Twelve South Africas
Practically no one in South Africa thinks it is a healthy society, but diagnoses of what ails it and prescriptions to cure it run a wide gamut. What is more, the divergent perspectives are fervently held. What I shall present are merely tendencies, rather arbitrarily selected capsule views typical of particular strands of thought but not necessarily representative of any single proponent. Virtually all strands are heterogeneous and evolving, so it would be a distortion to regard hybridized descriptions of them as anything more than paradigmatic. No doubt these capsule views do violence to nuances within each of the conceptions depicted. Even with these qualifications, a sample catalogue of this sort makes clear the scope and depth of the dissensus.
I shall enumerate the perspectives of participants and a few selected observers alike. Ordinarily, the views of participants should have priority in an exercise of this sort, but in the South African case the views of some observers either already represent a segment of more general South African opinion or are likely to form some part of the ongoing debate.[1] The sketches emphasize alternative descriptions of contemporary South African society, the end-states that are envisioned (including prospects for democracy), and the measures advocated to bring about the desired end-states. Some positions, of course, have changed over time. Some organizations and individuals could easily subscribe to parts of more than one of the views described here. Although twelve ideal-type perspectives are enumerated, there are many commonalities among clusters of these perspectives on one point or another. While it is important to elucidate the many ways of looking at South Africa, it is equally important not to exaggerate the differences either.
1. An Official View. South Africa is a society divided into four racial groups (Whites, Coloureds, Indians, and Africans) and, within
[1] Accordingly, the views depicted are not intended as a reflection of the state of academic theorizing about South Africa. Some major attempts to integrate South African experience into a wider framework, such as the theory of capitalist development or the theory of rational choice, are therefore completely omitted. See Stanley B. Greenberg, Race and State in Capitalist Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Michael Banton, Racial and Ethnic Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
these groups, into a number of distinct ethnic groups or nationalities. All of the racial groups need to participate in politics at the center, albeit on a group basis (as all groups do not participate now in the White-dominated regime). To create peace and democracy in such a divided society, however, maximum power over its "own affairs" should be devolved to each of the racial (and perhaps also the ethnic) groups, reserving to the center power over those matters that affect everyone. In addition, some or all of the nationalities may need their own territorial expression, in the form of self-governing, perhaps federated, homelands. (All of this is put in rather contingent terms. Within a few years of the 1983 Constitution, the government had become equivocal about the extent to which it continued to adhere both to the own affairs—common affairs dichotomy of that Constitution and to its policy regarding independent homelands. After the legalization of several opposition groups in 1990, these ideological commitments were weakened further.)
2. A Charterist View. According to the Freedom Charter, adopted at a public meeting in 1955 and subscribed to by the African National Congress (ANC), "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white."[2] The charter did recognize the existence of several "national groups," which, it declared, "shall have equal rights!" These were to include "equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and in the schools for all national groups and races. . . ."[3] In 1969, however, the ANC's Revolutionary Program rejected the idea of separate political institutions for racial minorities.[4] If South Africa manifests any racial or ethnic divisions, that is because of apartheid. Abolish apartheid, all forms of racial discrimination, and all manifestations of "separate development," and South Africa can have what is called a "nonracial [and nonethnic] democracy," although this will not necessarily be a "classical liberal democracy."[5]
[2] Freedom Charter , (preamble adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, South Africa, June 26, 1955), in Thomas G. Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter, eds., From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa , vol. 3, 1882–1964 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), p. 205.
[3] Ibid. For the background the Freedom Charter, see Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (London: Longman, 1983), pp. 69–74. See also Thomas G. Karis, "Revolution in the Making: Black Politics in South Africa," Foreign Affairs 62, no. 2 (Winter 1983–84): 378–406.
[4] See "African Nationalism in South Africa," in James Leatt et al., eds., Contending Ideologies in South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip, 1986), p. 102; Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 , p. 301.
[5] Monty Narsoo, "Responses to the Report," in Charles Simkins et al., The Prisoners of Tradition and the Politics of Nation Building (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1988), p. 88. For further evidence of hostility to liberal democracy, see Tom Lodge, "The United Democratic Front: Leadership and Ideology," inJohn D. Brewer, Can South Africa Survive? Five Minutes to Midnight (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 216.
