One
The Diffusion of the Logos

Which possess superior intelligence: animals living on land or animals living in water?

This peculiar subject, one that was "neither vulgar nor devoid of charm," inspired a staged disputation between two friends, Aristomimus and Phaedimus, the former championing the terrestrial animals' claim, the latter the aquatic animals'. In the prologue to his De sollertia animalium (On the cleverness of animals), Plutarch suggests that this contest was occasioned by a mild disagreement the evening before, during an inebriated symposium when the issue of the propriety of the hunt—that most aristocratic of sports—was discussed.^[1] The protagonists devoted the following morning to their preparations, and when their drinking companions convened at the appointed hour, the referee Autobulus divided them into two camps: those expert in the hunt took up Aristomimus' side; those who lived on islands or by the sea, Phaedimus'.^[2]

The debaters cast lots to determine who would be first to deliver his speech (965E). The language and imagery of Greek dicastic law courts pervade the two compelling, learned, and elegant speeches. When the judges—Autobulus and his friend Optatus, an expert on Aristotelian natural science—were called on as if dicasts () to cast their vote (; 965D-E), Autobulus softened the agon by

[1] Plutarch, De sollertia animalium 960B. For another debate that had its origin in a symposium, see Plutarch, Conviviales quaestiones 7.8.712D.

[2] Plutarch, De sollertia animalium 965B, 963B, 965C-E.

effecting a conciliatory resolution of the two positions. He stated that all animals, whether terrestrial or living in water, possessed rational intelligence and must therefore be treated with the requisite consideration (985C). Neither of the contestants was dismayed or surprised to find their hotly contested, opposing positions synthesized by Autobulus to refute critics who would deny rationality to all animals.

The scenario in De sollertia animalium may well be a refracted image of the practice of disputation in the Platonic Academy, which Plutarch himself had attended in Athens, though there can be no proof positive for such an identification.^[3] Public disputation between friends on subtle intellectual questions was a pastime of the privileged, highly educated adult males who possessed the requisite leisure to examine proposed topics in the shady groves of the Academy, far removed from the dusty bustle of the agora.

This debate could be convincingly portrayed by Plutarch as having reached an amicable resolution because there was no confusion of intellectual with social or professional considerations. The antagonists argued as if for arguments sake; with no prospects of material gain or other advantage, they simply reveled in ludic combat with social peers, continuing the sophisticated yet whimsical conversation of the previous evenings symposium.

This is not to suggest that the debate was taken lightly by the protagonists. The contest itself reeked heavily of lamp oil, of the painstaking study of pertinent writings (960B, 975D). The facade of effortless erudition in the speeches, in which each side proffered a litany of facts with great facility, was indebted to the wisdom enshrined in compendia of ancient works. The foremost authority on which the debaters relied was—to no one's surprise—Aristotle, whose reputation in matters of the natural sciences, particularly the science of animals, was unmatched in antiquity (965D-E). Yet his authority was mediated during the contest by the personal knowledge of the participants, especially Optatus, whose expert grasp of the Stagirite's corpus ensured that no scroll of the Historia animalium need be unrolled to check the veracity of the rival arguments (965E).

Plutarch's description of this friendly debate provides a starting point for discussing the ancients' ideals of public disputation, which are impossible to define in the abstract. First and foremost, a disputation was a ritualized verbal contest in which antagonists debated each other while adhering to the rules of a language game, whether of rhetoric

[3] See Plutarch, De E apud Delphos 386F-87A.

or of dialectic.^[4] In the above example, the debate entailed an exchange of reasoned arguments in successive continuous speeches rather than a mutual cross fire, or dialectical interrogation, by the two adversaries. Both forms of debate were common in antiquity.

In addition to its heavy emphasis on traditional textual authority and learned research, the debate was a mobilization of that knowledge arrayed in rival logoi (speeches). The construction and application of logoi connoted cunning and intelligence, principles of rationality thought to distinguish humans from wild animals.^[5] The placid and erudite discussions in Plutarch's Moralia , in which witty and polite conversation was mixed with the wine of dialectical rigor, were themselves ideal testaments to the primacy of logoi .^[6] Many educated Greeks were fascinated by the prospect that logoi might become the weapons of choice for people in disagreement, replacing the instruments of violence and compulsion in the ordering of human society.^[7]

Asked to characterize a public debate, a Greek might have used an analogy, an antithesis, or both. He might liken a debate to a wrestling match, or a gymnastic contest such as the pankration , with its strict rules (nomoi ). Or he might contrast the debate with a brawl or street fight, the latter resembling ritual contentions in traditional villages in which "each person takes a point or position and repeats it endlessly, either one after the other, or both alone or several at once."^[8] Though such activities fulfilled other social functions, they were unseemly and contributed nothing to the resolution of differences per se, because "points of views are rarely developed, merely reasserted. . . . [E]ach keeps yelling his point full voice until, usually, certain voices seem to prevail and the others fade." Educated males such as Plutarch would have made a categorical distinction between the two forms: a debate was an exchange of logoi ,

[4] Two fine, concise introductions to the ancient forms are R. McKeon, "Greek Dialectics: Dialectic and Dialogue, Dialectic and Rhetoric," in C. Perelman, ed., Dialectics (The Hague, 1975), 1-25, and P. Hadot, "Philosophie, dialectique, rhétorique dans l'antiquité," Studia Philosophica 39 (1980), 139-66.

[5] See De sollertia animalium 959C. On the perennial importance of cleverness in Greek culture, see M. Détienne and J.-P. Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society , trans. J. Lloyd (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1978).

[6] See the classic study of the genre by R. Hirzel, Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch , 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1895). For an exposition of the theoretical distinctions between rational controversy and rational inquiry, see hi. Rescher, Dialectics: A Controversy-oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge (Albany, N.Y., 1977), esp. 46.

[7] See Porphyry, De abstinentia 1.1.2-3 (Bouffartigue and Patillon, eds., 42).

[8] K. Reisman, "Contrapuntal Conversations in an Antiguan Village," in R. Bauman and J. Scherzer, eds., Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking (Cambridge, 1974), 110-24, at 121.

while an unruly argument of the kind described above was mere thorubos , tumult and noise, a faux pas in polite intellectual society.^[9]

Social class, rules of the game, boundaries—these considerations informed the ancients' articulated ideals concerning the rational logos . While the expectation that reasoned speech should regulate and harmonize social life was difficult to fulfill, the centrality of the logos was such that, from time to time, it manifested itself in the struggles between men who did not move in the privileged circles of a Plutarch. In the world of late antiquity, the superior claim of rational persuasion moderated, in varying degrees, the conflicts between Jews and Christians, between Christians and pagans, and among various Christian sects.

Jews, Pagans, and Early Christians in Controversy

The fierce rivalry between Jews and Christians from the time of the early principate gave rise to a large and long-lived polemical literature, much of it in the genre of the dialogue.^[10] The preponderance of this adversus Judaeos material, including the Argument between Simon the Jew and Theophilus the Christian , the Dialogue of Athanasius and Zacchaeus , and the Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila , is so one-sidedly in the favor of the Christian position as to suggest that the writers adopted the dialogue form merely to dramatize their anti-Jewish arguments.^[11] Even so, we can catch glimpses of the circumstances surrounding the face-to-face debates.

In the late second or early third century, a public debate took place between a Christian and a Jewish proselyte in a town in Roman North Africa—or so it was reported by one Christian writer.^[12] Under the watch-

[10] See the classic study of the genre, A. L. Williams, Adversus Judaeos: A Bird's-Eye View of Christian Apologiae until the Renaissance (Cambridge, 1935). For a rhetorical analysis of the pericopes showing debates between Jesus and other Jews in the Gospel of Mark, see J. Dewey, Markan Public Debate , Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series, no. 48 (Chico, Calif., 1980).

[11] Texts in A. yon Harnack, ed., Die Altercatio Simonis Iudaei et Theophili Christiani nebst Untersuchungen über die anti-jüdische Polemik in der alten Kirche . TU 1, no. 3 (Leipzig, 1883); and F. C. Conybeare, ed., The Dialogues of Athanasius and Zacchaeus and of Timothy and Aquila (Oxford, 1898).

[12] Tertullian, Adversus Judaeos . See critical text and commentary in H. Tränkle, ed., Q.S.F. Tertulliani Adversus Judaeos (Wiesbaden, 1964).

ful eyes of a group of spectators and partisan supporters (partes ), the disputation dragged on for a full day.^[13] When toward evening the dust finally settled, the Jewish convert emerged victorious: for the time being, Judaism's claim to represent verus Israel , the true Israel, had been tried and found authentic by the ad hoc judges of the debate—its immediate audience—in one corner of the Roman Empire.^[14]

What I have surmised as the historical outcome of this debate was not, however, the end of the story, otherwise we should never have learned of the incident in the first place. The Christian retired to lick his wounds and settled on a rematch: not a repetition of the day's disappointing performance, but the composition of a dialogue between a Jewish and a Christian interlocutor. Tertullian's Adversus Judaeos was the fruit of this labor.

