The Rally of Internal Opposition against Mao
As soon as Wang Ching-wei defected, the CCP mounted a major campaign to discredit him. It was designed to forestall the possibility that others might follow suit. For the time being, it remained for Wang Ming and other opponents of Mao to play up this danger. Mao remained silent. "Oppose Wang, defend Chiang struggles" were reported in Chungking, Changsha, and Shanghai.[33] On January 5, a rally was held in Yenan at which Wang Ming delivered the keynote speech. He exposed the long standing pro-Japanese inclinations of Wang Ching-wei and maintained that his defection was but the latest manifestation of an old Japanese plot to split the Chinese.[34] Quoting profusely from Chiang Kai-shek's own angry reaction to the defection, Wang Ming ranted at anti-Communist elements who secretly sympathized with Wang Ching-wei. They said, "The Chinese resistance is a war on behalf of the Soviet Union";[35] or "Opposition to Wang [Ching-wei] is necessarily an opposition to Chiang."[36] Wang Ming in-
[31] New York Times , November, 1939, p. 8.
[32] Chou Fou-hai jih-chi [Diary of Chou Fou-hai] (Hong Kong: Ch'uangk'en ch'u-pan-she, 1955), pp. 73–154, passim .
[33] Joho[*] , No. 7, December 1, 1939, p. 39.
[34] "Chiu yin-mao ti hsin-hua-yang" [New pattern in the old plot], Guide , VI, 105.
[35] Ibid. , p. 111.
[36] Ibid. , p. 122.
sisted, "Such people insult Chairman Chiang [by implying that he is in] secret agreement with the activities of Wang Ching-wei."[37] Evidently anti-Communist sentiment in some sectors of the Kuomintang was almost equal to the anti-Japanese sentiment. Wang Ming was trying to prevent the two halves of the Kuomintang from reuniting.
Specifically, Wang Ming's concern was the increased incidence of so-called "friction" between the Kuomintang's regional forces and the Communist forces. Local military clashes began to take place in Hopei Province in the summer of 1938, when the Communist forces expanded eastward from the Second War Zone in Shansi.[38] Chiang Kaishek called in P'eng Te-huai in February and instructed him to restrain Communist activities in southern Hopei.[39] But the CCP's Southern Hopei Administrative Office was established in August under Yang Hsiu-feng.[40] In September, the Hopei–Chahar (guerrilla) War Zone came into existence as the new Hopei governor, Lu Chung-lin, arrived in Nankung and assumed command of Kuomintang guerrillas such as those led by Chang Yin-wu.[41] Lu sought to enforce Chung-king's order to abolish the Communist government.[42]
For more than six months, between the end of the Sixth Plenum and June, 1938, Mao maintained silence about Wang Ching-wei's defection, domestic tension, and international developments. He was pushing furiously for implementation of the major decisions passed at the Plenum. I infer that two of these were uppermost in his mind. One was the establishment of a north–south link between the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. The other was the east–west link between the T'aihang mountain and Shantung. What little Mao did say during this period related exclusively to the development of bases. He wrote the preface to Nieh Jung-chen's book, which introduced the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region. Mao extolled it as a model to be emulated elsewhere. To the leaders of the CCP, Mao's essay had a more pointed message. He seemed to be reminding some of the practitioners of "new warlordism" who "take pride in being given appointments by the Kuomintang" to get on with the task of peasant mobilization and base construction.
The decision to take the Huai River valley in north Kiangsu was Mao's own. It is my inference that this decision was made with a view to an eventual civil war with the Kuomintang. Mao apparently de-
[37] Ibid.
[38] For accounts of these skirmishes, see Johnson, Peasant Nationalism , pp. 120–122.
[39] Ch'ün-chung , No. 8–9, May 25, 1938, p. 240.
[40] Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 49.
[41] Ibid. , p. 37.
