"Far Eastern Munich"
Toward the summer of 1939, domestic and world tension rose, and the united front was entering a crisis. Repeated warnings by Chiang Kai-shek to the CCP leaders in private meetings against unauthorized expansion were producing no results. Lu Chung-lin, who was dis-
[62] Decision on Consolidation of the Party , in Warren Kuo, "The CCP Campaign for Consolidation of Party Organization," Issues and Studies , December, 1969, p. 88.
[63] Ch'en Yün, "How to be a Communist Party Member," in Conrad Brandt, et al., eds., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 322–336; Yang Shang-k'un, "Hua-pei tang chien-she-chung ti chi-ke wen-t'i."
[64] Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i , I, 208. Judging from his writings, Liu straddled Mao and Wang Ming at this time.
[65] Decision of the Central Committee on the Work of Penetrating the Masses, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism , pp. 346–349.
[66] Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 205.
patched to Hopei to re-establish government authority, had suffered a setback in several clashes with the Communist forces. The government's anti-Communist measures were becoming more stringent. In the summer, a blockade of Shen-Kan-Ning began. Europe appeared to be heading for a major war, and the powers were shifting their positions. Chungking watched the realignment of powers to see how it would affect China's lone resistance. Amid the uncertainty over Chungking's direction, Wang Ching-wei's peace movement suddenly loomed large. Rumors about his contacts with Chungking were rife.
In the spring and summer, Britain's reaction to the crisis in Europe was the focal point of China's concern. Britain wanted to avoid a two-front conflict in Europe and Asia, which would leave her interests in Asia defenseless. While the United States stood on principles and refused to be a junior partner of Japan's New Order, Britain was willing to compromise. It sought to woo Japan away from joining the Axis. Japan let it be known that its interest in the Axis was confined to its anti-Comintern aspect.[67] Britain probed the possibility of "ceasing all aid to Chiang, recognizing Japan's military and economic predominance on the mainland, assuring her access to raw materials and markets, and trying to win back 'ultimate Chinese independence through cooperation.'"[68] The French government under Daladier was similarly inclined. As Japan tightened its control over the British settlement in Tientsin in late spring, British ambassador Clark-Kerr was meeting with Chinese leaders. In trying to forestall Britain from siding with Japan, Chiang Kai-shek and K'ung Hsiang-hsi threatened to join with Japan in excluding Britain from China.[69] Madame Chiang told an American naval attache, "The people would accept peace with Japan if the Generalissimo told them it was the best thing for China."[70]
In June, Mao broke his silence and spoke out on "The Greatest Danger in the Current Situation." In the opening paragraph, since deleted, he stated that he was replying to those who questioned his essay, "On the Protracted War," and his report to the Sixth Plenum.[71] He lashed out at the "international capitulators" and their plot to convene a "Pacific international conference" as "a preparatory step for turning China into another Czechoslovakia."[72] He clearly assessed the situation to be unfavorable for China. But the force of his attack on Wang Ching-wei and other "domestic capitulators" also suggested
[67] Nicholas R. Clifford, Retreat from China: British Policy in the Far East, 1937–1941 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), p. 100.
[68] Ibid. , p. 99.
[69] Ibid. , pp. 87, 102.
[70] Quoted in Boyle, p. 222.
[71] Mao Tse-tung-chi , VI, 343.
[72] Ibid. , p. 345.
that he was dodging his internal critics by shifting the blame for the friction in the united front from himself to the Kuomintang.
The announcement of the Soviet–German nonaggression pact on August 23 took the world by surprise. This diplomatic coup injected enormous uncertainty and complexity into international relations, as the other powers were jolted in their previous orbit and hesitated in search of new orientations. Two new alignments could be foreseen as the consequence of this pact. One was the union of the Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan. Chiang Kai-shek suspected that an agreement according north China to Japan and northwest China to the Soviet Union was then in existence.[73] One year later, in fact, Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka (second Konoe cabinet), Hitler, and Stalin conducted discussions concerning the prospect of dividing various parts of the world into "pan-regions."[74] Matsuoka intended first of all to use such a sphere of influence agreement to fortify Japan's "accomplished fact" in China, and then to compel the United States to desist from further assistance to China. For the time being, Japan and the Soviet Union ended the Nomonhan Incident by signing an armistice in September. The Soviet forces were rapidly transferred to Europe to join Germany in the division of Poland, to the dismay of Chinese public. Also in September, Mao and Wang Ming began to suggest the possibility of a Russo–Japanese nonaggression pact.[75]
The shock of the Soviet–German pact led to the fall of the Abe cabinet in Tokyo. Japan was isolated for the time being and became receptive to London's solicitation to prevent her from coalescing with Germany. Serious thought was entertained in London for reviving the Anglo–Japanese alliance in view of the United States' unwillingness to live up to the Nine Power Treaty. Japan quickly recomposed herself and allowed herself to be wooed by both the fascist powers as well as by Britain. The British ambassador to Japan, Sir Robert Craigie, advised the Foreign Office to grasp this chance to "recognize Japanese preponderance in a nominally autonomous North China . . . . "[76] In spite of protests from Chungking,[77] Britain moved one
[73] Soviet Russia in China , pp. 112–113.
[74] Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War between the United States and Japan (New York: Atheneum, 1962), pp. 145–147. The "pan-region" idea never materialized. But the Russo–Japanese neutrality pact of April, 1941, recognized Japan's hegemony in Manchuria and Soviet control of Outer Mongolia.
[75] Selected Works , II, 281; Guide , IX, 95–96.
[76] Clifford, p. 129.
[77] Chiang Kai-shek, "Appeal to Britain" (July 29) and "China and the European War" (September 9), Collected Wartime Messages , I, 307–308, 324–328; Clifford, p. 130.
step closer to Japan as the German invasion of Poland began on September 1. On September 8, Craigie requested the resumption of discussion with the Japanese government, terminated earlier. A week later he notified the Japanese foreign minister that Britain would cooperate in an embargo of war-related material into China.[78] France was willing to follow suit in Indochina.
The war in Europe was most opportune for Japan. A new cabinet came into being with a renewed determination to "solve the China Incident first." The circumstances paralleled those during the First World War when Japan exploited the absence of Western powers in Asia. On September 12, the China Expeditionary Forces were established under General Nihio Chuzo[*] to unify all the Japanese forces in China. The new command was designed to coordinate all the political and strategic operations in China in order to bring them to bear on the "Chungking operation."[79]
Mao expressed himself frequently in the fall. In an interview on the day the German invasion began (September 1), he divided the bourgeois countries into three groups. Following the Comintern's line, Britain and France were singled out for harsh criticism for their noninterventionist policy. The Munich compromise was blamed more on their policy than on Germany, which had just signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. The second bloc was the "German–Italian–Japanese anti-Communist bloc" which was just "smashed" by the Soviet–German pact. The third was led by the United States which also adopted the policy of neutrality.[80]
Two weeks later, Mao's attitude toward the international situation rapidly hardened to a point where it could be called "leaning to one side," to use a phrase made popular later. He felt that the imperialist war had entered the second stage.[81] In the first stage, the war was "non-universal" because some of the imperialist nations took a noninterventionist policy.[82] At this stage, according to Mao, it was still possible to organize an "anti-aggression united front" comprising the capitalist countries and the bourgeoisie in colonies and semi-colonies.[83] But as the war entered the second stage, the democracies and the bourgeoise deserted the united front and joined the fascists. The united front turned "from complex to simple."[84] The world, in his view, was
[78] Nihon gaiko[*] nempyo[*] , p. 129.
[79] Imperial Army General Staff , No. 1, pp. 613–616.
[80] Selected Works , II, 263–264.
[81] "Ti-erh-tz'u ti-kuo chu-i chan-cheng chiang-yen ti-kang" [Highlight of lecture on the second imperialist war], Mao Tse-tung-chi , VII, 33.
[82] Ibid. , p. 38.
[83] Ibid. , p. 39.
[84] Ibid. , p. 42.
divided into the bourgeois–capitalist–imperialist camp and the socialist camp.[85]
Mao's sweeping affirmation of loyalty to the cause of the Soviet Union was double-edged. He indicated that his view was challenged.[86] Were Mao's critics opposing him for lumping together the Anglo–American powers with Germany and Japan—a position considerably more radical than Moscow's? Or were they opposing Mao for writing off the bourgeoisie from the anti-fascist united front?
Mao's implacable ideological stance on the international situation was paralleled by a new militant stand on domestic questions, so much so that one suspects that the former was the cover for the latter. On September 16, he dropped what Hatano Ken'ichi called "the dynamite statement,"[87] which seems to have caused quite a ripple on the contemporary scene. In an interview with three presses, two of which were Kuomintang-affiliated, Mao blasted the Kuomintang for provoking friction.[88] His manner departed from the previously established rule in the united front politics. There had been minor friction between the two parties since 1937. But on each occasion the Kuomintang and the CCP Centers chose to regard it outwardly as local in origin and significance; they feigned innocence in the matter and sought to mediate in a settlement after the fact. Neither side ever blamed a "local" incident directly on the central leadership of the adversary. Mao had observed this rule through August when he made known his reaction to the P'ingchiang Incident, in which a rear office of the New Fourth Army was attacked by the Kuomintang.[89]
In the September interview, he came very close to linking the Measures to Restrict Alien Parties with Chiang Kai-shek in person. He revealed that Chou En-lai had communicated to "Generalissimo Chiang and the National Government demanding the withdrawal" of the measures. He named Chang Yin-wu and Ch'in Ch'i-yung, Kuomintang officials, as the chief "friction-mongers" in north China. He nearly conceded that a state of war existed when he proclaimed: "We will never attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked we will certainly counter-attack."
Mao announced categorically that the war in China was entering the second stage of its own, that is, the stage of stalemate. This announcement went beyond his judgment at the Sixth Plenum, when he
[85] Ibid. , p. 41.
[86] Ibid. , p. 42.
[87] Joho[*] , No. 31, December 1, 1940, p. 16.
[88] "Interview with Three Correspondents from the Central News Agency, the Sao Tang Pao and the Hsin Min Pao," Selected Works , II, 269–274.
[89] "The Reactionaries Must Be Punished," Ibid. , pp. 257–260.
stated that the war was entering the "transition to the new stage."[90] The point apparently was to restrain some hawks, for he said, "The time has not yet arrived for an all-out strategic counter-offensive, and we are now . . . actively preparing for it."[91]
What sort of deliberations took place among Chungking's leadership in the deteriorating circumstances of September and October cannot be known. Was any doubt voiced as to the wisdom of continued resistance? Or was the Kuomintang adhering firmly to the forward strategy of counter-offensive combined with restriction of communism? Were Mao's militant and seemingly reckless pronouncements based on some knowledge of the Kuomintang's inclinations? One indication of Chungking's attitudes was the action of the fourth session of the National Political Council which met between September 9 and 18. The CCP delegates sponsored a resolution calling for convocation of the national assembly and the adoption of a new constitution, putting an end to the stage of "tutelage" by the Kuomintang. The resolution carried the Council, which was handpicked by the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek spoke approvingly of the proposal in the closing address;[92] and the Sixth Plenum of the Kuomintang's CEC, meeting in November, set the date of November 12, 1940, for the convocation of the national assembly.[93] It seems that the Kuomintang was confident of its forward strategy.
This meant tightening up the restriction on Communist expansion in order to make the cost of the united front acceptable to itself. The method of using regional forces to attack Communist forces, while pretending that the government had no part in it, was viable so long as the Kuomintang side was winning. But by September, the forces of Lu Chung-lin and Chang Yin-wu in Hopei were in shambles. Chungking had to choose between acquiescence in the accomplished fact or escalation of pressure. According to P'eng Te-huai, the Kuomintang's anti-communism entered "a new stage having nation-wide and deliberate character" in January, 1939; and after November "military restriction of communism" was combined with "political restriction."[94]
There were unconfirmed Japanese intelligence reports that the Kuomintang and the CCP were exchanging emissaries in the summer and fall to settle the united front questions.[95] These meetings, if the
[90] Mao Tse-tung-chi , VI, 189–190.
[91] Selected Works , II, 269–270.
[92] Collected Wartime Messages , I, 329.
[93] Selected Works , II, 416.
[94] P'eng Te-huai, San-nien-lai ti k'ang-chan [Three years of resistance ] (Tung-fang ch'u-pan-she, 1940), p. 10; Joho[*] , No. 18, May 15, 1940, pp. 49–56.
[95] "Koku-Kyo[*] kiki no shin dankai" [The new stage in Kuomintang–CCP crisis], Toa[*] , December 1, 1939, p. 15.
reports are reliable, were an extension of the January and June meetings between Chiang Kai-shek and Communist leaders.[96] The Kuomintang probably intensified its political pressure on the CCP to stop the unauthorized expansion. It is my inference from subsequent negotiations that the CCP in turn proposed expansion of authorized combat zone by demanding Hopei Province for itself. In addition, it probably asked the government to authorize and pay for three army corps.[97]
The Chungking government took the most natural course; it took a legal or moral stand. It was the government of China, and it pretended that its authority should be obeyed. As Chiang Kai-shek had told Chou En-lai in June:
The root cause of the Communist problem is not limited to the enclaves of several counties in northern Shensi. It stems from the uncertainty over whether the Communists really and sincerely wish to obey the orders of the central government, to carry out the national laws and statutes, and to behave as a model in the revolution, or whether they want to separate themselves from the over-all state system in a special status to become ordinary practitioners of feudalism.[98]
If the Kuomintang felt that its legal case was strong, it nevertheless acted as though it was not. The "first anti-Communist high tide," to which these events were leading, was distinguished from the New Fourth Army Incident of early 1941 by the fact that the process of Kuomintang–CCP negotiation which preceded it was not made public. Chungking was in fact treating the united front question as a political one. It used its own military pressure in the field. Following the blockade of Shen-Kan-Ning in the summer, the supply of ammunition to the Eighth Route Army stopped in October.[99]
There is a presumption that the Soviet Union was mediating between the two parties to maintain the united front, though nothing definite is known. Soviet aid to China was in no mean quantity, ranging in estimate from US$250 million to US$450 million for the entire war.[100] Moreover, Soviet assistance was stepped up in inverse relation
[96] For the June meeting, see Soviet Russia in China , p. 92.
[97] Selected Works , II, 216.
[98] Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 613.
[99] San-nien-lai ti k'ang-chan , p. 46. In the summer of 1939, high Kuomintang officials began to make threatening public statements directed at the Communists. For instance, Chang Ch'ün, the vice chairman of the Supreme Defense Council, told Edgar Snow that the local Communist administration was "illegal and that the War Area Party and Political Affairs Commission would eradicate them." The Battle for Asia , p. 353.
[100] Arthur Young offers the smaller figure, p. 441, while Charles B. McLane offers the higher one, pp. 130–131.
to Soviet flirtation with the fascist powers, as though to soften its impact on China.[101] The Soviet–German pact was preceded by the signing of the Sino-Soviet commercial pact in June.[102] New Soviet ambassador A. S. Panyushkin arrived in Chungking in August, and foreign presses reported rumors of a Sino–Soviet military alliance though both Chungking and Moscow denied them.[103] Soviet assistance was again active toward the end of 1940 and in the spring of 1941—about the time of the New Fourth Army Incident and the signing of the Russo–Japanese nonaggression pact.
The aid material travelled the overland route through Sinkiang, after the Japanese blockade of South China Sea was completed. By November, 1939, a railhead was constructed from Aktogai in Outer Mongolia toward Tihua in Sinkiang. From there, an improved motor road stretched southeastward toward Lanchow in Kansu. The border checkpoint between Sinkiang and Kansu was well guarded; Sinkiang was in effect quarantined by Chinese troops. The largest Soviet outpost east of the border was in Lanchow, where 3,500 Soviet troops, technicians, and political cadres were running an airfield, arsenal, gasoline dump, and other installations. Sinkiang itself was undergoing development in Soviet hands. In Hami, there was an aircraft assembly plant.[104]
The Kuomintang was naturally acutely aware of the implications of Soviet buildup on the northwestern frontier. Chiang Kai-shek maintained in 1956 that Sheng Shih-ts'ai, a Chinese official in Sinkiang, had been a puppet since 1933 and had remained so until 1943 when Chinese pressure forced Soviet influence out of the province.[105] Outer Mongolia was drifting away from Chinese control, and by 1941 it was a Soviet satellite. The Kuomintang was also aware of the Comintern's instructions to the CCP, since 1934, to expand into Sinkiang and link up with Outer Mongolia.[106] Soviet diplomacy was no doubt doubleedged. Nonetheless, China appeared quite prepared to accept Soviet aid and pay a price for it. That is, Soviet and Chinese interests simply complemented each other so long as China remained in the war.