A dialogue written and published after such an unsatisfactory encounter could "set the record straight" and even turn to one's favor an ambiguous or adverse outcome.^[15] By reaching beyond the immediate audience of the disputation, both sides could in effect claim victory by practicing what is known in modern American political parlance as spin-doctoring. Though we are lucky to have Tertullian's side of the story, it would mean that much more if we could also read the account of his apparently triumphant opponent. Such a document was probably never composed, for a winner did not need to labor in writing to immortalize a victory that had already been secured.

The heated controversies between Jews and early Christians involved a proprietary dispute: the authority to attach their own preferred interpretations to biblical scriptures and prophecies. Both groups ac-

[13] Tertullian, Adversus Judaeos 1.1: "Proxime accidit: disputatio habita est Christiano et proselyto Iudaeo. alternis vicibus contentioso rune uterque diem in vesperam traxerunt. obstrepentibus quibusdam ex partibus singulorum nubilo quodam veritas obumbrabatur." The term partes was employed by Tertullian in a technical, forensic sense to refer to litigants in a dispute; see Tertullian, Adv. Marcionem 1.20 (CSEL 47:315): "Huic expeditissimae probationi defensio quoque a nobis necessaria est adversus obstrepitacula diversae partis."

[14] No appointed judges are referred to in this dialogue. Perhaps here the audience performs the function of determining the outcome. In some literary dialogues, such as Plutarch's De sollertia animalium , Methodius' De resurrectione , and Minucius Felix's Octavius , a member from an intimate circle of friends was asked to judge a "school disputation."

[15] Tertullian, Adversus Judaeos 1.1: "Placuit ergo, [ut] quod per concentum disputationis minus plene potuit dilucidari, curiosius inspectis lectionibus stilo questiones retractatas terminare." The motive for writing as stated in the Adversus Judaeos is surprisingly similar to one expressed in Tertullian's preface to De fuga in persecutione 1.1 (CSEL 76:17): "Ibidem ego oblocutus aliquid pro loco ac tempore et quarundam personarum importunitate semitractatam materiam abstuli mecum, plenius in eam de stilo nunc renutiaturus, utpote quam ei tua consultatio commendarat et condicio temporum suo iam nomine iniunxerat."

cepted—though with some notable exceptions, especially in the case of the Christians—the authenticity and authority of the Hebrew bible as holy writ; both embraced the interpretation of sacred texts as a valid method for ascertaining truth. The debates between Jews and Christians became sessions of competitive exegesis in which each side brandished its own catenae, compilations of prooftexts drawn from biblical sources, to advance its religious claims.

Jews and Christians may have contended for the scriptures by means of the scriptures, but they adhered for the most part to the general rules of disputation.^[16] The rival parties could engage in this kind of verbal and textual contest mainly because they shared certain fundamental assumptions.^[17] Without the common ground of received tradition and shared concerns and interests, they would have had little incentive or opportunity to engage in public disputations.^[18]

Yet the Jews and Christians of the Roman Empire did not project their rival claims in vacuo. These predominantly urban dwellers lived in a diverse Hellenistic world, which they shared with a majority population of polytheists or pagans of all stripes. They could not afford to ignore this considerable third party; in fact, each sought, with varying degrees of success, to gain the respect of the gentiles.^[19]

Solicitude for this population's goodwill may explain the peculiar nature of the narrative proem of Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho (mid-second century).^[20] On the one hand, the philosopher, a convert to Christianity, employs the techniques of exegesis to demonstrate that the followers of Christ were the true Israelites, and that scriptural prophecies foretold the coming of Christ.^[21] On the other hand, Justin directly emulates Platonic dialogues by setting up the exchanges with a dra-

[16] On the prominence of the theme of debate in the Pseudo-Clementine literature, see B. R. Voss, Der Dialog in der früchristlichen Literatur (Munich, 1970), 60-78.

[17] See Evagrius, Altercatio legis inter Simonem ludaeum et Theophilum Christianum 1 (E. Bratke, ed., CSEL 45:2).

[18] See J. G. Gager, Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975), 66-92, on the important causal connection between group identity and social conflict.

[19] H. Remus, "Justin Martyr's Argument with Judaism," in S. G. Wilson, ed., Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity II: Separation and Polemic (Waterloo, Ont., 1986), 59-80, esp. 74-80.

[20] For a discussion of the form of this dialogue, see W. Bousset, Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom: Literarische Untersuchungen zu Philo und Clemens yon Alexandria, Justin und Irenäus (Göttingen, 1915), 282ff.; Voss, Dialog , 26-39; and M. Hoffmann, Der Dialog bei den christlichen Schriftstellern der ersten vier Jahrhunderte TU 96 (Berlin, 1966), 10-28.

[21] This question is thoroughly examined by O. Skarsaune, The Proof from Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr's Proof-text Tradition (Leiden, 1987).

matic preface in which, along a colonnaded avenue of Roman Ephesus, a philosophically trained Jew named Trypho approaches Justin for a discussion of things religious.^[22] This proem, which places the writing in the genre of literary and philosophical dialogues, was not included solely as a stylistic ornament. In this brief preliminary exchange, Justin sought to show how the ensuing discussion—which is quite extensive and, arguably, quite tedious—could also have relevance for a readership that was neither Jewish nor Christian. When Trypho and his companions ()^[23] requested a discussion with Justin, who was still proudly wearing his philosopher's cloak, the latter responded by asking the proselyte how he expected to profit by a philosophical discourse. After all, Justin exclaimed, Trypho already held in his grasp the wisdom of Moses the lawgiver and the prophets. Trypho's clever response was clearly designed to appeal to a broad, educated audience:

Why not? Do the philosophers not fashion their every discourse with regard to the Deity? . . . And do they not continually entertain questions concerning his Oneness and Providence? Is this not indeed the duty of philosophy: to investigate the Deity?^[24]

The author needed to assert that this ostensibly domestic quarrel between Jews and Christians was of concern to everyone with a philosophical bent because what followed the proem bore little resemblance to Graeco-Roman philosophical discourse. Justin and Trypho engaged in extensive exegetical fencing, drawing on specific passages from the Hebrew bible to support their own positions and to refute their opponent's. Their contentions over the rightful interpretation of biblical prophecies, acceptable to those familiar with Jewish-Christian debate, would have elicited little understanding from outsiders.^[25]

Though Justin the Christian philosopher and apologist sternly op-

[22] Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone 1.3. Scholars do accept an underlying historical disputation; see S. Krauss, "The Jews in the Works of the Church Fathers," Jewish Quarterly Review 5 (1893), 123-30, at 124-25; L. W. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought (Cambridge, 1967), 23-24: "The best solution to the literary problem of the Dialogue is to postulate an original, historical debate with Trypho which occurred soon after A.D. 132, which Justin subsequently elaborated c . A.D. 160, drawing on oral and written testimony material which was known and used in the Church of his Day." The association of the Dialogus with Ephesus was made by Eusebius in Hist. eccl . 4.18.

[23] For references to Trypho's associates, see, e.g., Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone 1.3.

[25] See Acta Iustini 2 (H. Musurillo, ed., Acts of the Christian Martyrs [Oxford, 1972], 43-45, 48-49) on the abrupt change of subject by the magistrate Q. Junius Rusticus as soon as Justin began to expound his religious beliefs.

posed the unthinking acceptance of traditional beliefs by his polytheist contemporaries,^[26] he knew well that his own arguments in favor of Christianity were unsatisfactory from the standpoint of philosophical demonstration.^[27] It mattered little that he thought Christian truth-claims to be more worthy of trust than philosophical demonstrations or apodeixeis , for by his juxtaposition of the two Justin exhibited the standard expectations of proof among those trained in philosophy. Elsewhere, educated Christians who wished to conduct disputations based solely on the authority of scriptures likewise acknowledged their departure from normal philosophical practice, as did an interlocutor in Adimantus' De recta in deum fide , who said, "If you wish for there to be a wholly truthful investigation, take leave of philosophical arguments and be persuaded by scriptures alone."^[28]

For their part, Greek philosophers ostensibly disapproved of straightforward reliance on authoritative "givens" even as they paid homage to the ancestral wisdom of eminent predecessors. Rational skepticism was by no means practiced by all philosophical polytheists, or even a majority of them. Cicero knew of certain Pythagoreans, for instance, whom he regarded as undesirably dogmatic, because they invoked what "the master said" as their authority in disputation. The orator roundly denounced this practice of justifying one's position sine ratione , without rational argument, solely on the basis of unexamined traditional authority, auctoritas .^[29] Clearly, Cicero was protesting a contemporary trend toward the happy acceptance of dogmatic beliefs.

The same criticisms that Cicero had leveled at the Pythagoreans might be applied in equal measure to Jews and Christians. Christians, in particular, bore the brunt of such polemical assaults because they lacked the protective armor of tradition and antiquity that shielded the Jews from its most grievous blows. According to E. R. Dodds, "Had any

[26] For a fruitful discussion of the relation between Justin's truth-claims and the sociology of knowledge, see Remus, "Justin Martyr's Argument with Judaism," 63-66.

