the officers to endure a siege stands as a general censure of all who would take this course: "What is more foolish or more disgraceful than to make decisions about life and death on the advice of an enemy?"^[80] As if to illustrate its dangers, the enemy promptly violated its word and slaughtered the Romans virtually to a man.^[81]

Yet the political dangers of truckling to a victorious enemy were hardly less acute than the military ones. When victi faced a stark choice between accommodating the harsh realities confronting them or persisting in the moral posture their ethos required, there can be no doubt how they were expected to choose. The public placed a far greater value on holding firm, refusing to accept defeat, and defending the honor of the city than on sparing the lives of its soldiers. Sp. Postumius Albinus, the consul of 110, left his brother Aulus in charge of his army in Africa while he returned to Rome to conduct elections, and Aulus had promptly allowed himself to be lured into a trap by the Numidian king Jugurtha. His army was surprised in a night attack, driven from its camp, and

[78] Cf. the favorable judgment passed on M. Aurelius Scaurus when he confronted the Cimbri and Teutones at a parlay in 105 following his defeat: nihilindignumviroRomanoquitantishonoribusfructu[s]aut fecitautdixit (Gran. Licin. 33.1-5 C). More important, note that the stance attributed to him in the Livian tradition also clearly derives from the ideal of an unbowed attitude in defeat: although his army had been beaten, Scaurus attempted to dissuade the enemy from invading Italy on the grounds that the Romans could never be conquered (Livy Per. 67).

[79] On the siege and rescue, see Caes. BGall. 5.39-51; for Caesar's praise of Cicero, see BGall. 5.52.

[80] Caes. BGall. 5.28.6: postremo,quidesse leviusautturpiusquamauctore hostedesummisrebuscapere consilium? Cf. 5.52 and J. Szidat, Caesars diplomatischeTätigkeitimGallischenKrieg, 79-82.

[81] On the siege and destruction of these forces, see BGall. 5.26-37.

surrounded on a nearby hill. On the following day Aulus agreed to terms laid down by the king: surrender of arms, passing beneath the yoke, a treaty of peace dictated by the victors."^[82] Public anger exploded when news of these events reached Rome. Although his forces had been trapped, were in disarray, and faced certain destruction if resistance continued, Aulus ought to have held firm and battled his way out: "All were hostile to Aulus," Sallust reports, "and especially those who had often been outstanding in war, because although he had had his weapons, he had sought safety by disgrace rather than by fighting."^[83]

Death was never too high a price to put on the honor of Rome, and the aristocratic ethos demanded that generals themselves pay it unflinchingly when called on to do so. But to sacrifice the lives of their men on the same altar was something else again, something that took real moral courage (albeit completely misguided in modern eyes). Yet generals who balked at this step provoked a disastrous political backlash. Aulus' surrender ultimately gave rise to the quaestioMamiliana, before which his brother, as the magistrate formally responsible for his actions, was condemned.^[84] Far more grim was the fate of C. Hostilius Mancinus, consul in 137. After the Numantines had trapped his army and compelled him to lay down his arms, surrender his baggage, and swear to a treaty of peace, he and his officers argued strenuously before the senate for ratification of the pact. They emphasized the hard realities they had faced in making their decision and the number of men it had saved.^[85] That fact understandably pleased the friends and relatives of the soldiers, and the terms of the treaty itself do not seem to have significantly weakened the Roman position in Spain.^[86] The senate had actually agreed to a less advantageous peace there three

[82] Sources on the defeat are in appendix 1.1, no. 72.

[83] Sail. Iug. 39.1: Auloomnesinfesti,acmaximequibellosaepepraeclarifuerant,quodarmatusdedecore potiusquammanusalutem quaesiverat.

[84] On the Mamilian quaestio generally and the politics involved, see Gruen, RomanPolitics, 142-51; on Spurius' conviction, see Cic. Brut. 128.

[85] Dio frg. 79.2.

[86] Mancinus' quaestor, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, enjoyed great popularity among the relatives of the survivors as a result of his efforts to bring negotiations between the Romans and the Numantines to a successful conclusion and so preserve the soldiers' lives (Plut. Ti.Gracch. 7.1). Mancinus' friends could urge the fact that the agreement left the Roman possessions in Spain intact in support of the treaty (Dio. frg. 79.2; cf. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus, 151).

years before.^[87] Nonetheless, Mancinus' decision met with severe criticism from public and patres alike. The details of the pact were beside the point; Mancinus' surrender was the central issue, and neither diplomatic advantages nor the lives of his men could compensate for the ignominy it represented. He ought to have had the courage to cut his way out, even at the price of annihilating his entire army. Ultimately the assembly voted to hand Mancinus over to the enemy as a means of voiding the pact he had made, tantamount to a sentence of death.^[88]

