The French and English Histories

The most obvious sense in which the Histoire des ducs de Normandie et des rois d'Angleterre and the Chronique des rois de France embody distinct historical traditions with different meanings for their respective communities derives from the way the Anonymous of Béthune situates contemporary events with respect to the past in each work—that is to say, from the very structure of the histories that he elaborates. French history is located in a continuous tradition of royal descent from the Trojan Antenor; thus its meaning derives from a sequence of lineage, since the origin of the French peoples is already described in terms of a prestigious lineal ascent:

Antenor estoit li plus sages chevaliers des Troiens et li plus raisnables. Il s'en vint a Pannone od grant gent que de son lignage, que del lignage Priamus qui avoit esté rois des Troiens aincois que la cites fu destruite.^[71]

Antenor was the wisest knight of the Trojans and the most reasonable. He went to Pannonia with many people both of his own lineage and of the lineage of Priam, who had been king of the Trojans before the city was destroyed.

Indeed, so powerful is the genealogical patterning of French history in the Chronique that Ms. B.N. fr. 17177 rubricates the entire work as "li livres de geanologie [sic ] et coronikes [sic ] des Roys de France."^[72] At the same time, French history is unmistakenly chivalric, since An-tenor is figured as the premiere chevalier of Troy, who saves not only his own lineage from total destruction but that of King Priam as well.

Led by an eponymous hero, Francio—from whom the "Franci" received their name—the Trojans eventually migrated to safety in the Danube Valley, where they built a city at Sicambria. There they remained, according to the traditional account incorporated by the Anonymous, until the Roman emperor Valentinian sought their aid against the Alani, aid granted by the Franks in return for a release from tribute for a period of ten years. But when Valentinian sought once again to exact tribute from them, they rebelled, proclaiming that

"par lor sanc et par lor travail, ne jamais sous treu ne seroient" (by reason of the blood [they had spilled] and their work, never would they again submit to tribute).^[73] Resisting the emperor's attack, they traveled to the Rhine and entered Gaul under the leadership of Marcomir, whose son Pharamond they elected as the first king, thus inaugurating the succession of kings who ruled France down to the present day. Although many versions of the legend of the Trojan origins of the French, no doubt prompted by the Valentinian episode, add to this account etymological explanations for the name Franci as derived from "free" (franci ) or "fierce" (ferox —i.e., ferancos from feroces ), the Anonymous is content to trace the name to its lineal progenitor, thereby fusing etymological and genealogical explanations, a point stressed by his rubric:

Ci commence la geste de franche por coi il orent a non franois et dont il sont estrait et venu.^[74] ç

Here begin the deeds of France, and why [its people] have the name of French and whence they are descended and come.

In the Histoire des ducs de Normandie , English ascent is similarly traced to Trojan origins via a mythical, eponymous son of Antenor, from whom

il estoient apielé Danois por chou que Danaus, qui [fu] fill Anthenor, quant il fu eschapés de la destruction de Troie, s'en ala là endroit et si fu sires de cel païs.

They were called Danes on account of Danaus, who was the son of Antenor; when he escaped the destruction of Troy, he went to that place and was lord of this country.

But the Anonymous almost immediately abandons this account of Trojan descent in favor of an etymological explanation of the name Norman , rather than Danish :

Encore estoient-il apielé Normant por une autre chose, por chou que [en] lor langages nor chou est byse en franois et man chou est hom; et quant ces deus sillebes sont ajoustées, si sonne li mos autant en lor langage comme en françois hom de byse .^[75] ç

They were also called Normans for another reason, because in their language nor means north [literally, "north wind"] in French and man is man; and when these two syllables are put together, the word sounds in their language such that [it would be] in French "man of the north."

Moreover, the Anonymous at once begins the tale of Norman conquest: impelled, he explains, by overpopulation in the north, the Normans came to the shores of France. Their Trojan descent, therefore, has no narrative weight in his account, except as a brief and essentially etymological reference. Despite a common legendary foundation, the histories of France and England remain distinct in their earliest origins.

The first problem facing the Anonymous in the construction of his histories, then, was to establish the relationship between the two dominant forces in the chronicles, that is, between England and France, even before they are brought into direct confrontation in the contemporary sections of the texts. It is fair to say, I think, that the Anonymous handles this task poorly, at least as far as the respective histories of the two monarchies are concerned. In the early parts of the chronicles, snippets of the other's history are interpolated, clearly because they are chronologically contemporaneous, even if thematically unrelated to the subject under discussion. Thus, for example, the Normans literally thrust themselves into the French realm after the death of Louis the Pious: "Ne demorra mie an un an apres sa mort que li Normant asaillierent France et gasterent Dorescatum .i. chastel" (There had scarcely passed a year after his death when the Normans assailed France and wasted Dorescatum, a castle). Only then does the Anonymous backtrack to explain that

Normant sont danois de naissance et si les apela on primes normans en barbarine langue qui autre tant vaut que septentrionale por ce qu'il vindrent primes de cele partie.^[76]

Normans are Danes by birth, and one called them originally Normans in the barbarian tongue, which means essentially northern, since they first came from that region.

Notably absent, here, is any mention of the Trojan origins of the Normans that had figured at the beginning of the Histoire des ducs de Normandie .

Similarly, the Capetians first appear in Norman history in connection with the story of Hugh the Great's betrayal of his oath of loyalty to the young duke, Richard of Normandy, to whom King Louis had promised lands across the Seine that he now granted, instead, to Hugh:

Hues li Grans fu decheus par la covoitise qui li entra ou cuer, si oublia le sairement que il avoit fait à l'enfant, et fist au roi sairement contre l'enfant et contre Normendie.^[77]

Hugh the Great was betrayed by the desire that entered his heart and thus forgot the oath that he had taken to the child, and swore an oath to the king against the child and against Normandy.

Normans and French enter each other's pasts as antagonists, stripped of the presumptive legitimacy that surrounds their deeds in their own narratives. Indeed, the communal nature of a shared past is represented in the Anonymous's narratives largely in the form of contestation between the principal actors. As we shall see, this problematizing of legitimacy in each chronicle vis-à-vis the other was bound to affect the Anonymous's general understanding of the character of French and English kings, leading him to produce histories in which monarchy on both sides of the Channel is seen constantly through the eyes of the "other." This pluralism of vision, effected through narrative interlacing, is a hallmark of the Anonymous of Bíthune's historiography, endowing his histories with an oddly modern quality.

French and English kings are seen, moreover, not only in the light of their mutual and respective pasts, but also from the perspective of those whom they embroil in their antagonisms, whose actions take place within the tensions generated by royal competition. For example, when Duke Robert "the Magnificent" died in 1035, leaving behind his bastard son William to rule Normandy, the Anonymous reports that

dés primes [William] ot grant travail et grant paine: ses lignages le guerroia, qui grant desdaing avoit de chou que il estoit dus et bastars. Li baron s'entre-guerroierent, et fremerent castiaus li .i. encontre les autres: dont il avint que Hues de Mont-Fort et Jakelins de Ferrieres s'entre'ocisent de guerre. Puis refu ocis li cuens de Deu qui Gillebers avoit non, et puis Teroldes qui maistres estoit de l'enfant. Puis refu ocis Obiers ki plus grans maistres estoit à l'enfant; et fu ocis el val de Rueil en dormant, de Guillaume le fill Rogier de Montegny. Chil Obiers estoit fils del frere la contesse Gomor. Puis crut moult durement et la guerre et li maus; tant monteplia la guerre que li rois Henris de France manda au duc Guillaume que jà à lui n'aroit amour ne pais tant comme Tiulieres tenist en estant.^[78]

From the beginning [William] had great travails and great difficulties: his lineage warred with him; [it] had great scorn for him because he was a duke and a bastard. The barons made war against each other, and fortified their castles one against the other; whence it happened that Hugh de Montfort and Jacques de Ferrieres killed each other in war. Then the count of Deu, whose name was Gillebers, was killed, and then Terold, who was master of the child. Then Obiers

was killed, who was even greater master to the child; and he was killed in the valley of Rueil while sleeping, by Guillaume, the son of Roger of Montegny. This Obiers was the son of the brother of the countess Gomor. Then both the war and evildoing grew especially harsh; the war so multiplied that the king, Henry of France, sent word to Duke William that he would never grant him peace or favor as long as Tuiliers remained standing.