[27] See the explicit contrast between the two in Dialogus cum Tryphone 7.2. On Justin's philosophical background, see N. Hyldahl, Philosophie und Christentum: Eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialogs Justins (Copenhagen, 1966), 272-92, and M. J. Edwards, "On the Platonic Schooling of Justin Martyr," JTS n.s. 42 (1991), 17-34.

[29] Cicero, De natura deorum 1.5.10: "Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. Quin etiam obest plerumque iis qui discere volunt auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim suum iudicium adhibere, id habent ratum quod ab eo quem probant iudicatum vident . . . tantum opinio praeiudicata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret auctoritas."

cultivated pagan of the second century been asked to put in a few words the difference between his own view of life and the Christian one, he might reply that it was the difference between logismos and pistis , between reasoned conviction and blind faith."^[30] Christians were considered by many contemporary critics to be incapable of rendering a satisfactory defense of their extraordinary beliefs. Some Christians, unable to prove their claims by scriptures because pagans—who relied on them only in polemics against Christians—would not assent to their authority, even asserted, after the fashion of the apostle Paul, that the wisdom of the world was mere foolishness to the faithful. Tertullian, boasting that credo quia absurdum , self-consciously rejected the standards for demonstrations prescribed by a Hellenistic philosophical koine.^[31]

Another of Tertullian's famous dicta was addressed primarily to other Christians: "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?"^[32] According to him, Christians ought to desist from attempting to enhance the respectability of their religion by recasting its tenets in Stoic, Platonic, and dialectical terms. For such was what "heretics" attempted when they

introduce Aristotle, who instituted dialectic for them, the skill of joining together and pulling apart, subtle in its opinions, forced in its speculations, harsh in its arguments, a maker of controversies, an annoyance even to itself, investigating everything anew lest there is anything it will not have investigated.^[33]

Tertullian championed a paradoxical and radically inward-looking faith: "No one is wise unless he is a believer; no one is great unless he is a Christian (Nemo est sapiens, nisi fidelis, nemo maior, nisi Christianus)."^[34] One ought, in his view, to cultivate simplicity of soul by im-

[30] E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine (Cambridge, 1965), 120.

[31] The supposition that Christianity and pagan paideia were, in Tertullian's view, mutually exclusive is no longer tenable. For a documentation of the uses of rhetorical techniques and argumentation by Tertullian "the sophist" to support the claims of Christianity, see R. D. Sider, Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian (Oxford, 1971).

[32] Tertullian, De praescriptionibus haereticorum 7 (E. Kroyman, ed., CSEL 70 [1942]: 10-11): "Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? quid academiae et ecclesiae? quid haereticis et Christianis? Nostra institutio de porticu Solomonis est, quiet ipse tradiderat dominum in simplicitate cordis esse quaerendum. Viderint qui Stoicum et Platonicum et dialecticum Christianismum protulerunt. Nobis curiositate opus non est post Christum lesum, nec inquisitione post evangelium. Cum credimus, nihil desideramus ultra credere. Hoc enim prius credimus, non esse quod ultra credere debeamus."

[33] Tertullian, De praescriptionibus haereticorum 7 (CSEL 70:9-10): "Arte inserunt Aristotelen, qui illis dialecticam instituit, artificem struendi et destruendi, versipellem in sententiis, coactam in coniecturis, duram in argumentis, operariam contentionum, molestam etiam sibi ipsam, omnia retractantem, ne quid <re>tractaverit." The translation in the text is mine.

[34] Tertullian, De praescriptionibus haereticorum 3 (CSEL 70:4).

bibing the gnomic wisdom of a Solomon, not the clever mental tricks of a Greek philosopher. But Tertullian proposed this hierarchy of knowledge more to dissuade Christians from the elitism and fissiparousness of competitive claims to gnosis than to confute pagans critical of Christian simplicitas .^[35] The Christian wisdom, the true philosophy, was neither esoteric nor restricted to a privileged few, but was freely accessible to all believers, irrespective of rank or birth. Tertullian's invocation of the ideal of the via universalis , as expressed in his Liber apologeticus (46), was aptly summed up by Edward Gibbon, who infused in it his own signature prejudices:

[Formerly,] a chosen society of philosophers, men of a liberal education and curious disposition, might silently meditate, and temperately discuss in the gardens of Athens or the library of Alexandria, the abstruse questions of metaphysical science. The lofty speculations, which neither convinced the understanding nor agitated the passions of the Platonists themselves, were carelessly overlooked by the idle, the busy, and even the studious part of mankind. But after the Logos has been revealed as the sacred object of the faith, the hope, and the religious worship of the Christians, the mysterious system was embraced by a numerous and increasing multitude in every province of the Roman world. Those persons who, from their age, or sex, or occupations, were the least qualified to judge, who were the least exercised in the habits of abstract reasoning, aspired to contemplate the economy of Divine Nature: and it is the boast of Tertullian that a Christian mechanic could readily answer such questions as had perplexed the wisest of the Grecian sages.^[36]

We may be tempted to accept this portrayal as a valid social description. It is not inconceivable that certain Christian tradesmen in Tertullian's time, in keeping with the Graeco-Roman tradition of the self-taught man known as autodidaktos or theodidaktos ,^[37] flouted the prevalent conventions of their society, which stipulated gentlemanly otium and social privilege as conditiones sine qua non for attaining true elevated knowledge and the competence to discourse on issues concerning the

[35] See Tertullian, Adversus Valentinianos 2 (CSEL 47:178): "Ideoque simplices notamur apud illos, ut hoc tantum, non etiam sapientes; quasi statim deficere cogatur a simplicitate sapientia, domino utramque iungente: estote prudentes ut serpentes et simplices ut columbae. aut si nos propterea insipientes, quia simplices, num ergo et illi propterea non simplices, quia sapientes? et tamen malim meam partem meliori sumi vitio, si forte: praestat minus sapere quam peius, errare quam fallere. porro facies dei spectatur in simplicitate quarendi, ut docet ipse Sophia, non quidem Valentini, sed Solomonis."

[36] E. Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 21.1 (New York, n.d.), pt. 1, p. 680.

divine. Still, we can hardly expect that many educated pagans paid them heed, or showed much respect for the ideas expressed.

As far as we know, public disputation with a pars melior trained in philosophy was not the most common means by which early Christians attracted adherents to their faith. The literary record abounds with exceptions that prove the rule. It is unlikely that St. Paul debated publicly in the Athenian agora with philosophers and passersby, or delivered a discourse before the council of Areopagus Concerning the "unknown God" (Acts 17:16-34), yet the author of Luke-Acts thought it useful to depict the Apostle to the Gentiles in such a light.^[38] And the genteel and cultivated discussion in Minucius Felix's Octavius , in which Christian and pagan interlocutors engaged in a give-and-take school disputation over the validity of Christian beliefs, was almost certainly entirely fictive, yet its author used the genre of Latin literary dialogue to fashion an apologetic construct to suggest that such discussions might have taken place.^[39]

Early Christians mainly relied on less exalted and rigorous means, including the use of "inartistic proofs," to defend their faith and persuade potential converts. This emphasis may be due to demography: during this period, Christians and their potential converts hailed from the humbler segments of society, which traditionally had no training in philosophy.^[40] As one alert pagan observed:

Most people are unable to follow any demonstrative argument ( ?) consecutively . . . just as now we see the people called the Christians drawing their faith from parables [and miracles], and yet sometimes acting in the same way [as those who philosophize]. For their contempt of death [and of its sequel] is patent to us every day, and likewise their restraint in cohabitation. For they include not only men but also women who refrain from cohabiting all through their lives; and they also number individuals who, in self-discipline and self-

[38] See J. Dupont, "Le discours à l'Aréopage (Ac 17, 22-31), lieu de rencontre entre christianisme et hellénisme," Nouvelles études sur les Actes des Apôtres (Paris, 1984), 380-423. Other grand preaching scenes can be found in Acts 13:16-41, 20:18-35, 22:1-21, and 24:10-21, on which generally see U. Wilcken, Die Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1961; 2d ed., 1963), esp. 87ff. For a more humble (and more plausible) Sitz im Leben of Pauline missionary activities, see E. A. Judge, "St. Paul and Classical Society," JAC 15 (1972), 19-36, and R. F. Hock, "The Workshop as a Social Setting for Paul's Missionary Teaching," Catholic Biblical Quarterly 41 (1979): 438-50.