Ultimately, united front questions rested on the Kuomintang's decisions about the war itself. When the brief period of hesitation
[101] See McLane's revealing comments, pp. 134, 136.
[102] Soviet Russia in China , p. 89.
[103] See, for instance, New York Times , October 20, 1939, p. 8; Ibid. , October 21, 1939, p. 5.
[104] The North China Area Army, Seihoku Shina ni okeru Soren seiryoku shin-nyu[*] jokyo[*] [Conditions of Soviet power penetration into northwest China] (November, 1939).
[105] Soviet Russia in China , pp. 99–101.
[106] Ibid. , p. 100.
and uncertainty during the summer was over, the extent of Chungking's commitment to an offensive strategy in the second stage of the war became apparent. The China Expeditionary Forces reported four major campaigns in 1939. In March, the 11th Army attacked Nanchang. It cut the Chekiang–Kiangsi railway and engaged the Chinese forces along the Hsiushui River. Nanchang fell on March 27. The Chinese forces raised the slogan of "April offensive" on this front. To forestall it, the 11th Army swung northwestward across Hankow toward Ich'ang and Hsiangyang. The Chinese forces, some thirty divisions of the Fifth War Zone command, were routed. Then in September, immediately after the outbreak of the war in Europe, the Chinese forces belonging to the Ninth War Zone and numbering 215,000, challenged the 11th Army in what has since been called in China the First Changsha Campaign. Many of the battles in this campaign were rated by the China Expeditionary Forces as much more intense than those in the Nomonhan Incident. The morale and discipline of the central troops and the "anti-Japanese consciousness" of the middle-echelon cadres impressed the Japanese Army.[107]
The Chinese forces completed the second stage of reorganization one month ahead of schedule in December, and launched the "winter offensive." It started on December 12 along the entire front, but the assault on the 11th Army around Hankow was the fiercest. Before it ended on January 20, the Japanese forces counted 960 Chinese attacks and 1,340 engagements, with a combined force of 540,000 men. If it had not been for the diversion of the central forces from the Hunan front to the Nanning area to deal with the Japanese landing on the Kwangsi coast, the Chinese forces might have destroyed the 11th Army to win a strategic victory, according to Japanese army history. At no other time throughout eight years of the war did fighting come so close to taking on strategically decisive character as it did in the winter of 1939.[108]
It may be surmised that Mao's militant attitude toward the Kuomintang's pressure in the summer of 1939 was based on his assessment that the Kuomintang was not likely to surrender in the immediate future, regardless of the CCP's activities. At this point, the Communist forces were not large enough to remain in the war by themselves. Hence, Mao could not quite base his actual policies on the thesis of the Wayaopao Resolution, that the Kuomintang could be forced to stay in the war. So long as the initiative for war or peace (cum civil war) rested with the Kuomintang, the CCP had to be ready for all
[107] Imperial Army General Staff , No. 1, p. 619.
[108] Ibid. , pp. 619–620.
possibilities. On October 4, 1939, Mao gave his earliest hint that there might be some "emergency" involving a split in the united front. He demanded preparations against it so that "the Party and revolution will not suffer unexpected losses."[109]
On October 10, the Central Committee passed a resolution dealing with the "current situation." The CCP was watching closely the progress of the First Changsha Campaign, the first major risk taken by the Kuomintang forces against Mao's long-standing advice. While the stage of stalemate had arrived, the resolution pointed out, there might yet be farther enemy advance. That is, "if China does not capitulate of its own accord, the enemy may yet launch a large-scale offensive."[110] Therefore, "the stage of strategic stalemate . . . may yet be destroyed by the enemy and the capitulationists. The danger of the nation's defeat still persists abundantly."[111]
What sort of major alternatives did the CCP contemplate for itself at this point? Some general outline was suggested in intelligence collected by the Kuomintang and in turn captured by the Japanese forces when Hankow fell.[112] According to this material, there were three possibilities. First, if China won the war of resistance, the CCP was to proceed immediately to an "October Revolution." It expected to win the civil war; the Kuomintang would have been weakened by then, and the CCP would be strengthened by peasant support in the rural areas. This possibility conformed to Mao's vision at the Loch'uan conference, as reported by Chang Kuo-t'ao. Second, the resistance might end in a compromise between Japan and the Kuomintang government after the fall of Nanking and Hankow. The CCP expected that China would be divided into three parts in this eventuality. The Kuomintang would occupy the southwest; the CCP would remain in the northwest; and Japan would keep Manchuria, north China, and the coastal areas of the southeast. Third, the resistance might still end in a complete failure for China, and the disintegration of Kuomintang government. In this case, the CCP was to go underground completely. The CCP's aim, it was reported, was to work toward the first alternative, but there were strong possibilities that the second one would come to pass. It will be shown later that such alternatives continued to be debated in the CCP.
[109] Selected Works , II, 295.
[110] Mao Tse-tung-chi , VII, 88.
[111] Ibid. , p. 89.
[112] Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, Tiao-ch'a chuan-pao , No. 5, August, 1938, pp. 5–10. See also Tada Corps, Kitashina homengun[*] sanbocho[*] koen[*] yoshi[*] hoka jusanko[*] [Summary of briefing by the chief of staff of the North China Area Army and thirteen other items] (December 1, 1939), pp. 8–13.
It seems that, in the event of Chungking's surrender, the Comintern expected the Communist forces to move closer to the Soviet border. The conference of the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau in Tschita in January 1939, of which there is a secondhand report by the Japanese, was the occasion on which the idea of the "northwest route" was presented.[113] This was a statement of rather broad and long-range goals. The CCP was directed at the conference to expand its bases to five northwestern provinces, that is, Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Ch'ing-hai, and Sinkiang; to secure the recognition of this "soviet" from the Kuomintang government; and to cross the border into the mountainous areas between Inner and Outer Mongolia in order to establish an international route. The Soviet Far Eastern Forces and the forces belonging to the Mongolian Republic were directed to make supporting moves. The substance of this directive echoed the Comintern's instruction to the CCP just prior to the fall of the Central Soviet in 1934. In July, 1936, Chou En-lai confirmed a similar move as one of the CCP's alternatives.[114]
But in the fall of 1939, such a move was only a remote possibility, since the Kuomintang's morale was high. The most likely "emergency" for the CCP was one which would take place within the framework of the resistance, one in which the Kuomintang would "restrict" the Communists within tolerable limits. Toward the winter of 1939, the CCP appeared to be keeping vigilance but not expecting a dire emergency. Some time in October, 1939, the 359th Brigade of the Communist 120th Division, commanded by Wang Cheng, was transferred to northern Shensi, presumably to the Suite area.[115] Ho Lung's forces must have left central Hopei about the same time in order to make it back to northwest Shansi by December. Ho Ying-ch'in reported other troop movements into Shen-Kan-Ning without specifying their designation.[116] There appears to have been a transfer of important cadres to the Shen-Kan-Ning area for their protection also. Chu Te, who had been moving about with the Field Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, was back in Shen-Kan-Ning by early 1940.[117]
[113] "Kominterun kyokuto-kyoku[*] kaigi to Chukyo[*] Yenan shigatsu kaigi" [Conference of the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau and the CCP's April conference in Yenan], Joho[*] , No. 9, January 1, 1940, pp. 97–105.
[114] Snow, Random Notes , pp. 62–63.
[115] Ho Ying-ch'in, List of Unlawful Activities of the Chinese Communists since the Outbreak of the War of Resistance with the Object of Undermining the Very Existence of the Nation , cited in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China (hereinafter cited as Amerasia Papers ), 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washintgon, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 936.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao , XI, 65.