This passage, which barely attains narrative intelligibility, is nonetheless a typical sample of the Anonymous's procedures. The misdeeds of kings, either alone or in competition with one another, generate war and wrongdoing, into the midst of which French and/or English nobles, named and identified in terms of their networks of affiliation, are thrust. Even before reaching contemporary events, the Anonymous's history offers a kaleidoscope of martial activities on both sides of the Channel, into which he inserts a discussion of the genealogical bonds of the noble lineages sucked into the whirl of royal warfare. As this sample demonstrates, the focus of attention is not the king himself, but the intricate play of interests and power among and within the nobility. Many pages of both chronicles are devoted to the genealogical identification of the nobles who participate in the events occasioned by royal activities, overwhelming by its sheer weight of words the thread of the narrative.

The most compelling evidence of a shared, perforce competitive, past comes precisely from this genealogical patterning of the histories. In his interweaving of the stories of the lineages that appear as actors the Anonymous most clearly articulates the communal and interdependent character of time, event, and history. Take, for example, two wholly characteristic interpolations, both representative of the Anonymous's concern with the affairs and personages of Flanders and Béthune. The first occurs in the Histoire des ducs de Normandie , where the Anonymous is discussing the money raised to ransom Richard Lion-Heart. He notes that, when Richard was liberated, the king left behind as hostages his nephew Otto of Germany and Baldwin of Bé-thune. Although the lineage of Otto, future emperor of Germany, goes unremarked, the Anonymous adds to the mention of Baldwin's name the following passage:

. . . Bauduin de Biethune, cui il fist puis conte d'Aubemalle par Havi le contesse, que il li donna à feme. Cele Havis avoit esté feme le conte de Mandeville, qui Guillaumes estoit apelés et n'en ot nul enfant. Quant li cuens fu mors si le donna li rois à Guillaume de Fors, qui en ot .i. fill, qui ot à non Guillaumes; et apriès Guil-

laume de Fors, la donna li rois à Bauduin de Biethune. Celui Bauduin lassa-il en ostages por lui, avoec Othon son neveu.^[79]

. . . Baldwin of Béthune, whom he later made count of Aubemarle, by virtue of Havi the countess, whom he gave him in marriage. This Havi had been the wife of the count of Mandeville, who was named Guillaume, and he had no children by her. When the count died the king gave her to Guillaume de Fors, who had a son by her, whose name was Guillaume; and after Guillaume de Fors, the king gave her to Baldwin of Béthune. This Baldwin he left as a hostage for him with Otto his nephew.

It is noteworthy that this method of interlacing noble genealogies into the body of the text functions, additionally, to introduce as significant figures in the historical narrative the female branches of the family trees discussed. Women appear as essential links in the chains of genealogies with which the Anonymous overlays his text, important both for the land and wealth they bring to the noble family and in their own right.

The density of the information adduced concerning the Anonymous's Béthune patrons is not restricted, moreover, to the immediate generation of Robert VII, but reaches back at least two generations, as demonstrated by the following passage on the death of Robert V at Sutri on 18 January 1191 while accompanying Philippe of Alsace on the Third Crusade:

morut à Sutre uns haus hom de sa terre, qui od lui s'en aloit, qui ert apelés Robers; avoés ert de la cité d'Arras et sire del chastel de Betune.

Grans damages fu de la mort à cel preudome; car ce ot esté uns des meillors vavasors del monde. Mais sa terre ne remest pas sans oir; car il ot v molt bons ills: Robert l'aisné, un saint home et bon chevalier, qui après lui fu avoés, mais poi dura; Guillaume, qui refu puis avows et sire del chastel de Tenremonde par mariage, molt preudom et molt loials, mais molt ot d'aversités; Baudewin, uns très bons chevaliers, qui puis fu cuens d'Aubemarle; Johan, un clerc, qui puis fu evesques de Camberai; Cuenon, le puis né, qui puis fu maistre chamberlens de l'empiere de Constantinople et uns des plus preudomes et des plus sages del monde; et ce parut bien en la terre tant corn il vesqui.^[80]

there died at Sutri a high man of his [i.e., the count of Flanders's] land, who had accompanied him, who was called Robert; he had been avoué of the city of Arras and lord of the castle of Béthune.

The death of this honorable man was a great shame; for he had been one of the best vavasors in the world. But his land did not

remain without heirs; for he had five very good sons: Robert the eldest, a holy man and a good knight, who after him was avoué , but he lived only a short while [d. 1193 or 1194]; Guillaume, who then was avoué and lord of the castle of Dendermonde through marriage, a very fine man and very loyal, but he experienced many adversities; Baldwin, a very good knight, who later was count of Aubemarle; Jean, a cleric, who later was bishop of Cambrai; Conon, the youngest, who later was master chamberlain of the empire of Constantinople and one of the best men and the most wise in the world; and this was clearly seen in the land while he lived.

Once again, what is notable is not only the length of the insertion or the extremely detailed knowledge of familial relations that the Anonymous of Béthune displays, but the laudatory tone he assumes in discussing members of the house of Béthune and their progenitors. The praise and concern lavished on the Flemish nobility, moreover, is not matched in his discussion of English and French kings and their ancestors, as the remarks about William the Conqueror and Hugh the Great cited above testify. Indeed, a great deal of the interest of the Anonymous's histories lies in this differential treatment of kings and nobles, for it confirms beyond doubt that his principal motive was not to celebrate the emerging authority of centralized monarchy, but rather to explore and interrogate the nature of aristocratic existence within the changed conditions of life and loyalty that royal competition and power were creating.

Portraits of Rulers and Ruled

As long as the Anonymous of Béthune is engaged essentially in translating prior sources, his depiction of rulers and their cohorts on both sides of the Channel remains relatively balanced. Following the lead of his base texts, he distributes praise and blame in an apparently impartial manner, and his narrative seems free of the ideological pressures that come into play when he reaches recent history. Thus, he presents past Norman rulers according to the merits of the case at hand, commending those whose honorable behavior and traits of personality earn his (or his source's) approval, while censuring those who violate the values and conduct appropriate for rulers entrusted by God with the governance of society. For example, he bestows upon Duke Richard of Normandy an encomium whose list of virtues is clearly derived from royal models:

Li dus Richars fu moult preudom; il fu force des foibles, desfendemens des veves et des orphenins, confors as caitis, apaisieres des

maus, bastons as avugles, releveres de Sainte Eglyse, lumiere as non veans, hautece des clers, aidieres as soufraiteus, honnours as evesques, ameres de pais, cultiveres de viertus, esperance as desconfortés, pities as dolours, aliance d'amour, sieges de lois, pastours des povres, examples des princes, droituriers en justice, veritables en parler, en consel porveans, en jugement loiaus, en toute honnesté, de boines meurs reluisans, et toutes les autres boines teches avoit herbregies en soi.^[81]

The duke Richard was a very valiant man; he was the strength of the weak, defender of widows and orphans, comfort to the wretched, pacifier of wrongdoing, cane to the blind, rescuer of the Holy Church, light to those who did not see, grandeur of the clergy, aid to the suffering, honor to bishops, lover of peace, cultivator of virtue, hope to the disconsolate, pity to the sorrowing, bond of love, seat of laws, shepherd of the poor, example of princes, righteous in justice, truthful in speaking, in counsel farseeing, in, judgment loyal, in everything honest, shining with good morals, and all the other good traits were lodged in him.

William Rufus, in contrast, although acknowledged as a "rois larges et vaillans," is nonetheless castigated because he

trop deshiretoit volentiers la gent; de chou ert-il trop mal entechiés. Il fist maint mal à Sainte Eglyse et as clers, et meismement as abbeyes, que il apetisoit de lor tierres et de lor rentes.^[82]

very willfully disinherited the people; this was a considerable shortcoming of his. He did many wrongs to the Holy Church and to the clergy and especially to the abbeys, whose lands and rents he diminished.

One hears here, beneath the Anonymous's text, the voice of his clerical sources, reproduced with little change and with little apparent concern for making an independent judgment.

It is primarily when his chronicles become recent and original that the Anonymous of Béthune achieves real value, both as a narrator of history and as an index of the attitudes and concerns of the aristocratic audience for whom his histories were destined. Interestingly, his portraits of the French and English kings supply the same kind of gloss on the history he is narrating that the portraits offered in the Faits des Romains did, implicitly commenting on and evaluating the sources of both power and conflict with which those subject to royal authority must come to terms. The Anonymous's portraits of John and Philip Augustus disclose the complexity of the choices facing the French, and above all Flemish, aristocracy, caught between the

contending ambitions of newly powerful and rich rulers, who did not hesitate to use their accumulated rights, skill, and wealth to impose their wishes on the realms over which they sought to achieve new levels of authority.