[40] See R. MacMullen, "Two Types of Conversion to Early Christianity," VChr 37 (1983): 174-92.

control in matters of food and drink, and in their keen pursuit of justice, have attained a pitch not inferior to that of genuine philosophers.^[41]

This rendition, by Richard Walzer, from the Arabic of a statement attributed to Galen (in an epitome of Plato's Republic ) suggests how, despite the lack of logical demonstration of their claims, Roman Christians were admired by as demanding a judge as the illustrious Pergamene physician-philosopher. Though Stephen Gero has shown convincingly that the Arabic passage reflects later emendations by Christian apologists, he concedes that the first part of the statement—concerning the Christians' use of irrational forms of demonstration—may well be original.^[42] This strikes me as a fair guess, for an apologetic comment phrased in this concessive fashion would not normally have arisen unless to refute an authentic and widely held criticism. Further, the passage's emphasis on the rationality of religious and philosophical beliefs harmonizes well with the views expressed in many of Galen's undisputed writings, in which he evinces a sincere preoccupation with philosophical demonstration as a necessary guide to important choices in life.

Galen followed the advice of his father, whom he greatly admired, by avoiding attachment to any of the contemporary philosophical and medical sectae without thorough and lengthy investigation of their teachings.^[43] Galen set great store by the philosophical methods of establishing episteme , or certain knowledge, by which what was true could be distinguished from what merely appeared to be so; his extremely high standard of proof was outlined in his De optima secta .^[44] The central question was how to arrive at incontrovertible knowledge ().^[45] The Pergamene eventually opted—as did many of his contemporaries—for a deliberate eclecticism, because the certainty he sought ever eluded him.^[46]

[41] R. Walzer, Galen on Jews and Christians (London, 1949), 15-16; his full and helpful discussion appears on 18-74. See also R. L. Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Sara Them (New Haven, Conn., 1984), 68-93.

[42] S. Gero, "Galen on the Christians: A Reappraisal of the Arabic Evidence," Orientalia Christiana Periodica 56 (1990): 371-411, at 404: "The introductory statement, which criticizes the exclusive reliance on non-rational motivations . . . bears the stamp of originality." See also Gero's textual comments on this passage, which draw on other Arabic sources, on 404-11.

[43] See texts on Galen's life conveniently collected by P. Moraux in Galen de Pergame: Souvenirs d'un médecin (Paris, 1985), 15-16, 42-48. See also R. B. Edlow, Galen on Language and Ambiguity: An English Translation of Galen's 'De captionibus (On Fallacies )' (Leiden, 1977), 5.

[44] Text in J. Marquardt, ed., Galen: Scripta Minora 1 (Leipzig, 1884).

[45] Galen, De optima secta 2.42 (Marquardt, ed., 1:84). On Galen's theory of knowledge, see M. Frede, "On Galen's Epistemology," in V. Nutton, ed., Galen: Problems and Prospects (London, 1981), 65-86.

[46] See Wilken, As the Romans Sara Them , 73-77.

The question of how others discerned the veracity of their claims had concerned Greek physicians at least since the Hippocratic writings, for they often had to appeal beyond their professional circle for recognition.^[47] This concern was in part a reaction against the traditional temple medicines practiced by those who could not, or would not, articulate a rational scientific theory for their praxeis .^[48] For Galen, appeals to customary usage and established textual authority did not suffice as foundations of true knowledge, whether in the practice of medicine or in other areas of life. Galen, who enjoyed access to libraries and the leisure to cultivate broad-based knowledge, understandably scorned the dogmatism of others, whose positions stemmed partly from the realities of their limited choices. He generally deprecated blind trust in the dictates of an authority or in the accepted wisdom of authoritative texts, including the Jews' reliance on the Laws of Moses, which he otherwise admired.^[49]

The charge that Christians were unusually obstinate and unyielding to rational persuasion in matters of faith echoed widely in antiquity. Such a criticism could arguably be applied with justice to the pagans of Galen's time as well,^[50] yet to outsiders at least, Christians appeared especially unresponsive to pleas for philosophical demonstration.^[51] To sturdy souls convinced that divine revelation was their exclusive birthright, amelioration of their views—the epistemological principle upon which a dialectic of inquiry is predicated—was unnecessary, even undesirable. The proof of their belief rested in their supreme conviction, which they displayed before the world by becoming martyrs in Roman

[47] See G. E. R. Lloyd, The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science (Berkeley, Calif., 1987), 88-102. See especially his nuanced discussion of the implications various kinds of audiences had for the cast of the practitioners' rival truth-claims.

[48] See the fruitful discussion of these issues as they surfaced in the preclassical period by G. E. R. Lloyd, Magic, Reason and Experience: Studies in the Origins and Development of Greek Sciences (Cambridge, 1979), esp. 37-49.

[49] Walzer, Galen , 10-11: "They compare those who practice medicine without scientific knowledge to Moses, who framed laws for the tribe of the Jews, since it is his method in his books to write without offering proofs, saying 'God commanded, God spake.'" And on 14-15: "If I had in mind people who taught their pupils in the same way as the followers of Moses and Christ teach theirs—for they order them to accept everything on faith—I should not have given you a definition." On the reception of Moses by pagans, see J. G. Gager, Moses in Greco-Roman Paganism , Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series no. 16 (Nashville, Tenn., 1972).

[50] Galen, De optima secta 2.43-44 (Marquardt, ed., 1:84-85). On Galen's commentaries on the Aristotelian logical corpus, see Walzer, Galen , 78-79.

[51] See Porphyry's charge in Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 1.2. Generally, see S. Benko, "Pagan Criticism of Christianity during the First Two Centuries, A.D.," ANRW 2.23.2 (Berlin, 1980), 1055-1118.

arenas. This histrionic bravado, a Christian brand of demonstration, disturbed even the philosophical temper of Marcus Aurelius.^[52]

Certain Christians, eager for recognition outside of their own religious community, proposed a more intellectually defensible Christianity, but more often than not their attempts to respond to pagan critiques were regarded by their fellow believers as heretical.^[53] Others, such as Clement of Alexandria, proposed the use of philosophical dialectic as a means of differentiating proper from improper Christians.^[54]

Another educated pagan found absolutely nothing to commend in Christianity. Unlike Galen, whose rationalist outlook promised at least a degree of openmindedness, Celsus was a resolute traditionalist and apologist for the pagan heritage who based his arguments for polytheism on its greater antiquity and on the sanctity of customary usage. This determined foe of the Christian religion underscored what he regarded as the disturbingly unphilosophical modes of persuasion on which Christians relied to advance their faith:

In private houses also we see wool-workers, cobblers, laundry-workers, and the most illiterate and bucolic yokels, who would not dare to say anything at all in front of their elders and more intelligent masters. But whenever they get hold of children in private and some stupid women with them, they let out some astounding statements as, for example, that they must not pay any attention to their father and school-teachers, but must obey them; they [the Christians] say that these talk nonsense and have no understanding, and that in reality they neither know nor are able to do anything good, but are taken up with mere empty chatter. But they [the Christians] alone, they say, know the right way to live, and if the children would believe them, they would become happy and make their home happy as well. And if just as they [the Christians] are speaking they see one of the school-teachers coming, or some intel-

[52] Marcus Aurelius, Meditationes 11.3. Generally, see P. A. Brunt, "Marcus Aurelius and the Christians," in C. Deroux, ed., Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History (Brussels, 1979), 1:483-519.

[54] See the discussion of Clement of Alexandria's Stromateis in A. Le Boulluec, La notion d'hérésie dans la littérature grecque, I-III siècles (Paris, 1985), 2:276-88. See also E. F. Osborn, "Reason and the Rule of Faith in the Second Century AD," in R. Williams, ed., The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick (Cambridge, 1989), 40-61.

ligent person, or even the father himself, the more cautious of them flee in all directions; but the more reckless urge the children on to rebel. They whisper to them that in the presence of their father and their schoolmasters they [the Christians] do not feel able to explain anything to the children, since they do not want to have anything to do with the silly and obtuse teachers who are totally corrupted and far gone in wickedness and who inflict punishment on the children. But, if they like, they [the children] should leave father and their schoolmasters, and go along with the women and little children who are their playfellows to the wooldresser's shop, or to the cobblers or the washerwoman's shop, that they may learn perfection. And by saying this they [the Christians] persuade [the children].^[55]

Celsus characterized Christians as subversive infiltrators who targeted their efforts at women, children, and old men—people whose powers of judgment were customarily considered deficient—and who won them over by specious arguments and "old wives' tales."^[56] In his view, Christians had wrongfully bypassed the dominant authority of the adult males, in particular the patresfamilias , by appealing directly to the more gullible segments of Roman society. Christians employed this disgraceful tactic of taking advantage of the legally acknowledged weaknesses (to asthenes, levitas , and infirmitas ) of those compromised by their gender and age because, according to Celsus, they were unable to defend their views before cognoscenti Such as himself who possessed paideia , good education and moral character, and sound judgment. Since he could not otherwise come to grips with his elusive but seemingly successful adversaries, Celsus composed Alethes Logos (The true doctrine, c. 178-80), an exposé of Christian fraud using numerous established Jewish arguments, and in so doing threw down a gauntlet. The challenge waited three generations for the Christian intellectual Origen to take it up by composing his famous Contra Celsum to refute Celsus' denunciations seriatim .