[42] Ho Kan-chih, p. 351.
cided when the Japanese advance halted that the CCP must secure north China and prepare to confront the Kuomintang on that footing. As the Japanese commanders also knew, the control of Shantung Province was important, since it guarded the link between north China and Manchuria. The 115th Division was sent there, and efforts were made to establish a lateral link between Shantung and the T'aihang mountain across the plains of Hopei. This east–west link, however, could be easily cut unless the Kuomintang forces' advance into Hopei could be thwarted. Northern Kiangsu and northern Anhwei were situated to protect the soft underbelly of north China.[43] The importance of the Huai River valley to the CCP was underscored in the course of the Chungking negotiation of 1945 between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao. With American mediation, they redrew the boundaries of their respective forces as a part of futile efforts to avert the civil war. At that time, the Communist forces were in areas far to the south of the Yangtze River. Mao made concessions to withdraw them. The forces in Kwantung, Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, central Anhwei, Hunan, Hupeh, and southern Honan were moved north beyond the Lunghai railway and into northern Kiangsu and northern Anhwei. Central China was abandoned, but north Kiangsu and north Anhwei were not.[44]
As in the case of Hopei and Shantung, north Kiangsu was not assigned to the Communist forces. Subsequent events will show that the Kuomintang tried its utmost to prevent the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army from linking up with each other in north Kiangsu. It could only be taken by military conquest of Kuomintang opposition there. But north Kiangsu was behind the Japanese line. Mao's strategic rationale as applied to north Kiangsu was given by Teng Tzu-hui. Seldom can we find such an explicit statement.
Following the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, comrade Mao Tse-tung formulated the correct line that our Party and army should expand behind the enemy. This was because . . . only by penetrating deep behind the enemy . . . could we enlarge the political influence of our Party and army . . . again only by developing behind the enemy, by operating our army in areas not ruled by the Kuomintang could we prevent frontal friction with the Kuomintang from arising, and avoid giving any excuse to the die-hard forces to plot for split and surrender . . . [and] attain the good conditions for turning the subsequent stage into a preparation for the socialist revolution.[45]
[43] Teng Tzu-hui, "Hsin-ssu-chün ti fa-chan . . . ," p. 393.
[44] Selected Works , IV, 61.
[45] Teng Tzu-hui, "Hsin-ssu-chün ti fa-chan . . . ," p. 378.
As might be expected, the Kuomintang assigned the New Fourth Army to operate in an area which was very disadvantageous to it. The area in question was contiguous to the Shanghai–Nanking–Hangchow delta,[46] the most highly developed areas in China and the Kuomintang's traditional constituency. Except for Mt. Mao, the terrain was flat and unsuitable for guerrilla warfare. Social support for the Communist forces was also absent. The Japanese forces as well as Wang Ching-wei prized the delta and its environs. Behind the New Fourth Army were the central forces of the Third War Zone under Ku Chu-t'ung, to whom the New Fourth Army was subordinate. For these reasons Mao ordered the New Fourth Army to shift most of its forces east toward the Yellow Sea and then across the Yangtze northward into the northern part of Anhwei and Kiangsu.[47]
For some unknown reason, Hsiang Ying reportedly left the Sixth Plenum before it was over. Chou En-lai was dispatched to Kiangsi in the spring of 1939 to relay the decisions of the Plenum. He seemed to have been instructed to persuade Hsiang Ying to comply with the Party Center's order.[48] Hsiang Ying reportedly objected to the order. His formal reason was that he could not leave his station in the Third War Zone without authorization from the Kuomintang government.[49] In a few extant writings of Hsiang Ying from early 1939, one finds him extolling the rich natural endowments of the Chiangnan (south of the Yangtze River) as an advantage for his operation.[50] He was not alone in showing reluctance to obey the Center's directive. Kao Ching-t'ing, the original commander of the Fourth Detachment of the New Fourth Army (one of the four detachments initially authorized by the Kuomintang), was executed by Teng Tzu-hui for defying the order to move north.[51] Hsiang Ying's defiance of Mao was connected with the Internationalists' wish to retain a foothold on the Shanghai–Nanking–Hangchow delta, the cradle of the Communist movement.
Teng Tzu-hui, writing in the 1960s, listed other cases of deviation
[46] Ho shang-chiang . . . pao-kao , p. 418.
[47] Teng Tzu-hui, "Hsin-ssu-chün ti fa-chan . . . ," p. 379.
[48] Ibid.; Warren Kuo, "The CCP after the Government Evacuation of Wuhan," Issues and Studies , May, 1969, p. 41. One wonders how effective Chou was in this task. He made a speech at a party given by the New Fourth Army and agreed with Chiang Kai-shek that the war was in the stage of counter-offensive. Shih-lun ts'ung-k'an , No. 3, p. 3.
[49] Warren Kuo, "The CCP after the Government Evacuation of Wuhan," Issues and Studies , May, 1969, p. 42.