In his minute examination of the play of forces and personalities that shaped the destinies of France and England in the crucial first decades of the thirteenth century, the Anonymous of Béthune provides a unique view of how the aristocracy might have understood the processes by which an ascendant monarchy had transformed its conditions of existence. To the degree that he speaks for his patron, Robert of Béthune, he offers us a rare glimpse of how royal centralization in this period appeared to those most immediately affected by it. To be sure, his discussion of the impact of royal policies is refracted through the lens of royal personality; but his appreciation of the decisive role of kingship in determining the boundaries of aristocratic behavior indicates that he was keenly aware of the emerging shift in the balance of power between monarchy and aristocracy, an awareness that informed his depiction of the rulers around whom the political life of the thirteenth-century aristocracy gravitated. Through his portraits of John and Philip Augustus we can see an age in crisis, an age in which the conditions of political action and the meaning of loyalty had been radically transformed, leaving behind unresolved tensions that produced both open political strife and a less overt, but equally significant, sense of malaise.

The Kings of England and France

The Anonymous of Béthune's view of the two monarchs whose actions and ambitions so powerfully shaped the histories of France and England in the early thirteenth century is informed by an acute sense of the personalities of these rulers. His treatment of both John and Philip Augustus is marked by an ironic distance that accentuates the realistic effect of his narrative. The ironic tone that characterizes his appraisal is perhaps best conveyed in the proverb he cites when discussing the dissension that arose between Richard Lion-Heart and Philip Augustus on the Third Crusade—the origins of which he attributes to an underlying current of competition between two proud and unyielding men:

Voirs est que on dist que ja dui orgueilleus ne chevauceront bien un asne.^[83]

Two proud men cannot ride the same ass.

At the root of the limited success of the Third Crusade lay, in the Anonymous's opinion, the inability of its leaders to cooperate, for their rivalry overrode any commitment to a larger cause. Thus, he argues:

Li rois d'Engleterre ert orgueilleus sor tous homes; si ne daignoit estre obediens al roi de France son seignor, et li rois de Franche ne pooit souffrir son orgoeil, ne ne voloit. Por ce et por molt d'autres baras recommena la guerre entre'els molt grans et molt cruels.^[84] ç

The king of England was proud beyond all men; he did not deign to be obedient to the king of France his lord, and the king of France could not suffer his pride, nor did he wish to. For this and for many other pieces of roguery there recommenced the war between them, a great and very cruel one.

Although his explanation is couched in the language of personality, it is clear that the Anonymous understands the structural anomaly that fed the reluctance of English kings, vassals of the French king for their continental possessions, to be obedient to their nominal overlords. Indeed, it was this anomaly that underlay the struggle between Philip Augustus and John, for the former was determined to impose his authority and, if possible, reconquer for the French realm the continental holdings of his most powerful rival. As the Anonymous himself makes abundantly clear, Philip had repeatedly failed in the attempt to subdue Angevin rulers. The results of the renewed war that Philip initiated against Richard upon returning to France from the Third Crusade were, as the Anonymous indicates, hardly favorable to the French king:

Si convint le roi de France soufrir molt d'aversités de cele guerre: car li rois Richars estoit trop riches et de terre et d'avoir, asés plus que li rois de France n'estoit.^[85]

The king of France had to suffer many adversities due to this war, because King Richard was extremely rich, both in land and in goods, much more than was the king of France.

Despite his persistent efforts to assert his authority and to regain territory, the resources of the French king proved hopelessly inadequate in the face of superior English wealth, martial force, and, in the case of Richard Lion-Heart, military cunning. Only against John was the French king finally successful, and the Anonymous argues persuasively that the cause of the 'English ruler's ultimate failure stemmed as much from the oddities and inconsistencies of his personality as from

the improvement in French resources due to the king's acquisition of Vermandois and, in 1204, Normandy. In his handling of the struggle between John and Philip Augustus, the Anonymous provides a compelling picture of the complicated relationship and reciprocal influence of wealth, military power, behavior, and personality in shaping the events that culminated in the defeat of the English alliance at Bouvines and the final triumph of the king of France. His portrait of John skillfully articulates the precarious balance between power and legitimacy that, in a period when the bureaucratic structure of government was still relatively undeveloped by modern standards, depended finally on the personality of the king. The personal failings of rulers, therefore, assume a political significance for the governance of the realm and for the viability of those bound to them that is imbricated in the more fundamental issue of monarchical efficacy and legitimacy. The repercussions of royal success or failure were felt far beyond the court, and it is the Anonymous's clear understanding of the new precariousness of aristocratic life stemming from its dependency on monarchy that makes him such a valuable witness to noble consciousness in this period.

John Lackland . Robert of Béthune's extensive involvement with John of England as a member of the English party in Flanders and recipient of English fiefs and rents in exchange for military service in John's host meant that the Anonymous of Béthune was advantageously placed to observe this complex and curious king. His view of John is hardheaded and not a little tinged with scorn; the resulting image is of a cruel and inconstant man, driven by greed, lust, and envy and afflicted with a strange lassitude at critical moments in the struggle that he engaged in so ferociously, yet fecklessly, against his French adversary. In the Anonymous's eyes, John appears to be a king who relied on money instead of leadership to garner the support necessary to prosecute his wars and who, when finally engaged in battle, exhibited that most despicable of characteristics in a chivalric world that prized bravery above all: cowardice. Reporting how, in 1206, John fled the castle of Thouars in Poitou when French troops commanded by the king surrounded it, the Anonymous sternly notes:

Là parut bien la coardise le roi d'Engleterre: car od ce qu'il ne s'osa combatre, autre si tost que li rois de France se fu trahis arière, s'en rala il vers la mer et repassa en Engleterre.^[86]

There appeared clearly the cowardice of the king of England; for along with the fact that he did not dare to fight, as soon as the king

of France had withdrawn, he turned back to the sea and recrossed [the Channel] to England.

John's vicious tendencies, moreover, were not restricted to his enemies, but were directed equally at the preudomes upon whom, ultimately, the success of his reign relied. It would be difficult to find in contemporary vernacular historiography a portrait of a king as repugnant as the one the Anonymous here draws of John:

Molt mal homme ot el roi Jehan: crueus estoit sor toz homes; de bieles femes estoit trop couvoiteus; mainte honte en fist as haus homes de la tierre: par coi il fu moult haï's. . . . Ses barons melloit ensamble quanques il pooit; moult estoit liés quant il veoit haine entre els. Toz les preudomes haoit par envie; moult li desplaisoit quant il veoit nullui bien faire· Trop estoit plains de males teces; mais de grant despens estoit: moult donnoit à mangier et larghement et volentiers; jà sa porte ne li huis de sa sale ne fussent gardé au mangier: tout chil mangoient à sa court qui mangier i voloient. As .iii. nataus donnoit volentiers grant plenté de reubes as chevaliers: de chou fu-il bien entechiés.^[87]

King John was a very evil man; he was cruel beyond all men; he was very covetous of beautiful women; because of this he shamed the high men of the land, for which reason he was greatly hated·. . . He set his barons against one another whenever he could; he was very happy when he saw hate between them. He hated all honorable men out of envy; it greatly displeased him when he saw anyone do good. He was full of bad traits; but he was free in spending: he gave away much to eat, both liberally and voluntarily; neither his gate nor the entrance to his hall was ever closed for eating: all those who wished to could eat at his court. On the three nativities [principal feast days] he willingly gave a large amount of robes to the knights: this was one of his good qualities.

Only in his apparent largesse does John demonstrate the moral qualities appropriate for a king. In all else his behavior shames not only the office he holds but also the subjects he rules, whose wives he coveted and sometimes took for his own use, earning the hatred of the nobility. Envious of the success of others, he set noble against noble and took pleasure in the hatreds between them that he had engendered. He made himself so despised and feared throughout the land, the Anonymous of Béthune proclaims, that

toutes les gens tiesmoignoient que puis le tans le roi Artu n'avoit eu roi en Engletierre qui tant lust doutés en Engletierre, en Gales, en Eschoce ne en Yrlande, comme il estoit.^[88]

all the people bore witness that since the time of King Arthur there had not been in England a king who was so feared throughout England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland as he was.

At times, however, the king withdrew from the pressing concerns of the realm, retreating to a fantasy world in which he appeared to lose himself, concerned only with the care of his animals and pleasures of his marriage bed. For example, the Anonymous reports that when the news came to John that his castle at Chinon had fallen and one of his closest advisors, Hugh de Burgh, been taken prisoner, the king showed signs neither of regret nor outrage. In a rare use of the personal voice, the Anonymous displays his surprise at John's response:

je ne sai quel duel il en ot au cuer; mais moult en fist poi de samblant. Toute tourna s'entente en deduit de chiens et d'oisiaus et à conjoïr la roine sa feme, que il moult amoit.^[89]

I do not know what sorrow he had in his heart; but he made little pretense about it. He turned all his attention to the pleasure of his dogs and birds and to the enjoyment of the queen his wife, whom he loved very much.