One of Celsus' attacks turned on the plebeian character of Christian literature, unfavorably comparing the Altercatio Jasonis et Papisci —an early Christian anti-Jewish dialogue composed by Ariston of Pella following the Bar Kochba Revolt—with pagan literary dialogues.^[57] Celsus especially objected to its use of allegory to "explain away" difficult points.^[58]

[55] Origen, Contra Celsum 2.55 (H. Chadwick, ed., Contra Celsum [Cambridge, 1953], 165-66).

[56] See Origen, Contra Celsum 1.9.

[57] See Hoffmann, Dialog , 9-10.

[58] Origen, Contra Celsum 4.38, 4.52. On the pagan polemic against Christians' use of allegory on the Hebrew bible, see Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.19.4 and G. Binder, "Eine Polemik des Porphyrios gegen die allegorische Auslegung des Alten Testaments durch die Christen," ZPE 3 (1968): 81-95. For a fairly simpleminded, "do-it-yourself" handbook to Christian allegories, see A. Henrichs and E. M. Husselman, "Christian Allegorizations (P. Mich. Inv. 3718)," ZPE 3 (1968), 175-89.

Origen admitted Celsus' criticism of the "lowbrow" nature of the Altercatio , but argued that the work was directed at simple Christians to bolster their faith.^[59] To speak to the simplices , a sermo humilis was in order,^[60] though Origen himself was anything but a simple Christian.^[61]

Public Debate and Dispute Settlement Among Early Christians

In the mid-third century, Origen was among the foremost intellectual luminaries of the Greek east, held in the highest regard not only for his immense learning but also for his ascetic convictions and attainments.^[62] Deriving additional charismatic authority from his ministrations to the poor and visits to confessors in the prisons of Alexandria,^[63] this young hearer of Ammonius Saccas rapidly gained wide renown among Christians and non-Christians alike.^[64] Easily conversant and respected in both intellectual traditions, he "thought it right to examine both the opinions of the heretics, and also the claim that the philosophers make to speak concerning truth."^[65]

Origen conducted discussions and debates with an impressive cast of characters, many of whom wished to test () his knowledge of

[59] Origen, Contra Celsum 4.52. On the possible dependence of Origen on Galen, and of the two of them on Paul the Apostle, see R. M. Grant, "Paul, Galen and Origen," JTS n.s. 34 (1983), 533-36. On Origen's concern for the simplices , see, e.g., G. af Hällström, Fides simpliciorum according to Origen of Alexandria (Helsinki, 1984), esp. 23-32.

[60] The locus classicus for the notion of sermo humilis is E. Auerbach's Literary Language and its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages (London, 1965). See now a parallel discussion concerning the switch from a learned to a colloquial style of writing among Sung Confucianists in China, in D. K. Gardner, "Modes of Thinking and Modes of Discourse in the Sung: Some Thoughts on the Yü-lu ('Recorded Conversations') Texts," Journal of Asian Studies 50 (1991): 574-603.

[61] Origen could certainly speak the language of Aristotle and Chrysippus. On his use of Stoic logic, see L. Roberts, "Origen and Stoic Logic," TAPA 101 (1970), 433-44, and J. M. Rist, "The Importance of Stoic Logic in the Contra Celsum, " in H. J. Blumenthal and R. A. Markus, eds., Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought: Essays in Honour of A. H. Armstrong (London, 1971), 64-78.

[62] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.2.6-9, 6.3.9-13.

[63] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.3.3-4.

[64] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.3.1-3, 6.19.6. See Porphyry's unflattering remarks in Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.19.

[65] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.19.12 (Oulton, ed., 2:60-61).

logoi .^[66] Slightly before 215, he was politely summoned to an audience with the Roman governor of Arabia, who greatly desired to exchange words with him.^[67] His growing reputation caused Julia Mamaea to bring him from Palestinian Caesarea to her court in Antioch to make trial () of his abilities.^[68] Though not certain, it is quite likely that he also held discussions with Jews during his long stay in Palestine.^[69] The Alexandrian also debated with heterodox Christians, including followers of Valentinus:^[70] Candidus, a certain Bassus,^[71] and another Valentinian named Ambrose. This last, who later persuaded Origen to commit his views to writing, was converted after being refuted () by Origen in debate.^[72]

Origen did not limit his use of logoi to debates with religious outsiders, for a full roster of his discussions with other Christians has survived. These accounts are important in that they clearly document the use of public debate as a means for restoring social order and discipline within divided Christian communities.

Origen was especially active in Roman Arabia where, on numerous occasions, he participated in "town meetings" convened to resolve disputes among Christians.^[73] One such meeting came about after Beryllus, the bishop of Bostra in Arabia, uttered statements arguing that Christ did not exist before his incarnation, occasioning great offense among other Christians.^[74] Origen was given the first chance to enter into dialogue with Beryllus (). His

[66] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.18.2-4 (Oulton, ed., 2:54-55).

[67] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.19.15; see T. D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 83.

[68] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.21.3-4.

[69] On Origen's dealings with Jews and rabbis, see Origen, Contra Celsum 1.45, 1.55; and N. de Lange, Origen and the Jews: Studies in Jewish-Christian Relations in Third-Century Palestine (Cambridge, 1976), 89-102.

[70] On the way in which some of Origen's opponents managed to avoid direct debate with him simply. by rewriting his works and then disseminating their own versions, see Rufinus, De adulteratione librorum Origenous 7 (CCSL 20:11-12).

[71] The debate with Candidus is referred to in Jerome, Adversus Rufinum 2.19; the one with Bassus in Origen's Epistula ad Africanum in PG 11:49A.

[72] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.18.1 (Oulton, ed., 2:54-55): "Ambrose, who held the views of the heresy of Valentinus, was refuted by the truth as presented by Origen, and, as if his mind were illuminated by light, gave his adhesion to the true doctrine as taught by the church." Origen, according to Jerome, Ep . 92.4.1, wrote Libri in resurrectionis "quos scripsit ad Ambrosium dialecticum morem imitans disputandi, in quo sciscitatio est et responsio " (emphasis mine).

[73] On the established custom of inviting foreign arbitrators to settle disputes in and among the Greek city-states, see L. Robert, "Les juges étrangers dans la cité grecque," in his Opera Minora Selecta (Amsterdam, 1989), 5:137-54.

[74] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.33.2.

goal, according to Eusebius, was "to discover what were his opinions, and when he knew what it was that he asserted, he corrected what was unorthodox, and, persuading him by reasoning, established him in the truth as to the doctrine, and restored him to his former sound opinion."^[75]

The Caesarean Eusebius claimed to have seen the actual acta recording the discussions () between the two men.^[76] From these and other documents, Pamphilius of Caesarea and Eusebius together edited a volume of dialektoi Origenous , of which all but one have perished. Though Origen's debate with Beryllus is not extant, we possess unearthed papyri recording a similar encounter unattested in Eusebius' work.

Once more, the location was Roman Arabia. Around 245, a regional synod was convoked in response to a disturbance () caused by the controversial christological doctrine promoted by a local bishop named Heracleides.^[77] Heracleides' dissident theological stance rocked the community, threatening to introduce changes into the congregation's beloved and traditional eucharistic prayer, and brought about considerable social turmoil among the Christians.^[78]

Origen was once again called in. As arbitrator, he instituted an anakrisis , a cross-examination of the disputing parties aimed at establishing the facts of the case alluded to on the papyri.^[79] The preliminary and auxiliary nature of this procedure may explain why the exchanges were not recorded. Origen may also have judged it prudent to exclude from the written acta a negotiation held in private, behind stage as it were, so that during the preliminary meeting itself all sides could enjoy the widest latitude in explaining, discussing, and compromising without fear of public disgrace. Otherwise, existing differences might even become more entrenched as protagonists, equating the accommodation of opposing views with public defeat, hardened their positions with defiance.

Much more ceremonial in nature, the public discussions that took place before the assembled congregation comprised the official acta of

[75] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.33.2 (Oulton, ed., 2:86-87).

[76] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.33.3; also Jerome, De viris illustribus 66 (PL 23:705).

[77] Relevant text and discussion in J. Scherer, ed., Entretien d'Origène avec Héaclide , SC 67 (Paris, 1960); editio princeps in J. Scherer, ed., Entretien d'Origène avec Héraclide et les évêques ses collègues, sur te Père, le Fils, et l'âme , Publications de la Société Fouad I de Papyrologie, Textes et Documents 9 (Cairo, 1949). Some emendations are offered by R. Merkelbach in "Textkritische Bemerkungen zur 'Debatte des Origenes mit Herakleidas,'" ZPE 3 (1968): 192-96.

[78] Origen, Dialogus 4.17 (Scherer, ed., 62-63).

[79] The preliminary interrogation by a presiding magistrate is well-attested in archaic and classical Athens, Sparta, and Rome; see D. M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978), 239-42, and E. M. Carawan, "Erotesis : Interrogation in the Courts of Fourth-Century Athens," GRBS 24 (1983): 209-26, esp. 211-12n. 10.

the synod. The exchanges followed the model of an interview rather than that of an agonistic debate, and Origen, like the Socrates of Platonic dialogues, gently yet firmly pressed Heracleides to express and defend his own controversial views. The prevailing tone was that of a friendly conversation: the sincere goodwill demonstrated by Origen and his respondents recalls the intimate collegiality of Plutarch's dialogues. An instance of this bonhomie was Heracleides' behavior after he was maneuvered by Origen into saying that the Son was "different from the Father" and hence a second god, a claim that profoundly shocked his audience. Realizing that he had been neatly refuted, he courteously conceded defeat, agreed to never again raise the tricky theological question of christology, and subscribed to () Origen's preferred doctrinal formula before the assembled bishops and laity.^[80]

The next segment of the papyri describes a session, equally congenial, in which Origen responded to questions from others. The tenor was that of a revered teacher dispensing wisdom to respectful disciples. At the end of the session, these Christians pronounced their complete satisfaction with Origen's views and subscribed to his formulation just as Heracleides had earlier. The process of mending shattered solidarity continued. Origen called on the assembled congregation () to witness and act as guarantor of the outcome of these discussions.^[81] That Origen was successful in using the vehicle of a public debate to resolve a divisive religious conflict (which could not fail to have social ramifications as well) may be credited to his conciliatory posture and to the deferential attitudes of the other protagonists, who yielded to Origen's demonstration of the truth without intransigence.

Around 247, Origen once again played the key role at a local Christian synod, this one convened to examine the belief that the human soul dissipates at death and reconstitutes at the general resurrection, a view causing commotion within the Christian community. Origen again successfully employed the public debate as a forum for Christian dispute settlement:

When a synod of no small dimensions was then assembled together, Origen was again invited, and there opened a discussion in public () on the subject in question, with such power that he changed the opinions of those who had formerly been deluded.^[82]

[80] Origen, Dialogus 4.21 (Scherer, ed., 62-63).

[81] Origen, Dialogus 4.28-5.7 (Scherer, ed., 62-65).

[82] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.37.1 (Oulton, ed., 2:90-91). On Origen's views on the correction of errors in others, see Le Boulluec, La notion d'hérésie dans la littérature grecque , 2:535-38.

In his repeated attempts to reconcile divided Christian communities, Origen never took for granted an ideal, apostolic consensus omnium among Christians; instead, he saw unity as the fruit of constant vigilance. Refuting an accusation by Celsus, Origen confessed with refreshing candor that Christians had never been, even from the beginning, "of one mind." This admission, he said, should occasion no scandal, for "anyone who criticizes Christianity on account of the sects might also criticize the teaching of Socrates; for from his instruction many schools have come into being, whose adherents do not hold the same opinion."^[83] When Origen claimed for Christianity the name of philosophy, it was not just to garner prestige but to appropriate the indulgence accorded philosophical sects. Also, Origen wished to represent Christianity as another philosophical secta because his own circle operated in some respects as philosophical groups did. Origen's disciple Gregory Thaumaturgus lectured as a philosopher would, freely entertaining questions from his audience and debating with pagan intellectual agonistikos in an eristic fashion.^[84]

Broadly speaking, the influence of rational logoi and persuasion extended even to the conciliar proceedings of early Christians. Our discussion concerning Origen suggests that the position of third-century Christians as merely one religious and social group among many enabled relatively unauthoritarian and unregulated colloquia to be used successfully to air and settle internal differences.

This fundamental aspect of pre-Constantinian Christian debates is epitomized by an encounter between Dionysius of Alexandria (d. 264), Origen's pupil, and the Christians in the Arsinoite nome. While bishop of Alexandria, Dionysius received word of a spreading millenarian movement in the Fayum. Upon his arrival at the site of the disturbance, he made inquiries and discovered that the millenarian expectations of the local Christians were justified on the basis of the writings of a Bishop Nepos, whose work on the Revelation of John allegedly inspired wide-

[83] Origen, Contra Celsum 3.11 (Chadwick, ed., 134-35). Celsus' argument is as follows: "But since they have spread to become a multitude, they are divided and rent asunder, and each wants to have his own party . . ." (Contra Celsum 3.12; Chadwick, ed., 135). For Origen's analysis of Christian factionalism, see Le Boulluec, La notion d'hérésie dans la littérature grecque , esp. 2: 504-7.

spread eschatological hopes.^[85] Accordingly, Dionysius arranged for a public debate between himself and the local Christians, the account of which was given by Eusebius, who narrated it from Dionysius' perspective:

When I came to the nome of Arsinoë, where, as thou knowest, this doctrine had long been prevalent, so that schisms and defections of whole churches had taken place, I called together the presbyters and teachers of the brethren in the villages (there were present also such of the brethren as wished), and I urged them to hold the examination of the question publicly (). And when they brought me this book as some invincible weapon and rampart, I sat with them and for three successive days from morn till night attempted to correct what had been written.^[86]

The debate focused not on the merit of millenarian expectations, which had presumably been the prime cause of offense, but on the authorship of the Revelation of John.^[87] In other words, immediate social concerns were addressed in exegetical terms. Dionysius, using scholarly skills dearly attributable to his training by Origen, was able to convince the leaders of the local movement that the text in question was not written by the disciple John and therefore did not deserve the serious consideration the Fayumite Christians were giving it. Yet such an outcome was only possible because Dionysius' debaters abided by the rules of debate that he had set down. The bishop recalled:

On that occasion I conceived the greatest admiration for the brethren, their firmness, love of truth, facility in following an argument, and intelligence, as we propounded in order () and with forbearance () the questions (), the difficulties () raised and the points of agreement (); on the one hand refusing to cling obstinately () and at all costs (even though they were manifestly wrong) to opinions once held; and on the other hand not shirking the counter-arguments (), but as far as possible attempting to grapple with the questions in hand and master them. Nor, if convinced by reason, were we ashamed to change our opinions and give our assent; but conscientiously and unfeignedly and with hearts laid open to God we accepted whatever was established by the proofs and teachings of the holy Scriptures ().^[88]

[85] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 7.24.6. See now a discussion of this episode in D. M. Frankfurter, Elijah in Upper Egypt: The Apocalypse of Elijah and Early Egyptian Christianity , Studies in Antiquity and Christianity 7 (Minneapolis, 1993), ch. 10.

[86] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 7.24.6-7 (Oulton, ed., 2:194-95).

[87] On a fruitful sociological interpretation of early Christian millenarianism and the Book of Revelation, see Gager, Kingdom and Community , 20-65.

[88] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 7.24.8 (Oulton, ed., 2:194-95).

This ideal scenario for a debate lasting three successive days was sustained by a common trust in scriptural authorities, by mutual adherence to a code of civility, and by the forswearing of intransigence, so that points of contention could be addressed by questions and answers in an orderly fashion. Dionysius was rewarded for his patient, noncoercive approach to durable consensus with his debaters' open admiration and promise of cooperation:

In the end the leader and introducer of this teaching, Coracion, as he was called, in the hearing of all the brethren present, assented, and testified to us that he would no longer adhere to it, nor discourse upon it, nor mention nor teach it, since he had been sufficiently convinced by the contrary arguments. And as to the rest of the brethren, some rejoiced at the joint conference, and the mutual deference and unanimity which all displayed.^[89]

Aside from this happy ending, a suspiciously satisfactory closure to the story, we do not know whether Dionysius' exegetical debate was successful in quelling what appeared to be a widespread millenarian movement. Dionysius himself harbored enough residual concern to compose On Divine Promises , a work designed to counter Nepos' arguments once and for all, because

if he [Nepos] were present and putting forward his opinions merely in words, conversation, without writing, would be sufficient, persuading and instructing by question and answer () 'them that oppose themselves.' But when a book is published . . . then we are compelled to argue with Nepos as if he were present.^[90]

When it emerged that social and religious differences between Christians could be adequately addressed with a public debate based on the interpretation of sacred texts, the written word assumed greater importance. This common textual focus rendered the debates exercises in competitive scriptural exegesis, and as such they could be conducted on terms of parity, without any invocation of hierarchical authority or threats of compulsion.^[91]

Dionysius. was unable to attend the Council of Antioch in 264, convened to examine the teachings of Paul of Samosata, an influential

[89] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 7.24.9 (Oulton, ed., 2:194-97). On the significance of deference in a traditional society, see J. G. A. Pocock, "The Classical Theory of Deference," AHR 81 (1976), 516-23.

[90] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 7.24.5 (Oulton', ed., 2:192-93).

[91] On the sovereignty of early Christian congregations, see, e.g., C. Vogel, "Primalialité et synodalité dans l'église locale durant la periode anténicéenne," in M. Simon, ed., Aspects de l'orthodoxie: Structure et spiritualité (Paris, 1982), 53-66.

Christian and relative of Zenobia of Palmyra.^[92] According to Eusebius, Paul's theological position proposing the unity of God and the humanity of Christ had become cause for controversy.^[93] Prominent Christians, led by Firmilian of Caesarea, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Maximus of Bostra (an interlocutor in Origen's discussion with Heracleides), and others, set out in separate interviews to ascertain Paul's views and to persuade him of his error.^[94] The absent Dionysius articulated his own opinions in a writing that was read aloud in public, a practice foreshadowing subsequent Christian conciliar procedures (see ch. 7).

Yet despite the combined strength of the opposition, Paul was able to hold his own in the debates until Malchion, a priest and head of the paideuterion , the civic school of rhetoric, of Antioch, intervened and succeeded in formally securing Paul's defeat.^[95] It is not easy to discover from Eusebius' very abbreviated account how Malchion was able to accomplish what numerous prominent bishops had failed to do. The explanation for Malchion's success has traditionally been sought in the genitive absolute phrase episemeioumenon tachugraphon , which suggests that Malchion effected Paul's upset with the help of the stenographers he brought in to record the debate. This reading of the passage has recently been disputed by Marcel Richard, whose arguments remain inconclusive.^[96] He points out that the traditional supposition leaves unaddressed the question of how the incorporation of stenographers into the debate turned the table in Malchion's favor, and he further argues that notarii in the third century scarcely enjoyed the prominence they were to have in later centuries.^[97] Yet, at a minimum, a staff of shorthand writers implied ecclesiastical wealth, rich private patronage, or the interested support of secular elites. I suggest that the very introduction of stenographers was itself decisive, for they kept verbatim records with which debaters were able to point out their opponents' inconsistencies, and without which an effective elenchos or refutation would have been much more difficult to secure. In a fragment from an eleventh-century manu-

[92] See F. G. B. Millar, "Paul of Samosata, Zenobia and Aurelian: The Church, Local Culture and Political Allegiance in Third-century Syria," JRS 61 (1971), 1-17.

[93] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 7.27.1.

[94] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 7.28.1-2. Compare this procedure with the informal interviews of Christian leaders with Bishop Beryllus in Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 6.33.2.

[95] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 7.29.2. See also Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium 2.8 (PG 83:396B).'

[96] The traditional interpretation has been challenged by M. Richard, "Malchion et Paul de Samosate: Le témoignage d'Eusèbe de Césarée," Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 35 (1959): 325-38; he offers a different reading of the passage based on a dose study of the key terms used by Eusebius.

[97] Richard, "Malchion et Paul de Samosate," 328-29.

script that purports to refer to the exchanges between Paul and Malchion, Malchion recalled a previous statement by Paul in building his own argument, a tactic most effective when used in concert with "undeniable" records of the debate.^[98]

In Search of Consensus in Late Antiquity

Most scholars agree that the third-century anarchy was a turning point in Graeco-Roman society and culture. The crises, at once military, economic, and political—perhaps even spiritual—demonstrated the fragility of order and of its guarantor, secure political authority. They ushered in new adaptive responses, particularly in terms of the ideological formulations and representations of power, as the classical Mediterranean. model of competitive parity yielded to a more over fly pyramidal and authoritarian pattern of social relationship.^[99] Understandably, established modes of social interaction and competition between and within groups were also altered to reflect this broader realignment. Thus, a growing reliance on textual authority in debates was unexceptional at a time when traditional authority held fast, especially in religious and philosophical circles.^[100]

One concrete outcome of these changes was the increasingly negative reception of public debate as a form of social competition and dispute settlement. The focus of my study is to analyze this phenomenon historically and critically, without reference to a spirit of irrationalism that is at once unhelpfully tautological and mystifying. In this respect, my approach is informed by works of anthropologists and sociologists, notably Mary Douglas, whose labors to create understanding from observed social forms continually remind us that the ways in which communities adjudicate disputes correspond to their notions of authority and cultural preferences. Social conflicts, of which public debate is but one possible manifestation, and how people construe and approach them, lay bare implicit assumptions about power and social structures.^[101] By

[98] See H. de Riedmatten, Les actes du procès de Paul de Samosate: Étude sur la christologie du III , au IV siècle (Fribourg, 1952), 157.

[99] See P. R. L. Brown, The Making of Late Antiquity (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 27-53.

[100] See, e.g., A. H. Armstrong, "Pagan and Christian Traditionalism in the First Three Centuries, A.D.," SP 15 (1984), 414-31.

[101] Because it concerns the question of why certain people or groups perceived danger in particular settings when others did not, a theoretical analysis of the selective openness to risk is relevant here. For an anthropological approach to group culture and risk, see the provocative studies in M. Douglas and A. Wildavsky, eds., Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley, 1982); and M. Douglas, Risk Acceptability according to the Social Sciences (New York, 1985).

investigating late antique constructions of and responses to public debate, we stand to gain a richer understanding of the concrete dynamics involved in what modem scholars characterize as a phenomenon of growing traditionalism.

Many communities had found that their liminal social status guaranteed them freedom from intervention by outsiders, especially those on high, while the nature of some groups had disinclined the authorities to expect concord. These two considerations ensured that the social spaces occupied by philosophical and religious groups in the Roman world remained pockets of relative freedom, where disputes were allowed to unfold and resolve themselves in accordance with unsupervised local initiatives. Philosophers, especially those from different schools, were expected to dispute among themselves; thus little effort had been made to bring an end to philosophical dissension.^[102] While they at times embarrassed the educated and inspired the satirist's wit, the philosophers' disagreements had no bearing on the status of the rulers, who could therefore acquiesce to their disarray.

When not subject to episodic local persecutions, Christians initially also benefited from the autonomy guaranteed by the rulers' neglect. Their disputes with Jews excited little external concern until they became riotous and violent. Although Christian communities were beset with factional disputes from the beginning, no Roman emperor intervened in their affairs in a meaningful way before Constantine. Earlier, the pagan Aurelian was said to have arbitrated a dispute between Christians in Antioch (c. 272-75), but he did so only in a rescript to a petition and because the question concerned the rightful possession of property. Even the imperious Aurelian acted more in the role of iudex than of autokrator .^[103]

Constantine's engagement with Christians and their affairs shifted the delicate balance in significant ways. Christians were no longer marginal: much more property and wealth were at stake once Constantine bestowed his munificence on his new brethren; much more hinged on

[102] A notable counterexample is the unsuccessful attempt of a Roman magistrate to bring together the different philosophical schools in Athens. The episode is narrated in Cicero, De legibus 1.20.53: "Cum pro consule ex praetura in Graeciam venisset essetque Athenis, philosophos, qui turn erant, in locum unum convocasse ipsisque magno opere auctorem fuisse, ut aliquando controversiarum aliquem facerent modum; quodsi essent eo animo, ut nollent aetatem in litibus conterere, posse rem convenire; et simul operam suam illis esse pollicitum, si posset inter eos aliquid convenire."

[103] Eusebius, Hist. eccl . 7.30.18-19.

the rightful possession of the nomen Christianum , now that the name conferred privileges and status. Who would be entitled to priestly exemption from civic liturgies? Which factions would be endowed with imperial basilicas? These became pressing questions. There were also the beginnings of a demographic shift as Christians became more numerous and more socially prominent, swelling the imperial service and the new Constantinopolitan senate. In the post-Constantinian age, Christians picked up the pace of their march from social marginality toward the center of social and political power; as a result, rulers who earlier granted Christians freedom from intervention could no longer remain so indulgently detached.

The crises of the third century, the many decades of fratricidal wars for the imperial purple that brought on economic collapse and barbarian inroads, had reinforced in the minds of late Roman elites the supreme importance of consensus among themselves and with others.^[104] The rhetoric of concord assumed greater weight as social reality became increasingly characterized by fragmentation, conflict, and anarchy. Disagreements among their subjects that had been tolerable, even amusing, when the burdens of empire were lighter became thorns in the side of soldier-emperors who were not (though some tried to be) the civiles principes of the early empire. Order was bound to become an obsessive goal for those attempting to tame a disorderly world, whether the pagan Diocletian or the Christian Constantine. In a law that would have been unthinkable during the principate, Constantine exhorted jurists, known for and distinguished by their professional disagreements, to end their interminable squabbles over the interpretation of legal minutiae so as not to undermine the authority of Roman law.^[105]

A pronounced and energetic imperial advocacy for consensus in society could not fail to generate ripples that would reach, with varying strength and effect, the other strata of society. Such advocacy certainly had an impact on the development of imperial Christianity, including some immediate consequences that were not intended. The direct imposition of imperial demands for consensus was perhaps less important than the anticipation of imperial preferences, which often caused local leaders to impose unity on "their" people in the hope of courting imperial favor with greater success. This consideration was all the more

[104] On the public representations of this imperial ideology, see H.-P. L'Orange, Art Forms and Civic Life in the Late Roman Empire (Princeton, N.J., 1965), 69-125.