The situation of the legate C. Popillius Laenas thirty years later was even more tragic. He assumed command of what was left of the army of L. Cassius Longinus, consul in 107, after it had been driven into its camp following a crushing defeat by the Tigrini in Gaul and the death of its general. The enemy offered terms, and Popillius elected to save the survivors by accepting them. When he returned to Rome, he was brought up on charges of treason and condemned.^[89] In this instance the sole question under scrutiny was the character of the legate's dealings with the enemy. Popillius could hardly be saddled with responsibility for the defeat itself. Whatever blame there might have been on that score rested squarely on the shoulders of the consul, now dead. Nor did the conclusion of a treaty intrude to cloud the picture: Popillius had made none. The single issue inciting revulsion against him was the price he had paid for the lives of his men. So stark was Popillius' dilemma between honor and necessity that his predicament actually became a standard debating topic for rhetoricians a genera-

[87] In fact that treaty followed a serious defeat. But there is no indication that the commander who made it, Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus, was forced to surrender or ever encountered any trouble back at Rome because he had made it. The first overtures concerning a settlement had come from the enemy, and Servilianus could present the results of the battle as having induced the enemy to approach him seeking a peace, which he had judged it in the interests of the Republic to grant. A treaty on those terms was perfectly acceptable, and it was duly ratified at Rome; for sources, see appendix 1.1., no. 33. On the factors leading the senate to accept a settlement of the war, see Astin, ScipioAemilianus, 142-43. The fathers ordered the treaty abrogated soon thereafter (App. Iber. 70, cf. Livy Oxy.Per. 54; Diod. 33.1 4).

[88] On the reaction in Rome, see Cic. DeOr. 1.181, Har.Resp. 43; Brut. 102; Plut. Ti.Gracch. 7.1-3; App. Iber. 80, 83. Sources on the defeat and the bill to surrender Mancinus are in appendix 1.1, no. 41.

[89] Caes. BGall. 1.7.4, 12.5-7; Livy Per. 65; App. Gall. 13; Rhet.Her. 1.25; Cic. Leg. 3.36; Oros. 5.15.23-24.

tion later.^[90] Victory or death were the only acceptable ways out of the bind in which he found himself, and his failure to take the sole course honor allowed not only disgraced Popillius himself and Rome but laid him open to attack from his political opponents.

Thus one might say the aristocratic ethos demanded above all that a general manifest a refusal to accept defeat. That defiance motivated the heroics of commanders like Petilius or Sulla, who risked their lives when their men wavered and dared them to leave their leaders to fight on alone. It was most emphatically what Aulus Albinus, Mancinus, and Popillius had failed to do in choosing to surrender. The army's passing under the yoke and handing over of its weapons clearly symbolized their acceptance of the enemy victory and their own refusal to fight on. Most victi never found themselves in situations in which they were called upon to make similar choices, but the imperatives the ethos imposed on them remained the same. The optimal response to a reverse was simply to go on the attack once again and, if possible, win a resounding victory. Many did just that.^[91] Sp. Postumius Albinus, who did not, was nevertheless well aware of how important it was politically to renew the struggle in Africa. He raced back to his province in lio eager to take the offensive against Jugurtha once more in order to ease the hostility his brother's surrender had engendered.^[92] Even the annalists knew that picking oneself up and taking another crack at the enemy was the way a proper Roman general ought to respond to an initial reverse: they invented a second, successful battle for that exemplary inperator M. Claudius Marcellus after Hannibal had beaten his army in 209.^[93]

Conversely, the appearance of having left the field to the enemy

[90] Rhet.Her. 4.34, cf. 1.25; Cic. Inv.Rhet. 2.72-73.

[91] E.g. Q. Fabius Maximus Gurges, cos. 292; P. Cornelius Rufinus and C. lunius Brutus, coss. 277; P. Sempronius Tudetanus, cos. 204; M. Claudius Marcellus, cos. 196 (see appendix 1.1, no. 19); L. Aemilius Paullus, procos. 190; C. Calpurnius Piso, L. Quinctius Crispinus, promags. 185; A. Manlius Vulso, cos. 178; L. Mummius, pr. 153; Ap. Claudius Pulcher, cos. 143; Q. Lutatius Catulus, cos. 102; C. Sentius, propr. 92; L. Iulius Caesar, cos. 90; L. Licinius Murena, propr. 83-81; Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, procos. 79-72; Cn. Pompeius, procos. 76-72; M. Aurelius Cotta, cos. 74, procos. 73-70. Sources are in MRR under the appropriate years.

[92] Sail. Iug. 39.5; but the condition of his army kept Albinus in camp. Note also P. Valerius Falto, cos. 238, who after an initial defeat at the hands of the Gauls renewed the war when fresh troops arrived, determined to conquer by his own efforts or die, for he preferred death to living in disgrace (Zonar. 8.18).

