C—
Primary Versus Secondary Values

To avoid the problems posed by cases in which a primary good proves to be one of relatively low priority for some of the perspectives involved, it is helpful to supplement the distinction between primary and secondary goods with that between primary and secondary values.^[23] Primary values are those that rank the highest within a particular perspective, whereas secondary values are those that rank lower within that same perspective. Now, where primary goods and primary values tend to converge, there is a very strong case for the priority of primary goods. Moreover, whereas this is not logically required, it stands to reason that the two should often overlap. Thus, it would hardly be surprising if all the perspectives involved considered freedom from hunger and freedom from torture as goods, and if most of those perspectives considered these goods to be among their most highly valued ones. Consequently, if a primary good is involved and if it counts as a primary value for a vast majority of the perspectives involved, the adjudicator should be entitled to adopt the presumption that the primary good in question is entitled to priority.

This last presumption should be rebuttable, but only on a showing that, under the particular circumstances involved, giving priority to the primary

[23] This distinction is also made by John Kekes (1993, 18-19), but I do not follow his definition, which comes close to equating primary values with what I have described as primary goods.

good involved would only marginally advance the objectives of those perspectives for which that good represents a primary value while disproportionately disadvantaging those other perspectives that view pursuit of that good as a secondary value. Take, for example, the issue of whether euthanasia ought to be legally permissible in a polity in which the protection and preservation of life is a primary good and a primary value for most but not all existing perspectives. In this case, there ought to be a presumption against the legality of euthanasia. But suppose further that the proponents of euthanasia specify that they only support it in cases in which responsible adults in the possession of their full mental capacities freely choose it for quality-of-life reasons, and that they believe euthanasia to be inextricably linked to the primary value of individual control over his or her destiny. Moreover, a reversal of perspectives would not settle this issue, for it seems safe to anticipate that opponents of euthanasia would be as intensely committed to its prohibition as would proponents of its legalization. Proponents may further argue, however, that whereas prohibition of euthanasia would deprive them of something essential from the standpoint of their own conception of the good, legalizing euthanasia would by no means have a like impact on their opponents. Indeed, the opponents may find euthanasia profoundly ethically repulsive, but they would remain free to rule it out for themselves and to seek to persuade others to do likewise. Accordingly, proponents of euthanasia could plausibly argue that the harm to them following from its prohibition would be much greater than that to its opponents in case of legalization.^[24]

This last argument may seem very similar to the liberal argument made by John Stuart Mill that society has no business regulating the individual's purely self-regarding acts (1859, 73-74). In the context of comprehensive pluralism, however, the Millian distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts is generally considered to be untenable. This is consistent with the view that perspectives are fluid, open to external influences, anti susceptible to internal transformations and that partial selves and elusive others are in a constant state of dynamic interaction. Accordingly, so long as any intracommunal practice is not devoid of any conceivable intercommunal consequence, it may not be deemed self-regarding. Viewed in this light, legalizing euthanasia is certainly likely to have repercussions on the perspectives of its opponents and on the membership of opponent groups. That does not mean that communities that oppose euthanasia should be granted a veto over the decision of other communities within the

[24] See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health (1990), at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the state's "general interest in life" is outweighed by a person's "particularized and intense interest in self-determination" in determining whether or not to continue receiving life support).

same polity to legitimate euthanasia for their own members, but comprehensive pluralism requires that this conflict be settled on the basis of something beyond the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts.