7.2—
Semiotic-Semantic Properties and CTM'S Account of Intentionality
The first order of business, then, is to consider the prospects of CTM's account of intentionality on the assumption that the "semantic" properties imputed to mental representations by CTM are the same kinds of semantic properties normally imputed to symbols—that is, that they are what I have called semiotic-semantic properties. In order to proceed here, it might be helpful to return to Fodor's own characterization of cognitive states in Psychosemantics:
Claim 1 (the nature of propositional attitudes)
For any organism O , and any attitude A toward the proposition P , there is a ('computational'-'functional') relation R and a mental representation MP such that
MP means that P , and
O has A iff O bears R to MP . (Fodor 1987: 17)
On the current interpretation, the condition "MP means that P " may be interpreted as "MP semiotically means that P ." But this does not yet leave us at a point at which we can evaluate this claim, for the simple reason that claims about semiotic-meaning are ambiguous: they might be claims about interpretability, about intended interpretation, about actual interpretation, or about interpretability-in-principle. So even if we confine ourselves to semiotic-meaning of mental representations, there are really four distinct accounts of cognitive states that might be seen in Fodor's characterization:
Authoring Intention Version
For any organism O and any cognitive attitude A towards a proposition P , there is a relation R and a mental marker MP such that
MP was intended as signifying (that) P , and
O has A iff O bears R to MP .
Actual Interpretation Version
For any organism O and any cognitive attitude A towards a proposition P , there is a relation R and a mental marker MP such that
MP was actually interpreted as signifying (that) P , and
O has A iff O bears R to MP .
Interpretability Version
For any organism O and any cognitive attitude A towards a proposition P , there is a relation R and a mental marker MP such that
MP is interpretable under convention C as signifying (that) P , and
O has A iff O bears R to MP .
Interpretability-in-Principle Version
For any organism O and any cognitive attitude A towards a proposition P , there is a relation R and a mental marker MP such that
MP is interpretable-in-principle as signifying (that) P , and
O has A iff O bears R to MP .
Our task thus becomes one of examining each of these four versions of the account and determining whether any of them can succeed in providing an explanation of the intentionality and semantic properties of mental states.
In the following sections, I intend to address each of these versions of Fodor's representational theory of mental states and to argue that none of them can provide an account of the semantic and intentional properties of such states. The arguments against three of the versions of the theory—those based upon interpretability, authoring intentions, and actual interpretation—are roughly cognate with one another, and hence these three versions will be addressed together. The case against the version based on interpretability-in-principle is quite different, and will be addressed separately.