[93] See appendix 1.1, no. 18.

altogether involved serious political danger. The same M. Claudius Marcellus who won this fictive second battle against Hannibal in reality withdrew his forces into winter quarters after his authentic first defeat despite the fact that it was still the middle of the campaigning season. That move sparked a public outcry in the city orchestrated by an inimicus in the tribunate strong enough to compel the proconsul to return and defend himself against a bill to abrogate his command.^[94] For C. Plautius Hypsaeus, a similar decision proved disastrous. His defeat in Farther Spain in 146 was notable not so much for the extent of the losses as for his pusillanimousness afterward: he fled into winter quarters in the towns in the middle of summer and refused to march out against the enemy for the rest of the year. That decision left his opponent Viriathus free to pillage Rome's allies at will. Plautius faced trial and condemnation in the following year. He had failed to defend the friends of the Republic, but more than that, he had abandoned the contest altogether and covered himself with shame.^[95]

But perhaps the episode that does the most to illuminate how the reaction of the public to a general depended on its perception of his commitment to continue the fight is the celebrated reception accorded Varro after Cannae. Following the battle he had made his way to Canusium and there made every effort to rally the survivors and form them into some semblance of an army.^[96] His actions demonstrated unmistakably that notwithstanding the magnitude of the catastrophe that was then engulfing the Republic, he was not pre-

[94] Appendix 1.1, no. 18. Clearly Marcellus had some explaining to do, which he managed with extraordinary success: he was unanimously elected consul for the fifth time on the heels of his appearance before the assembly. Nothing is known of what he said on this occasion, unfortunately, but it was always possible to blame the soldiers, as Marcellus did after the battle (Livy 27.13.1-10; Plut. Marc. 25.5-6). Moreover, one could frequently justify staying on the defensive in the name of restoring the discipline and spirits of the army; cf. A. Hostilius Mancinus, cos. 170 (Livy 44.1.5-6); his son, C. Hostilius Mancinus, cos. 137 (DeVir. 111. 59.1). Livy presents the tribune's complaints against Marcellus as centering on charges of a conspiracy among the senators to prolong the war unnecessarily. This presentation is largely tendentious, however: see the same theme in the annalistic accounts of the complaints Varro and others made against the handling of the war by the senate early in the conflict (Livy 22.25.3-11; 34.3-11; 38.6-7; Plut. Fab. 8.4; 14.2).

[95] Appendix 1.1, no. 67. On disgrace at failing to protect friends, see Caes. BGall. 7.10; at being forced to keep to one's camp, see Caes. BCiv. 3.24, 3.37; Livy 40.27.10. Cf. Gruen, RomanPolitics, 29, who rightly emphasizes anger at Plautius' cowardice as the reason for his condemnation.

[96] Livy 22.54.1-2, 6, 22.56.1-2, 23.14.2; App. Han. 26; Dio frg. 57.29.

pared to give up the fight or consider its cause lost. And it was to this resolve that his countrymen responded: when the consul returned to Rome, a crowd of senators and common citizens went en masse to meet him and offer their thanks quodde republicanondesperasset, a gesture unique in the city's history.^[97] That willingness to fight on even in the face of seemingly hopeless odds is clearly in accord with the refusal to accept defeat that is central to the aristocratic ethos, as this demonstration of approval for his conduct unmistakably acknowledged. Inasmuch as it paralleled the senate's own determination, Varro was still fulfilling the principal duty of a consul in defeat to exercise leadership by example. His position was somewhat ambiguous, however, and a certain amount of rehabilitation therefore became necessary. Varro had elected to escape death on the battlefield rather than refuse to survive the calamity at all, in contrast to his colleague Paullus. On that score, then, some might harshly criticize him for failing to measure up to the highest standard of aristocratic conduct in defeat.^[98] The public gesture of support was necessary to stamp his decision as a manifestation not of cowardice but of that very same ideal: he had survived to carry on the struggle despite the apparent hopelessness of Rome's plight—an act of extraordinary courage in such desperate circumstances.^[99] Ultimately, heroic valor in the heat of battle and stubborn perseverance in the face of adversity were simply two methods of striking the same posture in defeat.

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The five or possibly six men tried following defeats on charges of extortion in the provinces (derebus repetundis ) form a distinct problem and require separate treatment. The question that needs to be answered concerns the role anger at their defeats played in these proceedings: to what extent did the formal charges serve as a vehicle to channel public hostility against them, so that in effect condemnation for extortion became a form of punishment for their losses? To assume that this was so might seem easy and natural.

[97] Livy 22.61.14, cf. 25.6.7; Val. Max. 3.4.4; Plut. Fab. 18.4-5; Frontin. Str. 4.5.6; Sil. Ital. Pun. 10.615-39; Schol.inJuv.adSat. 11.200; cf. Münzer, RE 5.1A col. 688.