Nor was this an isolated response. Upon returning to England in 1214 after fleeing in panic the defense of his garrison at La Roche-au-Moine at the approach of French forces under Prince Louis, John "torna ô deduire son cors: bois et rivieres antoit, et moult l'en plaisoit li deduis" (turned to the enjoyment of his body; he frequented woods and rivers and took great pleasure in this distraction).^[90]

The Anonymous of Béhune's portrait of John could scarcely be darker. Lascivious and uxorious, indolent and self-indulgent, riven with envy, fear, and hatred, yet passionately in love with his wife and capable at rare moments of great energy, only to fall then into inexplicable periods of lassitude—these are the features of John's personality that the Anonymous sketches with compelling detail. If they had been merely personal idiosyncrasies, disagreeable and disappointing for the theatrics of kingship, which required a certain level of ceremonial dignity and charismatic force to be effective, the Anonymous's careful exposition of royal deficiencies would remain interesting but ultimately insignificant. Yet it is clear from his account of John's dealings with his vassals and followers—and with the Flemish most particularly-that the effects of royal incompetence and instability cast a widening shadow of political failure on the events of John's reign, drawing into the circle of his defeat all those associated with him.

A good example of the inconstancy with which John approached the problem of consolidating support among the Flemish—a critical task if he was to be successful against his Capetian rival—is to be found in a pair of reports on the king's treatment of Robert of Béhune, which veered wildly between attitudes of scorn and derision for his Flemish allies and indecorous importuning of their military aid. In the first instance, the Anonymous tells us that Count Ferrand of Flanders arrived in England after the burning of the French fleet at Damme and sent Robert of Béhune to Windsor where John was residing. Upon gaining access to the king, Robert conveyed the news of the count's arrival, whereupon the following conversation ensued:

"Vostre sires, li cuens de Flandres, est arrives en cest tierre."

"Et k'atendés-vous dont," dist Robers, "que tantost n'alés à lui?"

"Oés," dist li rois, "del Flamenc! Il cuide bien que che soit une grans chose de son segnour le conte de Flandres."

"Par saint Jake !" dist Robiers, "je ai droit, ke si est chou."

Li rois commencha lors à rire, si lor dist: "Mandés tost vos chevaus, car je m'en vois maintenant vers lui."^[91]

"Your lord, the count of Flanders, has arrived in this land."

"And what are you waiting for then," said Robert, "that you do not go to him immediately ?"

"Listen," said the king, "to the Fleming! He thinks that he's a big deal, his lord the count of Flanders."

"By Saint Jacques !" said Robert, "I am right, he is."

The king began then to laugh and said to them: "Order up your horses, for I shall go to him straightaway."

The king's contempt for the count, upon whom his own military fortunes depended, and his open ridicule of Robert's claim for the dignity owed Ferrand as count of Flanders, which borders on the abusive, illustrate the political dangers posed for an aristocracy newly reliant on monarchy for its fate and the difficulties of sustaining loyalty to rulers who openly paraded their lack of respect for their vassals. In the cultic world of the feudal aristocracy, where questions of deference and precedence were as likely to instigate conflict as was competition for material gain, John's disdain for the protocols of honor governing relations between allies courted disaster. In this exchange, it is not the king but the poor knight who upholds the rules of social etiquette regulating feudal relations: Robert, not John, understands the implications of proper behavior for the conduct of political affairs, and he, ultimately, remains faithful to the ideals of kingship, even when monarchy itself derogates from them.

This last point is amply demonstrated by the second account, which involves the series of negotiations between John and his barons that led to the signing of Magna Carta, a story that the Anonymous labels as "l'ocoison de la guerre dont li rois Jehans moru deshiretés de la plus grant partie d'Engletierre" (the cause of the war by which John died disinherited of the greater part of England).^[92] John, incapable of overcoming the baronial rebellion that had risen up against him, was compelled to sign a peace "comme li baron vaurrent" (as the barons wished), which he did without consultation: "onques n'i atendi le consel de son frere ne des Flamens" (he did not wait for the counsel of his brother nor of the Flemings). Only after signing did John communicate the terms of the peace laid out in Magna Carta, sa chartre , to his Flemish allies, who were outraged at the capitulation of their leader:

Grant ire orent li Flamenc quant il oïrent les nouvieles de la vilaine pais que li rois avoit faite. Il vinrent à lui; mais il ne li fisent pas si boin samblant comme il avoient fait devant; nonpourquant il s'en alerent o lui jusques à Mierlebierge. Là fist-il une grant vilonnie; car il fist une grant masse de son tresor oster fors de la tour, si le fist porter en ses chambres, voiant les ielx as chevaliers de Flandres, ne onques riens ne lor en donna.

Aprils cele vilenie que li rois fist, prisent li Flamenc congié à lui, si s'en repairierent en Flandres.^[93]

The Flemish were very angry when they heard the news of the base peace that the king had concluded. They came to him; but they did not present themselves in a manner as favorable to him as previously; nevertheless, they went with him to Merleberghe. There he did a terrible thing; for he had a great mass of his treasure taken from the tower and brought to his chambers, in the sight of all the knights of Flanders, but he did not give them anything from it.

After this base deed of the king, the Flemings left him and returned to Flanders.

Furious that the king had negotiated peace without informing them, aware of John's dissembling nature, of which they were justly suspicious, and, finally, insulted and injured by his hoarding of money before their very eyes while they remained unpaid for their efforts on his behalf, the Flemish nobility appear, finally, to break their ties with a king so careless of their feelings, so unjust in his dealings with them, and so ineffectual in his government of the realm. Yet this is not the end of the story. For John, avid to reverse his situation by dethroning the committee of twenty-five barons that Magna Carta had created to

regulate and constrain his actions, schemed how "il se porroit vengier d'els" (he might take vengeance on them).^[94] To raise the necessary troops, the king sent letters to Robert of Béthune, imploring his aid:

Li Rois d'Engletierre saluoit Robiert de Biethune comme son très chier ami et son home, si li mandoit que il connoissoit que il s'estoit mesfait enviers lui; mais pour Diu ne presist garde à son mesfait, ains euust pité et merchi de lui et de la couronne; car il vaurroit d'ore en avant del tout ouvrer par son consel.

The king of England greeted Robert of Béthune as his most dear friend and his man, he sent word to him that he recognized that he had treated him badly; but for God's sake let him not heed his wrongdoing, but instead have pity and mercy on him and on the crown, for he wished from now on to do everything according to his counsel.

Before this spectacle of a king cravenly admitting his past error and begging for mercy and support, Robert of Béthune's sense of decency and fidelity carries the day:

Quant Robiers ot les lettres oïs, mlt [sic ] en eut grant pitié; il ne prist pas garde au mesfait le roi, ains se pena quanques il pot de querre gent et d'avancier le besoigne le roi à son pooir.^[95]

When Robert heard the letters, he was moved to great pity; he did not retain [his anger at] the king's misdeed, but strove with all his might to seek out men and to advance the king's cause.

Despite John's past history of royal abuse, betrayal, deception, and injustice, Robert of Béthune proves himself a staunch and steadfast supporter of the English crown, ready to forgive the king's misdeeds (mesfait ) for the sake of loyalty to the needs of the throne. It is the ruled, not the ruler, who demonstrates a perduring commitment to the principles and bonds that provide the social cement of the medieval world. And, as the Anonymous discloses, it is this very commitment that will undermine those who faithfully, if foolishly, adhere to their demands.

That Robert's response stems from his character, not from the dire straits in which the English king found himself, is demonstrated by Robert's equal magnanimity with respect to his immediate overlord, the count of Flanders. Although, the Anonymous reports, Robert was at odds with Ferrand ("estoit mauvaisement dou conte de Flandres") on account of "la roine de Portygal s'antain, cui il avoit guerroié por chou qu'ele faisoit tort à son pere" (the queen of Portugal his aunt, with whom he had made war because she had wronged his father),

nonetheless, when Ferrand requested the allegiance of his vassals in the break with Philip Augustus over the projected French expedition to England, Robert

comme vaillans chevaliers, ne vaut onques por chou laissier que il estoit mauvaisement dou conte que il ne se penast de tout son pooir de se besoigne avancier.^[96]

like a valiant knight, did not wish that, just because he was at odds with the count, he not strive with all his might to advance his affairs.

