1. Gildersleeve 1897, reprinted in Gildersleeve 1915.

2. Cornford 1907.

3. Lord 1945, originally entitled Thucydides: The First Modern Historian, derived its ultimate title from its final chapter (pp. 223–250), which compares the Peloponnesian War with the two world wars.

4. So Connor 1984.

5. Gilpin 1981, 226–227.

6. Crane 1996a.

7. Croix 1972, 23.

8. Hornblower 1992 emphasizes Thucydides’ disinterest in the political dimension of religion; for Thucydides’ treatment of the sanctuaries themselves, see the chapter on religious space in Crane 1996a.

9. Cochrane 1929 has grown unfashionable and is unjustly neglected; a similar fate has befallen Lord 1945; see also Woodhead 1970; de Romilly has continued to refine her “modernist” view: cf. de Romilly 1963 and 1990. Connor made the characterization “Post-modernist Thucydides” famous in Connor 1977a; he develops this view further in Connor 1984.

10. Thucydides has received a substantial amount of attention from scholars outside of classics in recent years. Consider, for example, the following book-length studies: Forde 1989; Palmer 1992; Johnson 1993; Orwin 1994.

11. Cornford 1907; also Stahl 1966; Lloyd-Jones 1971, 140–144; Edmunds 1975a and b.

12. For a skeptical view of the specific influence of tragedy upon Thucydides, see Macleod 1983; for the relationship between ideas expressed in Thucydides and Euripides, see Finley 1967.

13. Euben 1990b, 197–198; White 1984, 68–82.

14. In this I agree with White (1984, 85–87), who insists that many of the inconsistencies that remain in the History reflect structural tensions that Thucydides would not have resolved had he finished the work.

15. So Euben 1990b, 197–198.

16. For an example of extreme skepticism toward Thucydides, see Badian 1990, reprinted as Badian 1993, 125–162; also Hunter 1973.

17. Compare Gramsci (1971, 377), who distinguishes between “arbitrary” ideology, that can “create individual ‘movements,’ polemics and so on” and “ideologies that are historically necessary” and “create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.”

18. Habermas 1977, 22.

19. Howard 1991, 226.

20. Althusser 1971, 172.

21. The limits of any such attempt to transcend ideology will be pursued during the course of this chapter; on Athenian ideologies, see Ober 1989, passim and esp. 332–333; Ober argues that the masses at Athens exercised “ideological hegemony” over the elite; for the utopian ideologies of the Oresteia and of the funeral oration as a genre, see Rose 1992, 185–265, and Loraux 1986a, 328–338.

22. De Romilly 1963, 271.

23. Strauss 1964, 228.

24. Arendt 1958.

25. Arendt 1958, 19.

26. Arendt 1958, 20–21.

27. Cornford 1907; Finley 1967; Connor 1977a; Connor 1984; Hornblower 1987; see now also Walker 1993; Howie 1984 is a particularly thorough examination that reads the Archaeology against Pindar and explicates Thucydides’ relationship to his Panhellenic Greek audience.

28. Cochrane 1929, passim; de Romilly 1963, 271–272; Adcock 1963, 3.

29. See Edmunds 1993 (which was actually submitted in finished form in 1988).

30. On the ambiguity of Thucydides’ achievement, see, for example, Hornblower (1987, 30), who points out that Thucydides’ influence was “in one way…also profoundly damaging because…it was Thucydides who by his influential practice ordained that history should henceforth be primarily a matter of war and politics”; on the general dominance of the Thucydidean (vs. the Herodotean) model of history, see Lateiner 1989, 220–224; Momigliano 1990, 44–48 (who is somewhat more cautious).

31. So Strauss 1964, 226–236; such an Archimedian point of view is, even insofar as we can realize it, not without its problems: see Arendt 1958, 257–268.

32. Arendt 1958, 279.

33. Fuller 1957, 8, 43–50.

34. On the complex structure of book 1, see now Ellis 1991.