[98] See above, n. 34.

[99] Cf. Frontin. Str. 4.5.6; Flor. 1.22.17.

Consider the case of C. Porcius Cato, who sustained a severe reverse at the hands of the Scordisci in Thrace in 114 and suffered prosecution on charges of extortion at some point between his return and 110, probably in 113.^[100] It has been suggested that the one was the result of the other and that "righteous wrath" secured his condemnation.^[101] Yet information is extremely scanty concerning the trial, and post hocpropterhoc logic is no more than an argument from silence. No source explicitly connects Cato's defeat with the trial that followed. Charges may have centered on acts of official misconduct toward allies of Rome, and what little is known of the case seems to lend support. The fine assessed against the defendant was ludicrously small—HS 8,000 (or possibly no more than HS 4,000). Not unreasonably, the hand of Cato's powerful friends has been seen at work here.^[102] Yet if so, then their effectiveness in shielding Cato is highly revealing. How great could public indignation have been if the jurors were persuaded to mete out punishment amounting to no more than a slap on the wrist? It seems far more plausible to assume that Cato was tried for some minor abuse against provincials while abroad, that proof was furnished to the jurors' satisfaction, and that they elected to view it as falling within the scope of activities proscribed by law. The minimal fine accords well with this view: he was mulcted for the damages he had caused the plaintiffs, not out of vengeance against him for his defeat.^[103]

Any conclusions regarding the relationship between the defeat Cn. Papirius Carbo suffered while consul in 113 and the prosecution he sustained must be regarded as even more speculative. Carbo attacked the Cimbri by surprise, suffered a disastrous defeat, and lost a large part of his army.^[104] At some point he was brought to trial, and although the charge is nowhere specified, repetundae and perduellio both have been suggested.^[105] The date like-

[100] Sources are in appendix 1.1, no. 71.

[101] Gruen, RomanPolitics, 127, cf. 126.

[102] Gruen, RomanPolitics, 127.

[103] Badian, RomanImperialism,50. The fact that Cato was still on the public scene three years later when he faced prosecution before the quaestioMamiliana demonstrates that no stigma attached to his conviction; see appendix 1.1, no. 71.

[104] Sources are in appendix 1.1, no. 65.

[105] On repetundae, see Gruen, RomanPolitics, 306, although he is more cautious at 131; Tyrell and Pruser, CorrespondenceofCicero, suggest perduellio at Fam. 9.21.3, as does Malcovati, "Ad Cic. Fam. 9, 21, 3," 218.

wise is a matter of conjecture and to some extent hangs on the question of the outcome of the trial. Commonly it has been supposed that Carbo was condemned. Hence the trial must follow his consulship, and the accusation and condemnation fall into place as the consequence of his terrible defeat. But the evidence for conviction is tenuous in the extreme, and acquittal is a far more likely verdict.

The case for condemnation is supported only by Cicero's obscure remark that Carbo accusatus . . . sutorio atramentoabsolutusputatur.^[106] The phrase has been interpreted to mean that Carbo drank a copper sulphate solution in anticipation of certain condemnation.^[107] However, this view ought to be rejected. No parallel exists for sutorioatramentoabsolutus in this sense. Furthermore, it would have been an extraordinary coincidence if Gaius as well as his brother Gnaeus, both consulars, had each taken his own life in connection with a criminal prosecution, and one would expect Cicero to have remarked on the fact either here or elsewhere. The older view should be preferred, that the phrase somehow refers to a corrupt verdict.^[108] If so, then the trial itself may not have followed his consulate, and all connection with the defeat he suffered in it evaporates. The trial may have involved charges arising out of a term as governor of Asia Minor in 116 or shortly thereafter.^[109] The case can offer little dependable evidence on the relationship, if any, between defeat and a prosecution before the extortion court.

Testimony is a little better concerning two governors active in Sicily during the slave revolt there at the end of the second century. It is important to note that neither suffered a major defeat. L. Licinius Lucullus won a victory against the slaves in the open field in 103 and then laid siege to their stronghold; his attack met with mixed success, and he retired having had the worst of it.^[110] His successor, C. Servilius, probably suffered no real defeat at all in 102.^[111] Both, however, underwent trial for extortion and were con-

[106] Cic. Fam. 188 (9.21).3.

[107] Most recently by Malcovati, "Ad Cic. Fam. 9, 21, 3," 216-20, accepted by Tyrell and Pruser, CorrespondenceofCicero, and Gruen, RomanPolitics,131.

[108] Shackleton-Bailey, CiceroEpistulaead Farniliares, 2:330.

[109] Münzer, RE 18.3 col. 1022-23; Holleaux, RA 8, ser. 5 (1918): 234-35.

[110] Appendix 1.1, no. 46.