[105] Codex Theod . 1.4.1. On juristic rivalries during the principate, see R. A. Bauman, Lawyers and Politics in the Early Roman Empire: A Study of Relations between the Roman Jurists and the Emperors from Augustus to Hadrian (Munich, 1989), esp. 44-49.

crucial at a time of change, uncertainty, and experimentation. At an unsettling time when untraditional channels of patronage and power were thrown open to competing groups, the pressing question became: To which of the competing voices, to which hierarchizing principles, and to what types of personages should the celsae potestates pay heed? Out of the din generated by this intense competition for recognition and scarce resources, the voice that represented the unanimous concord of a populus was the one most likely to be heard.^[106] Even the elder Symmachus, a powerful senator, thought that the opinion of the Roman curia would gain a fairer hearing from an imperial court not always sympathetic to Roman senatorial sentiments if it was offered as a consensual decision of the entire body.^[107] The powerful force of unanimous advice was also recognized by nearly contemporary Chinese emperors, who heeded the axiom, "A hereditary ruler does not neglect precedents and the unanimous recommendations of officials."^[108]

The collective voice of a people came to be regarded as an expression of authoritative opinion, even of truth, in late antiquity.^[109] The corollary to this positive reception of vocal consensus was that demands made with discordant voices were likely to be passed over. According to the Petitiones Arianorum , Constantine's arrival at Alexandria (a visit I do not find attested elsewhere) was greeted by the customary official delegation followed by a crowd bearing requests and petitions. Among the petition-bearers were Arian Christians wishing to bring before the emperor accusations against Athanasius of Alexandria. They proceeded to shout their demands, apparently without prior coordination, and Constantine dismissed their request, convinced that "justice will not proceed from a multitudinous mob and from a Babel of sounds."^[110]

Constantine's reaction is not surprising, for the emperor was accustomed to chants by choruses of trained voices—no babel would emanate

[106] See P. R. L. Brown, "Poverty and Power," in his Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire (Madison, Wisc., 1992), 71-117.

[107] See Symmachus, Relatio 3.2 (R. H. Barrow, ed., Prefect and Emperor: The Relationes of Symmachus, A.D. 384 [Oxford, 1973], 34-35): "No disagreement of purpose is involved in this matter; for men no longer believe that they gain greater support among court officials if there is a difference of opinion about the matter of a petition (nulla est hic dissensio voluntatum, quia iam credere homines desierunt, aulicorum se studio praestare, si discrepent)."

[108] A Han dynasty court memorial of 31 C.E. , quoted in Hans Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times (Cambridge, 1980), 144.

[109] K. Oehler, "Der Consensus Omnium als Kriterium der Wahrheit in der antiken Philosophie und der Patristik: Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Begriffs der allgemeinen Meinung," Antike und Abendland 10 (1961): 103-30.

[110] Athanasius, Petitiones Arianorum (PG 26:820).

from a self-respecting late Roman theater. The voces of assembled citizens rising up from the theaters and hippodromes long remained one of the most compelling forces countervailing the authority of late Roman emperors. The effect of this "popular" expression was enhanced when organized into metrical chants, which enabled many voices to coalesce into a single vox populi.^[111] It was their control over this singular voice that entitled local notables to demand consideration from emperors. Yet this sociopolitical formula, featuring civic unity as a currency of negotiations between imperial and local elites, required that notables for their part vouchsafe in their cities a semblance of social order and deference to authority.^[112]

Before long, the role of consensus became important to Christians who wished their voices heard. The establishment of Christian culture within the context of a supportive secular empire was a complex transformation that entailed forging new bonds between the imperial center and the local city, at the head of which now stood the bishop.^[113] Late antique bishops, increasingly drawn from the decurionate and curial classes, became what Edward Shils calls macrosocial elites: people who by virtue of their grooming, training in politics, and relation to power possessed a keen awareness of the systemic ramifications of consensus and dissensus.^[114] They well understood that the viability of the alliance between center and periphery rested precariously on the stability of two main fronts: the strength of local support for the bishop, and the reliability of imperial patronage.

To cement such a relationship, it was first necessary to forge local consensus, which in turn entailed the quelling of dissensus.^[115] Diffused discussions and disputing, with individuals applying their powers of persuasion in a freewheeling way, were potentially dire threats to the shaky bond between center and periphery. The fluid manner in which

[111] On the important theme of civic acclamations, see A. T. Klausner, "Akklamation," RAC 1:216-33, and C. Roueché, "Acclamations in the Later Roman Empire: New Evidence from Aphrodisias," JRS 74 (1984): 181-99.

[112] See A. R. R. Sheppard, "Homonoia in the Greek Cities of the Roman Empire," Ancient Society 15/17 (1984/86), 229-52, and J. Colin, Les villes libres de l'orient gréco-romain et l'envoi au supplice par acclamations populaires , Collection Latomus 82 (Brussels, 1965), esp. 109-52.

[113] See H. Chadwick, "The Role of the Christian Bishop in Ancient Society," in Protocol of the 35th Colloquy , Center for Hermeneutical Studies (Berkeley, Calif., 1980), 1-14, and the subsequent comments and discussions; G. W. Bowersock, "From Emperor to Bishop: The Self-Conscious Transformation of Political Power in the Fourth Century A.D.," CPhil 81 (1986): 298-307; and P. Brown, Power and Persuasion , 71-117.

[114] E. Shils, Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology (Chicago, 1975), 169-70.

[115] Shils, Center and Periphery , 164-81.

pagans, Jews, and Christians debated "in the council-Chambers of Greek cities, in the market-places of North African villages, and in thousands of humble homes"^[116] became less desirable with the rise of new interest groups who preferred a via media —characterized by hierarchical order and firm group boundaries—to a more amorphous and unruly via universalis .

Though religious disputing was central to a proselytizing faith such as Christianity in the period of its early diffusion, in late antiquity the missionary religion par excellence was Manichaeism. The fear that local Christians might be lured into dispute by Manichaeans and then persuaded to "defect" long remained in certain regions of the empire.

The fear of influence through persuasion greatly increased at the highest end of the social scale, as when the imperial court itself became a cockpit for ecclesiastical struggles. Emperors and other imperial personages might be swayed by sophistic arguments to forsake one ecclesiastical party for another, with dire consequences for the spurned suitors. Sozomen alleged a direct appeal by Eunomius of Cappadocia, of whom more will be said in Chapter 4, to Theodosius I that was thwarted by Empress Flacilla only at the last moment. Mid-fifth century Constantinopolitans remembered this incident with a shudder: it was most unsettling to ponder how much still hung on a thread in the late fourth century, during the reign of that champion of orthodoxy, Theodosius I.^[117]

The political alliance between center and periphery thus sported two Achilles' heels. These vulnerabilities threatened both aspiring and established Christian leaders of favored status while presenting opportunities for their challengers to exploit. The practice of disputing among Christians was an obvious concern for those who prized hierarchical authority and their position at the apex of a stable community. No amount of wishful thinking could make good the embarrassment engendered by open Christian controversies, which became, to the chagrin of many Christians, prime satirical fodder. On the comic stage, publicly brawling Christian prelates became stock figures, joining a cast of disreputable characters that included prostitutes.^[118] A modem scholar of early Byzantine theater goes so far as to name this new subgenre "der christologischer Mimus. "^[119]

[116] Dodds, Pagan and Christian , 103.

[117] Sozomen, Hist. eccl . 4.18.

[118] See Gregory of Nazianzus, Or . 2 (PG 35:489B).

[119] See G. J. Theocharidis, Beiträge zur Geschichte des byzantinischen Profantheaters im IV. und V. Jahrhundert, hauptsächlich auf Grund der Predigten des Johannes Chrysostomos Patriarchen von Konstantinopel (Thessaloniki, 1940), 93-102.

The public perception of widespread disputing, along with Christian rioting that at times turned murderous, rendered the myth of Christian solidarity meaningless. Worse, this situation arose in a veritable market economy of opinions, in which the notion of deference—that is, the willingness of the hurniliores to give their assent to the guidance of the honestiores , who supposedly possessed better moral judgment—was irretrievably lost. Once deference, long considered a "voluntary" and "natural" state of affairs, had vanished among proliferating claims to knowledge and authority, it usually could not be regained by compulsion, which resulted only in a state of enslavement.^[120] The "superior" Christian ethos of simplicity was mobilized, I suggest, as a means of counterbalancing this eroded sense of deference. Though both deference and simplicity contribute to a successful hierarchical ordering of society, the difference between them is great: deference is an unspoken rule of conduct enmeshed in a complex system of social exchange, whereas simplicity is a vocal ideology promoted by interested parties to mimic the former. The distinction is not trivial. Origen saw simplicity as a quality natural to some Christians, but later Christians would plead that other Christians, even if they did not consider themselves to be such, should nevertheless become simplices .

An intensified advocacy for apophatic simplicity as a paradigmatic virtue was but one of many results of this confluence of competing interests. Many individuals and groups sought to domesticate the perceived threat of dissensus in public disputing, choosing from various ideological strategies and cultural values to mobilize hierarchical forms of authority against a culture that validated individualistic claims and rational argumentation. This complex web, within which the classical heritage was slowly transformed into a Byzantine matrix during late antiquity, is one I propose to unravel, one strand at a time, in the remaining chapters of this book.

[120] "Deference is expected to be spontaneously exhibited rather than enforced," according to Pocock, "The Classical Theory of Deference," 516.