In all his dealings, Robert of Béhune holds himself to the highest standards of behavior, despite repeated demonstrations that those to whom he offers his fealty and service do not maintain the same criteria in the conduct of their affairs, whether personal or political. Surrounded by rulers who repeatedly break oaths, violate rights, scheme to take revenge, and allow themselves extraordinary liberties in their drive to mastery, the nobility is hard put to find a path through which successfully to traverse the intricacies of contemporary political life. Whether the historical Robert of Béhune acted with the same degree of propriety and lofty idealism as the Anonymous's legitimizing portrait of him suggests is unknown. But the fact that the Anonymous locates the center of principled action and fidelity to the norms of medieval society in the nobility is significant.

From the perspective of the lesser nobility caught up in the wars and rivalries of overlords, political life had become a hazardous game whose rules were constantly shifting, threatening to submerge them in the vortex of violence that competition for power and territorial gain created. The contested and conflictual character of the Anonymous's history provides a narrative analogue of the contending forces that were so profoundly transforming the terms of aristocratic life in the early thirteenth century. And if the center of this vortex is the calm loyalty of the nobility, then the implication of the Anonymous's work is that this center will not hold, but will be drawn into the general crisis of conduct and values that monarchical conflict engenders. If John offers a particularly egregious example of royal misdeeds and deficient rulership, he represents but the outer limit of a more general tendency observable throughout the world inhabited by the Anonymous and his patron. When the Anonymous turns from England to France in the Chronique des rois de France , he finds no greater assurances for the long-term prosperity and viability of the nobility. No less than John, Philip Augustus is a king whose modes of operation

and relations to the nobility over whom he is attempting to assert his authority threaten to undermine the principles that, in the past, had guided noble conduct and maintained them in relative independence and affluence.

Philip Augustus . Philip Augustus in no sense exhibited the extremes of cruelty, instability, or feckless leadership that marked the reign of John Lackland in England. Yet precisely because he was an effective and cunning ruler, he posed a greater threat to the autonomy of the French nobility. The Anonymous of Béhune's consideration of Philip Augustus is more nuanced than his opinion of John, but not, for all that, less critically aware of the impact that this tenacious and often unscrupulous king had on the lives of those he ruled.

The Anonymous begins his account of the reign of Philip Augustus with a translation of the summary judgment offered by his source for this part of the Chronique des rois de France , the Historia Regum Francorum jusque ad annum 1214 , a passage that emphasized Philip's success in expanding the royal domain, fortifying its defenses, and ameliorating its cities—achievements, he repeats, that make the reign of Philip Augustus worthy of remembrance:

Et sachiés que il ne soit mie à dire legiere chose de com grans sens cil rois Phelippes fu, et combien il acrut le règne de France, et coment il fist renoveler les fermetés des chastels ki deceues estoient, et corn forment il fist fermer les cités et les bors et les chastels de France qui sans fermeté estoient, et coment il fist paver ses cités et ses bones viles.

And know that it is not an easy thing to say what great sense this King Philip possessed, and how much he augmented the realm of France, and how he renovated the fortifications of the castles which had fallen down, and how forcefully he enclosed the cities and bourgs and castles of France, which were without fortification, and how he had his cities and his good villages paved.

In addition to these tasks of building and fortification, the Anonymous notes (and here he departs from the language of the Historia ), Philip Augustus is also distinguished because

il mist le règne de France fors de la signorie et de la poesté des rois d'Engleterre, qui tozjors ont esté rebelle as rois de France.^[97]

he placed the realm of France beyond the lordship and power of the kings of England, who always were rebellious toward the kings of France.

The Anonymous thus discloses from the outset a keen appreciation of Philip's determination to assert royal authority and impose his will on his independent and recalcitrant vassals.

The Anonymous attributes to Philip Augustus an early and unwavering commitment to defeat his enemies and extend his power. Thus, repeating a story found in his source, the Anonymous recounts how in 1181, when the most powerful barons had risen up against him, Philip found himself isolated at Compiègne as the counts of Flanders and Hainaut ravaged the nearby lands of Crépy-en-Valois, the count of Sancerre attacked Bourges and Lorris, and the duke of Burgundy destroyed the lands around Sens. Brought the news that the barons were devastating his realm, the young king—"qui enfès estoit," the Anonymous emphasizes—vowed:

"se Dieu plaist, je croistrai en aage et en force et en sens, et il descroisteront de force et d'aage et de sens."^[98]

"if it pleases God, I shall grow in age and strength and sense, and they will diminish in strength and age and sense."

The tenacity of purpose and political skill with which Philip Augustus pursued the goal of securing royal suzerainty over the realm and eliminating rival sources of authority impressed the Anonymous of Bé-thune as forcefully as it did other contemporary observers.^[99] The story of Philip at Senlis in 1181 serves as a narrative prelude to the Anonymous's account of the war between the count of Flanders, Philippe of Alsace, and the king, a war that demonstrated the truth of the young monarch's prediction, since "tot ce avint, si que on le vit" (all this came to pass, as we saw). By the conclusion of the truce of Boves in 1185, the Anonymous proclaims, "cil qui le conte de Flandres avoient aidié refistrent pais al rois; ne ainç puis ne s'osrent vers lui mouvoir" (those who had aided the count of Flanders renewed peace with the king; after that they did not dare to move against him).^[100] ç

Moreover, the Anonymous makes abundantly clear the ways in which the Flemish became embroiled in the wars that Philip Augustus prosecuted against his Angevin vassals, wars in which the Flemish nobility became pawns played by one king against the other. Thus, for example, he demonstrates how the Flemish under Baldwin IX were cleverly manipulated to enlist as Richard Lion-Heart's allies during the campaigns that Philip waged against the English king upon his return from the Third Crusade:

Ensi adamagoit sovent par engien et par souprisure li rois d'Engleterre son liege seigneur le roi de France. Il li toli par son engien le

service del conte Bauduin de Flandres et de Hainau, qui jouenes hom estoit, à qui le conté de Flandres ert escheue de par sa mère, la contesse Margerite, qui fu suer al conte Phelippe de Flandres, et le conté de Heinau, qui ert escheue de par son père le conte Baudewin de Haynau.^[101]

Thus did the king of England by cunning and by surprise often do damage to his liege lord the king of France. He took away from him by his cunning the service of count Baldwin of Flanders and Hainaut, who was a young man, to whom the county of Flanders had passed from his mother, the Countess Margaret, who was the sister of Count Philippe of Flanders, and the county of Hainaut, which had come to him from his father, Count Baldwin of Hainaut.

If brought into the war by the strategic manipulation of Richard, Baldwin IX did not lack reasons of his own to combat the French king. At issue was the persistent problem of Artois and the count of Flanders's unwillingness to acquiesce in the French possession of the county. As we saw in chapter 1, Artois represented that borderland of uncertainty about whether the king of France would succeed in subduing a powerful and independent barony and make it obedient to his will. At the time of his accession in 1195, Baldwin IX had done homage to Philip Augustus and recognized the concession of Artois, together with the overlordship of the counties of Guines and Boulogne. Nonetheless, he remained unreconciled to its loss. So disturbed over the alienation of Artois was Baldwin, the Anonymous of Béhune reports, that

il fist tant à celui conte Baudewin qu'il demanda al roi de France Arras et Lens et Bapaumes et Saint Homer et Aire et Hesdin, qui li estoient doné en mariage avoec Ysabel la roine, la soror à celui conte Balduin, de qui il ot Loys, son fil. Et por ce que li rois ne li vout rendre, le guerroia il molt outrageusement, et il arst sa terre, et prist sor lui Saint Thomer et Aire et pluisors autres chasteaus, et assist la cité d'Arras.^[102]

it meant so much to the count of Flanders that he demanded from the king of France Arras and Lens and Baupaume and Saint-Omer and Aire and Hesdin, which had been given to him [Philip Augustus] in marriage with Isabelle the queen, Count Baldwin's sister, by whom he had Louis, his son. And because the king did not wish to return it, he waged war on him furiously, and he burned his land, and took from him Saint-Omer and Aire and several other castles, and attacked the city of Arras.

Such war, once initiated, spread to engulf virtually the entire county of Flanders. As the Anonymous tells us, Philip Augustus's insistence on controlling Artois provided a convenient pretext for Flemish barons to go to war against their French overlord. Already in June 1197, Renaud of Boulogne and the counts of Guines and Saint-Pol allied themselves with Baldwin IX, openly withdrawing their homage from Philip Augustus and transferring it to the count of Flanders:

Reinaus de Dantmartin, qui il ot fait conte de Boloigne, li failli, et devint horns le conte de Flandres, et Hue, li cuens de Saint Pol, autresi, et Baudewins, li cuens de Ghisnes.^[103]

Renaud of Dammartin, whom he [Philip Augustus] had made count of Boulogne, forsook him and became the man [vassal] of the count of Flanders; and Hugh, the count of Saint-Pol, did the same; and Baldwin, the count of Guines.

By September, Baldwin IX signed a solemn treaty with Richard I by which he reaffirmed the convention of mutual allegiance between Flanders and England. Before the treaty was even sealed, practically the entire Flemish nobility, led by Baldwin, was in open rebellion against Philip Augustus over the Artois succession, with the exception of Guillaume, the advocate of Béthune, and Guillaume, the castellan of Saint-Omer.^[104] The Anonymous's own patron, Robert of Béhune, in contrast, did not share his father's loyalty to Philip but joined the Flemish coalition against the king.

So poorly did Philip Augustus fare in this campaign that he was compelled to sue for peace. But as had happened before in the king's dealings with the counts of Flanders, Philip was to repudiate this peace on the pretext that a rebellious vassal could not legitimately impose conditions on his lord. Instead the king set out to punish the counts of Boulogne and Saint-Pol for their defection, ravaging the lands of both:

li rois, qui sa guerre avoit et à qui si baron faillirent, si com voz avés oï, fu sovent à grant meschief. Une fois mena il s'ost dusques à Hesdin por aler destruire la terre del conte de Boloigne et la terre [del] conte de Saint Pol.^[105]

the king, who was waging war and whom his barons had abandoned, as you have heard, often perpetrated great misfortune. One time he led his host to Hesdin in order to destroy the land of the count of Boulogne and the land of the count of Saint-Pol.

Compressed in the stark and straightforward narrative of events that the Anonymous of Béthune here offers are the most crucial issues

confronting the Flemish aristocracy: royal competition that engenders an ever-widening circle of hostilities; monarchical ambition, which does not hesitate to employ treachery and broken vows in the furtherance of its goals; revenge taken against recalcitrant vassals; and, most destructive of all, the intense political conflict between Plantagenet and Capetian that divided the loyalties of families and set father against son and brother against brother. Indeed, so powerfully does the Anonymous of Béhune depict the forces dividing the Flemish aristocracy that we are justified in believing it was this intense conflict that stimulated the development of contemporary historiography by forcing chroniclers, and the society for which they spoke, to come to terms with their attitudes toward these competing authorities. At stake was not merely the question of which side to support according to a hypothetical calculus of the likely winner, but the very safety of Flemish lands and peoples. Trapped both politically and geographically between royal belligerents, Flanders became the principal theater of warfare, the stage on which vying kings played out their drama of domination and exacted their revenge.

When Ferrand of Flanders refused, for example, to accompany Philip Augustus on his planned expedition to conquer England on the grounds that the king unjustly retained possession of Aire and Saint-Omer,^[106] Philip assembled his host at Gravelines to make the Channel crossing. Prohibited by the papal legate from continuing with his invasion plans, Philip turned against Ferrand and went to Ypres to await the count and demand his compliance, "où li cuens vint à lui por merci crier" (where the count came to him to beg for mercy). But to no avail. Furious at the frustration of his designs, the king turned to wreak revenge on the obdurate count:

Ains li commanda li rois qu'il feist cele nuit meisme son gré, ou, se ce non, vuidast la terre. Et li cuens s'en ala, ne revint pas al roi; et li roi prist la vile d'Ypre, et puis prist Bruges et Gant, dont il ot boens ostages.^[107]

Thus the king commanded that he do his bidding this very night, or, if not, he would waste his land. And the count departed, and did not return to the king; and the king took the town of Ypres, and then he took Bruges and Ghent, from which he had good hostages.

The beleaguered Ferrand was forced to flee to the island of Walcheren, while Philip occupied large areas of Flanders. According to the Anonymous's account in the Histoire des ducs de Normandie , it was this

refusal to comply with Philip's wishes that led to the ultimate destruction of the count of Flanders: "par cel escondit fu puis li cuens toz destruis, et jetés en prison à Paris en la tour dou Louvre" (on account of this refusal the count was later completely destroyed, and thrown into prison in Paris in the tower of the Louvre).^[108]

Indeed, between the firing of the French fleet at Damme in June 1213 and the battle of Bouvines on 27 July 1214, Flanders was the arena of innumerable skirmishes, pillaging, and arson, forced to bear the brunt of French hostilities while King John prepared his invasion force in relative leisure. Throughout this period, the county was subjected to extensive devastation. Prince Louis, in particular, brutally laid waste to the countryside, burning cities as he went. After taking and setting fire to Bailleul and Cassel, he turned on the neighboring town of Steenvoorde. So spectacular was the blaze that lit the city skies that Brother Guerin, Philip Augustus's chief counselor, who was present at Prince Louis's side, was moved to exclaim: "Seignor, or oés! Gardès si voz onques veistes nul estanfort miels taint en graine [i.e., scarlet] de cestui," a pun on the city's French name of Estanfort, which also designated a type of cloth fabricated there, dyed "scarlet" by the flames rising above the burning city. These words, asserts the Anonymous of Béhune, shocked the knights who were assembled within hearing of the king's counselor, who found them unseemly in a "home de religion."^[109] The devastation brought upon the county touched every level of Flemish society, both urban and rural, whose losses were poignantly reflected, as we saw, in the enquêtes of 1247 by which Louis IX attempted to compensate the inhabitants of Flanders for damages done at this time.^[110]

Capetian ruthlessness in the prosecution of war against Flanders, the Anonymous demonstrates, in the end left the Flemish little choice but to side with John against their French overlord. As he reports:

Li cuens de Flandres, quant il vit que il ne poroit trover merchi au roi, il parla à ses homes et lor demanda consel. Si home li loerent que il envoiast en Engletierre au roi Jehan et s'en plainsist à lui, et si manda as chevaliers de sa tierre que il por Diu mesissent consel en son afaire et li aidassent à lor pooirs enviers le roi.^[111]

The count of Flanders, when he saw that he could not find mercy with the king, spoke to his men and requested counsel. His men counseled that he send [messengers] to England to King John and complain to him, and thus he ordered the knights of his land, for the sake of God, to take counsel in his affair and aid him with all their powers against the king.

Baldwin of Nieuwpoort, sent to England to meet with the Flemish barons gathered at the court of King John, reported to them how Philip Augustus had seized the land of Flanders, chased out the count, and "ne li voloit faire droit ne loi, ne merchi n'en voloit avoir" (did not wish to do right or justice to him, nor did he wish to be merciful).^[112]

In a world where monarchs refused to act with justice and mercy and scorned the law in the pursuit of their own interests, loyalty to the principles of feudal service became not only precarious but infeasible. It is the Anonymous himself who draws this inference from the situation, exposing in dialogic form the forces and arguments that were fracturing the theoretical unity of reciprocal rights and obligations that supposedly bound the French realm together. When the Flemish barons approach the count to demand that he align himself with John of England, Ferrand at first counters with an articulation of the ethical barriers that render this shift in allegiance illegitimate:

et il lor respondi qu'il estoit hom liges le roi de France, si n'oseroit chou faire se si home ne li looient.

and he answered them that he was the liege man of the king of France, and thus that he would not dare to do this thing unless his men counseled it.

Against this scruple, however, the Flemish barons exert the full weight of their counsel to persuade Ferrand that in doing so he would remain blameless, for his withdrawal of loyalty resulted from royal wrongdoing and from this perspective was, in effect, a licit act of feudal diffidatio :

Si home li disent que il bien le pooit faire. Encore dont ne la volt-il faire, se il ne li looient par conjurement. Lors les conjura que il li donnassent consel par la foi que il li devoient, se il sans blasmer le pooit faire; et il disent que il le pooit bien faire sans blasme, sour chou que li rois avoit esploitié viers lui.^[113]

His men said that he could very well do it. Yet he still did not wish to do it, unless they counseled him with an oath. Then he made them swear to counsel him, according to the fealty that they owed him, [as to] whether he could do it without blame; and they said that he could very well do it without blame, because the king had acted against him.

Yet again, the desire to remain faithful to law and right, to fulfill the feudal obligations of service and loyalty imposed on vassals high and low, is thwarted by the realities of contemporary political life,

which subvert adherence to the rules governing feudal society. When rulers so freely violate the rights of those over whom they rule, for the ruled to persist in obedience to the legal terms of service and loyalty is mere folly.

Absent from the Anonymous's account, yet powerfully present in the silences that this absence generates, is the king himself. He does not debate the principles of justice with his barons; does not question the basis of his actions; does not negotiate to redress wrongs or recompense losses. Philip acts solely on the promptings of his own aims and angers, unmindful of the damage that he wreaks or the rights that he transgresses. His behavior is not bounded by the counsel of his vassals, as is Ferrand's. He acts virtually alone, with a sovereign (and sovereign's) insouciance for the norms laid down for the conduct of political life.

When the Anonymous inquires into the causes of this dangerous state of affairs, he brings before the reader the critical shifts in the conduct of royal government and sources of royal military strength that had contributed to rendering the nobility vulnerable to newly organized monarchies. Although he fails to report on the changed economic conditions that were operating to shift the balance of power and authority between kings and nobles in this period, his understanding of the structural transformations in royal modes of governing and fighting in the thirteenth century discloses a profound sensitivity to the underlying forces that were marginalizing the nobility's traditional role in the political and military governance of medieval society.

In the Anonymous's eyes, perhaps the most striking transformation in the form of royal government during the reign of Philip Augustus was the narrowing base of the royal conseil . In contrast to earlier Capetian kings, and to the king of England as well, by the opening of the thirteenth century the French monarch had excluded from his council the great barons who once had appeared there by virtue of their feudal tenure. In place of the barons, Philip Augustus increasingly relied on a restricted number of trusted counselors who formed part of an incipient service aristocracy and who owed their influence and whatever wealth they accumulated along the way to royal favor. These men were creatures of the king, recruited by him from among the lesser knights and clerks of the king—the milites et clerici regis —to fill the council and to execute royal orders, forming a corps of paid royal servitors responsive to the royal will and personally beholden to the king for advancement. With their rise to dominance in the conseil , royal government ceased to be the product of a collaborative effort be-

tween the king and the proceres of the realm, as earlier Capetians had envisaged it.

In the Anonymous's account we have a glimpse of the distaste with which the nobility looked on these men who had supplanted them in the royal council. The chronicler's principal characterization of Philip's counselors occurs in his record of the French king's sudden decision to undertake the invasion of England. According to the Anonymous, the king awoke one morning and, while lying abed, was seized by the plan to attack his rival across the Channel. Hastily he roused his chamberlain and demanded that he send for his conseilliers , namely'

. . . frère Garin, un hospitelir, qui trop ert sire de lui. Car trop ert sages et bien en parles, et se ert il de basses gens; cil frère Garins fu puis evesques de Senlis. Ensement manda li rois Henris le Mares-chal, un petit chevalier qui molt ert bien de lui: car molt l'avoit bien servi en ses guerres; si li ot donè li rois Argentuen en Normendie. Bertelmeu de Roie manda ensement li rois, un gras chevalier, qui molt ert bien de son conseil, et pluisors autres de ses conseillieres, et lor monstra que il voloit aler Engleterre conquerre.^[114]

. . . brother Guerin, a hospitaler, who was very much lord over him. For he was very wise and excellent in speech, and he came from the lower classes; this brother Guerin later was bishop of Senlis. The king also called for Henri the Maréchal, a small knight who was very much in his favor, because he had served him well in his wars; the king had given him Argentan in Normandy. Barthélemy of Roye he called for as well, a great knight who was very important in his council, and several others of his counselors, and he revealed to them that he wished to go and conquer England.

Concentrated in this brief report is an accurate assessment of the narrowing base and decline in social status of royal consultation during the reign of Philip Augustus. Key men of the royal conseil such as Guerin, acknowledged in the Latin histories of the period as secundus a rege ,^[115] and depicted even more forcefully by the Anonymous as "lord" (sire ) of the king, had risen from virtual obscurity and low birth to positions of extraordinary influence, not only in the royal council but throughout the range of royal government, in the royal chancery as well as in affairs of justice, finance, and war.^[116] A member of the crusading order of the Knights Hospitalers, Guerin in all likelihood had been discovered by Philip Augustus during the Third Crusade of 1190. Brought back to France by the king, he rapidly amassed prestige and property, no doubt by virtue of the cleverness and eloquence that the Anonymous attributes to him. Already by

1202-1203 he possessed houses at Saint-Léger-en-Yvelines, Orleans, and Lorris, and was later given another at Montreuil-Bellay.^[117] As the Anonymous indicates, he was eventually elected bishop of Senlis, after which both he and his church continued to enjoy royal favors.

Also of humble origin was the second of Philip Augustus's principal counselors named in this account, Henri the Maréchal, a petit chevalier esteemed by the king for his military prowess and duly rewarded for his services with the great fief of Argentan in Normandy.^[118] Henri already bears witness to the emergence of a service aristocracy composed of families of lesser knights who made their fortunes in royal service, since his father, Robert Clement, had served as a royal marshal and even guardian of the young Philip before 1181.^[119]

Perhaps the most successful of these counselors was Barthélemy of Roye, who ultimately attained the position of grand chamberlain (in 1208) but whose sphere of duties, like Guerin's, encompassed a broad spectrum of administrative matters. Like Henri the Maréchal, Barthélemy was the son of minor lords, in his case a family of lesser knights of Roye in Vermandois, but he succeeded in accumulating even greater wealth than his colleague in the royal conseil . At the height of his career toward 1214 he had acquired extensive holdings in land, primarily as a result of royal gifts. After Philip's conquest of Normandy he was granted fiefs at Mantes, Montchauvet, and Acquiny, which he held together with houses in and around Paris and other gifts from the king, including money and jewels. As John Baldwin has indicated, "except for bestowing on him a great barony, the king could not have rewarded his faithful knight and grand chamberlain more handsomely."^[120]

By the middle years of Philip Augustus's reign, these "new men" had wholly displaced the nobility in the royal council and, hence, in the system of rewards and benefits that service in the king's court implied. That the nobility resented the influence exercised over the king by this incipient service aristocracy and disdained the low social status of its members is clear from the muted scorn with which the Anonymous of Béhune labels them as "basse" and "petit." Already in the Old French Couronnement de Loois, a chanson de geste composed between 1131 and 1137 as part of the cycle of Guillaume d'Orange, the ancient emperor had counseled his son Louis to avoid accepting non-nobles into the royal council:

"Et altre chose te vueil, filz, acointier,
Que, se tu vis, il t'avra grant mestier:
Que de vilain ne faces conseillier."^[121]

"And one other thing I wish to teach you, son, which, if you live, will be very useful to you: that you do not make a counselor out of a villein."

Although Barthélemy of Roye and Henri the Maréchal might not constitute actual villeins (the case of Guerin is less clear), they clearly owed their social as well as political fortunes to the king. The intrusion of these lesser men into the royal court and their progressive monopolization of its primary offices, therefore, represented for the traditional nobility not merely a loss of influence and authority, but their exclusion from the benefits of royal largesse, which, as we know from contemporary romances, possessed a profound symbolic as well as economic significance for the nobility. The removal of the nobility from the king's court, in that sense, signaled a rupture in the symbolic conception of reciprocal services and benefits between nobility and monarch that had been a central component in traditional modes of feudal government. The Anonymous of Béhune's thinly veiled hostility toward the three principal counselors of the French king expresses in the language of personal scorn a more profound understanding of the structural transformations in royal administration that were marginalizing the nobility by distancing them from the sources of social and political power.^[122]

Another major threat to the status and symbolic prestige of the nobility in this period, as we saw in chapter 1, was the gradual loosening of its monopoly over the use of arms and its right to fight in a distinctively noble style. Here, too, the Anonymous of Béhune indicates his awareness of how the spread of mercenary soldiers was changing the practice of warfare for kings and nobility alike. A condensed but powerful picture of this development emerges in his account of the wars between Richard Lion-Heart and Philip Augustus, in which the French king was condemned to suffer many adversities, the Anonymous explains,

car li rois Richars estoit trop riches et de terre et d'avoir, asés plus que li rois de France n'estoit. S'avoit adès trop grant ost, que de ses homes que de ses soutiers. Les Flamens avoit, qui od lui estoient en soudées, et les Brabenons. S'avoit par somonce les Englois et les Normans et les Bretons et les Manseaus et les Angevins et les Poi-tevins. Adès avoit pluisors routes, par qoi il damagoit molt la terre al roi de France; car li routier estoient trop mal destruiseor de terres.

Un routier i ot que on apeloit Markadé, qui molt fu de grant renon en cele guerre; non porquant si le desconfi sovent uns sergans le roi de France, que on apeloit Cadoc, qui autresi menoit route.