[111] Appendix 1.1, no. 80.

demned.^[112] In view of the minor nature of their setbacks we cannot rule out the possibility that their trials, like Cato's, arose mainly out of wrongs inflicted on provincials rather than out of an effort to find a pretext to punish them for their losses. But be that as it may, Diodorus preserves some indication of the complaints made against their conduct, assuming his evidence is reliable.^[113] The thrust of these complaints concerns ineffectiveness in command as opposed to defeat per se. After noting Lucullus' failure against the rebel stronghold and the boost it gave their morale, Diodorus continues by remarking that he accomplished nothing of what was necessary, perhaps having been bribed or perhaps out of indolence, on account of which he was brought to trial and punished.^[114] A second excerpt offers a bit of information that accords well with this passage. There Diodorus reports that Lucullus was criticized for seeming to increase the war, presumably because he was taking no effective steps to stop it; whereupon Lucullus, assuming that if his successor likewise failed, his own performance would appear that much better, dismissed his army and burned his camp and supplies.^[115] Servilius, according to Diodorus, merely accomplished nothing worthy of note, on account of which he, like Lucullus, was exiled. Yet we also learn that Servilius had allowed the enemy to overrun the countryside without hindrance, even to the point of their putting some cities under siege.^[116]

Defeat does not loom large in all this, except in so far as it might be considered symptomatic of the two men's ineffectiveness in stamping out the revolt. Certainly, in view of the crisis in the north during these years, being perceived as having done too little—and that badly—to ease the situation in Sicily will have appeared far more egregious a failing than under ordinary circumstances.^[117] Moreover, the fact both Lucullus and Servilius had faced only con-

[112] On the charges and their political aspects as well as the identity of Lucullus' accuser, see Münzer, RE 2A col. 1762-63; Van Ooteghem, L.LiciniusLucullus, 14- 15; Gruen, RomanPolitics, 176-78; Epstein, PersonalEnmity, 65, 115.

[113] On the nature of the excerpts comprising Diodorus' book 36, see Rubinsohn, Athenaeum 60 (1982): 437-39.

[114] Diod. 36.8.5.

[115] Diod. 36.9.2.

[116] Diod. 36.9.1.

[117] Rubinsohn, Ath., n.s. 60 (1982): 449-51.

temptible rebellious slaves undoubtedly made their helplessness against them all the more disgraceful.^[118] Yet it is significant in that regard that P. Licinius Nerva, who led the war against the slaves in 104 previous to Lucullus, sustained a far more serious defeat than either of his successors yet suffered no prosecution thereafter.^[119] Clearly it was not simply the fact of a defeat, even against servile opponents, even in the context of the German invasion, that brought about the condemnations of Lucullus and Servilius. Perhaps, then, these prosecutions ought to be viewed as arising out of a context of moral failure as well. The charge against Servilius is strongly reminiscent of that brought against C. Plautius Hypsaeus in 146—abandoning the open country to the enemy and refusing to protect Rome's allies.^[120] And perhaps Lucullus' inertness following his loss, more than the loss itself, was what counted most heavily against him. Certainly if accusations that he had deliberately handicapped Servilius' efforts against the enemy played a role in Lucullus' trial, they will have done nothing to enhance his image as a man who refused to accept defeat (at least in any way that redounded to his credit). Thus the behavior of these two victi after their losses and the states of mind it reflected, rather than military failure alone, may represent the key factor in securing their condemnations. The latter was certainly relevant but not sufficient in itself.

The element of moral failure becomes even more pronounced in the trial of M. Antonius Hibrida, the consul of 63. During his proconsulate in Thrace from 62 until 60, his depredations against subject and neighboring tribes provoked attacks in response, and he was twice seriously defeated. Late in 60 he was recalled and put on trial the following year.^[121] The charge is somewhat murky: extortion receives support in the sources, although maiestas or vis remain possibilities.^[122] Likewise the factors impelling the prosecution were complex. Dio Cassius in a confused passage seems to say that events in Thrace were responsible for securing Antonius' convic-

[118] Cf. Plut. Crass. 9.6; App. BCiv. 118.

[119] Appendix 1.1, no. 49.

[120] Appendix 1.1, no. 67, and see above, p. 139.

[121] Sources are in appendix 1.1, no. 4.

[122] Schol.Bob. 94 St.; cf. Gruen, Latomus 32 (1973): 301-10, at 307-9.

tion, although the formal charges involved complicity in the Catilinarian conspiracy.^[123] That analysis has been strongly disputed and the contrary maintained: whereas his dismal record abroad supplied the pretext, in fact old partisan scores were being settled in the trial, and new political agendas were being advanced as well.^[124] But whether as pretext or substance, it seems clear that Antonius' failures in Thrace played a significant role in his political demise. What, then, sets these apart from the defeats other victi sustained? The best answer seems to be the charge that in them Antonius revealed himself as a coward and a drunk.