3. An Alternative Charterist View. There is less of a plural society and more of a common society in South Africa than many people realize. Commonalities among South Africans have been obscured by apartheid. If only nature could take its course without the artificial constraints of apartheid, an unremarkable democracy would develop in a nonracial society. (In some such formulations, however, rigorous safeguards, including some based on group affiliation, are regarded as necessary to guarantee the democratic character of the nonracial society.[6] )
4. A People's Democracy View. South Africa without apartheid can easily be a nonracial democracy, with no need for pernicious "group" protections. But mere representative democracy alone is inadequate. The future of South Africa can and will be shaped by the popular opposition to apartheid, out of which is growing a new form of people's democracy. That form is not limited to periodic elections or to a few spheres of political activity but is genuinely based on local organization by oppressed people, who are prepared to take every sphere of activity that concerns their lives directly into their own hands. (Such views are held by significant segments of the United Democratic Front [UDF], the Mass Democratic Movement, and the African National Congress.[7] )
5. An Africanist View. South Africa is not an ordinary divided society but a colonial society, defined by colonial oppression in the form of racially based capitalism. The problem of South Africa is "settler colonialism."[8] Africans are the indigenous people and the sole legitimate owners of the soil. South Africa needs an anti-colonial revolution before it can become democratic and socialist. The resulting state will
[6] See Heribert Adam and Kogila A. Moodley, South Africa without Apartheid: Dismantling Racial Domination (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), discussed at much greater length in Chapter 4, below.
[7] Paulus Zulu, "Resistance in the Townships—An Overview," in Fatima Meer, ed., Resistance in the Townships (Durban: Madiba, 1989), pp. 10–23; Andrew Boraine on Behalf of the United Democratic Front, "Democracy and Government: Towards a People's Struggle," Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa, Occasional Paper no. 3 (1987); African National Congress, Strategy and Tactics of the ANC (1969), quoted in Roland Stanbridge, "Contemporary African Political Organizations and Movements," in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg, eds., The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1980), p. 98.
[8] For the Africanist tendency in the opposition movements, see, e.g., Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 , pp. 84–86; Karis, "Revolution in the Making," p. 382. On "settler colonialism," see, e.g., Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), November 17–23, 1989. On skepticism of parliamentary democracy, see Simkins et al., The Prisoners of Tradition and the Politics of Nation Building , pp. 25–26.
require no constitutional checks and balances. Rather than parliamentary democracy, South Africa needs representation on a class basis in a socialist society. (In some such formulations, "nonindigenous" peoples have no part to play in a future South Africa, whereas in others even Whites can become Africans, by means unspecified.)
6. A Black Consciousness View. South Africa is a society divided by the oppression of color. Once those oppressed by color find the means to overcome their oppression, South Africa can become a socialist, revolutionary state. (In some such formulations, Black Consciousness is merely a means of struggle, so that color becomes irrelevant once the struggle is won, whereas in others something like a Black state is envisioned.[9] )
7. A Racial Self-Assertion View. South Africa is a severely divided society, in which democracy is improbable. But just as "racial dignity" has assumed priority over democracy in post-colonial African states, so may racial self-assertion be necessary in South Africa, even if democracy is not achieved.[10] "To some, freedom means the turning of the tables. . . ."[11]
8. A Two-Nationalisms Partitionist View. South Africa is fundamentally divided into Black and White. The interests of the two groups are so incompatible that territorial division is necessary. (There are many versions of this view circulating among dissident, sometimes exotic, White political organizations,[12] but it is also a view that was espoused by the African National Congress in the 1920s and the All-African Convention in 1936.[13] )
[9] See "Black Consciousness," in Leatt et al., eds., Contending Ideologies in South Africa , pp. 105–19.
[10] David D. Laitin, "South Africa: Violence, Myths, and Democratic Reform," World Politics 39, no. 2 (January 1987): 258–79, at 259 n. 3, 279. Since it is extremely unfashionable to eschew democracy in South Africa, this view is rarely, if ever, articulated there; but it probably enjoys a fair amount of support. It has, of course, some affinity to the Africanist view identified previously.
[11] Nomavenda Mathiane, South Africa: Diary of Troubled Times (New York: Freedom House, 1989), p. 117. For an interesting range of views, see ibid., pp. 115–20.
[12] Such as the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, the Vereniging van Oranjewerkers, and the Afrikaner Volkswag. See Carole Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey, 1985 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1986), pp. 11–12. For an inventory, see Helen Zille, "The Right Wing in South African Politics," in Peter Berger and Bobby Godsell, eds., A Future South Africa: Visions, Strategies and Realities (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau Talfelberg, 1988), pp. 55–94.
[13] Gwendolen M. Carter, "African Concepts of Nationalism in South Africa," in Heribert Adam, ed., South Africa: Sociological Perspectives (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 118.