[50] "Hsin chieh-tuan-chung wo-men tsai Chiang-nan k'ang-chan ti jen-wu" [Our task in the resistance south of the Yangtze in the new stage], Hsiang Ying chiang-chün yen-lun-chi , pp. 16–17.
[51] Teng Tzu-hui, "Hsin-ssu-chün ti fa-chan . . . ," p. 379–380.
and insubordination committed by Hsiang Ying. "Comrade Hsiang Ying . . . was afraid of violating the Kuomintang's 'conscription statute,' afraid of the Kuomintang's restrictions, and did not dare recruit a large number of new soldiers in the rural areas, nor organize guerrilla forces."[52] He also showed an inclination to depend on the supplies and pay from the government. That is, he was reluctant to procure them on his own. Under the circumstances, local procurement required confiscation of hoarded weapons and local taxation. Of this Hsiang Ying is quoted as saying,
during the war against Japan the landlord class is revolutionary; our conduct of the united front behind the enemy is precisely to cooperate with the landlord class. Particularly in areas on the periphery of the base we must organize anti-Japanese arms through the landlords. Reduction in rent and interest should be somewhat relaxed also. . . . If we enforce the 30 percent rent and reorganization of local arms, not only will it destroy the local armed forces but it will also have impact on united front work.[53]
Teng Tzu-hui was honest enough to admit that " . . . if one were to carry out a true reduction in rent and interest, it would be nothing but a severe class struggle."[54] This was the reason why Hsiang Ying objected to revolutionary mobilization. He felt it was particularly imprudent to carry on class struggle in the lower Yangtze valley.
Chiang Kai-shek is the representative personage of the Kiangsu–Chekiang financial clique, and the landlord class south of the Yangtze have ties of flesh and blood with the Kiangsu–Chekiang financial clique. If we organize the mass movement, expand our forces, confiscate weapons, and collect military pay, not only will we be blamed by Chiang Kai-shek but we are also bound to penalize the Kiangsu–Chekiang financial clique, . . . As a result we may create a split in the united front with Chiang Kai-shek. This will be disadvantageous for the resistance situation as a whole. We will lose a lot for small gains.[55]
It was probably because of Hsiang Ying's opposition to Mao that the Sixth Plenum decided to establish a new regional bureau called the Central Plains Bureau and to redraw the jurisdictional boundary of the existing South China Bureau and the Southeastern Bureau, of which Hsiang Ying was the head. The Central Plains Bureau was to assume control of areas north of the Yangtze River while the Southeastern Bureau was assigned to handle Chekiang and Fukien Provinces to the south of it. Liu Shao-ch'i was to arrive soon as the new head of the Central Plains Bureau to assume command of the units crossing the Yangtze, while some units of the Eighth Route Army were pushing
[52] Ibid. , p. 382.
[53] Ibid. , p. 392.
[54] Ibid. , p. 390.
[55] Ibid. , p. 387.
southward to link up with the New Fourth Army. The result of all this would be to deprive Hsiang Ying of most of his power.[56]
It can be shown from the case of the New Fourth Army that the issue between Mao and the Internationalists in early 1939 concerned the growing tension and friction in the united front. This tension was creating a split in the Kuomintang and induced one of its most respected leaders to defect to Japan. Many others who shared Wang Ching-wei's antipathy to communism chose to stay with Chiang Kaishek. How much longer would the Kuomintang stay in the resistance if the CCP kept up its revolutionary activities? How valid was Mao's thesis in "On Protracted War"?
Answers to these questions were not settled entirely on their merits, because they were bound up with internal politics. To settle these issues, the CCP went through a period of very intense, though highly controlled, infighting to see who would control the Party. Nothing that was done in the Party at this time failed to have some impact on the final outcome on the strategic dispute.
The terms of debate on issues related to Party building were set exclusively by the Internationalists until the fall of 1939, when Mao began to work out his own platform based on the concept of "New Democracy." In the meantime, both sides vowed their allegiance to the same concepts and same goals and attempted to outdo the other.[57] Both sides vowed to build a "bolshevized Chinese Communist Party" and accused the other of failing to do so. The concept, "bolshevized" (pu-erh-se-wei-k'e-hua ), was clearly connected with Wang Ming, the leader of the Returned Student Group. In 1931, during the period of the so-called "Third 'Left' line of Wang Ming," he had published a book entitled Two Lines . He republished the same book in July, 1940 in Yenan under a new title, Struggle for the More Complete Bolshevization Of the Chinese Communist Party , as a weapon in criticizing Mao.[58]
A whole series of questions related to "bolshevization" were raised and debated in 1939. A most prominent one was, "Is the Communist
[56] Warren Kuo, "The CCP after the Government Evacuation of Wuhan," Issues and Studies , May, 1969, pp. 38, 42.