When the Dardanians advanced against him, Antonius purposely retired with the cavalry and left his infantry to bear the brunt of their attack. In a battle against the Bastarnae Dio says flatly that he ran away.^[125] One might argue that Dio's words are not to be pressed here, that one should take them as referring to a rout of the entire army, not to Antonius himself. But one other fragment of evidence seems to go against that interpretation. A passage preserved from the speech of one of his accusers, M. Caelius Rufus, portrays Antonius as asleep in an alcoholic stupor surrounded by his harem during an enemy attack. The women made a desperate effort to awaken him, but Antonius, still groggy, only responded by trying to embrace them, and once awake, he was too drunk to function effectively in command. The fragment ends with him being tossed between his concubines and the centurions, presumably in an attempt to bring him to his senses.^[126] Although certainty is not possible, the likelihood is strong that this passage refers to the battle against the Bastarnae: it was apparently a surprise attack since they were bringing aid to an Istrian tribe Antonius was trying to plunder, whereas Antonius himself was long gone when the Dardanians made their assault. A terrified flight would have served as a fitting climax to the comedy Caelius described.^[127] Of

[123] Dio 38.10.3.

[124] Gruen, Latomus 32 (1973): 301-10; cf. Epstein, Personal Enmity, 122.

[125] Dio. 38.10.1-3.

[126] M. Caelius Rufus, ORF 17 (=Quint. Inst. 4.2.123-4), cf. 18.

[127] Alternatively, of course, the episode could have occurred some years earlier in Antonius' career and have been one of the charges that led to his expulsion from the senate in 70: sources are in MRR 2:127. But such an explanation appears to multiply hypotheses needlessly, inviting application of Ockham's razor.

course, accusations of moral turpitude were the common stuff of political invective during the late Republic. Caelius himself would come in for a healthy dose when he faced trial in 56. But the prevalence of that practice does not prove the charges untrue: Antonius already had a reputation as a dissolute wastrel and had been expelled from the senate on that account.^[128] Nor, more important, does it diminish their significance as evidence of what a prosecutor thought would rouse invidia against a victus among the judges in this trial. Immorality and a failure to display the courage demanded under the aristocratic ethos thus seem to have played a pivotal role in the proceedings, as in the case of Cn. Fulvius Flaccus.^[129] They mediated between the partisan forces lying behind the prosecution and the extensive public hostility that his enemies needed to foster against Antonius to secure his condemnation.^[130]

The moral issue was equally crucial in the trial of Q. Pompeius but led to the opposite result. He was brought up on charges of extortion following a series of failures against the Numantines during 141-140. Yet his conduct in their aftermath seems to have done most to stir up political trouble. He was eager to win credit for ending the war despite his losses and so came to terms with the enemy. But with the arrival of his successor, the deal began to unravel. The Numantines asserted that Pompeius had entered into a formal treaty of peace with them; he, on the contrary, insisted he had received their unconditional surrender. Unhappily for him, testimony from the members of his own consilium supported the Numantines and proved an acute embarrassment to his pretensions. The whole affair was packed off to Rome and a senatorial inquiry that decided to continue the war.^[131] Subsequently he faced not only charges of extortion but efforts in 136 to pass legislation requiring that he be handed over to the Numantines along with Mancinus to invalidate the treaties each had struck with them.^[132]

[128] Comm.Petit. 8; Sail. Cat. 21.3; Asc. 83, 84, 88, 93 C.

[129] See above, pp. 128-29.

[130] Note also that charges of immorality and cowardice help explain why Antonius' rehabilitation under his nephew the triumvir included a censorship in 42. Undertaking the supervision of public morality that the office entailed restored some of the damage done to his good name. Although some may have received the news with derision, open mockery will have been dangerous and rare.

[131] Full sources are in appendix 1.1, no. 69.

[132] For discussion of the date, see Rosenstein, CA 5 (1986): 246 n. 52.

Yet from both ordeals Pompeius emerged unscathed. Again, it is possible that his trial may have had little to do with his defeats or his agreement with the enemy.^[133] Yet even if it did, the result indicates that his enemies had not succeeded in arousing widespread antagonism against either his defeats or his dealings in Spain.