Celui Cadoc fist puis li rois de France chastellain de Gaillon par son service et por sa grant proece, dont plains estoit, et si estoit il petis.^[123]

for king Richard was extremely rich in land and possessions, much more so than the king of France was. At that time he had a very large host, both of his vassals and of soldiers. He had the Flemings, who were in his pay, and the Brabanons. And he had, by virtue of [feudal] summons, the English and the Normans and the Bretons and those of Maine, and the Angevins and the Poitevins. At the same time he had several commoners, with whom he very much damaged the land of the French king; because commoners were terrible destroyers of lands.

There was a commoner named Mercadier, who was greatly renowned in this war; nonetheless, a sergeant of the king of France often defeated him, a man called Cadoc, who also led commoners. This Cadoc the king of France later made castellan of Gaillon [as a reward] for his service and for his great prowess, of which he was full, even though he was small.

Embedded in this passage are the marks of fundamental changes in the methods of military recruitment and the social quality of those who composed medieval armies, changes that were completely transforming the practice of warfare in the High Middle Ages. Formerly feudal armies are now fully penetrated by mercenary soldiers, the most famous of whom the Anonymous identifies by name, such as Mercadier and Cadoc.^[124] Even feudal knights, as in the case of the Flemish serving in Richard's host, participate as paid members of the army, rather than fighting as a result of feudal service. Most striking, of course, is the presence of routier soldiers, whose damaging social presence in the host is disparaged by the charge that they are terribly destructive to the lands they attack. One hears through this charge a much broader complaint about their failure to observe those codes of comportment and military ethics that had served to define a distinctively noble style of fighting.

The Anonymous's remark about the destructive force of commoner soldiers can also be read as an index of the emotional response of the French aristocracy to the intrusion of non-noble contingents into the noble theater of war, a phenomenon that the French experienced as, in Duby's words, "un traumatisme profond."^[125] To the extent that medieval French aristocrats defined themselves in functional terms as bellatores —"those who fought"—the performance of this social task had justified their rights to the labor and services of "those who worked" and "those who prayed."^[126] To attack the aristocracy's pre-

rogative to defend society through the exercise of military valor was, thus, to undermine the sources of its legitimacy by calling into question its exclusive military vocation, and with it the whole cultural edifice of chivalry that had endowed that military vocation with an almost sacred aura.

Curiously, despite his evident awareness of the pervasive presence of non-noble contingents among the armies of his day, when the Anonymous comes to record the battle of Bouvines he excludes any mention of them, even though they participated by the thousands in this major bellum of 1214. He does acknowledge that the communes of Flanders sent contingents to join the allied forces together with the Flemish nobility, who "ièrent venu molt efforciement" (who came there in great strength);^[127] but in describing the actual battle he re-converts Bouvines into a purely aristocratic affair, orchestrated according to the rules of chivalric combat in which one champion opposes another in essentially single combat, backed up by the fighting of nameless, anonymous followers. Facing the French army across the fields of Bouvines is a great host of "bele gent et plenté de riches armes et de belles banières, et d'autre part autresi" (beautiful men and a host of rich arms and beautiful banners, on both sides). The battle itself is recounted in a series of paragraphs, each exalting the individual role of a single warrior: so, for example,

Lors corrut li cuens de Flandres as Champenois, et li Champenois à lui, et ot trop bone meslée entre aus. Mais li Champenois furent mis arière.

Lors corrut li viscuens de Meleun, en qui bataille se tenoient li quens de Pontieu et li cuens de Ghisnes et tot cil del fief Looys, le fil le roi, qui manoient entre Somme et la Lis. . . .

Gauchiers de Chasteillon, li cuens de Saint Pol, corrut tot outre la bataille et la desrompi molt malement. Et quant ce vit Henris, li dus de Louvaign, qui encor n'ert asamblés, il se mist à la fuie et com-mencha la desconfiture.^[128]

The count of Flanders attacked the Champenois, and the Champenois him, and there was a great melee between them. But the Champenois were pushed back.

Then the viscount of Meleun charged, in which battle line were the count of Ponthieu and the count of Guines and all those of the fief of Louis, the son of the king, who lived between the Somme and the Lys. . . .

Gauchiers of Châtillon, the count of Saint-Pol, charged all over the battle line and disrupted it greatly. When Henri, the duke of Louvain, saw this, [although he] still had not entered the fray, he took flight and began the rout.

Although the language of battle here retains the simple, realistic style that the Anonymous employs throughout his chronicles, the form of presentation is reminiscent of the strophic rhythm of traditional epic song. In its concentration on noble combatants and their heroic encounters, the Anonymous attempts to reinscribe the battle of Bouvines as, in effect, Roncevaux. In this last arena of aristocratic glory—the increasingly rare pitched battle—the cultic world of the feudal aristocracy reasserts itself. As depicted by the Anonymous, Bouvines offers a final opportunity for the display of chivalric theatrics in a ritualized conduct of war that seeks to assert the centrality and crucial importance of the aristocracy to the military defense of medieval society. But the outcome of Bouvines will provide the final sign that this attempt is a vain gesture. The triumph of the French forces at Bouvines is a triumph for the king, marking his decisive victory over the barons of the realm and vindicating his pretensions to stand over and above the aristocracy.

Just as the Anonymous omits any discussion of the fighting except for that engaged in by the aristocracy, so also does he render the activity of the king as purely managerial in function. In contrast to the royal chronicler Guillaume le Breton, whose Philippide was written to celebrate the royal victory at Bouvines, the Anonymous of Béhune is curiously silent on the role of the king. In his account, Philip appears only before the battle, seated on his horse. The king did not appear to be afraid, the Anonymous claims, because he

devisa et ordena molt sagement et molt seurement son afaire et non esbaiement, et fist crier que tuit, et chevalier et autre, ralaissent à lor batailles.^[129]

planned and ordered his affair very wisely and safely, and not in fright, and he had the order given that everyone, knights and the others, should return to their battle lines.

Royal action orders and initiates, but does not partake of, the fighting. In so situating the king outside the actual arena of battle, the Anonymous gives spatial expression to his understanding of the ways in which the French monarch had succeeded in disengaging himself from his membership in the world of the feudal aristocracy and surmounted the realm, over which he ruled as incontestable lord and governor. The victory at Bouvines marks the moment when the balance of power between monarch and aristocracy shifted decisively in favor of the Capetian king. In the wake of Bouvines, the Anonymous laments, "puis ne fu qui guerre li osast movoir" (there was no one who dared to make war against the king); his bailli

en tel servage mist tote la terre de Flandres . . . que tot cil ki en ooient parler s'en esmerveilloient coment il le pooient souffrir ne endurer.^[130]

placed all the land of Flanders in such servitude . . . that all who heard about it marveled how they could suffer and endure it.

Eight hundred years later, Henri Pirenne concurred in the Anonymous's judgment: "After Bouvines," he asserted, "the power of the French king became preponderant, so much so that at the end of the thirteenth century, the Low Countries seemed no more than an annex of the Capetian monarchy."^[131]

The two chronicles of the Anonymous of Béthune constitute the first step in the development of contemporary vernacular historiography, inaugurating a tradition of historical writing devoted to the narration of real events and actors that would achieve its mature expression in the Late Middle Ages in the work of chroniclers like Jean Froissart. Created in the turbulent decades surrounding the battle of Bouvines and shaped by the contest for loyalties and authority between vying monarchies on both sides of the Channel, the Histoire des ducs de Normandie and the Chronique des rois de France testify to the fracturing of a once-cohesive view of the past and of contemporary society's relation to it. The work of the Anonymous of Béthune sheds novel light on the essentially contested character of historical production in the Middle Ages, a process often masked beneath the valorized images of past and present that typify the tendentious and legitimizing narratives of much medieval historiography. In composing dual and alternative versions of the same sequence of events, his Histoire and Chronique are the first works of vernacular historiography to confront the ways in which the rise of a centralized monarchy had fundamentally changed the political situation in medieval France and to incorporate this changed situation as the very structure of a new kind of history capable of addressing the inherent instability and contested nature of the past.

With the triumph of monarchy at the battle of Bouvines, an era of aristocratic domination over medieval French society came to a close. Thereafter an ascendant monarchy progressively stamped its own style of rulership and dictated its own conception of social value on the realm, a process entailing a reevaluation of the ethical and moral precepts that had once served as the framework of royal behavior. The task of constructing a new image of the king now fell to royal

chroniclers. Just as the locus of power and authority in medieval society moved inexorably toward the central monarchy, so also is the central concern of vernacular historiography displaced to the creation of royal history. With the rise of royal historiography in the middle decades of the thirteenth century, the question of the values and principles governing kingly comportment came to the fore. It is to the growth of royal historiography that we must turn now, to trace royal responses to the emerging world that royal power itself had done so much to create.