[57] At the Sixth Plenum Mao tried to set the terms of debate by objecting to the separation of "internationalist content from national form," but "many people" dismissed the objection. Selected Works , III, 67.
[58] Wei Chung-Kung keng-chia pu-erh-se-wei-k'e-hua erh tou-cheng , in Hsiao Tsoliang, ed., Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement , II, 499–609. Note that in the preface to the 1940 edition, he affirms that his criticism of Li Li-san was correct, Ibid. , p. 501. His intention was to suggest that Mao's line was a 'Left' deviation.
party's class stand identical with its nationalistic stand?"[59] Another was, "Are internationalism and revolutionary nationalism compatible with one another?"[60] This was also put as a question of the relationship between communism and the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen. When the Soviet–German pact was announced and the Chinese Communists were put in the uncomfortable position of explaining it to the public, the question of whether the interest of the Soviet Union is identical with the interests of all mankind was raised.[61] One cannot dismiss these concepts simply as empty political rhetoric to conceal the power struggle. The basic issue raised in this context was supremacy of Moscow and the Comintern over the Chinese Communist movement. Mao was not quite ready to deny the proposition. However, the fact that the issue was raised at all indicated that the CCP was going through a rebirth.
Naturally, the contest for control of various organizations proceeded simultaneously. Plenty of opportunities were at hand as Party, army, government, and mass organizations were expanding. The manner and speed with which they expanded became an issue. Two important organizational directives were issued by the CCP in the second half of 1939. One was the Central Directive concerning the Party Consolidation of August 25, and the other was the Decision of the Central Committee on the Work of Penetrating the Masses of November 1. It appears that the former was drafted by the Internationalists and the latter by Mao. The Party consolidation directive terminated the first stage of CCP expansion in north China by stating,
Since the beginning of the anti-Japanese war . . . the Chinese Communist Party has greatly developed itself by absorbing numerous good elements into the Party and firming up the basis of a national massive bolshevik party. Because of the very fact that the Party has expanded too rapidly within too short a period, the Party organizations are not fully consolidated and the recruitment of new Party members is fraught with serious errors and shortcomings. In competing for the largest number of new members, the Party organs in certain areas launched the so-called storm membership drives and accepted new members without careful screening of the individual candidates. Hence, many mediocre anti-Japanese elements or temporary fellow travellers have joined the Party, and chances arose for the adversaries, speculators and subversive agents to sneak into the Party. Consequently, the Party organization
[59] Lo Fu, "Lun Kung-ch'an-tang ti chieh-chi li-ch'ang yü min-tsu li-ch'ang ti i-chih" [Identity of the CCP's class stand and national stand], Guide , VIII, 10–28.
[60] Po Ku, "Kuo-chi chu-i yü ke-ming ti min-tsu chu-i" [Internationalism and revolutionary nationalism], Ibid. , IV, 55–67.
[61] Mao Tse-tung, "The Identity of Interests between the Soviet Union and All Mankind," Selected Works , II, 275–284.
has been damaged in its function as a proletarian vanguard, and rendered impotent. . . .[62]
The substance of the decision was that "further membership recruitment shall in general be suspended" and that retrenchment and consolidation of the already expanded organizations be carried out by weeding out undesirable elements. The directive further demanded unity between the older and new cadres, tightening up of Party security work, and good coordination between secret and open work in all areas.
At this time, many leading Communist cadres were writing on the subject of Party building. Ch'en Yün and Yang Shang-k'un wrote in support of the above directive.[63] The best known of all was Liu Shao-ch'i's "On the Cultivation of A Communist Party Member." This essay was noteworthy for its attempt to soften the process of weeding out the undesirable. He said, "We do not . . . adopt a mechanical, absolute attitude. We combine irreconcilability and clarity in principle with flexibility in the methods of struggle and with the spirit of patient persuasion . . . . "[64]
The November directive on mass penetration was in line with Mao's position of March by which he upheld Nieh Jung-chen's efforts in base construction as the model.[65] The linkage between the organizational struggle and the strategic dispute was indicated by the fact that the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yü Border Region under P'eng Te-huai's control was electing the delegates to the Seventh Party Congress in September.[66]