The protection he enjoyed may be traced to his posture in defeat. Throughout, Pompeius steadfastly maintained that the enemy had performed a full and formal deditioin fidem, in spite of everyone else connected with the event asserting the opposite. In part this insistence arose out of a need to secure senatorial support for ratification of his agreement since absolute victory was the patres ' sine qua non for ending the war in Nearer Spain.^[134] Yet his stance was also calculated to demonstrate that, like P. Licinius Crassus or Q. Cicero, he had persisted in treating the victors as vanquished despite his position of military inferiority. Anything else would have been viewed as disgraceful, and Pompeius knew it.^[135] The difference in his case was simply the Numantines' weariness with the war, which led them to trust Pompeius' assurances of lenient treatment if only they surrendered. It was an arrangement few other victi could hope to convince their victorious adversaries to accept. But once the Numantines did, they allowed Pompeius to seize the

[133] Richardson, JRS77 (1987): 1-12 (cf. idem, Hispaniae, 137-40), has argued that the lex Calpurnia establishing the quaestiode repetundis did not cover crimes by magistrates against provincials. If he is correct, Pompeius' trial had nothing to do with events in Spain; it may indeed have preceded or followed those events by a considerable interval. Yet Richardson's arguments are not conclusive. In any case, politics seems to have played a role in securing his acquittal: the jurors, rather surprisingly, refused to credit the testimony of the four eminent consulars who gave evidence against him (Cic. Font. 23; Val. Max. 8.5.1, cf. Gruen, RomanPolitics, 3637; Epstein, PersonalEnmity, 99, 105, for discussion).

[134] See Richardson, Hispaniae, 144-150.

moral high ground and keep his actions free of any taint. That stance made him proof against his enemies' attacks, as verdicts from the jurors on the extortion court in 138 and the voters in the assembly in 136 confirmed.

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What evidence can be gleaned concerning victi tried derepetundis therefore indicates that here too the focus of attention was their personal conduct in defeat. Violating the conventions of the aristocratic ethos unleashed an angry political reaction in these cases, and this conclusion strongly reinforces the impression that for the rest security from a similar fate came with adherence to the dictates of the code. Its role as a trigger in unleashing aristocratic rivalry emerges forcefully. Whatever indignation and passion a lost battle might have engendered among the elite or the populace at large remained inaccessible to a victus ' inimici or other interested parties eager to exploit such sentiments unless they could raise the cry of moral failure or disgrace and tie it convincingly to his actions. Yet precisely because of the ethos conventions of deportment could protect as well as injure a victus. They made it possible for him to demonstrate to the satisfaction of all that he had behaved in a manner above reproach.

Efforts in this direction can occasionally be detected in the posture of someone like Pompeius, struggling gamely to maintain the image of having received a deditio. But the most impressive monument to a victus ' efforts to manipulate his conduct to meet the expectations of the code is the performance of C. Hostilius Mancinus. Once it became clear that the senate would not agree to ratification of his treaty but would instead propose legislation to hand its author over to the Numantines, he put on an unprecedented display of personal bravery in the midst of this political disaster by coming before the assembly to urge passage of the bill. The senate had determined that although Mancinus' agreement was not legally binding since the people had never voted to ratify it, nonetheless it had placed a strong moral claim on the Romans' fides. Hence it could not be ignored without in some way neutralizing the religious consequences this would involve. Mancinus therefore had to be sacrificed to free the Republic from these obligations. He

turned sacrifice into self-sacrifice: he offered to give his life willingly in this cause.^[136]

The effectiveness of this step in reversing public hostility toward him was virtually complete. He was duly handed over to the Numantines, who refused to accept him. Mancinus then returned to Rome and attempted to reenter the senate. He was prevented by a tribune who contended that the act of being handed over to the enemy had deprived Mancinus of his citizenship. The issue was debated before the patres, who found merit in the tribune's assertion. Yet far from indicating the vindictiveness of the senate, the controversy merely stemmed from a continuing concern for legal and religious form evident throughout this affair. To solve the problem, Mancinus was made the subject of a special law granting him citizenship once again. What is more, he later gained election to a second praetorship, which restored to him a place in the senate and honorable rank as well.^[l37]

There is no trace of hostility toward Mancinus on the part of his peers or the people in these events. The bill to renew his citizenship would not have passed easily in the teeth of senatorial opposition or continued ill will among the voters. If anything, the reverse is indicated: election as praetor once again meant he had won a considerable following among the senators and first-class voters. The change in his political fortunes is striking in view of the revulsion that greeted his return following his capitulation, and it can only be ascribed to the fact that he had adopted, albeit belatedly, precisely the stance of exceptional self-sacrifice the aristocratic code required from men of his class in defeat.^[138] Although the bill to surrender him represented a political, not a military, reverse, Mancinus by his gesture cast it in the latter terms. He insisted that since it grew out of his predicament at Numantia, the

[136] Mancinus' own fides was at stake as well. He had guaranteed the treaty with his oath, and his stance here manifestly demonstrated his commitment to keeping his pledge. He would offer his life in atonement for its violation. No less could be expected of an aristocrat where personal honor as well as patriotism were concerned. For sources, see appendix 1.1, no. 41; for discussion, see Rosenstein, CA 5 (1986): 244-51.

[137] On the debate, see Cic. DeOr. 1.181, 238; 2.137; Caecin. 98, Top. 37; Dig. 49.15.4, 50.7.17. On the citizenship bill and second praetorship, see Dig. 50.7.17; De.Vir.Ill. 59.4. Mancinus might even have gone further but for the fact that iteration of the consulate was forbidden after c. 151.