9. A Two-Nationalisms Accommodationist View. South Africa consists of several racial and ethnic groups, but the fundamental struggle is between White (or Afrikaner) and Black (or African) nationalism. Given time, these two nationalisms could accommodate each other and perhaps grow together into a nonracial society. For the time being, however, a binational state is the best that can be hoped for. With a dual set of largely autonomous institutions, such a state could be democratic.[14]
10. A Consociational View. South Africa is a severely divided society, with both racial and ethnic divisions. Democracy is rendered difficult to achieve by virtue of that fact—difficult but not impossible or even improbable if elaborate precautions are taken. To achieve democracy in a divided society, elites of the various groups must agree to share executive power and abide by a system of mutual vetoes and spheres of communal autonomy. (Over a period of nearly two decades, enormous energy has been invested in devising such model arrangements for South Africa.[15] )
11. A Modified Consociational View. South Africa is a severely divided society, requiring some complex institutions if it is to function democratically. "Checks and balances" will be needed to protect minorities, including "black political minorities."[16] But a full-blown apparatus of mutual vetoes and delegations of communal authority would render it impossible for the new polity to solve some of its most pressing problems of inequality and perhaps also, therefore, to remain democratic.[17]
12. A Simple Majoritarian View. Whether South Africa is or is not
[14] See Hermann Giliomee, "The Communal Nature of the South African Conflict," in Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., Negotiating South Africa's Future (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 114–29.
[15] Most of these efforts are discussed in Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1985), pp. 47–82. Among the major contributions are F. van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh, South Africa's Options: Strategies for Sharing Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979); Political Commission of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society, South Africa's Political Alternatives , SPRO-CAS Publication no. 10 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1973); The Buthelezi Commission, The Requirements for Stability and Development in KwaZulu and Natal , vol. 1 (Durban: H & H Publications, 1982); KwaZulu Natal Indaba, Constitutional Proposals Agreed To on 28 November 1986 (Durban: n.p., n.d.; pamphlet).
[16] Charles Simkins, "Democracy and Government: A Post-Leninist Perspective," Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa, Occasional Paper no. 1 (1987), p. 6.
[17] Charles Simkins, Reconstructing South African Liberalism (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1986; mimeo.), pp. 74–77.
a severely divided society is irrelevant. The problem is that it is undemocratic. To make it democratic, the majority must rule, and rule unimpeded. In the ordinary course of events, majority rule will produce a Black government.[18
]
It might be possible to reduce these twelve views to four main tendencies—official, Charterist, Africanist, and consociational—but this would do violence to the range of perspectives and would omit some important strains, both articulate and inchoate. Even a fourfold division, however, would show just how polarized ideologies are, for it would not be possible to align them on a spectrum if the test were self-perceived proximity of one ideology to the next. Or, to make the point more graphically, organizations in the Charterist stream have been engaged for years in violence not only with the official instrumentalities of force but also with organizations aligned with the Africanist stream and with Inkatha, the organization led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, an avowed consociationalist.
If all or nearly all of these perspectives are to be taken seriously, as they should be, South Africa could easily be seen as a kind of riddle society, impossible to fathom. Even within the realm of similar general diagnoses of the society's condition, there are many different prescriptions for its treatment. But despite the plurality of conceptions about South Africa, it is no riddle. South Africa is a complex place, but the cleavages reflected in these divergent views are patterned and explicable.
It is conventional to regard ideological cleavages as the fallout of historical events, conflicts, or movements.[19] South African history contains the seeds of the ideological cleavages already identified, but with a special qualification. European South Africa was what Louis Hartz calls a "fragment society," an incipient whole society constructed out of merely a part of the European society of origin—or, in South Africa's case, out of two societies of origin, the Netherlands and Great Britain.[20]
[18] This is sometimes the formulation of the ANC when it speaks of the "transfer of power from a white minority to a black majority." Quoted in Heribert Adam, "Exile and Resistance: The African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and the Pan Africanist Congress," in Berger and Godsell, eds., A Future South Africa , p. 104.
[19] Thus, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan speak of "inherited cleavages." "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Crossnational Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 8.
[20] Louis Hartz et al., The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964).
As Hartz explains, the history of such societies entails working out the logic of the fragment ethos or culture as it encounters new conditions, new problems, and new people in the transplanted setting. The process of fragmentation, whereby a part becomes a whole, accounts, in Hartz's view, for the distinctive character of fragments such as French Canada or Dutch South Africa. The full social complexity of the home country was not transplanted, and so the fragments escaped social conflicts that occurred in the sending country after the migration. Eventually, however, the isolation of the fragments from world history broke down, and the distinctive fragment societies returned to worlds they thought they had eluded. "As the globe contracted, the Western revolution that the fragments escaped was spreading throughout it with increasing rapidity, so that ultimately it was bound to overtake them, if only from a distant place suddenly made near. If Holland was left behind, there was still Russia, China, the awakening African states."[21]
The concatenation of distinctively South African historical events and reverberations of events in world history is responsible, above all, for the proliferation of ideological currents. To make sense of what otherwise appears to be a kaleidoscope, to put back together the views I have pulled apart, and to capture the extent to which ideas have migrated across cleavages and over time, at least an abbreviated historical excursion is required.