[138] On the reaction at Rome, see above, n. 88.

public judge him here by the standards appropriate there. The gesture was perhaps all the more welcome inasmuch as it did not require the soldiers trapped with him in Spain to die in order to demonstrate his courage and vindicate the honor of the city. Mancinus himself was quick to exploit the popularity his action had won. Not only did he immediately attempt to return to his rightful place in the senate and later run for public office, but he had a statue made depicting himself just as he had been when he was handed over, bound and naked, to the Numantines.^[139] The statue clearly aimed to memorialize the extraordinary virtus he had displayed in offering to die in order to sustain the refusal of Rome to accept defeat. He had covered himself in glory and, having survived, intended to lay claim to its fruits by advertising that fact.

Mancinus' case, however, is clearly special. He was struggling to regain his good name after the egregious disgrace of electing to lay down his arms to survive. His exceptional success here was rewarded with a dramatic comeback in the political arena. Yet most victi did not go on to subsequent electoral triumphs, only about the same percentage as was normal among their undefeated peers. Of these, it is certainly possible that some, perhaps even many, may have performed some striking feat of bravery or determination in their defeats to distinguish themselves and so enable them to rise to heights they would not otherwise have achieved. But for that to have been the case, an equal number who under normal circumstances would have reached consulates or censorships will have had to have disgraced themselves sufficiently in their defeats to deny them these positions. Only in that way—the latters' failures canceling out the formers' successes—will a statistically average result have been possible. Clearly, given the limits of the evidence, this hypothesis cannot be ruled out completely. But probability seems to tell against it.^[140] Rather, the effect of the ethos was defensive, protecting the political status quo as it existed previous to these men's defeats. Most of those initially strong enough

[139] Plin. HN 34.18.

[140] It should be noted, however, that the percentage of consular victi not prosecuted and exiled who went on to a censorship is slightly higher than was normal among all consulars, about 27 percent (see above, chap. 1, p. 18). Possibly, therefore, this anomaly is to be explained by the opportunity a defeat offered a general for a display of heroics whence to garner glory.

to gain higher office continued to be so afterward. Defeat neither eroded the basis of their support nor aroused additional antagonism against them.

Conversely, failure to measure up to the dictates of the code gave opponents a pretext to direct the passions and outcry that defeat engendered against a victus. Those who came under fire for their behavior did not suffer condemnation for immorality per se—that was never formally a crime under the Republic—but for its effect when manifested by someone in a position of military leadership. In some cases their behavior had a direct role in bringing about a defeat or a deterioration in the military situation, as when Flaccus' cowardice caused his men to flee or Plautius' refusal to leave the safety of camp allowed the enemy to overrun the countryside.^[141] But in others, like Caepio's or Antonius', a direct connection is more problematic. Malfeasance was less the issue in such trials than fitness to lead. Just as great virtus was deemed to qualify men to govern and enable them to benefit the state, so moral inferiority constituted grounds for censure and even expulsion from the senate.^[142]Victi who could be shown to have violated the canons of aristocratic conduct in their defeats thus were judged to have forfeited their claim to a place among the governing elite. At stake in most of these trials was the question of whether or not the defendant would remain within the political community or withdraw into exile.^[143] Viewed from this perspective, such condemnation represented in effect a process of purging a senator who had revealed himself to be incapable of bearing one of the primary moral burdens of leadership. In military commanders failings of this kind were tantamount to treason because of the general's role as an exemplar for his men. His own courage and refusal to accept defeat served as a model for theirs. Such failures also posed a

[141] P. Claudius Pulcher's refusal to heed the auspices falls into this category as well (see above chap. 2, p. 79).

[142] On virtus and the respublica, see Mitchell, Hermathena 136 (1984): 23; Earl, Sallust, 18-27, cf. idem, MoralandPoliticalTraditions, 20-24. On expulsion from the senate and the social role of the censors' regimenmorum, see Astin, JRS 78 (1988): 32-33·

[143] There are two exceptions. P. Claudius Pulcher was fined, but his first trial was on capital charges and, had it resulted in a guilty verdict, would have led to his exile. Porcina was fined, but here the issue was willful disobedience of a direct injunction from the senate not to expand the war in Spain (Richardson, Hispaniae, 150-51).

threat to his peers in the senate since they might raise doubts in the mind of the public about the ability of the aristocracy as a whole to measure up to the same standards. Thus such purges amounted to both a collective reaffirmation of the community's demand that its leaders live up to the conventions the victus had betrayed and a demonstration by their leaders of their own allegiance to those norms. Victi who met expectations, however, deserved praise for their success and earned the right to continue in their accustomed prominence. Their lost battles cast no doubt on their title to lead.